THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (AS OF 1500 EST)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 9, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
25X1
19
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
9 April 1972
The Situation in South Vint:nam
(As of 1500 EST)
Loa is being' subjected to constant mortar and
rocket attacks plus limited ground probes. A
prisoner who claims to be from the Conununist 9th
MORI/CDF pages 1-4 per
C03232206
1. The Communists are increasing' their
pressure against An L,oc in northern Military
Region (MR) 3. US- Air observers have ider tifiod
at least nine enemy battalions around the Dinh
Long provincial cafes tal that appear to be prepar-
ing for an imminent asnaurt. In the meantime, An
2. Air support fox, the defenders at An Joc--
about eight. battalions 'strong--has been hampered
by poor weather. A South Vietnamese airborne
brigade from Saigon moving tip Route 13 to reinforce
the An Loc garrison ran into an enemy blocking
force at the Binh Duong Province border on the
afternoon of 9 April and has been lie7.d up.
3. Elsewhere in MR-3, a large enemy force
accompanied by armored vehicles was spotted about
one mile northeast of the district capital-of
Phuoc Vinh in Binh Duonc4 Province. An air strike
on 9 April failed to halt the column's advance.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
All government. repro critati.on (poli(-,e, military,
and civil, officials) has been withdrawn from a
district capital in IPhuoc Long Pr:ovinCC which
bo der n on a Communist:--Cuntr:olled por,tio.n of
Cambodia. - In order to strengthen f,aigon's do-?
fensos, cadets at the nearby 7:hu Due Armor School.
have been formed into two armored companies and
put on the alert as a reserve force in case the
Capital is threate a 1..
The Delta
4. Military activity has increased in MR-4,
consisting mainly of Communist: hel.lings and
harassing at.tacks against a number outposts and
district towns throughout the Mekong Delta.
Chuong Thien Province, in the heart of the delta,
was the hardest hit. 'I.'h-,,:e attacks, which have
been CQnduoted by both mtein and local force units,
ar~pear to hayo been closely cooa;din%ated.
The Northern Provinces
5. Although the Communists have e ca].atesi
their attacks in the northcr:tr provinces, the South
Vietnamese are still.holding their defensive
lines near Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Iluc. Renewed
shellings of South Vietnamese positions in south-
eastern Quanta Tri Province are probahl.y designed
to mask the movement of North Vietnamese forces
that thus far have boon unsuccessful in moving
south of the provincial capital. The Saicjon
military command anticipates the beginning of
another phase of enemy action soon with attacks on
both Quang Tri city and flue.
The Western Ili. hlandn
6. Communist guerrilla Mid sapper units have
been harassing provincial outposts, bridges, and
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
to destroy the enemy i:or:ces, present y c.o e
ix Kontum Provincp.
highwayri in Kontum Pr?ovincc, but the enemy's main
force combat units continue to lie low. General
Ngo Dzu, commander of MR-2, said on i April than
his operations have been .-accessful in keeping
the enemy off balance and if t?he :?ncmy continue
to take the heavy carruaitie.s of the past few days,
their combat effectiveness will be seriously
impaired. Dzu also claimed that if he is allowed
to keep the reinforcements assigned to him and if
:the wtatber romaitne goody hi.. forces will be able
1 me, ntr'a cad
Further Reactions in the Northr'rn Provinces
Prominent religious figures in the
7
.,
northern: provinces continue to display minced
reactions to the current fighting. Buddhist
monks in Hue view the situation in Quaiig Tri and
Thua Thien provinces as sctiovs. They blame
overly optimistic government reports of the fight-
ing for misleading thtu people In Quang Tri and
giving them insufficient time to prepare for an
orderly evacuation. The same situation, they feel,
is currently taking place in Hue. A spate of
rumors, including one that the: US is ready to
cede the northern provinces to the Communists in
return for peace In the rest of Southeast Asia,
is_ .causing widespread apprehension, according to
the monks. Radical students in Ilue' reportedly are
further enflamitag the situation by mingling with
refugees. from Quang TL i and spreading anti-
government propaganda.
8. The government is trying to counter the e
rumors and apprehension through an extensive
information program in both Ilue and Quang Tr: i City.
