MSSI THESIS PROPOSAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000800040001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 210
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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1 OCT 86
DIC-20
MSSI Thesis Proposal
Complete
R[PLY TO
ATTN OF:
TO: PGIP Class 1-87
1. Enclosure 1 is
being
provided as
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum
proposal for th.s:. MSSI candidate eler,t?'ng to write a thesis.
guide ones for w: i ~i;~g a thesis a~ icy the' College's THESIS FANUAL FOR GRADUATE
STUDENTS avai ', Yie i.z LT i3rannen's office, 0-117. St:ic?ents should be aware
that a version: of the manual will bb published in approximately two
' Encl osura 0./s
VJ
4
MAX L. GROSS
Associate Dean for Career
Intelligence Studies
OIf1ONAL FORM 1 NO. 10
(REV. 1410)
as F*MR (41 CFR)101-11.0
1010.114
.m6nths.
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THE_DEFENSE_iNTELLIGENCE_COLLEGE
THESIS PROPOSAL
Student's Name: LCDR Michael W. Collier, USCG
Chairman: CDR L. A. Joslin
Date submitted for appro%,al: 20 March 1986
I. TITLE
The Wartime Threat to the Western Atlantic Sea Lanes
II. THE_CENTRAL_PROBLEM/HYPOTHESIS
A. I4~4~PSt 14F1
Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO)
overall concept of maritime operations, Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic (SACLANT) has been assigned the following tasks:
o To control the Atlantic Ocean sea lines of communication
(SLOCs),
o To protect reinforcement anu resupp ,
V To safeguard the seaborne trade of the Alliance.
o To provide support for Allied Command Europe and the
Channel Command.
NATO's.concept of operations envisages five campaigns to
carry out these tasks. One of these campaigns, the battle for the
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Atlantic-lifelines, is intended to secure the vital SLOCs as well
as protect the economic lifelines of the Alliance.(1)
The success of the whole NATO strategy of forward defense in
Europe is heavily dependent on reinforcement and resupply
shipping. Without reinforcement and resupply shipping, NATO could
not sustain fighting in Western Europe for more than about 10
days. At least 800 shiploads of military cargo and 1,500
shiploads of economic cargos each month would be required to
sustain not only a military action, In but also the economies of
Western Europe.(2) The majority of this shipping would transit
directly from U.S. Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico ports to Europe.
The purpose of this effort is to develop an assessment of the
wartime threat to this reinforcement and resupply shipping while
it transits the Western Atlantic Ocean, including the Gulf of
Mexico and Caribbean Sea. The Western Atlantic has several
features which make it both vulnerable and difficult to defend.
The Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts have broad continental
shelves which are susceptible to bottom mining. These shelves
also make it difficult to detect and track enemy submarines.
Cuba, a strong Soviet ally, sits astride the sea lanes exiting
the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean.
Two general views of the wartime threat to the Western
Atlantic sea lanes have emerged. The first view prescribes that
because of the vlet priority on defending the homeland from
direct attack and the U.S. Navy's recent declarations of planned
offensive actions in the Norwegian Sea, the Soviets would not
venture out into the Atlantic SLOCs. This view further
maintains that U.S. air power will negate the Cuban threat.
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The second view, however, posits a much greater wartime
threat. The'Soviet Northern fleet's possession of over 140
general purpose submarines, anti-SLOC exercises recently
conducted, and Soviet publications recognizing SLOC interdiction
as the third Naval mission priority (3), all point to a Western
Atlantic threat. This view further. Includes Cuba as a key factor
in a Soviet anti-SLOC campaign.
B. The Research HYeothesfs
In the event of a protracted conventional NATO/Warsaw Pact
conflict in Europe, Soviet and Cuban forces will pose a
significant threat to reinforcement and resupply shipping
transiting the Western Atlantic.
Subsidigry Auestions
1.
What Is the Soviet wartime strategy for the Western Atlantic?
2.
What
is the probable threat from Soviet forces?
3.
What
Is Cuba's likely role?
III.EVIW_OF_RELATED_LITERATURE
The extent and importance of a NATO reinforcement and
resupply effort is found in various articles and books. Sherwood
Cordier's
,~ggu~ i ty_1n_ hg_1~QQ$ provides a good general d i scus.;,i c_ ?' f the
NATO sea ?1 i . i.. N i tze and Leonard Sullivan, Jr., in ?ggg ~ Qq
~13g_~gAA___T~g_~sYlg~_NAYAI_S~Al1Al15g_~ila_WeA~gi:Q_~~~1~1?~e
.4211201, quantify the sheer size of such a sea lift and provide
various options for i.ts execution. Admiral Wesley McDonald,
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former SACLANT, has also published several articles on the NATO
sea lift and'its vulnerabilities.
An assessment of the threat to a NATO resupply sea lift must
consider the Soviet/Cuban force structures, strategy, and actual
capabilities as reflected in exercises. The Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations' ~DdggtggdDg_Sg_vigt_~Ja_val_pg_vglopmgr.ts,
Defense Intelligence Agency's ~igndbook_on_thg_CubaD_Amgd_~orrgs,
and various commercial reference books provide excellent
unclassified information on Soviet/Cuban force structures.
In developing Soviet strategy to use these forces, Soviet
military strategy in Western Europe must first be studied. Soviet
strategy in the-Western Atlantic will be directly tied to their
European intentions. Richard Simpkin, in Bgd_&rj2 I;s__$p
~CgmigatioD_Sf_thg_So_vigt_~lob,~~e_Focg_Cogcget, discusses how the
Soviets intend to use operational maneuver groups and special
forces to penetrate deep into Western Europe and intermingle their
forces with NATO's. It appears the Soviet strategy in Western
Europe now centers on attempting a quick victory using primarily
conventional forces. If this is true, a protracted conventional
conflict could result, making the resupply of NATO by sea lift
critical. Joseph Douglass' S~o_viet_Mi~,tay_Sta~ggy_~n_Europg,
Harriet and William Scotts' and Graham
Vernon's
01
Sov_let_Eercgpt~ong_of_War_and_~eacg, will be used to
develop Ins 1911'6-s ialto 3cvi': wartime strategy in Europe and their
effect on a Soviet anti-SLOC campaign.
