MEETINGS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE OF FEBRUARY 21
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-492-8-3-4
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
March 25, 2010
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 8, 1970
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
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Body:
L ~A*1-- klt:11~k W x71
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/25: LOC-HAK-492-8-3-4
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
Henry A. Kissinger
TIME: March 8, 1970, 9:30 a. m.
Meetings with North Vietnamese of February 21
Mr. Kissinger had given Ambassador Bunker the night before a copy of
the transcript of the meetings on February 21; Ambassador Bunker had
gone over it and made written notes.
Mr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Bunker's impressions. The Ambassador
said that he was very encouraged - - this was the most forthcoming approach
in his experience, "by a good deal. " He said that he thought Mr. Kissinger's
comments on our not agreeing to the overthrow of Thieu were strong enough,
and he found it interesting that they acquiesced when Mr. Kissinger said that
we assumed they would use their influence. with the PRG after an agreement
just as we would use- ours with the GVN. They had gotten the point that
there would be a GVN at that time.
Ambassador Bunker also-found significant the rfact that they said that "for
the time being" talks between the PRG and the Saigon administration cannot
be held. He was further encouraged by the fact that Le Duc Tho proposes
to stay in Paris. [ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLYJ
He was also impressed by the atmosphere of the meeting which, he said,
indicated that they want to move forward.
Ambassador Bunker said he thought that the North Vietnamese are not so
sure Vietnamization won't work. And he agreed with Mr. Kissinger's point
that they fear the consequences if it doesn't work, since that could mean
American troops will be there for a long time.
The Ambassador said he also thought that Mr. Kissinger's statements that
a political solution must reflect the existing political realities in South
Vietnam and that a fair political process must register the existing relation-
ship of political forces had sunk in.
He found further encouragement in the fact that they had agreed for the first
time to discuss both the 10 and the 8 points. He agreed with Mr. Kissinger
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on the significance. of their saying only that we should discuss the 10 points,
and not insisting that we accept them.
In addition to these points, the Ambassador agreed with the following
encouraging signs listed by Mr. Kissinger:
-- They did not take exception to Mr. Kissinger's use of the word
"reciprocity. "
- - They did not use the word "unconditional" in referring to American
withdrawal,
-- They did not insist that the GVN be changed before serious negotiations.
-- They based their argument for dropping Thieu, Ky and Khiem pri -
marily on the grounds that the PRG would not now agree to talk with the GVN.
-- They did not lay emphasis on coalition government, or talk about the
provisional government before elections. .
-- They allowed Mr. Kissinger to make the appointment of a new chief
of delegation conditional on progress in this channel.
-- They indicated a desire for more frequent meetings, and let us
choose the time for the next meeting.
- - They have accepted a procedure for negotiations in which it would
be difficult for them to pursue their.usual tactics, . since progress must
be shown.
-- On the Monday after the meeting, Mai Van Bo thanked French Foreign
Minister Schuman for helping with the arrangements for Mr. Kissinger's
trip. Bo said that Mr. Kissinger unfortunately had been very tough, but
nevertheless the talks would continue. This was encouraging, and if.the
French leak it, it won't hurt us with the GVN.
In short, Ambassador Bunker said, he found "every aspect encouraging."
Approach at the Next Meeting;
Mr. Kissinger described the assets we have in this channel:
He speaks with the President's direct authority.
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_.. The North Vietnamese can't kick him around, since his personal
position does not depend on progress in the negotiations.
There must be progress in this channel if they are to get a new U. S.
Ambassador at the talks.
-- We will not follow the usual approach, but will stater a position and
stick with it.
Mr. Kissinger then summarized the statement he proposed to use at the
meeting, subject to' the President's approval. He said that the basic objective
is to get their agreement to the principle of reciprocity in the withdrawal of
non-South Vietnamese forces. If they accept this principle, we have passed
a fundamental turning point. We should. not get bogged down in details.
Ambassador Bunker agreed. He noted that we should not flood Hanoi with
proposals.
Ambassador Bunker specifically agreed with Mr. Kissinger's (1) stating our
acceptance of the principle of total withdrawal, (2) presenting a schedule
showing what a U. S. withdrawal-in 16 months would look like, (3) stating
our understanding of their special problem with linking their withdrawals to
ours, (4) asking; them for a separate schedule for their withdrawal, . (5) saying
there should be means of verification and an exchange of POWs, and (6) stating
that if there were agreement in'principle the technical issues could be dis-
cussed at the Majestic. (Mr. Kissinger noted that this approach would enable
them to save face, since there would not appear to be exact mutuality, . and
it would give them a tougher problem since they would have to respond or be
open to blame for blocking progress. In addition, we could always hold out
for something different when they came back with their proposal. )
Mr. Kissinger said. that this was all he intended to do at the meeting. He
would say nothing about political settlement except to ask questions, if they
raise the subject, and reiterate that we will not overthrow Thieu. He would
then inform Ambassador Bunker, who could inform Thieu, of what was said
on political settlement, in accordance with our understanding with, Thieu.
