MEMO FROM MR. HELMS ON IRAN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
October 1, 2009
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 2, 1970
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5.pdf81.03 KB
Body: 
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5 MEMORANDUM IP THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRET SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MSSINGER FROM: Harold H. Saunders SUBJECT: Memo from Mr. Helms on Dick Helms has sent you the attached memo INFORMATION Essentially Ambassador MacArthur has concern that certain bureaucratic turnings in Washington might undercut what the Shah believes is a commitment by the President to provide a substantial number of F4 and C130 aircraft. The bureaucratic state of play is that the Defense Department has asked the intelligence community to do a SNIE on the military threat to Iran. This is somewhat like the .Arab-Israeli situation in that the visible threat is probably not great enough to justify as much hardware as the Shah wants. However, the Shah is building not just a military establishment suited to the threat, but a deterrent as well. An effort is already being made to broaden the framework of the SNIE so that it will not turn out to be so limited as to make it more difficult for us to operate from a broader view of the situation. However, the SNIE by itself obviously will not make policies. The decision on the number of planes to be sold will be made over the next couple of months, and we will have a crack at it in the normal bureaucratic machinery. Essentially, this decision will be made with the President's general commitment in mind, although not perhaps without some argument. In passing on the attached memo, therefore, I simply want to reassure you that I am on top of this problem and will continue to work -- along with Joe Sisco -- to make sure that the President's general promise is not undercut. SECRET SENSITIVE OSD review completed ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5 ipt25x1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5 SECRET SENSITIVE -2- The broader problem with Iran, of course, is that as long as the military credit program is held up we will not have the assistance of Iran that will permit it to proceed with financial confidence. " SECRET SENSITIVE No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5 25X1 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5 25X1