CONVERSATION WITH LON NOL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-503-2-6-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 26, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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? TIT:" PR: TTTIM T HAS SEEN
1W ft, rv ,
State Dept and OSD reviews
completed.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESII NT
FROM Houry A. Kissing
SUB ECT$ Coe i.ation wttl Lon Not
Maur 26. 1970
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Attached is a report from General Hs*g of his two-hoar eonversatioa
with General L*1% Nol. During the discaisste* the Cambodian leader
stressed tbatr
The Cai b+ sn people are behind. him and ready to make
sacrifices, but he rmst demonstrate an effective resistance
to the enemy. It is imperative to expand the Cambodian
govern ent's presence thra aghastt the countryside..
Cambodia mast have the wherewithal to resist, and it
can't Wait too long.
Carabodia critically needst
light anus to equip 50, 000 troops;
hslp in keeping the Mekong River open.
WAggrwernment is definitely in th. anti-coxamnsist stae gle
sand will glsdiy *Ater the US bloc of nations if necessary.
In his brief assersrrmnrer+ of this conversation General Haig concludes
that:
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MORI/CDF per
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a leadership
Ived to hold firm.
Up is badly shaken U
its bridges completely
~remptly with mo macrote, gestations
at sad not Tory realistic (towards this
'cO srsatioa he broke dow n). It would prove
fatal to his government U he we to continue to expect
a massive isksion of US ass te,
Our most urgent task is to get tb* Cambodians to launch
a. realistic action program with essentially short-range
goals design d to retain the support of the Cambodian people.
Aunt
HAK:JTH:ms:5/26/70
TOP SECRET /SLI' TIY "''EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 260500Z MAY 70 VIA CAS CHANNELS
FROM: General Haig, Saigon 655
TO: The White House, Exclusively Eyes Only Mr. Kissinger
Attached is a near verbatim text of my meeting with Lon Nol.
I am forwarding it by this means so that you will be able to draw your
own conclusions.
In sum the experience confirmed for me that the Cambodian
Government or at least its leadership has burnt its bridges completely
and is resolved to hold firm. However, it is equally evident that Lon
Nol is badly shaken if not desperate and that we must move promptly
with more concrete manifestations of U. S. support.
You will note that my efforts were to keep an emotional and
not very realistic leader thinking along practical lines. My discussions
with Matak being forwarded separately convinced me that Matak and
perhaps the military are having problems'in keeping Lon Nol's thinking
along realistic and practical solutions. If he were to continue to expect
a massive infusion of U. S. assistance, I am convinced this would prove
fatal to his government. Our most urgent task now is to get the Cambodians
to launch a realistic action program with essentially short range goals
designed to retain the support of the Cambodian people.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
IARTICIPANTS: BRIGADIER GENERAL HAIG
LON NOL, PRIME MINISTER OF CAMBODIA
DATE: May 23, 1970 -- 1000 hours
PLACE: PHNOM PENH - OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
General Haig: The President has asked me to confer with you and to
express his admiration for your efforts against our common enemy and
to convey to you and the Cambodian people his continuing support for
your courageous efforts. He has provided me with a personal letter
to you concerning my mission. (Letter opened and translated.)
Lon Nol; Before starting, I would like to express my gratitude and
the gratitude of my country for the assistance that the President has
given us. You must understand that our country is under heavy attack
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andi that the situation is very complicated. Although there have been
several unfortunate incidents, we are trying to form a network of
defense against the enemy.
General Haig : First, I will outline my government's plans as they
pertain to our operations in the VC sanctuaries. We contemplate that
all American troops will be withdrawn from your territory by June 30.
Lon Nol: One small question. Will the South Vietnamese withdraw
also?
General Haig All American troops will leave by June 30. We visualize
that, the South Vietnamese in consultation with your government will
continue to operate as required in the sanctuary areas in an effort to
prevent the enemy from re-establishing these sanctuaries and, hopefully to serve
as a-deterrent to the enemy's efforts to undertake more severe attacks
against Cambodia itself. We would hope that the nature of ARVN opera-
tions would not be so extensive as to serve as a pretext for more blatant
enemy activity in Cambodia.
