COMMENTS ON BOWIE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000700020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 174
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 9, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

rh ~G 3U~~
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9 September 1960
~EI~RAAIDUP~ Ft,~t : DCI
SIIBJECT: Comments on Bowie Report
1. This most thoughtful analysis of hoYV we mast revitalize
the Atlantic alliance to meet the challenge of the 1960s is worth
your reading in extenso. Ili only hesitation in tooting it so
highly is that I did some of the drafting.
2. Eowi.e feels that the Alliance needs some fairly drastic
overhauling, particul:ar]y in the military field. He argaes that
ti
both NATO~s exclusive reliance on the U. S. ~swordn far strategic
deterrence and its ~C-70 concept of tactical nuclear warfare in
Europe are becoming outdated by Soviet achievement of comparable
nuclear capabilities. Hence, a viable BATO strategcr for the 1960s
demands:
a. A greater non-nuclear military capabi3.ity to deter
local aggression below the nuclear threshold.
b. A veto-free supplementary Europe based strategic
deterrent to reassure our allies that they can deter Soviet
missile blackmail or all-out attack by means under their own
control.
However he re3ects independent national deterrents a la de Gaulle
as inefficient, costly, dangerous, and of dubious credibility for
this latter purpose. Instead, the tT.S. should provide an interim
~~
..~ ~.'v
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force of U.S. POLARIS subs in European waters wader SACEUR (not
II.S.) control, to be followed by a genuinely multi national NATa
Deterrent force (i. e. rm~ltilateral "sharing" ).
3. Louie also favors better concerting of Atlantic economic
and scientific efforts to promote greater grovrth and efficiency,
a bigger and more coordinated Atlantic program of help to the
underdeveloped areas, and a renewed push for greater European
integration which would make the U. S. and a European Community
more equal partners. Re argues that Britain mast "loin" this
European Community or inevitably suffer a decline in its influence
and in its special ties v?ith the U. S.
lt. In the meantime he urges the strengthening of the existing
instruments for political and economic coordination of Atlantic
pola.ey, i.e. NATf1 and the QECD. In particular a NATQ political
ste?ring group of the U.S., U.E., France, Germany, and Italy would
be a better way than de Gaulle~s "tripartism~~ to secure big power
a@reearent on com~moa policies.
~. I particularly recommend the S~nmar-~ Chapter I -the
Challenge, Chapter TI on NATQ Defenses and Chapter VI - on the
Requisite Political FramevPOrk.
DPW
~~~~~~
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~? r~crwrcHnuum rurc: Nir. vu~.les
Bob Komer would. like to see this after
you have noted it.
Bob participated rather extensively in the
preparation of this paper but has not yet seen thi
version which will be final if Secretary Herter
approves of it. On page 3 of Bob Bowie's letter o
transmittal of the report to Secretary Herter he
mentions that Bob Komer was of great assistance
in the drafting of the report.
FMC
31 August 60
I (DATE)
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ADDRESS OFFlClA[. COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 2S, D. C.
SsECRET Enclosure E_^.~c~':~c R_gictiY ~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE ~ U' '"' _~~~J
WASHINGTON 'j r~ ~^) n
AUG 31 1960
MEMORANDITM
FOR: The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, Executive Secretariat
F1tOM: Mr. John~A. Calhoun
Enclosed for your personal information is copy
number 14 of 'The North Atlantic Nations: Tasks for
the 196ots", a report -to the Secretary by Robert R.
Bowie. The report has not as yet been approved by'
the Secretary, and pending a receipt of such approval
the preliminary distribution of the report will be
very limited.
Enclosure:
Copy number 14 of "The
North Atlantic Nations:/
Tasks for the 1960ts."
SECRET Enclosure
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SECRET
T1iE NORTH ATLANTIC NATIONS
TASKS FOR_ THE 1960' S
A Report to the Secretary of State
August, 1960
SECRET
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S E C R E T
THE NORTH ATLANTIC NATIONSo
TASKS FOR THE 1960~s
Table of Contents Pa e
Letter of Transmittal-?____________???___m__?__________
SIIMMARY_??______m???_?mo_____?______?___?_m___?__?___-_
CHAPTER ONES Challenge of the 1960~s----m~_______-_?- ~9
CHAPTER TWOS NATO Defense--?-----??-??????--?______-? ~~~'
CHAPTER THREES The Atlantic Nations and the Less
Developed Countries????-?-___??_?__?_?__ 7~,
CHAPTER FOURo Relations with the Communist Bloc-__-_-- '99
CHAPTER FIVEo Resources of the Atlantic Community----~d.1-
CHAPTER SIXo The Requisite Political Framework-------~~~3
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T -
1
Bear Mro Secretaryo
I submit herewith the ~?eport on T~The North Atlantic
Nationso Tasks for the 1960?s?"s which you asked me to
prepares
This report seeks to analyze the i,~sues facing the
Atlantic nations in the c?ming decadeo It is designed to
provide a broad framework fmr the NATO Planning Exercise,
bent is~ n?t confined t? measures that should be undertaken
through NATOo It seemed to me that the Atlantic nati?ns
_ should emnsider the entire challenge facing them in order
tm determine which tasks should be performed an NATO and
which through other instrumentsa
T? prepare a report of manageable size9 it has been
necessary to focus on key lmng?range tissues for which
concerted eff?rt by the Atlantic nations will be most
ua^gently needed in the 1960~so
The report dies not attempt tc provide a blueprint
for specific action for the decade aheada It seeks rather
to lay out
The Honorable
Christian Ao Hertere
Secretary ?f Staten
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T i
to lay out general purposes and guidelines on which agree-
ment might be reached by the Atlantic nationso Such agree-
ment would provide a framework within which specific actions
could be effectively directed to agreed purposeso
In preparing this report9 I have been assisted by a
small staff drawn from various parts of the Government
and from institutions outsid? of Washingtono I appreciate
very much the cooperation of you and Mro Merchant in bring-
ing this group togethero The Staff includedo
Deane R, Hintons FSO~ member of the Staff
of the Mission to the European Communities9
Brusselso
Malcolm W, Hoag9 of the Rand Corporation, and
former member of the Faculty of the
Natioaaal ~las? College o
Professor Klaus E, K~aorr9 Associate Director
of the Princeton Center for International
Studieso
Hal B; Lary of the Preside~tQS Council of
Economic Advisorso
Central Intelligence Agencyo
Irving Ao Sirken9 International Cooperation
Administrationo
Francis To Williamsone FSOs former Director of
the Office of Research and Analysis for
t~lestern Europe9 Department of State9 who
is assigned to the American Embassy, in Bonn,
S E C R E T
STAT
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S E C R E T
-3-~
- 3 ~-
Brigadier General Bamilton A~ Twitchell, U, S, Army,
Department of Defense9 wae~ moat cooperative in providing
liaison with his Department and the military services,
Many officers and officials from the bepartment of befense
were also helpful in providing information and views,
In additionp papers on specialised topics were pr?-
pared for me by Robert Ei,~c~nberga Division of International
Financ?~ Alfred Reifman9 Division of Commercial Pbliciee