Soviet general naval strategy can be viewed from V. D.
Sokolovskiy's Sov_~,et_~Ii~,~tgry_Strategy and Sergei Gorshkov's Sej
E2wgr._2L_1hg_Ua1g. Sokolovskiy sets the broad framework for
-4-
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Soviet naval operations. Gorshkov then provides a detailed
development of overall Soviet naval strategy. There are also
numerous translations in the So_vfet_Na_val_Analyst from the Soviet
naval journal B6rgkgy_$b2rn1k which has articles on Soviet naval
strategy. B. Makeyev's 'SLOC Under Present-Day Conditions' and Y.
Bol'shakov's 'NATO's Plans for Maritime Transport,' are Just two
jj2rgk2y_?j2Qrn,k articles which show the Soviets recognize the
importance of NATO's resupply efforts and SLOC vulnerabilities.
Makeyev states:
As we can see, the success of military operations
in continental theaters and, under certain
conditions, the capacity as well of individual
countries for continued resistance will depend, to
a great extent, on the outcome of the conflict in
the transoceanic SLOC and on their stability during
the war.'(4)
Milan Vego, in 'The Role of the Attack Submarines in Soviet
Naval Theory,' highlights that since the mid-1970s there have been
unmistakable signs of the Soviets upgrading their anti-SLOC
mission.(5) Using translations of Soviet naval literature, he
concludes Soviet attack submarines will be deployed in anti-SLOC
roles. Richard Fisher also concludes, in 'Soviet SLOC
Interdiction,' that the Soviets can be expected to conduct
transoceanic SLOC interdiction.(6)
Keith Allen.,'In The Northern Fleet and North Atlantic Naval
Operations,' points out that anti-SLOC warfare receiv-:s honorable
but hardly enthusiastic mention in Soviet discussion of modern
naval missions.(7) He concludes danger to the Atlantic SLOCs is
limited by Soviet strategic priorities and weaknesses in Soviet
open-ocean capabilities.(8) Robert S. Wood and John T. Hanley,
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Jr. believe that U.S. offensive power projection into Northern
Europe will negate Soviet anti-SLOC efforts. They conclude in
.The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic,' that phrases such as
'protect the SLOCs' are becoming obsolete in the NATO Atlantic
maritime strategy.(9)
One of the major focuses of this effort is to develop which
of the above sets of views on Soviet military strategy are
correct concerning the Western Atlantic.
Reviewing actual Soviet Naval exercises is another means for
determining the Soviet SLOC interdiction intentions. Donald
Daniel, in 'Trends and Patterns in Major Soviet Naval Exercises,'
sees a heightened Soviet anti-SLOC priority.(10) Bruce Watson, in
provides discussion which supports Daniel's
conclusions. Daniel's article was based on 1975 and earlier
Soviet exercises. More recent exercises will be reviewed to see
if his conclusions remain valid.
Cuba's role in a Soviet anti-SLOC campaign is uncertain.
Cuba is neither a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization nor
does it have a defense treaty with the-Soviets. Mark Katz's The
Soviet-Cuban Connection' discusses the intricacies of Soviet/Cuban
military relations. Wesley McDonald, in 'Atlantic Security - The
Cuban Factor,' addresses Fidel Castro's options in a NATO/Warsaw
Pact conflict. -;avs-: range from shifting to the NATO bide
to overt belligerence. McDonald concludes that the
unpredictability of Castro's intentions would severely complicate
the SLOC protection problem.(11) Edward Gonzalez, in 8._S1r11tgy
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for_pedling__
with_Cuba-in the 1980_5, discusses
have a choice on entering how Cuba ma
g a NATO/Warsaw y not
states: Pact conflict when
he
aIn the event of a U
hostile Cuba, S?/Soviet confrontation, a
the sealanes as an ally of Moscow
only to the in the Caribbean could endanger that states United States and Cariaea vital, not
but to Western Carbbean Basin
sure, a rational Cuban a5 well.,
avoid bean uban leadership would seek to
the conflict would result with the United States
as well as militar esult in heavy civilian
strategic threat p
conditions osed under whichithend.
without serious peril toy Cuba cannot
conditions could U.S. security be ignored
of even turn out to be ? and these
the most rational beyond the
Cuban leaders.(12~ontrol
In addition to the above works, the
and book- re are numerous
length unclassified works ?n Soviet-Cuban relations that
also be reviewed.
IV. M-2899MEE2
A descriptive research methodology will be used In this
will be explanation of information obtained
used to develop a wartime threat assessment for the
Western Atlantic sea lanes.
in In addition to the
my bibliogra h resources listed
p y' my major sources w
questinnraireS ill be Personal interviews,
librara y searrhisearches As explained below, '. s' znd sIcific p;;s?iod1,.l
kept unclassified, this research is intended to be
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A. ~esonal_1Dter_views
In order to further refine the research topic and ensure a
meaningful contribution to the intelligence community, I will
conduct a series of interviews. These will probably include:
1. Dr. Milan Vego, Adjunct Professor, Defense Intelligence College.
Dr. Vego is a noted author on Soviet Naval strategy and
operations.
2. Mr. Richard Haver, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence for
Intelligence. Mr. Haver is a leading authority on Soviet
naval strategy.
3. Navy Operational Intelligence Center, Suitland, MD.
(Personnel in the Soviet Northern Fleet and Latin American
sections.)
4. Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. (Personnel in the
Directorates for Research and Estimates.)
B. i2ti i2GDA1tt&
Using the Delphi method, I will construct a questionnaire
soliciting naval analysts' opinions on the number of Soviet
submarines which will be deployed to the Western Atlantic in
wartime. This voluntary questionnaire will be sent to selected
personnel at the Defense Intelligence Agency and various Navy,
Coast Guard, and Canadian Defense Force commands. At least two
rounds of questionnaires will be used.
A second questionnaire will be developed soliciting analysts'
opinions on the probable Cuban involvement in a SLOC interdiction
campaign. This voluntary questionnaire will also be sent to the
above commands.
