NORTH VIETNAMESE STRENGTH IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-10-4-18-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 17, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/31 : LOC-HAK-10-4-18-6
11111
INFORMATION
i,R-/1-725
EMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM.:
SUBJECT:
JOHN H. 11OLDRIDGE
North Vietnamese Strength in Leos
Oa Docentber It you asked CIA Director Helms for infossnetion on change.
I. North Vietnam force levels in Leos since last spring. Mr. Helms hes
responded with the attached report prepared by CIA la coordination with
DIA, NSA. and State. Its main points are as follows:
-During the last sin months the structure and strength of Communist
forces le Laos have changed significantly. Large numbers of filler per.
souse sad organic units have deployed from North Vietnam and organic
units lame deployed from North Vietnam and Smith Vietnam to south Laos,
several NVA units in north Lao* have returned to North Vietnam, and new
logistical and tactical commando have either been established or come into
prominence in south Laos. As a result of these cheeses, Communist
strength bras been imbstaatiall increseed.
.Commaaist military streagth in Laois is presently estimated at approzi
mately 127.000 men. of whom about 82,000 are North Vietnamese and about
43,000 are Peal* Lao and Dissident Nestraliete. Of this total, about
64,000 (40,000 NVA *ad 24, 000 PL) are estimated to be in combat *site,
including some 9,000 men in artillery, armor, sad antiaircraft units. About
55% of the 64,000 combat forces are deployed in wroth Laos. However. NVA
combat forests who bear the brunt of combat operations now number
27,000 in month Laos and 13,000 in north Laos. The PL combat forces, on
the other hand, remain concentrated in tits north (16, 000 in the north and
8,000 in the south).
..-The large flow of combat and logistical personnel from North Vietnam
sad the diversion of combat forces from South Vietnam to south Laos since
Last April reflect Haaoi's growing concern for its remaining logistic rotate
to its forces in time south. The Allied incursions into Cambodia in May and
June, the loss of the Sibaeonkville mite, and concern over the growing
harassment by friendly irregulars as well as the fear of large.scate Allied
ground interdiction in Laos, all probably contriinated to Hanoi's decision
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
NSA Review Completed.
MORI C05099319
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/31 : LOC-HAK-10-4-18-6
IPPlir No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/31 : LOC-HAK-10-4-18-6
W 11,
C T 2
c a higher priority this year on **curing and maintaining its toes-
Moline to the south. Tho changed situation in Cambodia also haellsd
ommuniste to expand their supply and infiltration system in south
Laos and Cambodia. They apparently Intend to us* a sow north.soutit route
La thopookoodto this year, which is generally west of their previously
established arteries. As part of the **pension, they have crontd.s now
logistics authority in deep southern Laos which extonds into isorthmeastera
Cambodia.
Estimated Strength of North Viotuetnese Army
and Patket Lao Forces La Laos
PL
Combat
Command and support
ad and support
Total c/
02 000
32000
40,000
35 000
42.000
0,00045,000
27,000
24,000
21,000
21,000
115,000
127,000
team's* is
Paths* Leo units.
1,1 Inc wines about 2,000 Dissident Neutralists.
/ Totals contain some margin of error. Actual figures could range
front 100,00e to 120.000 for /4.4* 1970 and 120,000 to 135,000
for November 1970.
In mix
orth
ECT
SIM vbs 12117/70
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/31 : LOC-HAK-10-4-18-6