and Treaties 9 and Mr, B, B, S>trolnikof f 9 of the Prelsident ~ s
Science Advisory Committee, Mr, Robert Komer of the Central
Intelligence Agency has b?en of great assistance in the
drafting of the reporte Mro Henry Owen of the Policy Planning
Staff has been particularly helpful in contributing to the
Chaptex^ on the less dev?1op?d areasa Many other officers
of the Bepartment of State and Professor Lincoln Gordon of
the Harvard Busin?ss School9 who is a Consultant to the
Department9 have commented on various portions of the report
or discussed with m? the problems coveredo
I am very much indebted to all those who assisted so
ably in the preparation of the reporto Uf course, the
responsibility for its conclusions is mince
Sincerely yours
S E C R E T
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0
S E C.R E T
THE NORTH ATLANTIC NATIO1VSo
TASKS FOR THE 1960~s
A Report to the S~~r.etar_y of State bpa
ROBERT R, BOVdIE
Augusta 1960
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
THE NORTH ATLANTIC NATIONSo
TASKS F?R THE 1960Qs
S UMIKA RY
CHAPTER ONES Ch~llen~e.of the 19608s
1, Basic Goals
(PPS 19 23)
The Atlantic nations must trp9 over the gong runs
O
(a) to shape the basic forces at work in the world9
so as to create a e~iable world o~?derg and
(b) to prevent the SinomSm~iet Bloc from undermining
that order or from dominating non?Communist countriesa
2 o Ma Tor Tasks ( PP ~ ~~+ ~ ~5 )
To fulfill this dual goal9 the Atlantic nations
(a) assure their defense9
(b) assist modernisation of less de~reloped areas$
(c)
O
develop a common strategg~ toward the Blocg
(d) mobilize the resources required to accomplish
their purposes9
(e) create a political framework within which they
can work together to these endsa
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
This report analyzes these five tasks and the kind
of actions which the Atlantic nations must u~dertak~ in
order to discharge them, %n pursuing these tasksa the
Atlantic Community should rediscover the cohesion and
__~
sense of purpose which masked its creation over a decade
ago 0
CIiAPTER T6V0 s NATO Defense
l , The Pr?blem ( pp o ~Z; m 38,
During the 1950?se NATOQS strategy was based mn
decisive iJS superiority in strategic and tactical nuclear
weaponso Under these conditions9 the strategy was
effective in deterring aggression and maintaining the
confidence mf our allieso
Growing Soviet missile?nuclear capabilities are now
eroding the credibility of the threat of a strategic
nuclear response to less than all=cut Soviet attack, %n
consequence9 NATO Europe may become vulnerable to threats
of both limited aggression and nuclear blackmails Eurmpea~as
will fear both an excessive NATO response to limited aggresm
sign and the absence of a US strategic response to greater
threatso The Soviets may seek to exploit this vulnerability
for divisive effectso
S E C R E T
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O
S E C R ,E T
The problem cannot be met by enhancing NAT08s
tactical nuclear cap~balitaeso ~?or the Europeans9 tactical
nuclear ~rarfare would be tantamount ~o a general holocausto
20 Basic t~t~t~roach (PPS ~8)
A viable NATO strategy ~~~? thc~ 1960os musts
(a) enhance th? non?nucleas? capability of Shield forces
to resist attack by Soviet ready forces egad substantially
lessen their dependence cn nuclear weapmnsg
(b) eanable Nt~TO to mmunt nuclear retaliation agaans$
larger threats mathout a US vetoo
Revised Shield Strate~~ (PPS 39 5Y)
The enhanced nonnuclear capability could be based on
O central front Shield forces,~omewhere near SACBURBS target
of 30 divisions9 which wall come within reach when thy;
German build-up is compTetedo These forces must be bettex^
traiged and equipped and have metre adequate reserveso The
added costs may be partially offset by smme econmmaes9 and
should be well within Nt~TO capabilitieso Our NATO allays
should be the mor? walling to meet these costs9 because they
would be related to the onYy kind of strategy that makes
sense for 1~uropean countrieso
The tactical nuclear capability of the Shield would
be I.imitedo It would nett be designed to fight a.tactical
nuclear war in Europea but only to deter allmout massing .
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
of Soviet forces for conventional attack and to reinfmrce
the strategic deterrent to S?wiet nucieaa~? attack,
4o Strategic Deterrence (PP, 5l' m 65.)
The need for strategic deterrence moat continue to
be largely met by US strategic force~s9 which should be
maintained in a high state of effectiwenesso But a supple
mentary NATO strategic determent would assure our allies
that they were able to deter Soviet
llmout attack on
i~les~tern Europe by means under their own controlo
Independent national strategic forces are not a suit
able answer to this needo The IJKfls experience shows that
no mayor European power is able to produce a credible
national. deterrent from its own resourceso Ewen if feasible9
proliferation of independent national deterrents would be
dangerous inefficienty immensely costlya and haws a mAjor
divisive effect on the t~llianceo
A veto-free NATO strategic force under command of
SACEUR would meet many European concerns9 and would not be
subject to these drawbackso Sea based systems9 particularly
PO~,A~IS submarines 8 offer great advantages for this f orc~e o
They would be less vulnerable in warmtime9 and less likely
to create political tissues or public cmncern and more
secure against seizure by national forces in peace~timeo
O
O
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S E C R F T
The US-should offer to create such-a NATO strategic
force in two stapes
(a) Interim Forces Thy Interim Force would consist
of US?manned POLARIS submarines9 deployed in European
waters under the full control of SACEUR9 in peace and warn
Thin force would Fire its missiles (i) upon direct order
from SACEUR in the event of large scale nuclear attack on
the Tmeaty erase or (ii) as the North Atlantic Cmuncil
might decide in other circumstances or (iii) as the US
might decide in the absence of an affirmative SACEUR or
NAC decisiono (ppo 60 ~ 63' )
(b~ NATO Deterrent Forces In setting up this
O Interim Force9 the US would. offer to assist NATO in creat~
ing a multi national submarine missile force (NABET) uaecier
common financing and mwnership and with mimed crews9 so
that no ally could withds?aw units and employ them as a
national forceo The use of this force might be governed
by advance authority to SAOEUR to deal with large scale
nuclear attack and by NAC decision in other contingeaacies9
as in the case of the Interim Forceo If feasible the US
would seek by minimum custody or other means to keep weapons
design data secureo The US submarines which had constituted
the Interim Force could be sold to NAD)~T,
S E C R E T
(pp ~ 6i~ 0 65; )
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So Evaluation
S E C R E T
(pp~ 65 ?~;~~)
The above Shield and deterrent proposalc~ would be
iantermdependento Together with US strategic powers
they would deter Soviet military actions against the
NATO area$ they would als? safeguard againc~t Soviet
blackmail for divisive or political purposes9 aid go far
to meet legitimate European concer~nso
CHAPTER THREEo The Atlantic Nations and the Less
bevel?~?eci Countries
to The Problem and the Atlantic Nations8 Stake In Yt
The Atlantic nations have a vital intea?est in the
continued independence9 internal cohesion9 and stability
of the less developed nationso
This interest is only likely to be fulfilled if the
less developed countries can progress toward moderni~a?
