FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AT HELSINKI (SALT V)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-533-4-2-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 12, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-533-4-2-3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIIL. 6s- 1~- 516
National Security Decision Memorandum 127
TO: The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Further Instructions for the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT V)
The President has reviewed the issues raised by the Delegation and
discussed by the Verification Panel and has made the following decisions:
1. The U. S. proposal in the 27 July draft agreement as well as
the fallback position authorized in NSDM 117 remain the preferred U. S.
position on Alilvi ii.mitations - i n U. S. Delegation shoui-? not introduce
a proposai .zur zero-level ABM deployments nor should the Delegation
pursue the issue further in this phase of the negotiations. A ban on all
ABM- deployments remains an ultimate U.S. objective and will be a
subject for negotiations after we have reached an agreement on defensive
limitations and an interim agreement on offensive limitations. The Soviet
delegation should be informed privately of this position.
2. The Chairman of the Delegation is directed to provide the following
interpretations 'of the freedom of choice between the ABM alternatives in
paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the 27 July draft agreement: First, the U. S.
and the U.S.S.R. must indicate clearly their- choice.of an ABM deployment
before the negotiations on ABM systems are completed or an agreement
is initialled. When itis an appropriate time for selection, the Soviet
Delegation should be informed that the U. S. choice would be a deployment
at ICBM fields. Second, there should be an understanding that neither
country would have the right to change its deployment except by mutual
agreement.
MORI PER
C05447203
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-533-4-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-533-4-2-3
TOP SECRET/NODIS/SALT
3. The agreement should. contain a provision whereby neither side
shall deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor
missilesi. ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of
these components. (This provision, along with that in the next paragraph,
should not prohibit the development and testing of future ABM components
in a fixed, land-based. mode.)
4. The agreement should contain a provision whereby neither party
shall develop, produce, test, or deploy: (a) sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based ABM launchers, ABM missiles, or ABM
radars; (b) ABM components other than ABM interceptor missiles or ABM
.radars to perform the functions of these components.
5. In presenting this position, the Delegation should not invite a
detailed negotiation or discussion of future ABM systems. Our objective
is to reach agreement on the broad principle that the agreement should
not be interpreted in such a way that either side could circumvent its
provisions through future ABM systems or components. We intend to
han lc any problems that may arise through the Joint Coxalx xi',ld the
formal review proccdtres.
_ _6. For the information of the Delegation, the provisions in paragraph
4 above are not intended to require either country to destroy existing de-
ployed non-radar sensors or smiliar future ones. Rather, the provisions
are intended to prohibit ABM sensors. If the issue is raised by the Soviets,
the Delegation should seek guidance from Washington.
7. At some early time at the discretion of the Chairman of the
Delegation it should be made clear that the U. S. interprets the spirit of
the defensive limitations agreement -- i.e., J.ts stringent limits on ABM
systems, and particularly the complete ban on launchers with a rapid
reload capability -- to impose a'ban on the development, testing, production,
or deployment of ABM interceptor missiles having more than one warhead
on each missile,
TOP SECRET) NODIS/SALT
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-533-4-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-533-4-2-3
TOP SI::CItET/I\TODIS/SALT
8. The need for avoiding leaks is particularly compelling during
this sensitive stage of the negotiations. The President's directive of
October 31, 1969, entitled, "Avoidance of Leaks on SALT, " is reaffirmed.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Senior Members, U. S. Delegation to
the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
TOP SECR.LT/NODIS/,SALT
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-533-4-2-3