HEARINGS BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 1 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE ON REPRESENTATIVES EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS ON H.R. 3006 TO AMEND TITLE 37, UNITED STATES CODE, TO INCREASE THE RATES OF BASIC PAY FOR MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES, AND

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• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 26, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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HEARINGS
BEFORE
SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 1
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
ON
H.R. 3006
TO AMEND TITLE 37, UNITED STATES CODE, TO
INCREASE THE RATES OF BASIC PAY FOR MEM-
BERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
FEBRUARY 26, 27, 28, MARCH 5, 6, AND 7, 1963
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
CARL VINSON, Georgia, Chairman
L. MENDEL RIVERS, South Carolina
PHILIP J. PHILBIN, Massachusetts
F. EDWARD HEBERT, Louisiana
ARTHUR WINSTEAD, Mississippi
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
0. C. FISHER, Texas
PORTER HARDY, Ja., Virginia
CLYDE DOYLE, California
CHARLES E. BENNETT, Florida
RICHARD E. LANKFORD, Maryland
GEORGE HUDDLESTON, Ja., Alabama
JAMES A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
JEFFERY COHELAN, California
VICTOR WICKERSHAM, Oklahoma
OTIS G. PIKE, New York
JOE M. KILGORE, Texas
RICHARD H. 'CHORD, Missouri
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan
CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland
A. FERNOS-ISERN, Puerto Rico
ROBERT W. SMART, Chief Counsel
LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
LEON H. GAVIN, Pennsylvania
WALTER NORBLAD, Oregon
1,? ILLIAM H. BATES, Massachusetts
ALVIN E. O'KONSKI, Wisconsin
WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
BOB WILSON, California
FRANK C. OSMERS, Ja., New Jersey
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
PRANK J. BECKER, New York
CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN, Michigan
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
DONALD D. CLANCY, Ohio
ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont
ED FOREMAN, Texas
SUBCOMMITTEE No. 1
L. MENDEL RIVERS, South Carolina, Chairman
PORTER HARDY, Ja., Virginia
CHARLES E. BENNETT, Florida
GEORGE HUDDLESTON, JR., Alabama
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
JOE M. KILGORE, Texas
CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland
JOHN R. BLANDFORD, COMtSei
II
LEON H. GAVIN, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM H. BATES, Massachusetts
BOB WILSON, California
FRANK C. OSMERS, JR., New Jersey
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
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[No. 6]
SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 1 CONSIDERATION OF KR. 3006, TO AMEND
TITLE 37, UNITED STATES CODE, TO INCREASE THE RATES OF
BASIC PAY FOR MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, N *0. 1,
W ashington,D.C.,Tuesday,February 26,1963.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room
313?A, Cannon Building, Hon. L. Mendel Rivers (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. RIVERS. Let the committee come to order.
Members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen, we are begin-
ning here today on H.R. 3006. the most important legislative item this
subcommittee will consider this year insofar as the personnel of our
armed services are concerned.
I would like to say at the outset that while we normally think of
the armed services as conistino? of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
? Marine Corps, and Coast Guard when serving with the Navy, never-
theless the pay scales that we write into law also cover the commis-
sioned officers of the Public Health Service and the Coast and Geo-
detic Survey. Thus, there are seven services involved when we refer
to the uniformed services.
Before we hear our first witness today, I would like to make some
observations about this proposed legislation.
I have had an opportunity to study the bill and I have arrived at
certain conclusions as a result of that study which lead me to the con-
clusion that the bill should be modified in several major respects.
The bill covers 19 separate items.
The first and most important part of the bill is section 2 which con-
tains the new proposed basic pay scales. The increases recommended
range from $1.80 per month for an E-1 recruit to $120 a month for
an E-9 sergeant major so far as enlisted personnel are concerned.
? The increases range from $27.70 a month for second lieutenants to
$95 a month for the highest officer grade.
The increases in basic pay alone, on an annual basis, will exceed $985
million.
In general, I believe the recommended basic pay increases are rea-
.sonable. For the first time in 13 years the entering pay of second
lieutenants and privates will beincreased.
The major increases will be found in certain career enlisted points
and at certain critical points in the officer pay scales.
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General and flag officers, for practical purposes, receive only a cost-
of-living increase.
I believe some minor adjustments should be considered by the sub-
committee, particularly in the E-4 grade, where an increment in pay
has been cut back from the "over 8 years of service" point to the "over
6 years of service" point, and in the W-1 grade where the maximum
pay, just as in existing law, does not become effective until the W-4
has completed 30 years of service. Since the law requires a W-1 to
retire 60 days after the completion of 30 years of service, it would
make better sense to me if that maximum increase took efect at the
"over 26 year" point?because to me it seems senseless when it gets
to 30 years, you kick him out and he doesn't get the benefit of it, so
let him get the benefit of it when he gets the promotion.
With these exceptions, however, I find myself in general accord
with the proposed pay scales. Certainly they are modest, and in no
instance could they be called excessive. In many areas military per-
sonnel will still draw far less pay than their civil service counterparts,
but nevertheless any pay increase is welcome to the recipient, and I
recognize the fact that there are financial limitations that must be
acknowledged.
But there are 18 other items in this bill which must be discussed.
I am not in aareement with section 2(b) of the proposed legislation
which will be found on page 3 of H.R. 3006. This section, in effect,
provides that a member of the Reserves who is performing inactive
duty training for which he is entitled to pay will be paid under exist-
ing pay scales and will not benefit by the proposed new rates.
I cannot agree to a proposal that discriminates between an obligated
reservist and an unobligated reservist. These young men have all
served on active duty in one service or another while some of their
civilian friends have never performed any military service whatsoever.
To discriminate between a. reservist who has not fulfilled his reserve
obligation and the reservist who continues his inactive duty training
on a voluntary basis is unwise, and as far as I am concerned, I hope that
section of the bill will be eliminated.
On page 1 of H.R. 3006 is section 4, entitled "Constructive Service
Credit for Purposes of Appointment, Promotion, and Basic Pay."
This section seeks to extend the awarding of constructive credit to
those who hold postgraduate degrees in professions that are not now
recognized for that purpose in existing law.
As you know, we award constructive credit today to physicians,
dentists, veterinarians, lawyers, chaplains, and certain individuals
who hold Ph. D's in sciences allied with medicine.
But under existing law, there is no method by which other indi-
viduals can be awarded constructive credit for appointment, promo-
tion, and pay purposes.
As you will note in the analysis of this section only phys;cians and
dentists may now count their constructive credit for longevity pay
purposes. This section would grant all who are awarded constructive
credit the right to count that credit for longevity purposes. I do not
quarrel with the Concept. But the section, in my opinion, does not
belong in a pay bill.
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This is basically a promotion and appointment problem, and I would
rather see this section considered in the so-called Bolte proposal rather
than take the time to discuss its feasibility in this pay proposal.
I would also call your attention to the fact that this section as writ-
ten would vest in the Secretary concerned the authority to determine
what postgraduate degrees would be recognized. I do not believe we
should delegate this authority; I believe Congress and Congress alone
should make the determination as to which postgraduate degrees will
be so recognized. But beyond that, I would also call your attention to
the fact that this section is not retroactive except for those who entered
on active duty or were commissioned, or enlisted, less than 3 years
ago. In other words, while this section would provide constructive
credit to a newly commissioned lawyer, which he could count for pay
purposes, it would only be applicable to a lawyer hereafter appointed,
or a lawyer who has only served 1 or 2 years on active duty.
This means that lawyers and others entering on active duty would
receive longevity credit for their constructive service, but lawyers and
those with postgraduate degrees already on active duty will not receive
longevity credit, presumably on the theory that they have already
served 3 or more years and therefore are drawing longevity credit
for that period of time.
In my opinion, this section requires far more consideration, and
therefore I will recommend that this section be deleted from the bill
so that the matter may be considered more fully at a later date.
Now, if you will turn to page 11 you will find the section entitled
"Retired Pay and Retainer Pay."
This, of course, is a highly controversial section in the minds of
many people. I would remind the subcommittee that in 1958 the Con-
gress departed from the traditional concept of applying existing pay
scales to the retired pay of those who had retired prior to the enact-
ment of new pay scales.
It is probably not correct to say that we fully departed from tradi-
tion in 1958 because in 1949 we completely rewrote the disability
retirement laws and, as a result, many thousands of personnel retired
for disability, who did not have a sufficient degree of disability or
sufficient length of service to qualify under the 1949 pay scales, have
continued to draw their retirement pay under the 1942 Pay Readjust-
ment Act. However, they received cost-of-living increases in 1952,
1955, and 1958.
The section before you provides that individuals retired prior to
June 1, 1958, who are paid under the Career Compensation Act, may
recompute their retirement pay under the present pay scales that went
into effect on June 1, 1958, and, in addition, receive a 5-percent cost-of-
living increase in their retirement pay. Therefore, all those in receipt
of retirement pay will be placed on an automatic cost-of-living ad-
justment basis.
In other words, the section provides that each year a determination
will be made as to the cost of living, and whenever the culmulative
effect of the increase in the cost of living equals 3 percent or more,
retirement pay will be adjusted to the nearest one-tenth of 1 percent
to reflect that increase.
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Now this makes the issue clear cut. The Congress is asked to de-
cide once and for all which policy shall apply in computing military
retirement pay.
There will be many persons who will argue that we should not de-
part from the old tradition of computing retirement pay on the basis
of new pay scales. There are others who recognize the fact that there
are nearly 350,000 military personnel on the military retired lists and
? that this number is growing by 50,000 or more each year. Retirement
costs for military personnel alone exceed $1 billion annually, and will
exceed $3 billion annually in the years ahead.
The proposal submitted by the Department of Defense permits a
large group of officers and enlisted personnel to recompute their
retired pay under existing pay scales.
Now I think I should remind the subcommittee that in 1958 we
provided some rather substantial pay increases particularly for the
senior officers and noncommissioned officers. As a result, there has
been widespread dissatisfaction among the more senior retired per-
sonnel who, because they retired prior to June 1, 1958, were not able
to compute their retirement pay under the higher pay scales that
went into effect on that date.
These individuals, under the proposal before us, will be allowed to
recompute under the higher pay scales provided in the 1958 law, but
they will not be permitted to recompute their retirement pay on the
proposed new pay scales in this legislation.
However, the pay increases recommended for the general and flag
officers in the proposed legislation are approximately 5 percent, and
all retired personnel will receive a 5-percent increase in their retired
pay under the proposed legislation.
Dollarwise, therefore, there will be relatively little difference for
these more senior officers.
On the other hand, those now retired are concerned about future
pay increases. As I have said, the time for decision has now been
reached, and the Congress must make up its mind whether it will
adopt the automatic cost-of-living adjustment concept, starting now,
or whether it will go back to the old concept of applying retirement
pay to existing pay scales no matter when they go into efect.
This matter has given me much concern. But I have concluded that
we must recognize that retirement costs, although they are a part of
our national defense costs, are reaching such staggering sums that
unless we apply a reasonable principle to the retirement system we
may well jeopardize the entire retirement procedure. One of the
great privileges that exist today among military personnel is the
privilege of applying for retirement regardless of age upon the
completion of 20 or more years of service. No other Government
employee, and probably no employee of private industry, has this
privilege, except FBI agents, to the best of my knowledge.
However, there are many arguments in support of this privilege,
and I personally feel it is something that must be retained. On the
other hand, unless we take positive steps now to protect this retire-
ment system, we may eventually be forced to change the entire system.
For that reason I will state now that I will support the retirement
proposal submitted by the Department of Defense because I believe
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?
it does eliminate the gross discrimination that existed between those
retired prior to June 1, 1958, and those who retired after that date, and
at the same time provides a guarantee to all future retirees that they
will automatically receive a cost-of-living increase whenever the
cumulative cost of living goes over 3 percent. Under the provisions
of this bill, no further legislative action will be necessary. Thus the
retired serviceman's dollar purchasing power will be preserved and
guaranteed.
Stated another way, I have come to the conclusion that a bird in
the hand is worth two in the bush.
Now let me turn to another item in the proposal before us. You
will find this on page 16, under the title "Submarine Pay for Mem-
bers Training for Duty on Nuclear-Powered Submarines."
I recognize the fact that the Navy is having difficulty in obtaining
volunteers for the POLARIS and other nuclear submarine programs.
I do not believe we should pay submarine pay to a recruit who enters
into this program, but I certainly believe that we should continue
submarine pay for those who are already qualified submariners who
are accepted for advanced training for nuclear submarine duty. This
section is probably too broad, as written, but the concept is sound
and I intend to support it.
Likewise, I find myself in accord with section 7 of the bill which
would provide incentive pay of either $55 a month for an enlisted
man, or $110 for an officer, who is on duty "inside a high- or low-pres-
sure chamber." Present law already provides incentive pay for those
who are on duty as a "low-pressure-chamber inside observer," and the
law would be amended to include duty in a low- and high-pressure
chamber, regardless of whether or not the individual is an observer.
Also, I find myself in accord with section 8 of the proposed legisla-
tion which permits an individual to draw two incentive pays. Today
the law restricts an individual to one incentive pay.
Right there, Mr. Blandford, give them an example of two incentive
pays about the paratrooper or one of our dangerous missions.
Mr. BLANDFORD. That is in the next paragraph.
Mr. RIVERS. While there will not be many cases of this nature,
nevertheless I believe that if an individual is qualified and is perform-
ing duties in two incentive pay areas, then there is no reason he should
not draw the two incentive pays. Ihave not seen a cost estimate on
this section, but it will be very small.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I have a figure of $1,900,000.
Mr. RIVERS. For example, we provide paratroopers incentive pay
and we also provide incentive pay for those who handle demolitions.
There are also paratroopers who must be demolition experts?and
when you combine the two together, it is obvious that it becomes an
extremely hazardous occupation. There is no reason why individuals
performing duties of this nature should not draw two incentive pays.
Next we come to section 9 on page 17 of the bill, which repeals the
authority for special pay for sea and foreign duty.
This special pay is applicable only to enlisted personnel and under
this provision of law enlisted personnel draw amounts ranging from
$8 for an E-1 to $22.50 per month for the E-7's, 8's, and 9's. This
type of pay is intended to provide a small amount of compensation
to the enlisted man who serves at sea, or is stationed overseas. In
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fiscal 1964 it is estimated that this provision of existing law will cost
approximately $133 million.
The proposed legislation seeks to repeal this provision of law and
substitute in its place special pay for duty involving unusual hardship
;which will be found on page 18 of the proposed legislation.
I am advised that the fiscal estimate for 1964 for duty involving
unusual hardship, if it is implemented, would only involve about $30
million. It is intended to be applicable to officers as well as enlisted
personnel, and it will be in amounts equal to 15 percent or 25 percent
of the basic pay of the member concerned. Under the proposal, we are
asked to delegate to the Secretary of Defense the authority to deter-
mine who would be entitled to this extra pay.
Today any enlisted man who goes to sea, or any enlisted man who
goes overseas' 6 is entitled to sea or foreign duty pay. The substitute
proposed would obviously be applicable to far fewer persons than now
draw sea and foreign duty pay.
Frankly, I do not believe we should repeal the present law which
provides sea and foreign duty pay for all enlisted personnel.
In the first place, if it is repealed, it will immediately result in many
individuals receiving a very small pay increase after they have been
led to believe they will receive a fairly substantial pay increase. In
fact, in the case of E?l's, they would have to be protected against a
reduction on a saved-pay basis, and continue to draw sea pay because
the increase in their basic pay would not be equivalent to their sea pay.
I rather suspect that if we were to adopt the section dealing with
unusual hardship that very few people now at sea would qualify. I
believe that any enlisted man who goes to sea for extended periods of
time is entitled to some extra compensation.
I am very much afraid that if we eliminate sea pay we will seriously
affect the morale of our enlisted personnel in the Navy and Coast
Guard. I think the same reasoning is true in the case of our enlisted
personnel who are serving overseas.
I would be the first to admit that there are undoubtedly many in-
dividuals drawing sea and foreign duty pay who are not entitled to
extra compensation. For example, I don't believe that an individual
assigned to a ship who is living ashore and who spends every evening
home with his family should draw sea pay.
And I find it difficult to believe that duty in Wiesbaden, or Tokyo,
or Paris, or Honolulu or Naples is difficult duty. As a matter of fact,
there are many enlisted personnel who would like to have more of this
type of duty. But the fact that. there are some who are drawing sea
and foreign duty pay where it is probably not justified does not con-
vince me that the entire concept of sea and foreign duty pay should
be eliminated. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, I will not support
the proposed repeal of sea and foreign duty pay, even though it will
add $133 million to the cost of the bill.
On page 18, you will find section 10 which repeals the authority for
responsibility pay. This pay has never been implemented by the
Department of Defense. It was inserted in the 1958 Pay Act by the
Senate, and the House Committee on Armed Services never con-
sidered the proposal as a committee. Members of the committee will
remember we accepted it in Congress. It is my understanding that
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the Army and Marine Corps are opposed to the implementation of
this provision of law. As far as I am concerned, if the Department
of Defense wants to repeal the authority since they do not intend to
implement it, then I would have no objection. However, we should
discuss the pros and cons involved.
The question of whether or not we should approve section 11, on
page 18, which provides special pay for duty involving unusual hard-
ship will depend upon what we decide to do with sea and foreign duty
pay. I can visualize situations that would fully justify the hardship
special pay recommended in this provision. There are many remote
areas of the world where our officers and enlisted personnel are serv-
ing. Certainly nothing could be more remote than sitting in front
oft'a radar screen on a mountaintop many miles from civilization.
Certainly no one could quarrel with the unusual hardship of serving
on a destroyer between New Zealand and McMurdo Sound near the
Antarctic. Certainly no one can argue that living in the jungles of
South Vietnam is not an unusual hardship. But there are also other
problems involved which are not covered by this proposal?such as
the unusual amount of temporary duty that certain personnel of our
services must perform.
All of you have undoubtedly received correspondence from Air
Force personnel, in particular, who have had their per diem allowance
eliminated while on temporary duty. I will discuss this matter fur-
ther when we come to the family separation allowance provision.
If we retain sea and foreign duty pay, and I believe we should, then
undoubtedly the provision dealing with unusual hardship should be
eliminated. I don't believe we can justify both. We save $30 million
annually by deleting this section.
This leads me then to page 19 and section 12, entitled "Career
Incentive Payment."
The concept of this provision is that the services should be allowed
to pay a bonus to certain individuals with critical skills ranging from
$500 to $2,400 when they come up for their first reenlistment.
Today, existing law provides reenlistment bonuses up to a maximum
of $2,000 in the following amounts: On the first- reenlistment, an
enlisted man receives a bonus consisting of his monthly pay multiplied
by the number of years for which he reenlists. On his second reen-
listment, he receives two-thirds of his monthly basic pay times the
years for which he reenlists. On his third reenlistment, he receives
one-third of his monthly basic pay times the number of years for
which he reenlists; and in the fourth and subsequent reenlistments,
one-sixth of his monthly basic pay times the number of years for
which he reenlists. But he may not be paid more than the maximum
of $2,000.
You will be interested to learn that in fiscal 1962 the military serv-
ices paid bonuses to 246,000 servicemen involving more than $133
million, or an average of about $500 per man.
The present system of paying reenlistment bonuses would be phased
out under the proposed legislation and in its place we are asked to
substitute a career incentive payment which would amount to one
payment at the first reenlistment. Those with the highly critical skills
could receive as much as $2,400, and those with lesser skills as little
as $500.
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The theory behind this concept is that the first reenlistment is the
critical point in determining whether an individual will make a career
of the armed services. And in support of this, the Department con-
tends that those who have reenlisted once or more have a reenlistment
rate of approximately 88 percent.
My concern, however, is that by phasing out the present reenlistment
bonus system, the career reenlistment rate of 88 percent may begin to
decline. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing whether the
second and subsequent reenlistment rates are affected by the present
reenlistment bonus system.
Frankly, I do not think we should adopt the career incentive system
proposed in the bill before us because I think it might have a very
serious affect upon future reenlistments.
But in addition, I would like to call the subcommittee's attention
to the fact that the Department of Defense has never fully imple-
mented the proficiency pay system that was authorized in the 1958
pay act. That year, we authorized three types of proficiency pay-
ments for enlisted personnel with special skills. We authorized a P-1
rating in the amount of $50 a month; a P-2 rating in the amount of
$100 a month; and a P-3 rating in the amount of $150 a month. You
will be interested to learn that the maximum amounts paid today are
$30 for P?i's, $60 for P-2's, and the P-3 program has never been im-
plemented. At present, there are 2,225,000 enlisted personnel on
active duty in our Armed Forces. Of this number, 205,000 enlisted
personnel receive P-1 pay, and only 41,000 receive P-2 pay.
Before we delegate additional authority to the Secretary of Defense
or authorize another system to encourage the reenlistment of those
with critical skills, I think it might be wise if the Department im-
plemented the law we gave them in 1958. For the reasons I have
stated, I am opposed to the enactment of the career incentive payment
as suggested in the proposed legislation.
That brings me to page 24, and special pay for those who are subject
to hostile fire.
As you know, the Congress enacted a Combat Duty Pay Act in
1952, but under the terms of that law it is restricted to the geographical
location of Korea. I might mention, for the benefit of the subcom-
mittee, that the Combat Duty Pay Act of 1952 was never considered
by the Committee on Armed Services; it was added as a Senate amend-
ment to a Veterans' Affairs bill and became law.
I recognize that there are many arguments in support of a special
pay for individuals who are exposed to enemy fire, but the more I read
this section, the more I foresee serious problems of implementation.
Beyond that is the question of whether or not such a provision should
be made retroactive for those who have already been subjected to
hostile fire in such places as South Vietnam, the Congo, and in air-
craft that have been shot down by Communist aircraft or Communist
missiles.
This section, if enacted, may also involve us in some very interesting
international complications. If we have troops in certain parts of
the world who are supposed to be there for training purposes, could
we announce in an appropriation act that they are being paid the
equivalent of combat duty pay?
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4.
Beyond that is the question of the philosophy involved as to whether
or not an individual should be paid extra pay for performing the
duties for which he is basically employed. For these reasons, I am
of the opinion that the section should be deleted from the bill. Since
there is no money in the budget for this provision, I am unable to
project a cost savings if we delete this section.
This takes us to section 15 dealing with an increase in basic allow-
ances for subsistence for officers.
At present, all officers are entitled to a monthly subsistence allow-
ance of $47.88; the proposed bill would increase this amount to $77
per month. The estimated cost of this increase amounts to $120 mil-
lion per year. The $77 figure was arrived at by multiplying the daily
present ration allowance which is granted to enlisted men serving in
an area where Government messing facilities are not available.
I think there is little doubt that without increasing the subsistence
allowance for officers, and particularly the officers in the junior grades,
the overall increases proposed in this bill would not be adequate to
bring about the results that are sought.
On the other hand, I cannot justify in my own mind an increase in
subsistence allowances for officers without taking some action to in-
crease the $1.03 per day commuted ration now being paid to the
800,000 enlisted personnel who are allowed to draw this allowance,
as well as those few enlisted personnel who draw the $2.57 per day
allowance that is authorized when messing facilities are not avail-
able. I believe, therefore, it would be desirable for us to consider
establishing a statutory commuted ration of $1.25 per day for en-
listed personnel who are permitted to mess separately. This would
add $54 million a year to the cost of the bill. The figure of $1.25
will provide for the increase in the cost of food to the consumer,
and will also represent the savings to the Government reflected in re-
duced logistic support, messing facilities, and food handlers.
I believe we should also increase the $2.57 per day now authorized for
certain .enlisted personnel by 26 percent, or 68 cents a day, which is
approximately the increase in the cost of food away from home since
the allowance was last increased in 1952. This would add about $15
million a year to the cost of the bill.
Insofar as officers are concerned, I suggest we increase their present
subsistence allowance of $47.88 per month by approximately 6.6 per-
cent?the increase in the actual cost of food since 1952. I suggest
$51 a month, since this figure is divisible by 30 and is easier to
administer. Such an increase will cost $13 million a year.
However, since junior officers and junior warrant officers, in par-
ticular, will be affected by this proposed reduction in the subsistence
allowance, I further suggest that we increase the basic pay scales
of all first and second lieutenants, and all W?l's and W-2's by $15
a month; and that we increase all other officer and warrant officer
pay scales by $10 a month.
This will increase the cost of the bill approximately $47 million
a year, but approximately 20 percent of this will be returned to the
Government in income taxes.
To recapitulate my suggestion on subsistence, let me say this:
1. The estimated increase cost of the subsistence allowance for
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officers is $120 million annually. This was based on an increase of
$29 a month.
2. No increase in subsistence was recommended for enlisted
personnel.
My proposal would result in the following cost estimates:
1. Establish a statutory commuted ration for enlisted personnel
of $1.25 a day over the present rate. This will cost $54 million a year.
2. Increase the $2.57 now authorized for enlisted personnel where
messing facilities are not available by about 26 percent, or 68 cents
a day. This will cost about $15 million a year.
3. Increase the subsistence allowance for officers about 6.6 percent
from $17.88 to $51 a month. This is the increase in the cost of food
since 1952. This will cost about $13 million a year.
4. Increase the basic pay scales of all first and second lieutenants,
and all W?l's, and W-2's, 'by $15 a month. This will cost about
$20,160,000 a year.
5. Increase the basic pay of all other officers by $10 a month. This
will cost $27 million a year.
6. Total cost of my proposal is $129,160,000, as opposed to the
estimated $120 million for the increase in subsistence proposed in
the bill for officers.
7. Part of this cost will be returned to the Government in income
taxes.
8. To offset this, however, future retirement costs will be increased
? as a result of increasing the 'basic pay scales.
I fully realize, that my suggestion does not give officers as much
take-home pay as the amounts recommended in the Department of
Defense proposal.
On the other hand, we cannot justify a substantial increase in sub-
sistence allowances for officers, without providing an increase for en-
listed personnel in those areas where they are entitled to draw either
a commuted ration or a ration where messing facilities are not
available.
In my tentative proposal, I have tried to stay within the $120
million figure that was recommended for the increase in subsistence
allowances for officers.
My suggestion means that officers will receive from $11 to $16 a
month less in take-home pay than the amount suggested in the De-
partment proposal. If we restore the entire amount and put it in
the pay scales, we will of course go well :beyond the $120-million
increase recommended in the bill for this provision. If the sub-
committee decides to provide further increases in the basic pay scales
so that officers will receive the increases proposed by the Department
of Defense, then I will support such a change. This will be up to
the subcommittee,. In taking this action we must remember that
subsistence allowances have the advantage of being nontaxable, and
the disadvantage of not being considered -a in
of pay for retire-
ment purposes. On the other hand, increases n basic pay are taxable,
but have the advantage of increasing retirement pay.'
Section 16 of the bill deals with the quarters allowances that are
payable when a husband and wife are both members of the uniformed
services. This is a technical provision which is not applicable to a
substantial number of people. However, it is a correction that is
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necessary in the law. It will benefit some, and without a savings pro-
vision, would also bring about a reduction in allowances for others.
Briefly, what the section will do is to provide that where a husband
and wife are both members of the uniformed services and they are in
the same area, then the husband may draw a quarters allowance pay-
able to an individual with dependents unless either one voluntarily
occupies Government quarters. Under existing law, each can draw a
single quarters allowance but neither can draw any allowance if there
are single quarters available to each of them on the base.