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Another corollary solution would be to have you, the Americans,
train us. I mention this in particular in the northeast where we could
perhaps train and fight together. However, our big problem at the
moment is that we do not know what we are. going to receive in the way
of assistance from your government. General Cao Ky talked to me the
other day and it was his position that the South Vietnamese entered
Cambodia before the Americans so that the Americans could follow
after and give us the material we need. But we are ignorant as to
what we will receive and when. Operating in this vacuum makes it
.impossible for us as to organize ourselves.
General Haig: We, of course, have done much up 'til now and plan
to do more. The President has decided to send a military expert who
will operate out of our embassy here in Phnom Penh. He will work
with your staff in evaluating your needs and will be able.to expedite
deliveries, counsel your staff on the utilization and distribution of the
arms which we will provide. It is important that you recognize that
the equipment we will provide will continue to be basic in nature,
including rifles, ammunition, machine guns, mortars, and perhaps
some rockets. These are the kinds of equipment which will have the
most significant short term impact. As you know, President Nixon
has promised the American people that we will not furnish advisory
personnel.
Lon Nol: Our Army has grown immensely recently. It is very young
and we are just now trying to organize it into a viable combat force.
We would like to have mobile brigades with 9 battalions in each brigade
and about 500 men in each battalion, with a few tanks, a few heavy guns
and some aviation,
Up to now, we have been holding our own. True, in the north
we have had some rough experiences but in the south things are
going well. I must, however, have some arms to give to the students
who have volunteered for the Army.
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General Haig Can you give me your appraisal of how the military
situation is currently developing
Lon Nol: For the immediate situation, in the northeast beside Rattna
Kiri we have 2-3, 000 men who are holding well. I would like to ask
your forces to join them and fight side by side with us. We would
profit from your air support. This would provide us with a network
that would form a block in this area that would be sure to hold. To
the south, there is a momentary hole in our defensive network in the
two provinces south of Rattna Kiri. We will fill this hole as soon as we
can regroup our forces to send them back.
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General Haig: We will consider on an urgent basis the possibility of
providing U. S. air support in your northeastern provinces east of the
Mekong to help stabilize the situation there. But I must be perfectly
frank, in order not to do you any injustice, especially as you plan your
immediate defenses. The effect of undelivered promises by me could
be disastrous to your planning. We will be unable to employ American
tz bops in Cambodia after June 30. President Nixon has made this com-
mitment to our people. Were he to fail to deliver on this promise, he
could jeopardize other equally important measures of support for your
struggle.
Lon Nol: I understand your predicament, but we, too, have immediate
problems. Give us air support if you can. Give us some aviation. I
cite this example. We can set up a network to assist in the liaison
of air strikes east of the river but there are NVA/VC on the other side,
too, and we need the means to attack them there also. More aviation
of our own will give us greater flexibility to strike at several places.
General Haig I would like to provide you with my current tentative
appraisal of the enemy's capabilities. We are destroying his long-
established bases of supply along your border with South Viet-Nana.
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In the immediate future we must prevent him from re-establishing
his logistical support. The enemy has now been precipitously.
pushed away from his supplies and must now attempt to swim on the
sea of your people. He will try to convert your people against these
efforts. If you succeed, the NVA/VC will become inoperative for a
lack of logistics and his pressure against you will subside and hopefully
the land can be retaken.
Lon Nol: I agree wholeheartedly with your analysis. But it is
imperative that we now expand our presence throughout the countryside.
The people, especially in the northeast, are assessing who is the
strongest. They are vacillating between our cause and the visible
strength of the VC. The Central Government must be able to exert
its power in some way. In the northeast, your air support would help
General Haig: Before I leave Phnom Penh, I would like to sit down
with yourstaff and a map and review the latest troop dispositions, both
friendly and enemy.
Lon Nol: We have that for you. There are two places where our troops
have held. In Rattanakiri in the Northeast where the situation is critical
and in the south. In the south our troops must carry the will power of
the,nation for the people.
