THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, INCLUDING THE OUN, THE UPA, AND THE UHVR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R010100150006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 28, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASS I F I CAT I ONSECRET/CONTRODATSMIPI
SECURI
INFORMATION REPORT REPORT NO.
REFERENCE COPY? NO
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COUNTRY USSR (U17.inian SSR) DO NOT CIRCULATE . DATE DISTR. .":8 .14117 1. 1952
SUBJECT The History, Development, and Organization of the. NO. OF PAGES 31
Ukrainian Resistance Movement, including the OUN?
DATE OF the !TPA, and the. ITENR
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INFO. ll'iRSECURITY REASDI4S
MIS RIP.CRT IS MT TO BE FURTHER (LISTED BELOW)
PLACE "1::;,,iIVIIIEO WITHIN THE IINITED
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ACQUIRED BOORS
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t:IF THE UN tA
ITED STATES, WITHOUT TIE
REPORT NO.
71.7-in PERItiISSION Of THE ill 3-
25X1X TM 'UKRAINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENr
The Armed Conflict: Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)
The Political Leadership: The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (THIVR)
The Importance or the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalsits (OUN)
Contents
I. Introduction: Three Perspectives of the 'Ukrainian Question
II, A Review of the Years 1917...1923
In. The 'Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground Movement between the 'Two World
Wars
IN. Two Years of Peace in Eastern Europe (1939-191a)
V. Will the Ukrainian QuetAion be revivea
VI. The New Situation in Eastern Europe and the New Tasks of tile Ukrainian
Revolutionary Movement
VII. Out of Nothing Grows a Resistance Army - the UPA
VIII, The Year 1943 in the Ukraine
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The Supreme Political Council of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement
is Formed. The UHVR and its Aims,
X. The End of Fighting in Europe. The Struggle of the CPA Continues.
A New Terrible Enemy'.
XI. The Year of 1946 - Change of Fighting tactics.
XII, Principles of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement?
XIII. The Messengers of the Ukrainian Liberation Struggle in Europe.
XIV. A Fighting Front of Oppressed Peoples.
Conclusion.
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14 introduction
This discusalon is intended to .contribute objective information about the
Ukrainian people 'S independente struggle and freedom movement in the Ukrainian
homeland.. The author teeks to be as objective as humanly Possible and to leave
out personal _opinions,
A better understanding .of the present situation and development requires
brief outline or the history or the Ukrainian revolutionary movement and_ its
orgaaiZations, Ap/oret from factual reporting* pblemical note will be in-
cluded in the discussion because to Itetry distortions and so much contra-
dietary information laave been spread about the independence struggle and its
organizations The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (MR)* the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)/ and the organization .of 'Ukrainian Nationalists
(OUN) 0_ Weray one political reporter can claim to have an accurate picture*,
The natural question Which arise is bow' has this happened?
a. Firat: The ukrainian question is still unknown in the world in spite of
the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people for mallY Years
b, Seeondt Soviet Buss lent* Russian emigres* and lalso a large proportion
of. Poles :who are enemies of an independent Ukraine and who do not believe
a Ukrainian problem should exist intentionally spread falsified reports
to .diatort and alsnder the independence struggle of the Ukrainian people .
Third: The Ukrainian emigration has not previously been capable of pre-
senting an accurate picture of the struggle in the Ukraine* primarily
because of partisan reatons, Each emigration party tried to draw a
Pidture which would enhance. its role.
This threefold falsifieation prevented. the political publie of the world
from having a clear picture about the present Struggle in the Ukraine.
The nonAkraieima literature about the. Ukrainian struggle during World War
II and at present is very modest and one can tartly form an accurate picture
from it.? A few publithed works are cited in the bibliograPhY/ but they are
not able to clarify eireuestanees 40ePrehensively The absence of a non-
1Tkrainian edition of NYkola tebed's UPA is i'egrettehle as well as the feet
that only the first part* which deals with the German occupation of the
'Ukraine* is aVailable. Until now* the basic documents of the Ukrainian
movement, the Platform,,/ the Provisional' Constitution and Proclamation. of the
IURA the leaflet .11112EI, Does ./ an eso 0
, Axt):*Mt1.4.14,17. Oreat copsrpo '& t1 QITN* have net been published in
a .6x4ign language.,
let onlY dee-a the Ukrainian pres$ bear the bla00 for this, but also the world
press, the foreign language periodicals Ana the pnblitWn& boutet, Even
the Serious newspapers are no exception In reporting the UPAls Struggle only
from the tentational Atandppint,
Considering all these previous difficulties, the author seekt to fill a Op
with a briefs, but comprehensive, picture of the: Ukrainian .independence move-
ment political cOneepta.J., and StrnetUre# HO pas relied on his: personal
eXperieeeeS
and: knowledge at well at doCUMenarSe materials at hit- disposal,
Tn_r_ttztrw_: ..,01.112A fora aLsidevition, .of ,the. 'Ukrainian GOO:0U*
Since; the. Ukrainian quettion Ia much too eomprehensive to exhaust here* one
Of three possible aPProSebee has been Seleeted4 namelYf the political reIme.
lutionarY tledergrOund and. its result-the armed military struggle
The other tWO approaehea are: a) the official policy of the - powers whieh hay:0
occupied the Ukraine* until 19391 . The Soviet Union* Poland* Cz0440410vakial
and. 'Wean* Jan& since 1944 the Soviet Union alone, and the legal pOlitiet
or individual Ukrainian parties: including the. IP(b)u (the Cpmmunist Party
of Bolthevikt of the Ukraine)* :Lai b) the, standpoint of the emigration after
World War- I and II,
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Since .these laat two approaches can contribute to a clarification ot the whole
Ukrainian problem they are not to be rejected. However, they constitute a-
chapter in themselves which can, in all frankness, obscure and even distort
the present struggle in the Ukraine.
The promise of the future for the Ukrainian people hinges upon the strength
of the political underground; therefore, the latter will always be the most
important approach. The emigration can and 30111 only ,play a secondary rolea
and if it fulfills this it will have dene its duty for the fighting fatherland.
The guiding principle of the Ukrainian independence movement which holds that
foreign policy is a function of domestic policy means that the center of gravity
of decision is in the Ukraine, Conseventlathe emigration can only be the
representative of the fighting homeland, not its responsible political loader.
The inevitable subjectivity which an approach to the independence movement from.
the standpoint of the hoaeland involves does not obscure the objective picture
in any case. On the contrary, this approach gives a lively picture and the
political observer gains a thorough insight into the complicated characteristics.
This is unconditionally necessary for every proper political question and the
Ukrainian question is a European political question parexeelience.
II. A Surve of the Years 1917-1923 14/
The following document is important in regard to Great Britain's relations with
the Ukraine. It originated in December 1917 after the Ukrainska Tsentralna
Rada, the revolutionary parliament which had aiisen in March 1917, proclaimed
the formation of a Ukrainian state on 19 November 1917 under the name of the
Ukrainian People's Republic (Dkrainska NarodnaRespublYka):
"Representative of Great Britain
To His Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers
of the Ukrainian National Republic
ExcellencyE
have the honor to inform you that His Brittanie Majesty
has appointed .me by wire as the sole accredited representative
of Great Britain in the Ukraine.
My government has instructed me to communicate the
assurance of its good will to yona. It will, with all its
strength, support the Ukrainian Government's undertaking
of making a good government, of maintaining order, and of
combating the Central Powers, which are the enemies of
democracy and humanity. In that which concerns me particularly,
Mr. President, I have the honor of assuring you of my
full cooperation in the realization of our common ideal.
Piston Ragge
Representative of Great Britain
in the Ukraine."
Mr. PictonBagge had previouslybeen the British consul at Odesea, ,General
Tabouis, 'Commiasaire de is Republique Fransaise", submitted a document of sim-
ilar content to the Ukrainian government at the time.Cbmytro Dorodbanko:
10tOrlya Ukra 1917-1 23 (History of the Ukraine 1917-1923), Part I, Time
of the Central Council, TShorod, 1932, pages 234-236. Ukrainianj
The Ukrainian Peoples Republic, whose Central Council declared its political
independence and sovereignty on 22 January 1918, was unable to cultivate its
relations with the alntente. It had to conclude a peace treaty with the Central
Powers at Brest Litovsk on 9 February 1918 because of the war with the Russian
Soviet government of People's Commissara which had starte& on 17 December
1917, The Ukrainian national government only. succeeded in liberating the coun-
try :from the Ruzsian Bolshevik invasion with the help of German troops.
Frictions and tensions between the Ukrainien government and the Oberkommande
of Heeresgruppe EaShhorn arose almost immediately, even though the treaty of
Brest had recognizedthe Ukrainian_PeoPlaWRepalaic and respect for its soveriegnty
2,ve c?, ? ; , ,
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might bave been expeuted. The German command removed the Social Democratic
goVernment? drove the Central Council apart, and favored a putsch by General
Pavlo Skoropadeki, He took the historical title of beteer as head of the
state. This period of Ukrainian history is verified by the Gorman and
Austrian documents which are published in the collectionu_.....hruh ietalleneer
Deetschee Okku.tion in der Ukraine (Collapse of the Germaa Occupation in
e eelf957R?Iiii4eared in Moscow in Ruesian, and in German ie.
Straesberg,
After Germeny' ollapse? a national uprising broke out in November 1918
against Skoropadski's goverment. The latter had in the meantime proclaimed
the federation of the Ukraine with Russia.
Ukrainian political publicists and: writers of memoirs still claim today
that Skoroeade4ei's proclamation followed the suggestion of Entente diplo-
mats at Sofia era Jassy who made it a condition for negotiating. France and
Britain's attitude toward the -Ukraine chaaged eempletely in. the course of a
Year, and Paris and London no longer liked to hear about the maasiont of
Picton Bagge and General Tabouis.
The National Directory, which took over the Ukraine after the victorious
uprising, tried, to avakee an understanding for Ukrainian aspirations ef
independence in the Entente. It pointed to the danger of the Bolshevik
Revolution Which sought to further its revolutionary aims with slogans about
"the rights of nations to self-determleatioa to the separation and formation
of independent states." (This slogan was adopted in April 1917 by the VII
Party Congress of Bolsheviks). Hewevere at that time, the Entente supported.
Koechak? Denikin, and other Russian generals who were Unable to seize the
weapon of the Bolsheviks either in. their national concepts or social policy?
On the contrary this policy was only grist for the Bolshevik mill, Lenin,
Troteki, and Stalin know what use. to make of the Enteete'e mietekes by also
claiming to fight for the national aing of people suppressed by Tsariam.
The: Ukrainian National Directory with Simon Petlura at the head was left eom-
pletely to itself in these fateful struggles; at the end of 1919 it had to
clear the battlefield and seek an alliance with the newly created state of
Polami whose head, Pilaudekil had a great understanding of the danger
from the east, In April 1920aPoland and the Ukraine concluded a treaty in
conjunction withamilitary convention, A joint Ukrainian and Polish
'campaign led to the liberation of Kiev in May 1920, but it had to be abane
doned soon and the joint armies had to clear the Insalt,ine., Poland deserted.
its Ukrainian ally in the peace treaty at Riga In. 1921 when it recognized
the Soviet government in the Ukraine, The regular war between the Ukraine and
Moscow ended at that tine.