Section 17 will be found on page 31, under the heading "Family
separation allowance."
This section is intended to .permit an. individual with dependents
who is assigned to an area where his dependents are not permitted to
be with him and there are no Government quarters available to him,
to draw a station allowance which will include an amount equal to the
basic allowance for quarters for a member without dependents. I
can best illustrate the purpose of this section by giving an example.
If a major is assigned to an area outside the United States, where
there are no Government quarters available and his family is pro-
hibited from joining him, he draws the quarters allowances payable
to an officer with dependents. This allowance, however, merely covers
the cost of his household in the United States. In determining his
oversea allowance, however, he is only allowed the difference between
the allowances paid to a member without dependents and the allow-
ances paid to a member with dependents. The difference obviously is
insufficient in many areas to cover the cost of commercial housing
which he must obtain for himself.
On the other hand, the title of the section is somewhat misleading
for I believe that members of the armed services were anticipating
an actual family separation allowance which would provide a sum of
money to the head of the household when his family was separated
from him because they were prohibited from joining the bread-
winner.
Certainly there are many costs that are incurred when a wife is
maintaining a household without the assistance of her husband, not
the least of which is fixing a leaky faucet, cutting the grass, shoveling
snow, repairing the roof, fixing broken windows, and the multitude
of other chores'' that undoubtedly add to household expenses when the
husband is not present to do the work.
In addition, it will be noted that this section is only applicable to
an individual who is assigned to a permanent duty station. As I
mentioned earlier, there is no provision in the bill which compensates
the individual separated from his home for long periods of time on
temporary duty. In addition, the Department of Defense recently
eliminated the per diem allowances for individuals who are on tem-
porary duty even for long periods of time if they are in an area where
housing and messing facilities are available.
I have been impressed with the number of reasonable and sensible
complaints that I have received from well-meaning citizens who take
exception to this elimination of per diem allowances. I think there
are times when we are penny wise and pound foolish, and I think
this is an excellent example.
Personally, I believe the family separation allowance section in this
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bill, as written, should be modified, and that we should provide an
adequate benefit. Certainly we should not limit ourselves to a very
minor part of a very large problem. I suggest we amend this section
by adding the following language to section 17:
When a member of the uniformed services with dependents is assigned to a
temporary duty station for a period in excess of 30 days, his per diem allowance
shall not be less than $1 per day.
Except in time of war or national emergency hereafter declared by the Con-
gress, when a member of the uniformed services is entitled to a basic allowance
for quarters as a member with dependents, under section 403, title 37, United
States Code, as amended, and is assigned to a permanent duty station where his
dependenets are precluded by competent authority from residing at or near his
permanent duty station, including duty aboard a ship, or when a member with
dependents entitled to a basic allowance for quarters as a member with depend-
ents, under section 403, title 37, United States Code, as amended, is assigned to
a temporary duty station for a period in excess of 30 days, he is entitled to a
special family separation allowance of one-third of the quarters allowance pay-
able to a member without dependents for his grade, or $30, per month, which-
ever is greater, in addition to any per diem allowance to which the member may
otherwise be entitled.
This language will cost about $50 million a year, and will at least
recognize the costs involved in long family separations. I realize that
language may have to be revised, but it will give you the general idea
of my suggestion.
Section 18 deals with the advance movement of dependents, bag-
gage, and household effects.
Today there is authority for such action, but only under unusual
and emergency conditions. The proposed section would broaden this
to take care of other situations in which it is necessary for individ-
uals to return to the United States before a permanent change of
station set of orders have been issued to the service member.
That brings us to section 19 on page 34, dealing with travel and
transportation allowances which are authorized for travel performed
under orders that are cancelled, revoked, or modified.
I am in full sympathy with the objectives of this section for it
would permit an individual to be paid for travel and transportation
costs incurred after he has left his last duty station and has proceeded
toward his new duty station, and then new orders are issued can-
celling the original orders.
However, I would call the attention of the subcommittee to the fact
that this provision is retroactive. It is the only provision in the
bill which is retroactive and I do not believe it would be wise for
us to consider in this bill any provision which is retroactive. I
believe this section should stand or fall on its own merits and that
it should be considered as a separate legislative item. For that reason,
I am of the opinion that it should be deleted from the bill.
Section 20 of the bill deals with uniform allowances for officers
of the regular components. As you know, Reserve officers now re-
cieve a uniform allowance of $200 upon entering on active duty.
Under this suggested provision, all officers, Reserves and Regulars
alike, who hereafter enter on active duty will be authorized a uni-
form allowance of $250.
Frankly, I do not believe we can justify giving a uniform allow-
ance to Regular officers. This is their career and they have tenure of
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?
office. This is not true of reservists. While I recognize that regular
officers of the Public Health Service receive this benefit, I do not
believe we can properly extend this benefit to all Regular officers.
This brings us to page 37 and readjustment pay for enlisted mem-
bers who are involuntarily released from active duty.
This, of course, involves the question of quality control. We have
readjustment pay today for reservists and for Regular officers, and.
this section seeks to extend readjustment pay to regular enlisted
personnel who are released from active duty involuntarily or not
accepted for an additional tour of duty after serving 5 or more years
of continuous active duty.
This, in effect, is an extension of an existing benefit to enlisted
personnel of the regular services. It would entitle a regular en-
listed man to as much as 2 years of basic pay if he is not reenlisted.
This section must be carefully analyzed by the subcommittee, be-
cause there are arguments both for and against the proposal.
Parenthetically, I handled the Reserve incentive?I mean separa-
tion bill now on the statute books, and we wanted to pay them when
they got out. This reverses the whole philosophy. We simply want
to keep the enlisted men, yet we give them a bonus to get rid of
them. So I want the subcommittee to look at this thing pretty
closely.
Finally, we come to page 39 and the effective date prdposed, Oc-
tober 1, 1963.
Last year I was impressed with the need for an increase in quarters
allowances because allowances had not been increased for 10 years.
They finally went into effect, however, on January 1 of this year.
I believe we are all convinced that a pay increase is fully justified
for members of the uniformed services. But I know of no provision
in this bill which has created more dissatisfaction among service
personnel than the proposed effective date of October 1, 1963. Al-
ready individuals have delayed requests for retirement; others who
are to be retired involuntarily in the months ahead are complaining,
with considerable justification, that they are being denied a. pay
increase which will not be reflected in their retirement pay because
of the proposed effective date. And finally, there are those who argue
that if a pay increase is justifiable, it is justified now.
I find myself in complete accord with these arguments. For that
reason I am of the opinion that the effective date should be the
first day of the first month following the month in which it is en-
acted; and in addition to that, I believe we should insert a provision
in this proposed legislation to the effect that any individual who
retires during calendar year 1963 will be able to compute his or
her retirement pay under the new pay scales when they go into
effect. This will stop some Reserve officers who will soon be invol-
untarily retired, from enlisting in the Army or Air Force and then
applying for retirement after the effective date of the act. It will
also stop many individuals from turning in to hospitals to wait
out the effective date of the act. Finally, it will eliminate pressures
on the services to retain individuals on active duty until the new
law goes into effect.
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Frankly, it will eliminate many things I can't now conceive. of.
So let's put them all under the same tent .and get it over with.
Now, members of the subcommittee, I have given you my candid
observations and recommendations on the proposed legislation and I
hope they will be helpful to you. You also have before you a com-
mittee print which analyzes present law, proposed law, and provides
comments concerning the various changes.
Before I conclude I would like to say this: perhaps we may have
to defer to the executive branch of the Government when it comes to
a question of missile thrust, weapons production, or awarding or can-
celing contracts, but in the area of pay and benefits for the armed serv-
ices, I am confident that we need not defer to anyone. The Constitu-
tion says we shall raise and support armies and provide for a navy,
and we alone have this responsibility.
We appreciate all of the recommendations that are before us, but
we also have some highly qualified experts of our own right here in
this committee. I believe that collectively we have more knowledge in
the area of pay and benefits than any comparable group in the execu-
?tive branch of Government., and I believe we should now proceed to
,demonstrate that competence.
That is my short, concise statement.
[Laughter.]
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to compliment you
on the comprehensive nature of your statement and on your conclu-
sions.
Mr. RIVERS. Thank you, sir.
Mr. HARDY. I hope you will permit one other question. I trust
the chairman, who has expressed himself rather positively on some
provisions of the proposed bill, reserves the right to Change his mind
after he hears the testimony?
Mr. RIVERS. Well, I have already said that.
Those of you who don't know the subcommittee have a lot to learn,
and a surprise ahead. This subcommittee has a mind of its own.
We are complimented this morning having our distinguished chair-
man here. That demonstrates his intense interest in this area.
We have had numerous and many meetings with the chairman, Mr.
Blandford and I, and he has gone over this bill many times, and his
presence here this morning demonstrates to all of you his determina-
tion that a fair a.nd equitable bill be forthcoming from this session of
the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, would you like to say something? ?
Chairman VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to join Mr. Hardy in?
complimenting you on this very fine analytical statement. I think
it lays before the committee the facts in such a manner that you can
get right down to the controversy.
I compliment you on your splendid analysis of it.
Mr. RIVERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are very
appreciative and grateful for your appearance..
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Now, we will hear from the Honorable Norman S. Paul, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower.
Mr. Paul, we will be very pleased to hear from you at this time.
STATEMENT OF }ION. NORMAN S. PAUL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER
Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to emphasize, if I may, that the statement I am about to
read is a statement of the Secretary of . Defense, and to express his
regrets that he could not be with the subcommittee this morning. He
is tied down with the German Defense Minister at the moment, and,
as you all know, or many of you know, has just completed some 60
hours of testimony before committees of the Congress.
So, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read this statement,
then submit myself to questions.
Mr. RIVERS. Go right ahead, sir.
Mr. PAM, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee:
I welcome the opportunity to submit this statement in support of the proposed
Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1963, which was submitted to the Congress by
the Department of Defense on behalf of all the uniformed services. We are
prepared to explain the bill in whatever detail the committee may desire. In
this statement, however, I will limit my remarks to a discussion of the background
and major -objectives of H.R. 3006, which I hope will receive your favorable
consideration.
BACKGROUND AND MAJOR OBJECTIVES
The proposed adjustments in compensation for members of the uniformed
services are based upon a comprehensive staff study of military compensation
undertaken during the past year by the Department of Defense at the direction
of the President.
I might add, Mr. Chairman, this study took 10 months of very
concentrated work by a number of individuals.
The bill now before you for consideration implements the President's recom-
mendntions concerning needed adiustments in compensation for service mem-
bers contained in his budget message to the Congress for the fiscal year 1964.
In his message; the President stated:
In this era of increasingly complex weapons and military systems, a large part
of the effectiveness of our defense establishment depends on the retention of
well-trained and devoted personnel in the armed services. General military
pay was laSt increased 41h, years ago. Since then, higher wages and salaries in
private industry have provided strong inducement for highly trained military
personnel to leave the service for better paying jobs in civilian life. To help
meet this. serious problem, and in fairness to the dedicated personnel in our ,
Armed Forces I will shortly submit to the Congress specific recommendations for
increases in military compensation rates effective October 1, 1963."
Since the primary function of the military pay system is to attract and retain ?
sufficient qualified personnel to sustain our military forces at required levels
of effectiveness, the first phase of the Defense study of military compensation
involved an exhaustive analysis of the current and prospective manning situ-
ation. in the .Armed Forces. Following the manning analysis, the compensation
system itself was examined to determine if changes were necessary to improve
the system, and the compensation adjustments which should be made for mem-
bers in the different pay grades.. Accordingly, in evaluating the merits of H.R.
3906, it may be helpful to consider the manpower situation ,in the Armed Forces -
today, and the retention problems which principally determined the pattern of
the pay increases which we are proposing in this bill.
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THE MANPOWER SITUATION IN THE ARMED FORCES
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Procurement
The Armed Forces, with an enlisted strength of approximately 2.4 million, are
required to replace almost one-half million enlisted members annually, or ap-
proximately one-fifth of the total enlisted force. All the armed services, except
the Army, are meeting their enlisted manpower needs through voluntary enlist-
ments. The Army continues to obtain a part of its requirement for new recruits
from inductions.
Voluntary enlistments undoubtedly reflect a sincere motivation on the part of
our young people to serve their country. There is little doubt, however, that
the existence of the draft has been a most important factor in this picture.
Because the act exists, the majority of young men assume that they will be
required to serve in the Armed Forces at some time after reaching the age of
181/2 years.
Retention
While the Armed Forces have been quite successful in obtaining the required
number of men for enlisted service, they have had far less success in retaining
them beyond the first enlistment or induction period. The reenlistment rates
for first-term (first termers are those who have served an initial active duty
tour as a Regular) Regulars are shown in chart 1.
There are a number of reasons for this, but two reasons stand out above all
others. First and probably foremost, is that a large number of men come into
the military service with no intention of making it a career. The second reason
is that the pay and other tangible incentives which the Armed Forces can
offer have not kept pace with those of private industry and civilian government
employment, and in fact are insufficient to induce large numbers to continue in the
military service as a career.
( Chart 1 is as follows : )
CHART 1.-Reenlistment rates for first-term regulars, by major occupational
groups, fiscal year 1957 to fiscal year 1962
Major occupational group
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
All occupations
24. 7
27. 6
30.0
21. 2
25. 3
27. 4
Ground combat
19. 9
21. 3
24. 6
18. 6
NNNNNN
CO00 CO CO CO CO 4
26. 6
Electronics
20. 6
24.8
26. 8
16. 9
25. 5
Other technical
34. 5
23.2
27. 2
22. 3
20.6.
Administrative clerical
28. 4
27. 0
34. 6
24.9
28. 8
Mechanics and repairmen
25.9
32. 2
32.3
22. 0
27. 2
Crafts
26. 3
29. 7
33. 4
24. 1
27. 5
. Services
31. 4
34. 5
37. 5
29. 7
33. 5.
Miscellaneous
18. 5
24.4
21. 4
16. 1
24. 1
Since 1957 the overall reenlistment rate of first-term regulars has fluctuated
around 25 per cent. However, the rates vary considerably by career field and
military specialty. The lowest rates are in electronics and other technical career
fields which are in greatest demand by industry.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to say at this point, that the chart on
page 4 shows a fairly consistent reenlistment rate for first-term reg-
ulars. Although these are actualy figures, I would like to call the.
committee's attention to the fact that there is quite a variation within
each of these categories that I have indicated.
Also, I would like to emphasize to the committee, as I believe I do,
in my statement, that the retention rates we desire in certain of these
categories are quite different than they are in others. I will point
that out later on in my statement.
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Overall retention rates are useful as indicators of trends, but in the final
analysis it is the number of men retained by skill groups which is important.
The military services have determined the desired percentage of careerists
(regular enlisted men serving on a second or subsequent enlistment) for each
skill grouping which is identified as the "desired career ratio." A desired
career ratio of 65 percent in a particular skill would mean that 65 percent of
all men in that career field should be careerists: 35 percent first-termers.
As a general rule the higher the training costs, and the more complicated the
skill, the more desirable it is for the career ratio to be stabilized at a high level.
Rapid turnover of highly trained personnel boosts training costs and lowers the
operational effectiveness of the force. In fields where the training period is
short and training costs low there are certain advantages in replacing a large
proportion of enlisted members very early in their careers. This minimizes
future compensation and retirement costs without reducing combat effectiveness.
For example, in the services category, a desired reenlistment rate
there or career rate would be 25 percent. In other skills, such as
electronics, it is much closer to 50 percent, or higher.
The critical importance of our training and retention problem can be illustrated
by the following figures: First, the total cost of technical training in the Depart-
ment of Defense is nearly $1 billion per year. Nearly one-half of this cost is
associated with the training of electronic technicians, because of the longer train-
ing periods and the high cost of the training equipment. Our studies indicate
that the average cost of initial training for the electronics specialist is approxi-
mately $4,500, as compared to only $2,000 per man in administrative and clerical
skills.
For this reason the military services all recognize that there is a need for a
relatively high proportion of careerists in the most technical enlisted skills,
with desired ratios averaging about 60 percent. Actual career manning in these
skills, however, at present averages only about 40 percent for the Department
of Defense as a whole.
The situation I have described is, of course, an average picture which varies
considerably by service and by individual specialty. The cause of the low tech-
nician career ratios lies, of course, in the low first-term reenlistment rates in
these skills.
The reenlistment rate of individuals completing their second or subsequent
enlistments is quite satisfactory, averaging almost 90 percent. Undoubtedly
the military retirement system is of paramount importance in the reenlistment
decision of most individuals who have completed their second enlistment. This
generally occurs at about the 8- to 10-year point. Relatively few men feel they
can give up 8 or more years of service toward future retirement even if offered
substantially more salary in a civilian occupation. Under the military retire-
ment system, a member receives nothing in retirement benefits if he leaves the
service before completing at least 20 years of active service except, of course,
in the case of a member retired for physical disability.
In summary, there is abundant evidence that the critical retention problem
in all the services is associated with retaining individuals in most of the tech-
nical occupations upon completion of their initial term of service.
OFFICER PERSONNEL
General
The experience composition of the officer corps is characterized by two peaks
and an intervening valley. The largest numbers are in the 2 through 3
years of service group and the 19- through 21-year group. The valley is the
result of inadequate retentiOn during the past 15 years and small annual input
of new officers following World War II. The 1- through 3-year peak highlights
the turnover of personnel upon completion of their obligated service; the 19-
to 21-year peak is the World War II officer "hump" as shown on chart 2, following.
85066-63?No. 6-2
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24,000
20,000
15,000
5,000
YEARS
MICE
CARED
OHART 2.?DOD officer distribution by years of service.
.?????? MIND
ACIUAL
111131111011111111310131111111131101211101MEIIMITIMEMIMITIM
0261 8055515?666564535251 50 45 49 47 46 45 44 43 42 1 40 39 5 32 36 95 4 39
The 'mplications of this ' experience" distribution are of vital importance to
the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces have been able to live with the shortages
in the 5 to 17 years of service group by assigning officers from World War II
to positions which normally would be filled by officers with less service and
experience, and by assigning junior officers from the 1- to 4-year group to po-
sitions normally requiring more service and experience. This, of course, has
not been entirely satisfactory. Whatever other attributes a junior officer may
bring to his tasks, he cannot bring experience.
Although the services have benefited from the extraordinary experience level
created by the World War II hump, it has created certain undesirable situa-
tions. For example, it has limited the number of new officers that could be
brought into the services. It has affected the normal rate of promotion by slow-
ing promotions for those officers immediately behind the hump and by accelera-
ting promotions for those officers immediately ahead of the hump. In other
words, it has generally disrupted normal career progression patterns.
The shortages in the middle management group depict a situation unique to
the military services. Unlike private enterprise which, when faced with a
similar situation, can hire men of the necessary experience to fill the voids, it
is necessary for the military services to bring aboard young inexperienced officers
and hope to retain them.
Procurement
From a variety of sources, the services have obtained each year as many junior
officers as force limitations would allow. While the desire to serve their country
undoubtedly plays a part in attracting new officers into the service, in a large
part it must be assumed that the existence of the draft has been responsible in
substantial part for this success.
Retention
Officer retention rates have varied among the services and among the procure-
ment sources. As a group, service academy graduates are the most likely to
remain in service; approximately 85 percent have remained beyond their obli-
gated service period. Army and Air Force officers commissioned from officer
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candidate school (00S) have a retention factor of about. 75. percent. Retention
of Air Force aviation cadet graduates since 1957 has ranged between 65 and 90
percent.
The reasons for the high retention rates among officers commissioned from
these three sources are understandable. Graduates of the service academies are
among the most highly motivated and career intentioned of all officers; their
environment, associations, and experiences at the academies have brought them
to this desirable state by well-planned steps. For the OCS graduate, the change
from enlisted to officer status is a powerful career motivation. The aviation
cadet program, by obligating its graduates to 5 years of service, tends to attract
career-oriented volunters. Also their flight status entitles them to extra pay
which undoubtedly enhances their career interest. However, these three sources
together have been contributing annually only about 10 percent of the new
officers required. The remainder enter through sources with much poorer
retention experience.
The retention rate of ROTC graduates, which is a major source of officer
personnel, is a disappointing 33 percent. The Navy officer candidate school,
which provides about one-third of the officers annually commissioned by the
Navy, has had a consistently low retention rate of about 12 percent. Officers
commissioned from the latter program serve an obligated tour of 3 years?then
most of them return to civilian life. The major procurement sources for naval
flying officers are the aviation cadet and aviation officer candidate programs;
these sources have had, with the exception of Naval Academy graduates, the
highest Navy retention rates, 45 percent and 30 percent, respectively.
The services' inability to induce more officers to remain beyond their obligated
period of service directly affects the quality of the middle-management group,
and increases training costs. In order for the services to put into the career
force annually at the 4-, 5-, and 6-year points, the 11,000 to 13,000 officers they
require, they have had to accept from 95 percent to 98 percent of the officers
who apply for indefinite career status. Obviously, from a quality, standpoint
alone, the military services would welcome an opportunity to be more selective.
In addition, beter retention and selection is desired from a cost standpoint.
Each officer represents an appreciable investment in precommission and train-
ing costs. When officers leave after serving the minimum tour of duty these
costs must be repeated with the procurement and training of replacements.
ADJUSTMENT-OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF MILITARY COMPENSATION
The military compensation system consists of vveral items that are received
by all members, and other items that are avant-tide only under special circum-
stances. Examples of the first are basic pay, quarters, and subsistence;
examples of the second are flying pay and oversea pay. It is a radically different
system from that which generally applies to civilians, where a single amount,
called a wage or salary, is paid. Some of the items received by military per-
sonnel are in cash, others are furnished directly to the member or his depen-
dents, in kind.
To facilitate discussion, I will use the term "regular compensation" of mili-
tary personnel to include basic pay, quarters, subsistence, and the value of the
Federal income tax exemption on quarters and subsistence, whether in cash
or in kind.
This is what they all get.
While this is not wholly equivalent to the wage or salary of a civilian it is
very largely so. Accordingly, I will discuss the existing system and the pro-
posed changes in such terms.
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pno
Chart 3 shows the relative proportion of each of these elements for two officer
and two enlisted pay grades. In general, as you will see, the higher the grade,
the larger basic pay bulks as a proportion of regular compensation.
( Chart 3 follows : )
CHART 3
COMPONENTS OF REGULAR COMPENSATION - IlAtED ON PROPOSED RATES
(SELECTED GRADES)
Tot Advattage 7.5%
Subsidence 5.7%
COLONEL
Tax Advantage 6.1%
Selalaerwe 6.1%
Tax Advantage 8.1 %
2ND LIEUTENANT
(.7
(-4
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The proposed adjustments to each of the elements of compensation were
developed in the context of their effect on regular compensation.
The proposed alterations in regular compensation which would be effected
by H.R. 3006 were developed separately for officers and enlisted personnel.
I will discuss the basis for the adjustments, the resultant change in regular
compensation, and the estimated dollar impact of the proposed changes on the
DOD budget.
(A) OFFICER PERSONNEL
For officers, the largest percentage increases in regular compensation which
would be provided by H.R. 3006 are in the first lieutenant and captain grades.
The percentage increase becomes progressively lower with each higher grade.
I believe that this pattern of increase will be most effective in meeting the
junior officer retention problem which I discussed earlier.
Between 1952 and 1955 the median earnings of full-time employed professional,
technical, and kindred workers, a group generally comparable to officer per-
sonnel, increased about 9 percent. The Career Incentive Act of 1955 increased
the regular compensation of officer personnel by about 7.6 percent on the aver-
age, with the largest increases given to the higher grades.
Between 1955 and 1958 the median earnings of professional, technical, and
kindred workers increased by 20 percent. The Military Pay Act of 1958 in-
creased the total pay of officers to an average of 8.6 percent, and again most
of the larger increases went to the higher grades; second lieutenants received
very little increase, first lieutenants received a 4.7-percent increase, and the
higher grades received increasingly higher percentage increases up to 21.9
percent for two-star officers. The 1958 pay adjustment was designed to rplipy,A
salary "compression" and to increase junior officer retention by improving the
long-term attractiveness of a military career. The percentage increase in regu-
lar compensation in 1955 and 1958 is shown on table 1.
Table 1
Grade
1955
1958
Grade
1955
1958
General
21.5
1 28.0
Lieutenant colonel
!'.0 90 90 90 74
to? to cn
14.9
Lieutenant general
14.1
22.2
Major
9.5
Major general
5.8
21.9
Captain
7.4
Brigadier general
6.3
21.2
1st lieutenant
4.7
Colonel
8.1
16.2
2d lieutenant
. 7
1 Includes C/S.
While it is impossible to say what might have happened to junior officer reten-
tion in the absence of the 1958 pay adjustment, there has been little change in
the numbers of officers retained since that time. About 12,000 officers a year
have remained beyond a first tour of duty, and that is a number insufficient to
allow the services appreciable selectivity.
Between 1958 and 1962, the median earnings of professional technical and
kindred workers increased by 15 percent.
In order to determine the probable effect of pay increases on the career moti-
vation of junior officers, an extensive series of surveys was conducted. While
these surveys are not reliable predictors of future retention they do provide
a guide to the level of increase which is likely to have a significant impact. The
surveys indicate that an increase of between $100 and $200 a month would sub-
stantially raise junior officer career intentions. Higher increases indicate only
marginal improvements.
Development of recommended changes in the individual elements of regular
compensation proceeded from a prior determination on the appropriate overall
level of compensation for each pay grade. The proposed basic pay scales were
developed after taking into account each of the other elements of compensation:
the increase in the BAQ, which the Congress granted last year and became effec-
tive on January 1, and the proposed increase (from $47.88 to $77 a month) in
the subsistence allowance provided by section 15 of the bill.
Illustrative examples of the present regular compensation for commissioned
officers and the compensation which would be provided by H.R. 3096 are shown
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in attachment 1, at the end of this statement. For a general with 30 years'
service, the proposed increases amount to a total increase of 6.6 percent in regular
compensation. For a captain (0-3) with 8 years of service in the example
shown, a total increase in regular compensation of 17.4 percent would be pro-
vided by this bill.
During the past year Congress provided an increase in the basic allowance
for quarters for members of the uniformed services. This increase took effect
on January 1, 1963. As this increase is now in effect, it has been included in the
"present compensation" iii the examples we have shown.
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Almost 5 years have elapsed since the last military pay adjustment. In the
interim some erosion has taken place in the real value of the compensation of
these members and substantial loss relative to the wage and salary gains of
workers in the civilian economy.
As in the case of the officer compensation review, changes in the
wages of comparable groups since 1952 were examined in the process
of determining an appropriate, increase, in compensation for enlisted
personnel. Between 1952 and 1955 the wage increases for Army-Air
Force blue collar workers amounted to 14 percent; the Career Incen-
tive Act of 1955 provided an average increase in regular compensation
of about 11 percent to those in grades E-4 and above. The pay meas-
ure, although applied selectively as among pay grades, was aimed
at increasingly extremely low retention across the board.
