GENERAL ABRAMS' SPECIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-512-7-24-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: June 23, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-512-7-24-9
MEMORANDUM
AIM, F]ik';oly~:urJ.
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WASHINGTON k_1 A-6 blljO
THE WHITE HOUSE,
INFORMATION
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE June 23, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
SUBJECT: General Abrams' Special Assessme
Military Situation in Vietnam
Attached at Tab A is General Abrams' June 21 special assessment of
what the enemy can do in Vietnam within the next 30 days and of possible
ARV! countermeasures. The General's report is summarized below.
General Abrams believes that with our continued full support ARVN can
hold its own during the coming month and make modest progress in
regaining lost territory. The primary area of interest will be MR-1
where both the enemy and ARVN are preparing offensives. Elsewhere,
the enemy is not expected to be able to launch and sustain a major
main force offensive.
MR-1. In MR-1, the enemy despite heavy losses -- continues prep-
arations for an imminent attack against Hue. Meanwhile, ARVN prepares
for a main counteroffensive against Quang Tri scheduled to begin on
June 28. Abrams believes that ARVN's position in MR-1 has steadily
improved since early May. The counteroffensive, if it proceeds as
planned,' will probably succeed, despite minimal ARVN forces. If,
however, the enemy attacks Hue before June 28, his offensive will be
defeated. "There will be hard fighting and probably some dark days,
but the outcome should be favorable. "
MR-2. In MR-2, the enemy has suffered a major defeat at Kontum and
has logistical and personnel problems. His units have now redeployed to
restaging areas. ARVN should be able to hold its own and gradually
reassert GVN influence over some lost territories. The situation in
Binh Dinh probably will continue at about the same tempo and ARVN is
doing its best with the forces currently available.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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2
25X1
hda-I In Ma-3. the enemy's losses at An Lot have "degraded sigoIA-
cantly any further capability to launch and sustain a u*ai.xa force Offensive.:;
however, the shifting of enemy force from MR-3 to the Camibo&an
Parrots Seek area poses a throat along the boundary of IM-3 and Ali-+4.
A&V reinforcements engaged at An Lac are now being reaassigned to
MR-4. Abrams does not see a serious threat to Saigon in the coming
mouth but notes that the enemy could conduct sapper attacks for publicity
impact. ARYN caaa cope with the situation in MR-3. The major problem
continues to be deficiencies in senior level military leadership in the region.
Mme. in MR-4, the enemy's capability for any Major offensive action
similarly is reduced.
y does not have the ability to achieve
goal. 25X
ARYN has done a good job of intercepting and hurting enemy units attempting
to enter the area, but needs the reinforcement* being released from An
Loc to clean up pockets of resistance and continue effective border defense.
Q Concerning the Viet Cong, General Abrams comments that their
efforts are not expected to be of great significance during the next 30 days.
The failure of the NVA offensive has discouraged the Viet C4m# Wrastru ture,
and the North Vietnamese, in turn, are displeased with in adoquate per-
formance by YC cadre.
LS:APA:pab (Jun 22, 197Z)
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TOP SECRET
General Abrams.' June 21 Special Assessment
of the Military Situation in Vietnam
This message is an assessment of what the North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong can do within the next thirty days in South Vietnam and the:
actions RVNAF can take against this.
In MR-1 the enemy continues his preparations for an attack against
Hue in spite of heavy losses. He has the capability of launching the attack
from the north, northwest and southwest. Since early May, the RVNAF
position in MR-1 has steadily improved. Good progress has been made in
rebuilding depleted forces, command and control and fire support coordination
have improved and aggressive ground actions have been conducted. This
combination of activities has steadily eroded enemy units and logistics.