tion under moderate governments and through evolutionary
means, The obstacles are formn.dable9 decades or even
generations will be requaredo
Basic responsibility for achieving .this progress must
rest with the less devel?ped countrie~o Thy Atlantic
nations can make a significant coratribution9 howeverfl since
they possess most of the needed outside resourceso
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
2 , Financial and Technical. Aid ( pp o ?~ m 86.E .
Over the next decade9 the Atlantic nations should
plan to d?uble or triple their financial a^d to the less
develd~ed,countriese If equitab~,y shareds this burden
can be reasonably assumed by healthy A~tT.antic economieso
It will be more difficult to meet the need of many
less developed countries for people and instituts.ons
capable of effectively launching and pr.msec~uting their own
development programso T? do this9 they will require the
advice and services of outside experts9 help in training
their own officials and experts9 and assistance and encourm
O agement in their self-help effortso
Bilateral programs by the Atlantic nations wall be
important an meeting this need', They should be admanm
istered for their long?term effect on the less developed
countriese modernizations rather than for short?term
political or commercial advantaged
O
International and private agencies have many advantages
in meeting the need defined ab~reo Their intimate particim
pation in nation?building is m?re likely to be welcome
they are better able to insist on rigorous self?help9
and their efforts are less apt to serve as a precedent
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
for Soviet activityv The Atlantic nationns should9 therefore9
make a special effort to enhance the effec~~:veness of inter
national and private aid to less level?ped countries,
Qa) They should support making the UN Special Fund
into a key instrument for helping governments of less
developed countries plan and organize their overmall
development programso They should favor enlarging the
Fundgs scope and resources and giving it poYicy direction
of related UN programsa as necessary to this endo
Qb) They should support an increasing role for the
IBRD and INIF in advising governments of less developed
countriesa ,and an expansion in the resources of the IBRD~s
affiliate ~:- the International Development Association,
(c) They should establish a Development Center to
promote (i~ two?way contacts between civic9 business9
and?profes~ional and labor groups an the Atlantic and
less developed nations9 Qii~ the recruiting and training
of young people in the Atlantic nations for service in
less developed areas9 and QiiiD research on key develop
ment problemso
S E C R E T
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O
S E C R~~ m 13 m
3 0 ~frade ,hTith Less Developed Countries ( pp o 87, m 93~
In view of the dependence of the less developed
countries on trade for.foreiga~ exchanges the Atlantic
nations shoulds
(a) cooperate in developing feasible methods for
mitigating the effects o~ less developed countries of
drastic changes in prices of their primary exports9 and
(b) reduce the b~s?riers to these countri?~? exports
of manufactured productso This reduction might be undertaken
simultaneously by all the Atlantic nationsfl so that its
burden could be sharedo The domestic impact might be
cushioned by compensatory ~sssistance to the groups most
directly affecteda
4, Public Order
c pp o ~~ m 9~ ~
The Atlantic nations should seek to enhanee UN capa?
bilities for maintaining peace and order in less developed
countrieso They should be prepared to earmark contingents
or trarnsport facilities for use by future United Nations
forcesg and they should urge otY}er countries to do the
samea
S P C R E T
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S E C R E T
The US arad dome other Atlantic nations should mainm
taro effective forces which could be usede in ls.mited
operations9 to help less developed cmuntries to maintain
order or resist aggressiono
CHAPTER EOURs Relations with the Commun^st Blob
1 a Basic Apyroach ~ (PP ~ 9.g.. m x.01= )
In concerting their strategy s~egarding relations with
the Bloc9 the Atlantic nations must reconcile the require
ments of siaaultaneously competing with and dealin, with
the Bloco They need to maintain beths
Qa) an unremitting awareness of Bloc hostilit~~:_
even when the Bloc is following a acft line, and
Qb) a corntinuing desire for useful relations with
the Bloc9 even when tensions are at their peak, .
Economic Relations Q PP o ]L02 ~ ~:~~.. )
The Atlantic nations should maintain existing limited
controls on trades partly as a standby safeguards and
should also agree to hold the annual volume of private
credits to the Bloc to approximately the existing level.,
Exchanses
The Atlantic nations should press for widening conm
tarts with the Bloca and shouldo
Qa) try to agree on common objectives and guidelines
for their bilateral exchange programsg
S E C R E T
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Qb~ exchange information secured through these
programs among themselvese
~, Psych~lm~ica~. ~da.rfare Qppo 1(7"~".m 167};)
The Atlantic nations should seek greater coordination
of objectgves ancfl actions in psycholmgical warfare against
the Bloc9 in order t? increase its potential innpacto
S o Arens Control Q pp, ~Oa".~ ~.;.~;T~~
The NATO countries should seek more actively to develop
armis contr?1 ~aeasure,s which ~culd serve to reduce the risk
df accidental war9 to hinder the spread of nati?nal nuclear
capabilit~.es,~ t? stabilize deterrences and peassibly to
enhance regional security in Europeo
]Cn ?rder to facilitate genuine negotiation, the
NATO alJlies should consider allowirag? the U'S to negotiate
with the YTSSR in accord with agreed policya In that
case9 the ~JS should consult regula~?ly with its NAT?
partners about the progress of negotiati?nso
CHAPTER FIVE o Resources of the Atlantic Comn~munity
The steady growth and effecti~re use mf resources in
the Atlantic nations is essential for meetirxg the tasks
aheade To this ends
1, The Atlantic nat^ons~ especially the larger ones9
should concert their economic policies more effectively
through OECB.to stimulate more rapid gr.owtho They should
be willing to discuss freely all aspects of domestic
S E C R E T
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e 16
S E C R E T
economic policies and should seep to arrive at a common visor
of appropriate pmlicy objectives and priorities o (17.g -~ ~~~.)