Between 1955 and 1958 blue-collar wages rose 17.5 percent the Military Pay
Act of 1958 increased enlisted regular compensation in E--4 and above by 7 per-
cent. By 1958 overall retention had become generally adequate. The problem
had become selective; that is to say, the services were unable to retain adequate
numbers of enlisted personnel in many technical occupations. By June of 1962,
Army-Air Force wage board blue-collar wage rates had increased by 18 percent
over the level prevailing at the time of the 1958 pay adjustment.
Illustrative examples of the present regular compensation for enlisted members
and the compensation which would be provided by Ha. 3006 are shown in attach-
ment 2, also at the end of the statement. By reference to the examples shown
it can be seen that for an E-6 with 14 years of service, the proposed 12.7-percent
increase in basic pay amounts to 7.8-percent increase in regular compensation.
For an E-4 with 5 years of service the 17.6-percent increase in basic pay amounts
to 8.9-percent increase in regular compensation.
The largest increases have been provided for enlisted members in pay grades
E-7. E-8, and E-9 at the 26-years-of-service point. Under the present pay scale,
enlisted members in pay grades E-8 and E-9 receive only one longevity increase
of $10 a month between 20 and 30 years of service. No longevity increases are
provided in the present scale for an E-7 between 20- and 30-year service points.
Hit 3006 would correct these deficiencies by providing substantial increases for
all three senior enlisted grades at the 22- and 26-year service points. At the 26-
year point, the amount of the increase provided is $120 for pay grades E-8 and
E-9, and $100 for pay grade E-7. These increases are designed to provide an
incentive for longer careers of highly qualified, experienced members to meet
service requirements.
Somewhat the same philosophy that applied in 1958 when the com-
pression was relieved in the officer pay rates.
The proposed changes in compensation for the lower enlisted grades are based
upon different considerations than those applicable to the higher grades. In my
judgment, the level of pay is not a significant factor in the recruitment of the en-
listed personnel needed for military duty. A sizable increase in pay scales at the
point of entry into service would have little effect in attracting more personnel
or in improving the quality of initial input.
Under the proposed pay scales the rate of pay for members in pay grade B?i
with less than 2 years of service is $85 a month. In order to provide an ade-
quate pay differential between the three lowest pay grades, the rates proposed
for members in grades E-2 and E-3 (with less than 2 years of service) are $95
and $115, respectively.
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INACTIVE DUTY DRILL PAY
Under existing law (section 206, title 37, United States Code), a member of
the National Guard or a member of a Reserve component of a uniformed service
performing inactive duty training is entitled to compensation for each regular
period of instruction of at least 2 hours' duration at the rate of 1 day's pay (i.e.,
one-thirtieth of the monthly basic pay) for a member of corresponding grade on
full time active duty.
11.R. 3006 provides for an increase in the present rates of drill pay for non-
obligated members of the Reserve components. This is considered necessary
to enhance the ability of the Reserve Forces to retain members beyond the
obligated service period.
The proposed legislation provides that a member of the National Guard or of
a Reserve component of a uniformed service who has not completed the obli-
gated period of Reserve component service imposed by law would continue to
receive drill pay based on the present rates of basic pay. At the same time, this
change provides for appropriate recognition due those members who voluntarily
have assumed an additional period of service after having completed that obli-
gated period of service imposed by law.
No change would be made by H.R. 3006 in existing provisions of law governing
rates of pay for a member of the National Guard or a member of a Reserve
component of a uniformed service when on active duty. All such members when
on active duty for any purpose, including active duty for training, irrespective
of whether they are serving an obligated period of service or not, would receive
the same rates of basic pay as members of the Active Forces.
The estimated DOD cost of providing higher rates of inactive duty drill pay
for members who have completed the obligated period of service imposed by law
is $27 million for fiscal year 1964 with an effective date of October 1, 1963.
Mr. BLANDFORD. May I interrupt at that point, Mr. Secretary. It
also contemplates a savings of $38 million by not paying that much to
the obligated reservist on inactive duty training; is that not correct?
Mr. PAUL. I believe that is an annual savings, yes.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Thank you.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, if I could go to two major changes in our
special pays:
TWO MAJOR CHANGES IN SPECIAL PAYS
H.R. 3006 would also effect two other major changes in the present compen-
sation system for members of the uniformed services. The first of these changes
would provide for a new system of career incentive payments to replace over a
period of time the present reenlistment bonus systeim The second change would
repeal existing provisions for sea and foreign duty pay and provide instead a
new special pay for duties involving unusual hardship.
Career incentive payments
The current reenlistment bonus is not well designed for the retention problem
described earlier in my statement. It is paid to all individuals who reenlist,
regardless of skill, and the $2,000 ceiling is received over several reenlistment
periods. Consequently, its value as an inducement for initial reenlistment is
minimized. At subsequent reenlistment points, other aspects of the compensa-
tion system become more important, such as basic pay advances realized with
promotions, and the accumulated equity in retirement.
To replace the present reenlistment bonus entitlement H.R. 3006 would provide
for a system of variable payments keyed to critical skills and applicable to all
future first reenlistments. Designated "Career Incentive Payments," the new
entitlement would provide variable payments up to a maximum amount of $2,400
to individual's reenlisting for the first time in the most critical areas. A mini-
mum sum of $500 would be paid to all members reenlisting for the first time,
irrespective of their skill criticality, provided the period of prior service and the
period of reenlistment totaled at least 6 years.
Men reenlisting for the first time in a noncritical skill and who later retrain
into, a critical skill would be entitled to receive the higher payment, less the
amount of the payment received at the time of first reenlistment. This feature
will provide a needed incentive for voluntary retraining into more critical and
arduous occupations in short supply.
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Members on active duty on the effective date of H.R. 3006 who are serving on
a first or subsequent reenlistment would have the option of remaining under the
present reenlistment bonus system.
No incremental expenditure would be required for implementation of the
career incentive payment system. It would be phased in with the funds now
allocated to the reenlistment bonus.
Special pay for duty involving unusual hardship
Under H.R. 3006, additional compensation in the form of special pay at rates
of 15 percent and 25 percent of basic pay would be authorized for members of
the uniformed services while on duty at specified locations or stations, including
sea duty. Concurrently, the bill would repeal existing provisions for sea and
foreign duty pay for enlisted members.
Under existing law, extra pay is not authorized for commissioned or warrant
officers assigned to oversea stations or sea duty, irrespective of location or degree
of "hardship" involved. Enlisted members are authorized extra pay for "sea
and foreign duty" ranging from $8 to $22.50 per month, as the chairman stated
in his earlier statement.
The legislative history of this provision, however, makes clear that it was
neither intended nor designed as a selective extra pay for duty at locations of
unusual hardship. Consequently, the scale is the same irrespective of location
outside the continental United States.
We believe that from the standpoint of achieving maximum benefit from per-
sonnel dollar expenditures, extra pay for duty at specified remote and isolated
locations (including some sea duty) would be more effective than the present
system of sea and foreign duty pay.
The following conditions would govern the entitlement to extra pay for duty
involving unusual hardships.
(1) Enlisted members and officers would be eligible on the same basis.
(2) Only two rates of special pay would be authorized. This would reduce as
much as possible the problems inherent in attempting to effect subtle gradations
in hardship.
(3) The amount of extra pay authorized for all grades would be 15 or 25
percent of basic pay, depending upon the "hardship" classification given to the
particular station or locality.
Provision of such extra pay as a percentage of basic pay rather than a flat
sum would be in accordance with prevailing law and practice elsewhere in the
Federal Government.
The proposed rates of 15 and 25 percent are based on judgmental factors
in part, and in part upon consideration of the range (10-25 percent) now
authorized for Foreign Service and civil service employees. Consequently, 15
percent of basic pay is considered the minimum amount necessary to achieve the
intended purpose. The rate of 25 percent of basic pay would be authorized only
for those stations or locations, including specified sea duty, which involve a
high degree of hardship. For planning purposes, it has been assumed that un-
usual hardship pay would be paid to about 60,000 members at an average annual
individual cost of $500, or a total DOD cost of approximately $22.5 million in
fiscal year 1964.
In summary, the basis for the recommendation that a system of remote and
isolated duty pay be authorized, and the authority for sea and foreign duty pay
be repealed, is that the purpose of both pays is the same; that is, morale. It
would recognize, however, that from an equitable standpoint this extra pay
should be provided on a selective basis with due regard given to the widely
varying conditions under which our personnel serve outside the continental
limits of the United States.
ADJUSTMENT OF RETIREMENT PAY
Few issues in military compensation are as complex or as difficult as those
affecting retired members of the military services and their retirement or retainer
pay. The complexity stems in major part from the host of retirement laws en-
acted over past decades and the differing formulas prescribed in law for compu-
tation of retirement pay for different categories of personnel.
H.R. 3006 contains two major provisions affecting present and future retire-
ment pay for members of the uniformed services. The first provision would, in
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general, repeal existing provisions of law which authorize recomputation of re-
tirement pay or retainer pay whenever the rates of basic pay for members on
active duty are changed. A new system would be provided for adjustment of
retirement pay in the future, based on increases in the Consumer Price Index.
The second provision deals with the problem of what adjustments should be made
in the retirement pay or retainer pay of members already retired, so as to provide
a fair and equitable base for transition to the proposed new system of retired
pay adjustment for all members in the future.
I will discuss' each of these provisions in turn.
Until the Military Pay Act of 1958, adjustment of retired pay was linked to
changes in rates of basic pay for the Active Force. The system of adjustment,
referred to as "recomputation," involved adjusting the pay of retired military
personnel on the basis of the active duty basic pay rates. Whenever the latter
were changed retired members had their retirement pay recomputed.
Apart from historical precedent, recomputation has certain advantages. Since
retirement pay is based on active duty, disparities in rates of retirement pay
between members of the same grade and length of service were avoided. More-
over, a member retired either involuntarily or voluntarily, whether for age,
physical disability, or length of service had no reason to seek a delay in his
retirement. He knew that his retirement or his retainer pay would be the
same whether he retired before or after a pending pay increase. Under recompu-
tation the retirement date as such was not crucial since the level of retirement
pay always bore the same relationship to active duty basic pay.
On the other hand, some inequities are entailed in the recomputation system.
The major one of these revolves around the issue of preserving the real value
of the retirement annuity. Under recomputation, changes in retirement pay grew
out of changes in the management needs of the active duty force, and these are
not always consistent with preserving the value of retirement pay. For example,
some grades have received a very limited increase since 1952 while other grades
have received a relatively substantial increase. Such selective increases are
likely to be the basis for future changes in rates of basic pay; they are likely
to be designed exclusively to meet the needs of the active duty force. And we
believe strongly they should be designed to meet those needs. It would be inevita-
ble for some groups on the retired lists to suffer real income erosion if strict
adherence to recomputation were practiced.
But the most important drawback of recomputation, Mr. Chairman, involves
the inevitable constraint which it places on the management of the compensation
of the active duty force, which must remain of paramount concern.
When the number of retirees was modest relative to the number of men in
the active duty establishment, the retirement cost impact of increasing active
duty pay was minimal. In 1954 there were 5.8 men on the retired rolls for each
100 men on active duty.
However, as the retired rolls increased with the pending retirement of large
numbers of men who entered military service during World War II, the impact
of recomputation would grow proportionately. Currently, there are 12 men on
the retired rolls for each 100 in the active duty force; by 1970, assuming our
active duty force remains at the current level, 25 will remain in retirement for
each 100 men on active duty.
By then, if a recomputation system were in force, the cost impact of changes
in the active duty rates on retirement cost could have a profound and negative
impact on efficient management of the compensation of active duty personnel.
The most promising alternative we have found to recomputation is adjust-
ment of retirement pay on the basis of increases in the Consumer Price Index.
Placing future increases in retired pay on a cost-of-living concept would allow
the Department of Defense maximum flexibility in managing the active duty
forces, offer some prospect of holding the cost of the retired rolls within reason-
able limits, and achieve the primary objective of stabilizing and maintaining
the purchasing power of the retiree's annuity.
Acceptance of this principle, however, does not reconcile the Government's
obligation with respect to those members now on the retired lists who were de-
nied recomputation in 1958. The question is whether they should be allowed to
recompute on the 1958 pay rates with the explicit understanding that henceforth,
all personnel retired, or to be retired, will have periodic adjustments to retired
pay made on recognized changes in the cost of living. The alternative would be
to apply the straight cost-of-living adjustment to all persons now retired, ir-
respective of the base upon which their present retirement pay was computed.
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For two reasons the Department of Defense has concluded that the first
course of action should be taken and we recommend it to this committee: First,
those who were in the active duty force prior to 1958 and were retired prior to
June 1, 1958, had every reason to expect that their retirement pay would be
based on active duty pay scales at the time of retirement and thereafter. Re-
computation was provided for by law and had been practiced for 100 years. In
other words (no notice had been given that the system would change). Second,
the objective of the 1958 pay adjustments was to correct 'compression' which
had occurred since 1942, by raising most sharply the pay of those in the higher
ranks. The 'compression' did not take place because the pay of the low grades
was too high, but, rather, because that of the high grades was too low. Thus,
those senior retired officers who were denied recomputation were in effect being
told that while they were on active duty they had been underpaid, but that they
would not be able to enjoy recognition of this fact (as embodied in the 1958 Pay
Act) through recomputed retirement pay.
The cost of recomputation for this group will amount to $32 million for the
first 12 months following the effective date of the bill. The lifetime cost is esti-
mated at $600 million, but of course this is a cost projected over some 40 years
In the future. ,
After recomputation based on the 1958 pay scales for those members whose
retired pay is computed under the Career Compensation Act of 1949 (the 1958
scales are already applicable to the great majority of personnel heretofore re-
tired), all those on the retired list would have their retirement pay increased by
5 percent, the increase in the Consumer Price Index between June 1958 and
December 1962.
All members whose retired pay is currently more than they would receive
under the 1958 scales (e.g., persons for whom the 6-percent increase in 1958 was
more than they would have received under recomputation on the 1958 scales)
would retain their present rate of retired pay, increased by 5 percent.
The overall cost of the 5-percent increase to all members on the retired list
is approximately $56 million for the first 12 months following the effective date
of H.R. 3006.
Enactment of H.R. 3006 would require, Mr. Chairman, additional annual ap-
propriations to the Department of Defense of $1.2 billion, not including an esti-
mated increase in accruing retirement costs of $230 million. Apart from the
increase in quarters allowance which was voted by the Congress last year, this
proposed bill represents the first increase in compensation which the members
of our Armed Forces will have received in almost 5 years?a period of time dur-
ing which the wages and the cost of living of both the public and private sectors
of our economy have increased substantially. Although the cost of the increases
we are now proposing are substantial, we feel they are fully justified and in the
national interest.
In addition to the specific proposals before you, I wish to state that it is my
hope that, in fairness to the dedicated men and women of our Armed Forces,
future adjustments in their compensation can be kept abreast of changes in the
national economy on a timely and regularized basis. Toward this end, the De-
partment of Defense plans to review military compensation annually. Changes
in productivity and price levels as reflected in pay rates for the civilian sector
will be used as a guide to determine appropriate adjustments in military pay
scales. This procedure will result in more frequent and consequently more mod-
est increases in military pay.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while I have been discussing badly needed
adjustments in military pay. I should like to say that pay alone cannot insure
the degree of dedication and sacrific which we demand, and receive, from the
members of our armed services. Whether or not we will continue to have
the most effective Armed Forces in the world will depend ultimately on The
motivation of the people involved in it. This involves a combination of national
and personal pride, of confidence in leadership and of a feeling that the efforts
and sacrifices that the individual must make in serving his country, particularly
in time of peace, are respected and recognized by the country as a while. An
important element of this recognition, however, is proper compensation for
the unique services he is rendering. It is to this element that I address my
statement today, and I wish to express my appreciation to the House Armed
Services Committee and to this subcommittee for your prompt consideration
of the measures we have proposed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(The tables referred to are as follows:)
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Pay
0-10.
0-10_
0-9. _
0-8_
0-7._
0-6_ _
0-5_ _
0-&.
Examples of regular compensation for officers under present and proposed scales (H.R. 3006)
[All figures are on a monthly basis]
grade
Title
Years of
service
Basic pay
Quarters
allowance
Subsistence
allowance
Tax
advantage
Total,
regular
compensa-
tion
P
Is
ti
Ps
_
Chief of Staff
Present
30
$1, 875
$201
$48
$148
$2, 272
H.R. 3006
$1,070
$201
$77
$183
$2, 431
Increase
$95
0
$29
$35
$159
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
4. 2
0
1. 3
1.9
7. 0
_
General; admiral
Present
30
$1, 700
$201
$48
$136
$2, 085
H.R. 3006
$1,785
$201
$77
$160
$2,221
Increase
$85
0
$29
$24
$138
Percent Increase in regular compensa-
tion.
4.1
0
1.4
1.1
6.6
_
Lieutenant general; vice admiral
Present
30
$1, 500
$201
$48
$121
$1,870
H.R. 3006
$1,575
$201
$77
$143
$1,996
Increase
$75
0
$29
$22
$126
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
4.0
0
1.5
1.2
6.7
_
Major general; rear admiral (upper
Present
30
$1, 350
$201
$48
$112
$1, 711
half).
H.R. 3006
$1, 420
$201
$77
$131
$1,829
Increase_
$70
0
$29
$19
$118
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
4.1
0
1.7
1.1
6.9
_
Brigadier general; rear admiral
Present_
28
$1, 175
$201
$48
$101
$1,525
(lower half).
H.R. 3006
$1,235
$201
$77
$117
$1,630
Increase...
$60
0
$29
$16
$105
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
3.9
0
1.9
1.1
6.9
Colonel; captain
Present
24
$910
$170
$48
$74
$1,202
H.R. 3006
$1,000
$170
$77
$80
$1,337
Increase
$90
0
$29
$16
$135
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
7.5
0
2.4
1.3
11.2
Lieutenant colonel; commander
Present
21
$745
$158
$48
$59
$1, 010
H.R. 3006_
$835
$158
$77
$76
$5,146
Increase
$90
0
$29
$17
$136
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
8. 9
0
2. 9
1. 7
13. 5
_
Major, lieutenant commander. _
Present
19
$630
$145
$48
$49
$872
H.R. 3006
$725
$145
$77
$63
$1, 010
Increase_
$95
0
$29
$14
$138
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
10.9
0
3.3
1.6
15.8
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ercent
crease
basic
y only
5. 1
5. 0
5.0
5. 2
5.1
9.9
12. 1
15.1
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Boamples of regular compensation for officers un der present and proposed scales (H.R. 3006)-Continued
(All figures are on a monthly basis],
Pay grade
Title
Years of
service
Basic pay
Quarters
allowance
Subsistence
allowance
Tax
advantage
Total,
regular
compensa-
tion
Percent
increase
to basic
pay only
0-3_ _ ___- - --
Captain; lieutenant
Present
8
$460
$130
$48
$41
$679
H.R. 3006
$640
$130
$77
$50
$797
17. 4
Increase
$80
0
$29
$9
$118
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
11.8
0
4.3
1. 3
17. 4
0-2_ __ ------
First lieutenant; lieutenant (j.g.)- ---
Present
4
$370
$120
$48
$37
$575
KR. 3006_
$435
$120
$77
$46
$678
17. 6
Increase
$65
0
$29
$9
$103
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
11.3
0
5.0
1.6
17.9
0-1_ __ ------
Second lieutenant; ensign
Present
0
$222
$110
$48
$35
$415
H.R. 3006
$250
$110
$77
$41
$478
12. 6
Increase
$28
0
$29
$6
$63
Percent increase in regular compensa-
6. 7
0
7. 0
1.5
15. 2
Bon.
W-4
Chief warrant; commissioned war-
Present
24
$543
$145
$48
$46
$782
rant.
H.R. 3006
$635
$145
$77
$57
$914
16. 9
Increase
$92
0
$29
$11
$132
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
11. 8
0
3. 7
1. 4
16.9
W-3
Chief warrant; commissioned war-
Present
21
$470
$130
$48
$41
$689
rant.
H.R. 3006_
$540
$130
$77
$50
$797
14.9
Increase
$70
0
$29
$9
$108
Percent increase in regular compensa-
lion.
10.2
0
4.2
1.3
15.7
W-2
Chief warrant; commissioned war-
Present
18
$406
$120
$48
$37
$611
rant.
H.R. 3006
$470
$120
$77
$45
$712
35.8
Increase
$64
0
$29
$8
$101
Percent increase in regular compensa-
ton.
10.5
0
4.7
1.3
16.5
W-1
Warrant officer; warrant officer
Present
14
$354
$110
$48
$35
$547
H.R. 3006
$405
$110
$77
$42
$634
14.4
Increase
$51
0
$29
$7
$87
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
9.3
0
5. 3
1.3
15.9
Non.-The tax advantage is computed on the basis of 3 dependents, except 2 dependents for 0-2 and 1 dependent for 0-1.
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Examples of regular compensation for enlisted personnel under present and proposed scales (H.R. 3006)
[All figures are on a monthly basis]
Pay grade
Title
Years of
service
Basic pay
Quarters
allowance
Subsistence
allowance
Tax
advantage
Total,
regular
compensa-
tion
Percent
increase
to basic
pay only
E-9
Sergeant master; master chief petty
Present
20
$430
$120
$31
$33
$614
officer.
H.R. 3006
$485
$120
$31
$34
$670
12.8
Increase
$55
0
0
$1
$56
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
8.9
0
0
0.2
9.1
E-8
Master sergeant; senior chief petty
Present
19
$360
$120
$31
$33
$544
officer.
H.R. 3006
$415
$120
$31
$33
$599
15.3
Increase
$55
0
0
0
$55
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
10.1
0
0
0
10.1
E-7
Sergeant; chief petty officer
Present
18
$340
$115
$31
$32
$518
11.31. 3006
$365
$115
$31
$32
$543
7.4
Increase
$25
0
0
0
$25
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
4.8
0
0
0
4.8
E-6
Staff sergeant; petty officer, 1st class
Present
14
$275
$110
$31
$31
$447
H.R. 3006
$310
$110
$31
$31
$482
12.7
increase
$35
0
0
0
$35
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
7.8
0
0
0
7.8
E-5
Sergeant; petty officer, 2d class
Present
10
$240
$105
$31
$30
$406
H.R. 3006
$260
$105
$31
$30
$426
8.3
Increase
$20
0
0
0
$20
Percent increase in regular compensa-
ton.
4.9
0
0
0
4.9
E-4
Corporal; petty officer, 3d class
Present
5
$170
$105
$31
$30
$336
H.R. 3006
$200
$105
$31
$30
$366
17.6
Increase
$30
0
0
0
$30
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
8.9
0
0
0
8.9
E-3
Private, 1st class; seaman
Present
1
$99
'$18
$31
$11
$159
H.R. 3006
$115
'$18
$31
$11
$175
16.2
Increase
$16
0
0
0
$16
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
10.1
0
0
0
10.1
E-2
Private; seaman apprentice
Present
1
$86
1 $18
$31
$11
$146
H.R. 3006
$95
'$18
$31
$11
$155
10.5
Increase
$9
0
0
0
$9
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
6.2
0
0
0
6.2
E-1
Private; seaman recruit
Present
'0
$78
'$18
$31
$11
$138
H.R. 3006
$65
'$18
$31
$11
$145
9.0
Increase
$7
0
0
0
$7
Percent increase in regular compensa-
tion.
5.1
0
0
0
5.1
1 Government cost of quarters in barracks. 2 Under 4 months.
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Mr. RIVERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Members of the committee, I am going to ask the subcommittee to,
meet this afternoon, and then, ask Mr. Blandford, to ask the Secretary.
some questions.
If you don't mind, we will come back here at 2 o'clock and meet this:
afternoon.
So the committee will recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 11 :55 a.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m. the same'
day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mr. RIVERS. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Secretary, in order that we get started here, down in the south-
ern area of agreement, or disagreement, have you had a chance to
look at the statement I made?
Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir; I have had a chance to look at it, Mr. Chair-
man. I have not had an opportunity to, of course, discuss it with
the Secretary or with the services, as yet.
Mr. HARDY. You are up here representing the Secretary. You are.
supposed to be able to express your opinion. As far as the services,
are concerned, they are going to do what you tell them, anyhow.
Mr. PAUL. They may have an opinion on some of these issues. We
have not had a chance to discuss it with them.
Mr. HARDY. If they express an opinion contrary to yours I would
be surprised.
Mr. RivERs. Let us start on page 2 where we suggest a change in
E-4. I will ask Mr. Blandford to take on right there.
Mr. BLANFORD. All right, sir. Under present law, the E-4 has the
basic pay increment at the over-8-year point. Your proposal puts that
back to the over-6-year point. A rapid calculation indicates there are.
about 90,000 E-4's who have over 6 years of service who would be
frozen at the over-6-year point at $210. Now, we are reducing by one
increment the increase there, and therefore there are 90,000 individuals,
now serving on active duty who while they will get a pay increase in
this proposal, nevertheless they will be frozen at the over-6-year point
rather than at the over-8-year point.
If we should make any upward adjustments, a figure, say, of $10 a
month, to take that to $220, I think the subcommittee should under-
stand that any time you make these adjustments in pay, for example,,
even a simple adjustment of $10 a month at that point, i.e. at the over--
8, increasing the pay $10 more than at the over-6, would involve about
$12 million.
Mr. RIVERS. You start off with the first, it would be roughly 40,000
the first?
Mr. BLANDFORD. The breakdown in your books
Mr. RIVERS. There are about 40,000 affected.
Mr. BLANDFORD. At the over-8-year point there are now about 40,000.
If you will turn to your tab 5, in your book
Mr. RIVERS. Five or four?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Tab 4. You will see at the over-6-year point the
E-4's by number. The proposal is to take them up $40 a month which
is quite a handsome increase, percentagewise, 16.7 percent. However,
under present law they have a $10 a month increase in their basic pay
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at the over-8-year point, and you propose to freeze them at the over
six point.
Now, what we are doing there, as you can see from the column, there
are 40,743 E-4's who have over 8 years of service, 24,000 with over 10,
14,000 with over 12, 7,000 with over 14, and then it stretches out, you
have even 8 with over 30 years of service.
The only reason this point was raised is that, of course, out of a
total of E-4's in this grade, and there are a total of 451,000, it is per-
fectly obvious from a career viewpoint that the bulk of these people
are making E-4 prior to 6 years of service, and those who continue
beyond the 6-year point I think we can say, without being derogatory,
have certainly not made the same progress in proportion to the vast
majority of their counterparts in that grade.
Is this the reasoning behind the reduction in the increment?
Mr. PAUL. Yes, that is the reasoning behind it, that the majority
of them achieve that higher rate prior to that time.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes; in other words, to make it clear to the com-
mittee, of the 451,000 E-4's there are about 90,000 who have 8 years
of service, or more.
Now, to bring in an increment at that point would cost about $12 mil-
lion a year, and the question is, what do you obtain for that additional
$12 million considering the fact that they also will get a pay increase,,
because the basic pay will stop at 210, and their basic pay today in that
category is 190. So they will get a $30 a month increase notwithstand-
inc, the fact their increment stops at the over-6-year point.
You do not recommend going beyond that point, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. PAUL. We had not; no, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. You do not now recommend we go beyond that
point?
Mr. PAUL. I don't recommend it, although there is some validity in
your position on it.
Mr. RIVERS. It stays at 210.
Mr. BLANDFORD. He does get a $30 a month increase. It is just a
question of whether he should get a $30 or $40 a month increase. That
is really what it boils down to.