There were only two ways in whieh the Ukrainian people 'Could fight for
their political independence and sovereignty in this situation:
a. To master the Ukrainian Soviet Republic from within by strengthening
the Ukrainian element so that a. separation from. Russia would only be a
vestion of time,
b, To continue the regular war with Insurrections which would not allow
the Soviet Ukraine to be stabilized and thereby prepare the people for
a national revolution,
The Ukrainian National Communists, the leftewing Social Revolutionaries, and
the Independent Social Democrats took the first way, Their efforts net
a tragic- end in the thirties when they all became a saerifice of the purge
and liquidation machinery
Our distueeion is only interested in the seeped way because it proved to be
correct historically. Those who took the first way were by no means traitors
to the idea of Ukrainian freedom and a Ukrainian state& While they tried,
to bring the Ukrainian people its social and national freedom, their tragedy
lay in placing the social above the national, The year 1923 tealed the
Ukrainian independence struggle politically and in international law. The
Ukrainian Soviet Republic became a part of the USSR, while the Council
of Ambaeaadors finally granted the vest Ukrainian territories to Poland
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In March 1923.
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III. The Ukrainian Revolutionary Uasturound Movement Beteeu Both World. Wra
The national insurrection against Skoropadekies government vas only able to
succeed because the National Directory had the Sieh" Riflemen, the best
Ukrainian military unit, ap its side. This unit, which was under the command
of Evhea (Eugen) Konovaletal grew into a corps in the course of 1919.
Konovalets and his officers, seeing that the PolisheUkrainian alliance could
not bring the Ukrainian independence, resolvei to wage the battle by other
means. Individual uprisings broke out against the Soviet regime but they
lacked unified military ant political leadership& With the Complete break-
down of the PolisbaUkrainien eampaign? the officers of the Sich, Riflemen
considered it their duty to organize such a leadershiP,
The idea of an undergrouna organization which arose at this time led to the
founding of the (OSS (Voyskova Organizatsiya Sitshovich Striltsiv Military
Organizntion of Sich' Riflemen) in Klev? the capital of the Ukraine Its
main task Was the unifiel leadership and coordination of armed insurrectionary
actions. Al the same timeithe TIVO (Ukrainska Voyskova Organizatsiya
Ukrainian Military Organization) aroscain LVOV' (Lemberg) and conducted the
revolutionary struggle Against the Polish occupation. Both underground
organizations Were subordinated, to the so-called "Riflemen's Couneil"a
which vas headed by Colonel Konovalets.
The insurrectionary actions in the Ukraine did not last loag. The Caeka
eliminated the VOSS as a central iastitution and shot its leaders (Opoka
and andrukh). Actually the skillful policy of the Communist Party in the
national an social fields, rather than the terror of the Bolshevik security
police or Moscow's overwhelming military power, put an end to the ineUrrection-
ary action which continued in individual territories until 1924.
The so-called "Ukrainization period" deearvea the masses into believine
that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic vat a Ukrainian state which could be
enlarged into a national state. The somewhat liberal period of the NEP
gave many the hope that the Communist economic system had to and vould be
modified under the pressure of realities. These two facts were the main
reasons why every resistance movement in the Ukraine had to disintegrate
and diaaolve.
The underground movement felt compelled to pursue another tactic which involved.
the penetration of the state and Party apparatus. It had great success Until
1932-1933 when Moscow struck a great blow at the "local" nationalists in
the individual member republics. Already in 1929 the security police un-
covered the SVU (Soy= Vyzvolennya 7kraiay - Union for the Liberation of the
Ukraine), made up of leading Ukrainian intel1ectuals2 arrested it memberae
brought them to trial in the beginning of 1930, and condemned them to hard
labor in Siberian concentration camps. At the same time?the police eliminated
secret youth groups of the SUM (Spilka Ukrainskoi Molodi - Society of Ukrainian
Youth). llo so-called "Committee of Three" of the apu condemned and executed
thousands of arrested students and youths. Over 2000 young Ukrainians were
e
shot in abarkov? which was the capital of the Ukraine at the time.
Iona Enanuilovich Balytakil the People's Commissar of the Interior in the
Ukraine (thief of the GPU), gave a report to the Central Committee of the
Ukrainian Communist Party (TsK VKP(b) U) in 1934 about combating the Ukrainian
nationalist counter-revolution. Fe ealisted the following secret revolu-
tionary organizations g The Ukrainian National Center, the Ukrainian Military
Organization (HO), the the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).
This was the second great blow to the Ukrainian underground,
The third occurred in 1936/1937 in connection with the great purges and
liquidation which were carried out in the entire Soviet Union. At this
time a ruthleas liquidation of all national Communists, former Sociel
Revolutionaries, and Social Democrats, who had submerged into the Ukrainian
Communist Party, took place. Many nema-rs of the Ukrainian resistance movement
Were also liquidated.
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Between this wave of terror which Yezhov, the GPU People Commissar, conducted
and the outbreak of the Second World War in Eastern Europe in 1941, the Ukrainian
undergrounderes oily able to maintain a very camouflaged existence. It must
be admitted that the illegal network of this undergrouad became very thin and
bad ee be limited to individual persons in each town, nnA even then not in
every town. But this undergroued outlasted the furies of Bolshevik terror.
In 1939, when the Soviet Union annexed the western Ukrainian territories of
Galieia and Volhynia, and in 1940 Bukovina and Bessarabia, OUN members estabe
lisbed their connection with the illegal network.
From the UVO to the OM
After World War ',the territories of the Western Ukraine - Galicia, VolAynia?
Pidlyaska?.Poleesye (Polissya? Polessiye),. Bukovina, Bessarabia, and the
Carpethe-Ukraine - fell to democratic or half democratic states like Poland,
Rumania, and Czechoelevakia. Thus, this gave the Ukrainian underground the
opportunity to develop sakind of "state within a state" in spite of police
pursuit,
The UVO, which was founded in 1920.., changed from an organization of military
conspirators to a political revolutionary movement under the influence of the
masses .revolutionized by it. It adopted the title Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists (OUN) at the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists which took
place in Vienna In. February 1929,2d The Congress elected a leadership known
as the PUN (Provid Ukrainskykh Vatsionalistiv - Directorate or Leadership of
Ukrainian Nationalists) which embraced members. from the Eastern Ukraine, the
Western Ukraine, and from the political emigration, Colonel E. Xonovaleta,
the founder of the VOSS and the UVC, was elected head of the Pray-Id (Holova
Provodu),
Party headquarters were maintained abroad, while the OUN,s_press organ, Roe-
badava Natsii (Construction of the Nation), a monthly periodicaloras published
at Prague for the years 1928-1934. Each part of the Ukraine which was occupied
by a foreign power had a XE OUN (Krayeva Ekzekutyva - territorial executive
bommittee)g a KE OUN of the Western Ukraine in Poland, a KE of the Carpatho-
Ukraine in Czechoslovakia, and a KE Or_lal of Bukovina and Bessarabia in Rumania,
The KE OUN of the Western Ukraine became the main foundation of the OUN,s
political activity. This was beneficial, in that the population of the Western
Ukraine had an especially national consciousness and fully supported the OUN's
political activity. On the other hand it gave the OUN more and more of a
Western Ukrainian character and an antiePolish attitude which made it judge
the situation in the Soviet Ukraine from this standpoint, This does not mean,
however, that there were no connections between the Provid of the OUN and the
underground in the Soviet Ukraine.
The revolutionarytenaionse reached such a high point in the Western Ukraine
in .1930 that the Polish government felt compelled to intervene with the most
brutal means in the so-called pacification action which embraced almost every
Ukrainian town and village and aroused such attention abroad. The Polish
action came before the League of Nations and resulted in a protest by members
of the British Parliament headed by Ry Davis.
1934 was another high point of revolutionary activity, the Polish police elim-
inated almost the whole of the OUN territorial executive committee of the
Western Ukraine and carried mat mass arrests among the population. Many Ukraine
iana were delivered to the newly censtrueted concentration camp at Berea
Kartuaka, The police declared that its action was a reprisal against the attempt
against the life of Colonel Bronislav Pieraeki, tbe Polish Minister of the
Interior. (The OUN declared in a pamphlet that the attempt was a punishment
of the one chiefly responsible for the "pacification" of 1930).
A lawauit against the KE OUN of the Western Ukraine in 1936 at Lvov followed
a great lawsuit against numerous members of the KE OUN of the Western Ukraine
for the attempten Pieracki which tOoa place in Waraaw in 1935. Both lawsuits,
especially the stenographic and press reports in Ukrainian and Polish newspapers,
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offer co
la)
rehensive material on the concepts and. activity of the GUN.
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The blows of the Polish administration and police aould.not paralyze the revo-
lutionary activity of the OUN because the latter was too strongly rooted. in the
Ukrainian population and the political goals of the underground coincided with
those of the people. The Polish policy of repression and extermination con-
tributed to revolutionary agitation.
The importance of the Ukrainian underground grew not only in Poland but also
in Rumania (a lawsuit was brought against the GUN members at Chernovtay in
1937) and Czechoslovakia. The GJN contributed a great deal to the construction
of the autonomous Carpotho-Ukrainian state in Ciechoslovakia in 1938-1939.
The "Karpatska Stela's, Which formed the .ba1s for the Carpatho-Ukrainian army
in March 1?39? came into existence on the taitiative of OUN.members who occupied
leading command posts. It was comprised primarily of MN' members who had
resolved to resit an attack by the Hungarian Hdhoveds.
The Death of the Leader of the OUN - LKoete
12.,
The building of communications between the Frovid of the GUN and the Soviet
Ukraine led to the tragic death of Evhea Knnovcilets? the founder and leader
of the UVO and the GUN, on 23 May 1938 at Rettrrdam, Holland. A GPU agent
Who penetrated the OUNgs lines of communication delivered a time bomb to Kono-
valets. 1Conovalets was the most striking personality of the Ukrainian indepen-
dence movement between the two world wars. (Until now, the most comprehensive
characterization of Konovalets appeared in the periodical _g_t_....PoliVsvolntiz_ka.,
Volume II? No. 1-2 (11-12), January/February 1947, pagea 17-25,-V.P.S: "Evhen
Konovalets - Attempt at a Characterization." This article also clarifies the
reasons for his murder at Rotterdam),
Colonel Andriy Meanyk became the successor of Konovaleta. A. Melnyk, his
closest collaborator at the time of the Ukrainian war of independence in 1917-
1921 and chief of staff of the Sieh Infantry Co4a? took over the leadership
of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in October 1938 and was
confirmed in this post by the Second (Great?) Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists
which took plaee in Rome at the end of 1939.
The following leading personalities of that time are identified: Colonel
EVben Konovalets, Omalan Hrybivski-Senyka Captain Rile? Yary, Orly4-
Myron, ykola Seiboraki? Dmytro Andriyevaki? Kreminski?VolOdymyr Martyneta,
Zenon:Kosaak? Mykhaylc HazaanaPalodzinski? Yaroslav Baranovaki, Colonel Andriy
Melnyk, Stefan Bandera, Ivan Babrusevieh? Sydtr Chuchman, Mykola Lebed? Yaroa ?
alav Starukh, Ivan Mitringa, etc.