2., They should consistently welt to reduce and remove
restrictions on traded The US should tak? the lead by
drastically r?vising its trade agreement legislation to
permit negotiation; of substantial tariff re ds~ctions in
GAT~o The long range goal should be to move tocrard free
trade9 at least among the more advanced nationso (~.~ ~7)
3o The US should joie a reconstituted European
Monetary Agreement o (~ ~ ~, g~8)
4, The Atlantic nations should maltp a renewred effort
to ensure fuller and more concerted use of their scientific
bapabilities o (1~8 ~ 134)
Sa They should expand research and development to meet
NATO e s need for non=nsuclear ~reaponry9 and should intensify
efforts to secure coordinated_ production of mayor military
materiel in Europe and eventually tlxroughout the Alliance,
734 ~ ~ ~.~+]~ )
CI3APTER SIX o Rec~uiss.te Political Framed~orlt
Concerting of po~,icies anti actions by the Atlantic
nations9 as discussed in prior Chapt,ersQ vnrill require a
firmer political frameworlt?
1, Evolving Relations
Qpp~ g43?148
The creation of an adequate framewrorlt is complicated
by the fact that relations among the Atlantic nations are.
S E C.R E T
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S E C R E T
17
in transiti?no With booming rec?very,~ European nations
have regained their cmnfidence and aspire t? a larger
role in the Alliance and. in w?r1d affairso Their tmtal
potential w?uld justify and suppoa?t such a ~??le~ if
effectively marshalled in an integrated Europe, With the
existing disparity in strength and irnfluence9 however9 even
the largest of the existing Europeans nat~,ons cannmt nqw be
an equal partner with the USo Tensbons are generated by
this conflict between desire and reality and by differing
policies f?r curing it mn the part ~~ the Bu?itish9 end the
European C?mmunityy and aua?ng the members of that ~?mmunityo
2, Structure QPPa ~-~g"?15~J)
The most a~adical answer would be Atlantic C?nfederatimno
But whatever its ultimate meritsfl it would be premature
at this stage mm a source of division and weakness and
not o? strength, It should note h?wever9 be foreclosedo
The more practical course is to encourage the European
Community to become an effective entity9 if possible with
Britain as a full member9
Community and of Britaino
partners
With comparable resources9 the
European Community could bec?me
for joint policy and action and
the necessary instruments to give effect
3o Improving Existing Instruments
In the meantimee ATATO and DECD must
full and equal
could fashion
to their partnerships
be strengthened9
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
especially foa? the concerting of basic planning and policies
of their memberso Several measures are suggestedo
Qa~ A Steering Group should be established within
the NATO Council to develop joint proposals and policies
among the five or six members having most responsibility
in world affairs QUS9 UK9 Frances Federal Republics Italy9
and perhaps Canada), The NAC would be kept informed9
and would act on matters of general concern,
(b) An Atlantic Planning Gr?up should be created t?
help develop a consensus on the co~non Atlantic interests
on basic issueso Composed of three to five senior and
distinguished mene 'not representing any,nation but speaki~ag
as individualsD this group would recor~naend to NATO Foreign
l~iinisters iongmrange?objectives and policieso
To facilitate NATO~OECD coordination9 key affiember
states of both agencies should have a single national
delegation to both9 under a representative able to speak
for his Government and to influence its policy makingo
Q.d} To foster wider public understanding and supports
it would be desirableo Qi~ to eacpand the NATO and OECD
information program9 Qii~ to develop the role mf the NAT?
Parliamentarians in relation to both NATO and OECDe Qiii~ to
foster the nascent Atlantic Institute9 especially as a basis
-for wider public activityo
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S E C R E T
CHAPTER ?NE
CHALLENGE CF THE ].960~s
Table of Contents
O
O
Pa e
I, The Nature of the Cha].].enge?-----??_------o-? 19
~IIo The Soviet Response--?-?mm This would mean restoring
and maintaining the prospect of tolerably low damage to the
West in general wary while effectively threatening unacceptable
damage to the Soviet Union, This would require an assured SAC
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capability to destroy the steadily growing Soviet retaliatory
power whicha if the Soviets protect it walla will include perhaps
thousands of targetsa many of them sheltered or mobile9 dis-
persed9 and concealed -- and all protected by a defensive network,
Any attempt to implement this alternative would involve (i) the
certainty of considerable time and enormous exp~nsee and (ii) a
great uncertainty of achieving the d?sired resultso
It is this uncertainty of results that must be emphasized,
We cannot be confident that threats of massive retaliation could
again be a reliable deterrent against every expanded action'in
Europee And9 where the stakes are so highe gambling simply will
not do,
There remainsfl of coursee a reduced but vital range of
~~
massive Soviet aggressions for which there is no possible
alternative than deterrence by a strategic threat, For these9
as indicated latera strategic deterrence should be feasible,
But there is no prospect of recovering a degree of strategic
nuclear superiority so great that it would again permit us
credibly to threaten general war in response to any expanded
Soviet action in Europee
(c) Tactical Nuclear Defense
Tactical nuclear defense is not a solution, A strong
tactical nuclear defense had considerable appeal as long as the
Westa but not the Sovietse enjoyed nuclear plenty, The appeal
has been undermined, Soviet nuclear plenty has rendered a NATO
strategy based on tactical nuclear warfare very costly in peace? ~,
..
