THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE SETTLEMENT PACKAGE--"COULD THE GV N ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE IN-PLACE"?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-505-1-5-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 16, 1972
• Content Type: CABLE

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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-1-5-4
162,355Z O CT 72
T SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WHP0066
FROM: GEN HAIG THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: WINSTON LORD FOR. MR. KISSINGER
TOHAK 007
OCTOBER 160 1972-
TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: 'GENERAL, HAIG
MORI PER
C05148091
FOLLOWING IS A MEMORANDUM FROM. GEORGE CARVER CONCERNING SECURITY
ASPECTS:
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR
SUBJECT:
HENRY A. KISSINGER..
THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE SETTLEMENT PACKAGE--
"COULD.THE GV N ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE IN-PLACE"?
1. THE CRITICAL'. AMBIGUITY.. THE SECURITY RAMIFICATIONS OF A
CEASE-FIRE "IN PLACE"-- AND A REASONABLE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER THE GVN COULD, OR WOULD, ACCEPT SUCH A CEASE-FIRE --HINGE
VERY MUCH ON THE OPERATIVE DEFINITION OF "IN PLACE." IN SHORT, WHOSE
MAPS ARE. USED--HANOI'S, THE GVN'S OR EVEN OURS?
2. CURRENT ENEMY DEPLOYMENTS. AT THIS WRITING, ENEMY FORCES
THROUGHOUT MILITARY REGIONS (MRS) 1 AND 2 REMAIN BASICALLY DEPLOYED
IN THE POSITIONS THEY HAVE HELD FOR THE PAST MONTH OR SO. HEAVY
CONCENTRATIONS OF COMMUNIST UNITS ARE NOW LOCATED IN QUANG TRI
PROVINCE, WEST OF HUE, SOUTHWEST OF DANANG, WEST OF TAM KY9 AND
IN THE SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI-NORTHERN BINH DINH AREAS. B-3 FRONT
ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN AND ARE SPREAD THROUGHOUT KONTUM AND
PLEIKU PROVINCES. MRS 3 AND 4 HAVE SEEN THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
REDEPLOYMENTS IN THE PAST WEEK WITH THE ENEMY INCHING CLOSER TO SAIGON
THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE SPRING OF 1968. SOME 12 TO 14 BATTALIONS
HAVE MOVED SOUTHWARD TO POSITIONS NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF THE CITY
WHILE TWO REGIMENTS (ONE INFANTRY AND ONE ARTILLERY) REMAIN TO THE
EAST ON PHUOC TUY AND LONG KHANH. ADDITIONALLY, IN MR 4 THREE
REGIMENTS HAVE DEPLOYED EAST AND NORTHEAST OUT OF BASE AREA 470 IN
WESTERN DINH TRUONG PROVINCE TO POSITIONS THREATENING STRATEGIC
ROUTE 4 AS WELL AS CAI LAY AND MY THO. THE MOVEMENT OF A REGIMENT
FROM KIEN HOA TO CENTRAL DINH TUONG FURTHER ADDS TO THE BUILDUP SOUTH
OF SAIGON. ' TO THE SOUTH, THREE REGIMENTS REMAIN CONCENTRATED IN
CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE EAST OF THE U MINH FOREST. (SEE THE ATTACHED
SKETCH MAPS FOR. THE FOUR MRS.) (NOT SENT)
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-1-5-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-1-5-4
