VIETNAM AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, JUNE 25, 1971
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-489-1-14-3
Release Decision:
RIFLIM
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
April 3, 2012
Sequence Number:
14
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 9, 1971
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
C- c~ kw a l~c,~ 3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-489-1-14-3
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
July 9, 1971
MORI C05099502
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE FILES
SUBJECT:
Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting,
June 25, 1971
Ambassador Sullivan began by discussing the Pentagon Papers, He
announced that with help from CIA and DOD, the State Department was
completing its list of specified items which the Government considered
of "grave and irreparable danger" to national security as ordered by
the courts. He said that the four volumes dealing with negotiations --
which apparently is not in the hands of the press -- had been listed, as
had about seventy other pages throughout the remaining forty-two volumes.
Sullivan noted that some interesting tidbits were arising out of this whole
episode. He said that he had been involved in preparing Mr. Seaborn for
his mission to Hanoi several years ago. In doing so, Sullivan had pre-
pared a sensitive internal working memorandum for the State Depart-
m.ent's use only. Yet when the Canadians came to see Sullivan only
yesterday to check on the documents involved in the Pentagon Papers,
they showed him a copy of that sensitive internal memorandum. Sullivan
noted with wry amusement that the Canadians had marked on the cover
that it had been handed to them by Chester Cooper, shortly before
S eabo rn went to Hanoi.
Sullivan announced that former President Johnson had called the White
House on June 24 to ask if the Government would like to "review" his
memoirs prior to publication. Sullivan said that the White House had
referred the request to the State Department, and that Sullivan had been
tapped for the job.
Sullivan then turned to Congression problems. He noted that a new tactic,
"Resolutions of inquiry, " were being devised by the war critics to ferret
out classified information from the Executive Branch. There were already
four such resolutions under consideration by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee which tended to zero in on CIA operations in Laos and South
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-489-1-14-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-489-1-14-3
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Vietnam. Sullivan said that a coordinated effort would be needed to nip
this new tactic in the bud, and that special pressures should be brought
to bear on committee members. Sullivan also referred to Senator
Symington's "Laotion Resolution" which would limit U. S. spending in
Laos to $two hundred million annually (aside from the bombing of the
Ho Chi Minh Trail). Carver noted that this would effectively undercut
current CIA operations there. Sullivan remarked that Stennis was
wavering on this issue, and that the Administration should also make a
special effort to discuss it with him. Sullivan said that he had recommended
to the White House that Stennis be invited for a breakfast meeting with the
President for this purpose.
Sullivan announced that Froment Meurice, Asian Affairs Director in the
French Foreign Ministry, would soon be in Washington for his annual
pro forma consultations. Sullivan noted that this annual event had become
a rather mindless charade, but that he and Marshall Green were prepared
to carry on just for the record.
Sullivan asked General Karhohs about DOD's latest Vietnamese Improvement
and Modernization paper for the SRG. He said that the last draft he had
seen offered very little hope that the Vietnamese would be able to increase
their capacity to absorb additional helicopters. Karhohs responded by
saying that there was little point in saying anything else, since it was a
fact that the Vietnamese were unable to do any more. Both Sullivan and
Carver reacted rather cynically, and suggested that if there was a feeling
of real urgency in DOD,. programs could certainly be devised to increase
the transfer of helicopters.
Mr. Kirk reported that the U. S. delegation in Paris was encountering some
difficulty in getting military information from. MACV in Saigon. The dele-
gation had recently asked MACV about alleged NVA violations of the DMZ;
MACV had responded by saying that any information would have to come .
from Washington, Mr. Kirk asked Colonel Smith why MACV had taken
this unusual line. Colonel Smith said he was unaware of the problem, and
that he would check into it.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-489-1-14-3