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time and self?defeating in wartimeo
(i) Peacetime Cost
At presents the tactical capabilities of either side might
still be crushed by a surprise nuclear attack which was
relatively "clean"0 For examplee tactical aircraft at fixed
soft bases could be destroyed with relatively few air-burst
nuclear weapons9 with consequent relatively small damage to
cities and populations But major reliance on a tact~.cal
nuclear posture would more and more lead both sides to develop
and deploy missiles which9 unlike current aircraft were con-
cealedg mobile or hard, To destroy these missiles would require
resort to much higher yield weapons, It would require satura-
O tion bombing in the case of mobile targets and ground-burst
weapons in the case of fixed hard onesa The political costs
of a strategy which contemplated atomic hostilities on this
scale in the event of any expanded Soviet action would be very
great,
The economic costs would scarcely be less For although
some soft tactical targets in Eastern Europe and the Western
USSR -? especially interdiction points of road and rail junctionsg
ports and bridges ?- will not grow appreciably in number9 the
number of Soviet tactical missiles in this area would certainly
grow if the Wes set out to create a capability for destroying
them, Only through such proliferation could the Soviets ensure
the survival of their tactical missile capability in the face
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of a determined Western effort to create an effective counter?
missile force, In that events Western nuclear missile requirem
ments would probably be in the thousands9 rather than hundredso
(ii) Wartime Effect
The peacetime political and economic costs of such capabil>
sties would certainly be very large, But the costs of using
them9 should tactical nuclear war break out9 would be prohibitive,
Such a war would destroy much of a densely populated Western
Europe9 for which it would be difficult and immensely costly
to give even minimum protection through civil defense,
A nuclear war in Europe cannot be so limited in civilian
destruction as to be acceptable to Europeanso Nuclear weaponse
to be sure9 can be small in yield and relatively cleave and theyO
can be employed only as air-burst weapons against mainly military
targets, But military plans are not tending to implement this
concepte but rather its "dirty" opposite and the dynamics of
combate in any casee make likely swift escalation from very
limited use of nuclear weapons to very damaging used The best
answer to an effective little bomb is a bigger onee with no
natural limit on size or savagery in retaliation or counter<
retaliation, The Line between no nu~lears and nuclears is
definable and observable, but not so the line between a "clean"
and a "dirty" nuclear weapon~e which is a matter of degree,
Moreovere any concept of limited nuclear war in Europe
would destroy the Allianceo By admitting the concept of a
0
S E C R E T
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nuclear war restricted to Europe9 the United States would be
renouncing the threat inherent in current strategy to broaden
the area of ma3or European hostilities to the USSR. Thus it
would be giving the Soviet heartland sanctuary status in order
to preserve North American sanctuary. There can be little
appeal to our allies in this most divisive of strategies.
An explicit attempt by the US to disengage from the most
terrifying threats leaving its partners to bear the brunt of
that threat would undermine NATOts central principle of common
defense, It would shatter rather than rebuild European con-
fidence~ and invite a spread of neutralism,
(iii)Implications
Given its consequences9 tactical warfare in Europe is
not acceptable or credible as a deterrent to anything less
than all?out Soviet attack. For deterring this contingency9
it makes more sense\to rely primarily upon strategic forces that
threaten vital targets in the USSR _m both the existing
strategic force in the US and the proposed strategic force
in Europe which is discussed later in this paper, These forces
promise to be much more effective for deterrence9 and9 for
conducting general war if deterrence fails. For the outcome
of general war will be determined by the degree of damage
inflicted on the US and USSR rather than by the course of
tactical fighting in Europe,
Strategic forces thus seem the most powerful and there?
O fore leas unpromising means of deterring general ware And if
S E C R E T
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O
we have bought this capability for strategic deterrences why
duplicates it by great expenses direscted toward less effectivee
nominally 'tactical'"s means to the same end?
It is thus as infeasible to meet NATO?s current military
problem by a thorough effort to enhance the Shield?s tactical
nuclear capability as it would be to meet that problem by trying
to restore high confidence in the threat of massive strategic
retaliation,
(d) Conclusion
Accordingly9 NATO should revise its strategy and f?rces to
reflect the conditions of then 1960 ? s o F'mr a viable NATO strategy
in the coming decade9 two changes seem essentialo
(i~ A Shield in Europe whose conventional capabilities areO
so strengthened that thes increasingly prec~srious dependence of
NATO upon nuclear response to non nuclear aggressi?n will be
acceptably lessenedo
(ii) A means of reassuring Europe that effective strategic
power will be available in a crisis to deter remaining threatso
The means of achieving these changes and their consequences
are separately explored in thes followring two sectionse One
prefatory cautiora9 however9 is requirecflo The proposals are
interdependento Unless the Shield is strengthened9 the proposals
to assures strategic deterrenc8 to Europe w?uld be too risky for
reasons that will be indicated o- The proposals form a package:
that must be judged ande if acceptede implesmented as a wholeo
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
? 39
O III, Revised Strate~v for the Shield
1o Scope of Revision
In revising NATO strategy for the 1gb0~ss the aim should
be to strengthen the Shields conventional military capabilities
to defend Europe against non_nuclear attacks and to reduce its
risky dependence upon initiating the use of nuclear weapons,
By this meanss NATO could avoid the terrible dilemma
which the current strategy ].AV].tese If small non-nuclear
hostilities started to spiral into greater magnitudes NATO
need not then choose between either (i) local defeat if it
decided against using nuclear weaponss or (ii) tremendous
1
casualties if it uses themo NATO could instead meet greater
w non-nuclear threats resolutely in kinds with better hope for
(~1 assuring a favorable outcome, The burden of risky decision
would then be as much upon the Soviets as on us. And any
pressure upon the Soviets to move to preemptive attack would
be lessened. In sums fulfillment of this alternative would
create a much .less precarious situation in Europe before or
during hostilities and would enhance the cohesion of the
Allianceo These are great advantages.
(a) NonmNuclear Capability
To attain these advantagese it is not necessary th~t.the
NATO non nuclear capability be able to deal with the contingency
of all-out conflict resulting either from deliberate maximum
Soviet attack or from an unlimited spiralling of limited conflict.
