REPORTED BOLIVIAN DISSATISFACTION WITH US MILITARY ASSISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-19-6-34-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: January 13, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-19-6-34-7
? 00396
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
Janus Y, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG
FROM:
SUBJECT:
ASHLEY C. HEWITT \
Reported Bolivian Dissatisfaction with
US Military Assistance
25X1
Bolivian President Banzer and his military chiefs were angry and
disappointed at the level of military assistance received from the
United States, and at the poor performance of the US under the Mili-
taryAssistance Program. I pressed State for an assessment of the
validity of Bolivian. complaints, and State in turn asked our Embassy
in La Paz for an assessment. A reply has now been received (cable
at Tab A).
The Embassy indicates
somewhat exaggerated, but says that President Banzer and the Bolivian
military are feeling deeply frustrated by US performance to date under
the Military Assistance Program. The Embassy points out that the
program does not differ from the one already promised to leftist
President Torres before his overthrow. However, it indicates that
Bolivian frustration arises not so much from the overall levels of
military assistance programmed for the next three years as from the
glacial pace of deliveries under the program. The fact is that aside.
from training President Banter's security guard and delivering a
moderate amount of small arms ammunition, there has been no action
under the military assistance program since President Banzer assumed
power. Moreover, substantial deliveries still appear to be considerably
in the future. The Embassy emphasizes that the Bolivian need is now.
Rightly or wrongly, the Bolivians perceive significant security threats
in the near future, and talk of armored personnel carrier deliveries in
1974 is of no interest or use to them.
The Embassy believes that there are areas where we can speed up
assistance without significant increases in the cost of the total military
assistance package to which we are already committed. It contends
that a speedup of deliveries could contribute meaningfully to Bolivia's
DOS, OSD, NSS,
Reviews Completed
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-19-6-34-7
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of speeding up deliveries under the Military Assistance Program in
order to meet Bolivia's most pressing requirements and improve the
psychological atmosphere. It seems to me we ought to be able to equip
at least one of, the mobile regiments on a crash basis and the other
within a year. In addition, trickling in A-37Bs one or two at a time
may make sense from the economic point of view, but it can only have
an adverse effect on the government and the military in a political and
psychological sense. Although I am not an expert, I also doubt the
military usefulness of this approach.' I suggest we find ways to provide
Bolivia with at least six A-37Bs simultaneously in o der to form a mini-
Embassy recommends that we move quickly to assist the Bolivian Army
in equipping two of the five mobile regiments presently planned. The
Embassy also believes we could be more immediately responsive to
Bolivia's requests for jet aircraft. Under the present program, we
are considering delivery of one or two A-37Bs a year over the next
several years under the grant program but no decision has yet been
made. The Embassy understands from President Banzer that the
Government now plans to submit a request to purchase six A-37Bs
under the FMS program, The Embassy urges favorable and priority
action on this request when it is submitted.
Our inadequate performance in the military assistance field, as per-
ceived by President Banzer and his military chiefs, is symptomatic
of the problems we face in Latin America as a whole and our method
of dealing with them. US interests were critically threatened by the
leftist Torres regime, and we moved, rapidly to support the Banzer
Government when it came to power last August. Once the immediate
crisis passed, however, our interest subsided and our programs be-
came bogged down in the bureaucratic underbrush. The facts of life in
Bolivia are that the country is inherently unstable and will continue to
be whether its government is of the right, the center or the left. Fail-
ure to support adequately a government which is favorable to our inter-
ests only insures that the pendulum will swing the other way in short
order, and that before very long we will be back where we were before
the overthrow of the Torres government last August.
I recommend that you call Arruistead Selden and explore the possibilities
psychological needs and real military effectiveness. Specifically, the
mum working squadron. ~-'"""'~""-
RECOMMENDATION:
That.you call Armistea
up deliveries to Bolivia3 ie
Approve_ Called
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-19-6-34-7