I have asked for light arms totalling 50, 000 weapons. The
mobile brigades are being formed. Some are in training around
Phnom Penh but are without arms. We have an idea of what we want
but there is still much work to be done. In some cases we have brigades
with only 3 battalions.
Our VN allies operate along the southern border and they will
soon be leaving. It will not be efficient nor good if we have to replace
their well armed units with our poorly equipped ones. Furthermore,
our history with the Vietnamese has been very competitive and we
cannot let their ;units dominate ours even by comparison.
Until yesterday, we have been trying to look into the future.
We have the will to fight. Our studentsWand men want to fight but we
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lack the wherewithal. We are willing to buy these arms if we have to.
When the students have finished their tests, we will assemble 14, 000
of them to the rear to form a division. When we can clearly see who
will provide what aid for us, then we will buy what additional equipment
we i eed. We must exert our superiority over the enemy. We are
definitely in this anti-Communist struggle and if we must enter into
your block of nations, we will gladly do so.
General Haig: First, I hope to obtain from you today a summary of the
commitments made to your government by other countries,
Secondly, as I have said, the President intends to continue
with the provision .of individual weapons and equipment through the
South Vietnamese or perhaps others. We must not jeopardize these
critical steps by impractical ones which cannot be helpful in the short
term.
In regard to the question of joining our block of nations, as
you know, it is the official position of our government to restore the
neutrality of Cambodia, which may prove to be a myth. Nevertheless,
it is still important that we not provide Hanoi with additional pretexts
and justification for continuing their offensive against your country.
We continue to hope to re-establish stability and be able to prevent
further escalation or prolongation of the war. Therefore, we believe
that it remains, at least for the time being, in the best interests of
all parties that Cambodia continue to profess its. goal of re-establishing
its neutrality. Perhaps this will no longer be possible but we would
like to hold this question in abeyance until such time as the enemy's
intentions are further clarified.
We believe that Hanoi thought it could quickly overthrow
your government by exerting pressure on the Capital through cutting
off the lines of communications and its operations in the countryside
and then to return Sihanouk and re-establish a government sympathetic
to its objectives. However, I believe that the enemy's most urgent
need in Cambodia is to re-establish its logistical framescork and its
lines of communication. Thus, to the degree your people can hold
firm now, then the more likely a retrenchment in the level of enemy
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pressure will occur as his supplies dwindle further. If this occurs,
then your continued claim to neutrality may prove to be the most ad-
vantageous course.
Lon'Nol: That's a good point with which I agree. To answer your first
question with regard to the promises a sistance.
concrete yet.
In general, however, all the countries say that they have
nothing that they can give us. We need help and help now.
General-Haig : That clarifies the situation for me. I now know the
proportions of your problem. Permit me to reiterate what kinds of
immediate steps we are prepared to undertake. I would also again
underline what we will be unable to provide atleast in this phase. First,
we shall continue to furnish small arms through the South Vietnamese
and as our forces thin out in Viet-Nam we may be able to provide
additional quantities of individual arms and equipment. Secondly,
we will encourage the South Vietnamese to make shallow penetrations
along the border after June 30 to prevent the enemy from re-establishing
his logistical bases there and to deter further attacks on your country.
1 bird, we will consider providing immediate air support in the
northern provinces east of the Mekon . F_ -1
Lon Nol: Thank you. Remember two things. First, if we are not
made stronger, the intrusions of the well armed South Vietnamese
troops. will. be an affront to my people which can be exploited by the
enemy. This is a complex problem that we Cambodians have. We
cannot let the Vietnamese exhibit their superiority, over us. Now that
the VC has lost their bases, they will probably try to give arms to the
populace seizing any pretext to spread discontent and build support
for the illegal Government of Sihanouk. The press will probably
further inflame this situation. I have always said however that there
are very very few Cambodian Communists and the Khmer Rouge
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movement is very very small. The VC/NVA receive their support,.
primarily from the Vietnamese segment of our population. We must
now impose our will on the people and our morale will be greatly
lowered if we do not receive the wherewithal to do this.