Mr. HARDY. Do you know why we put that over-8-year cutoff point
before?
Mr. BLANDFORD. This was the promotion flow at that time, basically..
This was the promotion flow.
There is another chart in your book here which shows you the normal
promotion points, and I think that you will find that the E-4?you
will find on chart 6?that the average E-4 who was promoted to E-6
has 5.6 years of service, or 5.9 as a DOD average.
Now, if this is the increment concept throughout the pay scale, it
would appear to make sense, Mr. Hardy, that the pay scales must be
geared to a normal flow of promotion, so that if your average man is
getting promoted at average points in this career, then following the
original concept of the Hook Commission and the changes made in the
Cordiner report which we modified in 1958, when we cut back some
of the increments, then it would make sense to stop this increment, at
the E-4 noint at the over 6 years of service.
Mr. H RDY. Well, that would seem to indicate that this period of
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promotion has moved, has been shorter?the period served as E-4 has
been moved down to a shorter time than it was in 1958.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I would think perhaps there has been some modi-
fication, perhaps by a few months, perhaps a year, that they are mak-
ing E-5 somewhat sooner that what we were led to believe was taking
place in 1958.
Mr. HARDY. If that is the case, this would seem to be a reasonable
cutoff point.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes. I think the only reason Mr. Rivers wanted to
bring it out in his statement was to indicate these factors have all been
considered. In other words, there will be people who will say "why
did you stop at the over 6, when existing law says over 8?" Now, we
have the explanation as to why the Department did this.
Now, I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, if the Department has any
objection to moving the W-4 at the over-30-years point at 685, back
to the over-26-years on the reasonino. Mr. Rivers used this morning
that we require our warrant officers ikT-4 to retire 60 days after they
complete 30 years of service.
Mr. RIVERS. They should, because of the big number.
Mr. PAUL. No, sir; I think that makes a lot of sense.
Mr. RivERs. This will give him the benefit of the promotion.
Mr. HARDY. What does that do in terms of cost?
ME. BLANDFORD. $785,000, am I correct in that?
Colonel BENADE. About $292,000.
Mr. RIVERS. A year?
ME. BLANDFORD. A year, yes.
Mr. RIVERS. Where does that take us?
Mr. BLANDFORD. 972, W-4's who have over 26, and they will be
drawing $685 a month, rather than $660 a month, 4 years sooner than
they would otherwise draw under the proposal.
Mr. HARDY. The increase as it is set up here in the bill is meaningless
as far as these people are concerned.
Mr. BLANDFORD. That is right, because they only draw it for 60 days
and then retire.
Now, Mr. Chairman, if we are going to go through your statement
I suggest we turn to something reasonably controversial, which is
section 2(b), and I would like to refresh the subcommittee's mind on
this.
There is about $38 million involved here. What the Department
proposes to do?and this only applies to inactive duty training, it does
not apply to active duty training or active duty. What thelDepart-
ment proposes is that those persons who still have an obligated service;
in other words, people who must continue to serve in the Ready
Reserve, by going to drill one night a week, or weekends if that is
necessary, will only be able to compute their basic pay, and they are
entitled to a 30th of a month's pay, or 1-day's pay for 2-hour's drill,
and this has been traditional on the 1958 pay scales.
In other words what the Department proposes is that we freeze these
individuals under existing pay scales, and not apply the new pay scales
to them. The chairman's position is that this is an unjustified dis-
crimination between the obligated and unobligated reservists particu-
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1429
larly at a time when only about 50 percent of the eligible males in this
country are actually serving on active duty in one form or another.
Mr. HARDY. Find out how you got the number?
Mr. BLANDFORD. The statement indicated it was merely the fact they
have an obligated service, but certainly we ought to understand their
position.
Mr. PAUL. That is substantially it. The fact that this particular
group is serving through regular obligation, which usually runs be-
tween the ages of 18 and 26, either through being assigned to Ready
Reserve units following having been inducted for2 years, or as volun-
tary enlistees, or part of the 6 months' training program. It was
intended principally on our part to provide an additional incentive by
raising the pay of the unobligated reservists, an incentive to have
more of them to seek to continue in the Reserves. It does not reflect or
was not intended to reflect, Mr. Chairman, the idea that we want to put
our foot on the obligated people in the Reserve forces. Our interest
is to have a maximum Ready Reserve force. There was no reflection
intended by our proposal on the people who happened to be in the
Reserves because they are obligated.
Mr. BLANDFORD. The net result is that you do so, is it not?
Mr. PAUL. Well, there is a distinction between the treatment between
the two; that is right.
Mr. RIVERS. He walks into it with his eyes open, he knew what he
was getting, the obligated?
Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BENNETT. The principal desire is to cut down the expense of
the bill.
Mr. BLANDFORD. $38 million is involved in this.
Mr. PAUL. I think the whole subject of drills is one on which there
has been considerable discussion. Probably a lot more study ought to
be given to it. The man is paid 1 day's pay for 2 hours of drill, or 2
days' pay for a multiple-drill period. I think the only reason I can
give, Mr. Chairman is the one I had in my statement.
Mr. BLANDFORD. You would not take great exception if the commit-
tee deleted that part of the bill?
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Blandford, I really can't assume final responsibility
in these matters. As you know, I am working for the Department of
Defense. I have not exposed these to the Secretary.
Mr. HARDY. That puts us in a right awkward sort of position,
though, to try to work out anything here, with the expectation we
have any .understanding from the Department as to whether or not
we are going to have strong opposition. I thought Mr. McNamara?
you made his speech for him this morning. He didn't think enough
of this to come down himself. I thought you would be able to speak
for him. We wouldn't have to ask anybody else. He couldn't come
down here.
Mr. BLANDFORD. He is with the German Defense Minister today.
Mr. HARDY. I understand that.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I believe you will find this is the reason Mr. Rivers
stated, and I think probably the Assistant Secretary of Defense would
certainly concur in the last paragraph of Mr. River's statement, that
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the responsibility for writing a pay bill is the responsibility of the
Congress.
Mr. RIVERS. He told us what he thought. Let's go to the next thing.
Mr. BATES. Is there any other distinction?
Mr. BLANDFORD. I was asking if the Secretary will agree with that
statement?
MT. PAUL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Therefore what we decide to do is merely meeting
our responsibilities.
Mr. PAUL. Yes sir.
Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Blandford a moment ago mentioned how many
people would be affected by this particular section, I believe.
How many people would be affected by this $38 million?
Mr. BLANDFORD. 400,000-odd
Mr. PAUL. I have some figures on that if that will help.
Approximately 960,000 people are in the Ready Reserves now, Mr.
Osmers. Of that number close to 69 percent are in the obligated
category. Under the chairman's proposal, they would be entitled to
get the increased pay.
Mr. OSMERS. And the increased pay that has been proposed amounts
to about $38 million?
Mr. PAUL. That would be the annual cost of the increase.
Mr. OSMERS. The annual cost of the increased pay for all of the
obligated reservists.
Mr. BLANDFORD. No, sir. There is a $38 million savings if you don't
apply the new pay scales to the obligated reservists.
There is, of course, also an annual in the pay of reservists,
because you will have many reservists drawing inactive duty pay for
obligated and unobligated service. The question here is whether you
want to enact a law which will discriminate between the obligated and
unobligated reservists, it is as simple as that.
Mr. OSMERS I am very glad to have the matter clarified.
Mr. BATES. Is there any such distinction anywhere else in the law,
with people of the same rank at different pay?
Mr. PAUL. Not that I know of, Mr. Bates.
Mr. BATES. In retired cases, of course, but outside of the retired
cases?
Mr. PAUL. Not that I know of.
Mr. BENNETT. I was intrigued with something you said, Mr. Sec-
retary, although you said it was not directly pertinent to this. This
is the first time I had this thought brought to my attention. You
brought out that these people actually are being favored at the present
time, because they put in 2 hours a day when others put in a full day's
work. In other words they are being discriminated for.
If that is your thinking, is there any law?or I ask is there any law
that requires you to pay them on a 2-hour basis or is that a regulation
within the Department?
Mr. PAUL. That is the law.
Mr. BENNETT. Have you made any recommendations for changing
that law?
Mr. PAUL. Only to the extent of the present proposal, in the case of
the obligated reservists, their pay would not follow the pay of the
active duty force. That would be an amendment to the law.
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Mr. BENNETT. Personally it seems to me there is some merit in what
you said along this line, but it seems to me like you said also, the thing
ought to be handled in a different way. I don't like the idea myself
of discriminating between people just because they are obligated or
unobligated. This doesn't appeal to me as being very logical. If you
are going to bring about equality, maybe they ought to have equality.
Maybe you ought to pay them more equally. Presently you say the
benefits run the other way. So maybe you ought to bring it into the
law to correct that.
Mr. PAUL. It is a matter we are studying. We have no recommen-
dations to make on it at this time.
Mr. HARDY. I have this comment, if the Chairman will permit. We
are talking now in terms of incentive and in terms of people perform-
ing in the service' either reserve or otherwise. If they've got obli-
gated service, you don't have to pay them an increase in order to keep
them, is that right?
Mr. RIVERS. If you have them obligated you have them obligated.
Mr. HARDY. Of course that is right. The unobligated is a volun-
tary proposition.
Mr. PAUL. Generally, in our proposed active duty pay scales, the
greater increases are at the points where a man makes the decision
whether he is going to elect to make a career of the armed services.
Lesser increases were made in grades where members are in an
obligated category.
Mr. HARDY. You don't have to give them a financial incentive in
that situation?
Mr. PAUL. NO, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. May I ask this question, Mr. Secretary. I am un-
der the impression that the appropriation for paying these reservists
comes out of the appropriation for reserves.
Mr. PAUL. Yes, that is right.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Now,
then, this $38 million that you would save
would merely accrue to the reserve appropriation, and if this section
is deleted from the bill, this will not result in any net savings to the
Federal Government as such, it will merely result in a net increase
of $38 million to be available for reserve participation.
Mr. PAUL. I believe that is correct. Is that correct?
Colonel BENADE. That is correct.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes. In other words, we don't cut down anything.
Striking out this section merely means the reserve appropriation will
have to pick up the $38 million some place.
Mr. PAUL. Yes, they would have to seek an Additional
appropriation.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Not necessarily an additional appropriation, be-
cause obviously they haven't anticipated this as yet.
Mr. PAUL. No.
Mr. RIVERS. Will you admit that we have a pretty fair observation
here?
Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Let's get to something that is really extremely
complicated, and as the chairman has indicated for several reasons
does not belong in this bill, and that is the question of constructive
credit.
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In the first place, under the section as you write it, each Secretary
would decide which holders of post-graduate degrees would receive
constructive credit. To refresh the committee's memory on this, I
mention the fact we do have constructive credit today in many areas:
doctors, dentists, veterinarians, chaplains, Ph. D.'s allied with medi-
cine and lawyers. However, only physicians and dentists may count
their constructive credit for longevity pay purposes. This is some-
thing this committee did deliberately in 1957, in order to provide an
inducement to keep some of these doctors from leaving the service.
It has worked out fairly successfully, eten though they are way
behind their counterpart in the Veterans' Administration. Neverthe-
less it stopped the exodus. We made special provisions for dentists
and doctors, insofar as constructive longevity pay is concerned.
Let me tell you what constructive credit means, so we will under-
stand what this is about: It is the concept that when you enter on
active duty you are presumed for promotion purposes to have already
served on active duty for up to 3, 4, or 5 years. Now, if this helps
you for promotion purposes only, this means that you could come on
active duty as a first lieutenant or captain,_ depending on the amount
of constructive credit awarded to you, and then that makes you eli-
gible for promotion at an earlier date. The theory behind con-
structive credit is that if you went to college with John Smith, who,
when he graduated, immediately went on active duty in the Armed
Forces, he would now be a captain if he had, say, 6 years of active duty.
On the other hand, if you had gone to law school at your own expense
for 3 years you would be 3 years behind him if you entered on active
duty. Yet services are using you as a lawyer, and they are taking
your training and making use of it. So we give constructive credit to
certain groups of people. But we only give constructive credit for
longevity pay purposes by special law to physicians and dentists.
Now, what the Department seeks here, and unfortunately this
whole question is tied up with the so-called Bolte legislation, which
we do not have as yet, but is under active consideration in the De-
partment of Defense. What we have here is a concept that we should
allow each Secretary to provide constructive credit for those with
postgraduate degrees. Unfortunately, those degrees are not named.
This would be up to the Secretary to decide which postgraduate
degree holders would receive this constructive credit, and beyond
that is the fact that this provision, as written, is not for practical
purposes retroactive. This means a lot in dollars and cents. Let me
give you an example of what I am talking about. Two brothers
go to law school. One brother graduated from law school and was
admitted to the bar 4 years ago, and came on active duty in the armed
services. The other brother graduates this year, and enters on active
duty under the proposal before us. I asked the departments to run
a cost analysis of what this would mean under this proposal over a
20-year period. Under this proposal the officer who is commissioned
and given constructive credit for longevity pay purposes, which
would not be applicable to his older brother who has already served
on active duty for 4 years, would receive $14,950 more pay than his
older brother over a period of 20 years of service.
Mr. GAVIN. What is constructive credit
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Mr. BLANDFORD. Constructive credit is a credit that is given to an
individual who has obtained advanced training at his own expense
and, therefore, it is recognized when he comes on active duty that
they should give him a grade commensurate with the amount of
his training. Its purpose is to put him on the list so he will come
up for promotion and be in the same grade his counterpart would
be in who graduated from college at the time he did, but who did not
acquire a professional degree.
Mr. GAVIN. In other words, professional background entitles him
to more consideration?
Mr. BLANDFORD. That is it; yes, sir.
Now, under these circumstances, Mr. Secretary, would you agree
that in order to expedite a pay bill, and this is, after all, a pay
bill, that this is more of a promotion and appointment problem than
it is a pay problem, even though the constructive credit feature is
involved here, and that it would be?
Mr. RIVERS. Don't you think it would be better to have it put in
the report?
Mr. PAUL. Certainly, it does have elements of promotion, perhaps
predominantly over pay. It could have been in either piece of
legislation. We do feel quite strongly that this is a worthwhile
provision, and as long as Congress is willing to consider it, just
which bill they wish to consider it in is something we would defer
to your judgment.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Well, in the meantime, Mr. Chairman, may I sug-
gest the Department further consider the very serious problem, when
you have a retention problem of officers, and when you say to an officer
who served on active duty for 4 years, and this is the man you are
trying to appeal to, when you say to that man, we don't care about
you, we are only worried about the man who comes in next, you are not
going to help your retention problem, because the retention problem
involves the man who already has served 4 years. There is a retro-
active problem here that must be considered.
Mr. BATES. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, the services select
people according to their professional ability, and there might be
two or three individuals competing for a certain school.
The first year they might select the best man. The next year the
second best man, the third year the next best man. You set this bill
up so that the worst of the three would get entitled to more pay under
this bill, according to the timetable.
Do you understand what I am saying?
ME. PAUL. Yes.
Mr. BATES. I think we ought to put this on the side and take it up
separately.
ME. BLANDEORD. Yes, sir.
Mr. HARDY. I think we ought to put it to the side, I don't know
whether we ought to take it up or not.
I have another problem. I don't know whether you want to do it
here or not, but I know eventually if we do take it un I would like to
have a clearer explanation made of why there is any merit in permit-
ting constructive credit for longevity pay for a period when they
weren't serving in the military service. That is what it amounts to.
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I can subscribe to the propriety of constructive credit, but if you are
goingb to give a man credit for longevity pay based on the period of
time he wasn't even in the military services, then we better start a
whole new concept.
Mr. BATES. It is just as good a case as somebody getting paid at
graduate school while they were in the service.
Mr. BENNETT. Two wrongs don't make a right.
MT. BATES. No.
Mr. HARDY. He may have been in military service, and been
studying.
Mr. RrvEus. They wanted me to include all of the service academies
in this bill.
Mr. GAVIN. While you are on the particular subject take the three
academies. How long do they serve, say, the U.S. Military Academy,
how long are they required to serve after they graduate?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Four years for all services now.
Mr. GAVIN. For the Navy, too?
Mr. BLANDFORD. All are 4 years now. We finally have them all
uniform. It took quite a while to do it, but they are all uniform.
Mr. RIVERS. This is a comprehensive bill, so comprehensive the
chairman said he would appreciate it if we would get out a pay
bill. This is why we want to tailor it as close as we can to a pay
bill. We have had many 'conferences with the chairman, and he has
been here a lot of summers with us.
. Let us go to the next point.
Mr. BLANDFORD. If I may, unless you wish to get into retired and
retainer pay, I would like to leave that for the last discussion.
Mr. GAVIN. What page is that?
Mr. BLANDFORD. On page 5 of the chairman's statement, pages 5,
6, and 7, page 12 of the bill, I believe.
Mr. RIVERS. Do you want to leave this until the last?
Mr. BLANDFORD. I think this is going to create more questions
than anything else. We could go back to it today, but I would like
to consider eliminating some of these other provisions we discussed
in order that we can narrow the field of issues here as much as
possible.
Mr. RIVERS. We pretty well agree with him on that, on the re-
tirement pay.
Let us go to the next point.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Let us turn to page 9 of the chairman's statement.
Page 16 of the bill, which is submarine pay for members training
for duty- on nuclear-powered submarines, page 9 of the chairman's
statement, and page 16 of the bill.
I think everybody understands basically what the problem is, and
that is we have got to do something to pay these "submariners," and
I use that word advisedly, who, if they transfer, or are ordered to
a school for advanced training in nuclear submarines, lose their
submarine pay while they are in school. Of course, this means a
considerable loss in their income, because they are now on submarines,
therefore, they do not volunteer for this duty because they prefer to
stay on snorkel-type submarines, or the conventional submarines;
and thus retain their submarine pay.
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The Navy has a very serious problem. The chairman's objection
was that the bill as written was a little bit too broad. I might say
that the subcommittee print that was prepared is a little bit too re-
strictive. So somewhere in between is the answer to this whole prob-
lem of submarine pay, I think we are all familiar with submarine pay,
and also familiar with the fact that, with the exception of the double
crews for the Polaris submarine if you are gone from a submarine
I think it is for more than 15 days, there is one exception, I think
you can be hospitalized for 30, perhaps, or maybe you can go on
leave for 30, and be hospitalized for 15, one or the other, but sub-
marine pay is something you lose very quickly: if not assigned to and
serving on a submarine. In that respect, it is different from flight
pay. You can't make up submarine pay by going out and making
four dives at a later date. This has been traditional and the Navy
has no problem with it.
There is a severe problem as far as the Navy is concerned today
in obtaining volunteers for the nuclear force.
Mr. BATES. Do we have a statement to that effects
Mr. BLANDFORD. I am really quoting from the panel study on this,
Mr. Bates. I am sure Admiral Smedberg will certainly comment
on it in his testimony.
Mr. RIVERS. I might say at this point to the chiefs of personnel?
this isn't designed in anywise to proscribe your capacity to give your
views in this hearing, whenever you are free to discuss them. I am
sure you can discuss any area you want to. We want to get the views i
of the Secretary as relates to what is good and what s bad in my
statement so far as he is concerned. We have only gone nine pages so
far.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Page 10 of your statement, Mr. Chairman, deals
with inside a high- or low-pressure chamber. Now, we changed the
law several years ago to provide special pay or incentive pay, not
special pay, and we have got to be careful of terminology?special
pay is one thing, and incentive hazard pay is something else.
The present pay already takes care of the man who is a low-pres-
sure chamber inside observer. However, that is not always the man
who is in danger, as I understand the situation. There is as much
danger in a high-pressure chamber, and it doesn't make much dif-
ference whether you are there on duty or as an observer, you can
get blown apart one way or the other, either inwardly or outwardly,
depending on whether it is a high- or low-pressure chamber.
I don't know what the backup evidence is in support of this, whether
there has been any fatalities. I think if anybody who has taken the
chamber test out at Andrews Air Force Hospital?I have not, but I
have been told about it to the point where I am not sure I want to
take it now?when you are exposed to these various changes in pres-
sure, that there are some very definite physical chancres that take
place in your body, and I am told sometimes for several days there-
after you have trouble hearing, among other things.
Mr. PAUL. That is right.
Mr. BLANDFORD. What is your justification, Mr. Secretary, for add-
ing the high-pressure chamber, and also eliminating the word "ob-
server"?
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Mr. PAUL. I think pretty much for the reasons you stated, Mr.
Blandford. There is an increasing need for human volunteers in
these fields of experimentation, particularly in the aeronautical field.
As our air and undersea weapons get more sophisticated, these ex-
periments are going to be more and more frequent, and more danger-
ous. I don't know of any deaths that have occurred, but as you point
out it doesn't make any difference whether you are there as an ob-
server or subject, you are in the same chamber and subjected to the
same dangers.
There have been permanent physical injuries, that I do know. This
is also a volunteer program.
Mr. HARDY. In the incentive pay areas, how long do these incen-
tive pay rates continue?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Only while they are assigned to training.
Mr. HARDY. Then it is of short duration?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Well, the only type of incentive pay that attaches
to a man that can go through his career regardless of whether he is
serving in the Pentagon or at an airfield, is flight pay. This is done
for a very good reason, because of the fact that the man must remain i
proficient n flight, and he must fly so many hours a year, and do so
much instrument flying, because if he didn't do it, our accident rate
would go up and we would lose more in loss of aircraft and men than
the cost of flight pay.
But this is the only one, to my knowledge, where the man can draw
this incentive pay when he is actually not assigned to a duty involving
flying. In other words, where the primary duty is flying. All other
incentive pays are tied in with the primary duty involved, such as
handling demolitions, or as a paratrooper. A paratrooper, for ex-
ample, under the regulations, I believe, if he is gone for 30 days he
doesn't draw his paratrooper pay for that month.
Mr. HARDY. If he is what for 30 days?
Mr. BLANDFORD. The paratrooper who has gone away from his out-
fit for more than 30 days?I am not sure of these regulations' they
are different for the different incentive pays?but most all of them,
other than the flight pay, attach only while the man is assigned to
and serving on that particular type of duty.
Mr. RIVERS. That is right.
Mr. BATES. How is that language going to read now?
Mr. BLANDFORD. It will read?I will need title 37 to read the whole
thing.
Mr. RIVERS. You have it right here, haven't you?
Mr. BLANDFORD. The law starts off.
INCENTIVE PAY HAZARDOUS DUTY.
(a) Subject to regulations prescribed by the President, a member of a uni-
formed service who is entitled to basic pay is also entitled to incentive pay, in
the amount set forth in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, for the perform-
ance of hazardous duty required by orders. For the purposes of this subsection,
"hazardous duty" means duty?
(1) As a crewmember, as determined by the Secretary concerned, in-
volving frequent and regular participation in aerial flight:
(2) On board a submarine, including, in the case of nuclear-powered sub-
marines, periods of training and rehabilitation after assignment thereto
as determined by the Secretary concerned, and including submarines under
construction from the time builders' trials begin;
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(3) As an operator or crewmember of an operational, self-propelled sub-
mersible, including undersea exploration and research vehicles;
(4) Involving frequent and regular participation in aerial flight, not as
a crewmember under clause (1) of this subsection;
(5) Involving frequent and regular participation in glider flights;
(6) Involving parachute jumping as an essential part of military duty;
(7) Involving intimate contact with persons afflicted with leprosy;
(8) Involving the demolition of explosives as a primary duty, including
training for that duty;
(9) As a low-pressure chamber inside observer?
is the one we would amend to read?as a low or
Mr. BATES. Just as inside a high- or low-pressure chamber. That
is the only language?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes, but you see you have got to go back to the
previous page?"for the purposes of this section. hazardous duty
means duty inside a high- or low-pressure chamber." So if his duty
requires him to be in that low- or high-pressure chamber, then he will
qualify.
General Accounting Office would require a set of orders directing
him to perform that duty.
Mr. BATES. There was some reason why they used the word "ob-
server."
Mr. BLANDFORD. I think in the original justification the point was
they were putting people through these tests. The idea of the observ-
er was to have somebody with them there all the time. You don't pay
the man taking the test.
If I go to Andrews and they put me through the pressure-chamber
test, even if I am on active duty I won't draw the pay. The chap
whose duty it is to be there day in and day out, while other people are
taking the test, the word "observer" means he will pull me out if he
decided I was decelerating too rapidly or something. Now, we have
to prepare these people not only for the high pressure but the low
pressure type of duty.
Mr. PAUL. It is not only observers, either. It is the people who are
actually the subjects of this test.
Mr. BATES. That is what I wanted to find out.
Mr. PAUL. It is not just the fellow, as Mr. Blanford said, who
simply goes through to get his flight ticket, but the fellow assigned to
that duty to test out a certain new type of chamber, or to withstand
conditions that might be encountered in flight. He has to appear in
that chamber a frequent number of times. He is assigned to duty in
that particular field.
Mr. BATES. He is a high- or low-pressure person. That is one set
of circumstances. And the other is he must be assigned.
Mr. PAUL. Assigned too, yes, sir.
Mr. HARDY. He will be assigned to that for the purpose of taking the
test. Under this he would be entitled to incentive pay.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Not unless it is his duty.
Mr. BENNETT. Why does he take the test?
Mr. BLANDFORD. I am saying it would be his duty to take one test,
but not as a part of his continuing duty.
Mr. BENNErr. It doesn't say anything about continuing duty in
the statute, as far as I can see.
Mr. BATES. That is the reason I brought the question up, to try to
determine exactly how you are going to work.
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Mr. BLANDFORD. I think this colloquy right here will be enough for
GAO to put in pretty stringent restrictions.
As a matter of fact, what we are talking about here is $145,000 a
year.
Mr. HARDY. Well, that may be $145,000 a year, but you have got also
questions of eligibility, if that arises. I don't know if we intended to
eliminate any incentive pay to the fellow going down there just to be
tested, to take the test, himself. If we did, I don't believe that we
have got it in this language. Maybe we have in the colloquy, but I
think we ought to be sure what we are talking about.
We also have another section here that comes right on behind it, and
that is this question of double incentive pay.
Mr. RIVERS. That is right.
Mr. HARDY. If an individual is? assigned to duty inside a low-
pressure chamber for a couple days a month, and he is assigned to
duty in connection with handling demolitions for a couple days, or
something, is that going to constitute a basis for double incentive pay?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Hardy, let me suggest since General Bowman
is working on regulations, if they are completed?are they complete
by any chance, General?
General BOWMAN. I didn't hear the question.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Have you completed the regulations applicable to
low- and high-pressure duty?
General BOWMAN. No. We are working on that.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I would Suggest, Mr. Chairman, we attempt to
put in the hearings at this point the proposed regulations that will
control the payment of this pay.
Mr. HARDY. I can see an awful lot of opportunity for abuses of this
thing through regulations unless we do have an understanding of
what is involved.
Mr. BLANDFORD. We can certainly put it in the report so there won't
be any question.
Mr. RIVERS. I think we ought to know exactly what they are.
Mr. BLANDFORD. We can put it in the report before they complete
the regulations. There will be no problem.
Mr. PAM,. We can set the basic conditions for it.
Mr. BLANFORD. I think we understand basically what we are talk-
ing about.