C. ~C1b1:ACY_$~ACW~3f~S~_~q~>tISCA
The KGB, GRU, and Soviet allies make use of their legal
presence overseas and networks of agents for clandestine
work.(76) The legal presence includes diplomats, trade
mission personnel., correspondents, airline representatives,
merchant ' Ma. ^*? who have obtained legal entry into
a country. Agents are foreign citizens who have been
recruited by the intelligence services to carry out
clandestine tasks on their behalf. These agents are usually
recruited by their greed for money, under threats of
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blackmail, or by their ideological ties with the Soviets.
Agents could include individuals, members of Soviet
international front organizations (World Peace Council, U.S.
Peace Council, etc.), or even international or domestic
terrorist groups.
The KGB, GRU, and Soviet allies maintain undercover
residencies in their embassies. Using legal diplomatic
cover for their personnel, these undercover residencies
control networks of agents developed throughout both the
host and adjacent countries. The more trusted and valuable
agents may not be controlled by the undercover residencies,
but instead receive training, support, and directions from
Moscow or other foreign capitals. In addition to running
agent networks, the undercover residency personnel sometimes
carry out clandestine intelligence missions themselves. In
major Western countries the undercover residencies include
representatives from the KGB and GRU directorates and
departments assigned sabotage and assassination missions.
This does not mean that the Soviet legal personnel or
their agents would carry out the actual sabotage. They
could, but they could also support the sabotage mission by
conductin^- reconnaissance of sabotage targets, obtaining
01
blueprints of facilities and their ise~4_~i:. a sterna,
establishing safe house and supply networks for saboteur
support, and acting as communication links between Moscow
and the actual saboteurs. Without this support, the Soviets
could not count on the success of their sabotage efforts.
-d5-
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There are several examples of KGB-GRU personnel or
their agents who have been assigned Western sabotage
missions. In 1971, Oleg Lyalin, a KGB officer operating
under the cover of a Soviet trade delegation in Britain, was
suborned by British Intelligence. Lyalin gave details of
KGB war contingency plans to sabotage vital communication
and strategic centers in Britain. His own target was an
early warning system in Yorkshire.(77) He also reported how
specially configured Aeroflot planes were equipped to drop
mines to seal NATO SSBNs in their Scottish ports.(78)
Lyalin's information on KGB operations in Britain resulted
in the British expulsion of 105 Soviet intelligence officers
and the Soviet removal of many sabotage and assassination
specialists from posts worldwide.(79)
In 1972, Canadian authorities apprehended Anton Sabotka
(80), a Soviet agent involved in sabotage support. Sabotka,
born a Canadian citizen, was recruited after his parents
returned his to their native Czechoslovakia as a teenager.
He was trained in the reconnaissance of sabotage targets and
groomed by Moscow as a communications link between Moscow
and North American saboteurs. He operated for 11 years in
Canada before app:-tiension.(81)
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lllmll
The KGB, GRU, and Soviet allies also make wide use of
'illegals.'(82) Illegals are Soviet citizens, or sometimes
citizens of other Warsaw Pact countries or Cuba, who live
abroad illegally relying on fake identities, forged
documents, and fictitious pasts. Because of the independent
nature of their work and the lack of direct control Moscow
has over their day-to-day activities, illegals are selected
from only the most trusted of intelligence personnel.
Husband and wife teams are sometimes used.
After selection, a prospective illegal undergoes an
extensive training program. They are provided training in
the language, customs, laws, etc., of their future country
and given instruction in communication procedures including
ciphers, codes, invisible writing, dead drops, and radio
usage. Depending on their foreseen role abroad or their
cover story, they may also be trained in several
occupations. Most are also trained in selected areas such
as sabotage, reconnaissance, technology theft, etc. Their
training may include periods living in other countries to
help establish their false identities and fictitious past
and to see if they are crr '?le of melding fully into a
foreign society.
Eventually, using forged papers, they are illegally
entered into their foreign post and begin to generate
stronger cover stories by establishing residence, gaining
employment, and joining social and professional societies.
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Some illegals may immediately begin acting as clandestine
intelligence operatives; others may be left as 'sleepers,"
only to be activated when needed.
A key characteristic of illegals is that they do not
usually communicate or have contact with their home
country's diplomats or businessmen legally in a country.
Their directions usually come direct from their home country
either by radio or other means. Similarly, all information
the illegal collects is usually sent directly home.
Illegals may be organized in networks or residencies
where two to eight illegals work together on assignments.
These are the only cases where illegals know the identities
of other illegals. In countries where there is no legal
Soviet, East European, or Cuban presence, or if a legal
presence is thrown out of a country, 'illegal residencies'
are established to continue intelligence operations. These
illegal residencies perform similar functions to legal
residencies in running agent networks.
An example of a Soviet illegal residence Is the case of
Rudolf Herrmann (a.k.a., Ludek Zemenek). Herrmann was a
Czechoslovakian citizen who, along with his wife, was
trained as an illegal. After six years in Canada, he was
placed In the U.S. and established a residence ana bu'Ziueis..
near New'fork Although used mainly for low risk
intelligence collection in areas closed to legal Soviet
citizens in the U.S., the Soviets primarily groomed Herrmann
as the illegal resident for the entire U.S. should
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diplomatic relations between the U.S. and USSR be broken.
The FBI apprehended Herrmann in 1977 after he had been
operating in-the U.S. for over 10 years and had coopted his
son, a legal U.S. citizen and student at Georgetown
University, as a Soviet agent.(83)
$Qg~i~l_Esr~~~
To fill gaps in their other sabotage networks or attack
especially high value or well protected targets, the Soviets
may also use their special forces (Spetsnaz) units.