IV. Two Years of Peace in Eastern Europe (1!939-1941)
The Second Congress of the OUN took place shortly before the outbreak of the
Second World War and balanced accounts for ten years of activity. The Provid
of the OUN saw in the approaching storm ofwar an opportunity to convert the
Ukraine from an object into a subject of world. politics, The first two years
did not confirm these expectationa. The Western. Ukraine, which was the chief
reservoir of Ukrainian revolutionary forces, fell to the Soviet Union through
the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 23 August 1939 and was incorporated into the
Soviet Ukrainian Republic after entry of Soviet troops on 17 September 1939,
The Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine and, the Soviet Union ratified the union on
d November 1939
This _wags ablow for the Provid of the OUN which, had not reckoned. on aunt a
development.
In all objectivity it must be said here that the Frovid of the OUN staked a
great deal, though not everything, on the German card. This stake was, however,
on the German, not on the National Socialist card. The OUN never entered into
relations with the NSDAP, on the contrary they were always hostile to each other,
as the aocuments which the Western Allies have on hand arill confirm. The cause
for this is difficult to explain since many German and Ukrainian documents are
not available.
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Perhaps their hostility"may be explained by the fact that the goals of the
001, Which were neither racist or enti-semitic? were diametrically opposed
to those of the NSDAP. The OUN fought for the political independence ?and
sovereignty of the Araine, while the NSDAP sought living space for the
German people in Polande White Ruthenia, and in the Ukraine. The OUN aaw
the chance of restoring the national Ukrainian state in the European war
which had broken out? German policy required great caution because it
made use of the OarpathosUkraine to make POland more compliant, and later
to tie Hungary to the German side and to play the Soviet Union against
',Poland. (See Stalin's speech to XVIII Congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union on 10 March 1939, in which he compared the Carpatho-
Ukraine to a mosquito to which one wished to annex the elephant of the
Soviet Ukraine.)
In the summer of 1939 the W-estern Ukraine became a bargaining point to insure
the neutrality of the Ukraine in the German-Polish war.
The younger elements of the OUNe especially those in the Western Ukrainey
who had borne the main burden ,of the struggle and whowere determined to
continue the stubborn struggle against the Soviet Union thought the caution
yell placed- On the basis of the foreign situation, the Provid of the 00
cautioned restreint,,
The Crisis in the OUN
As result of this attitude of the Provid of the OUN? .e revolutionary
opposition developed and selected as their spokesman. Stefan ?Bandera (OUN
.district leader of the WesterneUkraine in1934? was sentenced to death In
the Pieracki trials and the sentence was later Commuted. to life is...prisons
neat) and 7Iolodymyr Lopatynski (this is .e cover nete).(Hewes the OUN
district leader of the Western Ukraine in 1939), '
,Ite.situation,beeame worse. On 10 February 1940-a Revolutionary Command
of the OUN was established. and was giVen full responsibility for the under,-
'ground movement in the Ukraine. In August 1940 it came to an open break,
which resulted in the formation of two Organizations of Ukrainian National-
iste and both groups started to fight each other, One was under the. command
of Bandera (called "Banderivi") and the other under Melnyk ("Melnykivi"),
Although the crisis was of a political nature., personal ambitions of the ?
two opponents played an important role. This split remains to this day
and is being continued abroad, among the emigrants..
The congress of the OUN in Krak.ov in March 194-1, also designated the Second
Great Congress, brought the GUN under the leadership of Stefan Benders"
The Situation in the Ukraine
The OUN.inethe Westernn-Ukraines which continued its underground Activity
.after the entry. of Soviet troops, recognised the party leadership under Bandere
because the latter's revolutionary attitude and political activity.corres-
ponded more to its owns The GUN used this opportunity to build up the weak
communications with the national underground in the Western .Ukraine. This,
was e. difficult task.. because, since the formation of the Soviet Ukrainian
Republic in 1921/ a .strongly guarded border existed between the various
Ukrainian territories. which _could. only. be crossed with an official pass
Nevertheless, the. OUN sent numerous .emissaries into the Soviet Ukraine
who either crossed the border illegally or went es.workers to the industrial
centers of the Donbas. The OUN also made contact with?Ukrainiens who came
to the Western. Ukraine as administrative officials and. .soldiers,
The nests of resistance in the Soviet Ukraine were strenghteneds The most
positive. aspect of the new situat..7.on was the unified?organization of the
national underground. which thereby added to its strength .and revolutionary
signifieenee.
. At the Same time he OUN.tried ta-become a .-Ta in-foreign:ea
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which the Finnish war offered. an.apportunity. Mykbaylo Kacbmer, who was
in the Ukraine in July 1944a .travelled, to Finlatd.through Sweden
as a delegate of the OUN to organize an action among the Soviet.SAgralnia
_prisoners of war. The Finnish Army command wantedan OUN delegation to
establish contact with the Soviet Ukrainian regiments (44 Soviet divisions)
on. the Finnish front? but the rapid conclusion .of peace thwarted the dispatch
of such a delitgation. Kachmar tried .to establish contact with the British.
in. Stockholm through the Finns; but the British showed .no interest in the
Ukrainian question,
In the meantime the OUN, which had strengthened its illegal network, planned
an insurrection in the Western Ukraine where the lines of commnnication
between the Soviet Union and Germany ran. One must bear in mind the military
importance of such an insurrection in 1940. The failure of Kachmar's
mission in Stockholm and the complete disinterestedness of the British
ruined this plan since it could not assure a success in foreign affairs.
Furthermore, all signs pointed to a future armed conflict between Germany
aad the Soviet Union which would once more offer the chance of presenting
the Ukrainian problem,
It should be emphasized here that only the OUN led the struggle against the
oppressors of the Ukrainian people.
For a long time there had been no Ukrainian parties in the Soviet Ukraine.
In order to remove the possibility of persecution of its members by the
Bolsheviks, all parties like the UNDO (Ukrainske Natsionalne-Demokratchne
Obyedennye - Ukrainian National Democratic Union), the USPR (Ukrainska
Sotsialistichna Radykalna Partiya a UkAainaian Radical Socialist Party),
the Me (Front Natsionalna Yedannya - Front of National Unity), etc.
ware dissolved. This political maneuver did not help and numerous members
of these parties, including leading party p4itigians; Wereebanished - e
to Siberian concentration camps Many members, however, joined the GUN as
the only party with a purposeful will from 1939-1941, through the German
occupation of 1941-1944, and the return of the Russian Bolshevik occupation
of 1943-1945. Subsequently it grew in extent, For this reason there is
only one Illegal Ukrainian party, which, however, does not pursue total-
itarian tendencies nor a one party system. The OUN is fighting for a
liberated Ukraine in which "freedom of the press, speech, opinion, conviction,
faith, and world outlook" shall exist. The OUN fights "against the official
imposition of philoaophical doctrines and dogmas." (Cited from the OUN
Program, Chapter II, Point 10, paragraph a4which was adopted by the Third
Extraordinary. Great Congress of the OUN meeting in the Ukraine 21-25 August
1943.) 3.
The mistake of the party politicians in dissolving their parties rather than
going underground became clear during the German occupation. At that time
the organization of political leadership for the underground and the UPA,
the resistance army, proved very difficult.
V. Will the Ukrainian Question Be Reviaedi- The War in Eastern 'Europe
When the German-Soviet conflict broke out an 22 June 1941, many Ukrainians,
including some GUN members, falsely believed that Germany would solve the
Ukrainian question as it had the Slovakian in the spring of 1939 and the
Croatian in April 1941.
The ProvideOf the OUN under Bandera entertained. .no such illusions, about the
Germane and resOlved to present them. with accomplished. facts. Since the
GUN could. not take the full responsibility for all future steps, it decided
to form a .representative Ukrainian National Committee (UNK), which the
representatiales of all former parties agreed to join with the excePt?tOn.
of Melnykqs- followers. Shortly before the outbreak.of the war preparations
:were concluded for a congress to meet on. 22 June 19419 not suspecting that
this was the date for the outbreak .of the war in. 'Eastern 'Europe. It was
a question of a congress of the political emigration and its party reprea
sentatives,
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The congress took place in Krakov and elected the following directors of
the Ukrainian National Committee: General Vsevblod Petriv-0 President;
Dr. Volodymyr. Gorbony, First Vice-president; Professor Victor Andriyeveki,
Second Vice-president; and Professor Dr. Stefan Shukhevich? Secretary
General. The following Ukrainian politicians also belonged to the Committee:
Vasyl Mudry, Mykola Livytski, Dr. V. Yaniv, Ivan Ravlyk, etc. On 23 June
a memorandum was presented to the Chancellery in Berlin demanding recog-
nition of the natural rights of the Ukrainian people for their awn inde-
pendent state by the German government. Two days before, the leaders of
the OUN submitted a memorandum of a similar content to the proper German
mlnistries.
These memoranda remained unanswered because Nazi Germany had its own plans
for the Ukraine and had no intentions of recognizing the rights of the
Ukrainian people. Ritlerfs prOclamation?of 22 June 1941 did not mention
nationalities of the Soviet Union, to say nothing of their rights.
The only possibility which remained for the leaders of the OUN waste
? face the German government with accomplished facts. In addition, it was
necessary to unmask the imperialistic aims of the Nazis, since their can-
plete war propaganda was 'built on the slogan "liberation from Bolehevise.
On 30 June a provisional Ukrainiangovernment was formed in Lemberg (Lvov)
and it proclaimed the restoration of the Ukrainian state. Since the plan
called for the proclamation of the state government in.Kiev, the Lemberg
government bore the name "the territorial government of the Western Ukraine".
Thin is what the Metropolitan Archbishop Andreas Count Sheptytski called
it in a pastoral letter of 1 Jnly. , Under the impact Of the contemporary
,political situation, the territorial government became the provisional
state government of the Ukraine in the following days. The Ukrainian
population in the territories of Lvov, Drogobych? Rovno, Volhynia, Stan-
islav, and Ternopol, as well as in some raions of the territories of Oherno-
vtsy, Zhitomir, Vynnytsya?:KamenetsPodolski, Kirovograd? and Kiev demanded
that the renaming be publicly announced.
On 30 June a provisional Ukrainian government was formed 4ri Lvov and. it
subaegnentlY proclaimed the restoration of a Ukrainian state.
The provisional government comprised the following members: '2
Chairman, for social and labor matters ,,Yaroalav Stetsko
First Deputy Chairman for health matters Prof. Dr. Panshychyp
Second Deputy Chairman .;.,e Dr. Lev Rebet
Political Coordinator - Ivan Legenda-Klymiv (a district leader of the OUN)
Foreign Affairs -Yolodymir Stalchilu his deputies: Dr. Kost Pankivaki
and Dr. Maritchak
Interior Affairs - Dr. Ivan Lysy
his deputy for Security Matters - Mykola Lebed
Military. Matters -0 General Vsevolod Petriv
his deputies: Col, Hike Yary, Air Force
mai4.Roman ShUkevich
Capt, Aleksander Hasyn .(or Gasyn)
Agriculture and Food Procurement - Eng. Eugen (Evhen) Khraplyvy
Forestry ." Eng. Piasetski
Economy, Industr. and Trade - Prof, Eng. Yulian Pavlykovski
Deputies: Eng..Dmytro Yasiv and Roman
ilnytski
Finance - Olkhovy
Information, Press, and
Education and Culture -
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Propaganda Hay Rolovko
Deputy: .Yaroslav Starukh
Prof. Dr. Volodymyr Radsykevich
Deputies: Representative of the Orthodox Church
(name unknown)
Father Prof. Dr. Havryl Kostelnyk.