w
3. THE PATTERN OF CURRENT ACTIVITY. PRESENT ENEMY FORCE
.'DEPLOYMENTS WOULD SUPPORT A COMMUNIST CLAIM TO DE FACTO CONTROL
OVER CONSIDERABLE UNPOPULATED TERRITORY IN WESTERN MRS 1 AND 2, PLUS
A MORE ARGUABLE CLAIM TO ENCLAVES IN THE POPULATED LOWLANDS OF SOUTHERN
MR 1 AND NORTHERN MR2. IN MRS 3 AND 4, THE PICTURE IS CHANGING
ALMOST DAILY. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MOVED SIGNIFICANT FORCES OUT OF
RELATIVELY ISOLATED BORDER SANCTUARIES AMD/OR BASE AREAS AND COMMITTED
THEM TO ACTION IN RELATIVELY CLOSE PROXIMITY TO URBAN POPULATION CONCEN~
TRATIONS. THESE MOST RECENT MOVES, COUPLED WITH PREVIOUS ENEMY
DEPLOYMENTS, IN MRS 3 AND 4, COULD EASILY BE PRESENTED AS A LOOSE
ENCIRCLEMENT OF SAIGON. INDEED, ALITERALLY CONSTRUED CURRENT-
SITUATION "FREEZE" COULD BE DEPICTED AS ENTAILING A LOOSE COMMUNIST
ENCIRCLEMENT OF SAIGON WITH THE GVN'S CAPITAL TECHNICALLY DESCRIBABLE--
AT THIS WRITING--AS AN ENCLAVE ISLAND MORE OR LESS SURROUNDED
BY "PRG" TERRITORY. IN TERMS OF REAL POLITICAL CONTROL SUCH A
DEPICTION MIGHT BE ARRANT NONSENSE--AND THE GVN WOULD CERTAINLY
INSIST THAT IT WAS--BUT IF ONE TECHNICALLY FREEZES "PRESENCE,"
NARROWLY DEFINED, THERE IS A CURRENT COMMUNIST- "PRESENCE" ON
AT LEAST THREE SIDES OF THE CAPITAL, WITH SOME ENEMY UNITS LOCATED
LESS THAN TWENTY-ODD MILES FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.
FURTHERMORE THE CURRENT LOCATION OF COMMUNIST UNITS PUT THE
ENEMY IN AN AT LEAST TEMPORARY POSITION TO HARASS THE MAJOR LINES
OF COMMUNICATIONS (BOTH ROAD AND 'WATERWAY) TO AND FROM THE CAPITAL,
AND IN A 'POSITION TO LAUNCH SHELLING.AND SAPPER ATTACKS IN AND NEAR
THE CITY. ALSO, COMMUNIST .UNITS ARE NOW IN POSITIONS FROM WHICH
(UNTIL DRIVEN OUT) THEY COULD THREATEN SAIGON'S LIFELINE TO THE MEKONG
DELTA RICE BOWL BY HARASSING-ROUTE 4 AND ITS PARALLEL WATERWAYS
THROUGH DINH TUONG AND'LONG AN.
4. POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPACT. A FREEZE-TYPE CEASEFIRE
AT THIS MOMENT, IN SHORT, WOULD GIVE THE COMMUNISTS AT LEAST
END PAGE ONE
- No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-1-5-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-1-5-4
4p w
SOME BASIS FOR CLAIMING PRESENCE IN,, HENCE "CONTROL"OVER, ROUGHLY
THREE QUARTERS OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE, MUCH OF THE UNINHABITED
TERRITORY OF WESTERN MR It THE WESTERN PARTS OF KONTUM AND PLEIKU.
PROVINCES. IN MR2, THE NORTHERN HALF OF BINH LONG PROVINCE IN MR 3t
A PORTION .OF DINH TUONG PROVINCE IN MR 4 AND CERTAIN ENCLAVES IN
THE LOWER DELTA (PARTICULARLY IN CHOUNG THIEN PROVINCE AND THE
U MINH FOREST AREA). IN ADDITION, HANOI WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE A
STRONG PITCH FOR "CONTRO"L" OVER A NUMBER OF "LEOPARD SPOTS" IN THE
POPULATED COASTAL LOWLANDS OF SOUTHERN .MR 1 AND NORTHERN MR 2.
FINALLY, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE RATHER SWEEPING
DEMANDS FOR ACKNOWLEDGING ,THEIR "CONTROL" OF KEY POPULATED AREAS
NEAR SAIGON.