Mr. HARDY. If the duty of the individual involves two or more of
these responsibilities that would entitle him to incentive pay, and they
are concurrent, and have any considerable duration, why, certainly, he
ought to be entitled to two incentive pays. That is the thing we were
talking about a minute ago.
If, however, there is a limited period in the same calendar period
of time, in which he is involved in one and then in another, I have a
little trouble understanding how in the world he could be entitled to
two pays.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I think, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hardy's point is well
taken. I think we ought to be pretty clear here so there isn't any
possible abuse, because if there is they will lose the whole thing.
Actually, there is $1,941,000 contemplated in fiscal 1964, for the double
incentive payments. That isn't very many people. This is the next
subject.
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It goes right into what Mr. Hardy is talking about. Now, for
example, it would be a little bit silly to pay a man flight pay and
have him come in once a month to go through a low-pressure chamber
and have him draw two incentive pays.
Mr. HARDY. That is exactly what I am talking about.
Mr. BLANDFORD. We ought to know before we approve this exactly
what they have in mind. That goes to the double incentive. We
already discussed it. The example is the paratrooper who is also a
demolition expert. I think they jump separately, but notwithstand-
ing, I wouldn't want to involve myself in either one.
That brings us to sea and foreign duty pay, and the question
Mr. RIVERS. What page?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Page 11 of your statement, section 9, page 17, of
the bill.
Now, this is a $133 million item. The chairman this morning ex-
pressed himself clearly without any reservation as being opposed to
the section which would repeal sea and foreign duty pay.
Mr. RIVERS. I believe ,I can be backed up pretty strongly by Admiral
Smedberg.
Mr. HARDY. As a matter of fact, I showed the Secretary yesterday
a letter, that convinced him we ought not to eliminate sea and foreign
duty.
Mr. PAUL. That was a very impressive letter' Mr. Hardy.
Mr. BLANDFORD. In that case, let us go to the next subject, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. BATES. You ought to take at least 5 minutes for $133 million.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Bates, to be perfectly honest, I have yet to
meet the first individual who recommends the enactment of this section.
Mr. BATES. Well, behold the
Mr. PAUL.. Well?
Mr. BLANDFORD. With present company excepted, of course I have
to except the Secretary, who is giving the Secretary of Defense's
position in this matter. But this is a serious problem. It is a serious
problem because you are in effect saying to many people now serving
at sea that after this long-vaunted pay increase you are about to get
we are going to give you the grand total of a $2.50 a month increase.
The letters we are getting indicate that this and the effective date
are the sorest points in this pay bill, without any doubt.
I am sure if the author of the Reader's Digest article, the Drake
article, had gone from the District of Columbia directly to a naval
base, where a ship had just put in and told the crew they were going to
take away sea pay, there would have been a couple of paragraphs added
to that article about elimination of sea pay. This is an important part
of an enlisted man's income when he goes to sea. It is an important
part of an enlisted man's income when he is overseas. It has been tra-
ditional since 1942 to pay people extra pay when they are overseas, or
when they are at sea. It may not purchase the sort of thing that the
Department of Defense would like to see purchased insofar as quality
control is concerned. But you can't run the armed services with just
technicians. Somebody? has got to do some fighting now and then.
These are the people that are involved here. This is the common,
ordinary seaman variety type of man. He may not know exactly what
happens when he pushes a button, but he knows when to push the
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button. This is the man who keeps the Navy and Coast Guard going,
who mans the outfits overseas, this is the man who is serving in South
Vietnam, this is the man serving in Berlin, this is the man serving in
Okinawa. If you start taking this kind of money away from him,
then all the morale effect you are trying to create is going right out
the window, because it is perfectly obvious the $133 million taken
away here is only to be replaced by a $30 million item, a great portion
of which could go to officers.
Mr. PAUL. May I speak to this, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. RIVERS. Yes.
Mr. PAUL. It is true that the unusual hardship pay that ware pro-
posing would apply to a considerably lesser number that presently are
entitled to sea and foreign duty pay. It may well be that the restric-
tion we placed on the number that would be eligible for that pay cuts
it down a little too fine, considering the needs of the services. But I
would like to say we have felt and do feel that sea pay and foreign
duty pay, and I would say particularly foreign duty pay, permits
certain people to draw a special pay for reasons we are not aware of
any justification for. This pay was, as I understand it, originally
set up as a morale pay, something to give men a little bit more who
were operating under special conditions. There are certain areas of
the world, Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out in your own statement,
that can hardly be described as placing any undue hardship on the
individual concerned. In fact, these assignments are very much
sought after.
So I do think that whatever the desires of the committee are, we
ought to be permitted to review this whole subject of whether or not
across-the-board blanket application of this type of a pay is really in
our best interest. Are we buying anything by it? And, by the same
token, if we take it away from certain of these individuals, are we
losing anything?
I believe that probably something between the position we have
taken and the complete restoration of all these pays makes more sense.
Mr. Chairman, just one other thing I would like to say on this. I do
think we ought to give some recognition to the difference in the type
of oversea or sea duty certain individuals have to perform.
Now, again, as you pointed out in your statement, duty down in
McMurdo Sound is not all the same as duty in certain areas of the
Caribbean. There are certain places where the hardships are con-
siderably greater than others. I have seen some of them, I am sure
you gentlemen have, too.
I would urge we don't throw out the window the concept of the
differential between degrees of hardship, because there are degrees of
hardship. My only plea to this committee would be, let us take a good,
long look at this one before we completely restore one and completely
do away with the other.
Mr. BATES. Mr. Secretary, did you ever give any thought to the
averaging out of the different set of circumstances that people meet
during a career? In other words, if we are trying to equate every-
thing simultaneously, we just can't accomplish that. But over a pe-
riod of a career, some duty you get is good, other duty is not so good,
some is a little bit in between. But it averages out, generally. The,
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old chief petty officers used to say it all adds up on 30, something like
that.
I think we run into quite a problem here trying to equate every duty,
as there are all kinds involved.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, I think the Secretary's point coin-
cides pretty much with your own statement to that effect, that there
are certainly areas of sea pay, very limited areas of sea pay, for ex-
ample, duty on a harbor craft, we will say a man who goes home every
night for dinner, and who may be piloting the tug around in the har-
bor at Norfolk, you can hardly say he is entitled to sea pay to the same
extent a man who goes aboard a carrier or destroyers and maybe puts
into his home base maybe twice in 14 months, or something of that
nature. There is a considerable difference.
I think the chairman pointed that out in his statement that there
are areas of sea pay and oversea pay. where probably it is not justified.
Mr. RIVERS. You gave an analysis of a tug in a harbor. I don't
know anything rougher than a service on a seagoing tug.
MT. BLANDFORD. If they are at sea, yes.
Mr. RIVERS. If they have to be called out to go offshore in a storm
or something, they don't have it easy all the time. It is hard as Mr.
Bates says, it is difficult to average it out.
Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir; that is a very pertinent remark.
Mr. GAVIN. Who reaches the decision now as to what the status is?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Sea and oversea pay is not subject to regulation.
Mr. BATES. The ship must be a commissioned ship, isn't that still
the criterion?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Admiral Smedberg can answer that.
Admiral SMEDBERG. We do not give sea pay to yard and district
craft today. A fleet tug, however, Mr. Chairman, as you say, which
does go out long distances, and tow in ships, does get sea pay, but the
yard and district craft do not.
Mr. BATES. Even though they are commissioned?
Admiral SMEDBERG. No, sir; they do not. Yard and district craft
are not commissioned craft.
Mr. BATES. My point is, years ago wheen this was put into effect,
the criterion was whether or not a ship was commissioned, is that still
in effect?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I would say people in any commissioned ship
would draw sea pay, sir, I can't think of an exception.
Mr. BATES. I know in 1942 they specifically mentioned a commis-
sioned ship.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, may we go on into page 18, section
10, dealing with responsibility pay?
Now, just to quickly summarize this law, this law was put in as a
Senate amendment and is applicable, if it is ever implemented
Mr. RIVERS. What page are you on, fuss?
MT. BLANDFORD. Page 18.
This section would repeal the authority for responsibility pay.
This has never been implemented. Under the law the Secretary
may designate positions of unusual responsibility which are of a criti-
cal nature to an armed force under his jurisdiction, and may pay
special pay in addition to other pay prescribed by law.
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If they are so designated, they would receive monthly pay rates of
$150 for the 0-6, $100 for the 0-5, $50 for the 0-1, and $50 for the
0-3, and parenthetically, that is probably the way we should have
written proficiency pay, and we wouldn't have these reduced payments
going on today.
The Secretary concerned shall subscribe the criteria as to who is
eligible for this special pay, and not more than 5 percent of the num-
ber of officers on active duty in an armed force in pay grade 0-3, or
not more than 10 percent of the 0-4's, 0-5's and 0-6's may be paid
special pay. This has never been implemented by the Department.
The Department now wants to repeal it. Stated, I think, more sim-
ply, the Navy and Air Force would implement it if the Secretary
?of Defense approved their request, and the Army and Marine Corps
would prefer not to implement it. It is as simple as that. The posi-
tion of each of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff on responsibility pay will
undoubtedly be stated if they are asked to do so.
I think this basically is something that the Senate put in, but on
the other hand we concurred in it when it became law, and perhaps
you might want to direct your questions at the various Deputy Chiefs
of Staff when they testify.
Mr. RIVERS. Of course we are equally responsible, we accepted it
in conference, but it is not our baby.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, that takes us to hardship pay,
which of course in your statement you indicate that if we do not re-
peal sea and foreign duty pay we would probably not be able to
justify having both.
The Department, of course, proposes unusual hardship provision in
lieu of sea and foreign duty pay, the dollars indicating obviously the
number of people who would get this would be considerably less than
those who are now getting sea and foreign duty pay. It may be that
the subcommittee may wish to have both, with the understanding that
an individual could not draw both.
Mr. HARDY. Since we are going to pass over the other one for fur-
ther study, I thing the things are so related
Mr. BLANDFORD. That is the point, we ought to go on to the next
one.
Mr. RIVERS. Yes.
Mr. BLANDFORD. That takes us to page 19, section 12, career incen-
tive payment.
Now this proposal submitted?
Mr. GAVIN. Will you tell us what page you are on, please?
Mr. BLANDFORD. I am on the bottom of page 14.
Mr. GAVIN. Where is it in the bill.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Page 19, section 12.
This is the proposal that would eliminate or phase out and even-
tually eliminate the present reenlistment bonus system.
You have heard Mr. Paul's statement, and this is one of the quality
control concepts that the pay panel recommended to the Secretary of
Defense.
Under this proposal an individual would receive one payment only,
other than the individual requalifying?would receive one payment
only of up to $2,400 if he was in a highly critical skill, or $500 in a less
critical skill, and I presume that anyone being reenlisted would draw
$500.
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Mr. PAUL. Yes.
Mr. BLANDFORD. There are arguments on both sides of this ques-
tion, there is no doubt about that. The theory is that 88 percent of
our people today, reenlist if they have once reenlisted. Thus there is
some question as to whether there is any necessity to pay a man a re-
enlistment bonus at, say, in his 8th or 10th or 12th year.
The rest of the idea is that this would give the Secretary a tool to
use when he needed certain skills. For example, if they were short
of electronics experts, you could attach a $2,400 price tag to a man
who would reenlist one time, in that critical skill, and he could get up
to $2,400 so long as his combined service, prior service, and reenlist-
ment, were 6 years or more, if I remember correctly.
Is that right?
Colonel BENADE. The draft bill does not so specify. Actually it
was intended in the administrative regulations which would imple-
ment this that the period involved would be 10 years, to reach the
maximum of $2,400.
Mr. BLANDFORD. The Department's point on this current incentive
payment is that this would be a method of paying people for a skill
that is needed at the time.
Now, it might be that a year after that they have all the electronics
specialists they want. I was amazed to find the other day, when I
made a trip for the subcommittee, that we are in very short supply
in the Air Force of mechanics on propeller-driven aircraft. The me-
chanics in that area are in short supply, because most people have
been concentrating on jet aircraft. And they have a reenlistment
problem, and they also have a shortage in this particular skill
Now, certainly, I know Mr. Paul will have other arguments in
support of this.
On the other hand, there are other arguments against this, one of
them as the chairman has pointed out is that the Department has
never utilized the law we gave them in the first place.
We set up a proficiency pay system in 1958, and this subcommittee
worked long and hard to come up with proficiency pay system. We
bragged to the world it would be possible for an enlisted man to
make $10,000 a year under this pay proposal.
The law was written so a man could get up to $150 a month profi-
ciency pay if he had a real critical skill.
Mr. RIVERS. I remember that vividly.
Mr. BLANDFORD. We used a figure of more than $10,000 for the E-9,
drawing $150 a month, and the pay of the E-9, and everything else
that went with it.
Now, the Department has only implemented proficiency pay to the
tune of $30 a month, or a buck a day for the P-1, $60 a month for
the P-2, and we have never implemented the P-3, but now they want
authority to buy critical skills by giving them a lump sum payment
of up to $2,400. We don't know what we are going to do to our
present reenlistment rate which is presently high, it might start to go
down if we take out the present reenlistment bonus system. There is
another factor here and that is that human nature being what it is,
once you have handed an individual $2,400 in one lump sum, which
seems like a lot of money at the time, after he has bought that second-
hand Ford, or whatever he buys with it, that same inducement no
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longer exists. There isn't any inducement thereafter to stay in the
service, it is a one-lump-sum payment. Parenthetically, I might add
all of it is taxable in one year for income tax purposes. Anybody who
figures this out today, is going to figure that as a factor to be taken into
consideration. The man won't get $2,400. You just tell him he is
going to get $2,400. Then the Government will take at least 20 per-
cent of it back, because it is subject to taxes. So there are many
arguments on both sides of this point, but probably the best argument
against the section is the fact that the Department hasn't even imple-
mented the law we have already given them.
Mr. PAUL. Well, the idea of the career incentive payment, and as
a matter of fact the idea of the current reenlistment bonus, is that it is
an incentive pay. I think this was reflected in the action of the Con-
gress in 1949 when this whole system was changed to provide more
money after the first obligated tour. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, what
we are proposing here is not an entirely new system. It is a proposed
change in the current system.
As of now, 57 percent of the money that is in the reenlistment bonus
system goes to reenlistments beyond the first one. I think we have
reliable figures that indicate the retention rates beyond that first re-
enlistment are pretty good.
Mr. HARDY. Why don't we cut it off right there, then, and save
some money, instead of going into this other deal that you stated in
here.
Mr. BLANCHARD. The answer, Mr. Hardy, is the possibility that
the 57 percent reenlistments now taking place, may be due in part to
this reenlistment bonus. We don't know how much effect this present
reenlistment bonus system has on the present high reenlistment rate.
If we change it we may find to our sorrow that this had a very impor-
tant part in the high reenlistment rate. But this is the problem we
face. We don't know the answer to that.
Mr. BENNETT. May I ask a question again?
Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BENNETT. Couldn't you use the legislation we have to accom-
plish about what you want to do in this? Is there anything that
says under that proficiency pay it has to stay with the man forever;
can't it come or go as the man is needed or not needed?
Mr. PATTI,. Yes, sir; it can, and should.
Mr. BENNETT. Why don't you make that work?
Mr. PAUL. Well, we feel that both proficiency pay and career in-
centive payment are needed to get at the problem of the retention of
critical skills. They are different things. The advantage of the
career incentive payment is that it has its maximum impact at the
time a man is about to make that big decision. It is flatly stated
to be a bonus.
On the other hand, the proficiency pay provides a continuing incen-
tive to the man in the service to acquire a specialty, to acquire a skill
that is needed by that service, and then to maintain that skill.
Mr. HARDY. You already have a certain reenlistment bonus now.
You also have a proficiency pay system.
And I think you would be in lot better shape if you would come in
here having tried to utilize what you have got, but you haven't done it,
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It may be that you've got a good point in suggesting that they be
cut off at 10 years, I don't know, maybe the reenlistments would go
down after that if you did, but if your reasoning is correct, then it
would seem to me the sensible thing to do would be to continue on the
present reenlistment bonus schedule, cut it off at 10 years, and see
what happens to it.
Mr. BENNETT. I am looking to the other side of this coin. What
I think you ought to do is take the proficiency pay bill you have now
and get it as close to this sort of thing you are asking for as you can
get it. It looks to me like it could be identical, and the same motives
could be stimulated in either case, it seems to me.
Mr. PAUL. It is directed to the same problem.
Mr. BENNETT. You already told me, maybe I didn't get my question
across to you, but I thought I got the answer from you that if a man
was very proficiency in something you no longer needed, like threading
needles, making a sail or something, you could get rid of the proficiency
pay paid to him, because he is no longer needed. If that be the case,
it looks to me like you could use this proficiency pay to get the quality
of man you needed.
Mr. PAUL. That is right, there is no difference in that sense. It is
related to critical skills, and the degree of criticality can change.
Mr. BENNETT. They can utilize the proficiency pay,more nearly to
what you wish.
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, is the theory behind dropping the re-
enlistment bonus after the first reenlistment that the man has enough
years of his life invested already and it can be presumed he would
be more than likely to continue at his career?
Mr. PAUL. That is a big part of it, Mr. Gubser.
Mr. GUBSER. Now, you are talking here about the seventh year in
most cases, aren't you? Three-year enlistment and four-year re-
enlistment?
Mr. PAUL. That would be the average, yes, sir.
Mr. GUBSER. Do you have the figures about the difference in the
reenlistment rate of a man in the 7th year of his career, or entering the
8th year of his career, and one entering the 12th year of his career?
Mr. PAra?. I don't have those.
Mr. GUBSER. I would suspect it would be very significant, because
a man can turn his back on 7 years rather much more easily than he
could turn his back on 11 years, it seems like.
Mr. GORHAM. We have done extensive surveys on career intentions
and have looked at the actual rates of reenlistment by year of service.
In general the rates go up, as you said, from the 7th to 12th year.
At about the 10-year point rates approach 90 percent, in some
cases go above 90 percent. At the 7-year point the rate is approxi-
mately 70 percent or 80 percent.
Mr. GUBSER. You would say that there is a marked difference
between the first and the second reenlistment?
Mr. GORHAM. That is the sharpest difference.
Mr. GITESER. Still a considerable difference between the second and
third, but from then on it is the same?
Mr. GORHAM. I would say between the second and third reenlist-
ment there is a marked difference.
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Mr. GunsER. Didn't you say about 20 percent a little while ago?
Mr. GORHAM. In the neighborhood of 10 to 20 percent. I would
have to check the figure.
At this point in a man's career he has much invested toward a 20-
year retirement. At 10 years if he leaves the military department he
gets nothing out of the retirement system.
Mr. GAVIN. That particular individual you were trying to select
knew that after he served maybe two terms, two reenlistments, and got
a bonus for it, he was going to get cut off. He may say, "Well, what
is the use of getting in now? After 10 years they are going to stop
the bonus. Why do with the Navy or any other branch?" They will
find out quick enough what you are going to do, and it will determine
their future and their decision.
What would you do? Would you take a job if you knew you were
going to get no bonuses, and then after the two bonuses they were
going to take it away from you?
Mr. PATTI- Under our proposal, Mr. Gavin, anyone who is presently
beyond the first reenlistment would continue to get his reenlistment
bonus until he has reached the maximum of $2,000 he is now entitled to.
Mr. GAVIN. You are talking about 10 years, now?
Mr. BLANDFORD. It is prospective in application, Mr. Gavin, because
there is a savings provision to retain the present law for those who
have already reenlisted once.
But the point that you make is a point that Mr. Rivers made, and
that is, we are dealing here with an unknown quantity. We just don't
know whether the present favorable reenlistment rate of those who
have already reenlisted one or more times would be seriously affected
by this phase-out of this present reenlistment bonus concept.
Mr. GAVIN. He would be, I presume, if he couldn't do better on the
outside, but if he could do better on the outside he certainly is not going
to stay in the Navy. He is going where he gets more money.
Mr. GUBSER. Mr.Chairman, if I may continue.
I presume the Department has come to the conclusion that the
reenlistment rate would not be adversely affected if cut off after the
first reenlistment. If you come to that conclusion, maybe you must
have had some hard, concrete scientific evidence to back up your con-
clusion. What was it?
Mr. PAUL. As I say, we can get more detailed figures and submit
them for the record, but the retention rates after the first reenlistment
are really very good.
The amount of a reenlistment bonus that a man gets on his first
reenlistment and later ones gets progressively smaller under the pres-
ent system. I don't believe that to give a man a few hundred dollars
for that later reenlistment, when he already has the investment of a
number of years in the service, is going to swing him one way or the
other. And the retention figures appear to back us up.
Mr. GAVIN. You are talking about $2,400?that isn't a few dollars.
It would't go down to a few hundred dollars on the second or third
one, would it?
Mr. BLANDFOIW. It is a one-shot proposition under the proposal sub-
mitted by the Department, unless they requalify under a critical skill.
But, again, Mr. Chairman, we are dealing here with the same prob-
lem that confronts industry, and everybody else, but the armed serv-
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ices are in a little different situation. We seem to always concentrate
on the critical skill man, and yet the armed services must depend on
the man who is doing the fighting, basically. I think we have got to
be careful that we don't get carried away with this idea that a man who
simply is a good barman doesn't have a critical skill. We have lots of
thesepeople. We may not have as many people who understand black
boxes, but that black box is only going to be as good as the man out in
front with the rifles. And yet you are going to give that man as little
as $500 and the man with the critical skill $2,400. This is what
worries me.
Now, we have got a built-in system to take care of the critical skill
man, with the P-1, P-2, and P-3 proficiency system; I still contend
the chairman is absolutely right. Let us implement the law we have
got first before we apply the evils we know not whereof.
Mr. RIVERS. I think it might be well to ask the Secretary what is
wrong with P-3, that you don't want to implement?
Mr. PAUL. Well, Mr. Chairman, we started off very slowly on the
-old proficiency pay system. As of now, 245,000 enlisted men are receiv-
ing "pro" pay of one kind or another. I was not a participant in the
initial decision not to go ahead with the P-3 payment, but I believe one
of the essential reasons why the service request for pilot programs was
turned down was that it was felt that the whole proficiency pay system
needed a thorough going over, and that we ought to explore different
directions.
I would agree with this committee that we have not administered
this program to the degree intended. I think one of the problems has
been that the system itself, has been a mixture of an award proficiency
for critical skills and for outstanding performance. As you know, the
legislation has both elements in it.
The services have administered this program quite differently. I
think we have got to find a means, and, in fact, the Secretary has
instructed me to come up by the middle of March with some proposals,
that will make more sense out of this system.
When we are able to do that, Mr. Chairman, and I think we will
be able to do it, we will be able to give the system a, better test.
Whether or not $100-plus in a P-3 payment would fit in properly
into that system, I can't say right now, Mr. Chairman.
MT. HARDY. Could we get back a little bit to the origin of this
proficiency-pay thing? All the services were enthusiastic about this
thing, as I recall it, when we considered it in the committee. My re-
collection, we could be wrong, but I think it is correct, was that all
of the services were highly desirous of this particular program. That
was going to enable them to keep these key people. Then, after you
get it, you decide you don't want to use it. It is not the kind of thing
that ought to be rehashed.
Then, I would go right back to the questioning. If my memory
is correct, the testimony that was given to us by the military people
that testified misled us. That was their own thinking, reflecting the
attitude of the folks at home.
Mr. HARDY. Maybe it isn't the military, maybe it is the OSD that
?is responsible.
Mr. GAVIN. The colonel was here in 1958, weren't you? You were
familiar with what we were going to do, and how the plan was per-
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fected with such accuracy we were going to really save money. Do
you remember that?
I remember the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they?the brilliant statements
they made. Can you tell us why this law that we passed at that
time was not implemented and carried out?
Colonel BENADE. Mr. Gavin, I don't think I have anything to add
to what Mr. Paul has said. The record speaks for itself. It has been_
a great deal short of the authority that this committee wrote into law..
Mr. GAVIN. Talk a little louder, will you, please?
Colonel BENADE. The program to date admittedly is a great dear
less than the authority which was granted by this committee in the
1958 pay bill. The figures don't as yet show we have experienced
any substantial increase in retention as a result of proficiency pay, but.
that is probably because the level of proficiency pay has not been
enough.
Mr. GAvirr. How much did Mr. Cordiner think we were going to
save?
Mr. BLANDFORD. $5 billion.
Mr. GAviiv. I remembered the figure, I wondered if you fellows did.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, if I left the impression with Mr. Hardy,
that I said that the services were against this proposal, or weren't
100 percent for it, I didn't mean to. They have always been for it.
Mr. HARDY. Let us get this thing straight.
Mr. RIVERS. One at a time.
Mr. HARDY. I would like to find out exactly what the picture is. I
take it from what you just said, Mr. Paul, that the services do want
to use it, and OSD has not, notwithstanding the fact Congress put
it into law. They say we have a little better bill for you here.
Is that the purpose of it?
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Hardy, the services would have wanted to im-
plement it to a much larger degree than they have been permitted to
do, that is quite right. What you are saying is right. The number
of people in the program now has increased to 254,000 people. We
are hoping to revise the rates of proficiency pay. We are working on
that very actively right now. The services are 100 percent in favor
of it.
Mr. HARDY. Well, this bothers me. This kind of retention bonus for
reenlistment?to me is not the kind of thing that is likely to produce
what you seem to want, and I really would feel a whole lot better
about trying to consider a change in the statutory provision if there
had been a pretty good test of what is in the law now. There hasn't
been. And if your basic assumption is correct, that you don't need
to pay reenlistment bonuses beyond 10 years, I would be perfectly
willing to modify the law and save a little money on reenlistment
bonuses, and let you accomplish the objective in another way.
But I don't see the justification for increasing the reenlistment
bonus the way you have set it up here. I think the point Mr. Bland-
ford made is correct, particularly, at this first reenlistment point, with
the younger people you are trying to retain. If you (five them a big -
hunk of cash, there is going to be quite a few of them dissipate it
pretty fast. Then after that, the morale is going to be worse than it
would have been before the payment.
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Mr. PAUL. Very few of them would get $2,400, Mr. Hardy. That
-would be the absolute maximum. And that would be for a 10 year
total enlistment.
Mr. HARDY. I am not sure that you have the ability within the serv-
ices to pinpoint your selection of your people so that you come up
with a satisfactory and result.
Mr. Chairman, that is all I want to say on that, but I do think it
might be pertinent to inquire, as Mr. Gavin suggested a minute ago,
where the $5 billion is we saved, if somebody will ever find it we will
have enough money to cover this particular bill.
Mr. GAVIN. In fact, we could increase it. This bill is only $1,200
million. This was $5 billion we were going to save in 1958. It must be
somewhere. Wherever it is it might be used to improve this legislation.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Gavin, I might mention that Mr. McElroy was
Secretary of Defense.at the time, and after listening to some of the
questions asked by this subcommittee, when he finally testified on the
pay bill, he said that he could not say that there was going to be a $5
billion savings, and he didn't want to say there was going to be a $5
billion savings. The only thing he was willing to say was that it would
improve the efficiency of the armed services. He would never say there
was going to be any dollar savings in this.
Mr. Cordiner could still argue, that if we adopted his proposal, as
he wrote it, that it might have saved $5 billion because of retraining
savings and things of that nature.
Mr. HARDY. And he could be just as wrong as he was when he wrote
it.