A coordinated operation was initiated by MR-1 in early June to set the. stage
for a major counteroffensive to retake Quang Tri City and vicinity. The
preliminary phase of the operation has involved the massive use of fire
power and spoiling attacks by ground forces. The tempo of action has been
gradually increased since June 1 in preparation for the main counteroffensive
scheduled to begin on June 28. If the enemy attacks in the Hue area before
the June 28 counteroffensive, and there are strong indications that he intends
to do so, I believe that he will be defeated. There will be hard fighting and
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
V
probably some dark days but the outcome should be favorable for GVN. If
the counteroffensive goes as scheduled it will probably move slowly but
should succeed. The greatest danger of a setback. is that of an enemy attack
on Hue from the' southwest at the same time the counteroffensive is moving norl
toward Quang Tri, Everything possible is being done to pre-empt this but if it
does occur, the plan is such that the forces attacking toward Quang T.ni should
be able to fall back into their defensive positions near Hue, The RVNAF is
in a good position in MR-1 to face the next 30 days although their forces
for the counterattack are minimal.
On the B-3 Front the enemy has suffered a major defeat. The main
enemy units which were involved in the fighting have deployed away from
Kontum into restaging areas. They have logistical and personnel problems
which indicate a seriously restricting resupply effort and trafficability will
progressively worsen. RVNAF should be able to hold their own and gradually
reassert GVN influence over some lost territory. In the next 30 days, the
situation in Binh Dinh will probably continue at about the same tempo until
rebuilding of depleted units enables RVNAF to reinforce there. They are
doing about all they can with forces currently available,
In MR-3, the enemy's failure to seize An Loc and the accompanying
major losses in manpower and equipment have degraded significantly any
further capability to launch and sustain a main force offensive. The remnants
of the 7th and 9th Divisions are expected to eventually withdraw to refit and
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-512-7-24-9
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TOP SECRET
resupply. The situation will now allow the release of RVNAF reinforcements
that have been engaged in the An Loc area. The Airborne Brigade is being
moved from An Loc to MR-1 to participate in the counteroffensive. The 15th
Regiment is being returned to the 9th Division in MR-4. The 21st Division is
expected.to be released from the An Loc area in the next few days and will
probably. be returned to MR-4 control although J'GS has not made a final decisic
on this. There will be some rearrangement of forces and areas of responsi-
bility along the MR-3/MR-4 boundary. The enemy intentions in the COSVN
area are not entirely clear but his shifting of forces out of MR-3 to the Parrots
Beak area poses a threat along the boundary between MR-3 and MR-4. I do not
see a serious threat to Saigon although sapper type attacks could be conducted
to make headline news and create the impression of strength. The main
problem in MR-3 continues to be deficiencies in senior level leadership which
I have discussed in detail with President Thieu. RVNAF is capable of coping
with the situation in and adjacent to MR-3 during the next 30 days.
In MR-4, the enemy's recent commitment of main force units into Kien
Thuong Province failed to seize either Moc Hoa or Tuyen Binh, indicating a
greatly reduced enemy capability for any major offensive action in MR-4.
Despite a period of refitting and resupply, the 5th Division fought with young
and inexperienced personnel, took additional heavy losses amounting to over
1, 000 in its shallow incursion into the Delta, and has withdrawn to the Parrots
Bear area.
TC)P AF.C:R 1 T
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TOP SECRET
The RVNAF in 25X1
MR-4 has beer. doing a good job of intercepting and hurting the enemy forces
attempting to enter the MR. They have shifted their forces quickly and
effectively to meet each threat. MR-4 now needs reinforcement to clean
up enemy pockets inside the MR and to defeat the enemy along the Cambodian
border. This should be facilitated by the return of the 15th Regiment and
probably the Zlst Division.
Concerning the VC, there is evidence that the failure of the NVA
invasion has discouraged the already ineffective VCI in RVN, and COSVN is
reportedly displeased over the inability of VC cadre to generate local
support for the NVA throughout the country. VC efforts, which will probably
consist mainly of sapper activity and terrorism, are not expected to be of
great significance and will. be controlled shortly after individual acts are
initiated.
During the next 30 days, I believe that RVNAF, with our continued full:
support, can hold its own and make modest progress in regaining lost
territory.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/18: LOC-HAK-512-7-24-9