Spetsnaz existence is a well kept secret in the USSR, but
in the past 6-8 years several Soviet defectors have revealed
their capabilities to the West. Although their total
numbers are not known, most estimates show there could be as
many as 27,000-30,000 Spetsnaz personnel in the Soviet armed
forces.(84) There are also believed to be several thousand
additional Spetsnaz type personnel assigned to the KGB and
Soviet MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs).(85)
Spetsnaz units are the true elite of the Soviet armed
forces. Only the most capable personnel are selected for
Spetsnaz training and this often includes many world-class
athletes. Soviet armed force Spetsnaz units exist at the
army front, naval fleet, and general staff levels. -;? :" e
not roalt1a lAenti?iable from other military units as they
often adopt the uniforms of the military units where they
are stationed. Spetsnaz personnel receive extensive
training including:- languages; the combat arts including
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hand-to-hand combat, small arms, communications, and
demolition; and special skills such as parachuting, SCUBA
diving, etc.(86)
Spetsnaz units are designed to be highly mobile,
destructive, and clandestine. They are well equipped and
depending on the target would normally work in small groups
of 4-12 personnel, using disguises as necessary to blend in
with a country's population. They are usually equipped
with rifle models designed for use by airborne/air mobile
units including the AKM, AK-74, and short barreled AKR
carbine. They have available a variety of sabotage
explosives and depending on the mission, may also have
hand-held surface-to-air missiles, silenced pistols, sniper
rifles, and grenade launchers.(87) In addition, they say
use man-portable atomic weapons and a variety of
bacteriological or chemical weapons.(88) For communications
they rely on long-range HF radios capable of encrypted burst
transsissions.(89)
Spetsnaz units could use a variety of methods to enter
the West in order to conduct target reconnaissance or carry
out actual sabotage. These include entering in the guise
of: tourists;'trade, scientific, or other delegatin1?3;
sports teams; or crews and passengers on merchant ships,
fishing vessel-, or civil aircraft. A c'rtain number may be
posted to permanent Soviet diplomatic missions or trade
delegations as technical personnel, guards, gardeners,
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drivers,.etc.(90) They could also infiltrate illegally such
the same as illegals.
Naval Spetsnaz elements are capable of infiltrating by
small boat, SCUBA, or minisubmarine.(91) The Soviets have
built at least two India-class diesel-electric submarines to
act as motherships for minisubmarine operations. Recent
violations of Swedish and Norwegian territorial waters by
Soviet submarines and suspected minisubmarines point to
their use in support of Spetsnaz operations.(92)
Once in the target country, Spetsnaz units would
require logistic support and would most likely work with
agent or other Soviet support networks already in place.
These agents, sometimes called 'pointers,' would probably
meet Spetsnaz teams, guide them to weapons caches and target
areas, and provide other support (safe houses,
transportation, food, etc.) as required.(93)
$Ab21A91_21r1a91h
Because of the clandestine and compartmented nature of
these sabotage elements, the true number tasked against NATO
port completes is all but impossible to determine.
Therefore, a broad scope of this sabotage threat is the best
that can be developed in peacetime.
Sovi.:,:, .ot..;r !apt- and Cuban agents operating
under the direction of legals in NATO countries probably
account for the greatest port sabotage threat. Most sources
estimate 35-40 percent of all Soviet and Soviet allied
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personnel legally in the West are undercover intelligence
officers. If true, this would place between 500 and 700
active intelligence officers (legals) In the U.S. and Canada
with several thousand in NATO Europe. The operations of
these intelligence officers cover a wide range. A certain
percentage most certainly are attached to KGB and GRU
directorates planning wartime sabotage and work in
undercover residencies controlling agent networks which may
eventually conduct the sabotage. Aleksei Myagkov, a former
KGB officer, estimates that in West Germany alone there are
a minimum of 8,000 active agents and 5,000 'sleepers'
belonging to only the KGB and GRU who are prepared to
conduct various sabotage assignments.(94)
The Soviets also appear to use international terrorists
as part of their agent networks. Italy's Red Brigade,
France's Action Directe, West Germany's Red Army Faction,
and Belgium's Communist Combatant Cells are all
Marxist-Leninist left-wing terrorist groups that have been
linked indirectly to the Soviets. Consisting of several
hundred total personnel, these are presently the most active
terrorists in NATO Europe. Recently these groups have begun
to make NATO facilities their primary targets. There is 01 so.:tt evitence these terrorist groups have even formed a
coalition to improve their opera"*ions.(95) 'During a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict these groups could add another
element to the Soviet sabotage network.
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Even after many years of experience with captured
illegals, Western security services remain puzzled by the
extent of this system.- Based on testimony of defectors, the
size of illegals' training classes in Moscow, and the
confessions of arrested illegals, estimates of total Soviet
illegals in the entire West run from several hundred to a
thousand. Harry Rositzke, a former CIA agent, points out
that illegals do not operate forever; therefore, he believes
there are only sixty or seventy Soviet illegals active in
the West at once.(96) In addition to the Soviet illegals,
probably a lesser number can be attributed to Soviet allies.
Of the total number of legals, agents, illegals, and
Soviet Spetsnaz personnel, the exact number assigned to
sabotage NATO ports is impossible to determine. Aleksei
Myagkov has written of several "Five-Hundredth Detachments'
stationed in the Soviet Union and trained to sabotage the
main seaports of the West.(97) In the overall context,
however, port sabotage would probably take a lower priority
than the destruction of NATO nuclear weapons, major military
facilities, and communication and command centers. Yet,
with several thousand personnel available for these sabotage
operations, at-least'soee sabotage of the port facilities
01
can be expected. This is probably most true for the NATO
European ports which are more vulnerable :-o the boviaz
Spetsnaz forces due to their proximity to the USSR.
In the U.S. and Canada the port sabotage threat is even
more difficult to determine. Because of logistic and
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transportation problems, only the highest priority North
American targets--nuclear weapon facilities, military bases
(including naval bases), and command centers--would probably
be assigned to Spetsnaz units, if they were even used.
Agents and illegals could also be assigned sabotage of these
high priority targets. As lower priority targets, North
American Re/Re ports would probably receive some sabotage,
with the major Re/Re ports the most likely targets. The
greatest threat to North American naval and Re/Re ports,
however, might not come from the Soviets directly, but as a
result of Cuban sabotage networks described further in
Chapter 4.
dQIAA
(Note: bQrAlSSy_$bQrD11S translations are provided by the
Naval Intelligence Support Center, Suitland, MD. They may
be found in various library periodical files under either
H2CA144Y_$b4C41K or $QY1Al_~IAYA1_~QAIYAI, both using the
edition numbers shown.)
