ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY WEAPONRY AND EQUIPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-160-1-6-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 11, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/20: LOC-HAK-160-1-6-6
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6857
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
MEMORANDUM
SECRET (GDS)
October 11, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
ROBERT B. OAKLEY
CLINTON E. GRANGER
SUBJECT: Israeli Requests for Advanced
Technology Weaponry and Equipment
You requested a fuller explanation of the reasons behind the Department
of Defense recommendation that we refuse the top-priority request of
Israeli Minister of Defense Peres for three advanced items of military
weaponry and equipment: Forward-looking Infra-red Radar (FLIR),
cluster bomb CBU-84 (Gator), and cluster'bomb CBU-55B/72 (fuel air
explosive). These explanations are at Tab A.
All three items have been requested repeaiedly by Israel throw h DOD
channels The
Department of Defense has rejected all these requests, for the reasons
set forth in the fact sheets at Tab A. There are three very strong
arguments supporting the position of the Department of Defense:
--If we release advanced technology items to Israel, we will
be under the most extreme pressure to release it to others
(e. g. our NATO allies) thereby decreasing further our technical
advantage and increasing the chances of compromise.
--We are being asked to break a cardinal principle of not
releasing weapons prior to their having been fully tested
and become operational for United States forces, particularly
with respect to the CBU-84.
--The CBU-55B/72 is a weapon with very strong emotional
connotations and as such would create an uproar in the Arab
world and elsewhere were we to give it to Israel, and especially
were Israel to use it in a non-war situation (e. g. against targets
in. Lebanon).
SECRET (GDS)
Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded. at
Two.Year Intervals; Declassified
December 31, 1983.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/20: LOC-HAK-160-1-6-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/20: LOC-HAK-160-1-6-6
FACT SHEET
FLIR (Forward-Lookin Infra-Red
Essentially, this sensor greatly improves the ability of
aircraft to fight at night. The Israelis want 25 sets for
their F-4 aircraft and later 50 sets for use on attach
helicopters to strike ground targets and low-flying
helicopters at night. The U.S. is the world leader in
FLIR technology.
DoD is unwilling to share the latest U.S. advances in
FLIR development with foreign nations. We have, in fact,
repeatedly rebuffed U.S. contractor requests to demonstrate
FLIR equipment to some of our closest NATO allies. We
possess an R&D and, more importantly, a competitive combat
advantage in this area that we are unwilling to jeopardize
through possible compromise of our advanced FLIR systems.
In addition to the problem of sharing such advanced military
technology with other nations, there is the problem of giving
Israel under present circumstances a greatly increased
capability for night operations, particularly for air-to. ground
strikes. Israel already conducts occasional operations of this
nature against targets in Lebanon, and providing an increased
capability could lead to more frequent strikes, as well as to
more accurate ones, in Lebanon and possibly elsewhere. The
United States would receive the credit (with Israel) and the
blame (with the Arabs) f & fiiLging such operations - something
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/20 : LOC-HAK-160-1-6-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/20: LOC-HAK-160-1-6-6
jt IN I
FAE
The Israelis have repeatedly requested CBU-72 and CBU-55B
munitions. Both CBUs are Fuel Air Explosives (FAEs).
Basically, they create powerful overpressure on a target
by dispersing a volatile aerosol prior to detonation.
The technology involved is not especially sophisticated
nor are there overriding security considerations that
would preclude release. However, FAE munitions have not
been sold to any foreign armed forces and they do repre-
sent a unique capability. Dot has characterized the in-
troduction of CBU-55B/72 to the region' as politically
counterproductive and destabilizing. burther, though the
charge may be technically fallacious, there is a popular
tendency to link FAE munitions with chemical and/or inhumane
weapons and it is my understanding that their trial employ-
ment during the war in Vietnam generated some controversy.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/20: LOC-HAK-160-1-6-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/20: LOC-HAK-160-1-6-6
SU Kt 1
GATOR
Known also as the CBU-84, this air-delivered cluster bomb
unit which dispenses land mines is still under development.
At present, it is estimated that the CBU-84 will enter the
US Air Force inventory sometime in 1979. It is contrary
to DoD policy to sell to foreign governments any military
article prior to completion of its test and evaluation cycle
and acceptance for use by US forces. Although there are no
currently discernible grounds for denying eventual release
of the CBU-84 to Israel, it is essential to defer a release
decision until after tl-:e weAnon b 'omPR operational.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/20: LOC-HAK-160-1-6-6