S E C R E T
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All-out Attacks Soviet mobilization for a non-nuclear
conquest of Europe would present the same clear-cut and
extreme provocation as a Soviet nuclear attacks The same
strategic forces that are relied upon to deter nuclear attack
can also deter this provocationo Either event would justify
invoking the supreme deterrents
Unlimited Spirallin~e If NATOts conventional defenses
are bolstered, the likelihood of any limited hostilities in
Europe spiralling into all-out conflict will be love For the
Soviets would hardly continue in so dangerous a spiral, if
the Shield were holding and tactical victory were not close
at hands They would realize that steadily expanding conflict
would generate a growing risk of general war by accident or
miscalculation and a growing likelihood of the US threatening
strategic retaliation if the conflict were not settled on
satisfactory termso
For these reasons, an "adequate" non-nuclear defense is
defined reasonably, if somewhat unprecisely, as one that could
.contain any Soviet conventional atta~ek based on ready forces
for a sufficient time for~the wider risks to become clear,
Such a defense should be our stated goal, The time perspective
should be measured in weeks, or at the most months, rather than
years, Such forces should deter any such action or its expan-
sion for the reasons already indicated,
(b) Tactical Nuclear Capability in Europe
The revised strategy would recognize that hostilities on
S E C R E T
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O
.~ ~ 1
a scale involving tactical use of anucle~r weapons would
rapidly move into general strategic warfare and that primary
reliance should be placed on other means for deterring or
conducting such warfareo Thos would not imply an absence of
NATO tactical nuclear weaponso They would stall be necessary
to supplement strategic forces in deterring the Sov~ is from
in^tial use of tactical nuclear weep?ns and from an ablmout9
and h?nce vulnerable9 concenta?ation mf Soviet conventional
forces in attacking i~Testern Europeo Rut this concept would
call for preparation on far lower scale than would be required
to enable NATO to carry on tacticcal nuclear warfare
t+dhat tactical nuclear capability v,~ould be required to
fulfill these purposes9 if conventional defense in the theater
is thus to be assiganed primacy as the Shields goal?
The roangh rule should be to add nuclear td nonnuclear
capabilities on~.y when addition is relatively inexpensive in
term? ~f money and of compromisisng the ShieldQS non nuclear
combat effectivenesso
barge tactical missiles illustrate the issued They would
r?place tactical aircraft which are us?ful for nonnuclear
warfare ~aaad which9 with re~orientaticn of design and concept9
could be made more solo Not sm an MRRI-I9 which would be an
absurdly expe~asive way of carrying conventional high explmsives
and whose cost as a nuclear delivery weep?n could only be
justified if it were intended to enhance the strategic deterrento
S E~ R R T
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42. ~.
S E C R E T
~,
Consequently new tactical nuclear capabilities should in
general be added to the Shield only to a limited extent, The
goals of strategic deterrence to all?out attack and of deter?
rence to lesser non_nuclear attack should have first claim on
military expenditures. If these goals are fu1fi11ed9 most of
the burden of deterring the enemy from moving to nuclear
weapons or to a decisive concentration of conventional forcese
because he finds our non nuclear defenses strong9 can be borne
by our strategic forces.
For these deterrent purposes howevere nuclear tactical
air strike forces will also be needed in the theater, Some
,small missiles dual purpose Howitzers nuclear-capable air
crafts etc.9 which can be added at moderate costs can also be
valuable in supplementing deterrenceo
On the other handy if this concept be acceptede some
current trends must and can be reversed. The design of
tactical aircraft oriented almost exclusively toward nuclear
deliveryfl with non-nuclear capabilities severely compromised
in the processe is one example. On the ground9 the compromism
ing of divisional conventional capabilities in terms of reduced
artillery and the other arms should be questioned. In design
of equipment9 as well as organization and deployment of forces9
we must be sure that we do not so compromise our non_nuclear
capabilities as to dissipate their potential adequacy,
2, Effect on Deterrence
On balances would this shift in strategy reinforce or
S E C R E T
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0
O
0
impair deterrence?
(a) Deterrent to All-out Attack
The NATO strategy must attempt to deter both allmout
;,a
and lesser aggression. Under the existing and revised strategy,
the deterrent to all-out attack would continue to be the threat
of strategic retaliation against the Soviet Union. The conquest
of Western Europe should, therefore9 continue to entail costs
too high to be attractive,
(b) Deterrent to Lesser AE~ression
The change would occur at the other end of the spectrum.
There the deterrent would be enhanced in effectiveness.
The strategic threat could deter any attack, aside from
incursions and infiltrations, so long as this threat remained
credible to the Soviets and our allies. But as its costs to
the United States soar, the Soviets may be tempted to actions
for their political-.effect, They may consider, in this event,
that the risks of the strategic response against smaller actions
are declining and that the potential political impact of such
actions is increasing,
They may consider that the risks are declining because
execution of the strategic threat would involve such dis-
proportionate costs to the U.S.
They may consider that the potential political advantages
of lesser actions are increasing because our allies would be
torn, in the event of such actions between two fearso (i) that
an all-out war response would destroy them for apparently
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
inadequate causee or (ii) that .failure to respond would leave
thenp naked to Soviet power, The USSR might expect that threats
of limited action could undermine the Alliance by the interplay
and conflict of these two fears9 so long as NATO strategy was
predicated on an all-out response to any expanded action.
1 9
As its own strength grewe therefore the USSR might be
tempted at some poiat.to threaten or undertake such limited
actions.
The revised strategy would mitigate this danger. Greater
conventional capability would allow such threats or actions to
be dealt with by responses more in keeping with their scope.
In consequence9 allied hesitancy about reacting and Soviet
doubts as to whether NATO would react. would both be mitigated,
Nioreover9 the Soviets would be deprived of the leverage of
blaekmail9 which is an added incentive to local aggression,
Not only would an effective NATO response short of general
war be more certain9 but the Soviets would still have to weigh
the serious danger that once violer~,pe began it might get out
of hand and escalate into general war, Hence their uncertainty
about the ultimate costs to them would remains and would rein-
force the certainty of an effective initial NATO response as
a deterrent to such actions.
The revised strategy should also reduce the risks of
general war because it would reduce the probability of limited
aggression spiralling into general war, NATO would be under
less compulsion to move from non-nuclear to nuclear hostilities,
S E C R E T
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O
O
This NATO shift from a trigger-happy situation to an inherently
more stable situation would reduce the likelihood of enemy
nuclear prememptiono
Under the revised strategy9 initiation of nuclear weapons
would mark the boundary between limited and general warn It
would be a conscious decision to expand hostilities through a
step that-was definable9 observable9 and of the gravest portente
If Western retaliatory power is powerful and secure9 as it
certainly can and should beg the probability that the Soviets
would thus deliberately decide to convert European provocations
into general war should be very smalle Deterrence of general
war would be strong,
3e Feasibility
A NATU policy that minimizes the need for Western initiation
of nuclear war and yet strengthens deterrence demands adequate
non_nuclear forcese What is '"adequate" and how feasible is
NATO financing of such forces?
