SAN CLEMENTE MEETING WITH HUANG CHEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-6-11-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 8, 1973
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/19: LOC-HAK-462-6-11-0
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
HAKTO- 40
July 8, 1973
qp
SUBJECT: San Clemente Meeting with Huang Chen
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
1. Huang and I met today for approximately 1 1 /2 hours, and then
broke for a 45 minute meeting with the President. This was followed by
further conversations in my office and a luncheon for the Chinese party
(including Mrs. Huang). While we were with the President, Mrs. Nixon
met with Mrs. Huang.
2. During my talks with the Ambassador we covered the following:
(a) My visit to Peking -- I suggested arrival in Peking on August 6
for a visit of 3 to 4 days. Huang promised to contact his Government and
let me know if the dates I had suggested were acceptable.
-- Huang said that he has been recalled to Peking and will be
leaving on the 10th. He expects to be in Peking to receive me when I
arrive.
-- I suggested we announce my trip soon, since speculation is
high. I proposed an announcement on July 12 or alternatively July 16. Huang
promised me an answer as soon as possible.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
MORI/CDF
C03363673
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-- I noted that their Vice Minister had been talking to diplomats
about my trip, and indicated that we would have preferred that nothing be
said. I admitted, however, that given our own press reports he had had
provocation.
(b) Chou Visit to the U. S. -- Huang pointing to press speculation
re a Chou visit to the Western White House, said that we must understand
that since we maintain relations with the "Ciiang Group" it will not be
possible for the Premier'to come to the U. S. A visit to San Clemente, Huang
said, would only be a "side door or back door" approach to the issue. Further,
Chou has no plans to visit the UN this year. I replied that the press reports
had not come from here. I noted that the President was prepared to make
another visit to China in 1974, but that this would be difficult if there were
no intervening visit from Chou. We agreed to discuss the question
further during my visit to Peking.
(c) Cambodia. -- On Cambodia, Huang handed over the attached
statement, emphasizing that it preceded Sihanouk's return to Peking.
I pointed out that we had made some proposals to the Chinese, of
which Sihanouk had apparently not yet been informed. Huang said that he
was sure our thinking would now be passed to Sihanouk.
-- I then reviewed our position on Cambodia:
= We cannot control what Lon Nol's people say, but we have not
been consulting with them; on these matters.
We seek a ceasefire, if necessary of only 90 days duration.
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Our objective for Cambodia is the same as that expressed
by Chou in his first conversation with you.
- We would not object if the Government in Phnom Penh were
friendly to Peking.
- Our problem is how to manage the transition without being pushed
into an undignified position. We take care not to embarrass the
PRC publicly, and expect the game in return.
If Prince Sihanouk could propose a ceasefire before I arrive in
Peking, then we could stop our bombing and move on to a
solution satisfactory to all parties.
-- Huang promised to report all of the foregoing, but said that the
PRC was not prepared to negotiate with us over the future of Cambodia.
Negotiations would have to be between the U.S., Sihanouk and the present
government.
- Before moving on the these issues I chided the Chinese
side for the remarks made upon Sihanouk's return to Peking,
as well as Chou's comments to our Congressional delegation.
During the course of our discussion your very good report of
that latter meeting reached me and I had to admit to Huang that
Chou had been provoked and we could hardly expect him to be
less than honest when pushed to give the PRC's view on
Cambodia.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/19: LOC-HAK-462-6-11-0
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(d) Nuclear Agreement with the USSR. -- I told Huang we did not
the PRC
expect/to support the agreement (in fact, it was better that they did not), but
that we would be grateful if they did not characterize it to our Congressmen
as a scrap of paper. We hope to use it with the Congress as a means of
strengthening our relationship with China. For example, speaking in the
context 'of the Agreement I was able to say that an attack on China would be
international peace.
a threat to / Without the Agreement such a statement would have
caused an uproar on the Hill; with the Agreement my comment went largely
(e) Brezhnev Visit. -- I briefed Huang on what had transpired since my
earlier meeting with him, and then turned to points raised by Chou in his
last conversation with you.
-- I said that should the Soviets attack China we would certainly not
provide arms or other supplies; in fact, we would cut off all credits and other
economic ties. It would be absurd for us, in such a circumstance, to
support the stronger over the weaker power,
I also assured Huang that we had not exchanged any nuclear
information with the Soviets, nor would we agree to do so.
3. We discussed one other item I do not want to commit to paper, but
will discuss with you next month.
4. Huang and I met with the President for some 45 minutes, during which
the President emphasized the following: our rejection of any idea of a US-Soviet
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE L EYES ONLY
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condominium; the strong interest of the U. S. in an independent and secure
China; and our strong desire to resolve the Cambodia issue in a way we
believe consistent with the views Chou expressed to you on the nature of a
future Cambodian regime. The President pointed out that the influence of all
Cambodian
interested parties would be required to enable a/settlement to be reached.
Huang promised to convey the President's thoughts to the Prime Minister.
5. I would be grateful if you would provide me with your thoughts on
subjects I should cover during my August visit, points I should make and
avoid, your estimate of PRC positions and concerns, plus anything else you
thjnk would be helpful. Since we will begin next week to plot our strategy
and begin work on my briefing papers, I would appreciate your thoughts as
soon as possible. You can then follow-up over the course of the month with
other suggestions as they develop.
Warm regards. I look forward to seeing you.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/19: LOC-HAK-462-6-11-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/19: LOC-HAK-462-6-11-0 ,,
The Chinese side informed the U.S. side earlier that as
Samdech Norodom Sihanouk was visiting in Africa and Europe, it
was yet infeasible for the Chinese side to communicate to him
U.S. tentative thinking on a settlement of the Cambodian question.
Although the Chinese side had informed the U.S. side that
negotiations between Samdech Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh traitorous
clique would be impossible, the U.S. side nevertheless openly
refused to negotiate with Samdech Sihanouk, which enraged him
all the more. However, according to news reports, U.S.
government officials have recently made some disclosures on this
question., which have given rise to various speculations. At
the same time, it is learned that the Lon Nol clique has gone
to the length of spreading the rumour that the Phnom Penh authoritii
will enter into official negotiations with the National United
Front of Cambodia very soon, with the United States and the
Chinese Communists serving as go-betweens. In spreading
such utterly groundless assertions, the Lon Nol clique harbours
ulterior mitives, wildly attempting to confuse public opinion
and forestall the settlement of the Cambodian question. The
Chinese side is of the view that such a turn of events is
extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the
Cambodian question and will even cause trouble. The Chinese
Bide cannot but bring this to the serious attention of the
U.S. side.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/19: LOC-HAK-462-6-11-0