AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-102-2-13-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 16, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-102-2-13-1
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Participants:
?
The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
Mr. Sisco
Ambassador Davis
Ambassador Vance
Mr. Cutler, Country Director for Congalese Affairs
r Bremer, Notetaker
Date: July 16, 1975
Subject: Africa
Distribution: S Memcon File, LPB Chron, Memcon Book, NSC-Rodma
The Secretar :(Laughingly) Davis is just trying to build his record here
on th s.
Davis: No, I'm trying to affect your mind.
The Secretary: I find it interesting that the African Bureau which six
months ago opposed Roberto because he had minimum 25X1
influence, now opposes it because the game is over and then if anyone
would win, it would be Roberto.
Davis: I think it is now a fair analysis that it is over.
The Secreta : But during the past year, I asked repeatedly for an
analysis of the situation, but AF said that no one would win so we
should not be involved. Then they said if anyone would win, Roberto
would.
You should realize that I will be facing everything you'll
face ten times worse. Everyone else is covered. But it's hard to under-
stand such a change of view. It is the same group which sabotaged my
requests for answers bygiving no answers or my requests for papers by
sending me non-papers. How can they now come to me with the argument
that it's over -- leaving aside the question of judgment. You may be right
or wrong, but a group of professionals owed it to their leadership to put
flags -- warnings -- of danger. If we do anything, I'll be the one in the
hot seat. I'm trying to teach the Foreign Service to be for the national
interest, which is what I'll do while I'm Secretary of State.
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A reasonable, patriotic, moral man can come to these conclusions
but I don't see how a professional group could come to that position over
a period of six months. If I were in the Foreign Service I would be very
disturbed by it. I can run the foreign policy of this place without the
Foreign Service if necessary. I suffered fzom the illusion that I could get
some toughness in this building. Can you name any papers that demonstrated
this?
Cutler: It goes back to the division within the bureau.
The Secretary: I understand that, but AF could have sent me papers
saying some people think this is going badly and others disagree. Instead
AF took a religious view. You knew for four months what was necessary
in the papers and what was needed. This is a question you should ask
yourselves as professionals. I know the choices and have made my own
judgment. I may be wrong and for that I am responsible; but I'm concerned
about how this state of affairs came to pass.
If Angola goes Communist, it will have an effect in Angola, in Zaire,
and in Zambia, etc. These countries can only conclude that the US is
no longer a factor in Southern Africa. We will pay for it for decades. It
will affect their orientation. They will conclude that if the Soviets can put
in massive aid and we cannot, it will mean the Soviets are the power
factor that they have to deal with. But I cannot see how professionals
could not bring to the attention of their leaders that there was a problem.
It pre-dates you Nat by many months but coupled with Indochina, it is
not a trivial thing which is happening in Southern Africa. I know others
disagree. Joes does, I know. I could be wrong but this is not a proud
institution.
On Angola, we will be giving the paper to the President tomorrow.
I am almost certain that he'll approve the six million. The State view
will be given to him unchanged and not summarized and he will get your
papers on top, too. He will get the State view and the individual views
too, My judgment is that he'll go ahead. Then what shall we do? Have
you talked to Simon?
Ingersoll: His boys are all apprised of it and he'll go along. Lynn
not.
The Secretary: Yes he vill.
Ingersoll: He wants a Presidential decision on the political basis since
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he can't support it on an economic basis.
The Secretary: We'll do it. Do a paper and show it to Lynn so that he
can't ayais views have been doctored.
on the economic side I'm 1007 sure.
Do. that paper by Friday.
Vance: I think it's urgent that I get back out there. Quite apart from the
event in Tanzania.
25X1
The Secretary: Nat, how do you explain that Carter had an American present
at Mega g ftheransom.
Davis: It was a mistake.
The Secretary: Why didn't we know? Why didn't he tell us?
Davis: That was a mistake too.
The Secretary: Why was he not called back?
Ingersoll: You said to bring him back when the kidnapped Americans were
all released.
The Secretary: Did anyone in Washington know that an American was present?
Davis: No.
The Secretary: It's a disgrace. You tell Mobutu for me that this was totally
unauthorized. It will not be repeated and there will be disciplinary steps taken.
I don't know what, just yet.
Vance: Walter and I will wait until you have the decisions.
The Secreta : The economic decision will speak for itself. Have we got
an answer on Kaunda's views yet? 25X1
Sisco: No. (Secretary makes phone call)
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Is Russian participation there known? How come they don't ever pay
a price for it?
Davis: There is a very real double standard.
The Secretary: Should we accept that?
Davis: There are ways to 8r t at that.