(a) Size and Calibre of Forces
Flow many NATO divisions would be required on the central
front to counter an attack by Soviet ready divisions in the
period ahead? In determining the feasibility of the proposed
strategy a precise answer is not necessary, It is enough to
know whether the proposal would be prohibitively expensive,
In considering the questions military experts from the
various services were consultedo Their views seemed to coincide
within a relatively narrow ranged A ,judgment must take account ofs
S E C R E T
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46.
(i) the probable Soviet ready divisions after recent
1/
and prospective reductions;
(ii) the number of these which could be allocated to the
central fr?nt in Eurmp?;
(fii)limitations imposed b~ logistic difficulties and
excessiv? vulnerability .from undue massing of forces9
(iv) the defensive advantage in non_nuclear warfare9
?etimated variously at 2s1 or 301;
(v) the density of forces required for specific areas,
reserves9 etco
In the light of these factors9 the requirements for non-
nuclear defense against ready Soviet forces do not appear too
ambitiousa In fact9 they probably d? not exceed the present
NATO targets of 30 divisions for Shield Forceso Both logistic
and military considerations would sharply limit the proportion
of t?tal Soviet ready forces which could be allocated and
d?ployed on the central Pronto And the Shields d?fensiv?
objective should permit its fortes to count?r a much larger
attac)~ing forcee The r?BUlting requirement could surely be met
by a NATO that has greater manpower9 as well as wealth9 than
the Soviet Union and European Bloco The expected growth of
German forces will bring the number ?n the central front to
According to current national intelligence estimates
Soviet ground forces will be cut. from 100 combat ready
divisions (plus 70 cadre) as of 1 January9 1960 to 6$ combat
ready divisions (plus 60 cadre) as of 1 January9 19f~2o
S E C R E T
S E C R E T
Q
O
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O
m ~7
more than 26 divisionso A target of 28-30 ready divisions
could be reached if some French forces returned from Algeria
or other members increased their contributions, And further
cuts in Soviet conventional forces might make a lower NATO
target adequateo There thus seems to be no rational basis
for the frequently_encountered despair about NATO force levelso
The picture is much less reassuring regarding the kind
of divisions, their quality, the desirable number of reserve
divisions, tactical air and other complementary support, and
stocks of arms and supplieso It is here that new responsibil-
ities must be squarely faced, One gets the impression that
many European forces suffer from a pervasive neglect, which
is not surprising as long as governments are persuaded that
virtually all protection rests with nuclear deterrence and
that little urgency attaches to concepts and budgets for non?
nuclear defense,
The proposed strategic concept will not permit these
rationalizations of neglect to continued For example, supply
levels for fighting will have to be improved, Above all,
modern equipment and training will be essential, When the
adjective "conventional" is used to describe non_nuclear warfare,
it does not mean World War II equipment, New weapons, tacticaa
and ideas are needed to match and surpass the Soviets in this
area, Complexity, sophistication, and high mobility of at
least some key forces are requiredo For this, troops must be well?
trained and ready, which implies periods of service long enough
S E C R E T
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48, o S E C R E T
to master complicated jobsa The political obstacles to longer
service are serious but might be mitigated or overcome if the
purpose of the non?nuclear force was understoodo
(b) Costs and~Savin~s
Thus the new requirements do involve. considerable new
expense for qualitative improvements in those forceso But
added outlays for these improvements must be balanced against
off setting economies made possible by other aspects of the
suggested strategy, Each of these potential offsetting
economies is considered further belowo
(i) New Technolo~v
There appears to be real promise that new guidance devel?
opments in defensive missiles suitable for use in a non nuclear
conflict may increase the, advantage of defensive over offensive
farces, Yf soD force level requirements for defense should
drop accordingly, The revolutionary advances in guidances ;
for example9 may so bolster air defenses m~ at least in a
non-nuclear environment where those defenses should survive --
that any Soviet advantages in numbers of tactical aircraft
may be less grievous than formerly estimatedo The tank
spearheads of future attack might be hampered by other ad=
vances ~.n guidanceo This is only a single illustration of
reasonable possibilities9 but one with real pointo On balance9
new technology may not be cost~increasing9 though the reverse
may prove to be the cased Research and development needs to
be urgently pursued in the now neglected area of nonnuclear
weaponryo
S E C R E T
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(ii) Other Innovations
There are other pertinent possibilities for economizing,
Are there unexploited opportunities for great improvements
in efficiency through integrated logistics for NATO? Should
they be seized9 despite all the political resistance attendm
ant upon breaking the principle of national responsibility?
Surely these questions should be answered authoritatively
by expert inquiry, As with weaponry advances a renewed
sense of purpose in non_nuclear defense can and should spark
new efforts for innovation and improvement,
(iii)Utility of Reserve Forces
Non-nuclear attack is not as overwhelmingly swift as
nuclear attack, This means renewed utility for reserve
forces, To be sure9 these reserves must be trained and
equippeda Stilly in Western Europe the cost of reserves
should be moderate, They need not have the full range of
advanced equipment and full supply that is required for global
mobility of ready forces like the US divisions in Europe,
Nora obviously9 do they require the transport and expense
of maintenance, with dependents, far from home, Savings
should be substantial, These advantages may be especially
': great for territorial reserves, While more highly?trained and
equipped units operate as key mobile forces in the theater,
such reserves can complement them with less mobilityo
(iv) Savings in Tactical Nuclear Capabilities
O The greatest area for compensating economies in the theater9
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
h~w~~~r?fl li~~ in 1~~~~n~d pr?~parati~n~ fmr? tactual n~x~l~ar
warfaa^~o If we plan cn the n~ucl?~~ initiati~~ in ~urmp~ and
r~lianc? ?n N~Tm tactical raucl~ar? fmu?c~~fl tfn~ ~~p~anclitug~~~
wc~.ulcfl b~ ~~ry~ lar?g~ ind~a~do ~A~~ would b~ f?r?c?cY th?a~?~aghl~
t~ r~nc~at~ its f~rc~~9 tm ~n~ur? th~ix~ ~uxr~i~al ira the faces
~~ gr~cwing Sm~ic~t tactical Wool?ar^ capabiliti~~ o This wc~nlci
irne~cl~? far m~r?~ than m?a~?lg~ acflding mcbil~ mr haa~d~aa~cfl
mi~~il~a mf l?ng?a? rarag? o Ccmm~ind grad c~rat~rol cent?~^~ a~culd
ha~? t~ b~ pu?~t~ct~d9 a~ wca~ld all ~ita~l ~?mbat ?l~m~rat~ d~wra
t~ ancfl including iradi~icYuml d~f?ra~c~ ba~tt~~ri~a and ba~ic~ irafr?~t=
~tructur?~ ancfl ~th~a^ ~upp~r^tirag fa.ciliti?~o mp?$~ati?nal~L~~
?xpe~rn~i~? ah~r?t~tak?=mff~~rad~lanciing air~pla~raea~ ira dip?u?~~d
la~cati~ra~ wctiuld ha~~ tc r?placa~ r?~gulaa? ai$?crafto ~ full
fg?dg?d ~?phi?ticat?d a~i~? cfl?f~nr~~
~~t~m m~tght ha?? tc b~
in~talLl~d in fiurampe9 akin to that ia~ N~r?~th ~m~r?icao ~%~~t
~~ th~~e n~~clla9 wrhich wa~uld ha~~ t~v b~ mgt fevs~ ara ~ff~cti~
t~sctical nuclear war capabilit~a would rn?t have tc b~ amt uracfl~r?