This is handicapped, however, by the basic distrust
of-the Buddhist population for the Saigon govern-
merit, as well as their experiences in the 1968 Tet
offensive, which have contr. ibuted to a large
credibility gap which the government mush: overcome
in order to 1;,.- effective.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
9, Farther from the battl.vfieid.,, lcadincj
Catholic prel~rto in Da Mani arc, 41A c about
the situFati_on. One priest CD-ti.rns that catholic-6
In the area beliove the Comrnun.i.nts wade a "major
blunder" by moving kac;ror; the Dt4 to positions
where Amt ricau and Vietnamese: air power can dr t rby
them. Taking a more cautious; approach, the
Bishop of Da Nang is concerned by th'~ threat to
l{ue, but he regards American air power as the
decisive mllit.ary factor in the ba7rt3 o. ills
opinions appear to reflect. a fairly widespread
view among the Vietnamese: that the US still will
bail out South vietn4tm through air power or
possibly even tho roint:roduction of ground -t-x'oops.
t7i : sem}
(Secret:/No Foreign
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Phil Odeen Q
SUBJECT: CIA Study on NVN Capabilities
CIA has prepared at your request an assessment of NVN's manpower and
logistics capabilities to conduct military operations over the next
three months. The summary j izdgement of CIA is that:
. . . the Vietnamese Communists have the overall manpower
and logistic capabilities necessary to sustain their offensive
activities for the next three months -- that is, to sustain major
main force activity in Military Regions (MRs) 1 and 2, heavy
main force probes in MR 3, and moderate harassment, prin-
cipally by fire, in MR 4. As indicated above, this judgement
perforce ignores several' critical variables -- for example, the
impact of Allied counteroffensive operations or unusually heavy
enemy supply or manpower losses as a result of Allied air
activity (which are not postulated). It presupposes other var-
iables, such as a pattern of combat generally similar to that seen
since 30 March, a pattern incorporating lulls and respites
even in periods of overall heavy pressure."
Manpower
NVN overall manpower reserves are fully adequate to continue fighting
at current or expanded levels for the next 3 months. However, the
heavy losses the NVN has suffered in recent years have reduced the
quality of NVN soldiers, cadre and troops. These limits on experienced
personnel limit combat effectiveness and NVN ability to expand its
forces to any degree.
Over 120, 000 troops have been sent south thus far this dry season,
surpassing total infiltration last year. As shown below, the infiltration
has primarily been for the forces in MR 1 and 2. The rather limited
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
infiltration toward the areas farther south places limits on the intensity
and duration of NVA combat in MR-3 and 4...
NVA Infiltration
':x'971:?72
Dry Season Dry Season
MRs1 &2
Northern MR-1 (TTH) 6000
12000
-5) . 1429
0
-1
MR
quthern
(MR
S
16000.
,
:
.
:
,
.
Highlands- (B-3)= ,,:,_ .14500
:42000,
MR 3 and 4
COSVN 45000 - .
36000
S. Laos 26500
14000
Total 106, 200
120,000
As a result of this infiltration, enemy strength in SNV and border areas
has increased over last year by about 27, 000. The other troops were
used to replace losses or to provide support. The enemy OB was
further increased by the movement of an estimated 28, 000 troops across
the DMZ.
Enemy OB (000)
Dec 1969
Dec 1970
Dec 1971
Apr 1972
VC/NVA
SVN 1
30-150
85-95
80-90
115-130
Cambodia
-
20-25
25-30
30-35
Khmer Comm
10-20
15-30
15-30
PL/NVA
N. Laos
35-40
30-35
40-45
40-45
S. Laos
20-25
30-35
30-40
25-35
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1
SECRET
As a result of this increased strength and U. S. withdrawals,, the main
force ratio has shown a significant decreasesin all areas; of SVN.
The ratio is near 2-1 in MR 1 and 2 and near parity in the threatened
~ .:,Tb +. rV~ has a mq .. vQra e ? r e ratio in MR 3 and 4,
eAR
'
in Cambodia the relative main force strength will drop well below 2-1 and
to parity in some areas. Thus the NVA has the forces to challenge the
RVNAF in all four MRs. (This is not noted in the CIA paper.)
A major. factor in NVA capabilities is the losses they are suffering from
pr'ev'ention attacks, bombing, etc.' The extent is unclear, but CIA
doubts if they have been as heavy as in past.major campaigns given
the bad weather which restricts friendly air.
But our analyses have indicated thatif the NVA commits"all of its forces
Logistics
The enemy has made a major resupply effort this year and is in better
logistic shape than he was a year ago. The supply flow has been especially
heavy across the DMZ and thru Laos into the MR-1 and 2 areas.
Supply movements into Southern Laos and Cambodia have also been high
this year, probably at record levels. Thus the enemy's supply situation is
probably the best in years (since losing the Sihaninoukville port). The
supply movements seems to emphasize arms and ammunition, perhaps
reflecting the adequacy of food from Cambodia. Thus the NVA apparently
has the needed stock to wage a major effort in the South. However, CIA
does not believe supplies are adequate for major combat in both MRs. A
much more serious problem for the NVA is the distribution of supplies
to its forces in SVN.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-30-16-1