Mr. RIVERS. I think he wanted to abolish longevity.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes, sir; step-in-grade increases only.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Paul, what would be the saving in this partic-
ular provision when we repealed the old reenlistment bonus and in-
stitute this one-shot proposition recommended by the Department?
Mr. PAUL. There wouldn't be any saving, Mr. Huddleston. Not in
the first year, or the first years of it, at least. Because you would con-
tinue on, under the old system, those who had already received the
first reenlistment bonus.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. What would be the savings by the time 1968 came
around? Could you come up here and report to us what we had saved
by making this change?
Mr. PAUL. I think we can give you that figure.
Mr. GORHAM. In 1964, we are planning to spend for first-termers
$57 million for reenlistment bonuses under the current reenlistment
bonus system. For career people we plan to spend $94 million for a
total reenlistment bonus allocation of $151 million.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. That is what you would be spending My question
was what would you be saving?
Mr. GonnAm. I understand. The $94 million planned for next year
would be reduced each subsequent year, as the career personnel in the
system begin moving out. Enlisted men, who move into the career
force subsequent to the effective date of the pay bill will not receive
reenlistment bonuses. Each year after next there would be a reduced
amount for the reenlistment bonus.
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Mr. HuDDLEsroN. Do you have any estimate as to the amount we
would actually save?
Mr. GORHAM. If you spend just what we are now spending on first-
termers, but reallocated among skills of different degrees of criticality,.
we would spend something on the order of $60 million
Mr. PALL. Instead of $151 million. But that would be several years
off, and that may be a low figure, because there probably ought to be
more money than that in a penlistment bonus or career incentive
payment system.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Secretary, do you have records with regard to
the various provisions in this bill, the figure that we would save by
this legislation, similar to what Mr. Cordiner gave us back in 1958,.
of the $5 billion we would save in his recommendations?
Mr. PAUL. I think it is an impossible figure, Mr. Huddleston. I
don't think we can give you a figure that would stand up any better.
than that $5 billion figure did.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. I appreciate your honesty, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. OSMERS. On this question of reenlistment pay, the history looks
so good for the second and third term reenlistments that I for one
would not like to monkey with it. I think maybe if we removed this,
reenlistment bonus in the second and third hitches, we might very well
be having the problem in these hitches.
- Is there any way of going back into history before the reenlistment
bonus concept was started and seeing what the reenlistment percentage
was for the first, second, and third terms, and see if there had been any
major change since this reenlistment bill was put into effect?
Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir.
Mr. GORHAM. In 1954, the reenlistment bonus system was changed.
A larger portion of the bonus was given to the first reenlistment, and a
smaller one to the subsequent one. Following the 1954 change there
was a continued rise in career reenlistments.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Unfortunately, however, that is not quite
Mr. GORHAM. You added some money to the bonus at the time.
Mr. BLANDFORD. That is not quite correct. If you took the man's
pay grade, and multiplied by the number of years at which he re-
enlisted in that pay grade, and then took two-thirds of the pay, the
next time he came up for reenlistment that might well have exceeded
the monthly pay when he reenlisted the first time, because of his
higher grade. So the figures wouldn't prove anything.
Mr. OMER& What is the problem? Why hasn't it been completely
implemented? Has it been budgetary?the Budget Bureau said you
can't have the money for it?or where is the problem?
Mr. PAUL. This is a problem of several years' duration, Mr. Osmers.
I don't think I can give you all the reasons, because I just don't know
what they were.
I do know that the problem we have right now is that in some cases
if you applied a proficiency pay of greater than $30, which is roughly
the difference in pay between different grades, you could have an in-
version?that is to say, a lower grade person in a given skill might get
more than the person who was of a higher grade. This, in turn, raises
certain command problems, but I think the main difficulty is that serv-
ices have administered this proficiency pay quite differently. The
Air Force has put almost 100 percent, if not 100 percent, in critical
specialties, critical skills.
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The Army and the Navy have treated it somewhat differently.
They have applied it, in most cases, to the critical skills, because those
are the regulations, but they have also applied it as an outstanding
achievement award. This is perfectly in accordance with the statute
and perhaps in accordance with their needs, but the fact of the matter
is that there has been an inconsistency of administration, and what
we are now trying to do it find the right way as far as all the services
are concerned.
One of the things we are thinking about is having a functional
specialty, or purely critical skills aspect, and apply our proficiency
pay to just that, and in addition to have outstanding effectiveness
awards handled as a separate matter.
I don't think the system as it is now laid out in regulations?and
this is our fault, not the Congress, because we are the ones who have
to write these regulations?makes a sharp enough distinction between
the two elements that an intended to be covered.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I might add, that the law also permits you to ad-
vance a man to a higher pay grade, so you wouldn't have a pay in-
version.
Mr. PAUL. Right.
Mr. BLANDFORD. We had that in mind when we wrote it. If this
man is that critical, or can do a job better than the average can, pro-
mote him.
Mr. PAUL. Right.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Give him the pay of that grade. Then you go
back to the Appropriations Committee and say the law says we have
to do this under regulations, and therefore we have to pay it.
Mr. OSMERS. You say the services like this "pro" pay. It doesn't
reflect that in a lot of mail I am getting. There has been criticism of
the "pro" pay, that it sets up sort of special checks, and so forth, with-
in the services, and I wondered if you ever made a study within the
services of the man who had it and didn't have it, as to its popularity,
and so forth. Is there a morale factor in the services today?
Mr. PAUL. Certain aspects of this system are definitely aimed at
morale. I will ask Mr. Gorham to back me up on this, because he has
been charged with studying this particular pay. I know from my own
experience in talking to enlisted men, that a great many of them feel
that this annual examination that has to be taken?I am talking now
of Army enlisted men?is not fair. They feel that, (riven the strict
percentage limitations on the amount of people that'' can draw this
pay, one fellow who happens to take exams better, gets an advantage
over the other. Some people perform better, although they are not t,,Cio
good at taking examinations, and this has created a, certain morale
problem. I think that there are other aspects of the system that have,
too.
Mr. OSMERS. I would hope we have the service secretary, or chief of
staff, or somebody come in and talk to us about it.
Mr. BLANDFORD. They are all here, Mr. Osmers.
Mr. OSMERS. Making a complete documentation as to whether it is
working in their particular service, or not.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I think one of the reasons it is not working is it
has never been implemented properly. You will note the law does not
limit the number of people who can draw proficiency pay.
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Mr. OSMERS. Somebody is limited, I would like to find out really
who.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I think you will find it in the comptroller's office
of OSD if you look hard. Basically, that is where the question is;
it is simply a question of money.
Mr. STRATroN. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, going back to the question raised, I think by Mr.
'Gubser, earlier, with respect to the bonus question. You mentioned
on page 16 of your statement that you made a little study as to what
would be needed to keep the junior officers in, and you determined
that an increase of $100 to $200 a month would make a substantial
difference. You conducted some kind of a survey there. You don't
go into it but I don't know whether you had a Gallup poll or what it
was.
Now, was there any similar survey with respect to reenlistments,
or was this something based on another consideration?
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Stratton, Mr. Gorham was the head of our pay study
group. I would like to ask him to answer that question, please.
Mr. GoimA.3.1. We did conduct surveys of both officers and enlisted
men. They were unique surveys, in which we asked different groups
of men, whether or not their career intentions would change if their
pay went up by a certain amount of money. For example, if the
members of the committee were the enlisted force, we would have
asked the three members to my left, whether $50 would have made
the difference between them staying in or leaving the service.
The next three members we would have asked whether $75 would
make the difference.
The next, $100.
We then drew up a series of?
Mr. STRATroN. I am asking you whether you did the same kind of
? thing with regard to the reenlistment bonus?
Mr. GonnAm. No, we did what I described only in terms of monthly
pay. We did conduct another series of surveys which indicated to us
how men regarded immediate dollars, that is, bonus money, as com-
pared with increments to his monthly pay. We found that men, in
general, preferred immediate dollars, that is, discounted future dollars
at a very high rate.
Let me use an example.
Mr. STRATTON. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush?
Mr. GonHAm. That is right. That is why we regard a reenlistment
bonus essentially very efficient. That is not to say you can't pay a
man money
Mr. STuArrox. My question was whether the issue was raised
whether you made any attempt to survey the question whether a re-
? enlistment bonus at the first reenlistment was more effective than at
the second or third. But you didn't make any such study?
Mr. GoimAx. Yes, let me answer your question now, I have been
beating around the bush, apparently.
We found that the reenlistment bonus influences the first reenlist-
? ment more than it does the second and subsequent reenlistments. It
doesn't appear as a major factor for those in their second and third
reenlistments.
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Mr. STRATTON. Well, now, this would also, I would think, be some-
thing that you could justify, and I think to some extent you were doing
that also on the basis of your statement that after the first reenlistment
then you have an investment in the service in terms of retirement which
you can't brush aside, lightly.
Mr. PAUL. No, and you can't cash in on it until you reach retirement
eligibility.
Mr. STRATTON. I know many who got called up in the Korean con-
flict, for example, reserves, wanted to stay on, as they had acquired 2
more years in the service, they said we might as well make a career-
out of it.
This idea, perhaps in contrast to the other members of the committee,
seems to appeal to me, Mr. Secretary. The only thing that I can't
understand is why your initial increase isn't a little bit more substan-
tial ; if you are really trying to do a job on the first enlistment it doesn't
seem to me an increase from $2,000 to $2,400 is really very significant,.
especially if you are going to knock off $2,000 on two or three succes-
sive enlistments?
Mr. PAUL. I think the difference, Mr. Stratton, is that in the case
of the $2,400 he is gettting it all at once. The $2,000 is the maximum
now that a man can get throughout his whole career. He doesn't,
realize anything like $2,000 on his first reenlistment.
Mr. STRATTON. Oh, I see. In other words, what would be the maxi-
mum that he would get on his first enlistment?
Mr. PAUL. He pts one month's basic pay times the number of years
of his second enlistment; $1,200, I think, is about the maximum he
could get for that.
Mr. STRATTON. Now, one other question, also with regard to this
matter of oversea pay versus hardship pay. If I understand this
correctly, you are proposing a kind of hardship pay in place of the
oversea pay. Now, does this hardship pay also embrace the hazardous
dutypay, and you are going to have these two grades that would deal
with both hazardous duty and hardship, or will this be over and above
what you get for flight pay and submarine pay, and so on?
Mr. PAUL. This is entirely different from hazardous duty pay.
Hazardous duty pay is related to the rigors that the man, himself, has
to undertake, the dangers he risks as a result of that duty. For ex-
ample, flying an airplane, or being in a submarine.
Unusual hardship pay refers to the conditions under which he lives.
There are an increasing number of men in our services today who
are in some specialties. For example, in the radar technician field,
a man, if he is adept at a certain type of radar technique, is likely to
end up in hardship posts a good deal of his career.
Mr. STRATTON. Up on the top of Blue Mountain in the Adirondacks ?
Mr. PAUL. For that reason we think there should be some gradation
in compensation, in consideration of the degree of hardship a person
has to undertake during his career.
In other words, I don't think, in certain technician grades, Mr. Bates,
that it does necessarily even out at 30.
Mr. BATES. That would be reflected in the rating, rather than the
location?
Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir.
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Mr. STRATTON. Your proposal is,
there would be 25 percent for
very hard hardships, and 15 percent for not so hard; is that correct?
Mr. PAUL. Yes, those would be the two categories. You could put
it into more categories than that. I believe Mr. Cordiner proposed a
.series of different categories of hardship, but we think that it would
complicate the system to make it more than two.
Mr. STRATTON. What is the oversea pay now, is it 10 percent?
Mr. PAUL. It goes from $8 to $22.50 a month, depending on the
grade of the individual involved. It is the same everywhere. In
other words, wherever he is, as long as he is overseas or at sea.
MT. STRATTON. Thank you.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we take two
items, subsistence allowance and family separation allowance, and just
briefly discuss them and then at 4 o'clock take the Deputy Chiefs of
Staff for Personnel, them,
they have been here all day, and tomorrow
we have scheduled outside witnesses, and then perhaps tomorrow after-
noon we can go back to Mr. Paul, and if the Deputy Chiefs could be
-here tomorrow afternoon, we could continue this.
Mr. BENNETT. That will be 5 o'clock every day.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Ten to twelve in the morning.
Mr. BENNETT. It is none of my business, but I do not think this com-
mittee might to run on the basis of adjourning at five.
Mr. BLANDFORD. The only point is to try to get the Deputy Chiefs'
testimony.
Mr. BENNETT. I don't mind today, but it should not be permanent.
Mr. RIVERS. I would like, though, to get the Deputy Chiefs of Staffs
this afternoon. We will not do it every day. We are not going to try
to rush this bill, we will take our time and do it right. If we can't finish
it this week, we will finish it later.
If we can't get the Secretary tomorrow, we will get him to come on
Thursday.
Mr. PAUL. Any time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. RIVERS. I do want to get the personnel chiefs before we adjourn
this afternoon, then we won't try to do this all the time, late at night.
Of course, it would suit me, but I know my schedule is different from
anybody else's. I will do what the committee wants to do, that is the
main thing.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss briefly with
Mr. Paul your suggestion concerning subsistence. As we know, there
was a $29 a month increase in subsistence allowance for officers in this
bill, and nothing for enlisted personnel. The third major part of the
mail that is coining into the committee, is the resentment on the part
? of enlisted personnel that the subsistence allowance has been increased
for officers, and there is nothing in the bill for enlisted personnel.
I am informed by DOD the cost of food has gone up 6.6 percent
since 1952.
Also, I understand that the cost of food away from home, that is,
the meals you buy in restaurants, has gone up 26 percent since 1952.
Presumably the subsistence for an officer is to cover his expenses when
he eating in a commissioned officers' mess or eating at a mess aboard
a naval vessel. There is an interesting surcharge levied against an
officer when he eats in an enlisted mess.
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Basically, however, the officers subsistence allowance, which has
undergone several changes over the years. It used to be that officers
in certain grades received three subsistence allowances, up to as high
as $66 a month for certain grades, but when he got to be a colonel, it
dropped. There isn't any rhyme or reason in subsistence allowances.
The $47.88, which appears to be such an incongruous figure in the law
today, was a result of a 14-percent across-the-board increase in allow-
ances which we agreed to in conference in 1952. I don't think that
we can say correctly that it was based upon any set of figures or any-
thing else except that 4 percent was alloted to the basic pay and 11
percent to subsistence and quarters allowance.
But if we can assume, however, that $47.88 is a reasonable figure,
then the officer is really only entitled to an increase in the cost of food
because presumably that is what he is paying for when he eats in a
.commissioned officers' mess or eats at a mess aboard a ship.
Now,
unfortunately, the enlisted man basically is subject to two
types of rations. There are only 811 that (Yet the third type so that is
really meaningless. The -enlisted man has traditionally been fur-
nished food in a messhall, but lye also is allowed to subsist out, that is,
-subsist on his Own, on what is known as a commuted ration. This
means he is allowed to mess separately, and we have only allowed
him the actual cost of the food to the Government.
Now the aCtual cost of the food to the Government varies from year.
to year, and the last adjustment was made downward,,I think, from
$1.05 to $1.03.
This means that when an enlisted man is allowed a commuted ration
he draws $1.03 a day provided he does not eat any meals in the mess-
hall. This, then, is what his wife uses as a cost figure for buying her,
food. However, if we translated the actual cost of feeding that man,
I am of the opinion that it would be considerably in excess of $1.03 a
ay.
Now, for purposes of comparison, what we have done in the pro-
posal before us here, as far as the chairman is concerned, is to take
the $120 million, which was the amount that we set aside in this pro-
posed pay increase for increasing subsistence allowances for officers,
and divide that money up much more equitably than the Department
proposal, insofar as enlisted men and officers are concerned.
We increased the commuted ration and suggest it become a statutory
ration of $1.25 a day. We, increased the $2.57 that the man now gets
if messing facilities are not available by 68 cents a day, which is 26
percent, because that is the increase in the cost of eating away from
home.
The subsistence allowance that was suggested in the Department
proposal is a significant part of the junior officers' pay increase with-
out which the increase would not approach the $100 figure Mr. Gorham
was talking about, and the amount which, the junior officers said
would be the amount of money that would make them think twice
about making a career of the armed services. If we take away the
'entire $29, from the second lieutenant or the first lieutenant, and only
give him the basic pay increase, then we fall short of the $100 increase
per month in increased pay that the junior officer said would be impor-
tant in his consideration when it came to a question of making a career
of the service.
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So the chairman has suggested, because the figures come out. to $129'
million as opposed to $120 million for subsistence, that we increase
the officers' subsistence from $47.88 to $51.00, that we establish a Statu-
tory computed ration of $1.25, that we increase the $2.57 for messing
facilities, when they are not available, by 68 cents, and that we then
give the junior officers, first and second lieutenants and W-1's and
W-2's, a $15 a month across-the-board increase. This would cost
$20,126,000. Then increase all other basic pay scales for officers by
$10, which comes to some $27 million.
Now, adding all of these figures up, the proposal that the chairman
offers as a substitute comes to $129 million as opposed to the $120
million that the Department proposal submitted for only increasing
the subsistence allowance of officers.
This still will not bring the junior officer up to the point that the
Department thought was necessary from a take home pay viewpoint to
make it as attractive as the Department proposal.
So the question here is, Should we do something with the enlisted
man's subsistence allowance? That is the first question. Would you
comment on that, Mr. Secretary ?
Mr. RrvEms. Ask him why they were left out.
Mr. PAUL. Well, with respect to the commuted ration change, Mr.
Chairman, that is proposed here, of $1.25 frankly, it is hard for me to
say whether I think that is a good idea, or whether that is the right
amount. This is an awfully hard figure to compute, and I don't know
how you can arrive at a good figure.
The figure of $1.03 a day is based on the cost of the ration, and, as
I understood it, that has been the statutory requirement.
So I am at a loss, Mr. Chairman, to comment specifically on the
commuted ration change.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I am at an equal loss because all we did was multi-
ply 800,000 by 22 cents, and came out with $54 million, when we added
up all the other figures we came out to $129 million. The $129 million
that is in the chairman's proposal is awfully close to the $120 million
that you people were going to spend on officers alone.
I think Mr. Gorham would agree that there is an added
charge?let's put it this way, if 800,000 enlisted men suddenly de-
scended upon the messhalls of this country, and said take your com-
muted ration, I don't want it, I will eat every meal in the mess hall,
I think it would cost you considerably more than $1.03 a day to feed
them.
Mr. PAUL. Of course a lot more would be eating there at that time.
The average might go up or down, I don't know.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. I think Mr. Paul is trying to answer this series
of questions with a recommendation in the cold. He is coming back
tomorrow afternoon. Why can't we ask him to give us his reaction
at that time. It would be a little more meaningful.
Mr. BLANDFORD. We can do the same thing with the rest of the
provisions, also, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. IlAnny. I think it might be a good idea if we could have a
little clearer understanding of the basis for doing some of these
things.
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Actually, we are working on a completely irrational approach to the
proposition, even the thing which Mr. Blandford has suggested, we
.are taking $15, simply multiplying it with an arithmetical figure.
That isn't very logical. You took a $77 figure there for your officers,
not based on anything that is rational at all. It obviously was a
device to try to increase somebody's take home pay without any logical
basis for it at all. It is not related to the cost.
Mr. RIVERS. Let me explain this to the committee.
Mr. HARDY. I am talking about what Mr. Paul says.
Mr. RIVERS. That is exactly the reaction Mr. Blandford and I got.
We tried, after we had gotten all this legerdemain, or whatever we
want to call it, we tried to figure out a way to say within that $120
million. The nearest we could get to it was $129 million. Am I
right, Mr. Blandford?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes, sir.
Mr. RIVERS. Then we found out the junior officers were short
-changed.
We are just trying to find out a way to stay close to the $120 million.
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman I think we ought to back up and do this
whole thing over. I think the approach that the Secretary has made
?in these subsistence allowances are just as cockeyed as it can be. I
don't think we ought to undertake to use that as a device to give a
lower officer grade an increase in base pay to which they are reason-
ably entitled.
Mr. RIVERS. You remember I said in my statement the committee
will have to work it out.
Mr. HARDY. I certainly agree; I am going to go to work on that $77
thing.
Mr. RIVERS. Let's see if we can work out something a little better on
this.
Obviously, they don't want to take my suggestion, and I don't think
we like theirs.
Mr. Secretary, thank you. We will excuse you.
Do you think he will be back tomorrow afternoon?
Mr. BLANDFORD. I think he will be here tomorrow morning also.
Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir.
Mr. MITERS. You are prepared to stay with us?
Mr. PAUL. Yes, at any time.
Mr. RIVERS. General Vittrup, we will ask you to come up and say
what you have to say on this.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RUSSELL L. VITTRUP, DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL, U.S. ARMY
General Virrurip. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:
I am happy to have the opportunity to appear before you in support
-of the Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1963.
The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army in their appear-
ances before the House Armed Services Committee and the Depart-
ment of Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Commit-
tee have already expressed their views on the importance of a pay
raise for the military services.
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In this respect I know of no way to better emphasize the position
of the Army than to quote from General Wheeler's testimony:
"I should like to state briefly at this point that the Army is highly apprecia-
tive that the Congress has always recognized in this scientific age that men are
not machines, that high morale and esprit de corps do play an important part in
operational effectiveness, and that investments in personnel benefits do pay divi-
dends in the increased effectiveness, motivation, and usefulness of the individual.
This recognition and understanding of the value of the individual to the modern.
military service is basic to our continued development and improvement.
It is plain, I think, that the Army's greatest resource is the professional-style
soldier with the highly specialized skills needed to man the modern army. Our
ability to attract, develop, motivate, and retain people of this caliber depends
to a large extent on such things as troop housing, pay, benefits, family and
bachelor quarters, and family life. I strongly support the need for a pay raise
for the military, and believe there is agreement on this point generally. At the
same time, I recognize that there will be some controversy as to the amount
of the raise. I am content to leave decision on this in the capable hands of
the Congress and this committee, since there is no logical way one can equate
salary received with the sacrifices which the men and women of the Army are-
making now and are prepared to make when called on.
Having been in the personnel business during the past couple of
years and having had the problem of trying to get a soldier with
the right qualifications at the right place at the right time particu-
larly during the Berlin buildup, and the Cuban crisis, and -Co concur-
rently meet other high priority requirements including Vietnam and
Korea, certainly makes me realize the great importance of not only
getting but retaining, on a long-term basis, competent people. Cer-
tainly adequate pay is a major factor in such retention. I am sure
that it is not necessary for me to undertake to amplify this point
further with this committee.
Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement.
Mr. RIVERS. Thank you very much.
Are there any questions?
Mr. HARDY. I have just one, Mr. Chairman.
General, I wonder if you can tell the committee what contribution
your office or the Chief of Staff office or the Secretary of Army's
office made in the preparation of this pay legislation that has been
before us.
General VirrRur. I didn't get the question completely.
Mr. HARDY. I want to know what contribution you and the Army
made in the preparation of this bill we are considering.
General Virinop. Actually, sir, as has been indicated, this special
committee made most of the study in connection with the bill.
The Army, the same as I believe the other services, made certain in-
put to that committee in data and little studies on the side that they
requested.
We also went over certain action officers so to speak, and made.
presentation to them on certain things like the ability to retain certain
people in certain categories, and such as that.
Mr. HARDY. Did you advocate this particular approach, this ap-
proach of the reenlistment bonus?
General Vrrrnur. To the best of my knowledge, we did?
Mr. HARDY. Don't you know whether the Army did or not, Gen-
eral? This is your baby. This is your responsibility.
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General VirrRur. We did not advocate that particular "gimmick"'
so to speak
Mr. HARDY. That is what I asked you.
General Vrranur (continuing). In the preparation of the study.
However, at the time we had an opportunity to comment, we did
not object.
Mr. HARDY. SO it was passive acquiescence?
General VITTRUP. Sir' you said that. [Laughter.]
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? General,
you heard Mr. Rivers' comments on the proposed bill?
General VirERETE. Yes.
MT. BLANDFORD. Would you advocate the elimination of oversea
pay?
General VITTRUP. The position taken by the Army at that time was
that we would not object to the elimination of the oversea and foreign
duty pay, provided the remote duty pay was implemented to a com-
parable and commensurate degree.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Do you think $30 million for unusual hardship
and $133 million for sea pay? indicates that would be the way it
would be implemented?
General VErEREE. I do not.
Mr. HARDY. He knew we were going to take care of that, didn't
you General?
Mr. RIVERS. Did you read the statement I made this morning?
General VIITRUP. Yes, sir.
Mr. RIVERS. Do you agree with this last paragraph, where I said we
had some professionals on this committee?
General VITTRUP. Yes, sir.
Mr. RIVERS. Thank you, General.
Mr. STRATTON. May I ask the general a question?
Mr. RIVERS. Excuse me.
Mr. STRATTON. I didn't understand your answer to Mr. Bland-
ford's question. You say you would have no objection to elimination
of oversea pay, provided the pay given to those on remote stations
was increased by a comparable figure.
General VITTRUP. What I said, I believe, I can quote it exactly here:
We have no objection to the elimination of sea and foreign duty pay
in its current form. It should be dropped only if compensatory pay
on a commensurate basis is added in the form of remote and isolated
duty pay, and family separation allowance.
In other words, to compensate; these two things are to a degree
in the same category.
Mr. STRATTON. You are saying
Mr. BAITS. You don't want to give it a different name?
Mr. STRATTON. If I understood you correctly, what you are saying
is you don't mind the elimination of the oversea pay provided those
who are actually in remote stations are compensated accordingly on
the basis of their hardship, is that correct?
General VITTRUP. That is the idea.
MT. STRATTON. Now, the amount of money that is spent in total
doesn't have anything eo do with it, does it?
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There would be presumably fewer people who would be undergoing
these actual hardships and would in fact be overseas, or would in fact
be at sea, isn't that correct?
General VITTRUP. Not necessarily.
Mr. STRATTON. Not everybody as the chairman himself pointed out
eloquently in his statement?not everybody overseas could be said to be
in a hardship status.
General YITTRIJP. No, sir; but the percentages used in the compu-
tation, either 15 or 25 percent, I would think would sort of up the
ante on the amount of money involved?the number of people you
have in Vietnam, for example. They are drawing foreign duty pay
now, but if they were given a 25-percent differential in pay, rather
than the foreign duty, there would be some difference in the pay which
they would receive, I would think.
Mr. STRATTON. It is conceivable, is it not, even if you were to give
this higher pay, that the total numbers would be smaller, so therefore
the total figure would be less? I took Mr. Blandford to suggest that
because the totals were different, that this had some significance which
I didn't quite understand, but you agreed with his statement.
General VrrrimP. My feeling is that the order of magnitude of $133
million versus $30 million leaves something left to be added to the $30
million.
Mr. STRATTON. In other words, your idea is there are so many people
who are in a hardship status, that if you were to give a larger bonus
to those who are in a hardship status, the total amount expended would
be pretty much the same?
General YI1-11MP. Pretty close.
Mr. RIVERS. Would you say that you would like for the committee
to look at this pretty hard?
General VrrrimP. Sir'?
Mr. RIVERS. Do you say you would like for the committee to look at
this whole deal very carefully?
General VITTRUP. Yes, sir; I am sure they will.
Mr. RIVERS. You wouldn't object, would you?