1. For a summary of various Western views on Soviet BLOC
interdiction see Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, Tbj_2tA_1n
$QY1?l_$1LAlt2Y (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983),
p. 181.
2. A. V. Basov, Tbg_~AYY_lII_lb~_~tCAAI_~AIClQIl~_S~Ar~
EIQg~lAagA_Qf_QQArAl14DA1=~lrAlA91g_~mQ1QYAADI (Moscow:
Nauka Press, 1980) p. 295, cited in Milan Vego, 'Anti-SLOC
in the Soviet Naval Theory and Practice,' draft paper,
28 Nov. 1984,, p. 2.
3. V. 1). Sokolovskif, ~d?,.~I111lACY_$l~CAIA9Z (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1962). A'second edition in 19.,3, and a thirA in
1968, were also published. The third edition, edi? ad with
an analysis and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott, was
published in 1975 in the U.S. as ~Q_vlet ~lilitACy_$lYAle_gy
(3d ed.) by Crane, Russak and Co., New York. This will be
the edition referenced.
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4. Ibid., pp. 205, 210, 211.
5. Ibid., pp. 299-303.
6. S. I. Filonov, 'Armed Conflict and Ocean Lines of
Communication,' U2r1k2y_5b2rn1K, no. 3, 1965, pp. 39-41,
cited in James M. McConnell, 'Strategy and Missions of the.
Soviet Navy in the Year 2000,' in PrQbl~?~_Q1_$?A_EQWgr_AA
~1Q_$eQrQSc~i_~~ie_Twenlg=~irs~_Cggtury, ed. James L. George
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 50.
7. Sergei G. Gorshkov, 'Navy,' ~~Q$~_$4Y1Q#~_~[1QYg1QQQS~lA~
Vol. 5 (1970), p. 675.
8. For a discussion of the shift of Soviet strategy see
Harriet Fast Scott and.William F. Scott, Tb1_ArB1d_E2r2g$_21
1tig_g?2g (Boulder: Westview, 1984), pp. 52-65.
9. Sergei G. Gorshkov, 'Navy,' QQXA1_K1111ArX
SQ912122ldIA, Vol. 5 (1976), p. 235.
10. Sergei G. Gorshkov, Tbg_$gA_~QEQr_Q1_SCbg_$1~A1c4
(Moscow: Voyenlzdat, 1976) (English edition--Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 276.
11. Ibid., pp. 213-222.
12. Ibid., p. 221.
13. Ibid.
14. Vego, pp. 22-26. The Soviet theory of naval blockade
is not detailed in any one reference, but must be gleaned
from numerous writings on the subject. Dr. Vego has
summarized their naval blockade theory in his paper, such of
which came from Morskoy Sbornik articles and other Soviet
military writings listed in this work's bibliography.
15. Red Star [Moscow], 9 May 1984, cited in William E.
Odom, 'Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions,'
Pr Qb1A2A_Q#_Sc2ABQn1AB? Jul.-Aug. 1985, p. S.
16. Vego, p. 20. -
17. N. Xaba iu, 'S:a.f,anes of Communication and NATO,'
K2rAk2Y_ b2rQ1LS, no. 4, 1984, p. 77; aad .4-' yev, 'Joint
Operations of the Navy and Ground Forces,' U2r1]S2Y_ b2tu1K?
no. 4, 1984, p. 23.
18. K. Stalbo, 'Some Issues of the Theory of the
Development and Employment of the Navy,' agrAw_Abaralh,
no. 5, 1981, pp. 18,
-55-
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19. ib1d?
20. Gorshkov, Tbg_$gA_~Qggr_Qf_S~~lg_$A~Q, p. 197.
21. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, VQgf;AAlfltd
SQIlIIYI11A~_NAYAl_41:S~~I;A~f _$Af~lA (Washington: n . p . , 1986),
pp. 2-3.
22. Milan Vego, The Soviet Threat Against Iceland and
U.S./NATO Ports and Installations,' draft paper, 15 Apr.
1986, p. 12a (Figure 1).
23. U.S. Department of Defense, gQy1~_ti1111tarY_EQligr
(Washington: GPO, 1986) p. 31.
24. John Hackett et al., Tbg_T#11rd_SlQrld_S~ari__SQ951;~3~
12$: (New York: Berkley, 1978), pp. 247-250.
25. ~n~1~gA1filsd_~CQBBQniA#c_~i~y~l_QrdgrA_Qf_$~1~~ p. I.
26. Ranft and Till, p. 185.
27. Lord Hill-Norton, 'Epilogue,' in $aa_warfari, by H.P.
Willmott (Strettington, Great Britain: Antony Bird Pub.,
1981), pp. 143-154.
28. Gorshkov, ~~2g_$gA_~4WgI:_Qf_~c!!~_$ScQScl~~ p. 194.
29. ~agg_A_igh11}g_$~1eai__1$$$.$6 (London: Jane's
Publishing, 1985), p. 511.
30. J. R. Hill, $p#~f-$3~L^A?1IIA_L~AKfAI:K (London: Ian
Allan, 1984), p. 31. Rear Admiral Hill is a former Royal
Navy ASW expert.
31. 'Soviets Sent 89 Subs Into Atlantic,' 11E11 (New
York), 29 Jul. 1977, p. A4, col. 1.
32. A. Kuz'min, 'Master the Art of Attack,' H2rAK2Y
$bQrn1K, no. 4, 1985, p. 52.
33. 'Mine System Survey: Soviet Union,' ~IAYY
.aliarnA 12fl 2 ' 91, nn . 2 (1986)o 114.
34. 'Soviet Navy's new on mine warfare,' lZil4t=ia
~KfAnAA_~Y?1S1Y, 3 Mar. 1984, p. 316.
35. A. Romanen, 'Torgovyy Flot V Planakh NATO,' U2r$kQY
J E121. Sep. 1979, pp. 40-43, cited in Robert E. McKeown,
'Their Merchant Fleet,' U.S. Naval Institute RrQ=41QUA?
