NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC IMPORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-538-3-3-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 19, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-538-3-3-8
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET
NSA (pages 1-6), DIA (all pages)
reviews completed
INFORMATION
October 19, 1973
(CONTAINS CODEWORD)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN V4'
North Vietnamese Military and Economic
Imports
CIA/DLA, at our request, prepared a report (Tab A) on North Vietnamese
military and economic imports which concludes that Sino-Soviet military
aid continues at reduced rate but that such a cutback has only a minimal
:effect on Hanoi's immediate offensive capabilities. The report emphasizes
that our information is extremely sketchy and contains only the best
indicators of recent imports. While stipulating that there is no conclusive
proof of post-cease-fire deliveries, it acknowledges that Hanoi probably
still is receiving "some" military equipment. Drawing on.somewhat weaker
information not cited by the report, we are more confident that possibly
substantial military imports are continuing. George Carver, in his
covering memorandum (Tab A), comes to the same conclusion.
25X1
The CIA/DIA study at Tab A notes the following non-categorical evidence
indicating that Hanoi still is receiving equipment:
-- Intercepted coxxmiunications in April and June revealing the
presence of two new types of significantly improved radars (TALL KING
and FLAP WHEEL) and between January and August the import of some
4, 000 trucks (800 more than observed being delivered last year in the
same period).
- The high rate of NVA logistic activity within Indochina and the
resulting circumstantial evidence that Hanoi would not be sending so much
equipment and ordnance south unless it were being replaced in the north
TOP SECRET XGDS 5B (1), (2), (3)
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TOP SECRET
with recent imports. (A related National Intelligence Estimate on
Vietnam's short-term prospects concluded that Hanoi now has moved
sufficient supplies into the South and adjacent areas to support intense
fighting through an entire dry season.)'
-- PRC-DRV military aid protocol, signed on October 5; signature of
a DRV-Soviet economic aid agreement which, however, omitted all mention
of military items. (On the other hand, the Deputy Defense Ministers of
both parties attended the ceremony.)
On the civil import side, Hanoi's total imports of economic goods in. 1973
may reach a new high of 2. 8 million tons, roughly 55% over the 1972 level
and 400, 000 tons greater than the peak 1971 year. Seaborne imports
will probably account for 1. 3cxn.iliion. tons while 1:5` million tons are expecte125xi
to arrive overland. Highlighting the scarcity of information on overland
imports, we have so far actually detected only 140, 00
land versus nearly 1. 1 million tons delivered by sea.
(Foodstuffs constitute 7017o of the observed over an
deliveries and 33% of the seaborne shipments, for an observed total of over
one half million tons. The installation of pipelines from China since 1971
has greatly increased the capability for overland POL deliveries to the DRV.)
In the area of reconstruction, the report notes that most of Hanoi's imports
represent commodities to maintain consumption and to rebuild war damaged
stocks. Hanoi's recovery efforts have been slow moving, and progress has
been limited (electric power is at about 2/3 of pre-bombing levels while
most other industries have recovered only a fraction of their pre-war
capacity.
Comment
By admission of its own drafters, the CIA/DIA report is a very conservative
estimate of DRV military imports and includes only the surest evidences
of recent deliveries. Even on this basis, we would conclude that Moscow
and Peking may well have replaced most, if not all, of Hanoi's losses in the
1972 offensive, thus allowing the DRV to pursue a military option. Other
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
less definitive evidence, however, does exist which reinforces the judgment
that Hanoi has again replenished its rear stocks of heavy equipment (at
a time uncertain) and suggests (but does not prove) that very substantial
military deliveries are continuing.
25X1
We cite the following instances to support our somewhat stronger conclusion:
-- Intercepted references on September 21 to an improved model of
the SA-7 missile being tested fired in the North (improvements very possibly
were conducted in-country).
A DIA. analysis of August 23 that doubled our estimates of existing 25X1
tank storage capacity at the NVA's principal armor park and thus concluded
that the DRV's armor inventory in the North now stands at least at 200-220.
(CIA carries a higher inventory -- 300 armored vehicles -- and privately 25X1
speculates that there may be even more tanks in storage.)
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET 4
From the above and the information provided by the attached report, we are
inclined to believe that Hanoi has been receiving very substantial military
imports and is probably not concerned about its logistics pipelines from
Moscow or Peking.
In any case, the report points up the urgent need for improved intelligence
coverage .... especially photo reconnaissance-- of Hanoi's military imports.
TOP SECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
17 October 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Soviet and Chinese Aid to North
Vietnam Since the Signing of
the Paris Agreement
1. Attached are five copies of,a,, memorandum on
Soviet and Chinese,id'to.North Vietnam prepared at your
request as relayed through Mr. William Stearman of the
NSC Staff.' As the "Key Points" on page one of the
memorandum indicate, the extent of our hard data and
factual information on this subject leaves a good deal
to be desired. Nevertheless, in the several months since
wa 7aat mcmnrialized you on Soviet and Chinese aid
acquired an appreciable volume of evidence which --
while not conclusive -- strongly suggests that a
substantial amount of military as well as economic aid
is still flowing into North Vietnam.
2. As Mr. Stearman requested, this study was
prepared jointly by the Central intelligence Agency and
the Defense Intelligence Agency. Both agencies are in
full agreement with the conclusions and all specifics
of the report.
3. I am sending other copies of this report to
Secretary Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary Clements, Admiral
Moorer, Deputy Secretary Rush, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Hummel and the Directors of the Defense Intelligence
Agency and INR.
we have
G.L. z.
Gegtge A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Copies 1 through 5
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SIGIETISSISVVIVI w
Copy No.
6
- Secretary Schlesinger
Copy No.
7
- Deputy Secretary Clements
Copy No.
8
- Admiral Moorer
Copy No.
9
- Deputy Secretary Rush
Copy No.
10
- Deputy Assistant Secretary Hummel
Copy No.
11
- Vice Admiral de Poix
Copy No.
12
- Mr. Cline
- r,1119
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 v
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Foreign Dissem
Intelligence .Memorandum
Communist Military and Economic Assistance to North Vietnam
Since The Paris Agreement Was Signed
t,.. Top Secret
17 October 1973 25X1
2
Copy No.
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