HAK TALKING POINTS THE CURRENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-451-2-14-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: MISC

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-451-2-14-3
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IIP
NSA review completed
HAK TALKING POINTS
The Current Situation in Vietnam
Issues for Discussion
. Ehemy Activities
(a) MR I. Our VSSG studies last summer clearly indicated a
massive enemy effort in MR-1 into _similar to actual occurrences.
Why is it that the VC/1\1VA offensive came as a tactical surprise when
it was anticipated a year in advance? What happened to our COMINT
on enemy troop movements? Why didn't We know about the enemy's
bridge building efforts?
Enemy activity is now apparently light and the lines have
stabilized. Do we think this situation will continue? Will the enemy
accept a stalemate without making a major attempt to seize control of
either Quang Tri city or Hire? When could we be ready for such an
attempt?
ARMY review completed.
(b) MR 2. Why has the major enemy effort envisaged for MR 2 not
materialized? I have seen reference to the success of allied interdiction
effort, but is this the real reason? What is the likelihood now that the
enemy's target effort will come in Kontum and Pleiku? Could the attacks
in MR:31 and 3 be diversionary efforts aimed at spreading ARVN there?
OSD Review Completed
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-451-2-14-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-451-2-14-3
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TOP SECRET
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(c) MR 3. Why was the attack on Binh Long not accurately
anticipated? I remember clearly reports of the movement of 3 NVA
divisions (the 5th, 7th and 9th) to Eastern Cambodia prior to the offensive.
What did we think the enemy was doing with those units?
The situation in An Loc seemed to be stabilizing over the weekend.
Now, it appears that the 9th NVA division is going to be thrown against
the town, Will An L'ochold? Is the 7th NVA division still held in reserve
in Cambodia likely to be used there or against Tay Ninh or some other
target closer _to Saigon. Does everyone agree
that Ihe-7th DivisiOh-;Arili be thrown against Tay Ninh city as well as _
elements of the enemy's 9th division? What are the capabilities of this
force were the attack launched? Can the enemy attack in both Binh 1.8ng
and Tay Ninh?
(d) MR 4. There seems to be a wide divergence of views here.
While DOD reported "a large number of low level incidents on April/7-th, "
CIA reported "a sharp increase in activity" and predicted "a wide
spread coordinated series of ground probes and shelling attacks." What
accounts for these differences?
Our earlier interagency work predicted no large scale or main
force activity in MR 4. Has the infiltration of the 88th pegiment and
other units changed this picture? What are the implications of substantial
enemy offensive activity in MR 4?
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-451-2-14-3
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TOP SECRET
. Enemy Capabilities
(a) Manpower. A recent DOD estimate shows that the enemy main
forces can match the RVNAF' s main forces in number countrywide if all
(excluding the 325th)
units deployed south/are committed to battle. Isn't this much more
pessimistic than earlier estimates? What are its implications for the
eventual outcome? Doesn't it mean that for RVNAF to exceed the enemy
in strength, its reserves must be committed precisely? Can we do this?
(b) Logistics.
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the NVA
"will continue to move large quantities of supplies through the Laos
panhandle at least through April." This raises the question of how
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sustainable the enemy's offensive efforts are. Our earlier estimates
implied through mid- summer. Is this view still held?
Enemy Cbjectives
(a) What are the enemy's objectives over the next few months?
Possibilities mentioned include (a) seizure of a provincial capital(s) and
holding of territory; (b) destruction of ARVN' s offensive capabilities without
seizure of territory; (c) a major reversal of the control situation. In short,
we don't really know yet what the objectives of the offensive are.
(b) Where will the enemy's offensive actions eventually focus? Most
observers agree that the offensive will be lost for several months. If ARVN
reinforcements are to serve their purpose, it must be accurately judged
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-451-2-14-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-451-2-14-3
TOP SECRET
whether the enemy will (1) continue its MR 1 threat with diversionary attacks
elsewhere; (2) make MR 2 the eventual focus of its offensive while attempting
to hold in MR 1 and elsewhere, or (3) thrust in MR 3 and the Delta -- the
most recent focal point of their. efforts. Clearly, this judgement has to be
linked to the best guess we can make about NVN' s objectives.
TOP SECRET
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-451-2-14-3