THE THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-31-3-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 22, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-31-3-4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM
SECRET/SPOKE
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Phil. Odeenr
SUBJECT: The Threat
The CIA has reformulated its threat assessment (Tab A) to incorporate
the latest-intelligence as well as the discussion of last week's SRG.
meeting.
The highlights, of this assessment are as follows:
-- Manpower infiltration (see Table 1). Total NVA infiltration
to Vietnam, Cambodia and South Laos is running about 22% ahead of last
year. Almost all of this increase is associated with northern-South
Vietnam (B-3, MR-5 and MR TTH); infiltration to COSVN fort'.
Cambodia and MR 3 and 4 shows a decrease compared to last. year.
The overall infiltration for this dry season could range between 130, 000
and about 210, 000, an appreciable increase over last year.
-- Supply infiltration (see Table 2). Overall supply input into
Laos is about 25% below last year's level but is rapidly increasing.
If the acce oration of supply movements, which has occurred i
th
n
e
last few weeks. continues, the enemy could exceed his inputs total
T
o e comparable 1970-71 period by mid-February. There is no firm
explanation of this lag in supply movement, although increased food
hi
s
pments from Cambodia may well be the answer.
Based on this infiltration situation, the CIA judgment is that the
enemy will be prepared to launch substained combat offensives in
MR 2 within a month, in MR 1 within one or:- two -months, ? and in
Cambodia within four months. Ih each of these areas, however, the
CIA believes that the enemy could .significantly accelerate its prepara-
tions and act more quickly than currently indicated.
SECRET/SPOKE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-559-31-3-4
INFORMATION
January 22, 1972
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-31-3-4
SECRET/SPOKE
On the whole, therefore, the CIA. credits the enemy with a substantial
offensive capability in northern South Vietnam that could be used within
a month or two. In South Vietnam and Cambodia;-however, it seems
clear that such a capability_ does not exist now and would take months
to develop.
In considering the enemy's intentions to utilize this caprability, the
CIA makes the following points:
The COSVN directive it' recently reported does not pinpoint
the forces'and magnitude of the upcoming attacks. It does suggest
that to some degree the man force activities will be combined with the
anti-GVN effort in the cities and countryside.
-- The follow-up directives indicate that "the communists would
like to make it rival Tet 1968, although they realize that targets will
have to be chosen more selectively and that the campaign will not be
sufficient to defeat the GVN. "
-- The -'directives- also siress military activities in MR 3 and 4.
Accordin to the CIA, however, these reports should not be accepted
at face value since COSVN's authority is limited to these areas and its
directives are bound to exaggerate their importance.
On the whole, the CIA judgment is that the enemy can and will -launch
major offensive operations in MR 2 and probably also in MR 1 over
the next month or so, but that MRs 3 and 4 along with Cambodia will
remain relatively quiet except for diversionary attacks designed to tie
down the GVN's reserves.
SECRET/SPOKE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-31-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-31-3-4
SECRET/SPOKE
Area
1971/72
1970/71
1971/72
as a%of
1970/71
COSVN
27,400
33,000
- 17
.B-3
32-, 600 m
3,800
+750
8,000
4,300
+ 86
MR-TTH
.4, 000
3,100
+ 29
S. Laos
6, 800
20, 100
- 66
TOTAL
78,800
64,300
+ 22
This includes a recently established large gap fill of 11 groups
(6, 300 personnel). _ We believe that the information establishing
this gap is valid and that subsequent information will demonstrate
that the extrapolation was warranted.
C., ., , ,,.,.__ _
= No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-31-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-31-3-4
SECRET SPOKE
1971/72 1970/71
Dry Season Dry Season 1971 /72
Minimum
Estimate
Maximum Minimum. Maximurn as a To of
Estimate Estimate Estimate 1970/71'-',
October
390
2, 529
817
3,266
71
November
2, 652
4, 722
4,726
7,096
62
December
5, 110
7, 249
7, 254
9, 703
.73
January
1-18
6,314
7,556
7,488 '
8, 910
85
Total
14,466
22, 056
20,285,
28,975
. 74
Tons per Day
13Z
201
184
263
Percentage calculation based on mid-point comparison.
1969/70 data is not comparable to that of the subsequent
two seasons and therefore is not included in this tabulation.
S 'r.DT7rr IcnntrL'
--- No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-31-3-4