Oct. 1982, p. 166.
-56-
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36. Jan S. Breemer, 'Soviet Naval Mine Warfare Forces,'
in Tai?_u1Y?_4#_1he_$Qv_ig1_~jA_vy, eds. Bruce W. Watson and
Peter M. Dunn (Boulder: Westview, 1986), p. 104.
37. I. Bykhovskiy, The Use of Submarines to Lay Mines,'
112r1KQY_?b2LQA, no. 7, 1977, p. 27.
38. 'Mine System Survey: Soviet Union,' p. 114, and
Vego, The Soviet Threat Against Iceland and U.S./NATO Ports
and Installations,' pp. 17-18.
39. jbJd.
40. V. Sysoyev, 'Naval Blockade,' dQt>~KQy_$hQt01k? no.
12, 1976, p.35.
41. V. Yankovskly, The Mine Blockade in the NATO Naval
Command's Plans,' H2CAI44Y_$bQEflhJ ' no. 5, 1984, p. 27.
42. Stalbo, p. 18.
43. Bruce W. Watson, g?d_l~jAyy_;_$??s__$QY1?_1~?Y?1
4Q?Ali1QQ;z_Qii_lib?_~t1gb_$???~_12~~=1~~Q (Boulder: Westview,
1982), p. 29.
44. For a summary of Soviet Northern Fleet exercises
1971-1976 see 'Soviet Naval Activities: 1971-1976,' NfiTO
$?y1gN, 24, no. 6 (1976), 8-11.
45. Bruce W. Watson and Margurite A. Walton, 00kean-75'
U.S. Naval Institute Jul. Jul. 1976, p. 96.
46. Donald C. Daniel, 'Trends and Patterns in Major
Soviet Naval Exercises,' in NAYA1_E21?r_1D_$2Y1?1_E211Q!.
ed. Paul J. Murphy (Washington: GPO, 1978), pp. 227-228;
and John Erickson, 'The Northern Theater: Soviet
Capabilities and Concepts,' $7:r? ?g1Q_E?y1?H, 4, no. 3
(1976), 74-76.
47. For a summary of Soviet Northern Fleet exercises
1977-1984 see 'Soviet Naval Activities: 1977-1984,' HATQ
$?y1?j, 33, no. 1? (1985), 17-20.
48. "1orfet SI.OC Interdiction,' In
Th?
QY1?1_HaYY?__$~I;?D1tbs_a~nd_~1~311111? t 1s. ^r'sre W.
Watson and Susan M. Watson (Boulder: Westview, 1986), p.
-163.
49. 'Soviet Navy exercise to counter NATO,' ~$D?=Q
Q?1?0Q?_ft?K1Y, 27 Jul. 1985, p. 155.
50. Charles C. Peterson, 'Strategic Lessons of the Recent
Soviet Naval Exercise,' HA112QA1_QC1&D1L? Feb. 1986, p. 32.
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51. Quoted in John Burlage, 'Naval Exercises Project
Power of Soviets, U.S.' HAYY_11Mii? 19 Aug. 1985, p. 10.
52. V. Chernavin, 'Naval Theory,' 1f2C1K21_?b2r01K, no. 1,
1982, p. 23.,
53. Douglas H. Hart, 'Soviet Approaches to Crisis
Management: The Military Dimension,' agrylyal, Sep.-Oct.
1984, pp. 214-215. Some Western writers also believe the
Soviets may decide during a 01914 model' crisis or as part
of a 01940 model' crisis to go to war, but wait until the
crisis has apparently passed and the West has lowered its
defenses before initiating hostilities.
54. Gorshkov, ~bt_$ta_~QgtC_gl_ltbt_$Alzt, p. 118.
55. V. Artamonov, 'Supporting Combat Operations of
Submarines,' Voyegnaya_ayslo (Moscow), Sep. 1973, published
In $~l~gf g~_LgAS~iII9A_f rQA_tl111fACY_Thssi9tif_1~~t=l~Z V01-
5, Part 2, eds. Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Haeber
(Washington: GPO, 1982), p. 211.
56. Stalbo., p. 19.
57. Milan Vego, 'Soviet Northern Fleet,' tIAYY
1Q1tCQA112QA1, 88, no. 12, (1983), 720.
58. V. A. Belli, 'Theoretical Principles of Conducting
Operations,' Thesis, Soviet Naval Academy, 1938,
cited in Sergei G. Gorshkov,Ad_$~AI;_14.DR_A?$t6
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974) p. 71.
59. 'Naval Blockade,' $Q v_ltt_i1111tary_Fngyc1o2td1a, Vol.
5 (1978), pp. 397-398, quoted in Vego, The Soviet Threat
Against Iceland and U.S./NATO Ports and Installations,'
p. 7.
60. B. Makeyev, 'BLOC Under Present-Day Conditions,'
MQCAISQY_$t2Cfi , no. 7,. 1979,.p. 22.
61. Ranft and Till, p. 184.
62. Gorshkov, '~h8_$4A_PQliAC_Qf_~hA_$ScA~A~ P-
63. Ranft and Till, p. 184. n
54. Chernavin, p. 22.
65. Caj us Bekker, ~1~1A1==A_L~AYAI_~dAr (New York: Zebra,
1974), pp. 304-338; and Samuel Eliot Morison, TbA_BA111A_21
~k~Q_8fl~tl~la~__$~el~~~st~_122otlAY_12~ (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1962), pp. 27-157, 410-414.
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66. Gorshkov, Thie_fgA_~sggr_Ql_S~he_~tAle, p.192.
67. A. Gontayev, -Combat Operations of Submarines on Sea
Lanes of Communication,- d2rgIS2Y_$b2rn1K? no. 1, 1983, p.
29.
68. G. Afanas'yev, -Submarine Communications,- jj2Cjjj2Y
$b2=1&, no. 2, 1985, pp. 28-31.
69. Michael Salitter and Ulrich Weisser, 'Shallow Water
Warfare in Northern Europe,- U.S. Naval Institute
rrQgttdjQgA, Mar. 1977, pp. 37-45.