The Secretary: How?
Davis: If we take the choice of not doing something we can be very effective
witih that in the African community.
The Secretary Where? Zaire? Zambia?
Davis:
The OAU meeting is on the 28th.
The Secreta But what specific countries will be impressed? Will Zaire
be impressedby our non -participation?
Davis: No.
Vance: Quite the opposite.
The Secretary: What about Zambia?
Davis: Yes, I think so.
The Secretary: I doubt it. What about Nyrere?
Davis: Yes.
The Secretary: Being impressed, what conclusions do they draw?
Davis: The Africans should begin to realize that they are responsible
or their own destiny.
The Secretary: Suppose they realize their destiny is with the Eastern
Europeans and then use the Chinese to balance it off?
Davis: They've been surprisingly successful in the past decade.
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The Secretary: That was before the Soviets made one of them wing'
Davis: The fallout from the Berbera exercise was pretty good.
The Secret Well, I'm not in favor of going into Somalia. What are
your thoughts?
Vance: I don't think the Africans will denounce the Soviets.
The Secretary: Will they denounce us?
Vance: Yes, they're already doing it.
The Secret The radicals will certainly do it, but what will the impact
be on the moderates?
Vance: It will help with Mobitu. I think the Africans are not too much
alike her countries and they respect a degree of strength and success.
Davis: Then Me'd better succeed. How do we define success?
Vance: I would define success as avoiding Neto domination of Angola.
Primly that's the best that can be done.
Davis: That could even conceivably be done by some overt effort. For
example, we could get the Portuguese to appeal on the UN.
The Secretary: The Portuguese will not put it in against the Russians in the
UN. The-o"Ej-ective result of Portuguese actions will be to help Neto. Who
in Portugal will oppose Neto and support Roberto?
Davis: They want to support Roberto.
The Secrets : I don't see a basis in. Portugal from which someone would give
an order to help the opponent of Neto when Continhuo is a big supporter of Neto.
Is there any evidence that any Portuguese leader supports anyone but Neto?
Davis: The High Commissioner on the spot.
The Secretary-, But he's not going to the UN. If Antunes goes to the UN,
what will he ask?
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Davis: The only utility would be to try for a reduction of arms imports.
Itlt would have a wide support in Africa.
The Secretary; It would probably hit us more than the other side.
Davis: That's why we have to decide whether to enter the arms race
there.
The Secret : The arms race has been won by Neto. If we stop now we'd
seal the victory of Neto.
Davis: If we enter the competition in arms we must have a hope of
success.
Sisco: If the Portuguese move to the UN it will be only after they have a
c~ ear" indication thatthey read the forces there in favor of Neto and then
they will work to keep everyone else out.
The Secretary: We should not read the Portuguese taking the issue to the
ON as encouraging. Six months ago maybe we th ould have done it. I was
not gung ho for getting action but for getting a strategy. Now it would
only be a way to legitimize the outcome.
Vance: Even though Neto's forces mon in Luanda, the fact that the Portuguese
still are the government until. November will help - - if Roberto and Savimbi
are helped.
The Secret : Six months ago, Neto was the weakest of the three. Someone
had to of helped him. Six months ago your papers were sneary about Net-
They pay off on victory and not on losing in moderation.
If the President approves it, we will use the six million set aside for
a concrete program but we need to know from his how to spend it, and what
concretely will happen. Six million is not necessarily the end. You should
come back with his proposal and also his views on how he will do it with
Kuanda. I think Kaunda has to get a bit involved in this too.
Sisco: In terms of the scenario that's exactly the way; if he can pull
Kaunda in all the better.
The Secretary: My judgment of Kaunda is different from that of AF's.
I thin E he wants Savimbi to win. Certainly he does not want Neto to win.
He is very influenced by power considerations though it's done in a
missi onary way that fits his background.. However, I think he is one of the
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more hopeful phenomena in Africa. So I believe Kaunda would like it to happen.
He'll judge the chances of success.
How would Mobutu communicate with Kaunda?
Cutler: They'll see each other at the OAU.
The Secretary: When is that?
Cutler: On the 28th.
The Secreta : All right. Then you can go back out there, come back here,
and then go back out.
We need his ideas on how to proceed and-fast 25X1
Sisco: Get to see what he has in mind.
25X1
The Secretary: I think it's essential.
Vance: They're prepared to do it.
The Secretary: I'm strongly in favor.
Ingersoll: We will need congressional consultations on the aid part.
The Secretary: What is the meaning?
Ingersoll: You know, on the aid loan of $20 million.
The Secretary: You can tell him about what we have done.
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