If the North Vietnani.ese accepted the principle of mutual withdrawal, the
question of a political settlement should fall into place somehow. Agreement
on this principle would put heat on the NLF to reach agreement with the GVN
on political issues.
Ambassador Bunker said he thought the whole approach was "very
tactics. "
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Mr. Kissinger-said that he wanted to be sure that Ambassador Bunker was
not agreeing reluctantly. Ambassador Bunker said, on the contrary, " he
was whole-heartedly in accord.
Informing President Thieu
Mr. Kissinger suggested that Ambassador Bunker give Thieu the essence of
the transcripts of the February 21 meetings. He should inform Thieu that it
was the President's wish that he receive. this information. Ambassador
Bunker.said that he would call Thieu's attention particularly to Mr. Kissinger's
strong statement to the North Vietnamese that we were not entering the dis-
cussions with an agreement or understanding that we will change the government
in Saigon.
With regard to informing Thieu of our. approach at the next meeting, Mr.
Kissinger said that he thought we should be as candid as possible. We would
leave it to Ambassador Bunker to judge the amount of detail into which he
should go. He should inform Thieu that we will not let the North Vietnamese
use the negotiating process to overthrow him.
Mr. Kissinger said that the Ambassador should emphasize to Thieu that
Thieu and. Bunker are the only two people in Saigon who know of this, and
Thieu should mention it to no one, including other Americans. Ambassador
Bunker said that we can trust Thieu not to talk about it. He kept his
promises to be silent about secret negotiations in 1968.
Thieu's Probable Reaction
Ambassador Bunker said that he thought Thieu would be encouraged by these
moves. He knows that while Vietnamization can lead to the end of the war
for us, it does not mean the end of the war for him. This is why he has
been publicly taking a harder line recently. He is thereby steeling his
people for a longer struggle, and is trying to overcome the effect of Big
Minh and Senator Don in lessening the resolve of the Vietnamese people.
(Thieu had, however, handled the Chau case badly.)
Thieu knows that while Vietnamization has gone well so far, there are problems
ahead for the GVN and for Thieu himself. Thieu therefore hopes that things
will go well now so that the other side will come to terms.
Thieu will therefore be "reassured" by Mr. Kissinger's meetings with the
North Vietnamese.
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While Thieu has the "usual Vietnamese suspicious nature, " he has great
confidence in the President. The President's meetings with him at Midway
and during the Asian trip, and the November 3 speech, helped build this
confidence.
Mr. Kissinger asked if Thieu'would be bothered by Mr. Kissinger's state-
ments that a political solution must reflect the existing political realities
in South Vietnam and that a fair political process must register the existing
relationship of political forces. These statements mean that both Thieu and
the NLF must have a role. Ambassador Bunker said that Thieu would not
be bothered by these statements; he is committed to the same position.
Knowledge of Meetings within the American Government
Ambassador Bunker agreed with Mr. -Kissinger's doubts about the wisdom
of spreading knowledge of his meetings with the North Vietnamese. In
addition to the dangers of leaks, knowledge of the meetings would lead to
increased pressure for a flood of initiatives such as ceasefire. They -
agreed, however, that at some point we should bring in a selected and very
limited number of people. Mr. Kissinger said that he thought the Secretary
of State should be informed, perhaps after two more meetings.
Arrangements for Keeping Bunker Informed
r-.
Ambassador Bunker said that he had set up a special procedure for back-
channel messages on this subject.
r. Kissinger said that he would send
Ambassador Bunker a brief account of the next meeting through this, channel
by the morning of March 18, Saigon time, and would then send him a full
account by
messa es. ~ 7
25X1
Troop Withdrawals
Ambassador Bunker said that he,thought the next troop withdrawal should
be for about 50, 000 men. Mr. Kissinger asked if he favored such a with-
drawal. Ambassador Bunker said that he did, if it were spread over four
months. Mr,. Kissinger said that he had been told that it might damage the
military situation. Ambassador Bunker said that the Vietnamese expect us
to withdraw about 150, 000 troops this year, and two more increments of
50, 000 each during the year would be acceptable.
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Mr. Kissinger asked his conversations with the North Vietnamese provide
a reason for balding withdrawals down. Ambassador* Bunker said that per-
haps they do. Mr. Kissinger said that he himself would therefore favor.
holding off, ",b* "hell would break loose" if we did. Ambassador Bunker
agreed.
Mr. Kissinger said that he could tell Ambassador Bunker in great confidence
that the President is thinking of making the next increment ZO, 000 men over
a two month period. Ambassador Bunker said that he would prefer this to
50, 000 over four months.
Ambassador Bunker recalled that Thieu was the one who had first mentioned
the figure of 150, 000 men to be withdrawn during the course of 1970. Mr.
Kissinger suggested that he might have been saving face. Ambassador
Bunker agreed, but said that Thieu had volunteered that the President should
decide whether to announce the 150, 000 at the beginning of the year or do it
in stages. He noted also that the South Vietnamese want us to follow the
three criteria.
Military Situation
In response to Mr. Kissinger's question, Ambassador Bunker said that
General Abrams .is doing what he can to keep on the pressure, and that
there ks no indication of contrary orders from Defense.
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