70. Hill, pp. 32-33.
71. Aleksei Myagkov, -Soviet Sabotage Training for World
War II,' 221 AI_BnA1111, 20 Dec. 1979, page unknown.
72. Oleg Penkovsky, Tht_fgn9211KY_EA21r1 (London:
Collins, 1965), pp. 79-84.
73. John Barron, 1~~~=__Tag_$ggrA#c_~2rk_Qf_~2Y1lti~_$ggr2
agtoll (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974) (pap. New
York: Bantam, 1974), p. 432 in pap.
74. John J. Dziak, The Soviet Approach to Special
Operations,- In Special Oeerations_in US_8trategy, eds F.
Barnett, B. Tovak, and R. Shultz (Washington: National
Defense University Press, 1984), p. 112.
75. Aleksei Myagkov, The Soviet Union's Special Forces,
$2Y1A1_a2A1gg1, 9 Jan. 1980, p. 4.
76. For additional information on Soviet legal presence
and use of agents see: Penkovsky, pp. 84-93; Victor
Suvorov, lnsicAe_SQv_let_Mill~ary_lntelllggggg (New York:
Macmillan, 1984), pp. 83-135; and Barron, KQ$s_Thft_$42r11
L~2r4S_Q1_$2Y1lSc_$ggrac_$g2n#cA~ pp. 23-28, 413-447 in pap.
77. Brian Freemantle, JStS (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1982), p. 86.
78. Roger Boar ana Nire' Blundell, W2rWAAMIC11
22111_AnIS_$21'LAAarA (London: Ujt.,j,..c^a's- 1984), p. 118.
79. Barron, ~SL~s_Tbg_~Agrf~S~_~2r~?Q1_~2YlA~_~QgrAlt_B9Q4g?
pp. 413-414 it pap.
80. Not his actual name, Barron changed it for his
protection.
81. Barron, ~St~s=Ttig_$Qgrglt_Sd2t1S_2f_$2YlA_$AgrQ~_8g~n&g~
pp. 434-446 In pap.
-59-
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82. For additional information on illegals see:
Penkovsky, pp. 79-84; Suvorov, pp. 75-82; John Barron, $rg@
(New York: Reader's Digest Press,
1983) (pap. New York: Berkley Books, 1985), pp. 247-314 in
pap.; and Harry Rositzke, (New
York: Doubleday, 1981), pp. 53-57.
83. Barron, ~~$_~Qdtys__~>t}t_$~$ag4_IA>nd, pp. 247-314 in
pap.
84. Viktor Suvorov, 'Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's
Special Forces,' ~p~~CpBti~Q4a~,_QQggAe_ggyjg~r, 16, no. 9
(1983), 1211.
85. Frederic C. Smith, 00n Soviet Unconventional
Warfare," Qgf gl~,~g_A>~~_FQEAlg>E1_~iA1t$ ? Jun. 1983, p. 7.
86. Suvorov, Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special
Forces,' 1209-1216, passim.
87. Ross S. Kelly, 'Spetsnaz: Special Operations Forces
of the USSR, Q~~gDgg_A1}$_~Qr~190_$fA1rA? Dec. 1984, p. 29.
88. Myagkov, The Soviet Union's Special Forces,' p. 4.
89. Kelly, p. 29.
90. Suvorov, Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special
Forces,' 1215.
91. Kelly, p. 29.
92. Lynn M. Hansen, $ov_Sgt_~Ta~v_y_$Qetgnaz_QQeCAt~ogs_QQ
S~h4_I~IQLS~~]I~CII_~IAO~Si__IDlQ11cAS~14GA_~Q~_S~hg_Lg~l~[lAl~_4f _S~gAS~l~~Il
IQCQet (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic
Technology, 1984), passim.
93. James H. Hansen, 'Countering NATO's New Weapons,
Soviet Concepts for War in Europe,' In~tr>D~~iQO~I_Qtfta~t
$iyiuu, 17, no. 11 (1984), 1618.
94. Myagkov, The Soviet Union's Special Forces,' p. 5.
95. Harry Anderson, Debbie Seward; anu ra?.... "."'?^ -%an, 'A
New Terrorist Alliance,' N;gggtta, 19 Aug. 1985, pp. 39-40;
Frederick Painton, New Generation of Violence,' list,
11 Feb. 1985, p. 41; aid, Roger Thurow and Peter Gumbel,
'Blunt and Brutal, the Chill of Terrorism Again Descends
Upon Western Europe,' jjAU1_$j1=8Lt_j2Mr0A1? 4 Feb. 1985, p.
96. Rositzke, p.-57.
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97. Myagkov, 'Soviet Sabotage Training for World War II,'
page unknown, cited in William T. Smith, 'A Selected
Annotated Bibliography on Soviet Special Operations Forces
(Spetsnaz) 1975-1985,' draft paper, Dec. 1985.
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CHAPTER 3
The Potential Soviet Western Atlantic Anti-SLOC Campaign
On 12 December 11941] at a conference between
Hitler and Grand Admiral Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of
the German Navy, the decision was made to plan and
carry out Operation PAUktaASbIAS ('drum roll') off the
East Coast of America.
Its purpose was to paralyze coastal shipping and
thus disrupt the supply of oil and other raw materials
on the U.S. East Coast. A gradual expansion of the
operations area into the Gulf of Mexico and the
Caribbean Sea was planned in order to disperse the
Allies' patrol and escort forces, which were not
numerous to begin with, and thereby reduce the
effectiveness of the war against the (German]
submarines....
The aggressiveness of the German submarines
literally stunned the U.S. Navy command. However, the
shortage of forces prevented the Americans from
organizing an effective antisubmarine defense of their
coastal communications. Moreover, whenever ASW forces
in any one zone were augmented, the Germans enlarged
their area of operations....
