NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT KOREA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-559-25-18-5
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
November 17, 2011
Sequence Number:
18
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 25, 1976
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
LOC-HAK-559-25-18-5.pdf | 114.17 KB |
Body:
C614D
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-25-18-5 -
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'MORI/CDF C03205435 Pages 1-3
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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
6-76
0900 EDT
25 August 1976
National Intelligence Situation Report
Summar
North Korean Armed Forces generally remain in an advanced
alert posture. No major elements have redeployed, however,
and some units within all three services have shown signs of
returning to more normal activity. North Korean actions at
the Military Armistice Commission meeting this morning were
generally restrained and indicated an interest in pursuing
discussion of the issue of personnel. security in the Joint
Security Area. In the near term, North ;ior, ea will probably
continue to attempt to defuse the ciurrenL crisis.
Military Situation
UN Command forces remain in DEMON 3. The additional two
tactical fighter squadrons--the r-4 squadron at Kunsan and
the F--111 squadron at Taegu--deployed to Korea in the wake
of the August 18 incident remain there. The MIDWAY and her
accompanying surface combatants are operating in the Korean
Strait,?and B-52D training sorties continue to overfly South
Korea at a rate of one cell of three aircraft per day. US
intelligence collection operations also continue at, an advanced
pace.
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-25-18-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-25-18-5
Political Situation
At?the'scheduled meeting of the military Armistice Com-
mission this morning (1600 Korean time on 25 August)', the
North Koreans-proposed complete separation of the security
personnel of the two sides as one way to avoid further violent
'incidents, in the Joint Security Area at. Panmunjom. Specific-.
ally, they suggested that guard posts of the two parties be'
set up only on their respective sides of the military de--
marcation-line'as it runs-through the Joint Security Area.
north Korean press and radio commentary suggested that
separation be enforced even in the conference hall. at the
site. The. commentaries argued in restrained language for
the "reasonableness" of the Northern proposal which, in
effect, substantially modifies the.agreed 1953 ground rules
?of?the Military Armistice Commission.
At the same time, however, the North Korean senior re-p-
resentative at the military Armistice Commission meeting
evaded direct comment on.the UN representative's demand
that Pyongyang ensure the safety of UN Command personnel
.at Panmunjom and punish those responsible for the 18 Auguist
murders.
Meanwhile, a South Korean news service has characterized
the North Korean posture these past few days as a virtual
"capitulation." .
Assessment _
Our best judgment is that the North Korean Armed Forces
are not preparing any major military response to US actions.
Since the August 18 incident at Panmunmom, North Korean
actions have been primarily cautious and defensive in nature
and have not reflected intent to conduct open host-.lities.
The military alert, publicly announced on August 19, will
likely remain in effect until Pyongyang is convinced that the
threat of military action by the US and its South Korean ally
has been reduced. In the near term, North Korea will probably
continue to attempt to defuse the current crisis. In the
? longer term, however, Pyongyang will continue to try to
.25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-25-18-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-25-18-5
RP
focus world attention on the US presence in Korea, emphasizing
claims that the US is responsible for tensions on the peninsula.
in this respect, we would expect continuing harassment, propaganda,
and diplomatic initiative. We would, however, expect North
Korea to avoid actions that could lead to new confrontations
with US forces.
Major General, USAF
Vice Director for Production
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-559-25-18-5