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Prof. Turshyn (for universities)
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In addltion there were two members of the government whose names are not
known e One for transportation and one for .postal service.
The German government, which eoneidered the foimation of a Ukrainian govern-
ment provocative, decided to liquidate the Lvov "coup". Heinrich Rimier,
Who was commissioned with the liquidation, brought the leading members of
the government to Berlin.. Here they-were put under some preesure to renounce
the proclamation about the recreation of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian
GoVertment. The Germans resorted first to arrest and then imprisonment in
concentration camps when their demand was absolutely rejected at the beginning
of August? On 15 September 1941 the Gestapo made mass arrests of OUN memhere
in the Ukrainian territories already occupied by the Wehrmacht. First it sent
the priaoners to prisons in Lvov, Krakov, and Berlin and later to the coneentra
tion camps of Sachsenhausen and Amachwitz. Stefan Banderaa who was arrested
on 27 lane and detained first at Erakov and then Berlin,. was kept under ztrict
guard and in isolation at the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen until
27 September 1944.
Also arrested were Y. Stezoa V. Stakhiv, L. Rebet? B, Mary; Piasetski
(shot in Lvov in 19)42), D, Yasiv (died in Auschwitz), I. L, Klymiv (arrested
in Lvor and tortured to death), and R. Ilnytski.
The Ukrainian question was opened, but the Ukrainians stood on the front
against Nazi G6rmaYf
VI. The New. Situation in Eastern Eurwt2ml_th_NEE_Tasks of the UkraincLan
Rei,r_loonttELnztteaetnt
Gathering of New Revolution Forces
NOcelaiebed vrites about this new pealod of the Ukrainian Revolutionary
movement in the book The_ Ukrainian IzteuetItt, page 16g
ea
ItThe Ukrainian independence movement and its political carrier, the OUN,
entered into a new phase of the struggle in combating the German occupation.
Widespread revolutionary underground activity with the aim of mobilizing
the masses around the idea of political independence distinguished this
period. An open fight was impossible and useless for the following
reasons
a, The entire territory had to be cleared of Bolshevik agents so that
the latter could not capitalize on thia struggle for independence.
It was not vaged against the Germans to facilitate the return of
Bolshevism and the Stalin dictatorehip.
b. The Ukrainian masses, vho had hoped for liberation from Bolshevism
and. the creation of an independent state, were not yet prepared for
a direct struggle, Firet they had to recuperate from the Bolshevik
terrora to organize, and to learn to know the new occupier, his
System of domination andhis methods.
Under the Bolshevik occupation the leading cadres of the Ukrainian
people and the OUN had suffered important losses. When the Bolshe-
viks retreated they had butchered tens of thousands of Ukraindan
prisoners.
Alter the bows of the Bolshevike And the Germans, the OUN had to
reorganize, increase its strength, and adapt tactics and organiza-
tional methods to the mentality and methods of the new occupier."
MYkola Lebeda who was a member of the provisional Ukrainian government and
at the same time Deputy Chairman of the Provid of the OUN under the German
occupation, succeeded in evading arrest by the Germans.
At this time the command of the hOUr for the Ukrainian underground. was "Gathering
of Ne W Forces."
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During the the second halir of September 1941 ,the First Party Conference of the
OUN took place under the chairmanship of Mykola Lebed, The situation in
the Ukraine was discusseds and the provisional OUN government of M. Lebed
aaa confirmed, and the following guiding principles for the immediate
future were adopted: a. The infiltration of lower administrations with
nationalistic Ukrainians in order to continue the activities of the Ukrainian
state government; b. the dispatch of leading membera of the OUN into the
territories of the former Soviet Ukrainian Republic in order to contact
the Ukrainian underground movement there; ca the dissolution of the
kolkhozy and sovkhozys and the storage of grain for the Ukrainian population
in order to prevent famines; d4 the securing of printing presses and manning
editorial staffs with reliable Ukrainians in order to utilize the press for
furthering the idea of an independent Ukraine; e. active resistance against
the delivery of grain to the Germans; f, enlightening the population about
tfle forced deportation of workers to Germany; g. educational preparation
and activities for the active battle against the German occupation together
with simultaneous measures against any efforts for restoration of Bolshevism
In the Ukraine; h. the collection of weapons and ammunition for an armed
conflict against the German occupation forces and if necessary also against
Bolshevist Russians; and i. supplementing the party program and political
principles of the OUN with the political and social advances of the Ukrainian
people achieved under the Bolshevist regime.
These resolutions which were adopted by the party conferenee show the
departure from the illegal and political activity of the OUN. All activi-
ties, were directed toward the preparation for an armed struggle and the
defense of the Ukrainian people against the German despotism and the repe-
tition of the Bolshevist terror regime. The decision on point i. proves
that tile OUN will adapt itself to the conditions in the Eastern (Soviet)
Ukraine?
As ha o already been mentioned, in the course of its development the auu
adopted in part a Western Ukrainian character and was an outspoken nation-
alist party in its political program. This may have been suffaaient for the
Western Ukraine where the feeling of nationality was very pronounced. It
was not, however, sufficient for the Eastern Ukraine where the population
was already politically conscious 0 a Ukrainian state, and asked for a
precisely formulated description of the nature of an independent national
Ukrainian state. Words about the national struggle of independence did not
suffice. They demanded accurate information about the construction and
social structure of such a state. If the OUN wanted to mobilize all the
people for the independence struggles it had to meet the demands of the
people.
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The Second Pany_Congress of t4112_212Lini_1242
The Second Party Conference of the GUN took place in April 1942 and its
resolutions dealt with the following:
We base our policy on the following:
a. On the formation and extension of our awn revolutionary forces, both
political and military.
b. On a policy of revolutionary struggle which is dependent on no one.
c. We oppose the Russian-Bolshevik foreign policy concept of the
internationals and the *man idea of a so-called. "New Europe"
with the international concept of a just, nationals political, and
economic new order in Europe based on the principle of free national
states conforming to the solution ,freed am for all peoples and men.4
da We emphasize the idea of an independent Ukrainian state for which
the Ukrainian people have sought constmatly as santsaaataty, Only
a just solation of the Ukrainian question .can establish the
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balance of power in Eastern :Europe and guarantee a free life to
the nations oppressed by Moscow.
V1I4 We regard the so-called agrarian reform as an economic maneuver
designed to divert the Ukrainian people from their struggle for their
own 'government by securing the Power of the German occupation with the
help of a supposed measure of liberation. The se-called agrarian reform
does not serve the interests of the Ukrainian peasantry, but the
exploitive and practical aims of the Germans who wish to obtain as
much bread and labor power as possible.
mu:. We conduct a critique of the German economic system by means of
the enlightenment of the masses and by combatting the opportunists
and the servants of slavery .
)0CIV We connect the reriticism of German colonial policy- in the central
and eastern territories of the Ukraine with the combatting of the
Ru.ssian, Bolshevik influences and the partisan mischief instigated by
Russian tepe-rialism.
It should be added in explanation that the GUN was completely absorbed in
the extension of a thick network of underground organizations Since it knew
that only. unified actions of resistance could lead tosuCeess. For this
reason the GUN had to take a strong position toward the partisan mischief.
The OUN was not interested in the collapse of German imperialism, but in
the restoration of an independent Ukrainian state. The OUN held that there
was still time enough for an armed attack on the German occupation. Besides
the Ukrainian underground had no wish to pull the hard pressed Stalint's
chestnuts out of the fire.
Mention of the agrarian reform referred to Rosenberg(s decree of 16 January
1942 about the new agricultural order in the eastern occupied territories.
Practically, it only involved a change of name from kollehoz to "Gemeine
Wirtschaften". The Deutsche Ultra_LinLaelLtla (German Ukraine Newspaper)
declared that the reform, "should in the first place guarantee a maximum
of agricultural achievement."
The ordinance about compulsory labor service of 19 December 1941 was designed
to increase considerably the Ukrainian labor forces for the German war
industrya
Since the agrarian le (ILA provided the legal basis for the robbing of the
vil*ge population and the labor ordinance the pretext for man bunts to
augment the nutber,of deported workers in Germany, the OUN had to organize
the Ukrainian masses against the consequence of both.
The GUN joined national political tasks with practical actions in the
economic and social field.
Since this discussion is limited to the contribution of a better insight
into the political and organizational construction of the Ukrainian inde-
pendence movement, no detailed picture of the Nazi and Bolshevik occupation
can be given. That is why the terrorist actions of German security and
occupation forces and the Ukrainian counter-measures must be omitted.
The system of terror in the Ukraine was the same as in the rest of Europe,
only perhaps more cruel.
VII Out of Nothin Grows a Resistanathett_PA.
The Ukrainians had more difficulty organizing an underground army than any
other European nation. In Europe there was recourse to the military ex-
periences of former officers, to their professional knowledge and to an in.
tact officer ?s corps. The Ukrainians only had a few reserve officers at
their diSposal apart from a few revolutionary fighters with sufficient
military talents.
While other European nations could count on material, moral, military, and
political support from the freedom loving Allies, the Ukraine had to rely
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on its own strength.
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The Ukrainian people did not lack the will to fight, even though their
immediate future was not as hopeful as that of the other European nations
who had no foreign occupation to fear alter the defeat of the Germans.
The Ukrainians had to count on a, continuation of the struggle for indepena
deuce against the Bolshevik dictatorship after the end of World War II.
Unlike the West, the Ukrainian people never let themselves be deceived by
the democratic and.anti-imperialist phrases emanating from Moscow.
In spite of all these difficulties, one of the most powerful resistanca
armies of Europe, which could hardly be surpassed by any other, arose in
the Ukraine.
Since the aim of this discussion is to present a political survey of the
Ukrainian independence movement, a detailed description of the construction
of the resistance army and of its operational and tactical effects would
be pointless.
The First Armed Clashes
Already during the last few months of 1941 the OUN organized small armed
groups which acted as body guards of individual revolutionaries, since
every request for surrendering identification cards by German security
patrols (SD) could be answered only with shots. Individuals no longer
let themselves be captured without resistance as happened during the first
half of September. However, there were not many armed olashea because the
members of the OUN evaded encounters with those patrols or they managed
to obtain freedom of movement through other means (forged identification
papers, march orders, etc.).
After the Second Party Conference of the OUN took place and the resolutions
and directives of the conference were distributed over the country, increased
terror measures of the SS were to be expected. Organized resistance against
the forced deportation of laborers to Germany caused an ,increase in the
number of persons having to go into biding. The number of troops of the
OUN increased and armed clashes became more freqaent. By spring, 1942 the
number of these troops grew to such an extent that an.. unorganized and un-
coordinated revolution was feared. The wooded areas of Volhynia, formerly
in Poland. and at the 1939 border of the Soviet Ukraineyoffered particalaray
good biding places for these troops Which were organized into larger sections,
into so-called military units of the OIN (Vlyskovi Viddily OUN). Small
scale engagements of these units were avtdded,.becauee a still further
weakening of the fighting spirit of the Soviet Union was awaited.
