MESSAGE TO HAFEZ ISMAIL
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-127-6-16-7
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
January 4, 2013
Sequence Number:
16
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 11, 1973
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
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Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04: LOC-HAK-127-6-16-7
State Dept review
complete
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA5H1NGTON
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SECRET /SENSITIVE`EYES ONLY April 11, 1973
MORI
C05525256
MEMORANDUM FOR
Message to Hafez Ismail
"1. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's thoughtful message of
April 7.
"2. Dr. Kissinger agrees that U. S. -Egyptian relations require patience,
moderation and wisdom on both sides. For its part, the U.S. will make
a sincere and serious effort to put this relationship on a new basis.
"3. With respect to Mr. Ismail's assumptions, the U. S. position is as
follows:
"a. The White House has engaged itself in a serious effort
to determine whether it can play a useful role. It will not mislead
Egypt; but promise only what it believes it can deliver. On the
tither hand, it will make a major effort to live up to what it promises.
"b. The United States is not certain about Israel's reaction
since it has sought to avoid theoretical discussions. Dr. Kissinger's
understanding was'that the next meeting would involve a discussion
of what Mr. Ismail called heads of agreement which could serve as
a link to the opening of the Suez Canal as well as the overall
agreement. These would, of course, be based on Security Council
Resolution Z42.
"4. Within this context, the U. S. affirms its serious interest in movement
toward a peace agreement and is prepared to discuss possible heads of
agreement. To provide for a fruitful discussion, the U.S. side assumes
that the Egyptian side will be prepared to put forward its precise ideas
on the issues raised at the last meeting. As discussed then, it might be
useful if some of those could be sent in advance.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04: LOC-HAK-127-6-16-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04: LOC-HAK-127-6-16-7
SECRET [SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
1115. Dr. Kissinger would welcome another meeting. He would prefer
to meet in the U. S. and would find it difficult to make a special trip to
Europe at this time. However, he is planning to be in Europe for other
business about May 8 and could arrange to meet around May 9. If
Mr. Ismail agrees, Dr. Kissinger will send Dr. Trone to Egypt to
work out modalities.
"6. There is one final important point that must be mentioned regarding
the security of these talks. A report reached us late last week from
Mr. Greene, the head of our Interests Section in Cairo, of a conversation
between him and Mr. Kamal Adham. Mr. Greene reported at some length
Mr. Adham's comments on our discussions here which he allegedly
received from high Egyptian sources. For one thing, Mr. Adham
reported some points which were simply not true. For instance, he
said it was agreed that there was no need for Mr. Ismail to tell the
Soviets about the conversation since Dr. Kissinger would do that. This,
as Mr. Ismail knows, is inaccurate since it was agreed that both sides
would mention the meeting to the USSR. He also reported to Greene
Dr. Kissinger's having said that Mr. Ismail could disregard what he
might hear in the State Department. This, too, is not true. It was
Dr. Kissinger's understanding that the so-called interim arrangement
would continue to be pursued in State Department channels.
1?7. Adham also reported that the Egyptian side was offended by an
alleged phrase of Dr. Kissinger's; to the effect that Israel was now
on the Canal and there was nothing Egypt could do about it. The U. S.
record shows no such remark by Dr. Kissinger. Throughout,
Dr. Kissinger attempted to explain the realities which were needed
to frame a settlement. Apart from these and other inaccuracies, a
serious question about the security of these conversations is raised.
Dr. Kissinger must know in what channels the conversations might
appear. Obviously, his own conduct will be affected by it. If tight
security cannot be maintained, Dr. Kissinger will have to reconsider
his own participation. Dr. Kissinger would appreciate categoric
assurances on these points. Obviously, he can have no interest in
discussions whose primary purpose is to establish a villain.
'18. Dr. Kissinger looks forward to another meeting with Mr. Ismail. "
Oral Addition to the Message:
r'The U. S. side recognizes the Egyptian concerns about past
experiences It would not, however, pursue these channels if it
wished to repeat the patterns of the past. r'
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04: LOC-HAK-127-6-16-7