THE SINO-SOVIET POLEMIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-8-21-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 29, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2014/01/02: LOC-HAK-462-8-21-7
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY fOUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
August 29, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: HELMUT SONNENFELDT
FROM: William Hyland
SUBJECT: The Sino-Soviet Polemic
Attached is a quick resume of the main themes and probable purposes
of the new Soviet polemic. You may want to send it on to Dr. Kissinger
with an addition, etc.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
?SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2014/01/02 : LOC-HAK-462-8-21-7
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2014/01/02: LOC-HAK-462-8-21-7
teIEMOR.A.NI>UM
THE WHITE HOUSE
IR:SECRET SENSITIVE
WASHLNOTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:? MR. mssINaErt.
FROM; Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: The New Phase of Sino-Soviet Relations
It is obvious that the Soviet leaders have made some important new
decisions concerning China.
-- The first phase is a major public polemic; it is designed to persuade
other communists that China has totally and completely broken with.
socialism. On this basis, the Soviets are pressing for another inter- .
national communist conclave, that presumably would ratify China's final,
irrevocable excommunication,
-- It is a subsequent phase that is more worrisome. The general line
now being carried by Brezhnev and in numerous authoritative articles is
that a "normalization" of interstate relations, while still desirable, is less
and less likely, given Chinese policies and leadership.
- Since China has rejected all of the Soviet offers for a negotiated
accommodation, the implication is that the Soviets have now given up all
hope of a reconciliation with the Chinese state.
Most ominous is the accusation in Pravda on August 26 that China is
seeking the status of a nuclear missile "superpower" and that its policy
foresees war as inevitable and the only means of resolving disputes.
The timing seems to go back to just after the US summit. Shortly after-
ward the Soviets ostentatiously announced that their negotiator on the border
question was returning to Moscow. Then, in tlx%rCet114431Ernixiit on
July 31 the Soviets apparently expound:Mt:WW1 ktsr M ese pXana
TOP SECR.ET/SENSITIVE
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2014/01/02 : LOC-HAK-462-8-21-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2014/01/02: LOC-HAK-462-8-21-7
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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The rapid development of the public campaign also may relate to the Chinese
party Congress, and Soviet hope of influencing it.
For now there is no indication that military preparations are accompanying
the polemics. And if this is a two stage operation, beginning with an inter-
national conference, military pressures would probably undermine the
Soviet appeal to other communists.
The Chances that the Soviets can arrange the kind oT excommunication that
they now seem to want are not very good. The Romanians for one, intend
to drag their feet, to buy time. The Yugoslays are not going to subscribe
to an excommunication. And some of the Western European parties will be
reluctant to take the final step.
Nevertheless, the Soviets do not necessarily have to hold a. meeting. They
are, in effect, unilaterally making the final judgment that China has made a
total break with the principles of socialism, and citing evidence that China
can only be treated as any other "reactionary" state.
They are claiming that a war psychosis is building in China and that it is
directed against the USSR.
All of this is somewhat reminiscent of the 1969 crisis which built to the
climax of a Kosygin Chou meeting and the agreement to begin border talks.
Apparently, the Soviets in the wake of US summit, believe it is an opportune
moment to close out this four year effort, and to return to the path of
confrontation. If the Chinese party Congress confirms that the pro-American
forces around Chou En lai have been strengthened, then it is possible that the
Soviets will resort to more blatant and open pressures.
TO _SECRET/ SENSITIVE
TOFIECRET_ SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2014/01/02: LOC-HAK-462-8-21-7