PHAM VAN DONG'S NATIONAL DAY SPEECH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-26-5-14-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 7, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM 111,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
September 7, 1972
SECRET
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
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At your request,
September 1 National Day speech (Tab A), which concludes that the
speech indicates areas of possible flexibility- and potential for move-
25X1 ment in the North Vietnamese negotiating position. The following are
the salient conclusions.
MR. KLSSINGER
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
Pham Van Doug' s National Day Speech
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EX !;1?11" L F Kt) M vECLASSIFICATION
SCIIEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
.F.:ErifilliON CATEGORY 5B (2)
4UTOMATiCALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
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Comment: We do not share that Doug's speech indicated an25X1
new flexibility or potential for movement in Hanoi' s negotiating position.
As we previously pointed out in our own analysis of the speech (Tab B),
Doug' s speech contained unusually broad demands for complete U.S.
abandonment of South Vietnam. Not only did he expand the "point one"
military stipulations with the demand that we must ilcomplet ely dismantle
all U.S. military commitment to the Saigon administration," but called
foruthe cessation of all U.S. involvement in South Vietnam," a demand which
could scarcely be more sweeping in scope. Moreover, Doug stated that the
U.S. must "agree to the establishment of a three. segment coalition govern-
ment." We cannot recall when the other side has been this specific in
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publicly demanding our agreement to a coalition. (It is, incidentally,
interesting that Dong referred only to a coalition and not to the more
innocuous sounding "government of national concord" normally used.)
Up until now, the Communists have not been this explicit and have more
vaguely called upon us to stop supporting Thieu and cease our "inter2'5x1ice"
in South Vietnam's affairs.
It is difficult to see where Dong's
25X1 statement that an "all-inclusive solution must "be as proposed" in the
seven points, especially when read in its context. (See Tab B for text)
that Doug says nothing about ending U.S. economic and political
aid but it molts any reference to Dong's call for the "cessation of all
involvement in South Vietnam." On the other hand, the original "seven
points, clearly left open the possibility of future U. S. economic assistance
-- on Communist terms.
We do not see any special significance in Dong's omitting references to
Thieu's resignation or holding elections. A coalition by definition excludes
Thieu, and Dong would not on this occasion spell out all the details of
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Hanoi's negotiating position. Thus an omissions on h' part do not necessarily suggest "flexibility" 25X1
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Doug indicates that U.S. agreement in principle to a
coalition might, along with U. S. withdrawal, be sufficient. This does not
seem to be borne out by Doug's unusually precise demand that the U.S.
agree to the establishment of a coalition government. Moreover, it is not
quite clear what 25X1
Dong's statement that "a genuine and stable peace
can be... only the result of victory" and that "all illusions and all com-
promises on this crucial question will be very dangerous as has been
proved by so many examples found in various parts of the world." This
statement, albeit hortative and at least partly aimed at Moscow and Peking,
does not exactly reflect a spirit of flexibility. In fact, Saigon's analysis
(Tab C) focussed on this part of the speech as further evidence of Hanoi's
determination to resist pressure from Moscow and Peking to accept an
unsatisfactory peace settlement. Saigon apparently saw no signs of
flexibility in Doug's speech.
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