General VirrRup. No, sir.
Mr. MITERS. Don't let's give the man any more trouble. The first
thing you know somebody is going to ask him how many people are
in Vietnam, how long they have been in Vietnam, and under what
arrangements they got there, and all these things, that the public
doesn't generally know. Don't let's ask the General. We want to
see him live a little longer.
Mr. BENNETT. Section 312 of this bill, page 24, provides for spe-
cial pay relative to hostile fires, something comparable to combat pay.
Do you favor inclusion of that?
General VITTIMP. Yes, sir.
Mr. BENNETT. There is one section of this that does give me some
concern, however, the overall section I am very much in favor of,
but I have some question about subsection 4, which says, this pay will
be paid when a person is captured by a hostile force, or become miss-
ing under circumstances indicating hostile action was involved.
It seems to me this might be subject to criticism of being contrary
to public policy to pay somebody that was captured. I am not saying
it is throwing aspersions on anybody, but I never heard of paying
people for that event.
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General VITTRI7P. That is sure a possibility, sir.
Mr. BENNETT. Wouldn't you look on this as a negative force in
this particular section? Do you have any comments you would like
to make on that particular subject?
General VITTRUP. I didn't register on that particular point, to be
perfectly honest with you, when I looked at the bill.
Mr. BENNETT. You do favor combat pay?
General VIrCRUP. Very definitely. I think the people that are being
shot at, ought to get a little better shake than the others.
Mr. RIVERS. Thank you, General.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. W. R. SMEDBERG III, DEPUTY CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (PERSONNEL AND NAVAL RESERVE)
AND CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
Admiral SMEDBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen of the
committee. I am, as you know, the Chief of Naval Personnel. I am
also Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Then I am Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Personnel and the Naval
Reserves.
It is a great privilege to me to be able to testify before this com-
mittee on behalf of a pay bill for the uniformed services; the first
military pay bill since 1958. Since that time there has been an ad-
justment in the allowance for quarters, but other important fields of
basic pay, subsistence allowances, and hazardous duty incentive pays
have not been increased.
It is my belief that very few of the citizens of this country are aware
of the degree to which the compensation received by the military man
has declined relative to compensation in industry and in all other
government activities since the military pay revision in 1958.
During this period, military men have been subjected to financial
pressures of two types. First, the pressure of a slow but steady in-
crease in the cost of living totaling close to 5 percent. Secondly, the
economic pressure generated by the continuing rise in compensation
of employees at all levels in the overall national economy. This in-
crease has been estimated at anywhere from 18 to 23 percent by various
sources, even more in some areas known to me.
The effect of these two pressures has been particularly severe on the
Navy. Navy families, because of the nature of our calling, are for the
most part concentrated in the areas where the cost of living is highest;
namely, around the great cities and seaports of this country. The skill
specialties which are so essential to the effective operation of our
modern Navy are the very ones in the greatest demand in the civilian
economy, and the ones for which the greatest financial inducements are
offered.
In addition to economic pressures, there is a third important factor
which adversely affects the Navy's retention of skilled personnel. I
refer to the long and frequent deployments of ships away from home
ports, which is required by the Navy's role in the cold war, with re-
sultant family separation. During calendar year 1961, the last year
for which compiled statistics are available to me at the moment, the
crews of three essential types of combatant ships in the U.S. Navy?
carriers, cruisers, and destroyers?spent 70 percent or more nights
85066-63?No. 6-5
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away from home. During a 4-year tour of duty, days away from
home for men in such ships totals approximately 3 years out the 4.
The Navy is also being squeezed by the increasing sophistication
of our hardware which has intensified the need for longer and more
expensive training of personnel before they can become skilled in the
operation and maintenance of our complex weapons systems. Thus,
failure to retain personnel beyond their first enlistment m many of
the technical ratings is a matter of continuing grave concern to me.
As Chief of Naval Personnel, I am responsible to the Secretary of the
Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations for providing trained per-
sonnel for our ships and their weapons systems.
May I give you an example taken from the records of a division of
a ship engaged in missile research. As you know, a division is an
important functional part of a ship's organization.
This division of which I speak normally has 15 electronics tech-
nicians ranging from third class (E-1) to chief petty officer (E-7).
During the past 18 months, the enlistments of 12 of the 15 have ex-
pired. One chief electronics technician with 161/2 years' service re-
enlisted. The 11 who did not reenlist ranged in grade from third
class (E-4) to chief petty officer (E-7) with 4-8 years' service. We
know that seven left for jobs in industry with a starting salary of
$600 per month straight time, plus overtime and an expense allow-
ance. These men were hired by six different electronics firms, at least
four of which are known to have excellent retirement, hospitalization,
and insurance plans.
In my own nontechnical Bureau in the last 2 years, we have lost
19 machine accountants to industry.
Unfortunately, these are not isolated incidents. The number of
skilled petty officers in critical ratings has been subjected to a steady
erosion. Our shortage of these petty officers, as of October 1962, was
over 32,000 in our critical ratings alone. We also have a substantial
shortage of experienced officers, over 4,000, in the grades of lieutenant
and lieutenant commander alone.
Admiral Anderson, in his statement before this full committee,
spoke of the Navy's challenging problem of rapid turnover of
personnel.
This is, of course, primarily due to our inability to retain sufficient
numbers of our skilled technical personnel. The actual numbers in-
volved are startling and will be of interest to this committee, I am
sure.
I want to digress a little from my text here because I see it doesn't
say quite what I meant. I wanted to say the number involved in the
turnover of our personnel, the numbers are startling, and will be of
interest to this committee, I'm sure.
We are talking about a total turnover in this present fiscal year,
1963, of 290,000 officers and men who are either entering or leaving
the Navy-144,252 entering and 145,907 leaving. For fiscal 1964, we
forecast that, under present conditions, the turnover will be about
300,000 officers and men.
As this committee is well aware, the Armed Forces are proud that
ours is a profession of service. But officers and men must have a
reasonable wherewithal for themselves and their families. An
adequate increase in pay is clearly imperative.
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In my fourth year as Chief of Naval Personnel, based on experience
(mined under three different Secretaries of the Navy and the three
Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Manpower) I am convinced that,
without such adequate recognition of the value of our officers and
men, the Navy will be in serious straits in the next few years.
I am confident that today, as in the past, this committee will take
the necessary action.
I am grateful for the opportunity to testify. This completes my
prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.
I might say, sir, incidentally, because you have a lot of what I like to
caill (Told, instead of brass here today, I have brought a second-class
electronics technician with me who is in the back of the room. I
will bring him every day I am here before your committee. I took
him off the cruiser Long Beach. He is drawing the highest pro-
ficiency pay authorized, $60 a month. He has a wife and three small
children. He is the nuclear reactor console operator on the nuclear
cruiser Long Beach, and I really brought him because I was shocked to
the core when I read the other day in an official piece of paper that his
opposite number in the SS Savannah, the only merchant nuclear ship,
draws $14,000 a year, and his union is negotiating for a 50-percent
increase for him. This young fellow gets $397 a month, with the
highest proficiency pay we can give him.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. RIVERS. I have so many questions I want to ask, maybe I better
let Mr. Hardy start off.
Mr. HARDY. I wanted to ask the same question I asked General
Vittrup, just what did your office, or the Secretary of Navy, con-
tribute to this piece of legislation we have before us?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I will say first, sir, we contributed the same
group of people to work with Mr. Gorham's committee. We made
presentations outlining our problems. In the short time that we had
to see the results of the committee, both our Secretary and Admiral
Anderson protested vigorously against this career incentive payment
system.
The letters are a matter of record, I'm sure.
Mr. HARDY. The incentive reenlistment?
Admiral SMEDBERG. This career incentive payment system we are
talking about, the reenlistment bonus; yes, sir.
Mr. STRATTON. Were very much against it, Admiral, did you say?
Admiral .SMEMERG. Yes, sir, they expressed very strong views
against this proposal.
Mr. STRATTON. The present system?
Admiral SMEDBERG. No, sir; I'm talking about the proposed system.
Mr. HARDY. The system that is contained in this bill, is that right?
Admiral SMEDBERG. The system that is contained in the House bill,
not Mr. Rivers' bill.
Mr. HARDY. That is what I'm talking about, the House bill.
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir.
Mr. HARDY. I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to have at least in our
hearing record, a copy of these, so that we can understand fully the
arguments that have been made on this point so that our record will
be complete.
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Mr. RIVERS. Can we get those, Mr. Blandford?
Mr. BLANDFORD. I think it is really a question here of executive
communications, which I don't like to raise, but I presume if the com-
mittee requested the Navy to submit to it its recommendations con-
cerning the career incentive payments that there will be little the
Secretary of the Navy could do except to comply with the request.
Mr. HARDY. That is the request I am making, Mr. Chairman. I
hope you will honor my request.
Mr. RIVERS. Let's see if we can't get that.
Mr. BLANDFORD. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, in that connection, if
Admiral Smedberg thinks this bill, as written by DOD, will go a
long way toward solving the Navy's problem?
Mr. HARDY. In light of the procedure
Mr. BLANDFORD. Well, the DOD bill, as a whole.
Mr. RIVERS. I assumed Admiral Smedberg didn't recommend we
discontinue the sea pay.
Admiral SMEDBERG. To answer the first question first, sir, if I may,
although the seniority is less.
In my opinion I definitely feel that the problems of retention which
we now face in the Navy will continue to exist under this bill.
Mr. BLANDFORD. You think that the chairman's proposal is an
improvement?
Admiral SMEDBERG. As I see it I think the chairman's proposal is
an improvement, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. You think this will do more to help solve your
problem of retention?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I think it will help more, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. It won't solve it?
Admiral SMEDBERG. NO, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Are you satisfied with the increases provided for
officers?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Personally, sir, I am not.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Do you think we have made sufficient increase for
the junior officers?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Personally I do not feel, sir, that?I don't want
to volunteer information, I want to express my views, but I can't
,express my views?I don't feel that I can volunteer information sir.
Mr. HARDY. Then we will just have to give you a whole flock of
questions, Admiral. I appreciate your situation.
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. DO you think the senior officers?let's put the
question this way: Do you feel the junior officers look to the increases
provided here for the senior officers, and that this enters into their
consideration as to whether they are going to make a career of the
Navy?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I personally feel very definitely that is the case,
particularly with the best young officers, the smartest ones, the one,s
we want most to keep.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Obviously the Navy did not recommend the
elimination of sea pay?
Admiral SMEDBERG. We did not, sir.
Mr. RIVERS. Did you protest it?
Admiral SMEDBERG. We did, sir.
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Mr. HARDY. If that was in writing, Mr. Chairman, I ask we have
a copy of that, also.
I think we need this in order to understand this better.
Mr. RIVERS. If we can get that?Mr. Blandford, see if you can get
that.
Mr. Bates, do you have a question?
Mr. BATES. Fiscal 1964, why such a large increase in the turnover?
Admiral SMEDBERG. It is not a great deal larger, sir. It is only
about 10,000 or 12,000 more, 290,000 to 300,000.
Mr. BLANDFORD. That is in and out, both, sir.
Admiral SMEDBERG. It is an in-and-out total.
Mr. BATES. It is in and out, oh, all right.
Admiral SMEDBERG. It is a total of 10,000 in and out, or about 5,000
each way.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Do you think, Admiral, the chairman's suggestion
which has not been thoroughly discussed, but contained in his state-
ment concerning a family separation allowance for all personnel who
are truly separated from their families, and the illustration you have
given here of a man going to sea, and being actually at sea 3 out of 4
years, do you think this family separation allowance the chairman has
suggested would help to alleviate the situation?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir, it is one of the finest things I have
heard in a long time.
Mr. BLANDFORD. You would endorse the family separation in the
concept Mr. Rivers has proposed?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Heartily, sir.
Mr. RIVERS. I wish we had time to read the letter here that was
handed to me by somebody. If the committee will give me a second,
I would like to read a little bit of it.
Mr. HARDY. Second.
Mr. RIVERS. Read starting right here [indicating].
Read starting at No. 1, and read on through there.
You spoke of that electronics young man on Long Beach.
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir, who is here now.
Mr. RIVERS. How he compared with a man on the SS Savannah,
NSS ?
Admiral SMEDBERG. No, it is the SS, Steamship Savannah,.
Mr. RIVERS. This letter is from a captain, comparing himself with a
civil service employee.
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir.
Mr. RIVERS. I want you to hear that. Read that.
MT. BLANDFORD reading:
"In view of the recent pay increases for professional civil service personnel,
the small amount of information that has leaked out with respect to the potential
military pay increases has been most disquieting, in fact, almost insulting.
At the comparable service position level, civil service personnel will receive
approximately a 20-percent pay increase by January 1, 1964. The only infor-
mation I have been able to gather with respect to our military pay situation
ostensibly because Secretary McNamara has maintained a veil of secrecy over
this matter is that captain will be recommended for a pay increase of about
$45 per month. If this is true, then I find the entire pay situation insulting
with respect to the military-civilian relationships in our activities.
I am not against the pay increases for our civilian engineers. Their increases
have made their pay somewhat equitable with their commercial counterparts
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* * * GS-14 and above civilian personnel making up to approximately $4,000
more per year than I will be earning including allowances as of January 1, 1964.
I consider this to be a most unhealthy command and management situation. I
feel that I contribute just as much technically and considerably more in ad-
ministration and decisionmaking on technical matters as any civilian engineer
in a certain laboratory. I am sure that this situation prevails in other labora-
tories and activities of the Navy, and in ships, perhaps to even a greater degree.
My pride has been wounded sorely and the pride is about all we have left in
our profession. I would take such retirement action most reluctantly since I
have loved the Navy and it has been fair and just with me in the past.
Of course, I as an individual don't really count for much in the Navy but I
feel there must be hundreds more who are going to have the same thoughts and
conclusions and the Navy and Government cannot afford to lose our collective
services.
I request this matter be brought to the attention of those in uniform who are
working with the pay study groups and/or the Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. RIVERS. This is a thing that is on my mind. If we look at
these things as a slide rule proposition, and confine it solely to figures,
they talk about quality control, we don't have any. We are dealing
with human beings, and there is no such thing as slide rule thinking
The slide rule thinking is bad for morale. We have so frequently
used uniform services up and down the breadth and length of this
country. I lived in the shadow of a naval shipyard all my life. I
used to work in a naval shipyard. We don't like to see a cleavage
between civilian personnel and officer personnel.
To let these things get so far out of line is disturbing me. It is
destructive in my opinion, of something that you can't buy with money.
If one dedicates one's self, and realizes someone is overlooking this,
it is something you can't put your hand on, but it is a tragic thing. It
is a tragic thing. You can't evaluate these people.
If they are losing interest and wanting to get out all over the lot,
from the lowest to the highest. It must bring you the same heartache
that I feel. You must see a "jillion" cases. I have gotten so many.
Mr. Blandford is my repository. I don't know how many you get.
Admiral SMEDBERG. You have expressed my personal thoughts far
better than I could, Mr. Chairman. In my own Bureau, and in all of
our bureaus, we are having this same situation. Our division directors
now have many people working for them who are drawing more money
than they who have the full responsibility and the authority for all
the decisions and judgments that are made in the division.
Mr. RIVERS. This is what is disturbing me. When I compiled my
statement, I put it in.
Mr. HARDY. I was thinking along this line, Mr. Chairman. It is an
extremely serious situation, and I am wondering what we can do from
a practical standpoint in view of the pay raises that have been ap-
proved, I believe another one goes into effect soon?in view of that
level, I think most of us who are realists believe there is no prospect of
getting a military pay bill that would overcome this inversion situation
that you have been talking about.
Now, you are bound to have a rather rough morale situation, where
you have military personnel and civilian personnel working in the same
area, perhaps the military personnel even supervising the civilian
personnel, and the civilian personnel getting considerably more in pay
than the military.
I don't know what the answer to it is. I think it perhaps obviously
would not be a provision for prohibiting the employment of a civilian
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at a higher pay rate than the military supervisor, but there must be
some way that we can approach this. Do you have any suggestion?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I can only say, sir, it is my personal conviction
that if this is not corrected, it is going to be very bad for the military
services.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, I think we should bear in mind that
we have a serious imbalance, or have had in the past a serious imbalance
in the armed services personnelwise.
One of the great problems that we always face in a pay bill is that
we separate the concept of pay from the concept of career management.
Perhaps the ideal system would be one day to write a pay bill and a
promotion bill simultaneously. Then you would have your attrition
rates established by law. About the time you get an attrition rate
established by law, you come across a situation such as Korea or the
Berlin crisis. Then your attrition system falls by the wayside.
One of the problems that we face, which was brought to my attention
the other day, that there was a recommendation at one time in 1958
that if the 1958 pay increase were to be put into effect, then they would
reduce the number of colonels and captains serving on active duty.
This has not been possible, because of a variety of things that have
come up since that time. Then we had to pass a hump bill to get rid
of captains, in order to provide promotion opportunities for com-
manders then we had to force out commanders, in order to get pro-
motion opportunities for lieutenant commanders.
On the one hand we talk about an officer who retires because his
civil service counterpart is earning more money, and on the other
hand, we talk about forcing out a commander who wants to stay be-
cause there isn't any place in the promotion system for him What I
am saying is that when you combine pay and personnel management
together, and try to consider these as isolated parts of the whole, you
just don't come up with a really intelligent approach to this matter.
I believe when the Bolte proposal is considered and thoroughly
analyzed and we get together, that is, the services come closer to-
crether, on uniform promotion procedures, that thereafter, someone
is going to have to sit down and write a pay bill commensurate with
promotion opportunities.
It is going to have to be tied hand-in-glove.
Mr. RIVERS. Of course, Mr. Bates makes the observation that the
rate by which obsolenscence has overtaken the fleet, this deficiency in
your personnel will be all right, because you are not going to have any
fleet to put them on anyway.
We ought to wake somebody up and get this fleet going. I just
don't know what is going to happen, frankly. I am just as indecisive
as the rest of you. The only thing I know, is that our fleet is getting
obsolete much faster than we modernize. We can add up 2 and 2.
Your personnel is in the same situation.
I have been in Congress 23 years, and I never have heard anybody
discuss, in the annual pay increases for the Post Office employees?
I never hear anybody worry about the budget. They pick out the
thing, and away we go.
Mr. BATES. I wonder why that is, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. RIVERS. You know why that is. I never heard anybody worry
about the budget in that bill. They just give a raise, and that is it.
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But here we are with people who are charged with the responsibility
for the security of this country proscribed by a budget figure, and it
is disturbing. That is why this letter was read, that is why I wanted
this letter read here.
Mr. Blandford, what will they make; these civilian employees ?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Actually, the figure of about $3,000, a GS-14 will
make betweeen $3,000 and $3,500 more than 0-6. Now you can sub-
tract from that the retirement feature, because of the fact that the
civil service individual must contribute toward his own retirement.
I don't want to get into that aspect of it, because you would be here
forever when you start discussing who contributes most or who has
the better system. But you can subtract about 61/2 percent from that
figure of his total pay and you will find that the GS-14?and there
used to be relatively few of them, and I have the figures, we have
many more GS-14, 15, and 16, now?there is about a $2,500-a-year
difference, if you consider many factors, and you can argue that figure
one way or the other.
We try to make this apply to 15,000 0-6's, for example. It is obvi-
ous there aren't 15,000 0-6's who have 6 or 8 GS-14's working
for them. We probably have some 0-6's, who probably have a GS-3
working for them.
I am not being critical of this at all, Admiral. What I mean is, in
a military pay system, as in a Government pay system, the good man,
the average man, and the fairly borderline case, and the outstanding
man, all draw the same pay. That is why it is impossible in my
opinion to ever try to compare military pay with industry.
In industry you promote the man and make him president of the
Ford Motor Co., then make him Secretary of Defense, if he is a really
capable individual.
We have below-the-zone selections. We do have selection up to the
grade of captain, and then we have selection on to admiral. We try
to do this on a best fitted system. We try to work in a system that
will produce the best men for the jobs, but we also know we have to
use promotion in order to get people pay increases. The difficulty
here is that you have got lieutenant colonels who are doing fantastic
jobs.
In industry they would probably be making $35,000 a year. On the
other hand, you undoubtedly have 0-5's who are running small post
exchanges some place, who would do well if they got $6,000 a year in
a comparable position in industry.
This just happens to be the luck of the draw, as to where a man
is serving at the time. His next assignment might put him in an im-
portant position. This is all part of the military system. This is
why the comparisons are so unfortunate, because the man that sees
this, the man who has the GS-14 working for him, is the man who at
that moment is unhappy, and he is the one who applies for retirement.
Mr. RIVERS. We don't want to get too much into philosophy here.
Mr. Stratton.
Mr. STRATTON. I would like to get the Admiral's point of view
here. It is my understanding that you like to answer questions,
rather than express your point of view.
Admiral, do I take it that you favor this bill or you are against it,
personally?
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Admiral SMEDBERG. I support a pay bill, sir.
Mr. STRATTON. Well, now, is your recommendation for a higher
increase?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir.
Mr. STRATTON. What was the difference between your recommenda-
tion and the bill?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Well, I would say roughly, where this bill is ap-
proximately 13 percent, or the bill is 14 percent, we honestly can't
find where that 14 percent is?I would say that the minimum neces-
sary to bring the military man back into a comparable level today in
the economy of the United States would be something on the order
of 23 percent, which is just what the civil service has had in the last
41/2 years. We need comparability in government. I am not worried,
myself, about the comparability in industry. I agree that we can't
have that.
Mr. STRATTON. I don't want the philosophy of it, Admiral, I think
we all agree on that, and I think we also recognize this is probably an
impossible goal. I want to know what the Navy recommended. Did
you recommend a 23-percent increase?
Admiral SMEDBERG. No, sir; we did not make a specific percentage
or dollar increase.
Mr. STRATTON. That would be what you would recommend?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir. This is my own personal opinion.
Mr. STRATTON. Is this a straight across the board, or do you disagree
with the way in which this thing is allocated between the various
ranks?
Admiral SMEDBERG. It would not be in my opinion straight across
the board, sir. I think that the attention that has been given to the
middle-grade officers is excellent. I think that that is going to correct
some of our problems in the salary area. The lieutenant (junior
grade), the lieutenant, and lieutenant commander. I think the ensign
is woefully short, in comparison with all his fellows. His increase
is barely that of the cost-of-living increase since he had his last raise
10 years ago.
I feel that the enlisted middle grades are getting about one-half
of what they need to have to live decently. Where they are given $20
to $35 a month, it should be $40, $50, or $60 a month, in my opinion, to
enable them to live decently like Americans.
Mr. STRATTON. What about the higher ranks?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I honestly feel the smartest young man will
not be very much attracted by the salaries of the higher grades. The
percent increase of the higher grades, as I read it, is equal to or just
less than the cost-of-living increase during the past 41/2 years.
Mr. STRATTON. You don't recommend?you still don't recommend
a flat increase in each particular grade?
Admiral SMEDBERG. No, sir. I think this committee is far better
equipped to do that than I.
Mr. STRATTON. Well, I am sure the other members are, but I am
just one member. I don't know how we can do it without getting rec-
ommendations from those who deal with this kind of thing. It would
seem to me any pay bill would be an almost impossible job.
I would like to get your recommendation, Admiral, with respect to
the Navy. How much should we give the admiral, how much the
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captains, how much should we give the apprentice seaman, and so on?
It seems to me this would be helpful, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. RIVERS. I don't think the Admiral made any such proposal.
Admiral SMEDBERG. No, sir.
Mr. STRATTON. I am trying to give him an opportunity to present
it to us. Perhaps he could give it for the record.
Mr. RIVERS. Do you have any such studies?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Have we studies?
Mr. RIVERS. Have you any such list of suggestions he asked for?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I have not made up a. detailed pay bill; no, sir.
We have very definite ideas, some of which I just stated in response
to questions.
Mr. STRATTON. Let me try to pursue some of these other things then.
Admiral, to try to get your thinking. This is for guidance for me. It
is all very well for us to talk about how inadequate the bill is and it
is all very well, of course, to talk about how there is no dollar figure,
but we are talking about tax cuts and trying to reduce the expenditures
to meet it, and it does seem to me we have to be as responsible on this
committee as any other committee is.
What about this reenlistment bonus? Do I understand that you
are in favor of the present system, and you don't recommend any
change in it?
Admiral SMEDBERG. No; sir; that is DOI correct.
Mr. STRATTON. What change would you recommend?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I personally feel that the present proposal will
not increase the retention rate of the men we need to keep with us.
Mr. STRATTON. Would you oppose any increase in the reenlistment
bonus for the first reenlistment as a method of trying to attract the
men that you want?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I personally feel, sir, that the present reenlist-
ment system has been very effective in ratings, other than the critical
ratings. For the critical ratings, it is obvious to us we have to offer
a lot more than we have been offering, or we wouldn't be 32,000 petty
officers short in those critical ratings.
We frankly feel that a bonus such as the Department of Defense pro-
poses superimposed on the present bonuses might do the trick.
Mr. STRATTON. Superimposed on it, rather than substituted for?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir. For instance, we can't honestly see
that there is much attraction for a radarman-second to know that he
can get $2,400 when today he knows he can get $2,000.
Now it is true he can't get it all at once, but I am not certain that
getting it all at once is the attractive thing that it is purported to be.
We think that the reason we have a 90-percent or better reenlisment
rate after the first reenlistment, and we do not have that in our critical
ratings, the men who do reenlist, and they are splendid people, reenlist
about 80 percent for a career.
Mr. RIVERS. At that point, Mr. Stratton, may I interject here?
If we were to implement P-3?the P-3 that would give him $150 a
month. That is $1,800 a year.
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir.
Mr. RIVERS. That $2,400 is a lump payment, as Mr. Hardy says, he
may wake up tomorrow morning and say, I spent all my money, I
bought that broken-down Ford, or whatver it is, now I am hooked
for 4 more years. 'Whatever it is, tomorrow it is all gone.
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Under this P-3, he would get $150 a month, and something to go
along with. I suspect that is why I made my statement. We ought
to give that a fairer try.
Admiral SMEDBERG. Were you telling me or asking me, Mr. Chair-
man? I am not quite certain.
Mr. RIVERS. If I started telling you, I . Would be speaking to the
wron.gman. Did you hear what I said?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I did hear what you said, sir. I am in a bit
of quandary, because I have supported, for some years, a greatly in-
creased "pro" pay for the Navy.
And that was after coming from command of the 1st Fleet-2d
Fleet, 4 years ago, when I was against it. In the fleet I was against it,
because there was great bitterness, and there still is today, among the
enlisted men. For example, two petty officers, the boatswains mate-
second, who comes off the forecastle after 18 hours in freezing weather,
comes down and sees the electronics techniciansecond, working in the
warm compartment and drawing more than he does every pay day.
It is a constant, every other week, irritation to that man to see this
other fellow whom he thinks isn't working as hard as he is, getting
more pay.
There are two sides to this question, Mr. Chairman. I personally
feel that the bonus at the point of reenlistment is preferable because
that is a one-shot deal, it is not known to everybody else, really. It is
between the Government, and it isn't brought to light in the ship every
2 weeks at the pay table. That is my philosophy.
Mr. RIVERS. As against the full implementation of the P-3?? or
P-2, or P?i?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes sir. I feel the "pro" pay is a very valuable
tool if properly used, and have stated so during the past over 3 years.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Isn't that the answer, Admiral?