The time for an open armed struggle came in the summer of 1942 when the
conflict between the agricultural Sonderfuehrer and the Ukrainian peasants
over the harvest broke out. The peasants, .supported by the "people in the
wooden, followed the directives of the OUN and refused to make grain de-
liveries. The militia units which the Gerdan administration sent against
the 'Ukrainian forest" and recalcitrant villages joined the resistance
movement with. their arms. Thereupon, the Germane sent Polish police
units from the Generalgouvernemeatl.organized Sonderabteilungen composed
of Poles from Volhynia, and dispatchedRuasianunits. The die was east for
an armed .struggle.
The OUN command took the initiative in the formation of a military general
staff consisting of former Ukrainian officers of the 1917-1921 Ukrainian
army as well as of the Polish and Soviet ArmY. All "battalions of the
woods" and the military units of the OUN were subordinated to this general
staff and received the same desigeation: Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska
Povstanska Armaya UPA).
On 14 October 1942 the first open battle took place and the Ukrainian Insure
gent Army received its baptism of fire.
Colonel Savar took over the command of the Northern UPA Groper) and Colonel
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Stupnytski became his chief of staff. The latter VUS a general staff officer
of the Ukrainian People V5 Republic (DNR) Army between 1917.1921; and was
promoted to general in 1944. Re and Col. Savur were later killed during
the battle against the Bolsheviks.
The combat Area of the Northern UPA Group included the districts of Volhynia
(Lutsk, RovnosZIitomir) and ,Polessye (Pinsk and Brest-Litovsk),
In 190 the following combat areas of the UFA were established:
a. UPA Group East (regions: Kamenets-Podolsti, Vynnytsygrand Kiev)
b. JEA, Group South (regions: Bukovina.and Odessa)
c. URA Group West (Galician regions: Stanislav, Lvov Ternopol,
Drogobychs and, since 1945, also the Carpatho-Ukraine).
During i945 the UPA (roup Westmark ,was formed and it embraced the territory
vest of the Curzon Line in Poland It was dissolved in spring 1948 after
the Ukrainian population was deported from, the territories west of the
San and the Bug Rivers and the West-Beskids,
The names of the commanders Of these URA groups are not listed because
it has botabith,Stablished.whether they are still active or died in battle.
Eit.e.fori_s_as_inL2L-11.12_132E.
The military general ataff was .later transformed into the High Command
of the UPA which was beaded by Colonel Tares Chuprinka (a pseudonym). LI-4/
(Chuprinka was promoted to general by the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme
Council of Liberation (UBVR) on 19 February 1946, effective 22 January 1946).
Chief of the general staff was Major Perebynis,who was killed on ,l November
1943 and posthumously promoted to general.
The URA issued the following political theses to the underground army
entitled: What DoeS the URA Fight For?
"Tbe URA fights for an Independent L United Ukrainian State (Sam-
, , Isty4azygpbbrna"UkkaihskalOgrh4Va i.1)USSip.) and together with other
oppressed peoples fights for independent national states on their own
territories. ,We recognize the right of every People . Poles, Czechs,
Russians, and others - to their awn state in their awn borders. We
only fight against imperia/ists and their servanta. The URA defeats
all those who seek to subjugate the Ukraine in one way or another,"
Furtber on in the thea we read:
"Peasants, ,workers? an& intellectuals in the ranks of the URA fight
against the oppressors for national and social liberation, for a
new state orders and for anew social order in the: Ukraine.
They fight for the destruction Of the Bolshevik kolkhozy and the
Germmallpmeinwirtschaften? for land for the peasants ,without com-
penSation, for a free economy, and for the free use of the products
? of labor.
They fight for the national.state awnership,of large industry and
000perati e ownership of small industry.
? They fight for the participation of -workers in the factory, managements
and for the professional but not party commission principle in the
nanagement.
They fight for the respect of the intellectual professions,
for the creation.of.material conditions which will enable the intel-
lectual to dedicate himself to cultural activity without worrying
About the future and the fate of his family, and for working conditions
which will enable him to enrich his knowledge and to raise his cultural
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They fight for the freedot of the press/ speech religion ? and philos,
ophy and against the *position of doctrines or dogmas.
They fight for the right of national minorities to cultivate their
national culture...
....We fight to have every nation live freely in its independent state,
for the abolition of national oppression and exploitation, and for the
onlyplitical system which can lead to a solution,of.the national and
social question in the whole world/ a system of free national states.
...0We shall only achieve victory with a national Ukrainian revolution
involving an armed. struggle. That is why no one can stand aside and
only observe and:wait."
These new prinPiples which were adopted by men who decided on an open and
armed fight were new in the Ukrainianaiberationmovement particularly if
compared with the resolutions of the First (Vienna), Second (Rome)and
Second (sic) (Krakov) Congresses of the DUN.
In the years 1929, 1939, and 1941 the ideology of the GUN ,was extremely
nationalistic/ strongly, leaning on other. European national movements (Italy/
France, Germany, and Belgium), It clearly had authoritarian and even total-
itarian tendencies.
The new political program originated in the struggle with the two authori-
tarian and totalitarian powers and this struggle had to be executed not Only
physically but first of all ideologically. The UPA thesis, What Does the
TJPA Fight For?, was a complete re-evaluation of previous axioms which it
appeared were not to be shaken. This was the consequence of two undergroupd
movements, one of which had existed in the totalitarian reality of the Soviet
Union and the other in the territories of the Western Ukraine, growing into
each other. The first rejected totalitarianism, in every form even if it
cams from the right and pledged itself to a democratic constitution and a
just social order, The second was only filled with the spirit of a national
elan and did not concern itself with constitutional and social questions.
Under the impact of a struggle against the totalitarian terror of a nation-
alistic occupation power and against the propaganda for the return of a
Communist colored authoritarian regime of Russian imperialism, a political,
national, social, and cultural program was developed which conformed to
the democratic traditions of the Ukrainian people.
The ideas of the UFA found a mighty response in the Ukrainian working
population and among the idealistic youth, demonstrating that a correct
step had been taken. Thus, the UPA-became a political,.military force
of the Ukrainian people. In its new development the OW only had political
tasks to fulfill, which became specially apparent in the decisive year
Of 1943.
VIII. 71.LBE:1.211-Lin the Ukraine
The -.Third Tarty Conference of the OUN took place on 17 - 23 February
1944at.Which time directives for an open armed conflict were laid down.
The following are extracts from these resolutions:
"Article The present war in the east which was rinTeashed in the
interests of German National Socialism and. Russian Bolshevism is
being conducted for reactionary and anti-popular purposes; namely
for the colonial exploitation and plundering of people and countries
This brings with it a moral, economic, social, and political exploi-
tation and subjugation; in other words a complete suppression and
subjugation of people and nationalities. This war is especially
being fought for the possession of the Ukraine, which is considered
by both German and Russian imperialism as the central goal of their
expansion policy in Eastern Europe and as the base for further ag-
gression."
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"Article 6 The Ukraine is at present between the hammer and anvil
of the two opposed imperialistic powers from Moscow and Berlin;
both consider the Ukraine as their colonial territory..."
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Article 222 We recognize that only organized armed efforts of the
Ukrainian people... can lead to the re0oration of a Ukrainian state..."
"Article 242 The execution and realization of our revolutionary
liberation plans and aims of our struggle for an Independent United
Ukrainian State... required and continue to require the task to
strengthen and expand new renters of organized might of the people".
This conference of the OUN confirmed herewith the initiative of the
party leadership in the formation of a special military orgarevation
for armed resistance, the establishment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
(UPA).
During the first half of 1943 the UPA experienced rapid growth: eager
and able-bodied young Ukrainians, coming from all classes and all regions,
streamed into the forests of Volhynia. Large areas were liberated from
the German administration and the UPA had to set up its own civil admin-
istration. This task, too, was mastered. So-called "OPA Republics"
were formed where the entire life of the Ukrainian population (administra-
tion, economics, education, church, printing press, health service, etc.)
was under the supervision of the IRA and its various organs.
Numerous publications, appearing either periodically or non-periodically,
were issued. To enumerate them all would take an entire chapter. Only
the most important ones are given here2
a. Povstanets (The Revolutionary) - organ of the press department of the
UPPI
bn Ideya i CAE (Idea and. Action) - organ of the party command of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN),,the then leading organ
of the Ukrainian underground movement.
??11m11p2ILk.12.112.2 (For an independent Ukraine), organ of the regional
headquarters of the OUN for the eastern and central districts of the
Ukraine.
Za Ukrainsku Derzhavu (For the Ukrainian State), organ of the regional
headquarters Of the OUN for the western district of the Ukrainian
revolutionaries.
e. Perets (Pepper) a satirical publication of Ukrainian revolutionaries,
Later, in 194k, there also appeared the publication Visnyk (Gazette) as
the organ of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation
(UEVR), Which, in 19460 was renamed Zamostiynist (Independence) and which
continues to the present.
In Addition there were numerous printed and. mimeographed leaflets, daily
reports, radio broadcasts, and propaganda pamphlets.
The Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN
The Third Extraordinary Great Congress,which met from 21-25 August 1943
under the prOtection of armed TWA units, made accounts of the previous
activity of the OUN? confirmed party leadership's activity, and made the
resolutions of the three party conferences its own. These resolutions were
elaborated, made more exact, and extensively interpreted.
The Congress made many Changes in the party, the most important of which
was the substitution of a three member party bureau for the former party
leader. This bureau (bureau of the Provid)? which was completely res-
ponsible to the party executive committee, was to meke decisions between
the meetings of the committee, which was itself responsible to the party
conference or the congress. This finally eliminated any trend for a -
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leadership principle which some GUN circles sought to establish. New
men, who had distinguished themselves in political and armed struggle,
were elected to the bureau, while the former deputy chairman. of OUN
retired. In Novetber 1945, Taras, a member of the bureau, met a hero's
death.
In. addition., the Congress adopted a new party program .which,in the introa
ductionyls called an "achievement of the theory and practiae of the last
two years." Also included in the introduction to the party-program is
the following
"The- idea of the new society is the free pan- Even though a free
act is the fundamental impulse of social life, it cannot be directeda
towards personal material interests and lead to the exploitation
of other free -men as happens; for example, in .the capitalist system."
These principles greatly resemble the fundamental thesis of What Does
the UPA Fight For? of October 1942. A fear pointe are cited for compari-
sona
1. "The ?UN fights for an Independent United Ukrainian State and so
that all people can live a free life in their own independent state.
The abolition of national oppaession and esploitation of one people
by another, and a political system of free people in their own
independent states is the only order which will bring a just solution
of the national and social question in the whole world.
5. The GUN is for the complete liberation of the Ukrainian people
from the Bolshevik Russian and German yoke and for the creation of.
a Ukrainian state without large landowners, capitalists,. as well as
Bolshevik commissarsINKVD executioners, and. Party parasites (party
..bosses)..."
"Peasants, workers, and members of the intelligentsia fight in the
ranks of the OUN against the oppressor, and for the Ukrainian state,
for national and social liberation, and for a new state and social
order.
1. They fight for the destruction of the Bolshevik and German system
of serfdom in economic organization. Operating on the principle
that the soil is the property of the people, the Ukrainian government
will not impose a uniform system of farming. The question of individ-
ual collective'farmihg Will be left'to the will-of the-population,"
The program for the workers was almost indistinguishable from the TPA
thesis of 1942. The workers should "participate in the management of an
enterprise, "every labor can only ]se done voluntarily," for which the worker
shall receive a just wage, and the workers shall have a share in the
profits of an enterprise."