5. HANOI'S' ACTUAL-DEMANDS WILL 'BE FUTHER SHAPED BY THE
BATTLEFIELD POSITION ON THE DAY THEY ARE MADE. EVEN IF WE DID NOT
HAVE A WEALTH OF EVIDENCE. TO THIS EFFECT (AND WE DO) t THE CURRENT
PATTERN OF OBSERVED COMMUNIST 'ACTIVITY WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT .AT
LEAST ONE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THE COMMUNISTS' OCTOBER HIGH POINT
IS TO STAKE" SOME FORK OF SUPPORTABLE CLAIM (HOWEVER TENUOUS) TO
AS MUCH POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT TERRITORY AS POSSIBLE AGAINST THE
CONTINGENCY. OF AN IN-PLACE CEASE-FIRE.
6. THE GVN MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE AND GRUDGINGLY WILLING
TO LIVE WITH THE DE FACTO DEPLOYMENT SITUATION JUST AFTER THE RECAPTURE
OF QUANG'TRI AS THE BASIS FOR A POSSIBLE IN-PLACE -CEASE--FIRE.
THIEU AND HIS SENIOR ADVISORS, HOWEVER, WOULD NEVER ACQUIESCE
IN A FREEZE BASED LTTERALLY ON "PRESENT"POSITIONS. INSTEAD -:. WHEN
OR IF THIS TOPIC WAS BROACHED THIEU AND HIS TOP, AIDS. WOULD ARGUE
ADAMANTLY THAT IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO FREEZE DURING THE RISING CURVE
OF AN INITIATED ENEMY HIGH POINT. THIEU WOULD FURTHER CONTEND (NOT
WITHOUT REASON) THAT ANY SUCH HIGH POINT SURGE WOULD BE BOUND TO
CREST AND RECEDE WITHIN "A FEW WEEKS" AND THAT THE OPTIMUM
MOMENT FOR TABLING AN IN-PLACE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL WOULD BE ON THE
DOWN CURVE OF THE COMMUNISTS' SHORT TERM ACTIVITY CYCLE, I.E.,
AS COMMUNIST FORCES WERE WITHDRAWING TO THEIR BASE AREAS. SHOULD
THE U.S. TRY TO INSIST ON TABLING SUCH AN OFFER "NOW," OUR RELATIONS
WITH THIEU WOULD SWIFTLY BECOME SEVERELY STRAINED.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-1-5-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-1-5-4
V IV
IN VIETNAM--AND MORE SO THAN MANY-THE NET POLITICAL IMPACT OF
A CEASE-FIRE SITUATION CANNOT BE REDUCED TO LINES ON A MAP OR NUMBERS
T. THE LARGER PERSPECTIVE. AS WITH MOST POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS
OF LOCAL OBSERVERS FORMED ITS VERDICT OF THE CEASE-FIRE'S SYMBOLIC
PORTENT; FOR THIS WOULD BE A VERDICT OR PROGNOSIS THAT WOULD TEND
TO BECOME SELF-CONFIRMING, IF SUBSCRIBED. TO BE A BROAD ENOUGH
SPECTRUM. OF THE LOCAL POPULATION. . "
IN A TABLE. THE OVERALL IMPACT, HENCE NET POLITICAL. CONSEQUENCES,
WOULD HINGE VERY MUCH ON WHAT THE CONTENDING PARTIES --
COMMUNIST, ANTICOMMUNIST, AND ANY "PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES"
ELEMENTS - CONSTRUED AS THE SYMBOLIC MEANING, NOT JUST OF THE
LITERAL' CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BUT OF THE WAY IT- WAS REACHED AND
IMPLEMENTED. WHETHER ANY GIVEN SET OF CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS
REDOUNDED TO ONE SIDE ; S ADVANTAGE OR THE OTHER'S, THEREFORE, WOULD
AT LEAST PARTIALLY DETERMINED BY HOW THIS SOMEWHAT INCOHATE JURY
GEORGE A. : CARVER r JR
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS
END OF MESSAGE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-1-5-4