RECENT INDICATIONS OF PEKING'S VIEWS ON TAIWAN QUESTION IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-16-1-81-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 81
• Publication Date: August 20, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/27: LOC-HAK-16-1-81-3
V 1P
,August 2O, 1971
~,ecent Indications of Peking's Views on
Taiwan Question in Sir-American
Relations
central question in flaw-American, relations (despite what Chou En-lai
estop about the need for the prior resolution of Indochina
14,
told
hostilities), ate -]Peking's position an this issue has not altered
No nati +aa could give a promise not to
recover its sovereign territory by any means possible. F
raou
lst might make a statement to President Nixon which the U. .
could itself interpret as Chinese intent to avoid the use of force toward
Taiwan.
That the U. S has already
changed its stance on Taiwan was demonstrated by the fact that your
tams with Chou En-lai continued for 20 hours. Given the U i. policy
change, China must not miss the chance to negotiate.
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49 -
,~ RN
ET /NO EQ
As described in the State memorandum to you at Tab A, We essay
makes the point that negotiation is a form of confrontation by other
neans, and in the present context of your Peking visit and the
President's upcoming China trip is probably intended to reassure
those Chinese who fear that negotiating with the U U. S. implies an
abandonment of revolutionary fervor or confrontation with the U. S.
SECAET/NOFORN
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 X111881
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V W,
August 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Mao Quotes and the President's
Trip to Peking
In connection with President Nixon's trip to
Peking, Chinese officials are being asked to study
certain selections from the writings of Chairman Mao
and Lin Piao. The selections have been related by
analogy to the opening of PRC negotiations with the
US.
is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, going t negotia ion
is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to go before,
and also right to go this time; in both cases we have
given tit-for-tat."
The quotations go on to suggest, however, that
the PRC may be "prepared to make such concessions as
are necessary and as do not damage the fundamental
interests of the people." "Subject to the principle
of not damaging the fundamental interests of the
people, it*is permissible to make certain concessions
in exchange for peace. . ., which the people of the
whole country need." "Stick for stick and carrot for
carrot. Such is the revolutionary dual policy."
The quotations, the most relevant of which are
derived from Chairman Mao's discussion of Communist
negotiation with the Chinese Nationalists in "?rink,ng
shortly after World War II, are obviously intended to
reassure those Chinese who fear that negotiating with
the US implies an abandonment of revolutionary fervor
or confrontation with the US. They emphasize that
negotiation is a form of confrontation by other means,
remarking that "sometimes, not going to negotiations
A t' s
CONFIDENTIAL
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One quote hints at the PRC's official interpre-
tation of US motivation in seeking negotiations when
it refers to the factors which brought Chiang Kai-shek
to negotiate with the Chinese Communists after World
War II: "The subjective desire of Chiang Kai-shek is
to maintain his dictatorship and destroy the Communist
Party, but many objective difficulties stand in his
way. Therefore, he has to be a little realistic. He
is being realistic, and we are realistic too. He was
realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in
going to negotiate with him."
(NOTE: The source of these particular quotes
is the July 26 edition of a Hong Kong Chinese-language
caper, WEN HUI PAO. The articles from which they are
taken, particularly "On Chungking Negotiations" are
now being read throughout China in Mao Thought study
sessions in accord with the quoted Mao dictum: "Policy
and tactics are the life of the party; leading comrades
at all l cat e7 s must rri trra thAm f u l l I. attention and must
never on any account- De negligent.")
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/27: LOC-HAK-16-1-81-3