The program of the OUN insists upon free,- trade- unions and the abolition of
the Stakhanovite system. aandicraft_shall be free and the craftsmen
shall have the right to unite voluntarily in handicraft artels.
,Oaly small trade shall be private; large trade shall be nationalized
and medium trade cooperative.
The party program, which was worked out in detail, had the following
to say about the rights of citizens. The OUV fights for
"10.
a. For freedom of press, speech, thought, religion, and world out--
. look; against the official imposition of philosophical doctrines_
and dogmas.
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b. For the freedom of worship, in so far as it does not Conflict
with social morality,
c. For the separation of church and state.
d- For cultural relations with other peoples, for the right of all
citizens to travel abroad for the purposes of vacation, study, and
to become acqaainted with the life and cultural achievements of
other peoples.
11. For the full right of national minorities to cultivate their awn
culture.
12. For the equality of all Ukrainian citizens regardless of their
nationality in all political and civic rights and duties and for the
equal right of all to work, income, and recreation."
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Some Europeans might consider this program dated because many of its demands
have been achieved in Europe, but for a nation which has only known a system
of totalitarian dictatorship for over 25 years, the points in the progava
are fighting slogans. The introduction to the program nays among other things:
"A program must also be a mighty weapon Vhich must, lead to the increase of
our powers and facilitate our victory." The long resistance of the Ukrainian
people and the resistance movement demonstrate that the idealistic principles
Of this resistance have the power to mobilize and to infuse the people with
an enthusiasm for such a struggle,
Fighting slogans joined with the honest conviction that they can be realized
guarantee the victory of people atruggling with total tyranny. The idea of
freedom is indivisible and it must be realized in per'sonal? political, national,
social, and economic areas of life.
EI222xnion for the Fight Against the -Return of Bolshevism
The Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN is a symbol of the increased
power and importance of the UPA on the one hand and of the withdrawal of the
German occupation and likeviSe the advance of the Soviet Army on the other
hand. The problem now was to prepare for an even more difficult struggle,
to arm oneself for it morally and idealistically, and to organize more
tightly politically.
The strength of the UPA and its combat operations assumed such a volume
that one political organization could not carry alone the full responsi-
bility for this armed dOnflict. The battle for independence and national
freedom was not to become the concern of one political organization for it
had already become the concern of the entire Ukrainian population. Thus,
a solution had to be found for the assumption Of the political responsi.
bility. A national resistance center comprising all political factions
had to be formed. Unfortunately, there were no longer any other parties
in the Ukraine; some of them were obliterated in the 25 year struggle
against the Bolshevist regime in the Eastern Ukraine and formed a united
underground movement, while others - in the Western Ukraine - were disbanded
in 1939. There did exist in the Ukraine the semi-illegal OUN group under
A. Melnyk which, however, following extended negotiations, refused to set
Up such a united. resistance center. The reason for this aefasal was that
the group desired to continue its fight only under the anti-Bolshevist
banner and it displayed a. very reserved attitude with respect to the con-
tinuance of the right against the German occupation. At the beginning
of 1944 the leading personalities of this group were arrested by the Gestapo.
The group had not profited from its reserve. In addition, there was also
a small illegal group of the Ukrainian People's Party operating in Volhynia.
The negotiations with this group unfortunately led to no success either.
IX. The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (UBVR) andL Its Aims
In the summer of 1943 the Soviet Army began its attack for the reconquering
of the Ukraine, and, by autumn, reached the Dnepr River. At the beginning
of November Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, fell, and all ?blasts located
on the left bank of the Dnepr River were reoccupied by the Soviet Army.
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The UPA? operating in the wooded area in the western part, i.e., in the
?blasts located on the right bank of the Dnepr River, found itself between
the hammer and the anvil. This was the start of the two-front warfare
with all its fateful consequences. But there was no alternative for the
UPA. The continuation of the struggle against the retreating German
armies gave it the moral-political strength to resume also its fight
against the Moscow regime, It knew that the Ukrainian people would follow
it in this heavy struggle.
Toward the end of 1943 the wooded Carpathian region, too, became a combat
area of the UPA. The UPA units which were formed here were subordinated
to the command of the Western UPA Group,
The Germans fought the UPA units with foreign troops: units of the
legions of eastern people (Turkestanians, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazaiths?Azer-
-baidzhanians? Armenians, Georgians* Tatars, etc.) as well as regiments
of the Central-European Allies,: predominantly Hungarians. The command
Of the Northern UPA Group in Volhynia established contact with these
anti-partisan units, and as the result of skillful explanation,these
foreign soldiers deserted to the UPA in large numbers and formed autonomous
foreign units within the UPA. The Hungarian regiments displayed a bene-
volently nOtral attitude* concluded a "non-agression pact" with the UPA
and even assisted it with weapons. The situation was similar as to the
Rumanian regiments in the combat area of the Southern UPA Group,
All these facts . in internal and foreign politics, enabled the High
Command of the UPAto grasp the initiative, to resume negotiations,with
the existing Ukrainian political circles (as mentioned,previoualyl.parties
no longer existed)in order to form a representative central politidal organ
of the Ukrainian resistance - The High Command secured the full assistance
of the OLIN :whose leadership declared its readiness to follow the commands
and directives of such a_central body. Negotiations were carried on with
the following circles: The Christian-Clericals, Monarchists, Christian.
SocialistauNational.eDemocrats? Socialists, Social.Revolutionaries* and the
Social Demoarats. They ended incomplete success. Each of these circles
Sent delegates to a committee whose task .it was to arrive
at apolitical platformand to establish the constitution of such a political
center of resistance, .It was agreed,upon.to direct a proclamation to the
Ukrainian people,
All representatives agreed that the struggle against the German ,occupation
must be continued* even though the Soviet Army had occupied more than half
of the Ukrainian territory. The risk of a two front war had to be taken
to, bring the independence strUggle to a successful concluelon, because
neutrality towards the Germans would have taken UPAls weapon against
Bolahevism away.
The Found, irig Congress
The secret congress of representatives of all Ukrainian political groups,
which were determined to fight actively for liberation, opened on 15
July,1944. Representatives from all Ukrainian regions were present. UPA .
detachments guarded the safety of this meaningful Congress.
? The outcome of the congressional work was the formation of the Ukrainian
-Supreme Council of Liberation (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada) as the
"supreme organ of the liberation fight of the Ukrainian people" in the words
of the Proclamation
The council elected apermanent Presidium headed by,a president which
had the task of making important decisions, otherwise left for the congress,
Auring the periods between congressional meetings, Representatives of all
political groups were elected to the Presidium. The Presidium suggested
congressional approval of the chairman of the Council of Secretary-Generals
(of the executive organ of the UEVR). He appointed the individtal secretary-
generals.; such as, for military affairs, foreign affairs, internal affairs,
finance, etc. The Supreme 'Commander of the UPA, General Taras Chupriakal
became Secretary General for Military Affairs, Mykola Lebed became Secre-
tary General for Foreign Affiars? and Rostyslav VoloshynPavlenko? who
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Was killed later in,19441 was appointed for Internal Affairs. The names of
the other secretary-generals cannot be mentioned for security reasons,
The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation addressed.a Proclamation
(called "Universal" in Ukrainian) to the Ukrainian people which was dIstri.
buted_on both sides Of the eastern front by soldiers of the UPA and by
members of the Ukrainian raaistance.
The Proclamation stated the following among other things:L/
"The:UHVR.places the following vow in .your hands, Ukrainian people,
To fight so that you:will be the only master on your soil,
To fight for a just social order without oppression and exploitation,
for the destruction of serfdomand for the free laborof the Ukrainian
peasant on his soil.
To tight for the free labor of the workers, for the broad initiative
of the working population in :511 fields of economic attivi%and for
the full development of Ukrainian national culture,"
The -UTVR had the following to say about its origins:
"Various freedom loving revolutionary forces and various political
factions from all Ukrainian .provinces have united in the UHVR.. They
consider the political platform of political independence as the only
proper one,
The TEVR is the hi hest and the only governing organ of the Ukrainian
revolutionary
organization of a government of an Independent nited -Ukrainian
StatT7
eriod of its
The Ukrainian underground printed this Proclamation on the anniversary of
the founding of the UHVE in July, and distributed it in all Ukrainian
territories. This Proclamation, -whic:biLwas especially widely distributed
after the Second World. War upon the return of Soviet troops from Central
Europe, is not only, well known in the Ukraine but all over the Soviet Union.
The political Platform circumscribed the goals and tasks of the UEVR as
follows: L/
"To unite and coordinate all independent forces of the Ukraine within
and.outside the country.,.
b,
To set up the ideological program of the Ukrainian peoples independence
struggle,
To lead-the entire liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people until
the achievement of independence and the organization of the organs
of government for an independent :Ukraine.
d.? To represent the struggle of the Ukraine at home and abroad as the
supreme all.Ukrainian center,
To create the first Ukrainian government and to call the first popular
assembly,"
Mention is made of the political and social platform in Paragraph II,
Point 6:
"The UHVR.adopts the following political and social platform for the
unification of Ukrainian revolutionary forces:
es" The ensuring of a democratic political constitution for the Ukrainian
state by popular representation.
The ensuring ....freedom ofopinion, of philosophyiand of religion.
The ensuring of a just social order .,.
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f. Ensuring the rights of all national minorities
d in other points;
e "T'reectom of dii:,dittzenkaefore lee
h? "Freedom of initiative in economic activity"
"Socialization of natural resources"
in the
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Ukraine."
k, :nUtionalization of heavy industry and communications, the transfer
of light and food industry to cooperatives"
1. "Free trade"
in. -"Free craftsmanship"
n 6
Protection of the workers through social legislation."
Point 7 speaks about "the alliance with 411 oppressed peoples of Europe
and AsisUleho fight for their freedom and recognize the Ukraine's right to
, political independenee. Point, 8 speaks about "understanding and cooperation
\ with all the neighbors of the Ukraine on the principle of mutual recog-
nition of the right to a state within the ettehnographie borders of each
people."
The Provisional Constitution of the UBVRI.whieh the founding congress adopted
""---4-r?r]'--=----a.iss.tillvalidtoinJyl9andulday, is one of the most important
documents, lj Among other things it get forth:
nl, The UBVR is the supreme organ of the Ukrainian people during the
time of its revolutionary struggle for an Ukrainian state,
The source of power of the UMR is the will of the Ukrainian people
which has expressed itself in the efforts of all active forces of
the people for independence.
.Any nationally active Ukrainian can become &member of the UEVR
providing he recognizes the Platform of the UBV.R.andis at all
tittles prepared to assist in the realization of it.
5. The:UBV.R.can increase its 25 members through cooptatidin, These
cooptations are executed on .the recommendation of the Secretary
General through the Great Congress (Veliki air) of the UHVB
or the Presidium.