Admiral SMEDBERG. It is hard to say what the answer is, sir.
Mr. STRATTON. I would like to return to my line of questioning.
Admiral, do I understand you to say, then, that the implementation
of the Department's recommendation with regard to eliminating the
bonus on the second and subsequent reenlistments would, in your
opinion, jeopardize the reenlistment rate for the Navy?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Personally, I think it would harm it, sir. And
I think it fails to recognize something that I think is tremendously
important. And that is that all men of high mental caliber are not
necessarily in the critical skills, nor does loyalty, dedication to duty,
and effectiveness, necessarily go hand in hand with skills and mental
capacity. We have perfectly wonderful men in this Navy in other than
the critical ratings, and we need them?all of them.
We can't lose them by taking away from them what they have today.
Mr. STRATTON. How do we take care of the gentleman that you
brought with you here, other than just a general pay increase?
Admiral SMEDBERG. The reason I brought him, sir, was in the
thought that perhaps at some time in this hearing you might like to
ask him a question. He was picked from the cruiser Long Beach.
I asked that a man with a wife and several children who was a nuclear
reactor operator be sent down here. I asked him when he came into
my office, how much more money per month would he feel be would
need to make the Navy a career. He hasn't made up his mind yet.
He is in his 7th year. He is drawing top "pro" pay. He said he felt
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that $100 a month might make the difference to him. He is right here,
you could ask him, if you have time later. I will keep him as long
as this committee would like to have me keep him available..
Mr. STRATTON. May I ask just one more question, Admiral, and
that is, with respect to the recommendations on retired personnel, Do
you favor that part of the bill?
Admiral SMEDBERG. After a long struggle, sir, I have come to the
reluctant conclusion that that is the best solution in the long-range
interests of the country. I'm going to be one of the people who will
someday perhaps be inclined to say, in my old-age retirement, well,
these fellows are getting all this extra money, but I don't think now
that I will honestly think I am entitled to it.
Mr. STRATTON. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Long?
Mr. LONG Admiral, will this bill, inadequate as it is, in your opin-
ion, improve morale and increase enlistment?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir, it is bound to improve morale. I
don't honestly feel it will increase retention, and I say retention,
sir, because frankly we get enough enlistments. Our failure is not
in
Mr. LONG. I meant reenlistment.
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir, reenlistment.
It will not encourage, in my opinion, reenlistments beyond?in the
critical ratings.
The differential is too great, sir.
Mr. LONG. On chart 1, on the Secretary of Defense's report, on page
4, there are a whole bunch of reenlistment rates here for first-term reg-
ulars, these puzzle me a little bit. I wondered if you could clear
up that puzzle possibly, Admiral.
I think the last pay increase went into effect in 1958?
Admiral SMEDBERG. Yes, sir.
Mr. LONG. Do you have that table there, sir?
Admiral SMEDBERG. No, sir, I don't. Does somebody have the
table?
I have it now, sir.
Mr. LONG. It shows as you might expect in 1959 there was an
increase in reenlistment rates for first-term regulars, that is what
you might expect as a result of the increased pay. But the thing
that puzzles me is that in 1960, the year following that, reenlistment
rates went way down, and as a matter of fact, the average of 1959
and 1960 then is substantially lower, 25.6 percent, than it was in
1958. That puzzles me. Just why that sharp decline in reenlist-
ment rates from 1959 to 1960 occurred, after that rather encouraging
rise. And then I am further puzzled by the fact that from then on,
in 1961-62, there is an increase in the reenlistment rate in practically
every category, occupational category, although I gather that there
has been no substantial improvement in pay, or incentives. These
rates baffle me a little bit. I have a feeling we perhaps ought to
know what the reason for them is, to understand possibly what effect
the proposed pay bill might have.
Admiral SMEDBERG. I can only say, Mr. Long, these, of course, are
all the services.
Mr. LONG. That is right.
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Admiral SMEDBERG. And I have compared these figures with my
own in the Navy. They are somewhat alike. Just for your own
information, my own Navy figures in 1959?or take 1958?were 22.6,
first-term reenlistment. Then 1959 was 23.4, a slight drop in 1960,
to 21.3, then at 27.8 in 1961, a 28.3 in 1962.
Mr. LONG. Yes.
Admiral SMEDBERG. We are very proud of those increases in the
face of the situation.
Mr. LONG. I wonder how you can explain them in view of the fact
that the pay hasn't really?how could you explain that drop in 1960,
which for all three services is very severe' and extends to every single
occupational category, and then second, how would you explain the
improvement since then?
Admiral SMEDBERG. I find it impossible to explain it, sir. I have
asked my people that question. We are trying to find the answer.
We don't know it.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I think I might be able to suggest to you, Dr. Long,
some of the possibilities. You will find that your reenlistment rates
?
will have something to do with your enlistment rates and in the years
when they occur; for example, following the pay increases in 1952,
1955, 1958. Now you will notice that 1962 figure, the civilians got a
pay increase, and the theory is when the civilians are getting a pay
increase the military cannot be too far behind. In this case they are,
but in 1962, people started talking about a pay increase, and that is
when this pay study started. So therefore, you have a slight increase
in reenlistment rates in 1962. Now, you will find that your 1960 rates
probably reflect the 1956 enlistment, you see. By that time the effects
of the 1955 pay increase had worn off, so that you didn't have quite
as many people enlisting for the 4-year period.
Mr. LONG Kind of an echo affair.
Mr. BLANDFORD. These are echos, plus the fact you get the Berlin
crisis in here in 1961. That enters into it. You have the Lebanon
crisis in 1958. All of these things are factors in enlistment rates, and
therefore they are a factor also in reenlistment rates.
Mr. LONG. Do you find your reenlistment rates are very well cor-
related with the unemployment rate?
Mr. RIVERS. That is what I was going to say, the economic picture
affects it some in some areas?
Admiral SMEDBERG. It is hard for me to say, sir, as far as I can see
the employment in this country for the people we want is very good.
Mr. LONG. Yes.
Admiral SMEDBERG. And they are siphoning our people from us.
Mr. RIVERS. Has this been true for a long time?
Admiral SMEDBERG. It has been true for several years, sir, and it is
getting more and more true as the offers from industry to our people
increase in size.
Mr. BLANDFORD. I think the most significant figure, Mr. Chairman,
and Dr. Long, is to look at the 1959 improvement over 1958. This is
an indication of what happens when you come up with an "honest to
God" pay increase.
Mr. LONG. That is right, I pointed that out.
Mr. BLANDFORD. 1958 was a very good pay increase.
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Mr. LONG. That was very encouraging, as I say, but the dropoir in
1960 occurred. I wonder if we will look for something similarly dis-
couraging after this pay increase.
Mr. RIVERS. Thank you very much, Admiral.
We will start off with General Stone tomorrow morning, and ask you
to come then. We will also hear from General Diamond, General
Terry.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Dr. Diamond is representing General Terry.
Mr. RIVERS. Admiral, have the young man stay around here a few
days.
We will meet again tomorrow at 10 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10
a.m., Wednesday, February 27, 1963.)
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE No. 1,
TV asking ton, D .0 ., February 27,1963.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:12 a.m., in
room 313?A, Old House Office Building, Hon. L. Mendel Rivers (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. RIVERS. Let the committee come to order.
I want to announce that we will be unable to meet this afternoon.
We have business on the floor. The chairman wants us to be on the
floor at that time. So those we cannot hear this morning, and who
are scheduled, if you will be here tomorrow morning promptly at 10
o'clock we will take up exactly where we left off.
Is there anything else?
Mr. BLANDFORD. No, sir.
I would like to insert in the record at this point a letter from the
dean emeritus from the College of Engineering, University of Texas,
concerning salary levels of professional engineers.
(The letter is as follows:)
Congressman HOMER THORNBERRY,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
I)EAR CONGRESSMAN THORNBERRY : The writer has been engaged in professional
engineering for more than 50 years?sometimes for industry, sometimes for the
U.S. Government and again for university-level engineering education. This has
included personnel selection for the International Harvester Co., the Tennessee
Valley Authority at Knoxville, the U.S. Embassy at London under civil service,
the United Nations at Ankara, Turkey, and the faculties at the University of
Tennessee and the University of Texas.
One principle those of us involved in such engineering and scientific selection
needs to be emphasized. In closely related assignments in engineering at each
level, a high degree of uniformity must be maintained. This is especially true
in Federal offerings otherwise the harmony and efficiency as between services
disintegrate out of all proportion to the saving made by the lower paid units
of such services.
Currently, there is a bill proposing a much larger pay increase for the civil
service personnel of the United States than for the military personnel assigned
to do mostly civilian duty especially in ?the fields of medicine, sanitary engi-
neering, public health engineering and industrial hygiene. For strategic reasons
these men must be prepared to go anywhere or any place under U.S. orders
but during peacetime are assigned to civil duties in sewerage, health, water
supply and medical services in States, cities, hospitals and government research
laboratories.
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The inconsistency of different levels of compensation for the same or similar
professional engineering assignments is most noticeable when the recruiting
agents of the several U.S. services visit our engineering and scientific colleges
and universities. It is not possible for an engineering faculty adviser to give
the interviewed graduates at the bachelors, masters, or doctorate grades a
justified reason for one U.S. service to have one pay scale and other divisions
to have a higher or lower scale.
I would recommend that H.R. 3006 be amended to place the salary levels of
men of professional engineering and scientific level on a comparative and equi-
table basis whether employed by the Civil Service, the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity or the civil activities divisions of the Armed Forces.
Sincerely yours,
W. R. WOOLRICH,
Dean Emeritus aqui Professor of Mechanical Engineering, College of
Engineering, the University of Texas.
Mr. RIVERS. Just before we call the first witness, I want to enter-
tain Mr. Hardy's request that you obtain from the DOD the position
of each Department on this proposal transmitted to Congress.
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, I would, if you don't mind, prefer that
we defer putting that request in the record until after we had had
General Stone's testimony, because there are certain aspects of it I
think may clear up some of the data we need.
Mr. RIVERS. We will defer that. We will begin this morning by
hearing Lt. Gen. William S. Stone, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air
Force for Personnel.
General Stone, we will be pleased to hear from you at this time.
You may proceed, General Stone.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM S. STONE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, PERSONNEL, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General STONE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is
a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the matter of mili-
tary pay and allowances. This is my first opportunity to testify be-
fore your committee since my recent return to the Pentagon.
It is reassuring to see several familiar faces and to recall the many
pieces of legislation benefiting military personnel which this commit-
tee has developed and sponsored. It is particularly gratifying to
renew my acquaintance with several members of this committee and
to acknowledge the collective experience, ability, and judgment of
all the members.
President Kennedy, in his message accompanying the Federal Serv-
ice pay reform bill, made quite clear his hope that Federal employees
would be paid at a rate comparable to industry. His desire was
carried out by Congress insofar as civil service pay is concerned. I
suggest that the military pay should also be comparable to industry,
and certainly not less so than civil service pay. Please notice, I do
not say equal, but comparable.
In the balance of my statement I will make frequent use of the
civil service pay rates only as a means of making meaningful corn-
parisons with other civil pay rates.
The Air Force joins in prior testimony advocating the nred for a
military pay raise. From a philosophical standpoint, I believe that
military people should always be compensated at a level which im-
plicitly recognizes the military profession as a dignified, respected,
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and honorable one. As the users of some of the most expensive and
complicated military systems and hardware, it is also vitally im-
portant that we attract and retain the highest possible caliber of peo-
ple. We cannot ask our people to continue to live under conditions
substantially inferior to those enjoyed by personnel of like ability and
experience in the civilian segment of our economy.
The Air Force agrees that the goals of the pay proposal before your
committee will help to achieve both of these ends. In attempting to
achieve those goals, however, we must face up to the fact that a period
of 4Y2 years between pay adjustments has been too long. The gap
between military and other types of pay has become too wide to be
overcome easily. Still, it must be overcome, or at least significantly
reduced.
I have appended a series of charts to this statement and I would
like to refer now to the first one.
The source of the first chart is the Endicott Survey published in the
Management Record of the National Industrial Conference Board.
It covers 352 college campuses, surveyed by 218 companies. You see
that the average college engineering graduate is made a more attrac-
tive offer than we can make and that the take-home pay differences
exist throughout the years.
I might add parenthetically, that these 218 companies hired about
15,000 college graduates in 1962, which is about the annual income,
input, of new officers into the Air Force each year.
The proposed pay rate for a second lieutenant may not attract the
high quality young man we must have in the Air Force to operate
and maintain the complex systems we employ.
The sharp young man we need sees that the starting military salary
is lower than what he could get in civilian life?he knows that law will
set forth his promotion opportunities and his pay. He looks at the
future. He knows that in the military he will be required to make
frequent moves, that he will often be separated from his family; that
he may be required to serve in isolated and unpleasant places. On
balance, it isn't a very attractive career picture when compared to the
relative stability and higher pay of civil an pursuits. Recent letters
requesting retirement from officers clearly pointed out their devotion
to the military life, their wholehearted willingness to serve and the
satisfactions they obtain from serving their country in uniform. The
tenor of these letters can be easily summarized simply in the statement:
they can't afford to stay with us.
Of course, the young man we want faces a military obligation.
However, he may join the National Guard and not have to leave home,
or, he can be inducted and be out in 2 years. If, however, he elects to
become an officer in the Air Force he is obligated for 4 or 5 years.
Many are taking a chance on the draft. If our pay rates do not be-
come more comparable, we must expect to attract even fewer good
people than at present.
Charts 2 and 3 are illustrative of imbalances that have taken place
since 1949. These charts do not intend to infer that the civilian and
military grades are equal?rather, they tend to illustrate how the pay
rates have grown further apart as the years have passed. This is
true of all civil service pay rates?and because the civil service pay
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rates are now comparable to industry; these charts illustrate clearly
the lack of comparability of military pay?even with the proposed in-
crease you are now considering.
The upshot of this situation is that we have retention problems.
For example, in fiscal year 1962 we needed 13,000 reenlistments in
technical skilled fields to meet our requirements. We actually ob-
tained about 77 percent of our desired input; for fiscal year 1963 we
need 17,000 reenlistments in critical skills. At this time it looks as
if we will obtain approximately 60 percent of our desired input and
this even in light of the normal rise in reenlistment rates just prior
to a pay bill. Anything less than 100 percent of our objective is of
course unsatisfactory. Lack of continuity and pyramiding training
costs are but two of the reasons.
In the officer area, we are retaining approximately 41 percent of our
young officers beyond their minimum obligated tour of duty. Within
this overall rate, rated officer retention is 56 percent, nonrated officer
retention is 21 percent, scientific and engineering officer retention rate
is 20 percent, with some skills in the scientific and engineering areas
as low as 7 percent.
It is anticipated that retention in the future will be even more diffi-
cult because about 90 percent of the officers we are now procuring have
college degrees. This will increase their chances of obtaining jobs
outside the military with far more attractive pay scales than those we
can offer. It is not unusual for an officer to leave the service as a
lieutenant with pay of approximately $6,000-1958 rate?per year and
within 12 months command a salary of $10,000 in either industry or
civil service. In a recent service publication, a former staff sergeant
wrote?
Because civil service offered higher pay and faster promotions I, a 30-year-old
staff, picked up my Air Force discharge along with my newly won bachelor of
science degree and accepted a position as a GS-7 in the procurement field at
Fort Hood, Tex.
In addition, he stated?
Now, two and a half years later, I am a GS-9 (compared to a first lieutenant).
I have a civilian secretary, a second lieutenant, and three sergeants working for
me, and I am eligible to join the Officers' club if I so desire.
When we consider comparability, which is so sorely needed, we
should include all grades and ranks. I need not go into detail on the
senior officers' responsibilities for vast amounts of the Nation's re-
sources and the demands on them for the highest degree of manage-
ment skill. The influence of adequate compensation at the top as a
factor in attraction and retention at the lower levels should not be
overlooked. The capable, ambitious young man who aspires to suc-
ceed will look further than immediate salary in selecting his lifetime
career. His goal is the top, and he naturally will examine the remu-
neration at this level when making his carrer decision. I note that
the proposed pay increase for the Chief of Staff is $95 as compared
with a $120 increase for a chief master sergeant.
This committee will hear detailed testimony on all the features of
this bill. I will not take any more of your time at this point. I will
conclude my remarks by saying that the record of this committee
reveals an intense interest in the welfare of the military man. I have
85066-63?No. 6-6
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i478
the utmost confidence in the collective experience, ability, and judg-
ment of the committee to recommend an equitable bill which will suit
the needs of the service.
I would like to thank the entire committee for its interest, and com-
mend your counsel, Mr. Blandford, for his assistance and sympathetic
understanding of our problem.
(The charts above referred to?Nos. 1, 2, and 3?are as follows:)
CHART 1
COMPARISON OF ANNUAL INCOME OF COLLEGE GRADUATE (ENGINEERING)
IN AIR FORCE (NONFLYING) AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY
(MIL INCOME: BASIC, BAS, BAQ) (Proposed Basic Pay)
(IN HUNDREDS)
? $110
$10872
[11 Air Force
Industry
? 99
$8868 $8976
88
? 77
$7235
$7056
? 66
? 55
$4896
? 44
+$2160)
(+$1633)
+$1896)
? 33
? 22
- 11
ONE YEAR SERVICE FIVE YEARS SERVICE TEN YEARS SERVICE
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CHART 2
SALARY COMPARISON
0-5 with GS-14
1949
DOLLARS
(1000)
to 1964
18
_
17250
17
_
162451
16
_
15
_
142901
14
_
GS -14
13275 13260
13
_
I /1\
I
OSD
120401
1
Proposal
12
11766 1
11520
0-5
11
10600
10272
10
? 9800
951
9
8952
91% 90%
85% 87% 81% 72%
77%
8
(III
II
I II I III I
49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65
NOTES:
1. Computed at maximum pay points.
2. Civilian salary includes Base Pay only.
3. Military salary includes Base Pay, BAQ and BAS.
4. OSD pay proposal for 1963 includes $29.22 in increased
subsistence.
91% X$17,250 $15,697
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DOLLARS
(100)
45 _
40 ?
35_
CHART 3
SALARY COMPARISON
E-3 with GS-3
1949 to 1964
4075 4135 4195
GS-3
3780
3430
3190 1
30 --
2890
25 --2238 2424
77%
20 --
15 _
10 ?
5?
2586
E-3
76% 75% 71% 66% 72%
2682
3018
27301_1r0SD
Proposal
0
I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I
49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65
NOTES:
1. Computed for E-3 with over 4 years and GS-3 in
step 4.
2. Civilian salary includes Base Pay only.
3. Military salary includes Base Pays BAQ (1 Depend),
BAS, Reenl Bonus, and Clothing Allowance.
4. Computed on an annual basis.
77% X $4195 = $3230
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1481
Mr. RIVERS. Thank you very much, General Stone.
I want Mr. Blandford to ask a question for me concerning these
men assigned to isolated posts, for the record at this point.
Mr. BLANDFORD. General Stone, the Air Force in particular has a
problem with people who are assigned to remote duty stations. I am
speaking of the radar technician and the electronics personnel who are
operating radar stations, and that type of an assignment. They have
in many cases the misfortune of being in a skill which actually sends
them from one remote area to the next. They may come back to
civilization for a year, but they can almost rest assured their next
assignment will be on the top of a mountain someplace, or up around
Point Barrow, Alaska.
There is a suggested provision in this bill which may or may not be
sufficient to include them, but what would you think of the concept of
paying these individuals a family separation allowance equivalent
of not less than $30 a month, or one-third of the quarters allowance to
which they would be entitled if they were without dependents, as
some compensation for this onerous type of duty to which they are
constantly exposed?
General STONE. Mr. Blandford, Mr. Chairman, the situation is not
limited to these radar operators. We have many different skills where
the requirements are principally overseas, and principally in areas
where the locality of the service is remote, isolated, away from a com-
munity.
In one particular case, for example, we have most of the airmen and
officers in this career field serving in isolated places overseas. This
is in the security business. We train these people at great expense.
They go to a remote station where there are few facilities. They are
separated in general from the normal aspects of civilization, as we
know it, and after one enlistment or one obligated tour of duty as an
officer, they say, "that is all for me," and leave, and we have to train
another one; and some of these skills require extremely long training
periods.
For example, training in the Chinese language. It takes a very long
time, and it is a very expensive proposition. We get the use of the
man for. a year or so, then he goes out in civilian life. I think that
the provision you speak of would be an assistance in this area.
Mr. BLANDFORD. You would endorse this family separation al-
lowance concept proposed in the committee print the chairman has
prepared?
General STONE. I would.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Do you think that the proposed bill sent over by
the Department of Defense will accomplish this objective?
General STONE. In the overall context?
Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes, sir.
General STONE. I noticed in Mr. Paul's statement yesterday, Mr.
McNamara's statement read by Mr. Paul, that he said that the purpose
of the military compensation system was to attract and retain per-
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..82
sonnel in the services. If that is the objective, I don't think that this
proposal will meet it.
Mr. HARDY. What other objective could there be, General, if that
is not the objective? What would you think the objective is?
General STONE. Those are the proper objectives, but I don't think
the bill will meet them.
Mr. BLANDFORD. You heard the chairman's statement yesterday.
?Would you endorse in general what he said; that is, or would you
consider that his subcommittee print is an improvement over the
DOD bill?
General STONE. I think there are some very excellent features of
the committee print. There are some deletions with which we concur.
On the whole, I think that the committee print is a manageable ap-
proach to the problem.
I would like to see a higher rate of pay included, however.
Mr. RIVERS. In what area?
MT. BLANDFORD. That is just what I was going to ask.
General STONE. Well, there are several areas, but it is a difficult
thine, to summarize in a few words the entire pay scale.
Mr. BATES. Did you have any chance to prepare any tables, General
Stone?
General STONE. Yes, sir; in anticipation we might be asked for a
recommendation, we constituted a group of officers from all the major
commands of the Air Force in the United States, and they studied
this problem for several weeks and came up with a proposed pay scale
that they would think would be adequate to do the job of restoring, the
historical relationship between military and civil service pay.
Actually, they in general are pretty close to the committee's print
on the first increment. They have followed the civil service pay bill
format in that they broke it into two increments realizing the gap
between military and civil service pay is too great now to be eliminated
in one change. The first one is generally the same as the committee
print, as amended by the Chairman's remarks yesterday.
For example
Mr. BATES. Do you have copies of this, General?
General STONE. I have only one copy here.
Mr. BATES. Would you have some made for the committee?
General STONE. Yes, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Also, insert that copy in the hearing at this point.
Mr. RIVERS. Put that in the record at this point, General Stone.
General STONE. All right.
(The charts referred to above by General Stone follow:)
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AIR FORCE PAY PANEL PROPOSED RATES
Officers - First Increment
GRADE
____L _
C/S
OMUIATIVE YEARS OF SLRVICE
Order
2
_____
Over
2
_.___
Over
3
____
Over
4
________
overt Overt Over
6 8 0314
______,___________
Over
2
Over
Over
15
Over
18
Over
20.
2170
Over
22
Over
2630
Over
_
217
2170
2170
2170
2170
2170
2170
2170
2170
2170
2170
1170
2170
1965
170
1965
0-10
138
1440
1440
1440
1440
1500
1500
1615
1615
1735
1735
1850
1850
-0-9
1221
1265
1290
1290
1290
1325
1325
1380
1380
1500
1500
1615
1615
1735
1.735
0-8
1105
1105
1175
1175
1175
1265
1265
1325
1325
1380
1440
1500
1560
1570
1560
0-7
915
985
985
985
1030
1030
1090
1090
1150
1265
1355
1355
1355
1355
1355
0-6
665
705
760
760
760
760
760
760
775
905
950
975
1035
1120
1120
0-5
535
570
615
615
615
615
635
670
720
775
825
855
890
890
890
0-4
460
490
525
525
535
560
600.
635
665
695
725,
725
725-
725
725
0-3
385
410
440
490
515
540
570
600
630
630
630
630
630
630
630
0-2
305
345
420
435
450
465
490
510
530
-530
530
530
530
530
530
0-1
265
280
355
365
380
395
410
430
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
Footnote for officer pay tables: Pay rates are based on the assumption that subsistence
rates will be increased to SYY.10. If this increase is not provided then the basic pay
rates must be increased by $29.22.
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AIR FORCE PAY PANEL PROPOSED RATES
Officers - Second Increment
GRADE
CUMHATIVE 'MARS OF SERVICE
Over]
16
Over
18
Over
20
Over
22
Over
I 26
Over
30
Under
2
Over
2
Over
3
Over
4
Over
6
Over
8
Over i
10
Over
12
Over
14
C/S
2225
2225
2225
2225
2225
2225
2225
2225
.....
2225
2225
2225
2225
2225
225
2225
0-10
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
015
2015
0-9
1780
1780
1780
1780
1780
1780
1780
1780
1780
1780
1780
1605
1780
1605
1780
1780
1780
0-8
1605
1605
1605
1605
1605
1605
1605
1605
1605
1605
7
1605
1605
1605
0-7
139E1395
1395
1395
1395
1395
1395
1395
1395
1395
1395
1295
1395
1395
1395
0-6
1010
1010
1010
1010
1010
1010
1010
1010
1010
1010
1060
1100
1145
1245
1245
0-5
725
725
725
725
725
765
800
840
875
910
965
1000
1045
1045
1045
0-4
545
580
620
620
650
680
710
750
785
820
860
860
860
860
860
0-3
415
450
490
530
555
585
615
645
680
680
680
680
680
680
680
0-2
340
380
450
470
485
510
530
550
570
570
570
570
570
570
570
0-1
285
320
405
415
435
450
465
490
515
515
515
515
515
515
515
Footnote for officer pay tables: Pay rates are based on the assumption that subsistence
rates will be increased to $77.10. If this increase is not promided then the basic pay
rates must be increased by $29.22.
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AIR FORCE PAY PANEL PROPOSED RATES
Airmen - First Increment
GRAM
CUMULATIVE
YEA.R3 OF &AIME
Under
2
Over
2
Over
3
Over
4
Over
6
Over
8
Over
10
Over
12
Over
14
Over
16
Over I
18
Over
20
Over
22
Over
26
Over
30
E-9
435
445
455
475
490
510
540
450
570
500
570
500
E-8
365
375
385
395
405
415
425
E-7
255
275
285
295
305
315
335
345
355
365
375
385
410
450
450
E-6
220
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
310
320
330
330
330
330
330
190
210
220
230
240
250
IE-5
260
270
280
280
280
280
280
280
280
E-4
160
180
190
200
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
E-3
115
145
155
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
E-2
100
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
E-1
90
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
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CUI:i.01.1TIVT 'EARS OF SERVICE
1
Over Over Over I Over
20 22 26 i 30
580 615 1650 I 650
o
N
In
to
4-1
o
to
CO
co
o
.01
co
to
to
N
o
o
N
o
ol
o
.-4
0
C-
4/7
IC)
,1
u)
.0
CO
en
0
'14.
en
u)
40
CV
o
0
N
0,
N
r?41
o
r41
4441
IL)
.-1
o
to
co
v.
to
oo
co
o
er
co
to
o
N
o
o
N
o
eq
rt
o
.-t
ri
I))
CO