To assure the victory, we must:
1. Consolidate the northeast and northwest.
3.
Consolidate the south.
Receive from you urgently 50, 000 light arms.
4. Build our mobile brigades, and,
5. Obtain some additional aviation.
The population will not give food to the VC unless we lose
face. It is a question of maintaining face and re-establishing our
presence in the provinces. Another area where you can help us is
along the Mekong by providing some Marines to keep the river open.
This is an all important economic and communication link.
General Haig: Yes, that is important and I believe the South Vietnamese
can continue to do this.
Lon Nol: Let me give you the character of the atmosphere around
here. Historically speaking, as Chief of State I am well obeyed.
However, there is much confusion. I suppose that this is caused
by the fact that we have not dominated the military situation. Added
to this is the fact that we have met a very solid, battle-hardened
Vietnamese Army. So, our situation is not like before. I cannot see
how we're going to get out of this. We wait for help and we wait, but
we can't wait too long.
General Haig: I would like to examine one point you have raised
more closely. You must understand that we recognize the problem
posed.by Cambodia's traditional distrust of the Vietnamese. I spoke
to General Abrams on Wednesday about this. Through our advisors
we have monitored very closely the South Vietnamese Army's per-
formance in Cambodia. General Abrams reported that the South
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Vietnamese Army is performing magnificently and there was little if
any abuse of the Cambodian population. I therefore suspect that the
VC/NVA are spreading these stories of atrocities. These must be
refuted. On my return to Saigon, I will talk to President Thieu and
ask-him to be sure that public statements by his spokesman as well
as the ARVN's future performance do not add to these long standing
tensions.
Lon Nol: General Ky has already made such a declaration. He took
the bull by the horns right after Svay Rieng was retaken. We have
established liaison with South Viet-Nam and we are doing our best to
find the solution to this problem. He's agreed that the situation is a
little over-heated on both sides. This is just an accessory problem,
however, and all can be smoothed over. What is important in these
times is to sort the essential from the accessory problems. The
essential fact is that we now have weak troops facing a strong, experienced
VC/NVA Army. The people are behind me but I must do something in
this "essential" area. I must form an effective network of resistance.
If I do not, I will lose all that we have accomplished. Cambodians are
reasonable. My colleagues and I have been trying to resolve our
difficulties. I hope that you are ready to aid us. We feel the ground
trembling under us. I have just spoken to the Central Committee and
told them that it is not going to be easy to win our liberty. We must
be prepared for sacrifices.
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However, the government can't wait too long. The ground on
which we stand is not firm. We stand ready to make sacrifices to save our
country.
General Haig: I am extremely grateful for your evaluation of the
situation and am sure that the results of our meeting today will be of
great interest to President Nixon. As I stated earlier, he has asked
me to convey to you his friendship and to reiterate his support. I want
to make it clear what we will do. I understand your outlook and I
accept it. Our problem is to overcome them. I do not want to promise
you what we cannot deliver, that would be shortsighted. I will discuss
your problems with the President and we will study them with the
utmost urgency.
President Nixon however also has many problems of his own
and he does not want to jeopardize our future freedom of action by
making conceived moves at this time . He realizes that patience,
sacrifice"and courage are necessary to do the job and that basically
Cambodians must save Cambodia.
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The enemy can repeat can be beaten. We have already proven
they are not invincible. The Army of South Viet-Nam is standing up
well against them as you have seen in the south. Cambodians can as
well. Our hearts and our sympathies are with you and we will do all
we can. (At this point General Lon Nol broke down and sobbed. He
then got up and went to the other end of the room until he regained his
^composure. )
Lon Nol: Help us to buy the military hardware we must have. And
please convey to President Nixon our warmest regards and heartfelt
thanks for his kind efforts on our behalf.
Lon Nol then gave General Haig his government's written plan
for rebuilding its armed forces.
The meeting terminated at 12: 15 P. M.
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