STATEMENT BY HANOI OFFICIAL ON NORTH VIETNAMESE PROBLEMS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-293-2-23-9
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
November 16, 2009
Sequence Number:
23
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 28, 1970
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/16: LOC-HAK-293-2-23-9
MEMORANDUM - 24620
INFORMATION
December 28, 1970
CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
,THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MORI/CDF
C03419557 page 1 only
SUBJECT:
HENRY A. KISSINGER f'sf ,
Statement by Hanoi Official on North
Vietnamese Problems
The North Vietnamese official reportedly made the folio
points:
The war has been very difficult for North Vietnam.
There is a great difference in the strength of the U.S.
and Hanoi.
Hanoi has had great difficulty in maintaining the
flow of essential military supplies to the front.
of fighting a Maoist "protracted war" in Southeast
Asia. This policy is forcing Hanoi to "reorient its
basic strategic concept. " The current plan is "not
working out. ?
--. Vietnamization is the first step in the U. S. policy
In line with this, it leaves an "opening" in making new
a negotiated peace before Vietnamization is co plete.
it would like to get a negotiated peace "soon. " I needs
- Hanoi will keep the Paris negotiations going si Ace
proposals so as to avoid an impasse.
CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/16: LOC-HAK-293-2-23-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/16: LOC-HAK-293-2-23-9
CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
--After describing you as a "clever man, " he said that you
knew Communist tactics.
Comment: We must regard this report with some reservations, since
it is unusual for a North Vietnamese senior official to speak so frankly
in a circle which includes foreigners. However, the circumstances
under which the reported statement was made suggest that it represented
lizenuine views
then was suddenly
moved to deliver the' above recital of Hanoi's problems during an emo-
tional upsurge which no one could turn off.
We do not have any additional material indicating whether his views are
personal or whether they reflect the thinking of any important segment
of the Hanoi leadership, but they represent an intriguing indication that
beneath Hanoi's hard line there is some doubt about the future.
CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/16: LOC-HAK-293-2-23-9