The =Vie active through the following organs: a) the Great
Congress, b) the Presidium with the President at the head, c)
the General Secretariat headed by the Secretary General, d) General
Court of Justice headed by the Chief Jueticeleand e) the Comptroller
Body headed by the Comptroller General,
.1i The UB:VE is_located in the Ukraine. It can send delegates abroad"
The powers of the Great Congress are more exactly defined in Section II,
.Paragraphs l8 of the Presidium and the President in Section III, Para-
graphs 1434 of the General Court of Justice in Section VI Paragraphs
and ,of the Comptrolling Body in Section VI, Paragraphs
Section IV has the following ,to say about the General Secretariat:
-"1 The .General Secretariat is the executive organ of the UBVR.
.2e The General Secretariat ia.domposed of: a) the Chairman (Secretary
General) of the General Secretariat, b) the Secretary for Internal
Affairs) c) the 'Secretary of Foreign Affairs, d) the Secretary of
Military Affairs, e) the Secretary for Finances and Economic
Affairs, and f) other secretaries.
The Great Congress of the UlIVR elects the Chairman of the -General
Secretariat,
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The Chairman of the General Secretariat appoints the secretaries
to their posts and the President of the UAVR confirms them.
10. The General Secretariat reaches decisions by majority vote. ?"
The political platform of the UAVR established the following to eliminate
angmdsinterpretations and misunderstandings in the future:
The initiative for organizing the TJAVR belongs to the URA_ in the operation
of the armed struggle of the Ukrainian population against the plundering
and violence of the occupiers of the Ukrainian lands.
In the fight against the Russian Bolshevist conquerors of the Ukraine
the following leading Ukrainian personalities and members of the WIVE
met their death:
Rostyslav Voloshyn-Pavlenko organizer of the TWA in Volhynia and
Polessiya? Chairman of the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the
OUN in August 1943, Chairman of the First Conference of Oppressed
Nations (also reported as the First Conference of Enslaved Peoples)
in November 1943, Chairman of the First Congress of the UBVR in July
1944, and the Secretary General of Internal Affairs, was killed in
August 1944.
b. Yosip Pozyezaniuk-Shuhay? a revolutionary from the Soviet Ukraine,
well-known young poet, organizer of the TWA in the Zhitemir and Vyn-
nytaya areas, a member of the First Conference of Oppressed Nations,
and a member of the UliViirwas killed in February 1945,
Peter Mykola Halant, Chancellor of the Ukrainian Catholic Archdiocese
in Lvov and a member of the UEVR?was killed in June 1945.
Also killed were Dr. Yuri Lypa, .Chief of the Medical Service of the Western
TWA Group, and a well know 1, inian physician and writer; Peter Romen-
Rafael Khomyn? frier of the Studiten Order; Kharitina Kononenko, a well
known Ukrainian suffragette in Volhynia; etc.
The delegation sent abroad, designated the Foreign Representation of the
UAVR (76kordonne Predstavnyztvo UAVR)? is the only authorized representation
of the Ukrainian underground movement and its leading political and military
organs
This Foreign Representation was sent abroad towards the end of July 191111.
It consists of several members of the UBVR. Some of its members are:
Prof. Dr. Ivan Erynioch of the Presidium of the ISM, Mykola Lebed, Secre-
tary General for Foreign Affairs, and Mts. Darla Rebet. Other members of
this delagation cannot be named for security reasons. The cited names
have already been mentioned officially in the Ukrainian emigration circles.
The Foreign Mission otthe UM, headed by Major I. Hucul? is subordinated
to the Foreign Representation, The TWA soldiers who had the task of
fighting their way to the west, still constitute the so-called "Raid
Detachment of the TWA Abroad" and are commanded by their senior officer,
Major M. Baida,
X. The End of Fit in Euro The struggle of the TWA Continues - An
/2s.aloftheLeadersotheOlat._
The Presidium of the UHVR and the High Command of the TWA issued appeals
after the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, which stated that the struggle
of the Ukrainian people continued. Calling upon the Ukrainian people for
perseverance, endurance, and the support of the TWA, the Presidium contended
that it was now a question of a- more difficult struggle with Bolahevik
totalitarianism.
The following citations are characteristic of a declaration of aolidarity
by the Provid of the WE:
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The struggle of the people oppressed by the Soviet Union shall be
conducted with the following revolutionary watchwords:
For the destruction of Muscovite Bolshevik imperialism, which drives
Whole populations to war.
For the overthrow of the Stalin regime,
For the com lete democratization of the entire olitical and
/mblic life,
For the realization of national political selfdetermination and
political separation.
For the organization of a just system. of states which shall
be based on real friendship and cooperation involved in the
watchword: ,"Freedom of all peoples and all .mankind."
We number the Russian people among the oppressed_nationalities of the
Soviet Union. The imperialist elements of the Russian people, whO
offered their services to Stalin and his clique?.became the enemies
,of their OWA people
And later one of the most important declarations: "Wey the Frovid of the
OUN$ remain.anthe battlefield for Independence with our people in the
Ukrainian homeland..." (This declaration was first published abroad in the
monthlrperiodical Vyzvolna Politika- Vol. III, No..1 (18), January 1948.)
All of these appeals made an especially strong impression on the Soviet
troops returning, homelmany of whom spread them throughout the entire
Soviet Union. Some Soviet officers made contact with the UPA,-passed
over into itsor declared that they, knew what Side to fight on in the hour
of national revolutions.
,This attitude of officers and men forced the authorities in the Soviet
Union and in the Soviet Ukraine to use only special MVD and,MGB detachments
(police and security troops) in the fight against the UFA. ,The command
,of these troops was in the hands of Vasil Stepanovich Riasny, Security
Chief in the Ukraine and a Lieutenant General of the Police, who together
With the Soviet Partisan General Novak led the "fight against the parti-,
Sans",
Toward the end of 1946, when the UFA changed its tactics and.Riasnyfs
troops ceased to show any important successes, Riasny was relieved of his
command. He appeared again in 1949 when he commanded the MVD and AGB
troops in Carpathia, Volhynia, Polessiyal and Podoliya -(Zhitomir and
Vynnytsya), The fights here began in May 1949, and toward the end of
August Riasny was decorated with the Order of the Red .Banner.
XI. The year 1946 Change of LTA Fighting Tactics - The Ukrainian Underground
NeWsplers 11,1ea 12,Liatja4 and IndeDendence
In 1945 :the ITA carried on raids from its main areas of activity into
other Ukrainian territories like Podolia, Odessa, Bessarabistrand into the
neighboring territories of Rumania, Hungaryl,White Ruthenia, and even the
Baltic states. The world press gave the most publicity to the raids into
Slovakia..
The world press also reported the heavy fighting of UFA Group Westmark
in the territories West of the Curzon Line where an effort was made to
protect the Ukrainian population from the violence of the Bolshevik Polish
police authorities and compulsory resettlement in the Soviet Union. The
Press unfortunately twisted the truth in significant matters..
In the winter of 1945/1946 there was hardly a day of no fighting and
all TWA units had a hard time, The fighting increased In the following
spring after the TWA had undertaken successful action against the elections
to the Supreme Soviet on 10 February 1946, The Soviet police and security
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forces bad to strengthen their action against the UPA. The Ukrainian
situation at that time is reported in detail in the underground periodical
of the OUN Ideya i. Chyn, Vol, 5, No. 10 and. in Samostiynist? the organ
of the UBVB, Vol I, No. 1. The organ ofthe UBVR especially gives an
accurate account about the struggle of the Ukrainian people. It was
moved abroad in 1949.
The artiCe about the "Terror of the NKVD Garrisons" published in it
from pp 116-128, gives exact information which makes it clear that during
the elections 2000 to 5000 NKVD soldiers were stationed in every Ukrainian
raion? 25.100 per vilkAge
.1Ie article "A TragiComedy,of the Elections" (pp, 128-138) pictures the
electoral methods of the "democratic" Soviet Union, which are not inferior
to those of Fascist countries in anything,
The article "Combat Performance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army" enumerates
UPA'a encounters between January and July 1946.
The main articles Of the periodical Independence are:
a. "The Vileness of the 20th Century", an excellent analysis of the
untruthfulness of the Bolshevik regime in all areas oflrolitica17.sociaL
and Cultural life with many examples, (pp. 11,68).
b, O. Honcharuk - -"The Ukrainian Insurgent Army as the Bearer of the
Ideal of Liberation and Friendship of all Peoples" (pp. 68.96) In which
the ideal of the UPA is clearly presented. Citations from its pamph
lets and appeals illustrate the cooperation with the undergrounds of
other peoples,
c. 0, Bornovy - "About the Freedom of Press in the Soviet Union" (pp.
96,116). This unmasks the Soviet press as an instrument .of oppression
and deception of the Soviet government.
Besides this, the periodical published the Appeal of the UBVR of November
1946 and 7 October 1946.
Although we cannot go into these documents in detail in this discussion,
we should. like to point out that, among other things, the appeal of Novem-
ber 1946 declared: "The Foreign Representation of the UENR (ZPUBVR) shall
inform the world about the situation in the Ukraine, why, the Ukrainians
are fighting, and for what. It shall unmask the deception of the Bolshevik
regime and popularize the independence struggle."
The ordinances published the distinctions gained by individual UPA commanders.
The ordinance of 9 February. 1946 announced that Lieutenant Colonel Tares
Chuprinkal the Supreme Commander of the URA, had been prompted to the rank
of general, effective retroactively, P11,22 January 1946. Vychyty, the
commander of TWA Group West, was promoted to colonel; and Captain Bavrysh?
who was of Jewish origii and who headed the medical service of the group,
was promoted to Major.
The Periodical "Men, Rnd4fttiop
The Glint main press organ, Ideya I Chyn0 published a detailed and profound
interpretation of the political and social program of the organization by
P. Poltava entitled "Revolutionary Elements of Ukrainian Nationalism".
PoltavO seep the strength of the Ukrainian resistance movement in its
democratic idealism and clearly circumscribed social prograd. Both give
the Ukrainian people a strong support in the struggle for political and
national independence.
Poltava's discussion0 which appeared in the Munich weekly emigration
paper Ukraineka Trybuns No 15 - 23, from 13 March to 15 May 19490 aroused
heated discussions in all emigration papers on both sides of the Atlantic.
The arguments revealed that only. Ukrainska Tr7buna, which was cose to the
Foreign Representation of the MR, and Vpered (Forwards) in London defended
the principles of the Ukrainian resistance movement in the homeland.
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The periodical Ideya i Chyle made a report of the resolutions of the Fourth
(Extraordinary Great?) Congress of the OUN which had struck a balance of
the three year struggle since the Third EXtraordinary Great Congress
in 1943, when it met in June 190 in the Ukraine,
The content of VoluMe 50 No. 1.(lis made up of a report about the fighting
Ukraine and A few political articles analyzing the Leninist interpretation
of Marxism in. the Stalinist adtuality.
Change of Tactics of the Ukrainian Underground Movement
The months of difficult fighting in 1945 and during the first few months
of 1946 forced the Nigh Command of the UPA to change their fighting tactics.