The effectiveness of the submarines' combat
activity in the Western Atlantic may be Judged from
(the following] data.... (Between January and September
1942] they sank 520 ships of a combined displacement of
2,739,345 tons.... The enormous disparity between the
number of ships sunk and the number of German
submarines sunk is striking, 520 and 15, respectively:
that is, 33 transports for every submarine sunk....(1)
This recent (1982) Soviet analysis of German World War
II operations could provide insight into a future Soviet
Westlant ant(-SLOC campaign. As Chapter 2 showed, Soviet
obJect. s namoaign, disruption of shipping and
dispersal of enemy forces, are very similar to those of
Germany over 40 years ago. But, like the German U-boats,
Soviet forces in Westlant would be restricted by supply
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APPROVAL SHEET
Title of Thesis: The Western Atlantic Wartime Threat
Name of Candidate: Michael Wayne Collier
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Coast Guard
Graduate Class 1-86
Master of Science of Strategic
Intelligence, August 1986
Thesis and Abstract Approved:
lie A. Qo4l in
Commander, S. Navy
Date Approved: 07A ve l9$b
--- -------------
Thesis and Abstract Approved:
Graham D. Vernon
Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Dr. Hazed' Ingers
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/09: CIA-RDP90T00155R000800040001-1
lines stretching thousands of miles from their homeports and
an enemy possessing both air and sea control throughout the
operating area.
This chapter takes the Soviet North Atlantic anti-SLOC
strategy described in Chapter 2 and develops the operational
art components of a Soviet Westlant anti-SLOC campaign. The
Soviets describe operational art as focusing on
The operational deployment of forces, operational
coordination, the planning, preparation, and conduct of
operations, land] operational support to combat
actions.... (2)
Each of these areas is treated within the framework of
the Soviet principles of naval art in Table 1 (pg. 11).
Only by viewing a possible Westlant anti-SLOC campaign
through the prism of these principles of naval art may the
full extent of such a campaign be understood.
Who are the Soviet war planners and operational
commanders for a Westlant anti-SLOC campaign? For this
answer the Soviet wartime military command structure in
Figure 5 must be reviewed.
During wartime the Defense Council has virtually
complete control'over the military, economic, and political
direction of the USSR. The exact composition of this
.council is unknown, but it is assn.Aea bo heedeA by the
general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) and includes only the highest Soviet leaders.(3)
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Defense
Council
General Staff
Continental
Atlantic
TVD
Westlant
Anti-BLOC Forces
Arctic
TVD
Figure 5
Soviet Western Atlantic Wartime Control Structure
Sources: Adapted from Harriet Fast Scott and William F.
Scott, !?g_~l~B!Qt1ons-------------- ------- -S$YA~A9g~- ---
Switch Sides
Overt Belligerence
True Neutrality
Overt Neutrality/Covert Belligerence
QYgrt_l~gSi&~AlitYtQgf ArZtiA~_~~1115Ar~Q~~---------- If------ -
Engri-Irlada
The estimates and analyses presented in this work
have dealt with a Westlant threat assessment based on Soviet
and Cuban force capabilities that exist today. What might
be the potential threat from these forces by the aid-1990s?
The Soviets are continuing a program to build more
modern and capable submarines, both nuclear and
diesel-electric powered. Based on their current
construction rates, by 1995 the Norfleet could contain a
submarine inventory as shown in Table 14.
-152-
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? Table 14
-_---Potential 1995 Soviet Northern Fleet Submarines
Present No. Estimated No
ZZ29--'--Una------- ------loAa4Yla---------In-$~alm-129
SSBN TYPHOON 8
nwrTA -4
OTHER 14
SSGN OSCAR 2
CHARLIE I/II 10
ECHO II 14
PAPA 1
YANKEE --
SSG JULIET/WHISKEY 9
SSN ALPHA 6
VICTOR I/II/III 29
MIKE 1
SIERRA 1
OTHER 10
SS FOXTROT 26
5
10
8
1
10
6
29
10
12
TANGO 10
KILO 10 20
TOTAL 174 161
------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: Developed from John Jordan, 'Future Trends in
Soviet Submarine Development,' In
T~g_~5i3cuEA_41_?c~S~_$QYIS~C
NAYY, eds. Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn (Boulder:
Westview, 1986), pp. 16-18; Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, qi}de~A~aBd1Qg_~Qv_!et_~)Av_A~_g~y~~QQmAQ~A
(Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 88-104s.U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency UnQIAAAIfli~fg~Yl~~~
Argubright, Steve, CDR, U.S. Navy. Port Security Section,
Navy Investigative Service. Personal interview.
23 Oct. 1985.
Barax, Nancy. Navy Operational Intelligence Center.
Personal interview. 5 Aug. 1986.
Brown, Ray, LCDR, U.S. Coast Guard. Readiness Planning
Division, Coast Guard Headquarters. Personal
interview. '9 Oct. 1985.
Calhoun, Elizabeth, LCDR, U.S. Coast Guard. Port Security
Branch, Coast Guard Headquarters. Personal interviews.
9 and 24 Oct. 1985.
Christakos, John, LT, U.S. Navy. Soviet Naval Forces
Branch, Directorate of Research, U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency. Personal Interview. 2 Jul. 1986.
Dillard, Steve. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Soviet
Counterintelligence Section. Personal interview.
24 Oct. 1985.
Graham, Scott, LTJG, U.S. Coast Guard. Port Security
Branch, Coast Guard Headquarters. Personal interview.
It Jun. 1986.
Haver, Richard. Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.
Personal Interview. 3 Jul. 1986.
Milheim, Russ. Navy Operational Intelligence Center.
Personal Interview. 5 Aug. 1986.
Pallas, Dr. Thomas E. Latin American Section, Directorate
of Estimates, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.
Personal Interview. 3 Jul. 1986.
Pryor, Larry', CAPT, U.S. Marine Corp. Nav, Operational
Intelligence Center. Personal interview.
23 Oct. 1985.
Stone, Les. Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Counterterrorism Section. Personal interview. 24 Oct.
1985.
'The Soviet Threat Against Iceland and U.S./NATO
-181-
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Straub, Alfred. Soviet Navy Team, Directorate of Estimates,
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Personal Interview.
3 Jul. 1986.
Townsend, Mary Louise. Latin America Branch, Directorate of
Research, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Personal
Interview. 2 Jul. 1986.
Vego, Dr. Milan. Center for Naval Analysis. Personal
interview. 2 Jul. 1986.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/09: CIA-RDP90TOO155R000800040001-1