CAMBODIA FILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-460-3-5-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 12, 1969
• Content Type: MISC

C--r -141t A~k33` '
o Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-3-5-2
DOS, OSD, NGA
`Reviews Completed
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-3-5-2
IO
qPW
TOP S T
ECRE
half, operations are authorized to a depth of 20 km.
Washington approval is necessary for each mission in most
of the southern area. Teams are instructed to avoid
contact with Cambodians and not. to fight VC/NVA elements
except in self-defense.
13. Medium/low-level and high-level daylight aerial
reconnaissance operations (DORSAL FIN and GIANT DRAGON,
respectively) are currently authorized. DORSAL FIN
operations cover the border area to a depth of 20 km .
into Cambodia. Thirty DORSAL FIN operations are authorized
per month. GIANT DRAGON operations cover generally the
area east of the Mekong but also include the area around
Sihanoukville. Flights are prohibited. within 10 miles of
Phnom Penh.
15. U.S. forces in SVN.operating against the enemy
along the SVN/Cambodian border are authorized in emergency
.situations to take necessary counteractions in. the exercise
of the right of self-defense. Counteractions may include
artillery and air strikes against enemy firing from the
Cambodian side of the border against US/RVNAF troops, and
may also include. maneuver by U.S. troops, while actually
engaged and in contact with VC/NVA forces, into Cambodia
when necessary for the preservation of the force. In
.such emergency situations, no Cambodian forces will be
.engaged except in self-defense, and no Cambodian villages
or populated areas will be attacked..
16. Alternative Two - Increased military operations
in Cambodia. To date the military responses of the U.S.
to NVA/VC use of Cambodia as a sanctuary have been limited
to monitoring the size, location and activity of these
enemy forces. In addition,-the U.S. military forces have
responded with fire to attacks by fire from enemy forces
in Cambodia. It might be possible to reduce this NVA/VC
threat from Cambodia by undertaking preemptive operations
against these enemy forces in their Cambodian base areas
along the SVN border. Preemptive operations could include
ground and/or air attacks of limited depth and duration.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-460-3-5-2
 r r
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-3-5-2
to Cambodians would be minimal.
expressed statement by Prince Sihanouk that US forces could
engage NVA/VC forces in those areas of Cambodia where danger.
This course of action would be in keeping with the publicly
SVN Border - If there were a way to prevent military activity
Into their base areas would accomplish.
.18. Alternative Three - Neutralization of Cambodian/
into Cambodia from Laos and into Cambodia by sea would assist
in reducing the threats but not to the degree,that striking
17. Interdiction operations against the enemy.'s LOCs
..their normal administrative and governmental activities in this
to station forces in this area for that purpose. RKG and RVN
would be free to maintain their border posts and to conduct
jointly declared a strip of the border neutralized and subject
to the inspection of a neutral nation which they would invite
effort. It seems it-might be accomplished if the RKG and GVH
ICC. The USSR and Its allies could hopelessly sidetrack such an
by taking the problem to the United Nations nor by involving the
a neutralized border area which is to be patrolled by an outside
nation. It is apparent that this would be difficult to accomplish.
means by which this might. be accomplished would be to establish
deny to the VC/NVA the sanctuary which they now enjoy. One
in the territory immediately adjacent to the borders it would
(region, but;:they would agree not to conduct military operations:
~:"establish observation posts and conduct helicopter and ground
.:in the area, except. in self-defense. The neutral nation would
the hope that this program would remove from their national territory
foreign military forces which pose a threat to their independence,
i.e., VC/NVA forces which might turn against them should hostilities
cease in Vietnam. It is recognized that the probability of achieving
this objective is not high. Prince Sihanouk might find
possibly agreement to enter into discussions concerning increase
of trade and other economic relations. In addition to these
advantages which such a proposal would hold for the RKG, would be
possibly agreement to enter into normal diplomatic relations, and
concerning the re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations, and
`!over territory within their borders, agreements to enter discussions
an arrangement should include a recognition of their sovereignty
..Our proposal to the Cambodian Government that they enter into such,:.
patrols to inhibit the violation of the area by any third parties.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-460-3-5-2
 r 6 f
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-3-5-2
W
technical devices as we feel we can allow them to use.
,neutral zone we could provide them helicopters and such
and the fact that we have made such an effort will free
us somewhat from the inhibitions which the international
political climate already imposes on our efforts to
combat the problem militarily. To remove economic
considerations from the decision of a neutral nation we
could offer to pay' the costs and provide equipment., To,
improve the effectiveness of their surveillance of the
the international political impact should be favorable
to get a neutral nation such as Switzerland or Sweden
to participate. However, even if the attempt fails,
sincerity of his position. It may also be difficult
it unacceptable, but in coupling the proposals for
recognition of his border and resumption of diplomatic
relations with this proposal, we would truly test the
relations toward achieving US objectives of denying or
expressed interest of Sihanouk to improve US/Cambodian
19. Positive efforts should be taken to exploit the
Conclusions
20. The full range of possibilities related to this..
reducing VC/NVA use of Cambodia.
the military situation, a more comprehensive study of
problem has..not been developed. Due to the gravity of.
US options should be made.
authorities designed to protect our forces in SM.
or inhibition in any expansion of current operating
to undertake a diplomatic action which implies 'a restraint
in relation to Cambodia be evaluated prior to a_declsioL.
courses of action appropriate to achieving the US obe:o
21. That-as d ,matter of.urgency, the full'range`oo
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-460-3-5-2