Until the middle of 1946 strong units of the UPA, about 100 250 men
strong operated in and controlled large areas where they also maintained
their own administration. These tactics were leftovers from World War II
when the front in the east constantly changed and neither the German
nor the Russian occupation forces were sufficiently strong to completely
control the entire area.eegalattarefightinreatillatUnghSt15214/1athe Bolshe-
viet rcgime proceeded energetically, with the support of local Party
grOups and MVD/MGB units, to expand its administrative apparatus up to
the smallest and most remote village. Only the large forest areas in the
northern Ukraine ahd in the Carpathian Mountains offered protection to
UPA anits,
The larger fighting units in the strength of a company, battalion/ and
regiment had to be reduced in order to insure their flexibility. Therefore,
groups of 15 to 30 men were formed and they had to carry out raids at all
timea. Earth bunkers were built in the distant, impassable wooded areas
of Poleasiya and Zhitomir0 and in the Carpathians Mountains. These bunkers
became the garrisons of the UPA. 12/
The camouflage of the earth bunkers prevents them from being found and the
Soviets cannot put thkir hands on the small UPA units because they are so
mobile. The armed struggle goes forward in spdte of everything, demanding
the greatest readiness for sacrifices Of the part of the UPA soldiers
The resistance struggle could only be continued because of the Ukrainian
people who supported their troops in the face of a terror which was carried
ad abaurduM, The significance Of the resistance lies in the destruction of
the Myth that the MVD/MGB apparatus is almighty.
Neither the most brutal terror nor the enticements of the Soviet regime
could force the Ukrainian people to give up it resistance, as Independence
and Idea and Action have reported*
M. lirechakha? the President of the Soviet Ukraine,. and Nykyta Khrushchov?
the Secretary General of the Communist Party and a member of the Stalinist
Politburo, issued amnesty appeals 12 February 1944 and during the course
of 1945 urging the UPA soldiers to give up/ Since the struggle has came
to be for the existence or non-existence of the Soviet dictatorship in the
Ukraine and the Soviet Union, and there are no more appeals which speak of
the "Forgiveness of the Soviet government and the Soviet fatherland".
XII. Princi les of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement
The title of this chapter is taken from a book of collected materials
dealing with the 44aostions of the struggle for an independent Ukraine which
the IIPA soldiers brought to Western Europe in their raid of 1947.
It contained the following articles: P, Poltava "The boncept of An
Independent Ukraine and the Universal Tendency of Political Development
in the Present"; 0. Rornovy - "At the Bolshevik Ideological Front"; and
U. Kushil - 'The Seientific Foundations of Dialectical Materialism".
Since leading members and publicists of the underground in the Ukraine
wrote these discussions, they reveal the secret of success of the revolu-
tionary resistance, The discussions included a treatment of the spiritual
principles 0 the independence struggle and future constitutional problems,
social policy, and economic and cultural questions*
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The common denominator of these articles is, as P. Poltava wrote" that the r.
motivating power of the national idea", the democratic .political consti-
tutionjand the concept of life, social justice, and economic democracy
Connected with political democracy only can assure the freedomof the
individual and. of peoples.
The discussions which came from the fighting homeland provoked attacks
from the Bandera.end Melnyk groups, whose nationalism differed from the
one in the homeland. These two emigration groups accuse the resistance
movement in the Ukraine of Socialist deviation and seek to slander it
with the name of national Communism. 41,4/ In the first place The Principles
of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement ve nothing in common with Marxist
Socialism, and in the second place they are only extensions of the theses:
in the program adopted by the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the
OUN which met in August 1943.
The task of this discussion does not include going into these principles
any closer,
XIII, The Messenqrs ofthe-Ukrain iFifl,Libaration-4trmggieL14-Mestern,Zuro e
In September 1947 the world was startled to hear about the breakthrough
of UPA units through Poland and Czechoslovakia to Bavaria., ,Thip armed
raid _commanded by Major M. Baida.was undertaken to prove to the world
that the fight for liberty continues in the Ukraine and to develop world
understanding for it.
In. the summer of 1947 several UFA units received the order from the High
Command-of the TWA to fight their 'way-through to the west similar to
the armed raids into Slovakia, Byelorussia, Rimmitia, Hungary, and the
Baltic countries. To the amazement of the whole world these units succeeded,
Several small detachments arrived as late as 1948 and two more small groups
followed in July and August 1949, .Another task of these raids wasto offer
mi1it4g, protection to couriers of the Presidgm of the Ukrainian Supreme
Council of Liberation sent ttu Jepre.Is thei-pnly
way to get through the double iron :curtain, the first one at the Lubeck -
Laibaoh line, the second,at the borders of the Soviet Union.
This first breakthrough of the UPA to the west is extensively discussed
in the book The UPA inJ.testern.Europe? New York..Paris-London, 1946, pub-
lished by the UlirainianPress dervice (UPS) with the aid of the Foreign
Representation of the UTVR, .AMOnvother things, this book mentions the
tote of Mykola Lebed, Secretary ,General for Foreign_Affairs of the UAW,
to George C. Marehall?.US Secretary pf State) asking for the right of asyl.um
for UPA soldiers, The book also Contains an appeal of the Foreign Repre-
sentation,of the UAVR to the entire civilized,
Those UPA soldiers who are outside the Soviet orbit and who have not received
orders to make their way back home form the Raid Section of the UPA abroad.
Through the Foreign Mission of the UPA it is politically subordinate
to the Foreign Representation of the UBVR. The task of the command of .
the Raid Section is to take care of UPA soldiers coming with orders from
the UPA High Command.
Any UPA soldiers abroad ,who intend to be active in party politics are
released from the "raid detachment' and assume the status of former UPA
soldiers and of political emigres, As such they do not have the right
to appear publicly, in the name of., the UPA.
wo A Fighting Front of Oppressed peoples
-
The .UPA's armed and the Ukrainian underground's political revolutionary
struggle aim not Orily at the liberation of the Ukraine but of all people
oPloreSsed by the totalitarian Boldhevik regime. This is clearly estab-
lished in the fundamental documente Of:the Ukrainian resistance and in the
numerous appeals and pamphlets isided:to the representatives of other
peoples in the Soviet and German arpies.
nese principles are obligatory for the UPA's armed struggle and for the
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practical policies of the UHVR.
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Because many Eastern European and Asian nationals have gone over to UPA
since the summer ef 1943, the High Command of the UPA decided to form
units of foreign nationals which are completely autonomous though subor-
dinate to the UPA High Command tactically and operationally.
In the fall of 1943 an entire battalion of the Azerbaidzhan Legion ere several
companies of Turkestanians and Georgians joined the UPA. The UPA High, Command
developed a plan to call a political conference of representatives of these
nationalities and to forma Fighting Alliance for the Liberation of Oppressed
Peoples. The soldiers of foreign nationalities warmly, welcomed this plan
and a special committee was formed to prepare the program of such a congress.
The First Congress of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Soviet
Asia took place in the east,Volhynian forests fran 1 to 22 November 1943. The
day before, a German police battalion attacked the region in which the
congress was to take place and the members of the congress also partici-
pated in the combat actin s epithet the German police.
Thirty-five delegate frog 13 nations participated in thie congress. There
were AkereAeerbaidZhaeians? one Bashkirian, two Byelorussians, four Armenians,
six Georgians, one Kabardinian, one Kazakh, two Ossetians, four Tatars,
five Uzbeklans? one Cireasseene-one-eChuvashiene-andeteneadditionaI, guests
.of .honor of various nationalities.
The resultsc of tliseeorcgreeteetirerettile?"Reeeleatieneeefette7Firstedengress
of Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Soviet AMA" and a common pro-
clamation Jac) the oppressed peoples".
Among other things, the resolutions stated that "the First Congress of the
Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Soviet Asia welcomes the heroic
struggle of the peoples of Western and Central Europe and declares its
solidarity with then."
The coordination of a common struggle against Bolshevik imperialism :which
was getting ready to flood Central Europe was another result of this
Congress.
The pamphlets which gave the goals of the struggle of many individual
peoples and which were widely distributed in the Soviet Army achieved
significant success.
In 1945 and 1946 the "foreign" units of the UPA asked to be disbanded
and the insurgents returned through semi-illegal Nays to their home countries
in order to carry the fight for liberation to their people. Many of these
soldiers and. officers -however, remained with the UPA and are still fighting
in its ranks.
At present singe pamphlets are distributed in all of the USSR calling
for a fight for liberation. Such individual pamphlets appear everywhere:
in Moscow and in Kazakhstan, in the Donbas and, in the Transcaucasus? and
in Leningrad and ineKagnitogorsk.
These facts should not be overestimated or played up as. sensations. But
they should not be underfstimatede for they are like a snowpile which
has begun to ,move and may be. turned into a enos011idee-iCe -eLun kc..1-ve
7-e
The Soviet dictatorship has been wounded in its Achille0 heel: the unsolved
question.of nationalities policy and the social contradictions of the
regime.
XV. Conclusions
The armed struggle of the UFA, politically guided by the UHVR, forms one
of the greatest dangers to the Bolshevik regime of the Russian people.
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This regime, "which thirty years ago with the outbreak of the Bolshevik
Revolution prevented the Russian empire from falling apart into its con-
stituent nationalities, has become the last expression of Russian imper-
ialism.
Lenin and after him even more Stalin became the preservers of Russian
imperial unity, In this way they were the suppressors of the only true
motive force in history, the idea of the nation, This raises the question
of whether imperialist tendencies can in the long run resist the national
idea.
The development of the Soviet Union and the consequences of the Second
World War lead to a negative answer. Not even the cruelest methods of
terror or the most artful measures of .oppression can hinder the advance of
the national idea.
rack 0. au> 0 ops
o
as,40.04*,
a
The fight of the peoples of the $oviet Union cannot only be regarded
from the standpoint of these peoplese but must also be considered from the
international viewpoint, from the standpoint of other national interests,
Ifit was appropriate to begin this discussion with the writing of Mr,
Picton Bagge to the national government of the Independent Ukrainian
Republic, then it is not out of place to conclude with the observations
of another British diplomat who, even though he had no relations with the
Ukraine, correctly evaluated the situation,
Viscount E. d,Abernon? the first British ambassador to the German Republic
after the First World War, noted the following in his diary An Ambassador
of Reece, (See pages from the diary (Berlin 1920-1926), Vol, 1.31 London
1929.1930 under the date of 30 August 1922):
'British policy faces the question of whether .a large, unified. Russian
empire is desireable for us? American gives .a decidedly affirmative
answer to this question probably because it needs a strong Russia to
counterbalance, Japan. It is certainly not in the English interest,
India is severely threatened as long as there is a strong Rnssia.
The Balkanization.of Central Europe is regrettable but the Balkani-
zation. -of Central Asia would be an unquestionable relief for British
policy, The division of Russia into several states with stronger
trade interests rather than political ambition would be more favorable
for our position on the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean area than
the reconstruction of a mighty empire. The secession of the Ukraine
would unquestionably make the situation on the Black Sea more secure
and healthier and. facilitateaoommercial control of the straits as
a balance to a political control?'
Since this entry was made, twenty-five years have passed, and twenty since
it became public, The Second World War has demonstrated that Viscount
(PAbernon, evaluated the Ukrainian problem very clearly whereas the poli.
ticiana of the democratic west did not, A proper evaluation of the national
forces in Eastern Europe during the Second World War would perhaps have
led to the overthrow of Hitler and Stalin and brought about a proper
balance of power on the European continent,
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Comments:
for another report on the history of the Ukrainian resistance
movement covering the period 1900-1947.
25X1A 2. lists the 1929 Vienna Congress as the third rather
3-rflowever, all previous accounts list it as the first,
lists the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists as taking place in
Berlin in 1927, the Second Congress in Prague in 1928, and the Third
Congress in Vienna in 1929.
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