the prapm~~d ~trat~g~o
7Cn ~umfl the prop?~al fir ~nh~sncirag Shield n?n~nucl~ar
capabiliti~~ wmuld irn~?l~~ ~igrnificant cc~t~~ main7l~ f~~? ?gw~al=
itati~~ impmc~~m~nto ~he~~ cc~t~ wculci be partl3~ cff~~t b~
~ar?i~ty ?~ po$~ibl~ ~a~ing~o How much nit cc~t~ would g~ up
i~ uunc~rtain o
~'he alt~rnat~.~~ mf a Shield th~r?ugh~.~v r~~amp~d f ?~ tacti~
cal nuclear war in an era ?f gr~?wing Sc~i~t nuclear capabilL~,ti~~
w?ulcfl b~ far mcr~ ~?~tlyo Thy pi~cp?~al i~ ~~p~sa~i~~ ?ral~ iaa
S E C R E T
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O comparison with alternatives that would simply accept acrossm
the board deficiencies everywhere, or that would move to a,
more "trip?wireT4 concept in Europe without facing the concomitant
need to bolster strategic offense and defense capabilitieso
(c) Political Requirements
What is proposed is surely within the economic capability
of an Alliance whose incom? ?- especially an Europe mm has risen
at such a rapid rate in recent yearsa To be within our political
reach, howevers
(i) Its merits and implications must b? clearly anderstood
within the All~anceo Europeans will not support the unexotic,
but extremely useful, repairing of Shield deficiencies unless
they understand that fulfilling this task will reduce the like
O lihood that any significant use of the Shield would trigger
nuclear hostilitiese
(ii) The US must maintain its share in conventional defenses
If we want to persuade our Allies to butteess the Shield, we
can hardly began by diminishing our contributions to ito Later,
when European contributions can and should be greater, and the
threat may be lower, US contributions may be able to decline
without impairing our securityo But that tame is not at hando
? IV
Reinf
em
r
t
f St
D
t
i
t
,
c
en
o
o
ra
eg
c
e
errence
1 o The Need for NATO Strate~:ic ~at~abilities
(a) The Basic Requirement
More powerful conventional forces will obviate depend?
ence on strategic retaliation for counte~?ing certain classes
S E C R E T
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of aggre~agion specified above+~ But sae cannot e~s~~c~ape de+pe;rndlU
. e~n~;c~ on strategic deterrence for othe+~~ type+~s ?f agg~~c~a~~i~?m =.~,
xnota.bly nuclear blackmail and the ths~e~at of maeaive+ nra.cle~s~,r
aaea~ult on Western Europe
Soe?iet threat8 of rocket attar;ky the moat f la~ga^ant g?~m ?~'
po.litic.al pre~,~ureA may well growr a~ they. already ~ho~r ~ign~
of doing I,cat hest?rx~ European rountri~n became, 'cow-e;d. by
Soviet threata9 these mu,~t be+ r^ende~re;d ineff'e;ctive by a~
credible counterWthrcato
Such a count?s~-~thresat i~ al,~o g?~~quia?~d in card?r to dc~t~x~
the Soviet Union from crippling NATO conventional forces by
a nuclear blit~9 or from expanding a conflict tm e~xtr~me, limit,
in they event a conventional Bloc attack i~ ~reapelled bgv the NATO O
forces a Even a ata~ong conventional Shield cannot provide each
a counter~threato
(b) The US Role
US strategic forcec~9 nom ~+nd for the fore~ec~able f'utua~e,,
must be 'the main instrument for deterring extreme Saavirt
provocations in Europ? as gall as dir?ctly.aga~in~t the USa
Strengthening the Shield would lessen the bu~?den on US ata?~tc~gic
fore?? by reducing the range of Soviet provacatione aga,inffit
v~hich threats of strategic r?prieale must b? madeo Even in a
period of nuclear stalemate9 this appears to b? a cx^edible
S E C R E T
O
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m 53_ m
burden for strategic forces, To this endo
(i) We should maintain a strategic posture that lends
real credence to our deterrent policy, Soviet fear of US
deterrent power must be maintained by preserving our strategic
capability against the USSRe despite Soviet defensive measureso
(ii) We should state and restate our intention to protect
Western Europea We should make clear that w? believe that
it is rational for the US to equate the security of Western
Europe with that of the continental US,
(iii)We should try to preserve a critical area of unm
certainty in Soviet estimates of the US will and ability to
strike under conditions which are highly provocative but
fall short of all.-out conflicts The Soviets must be given
O some cause to fear that the US mighty in this circumstance at
a _
least unleash a limited strategic nuclear war9 counting upon
its nuclear blackmail to intimidate a Soviet responses
In all these ways9 US deterrence can be kept suffic~.ently
powerful in the eyes of the Soviets to meet the burden which
would be placed on that deterrence under the proposed strategy,
(c) The European ReQUirement
Providing ample US strategic power to meet these threats
is indispensable9 but it is not enough, European anxieties
will center increasingly on whether that pow~*r can be counted
upon in a crisiso Will the United States resolutely face an
acute risk of millions of American casualties in general war
S E C R E T
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%n order to deter a looming or actual Soviet major prov~ocati on
in Europee'
We Americans may ri-aintain axa effective strategic striking
force9 and it is important that we dos We may say that we
can be counted t~pon~ and it is important that we doo But these
words and military preparations can merely allay deep seated
a~r~xietieso These anxieties will only b? removed if the European
members of NATO have a capability for strategic retaliations
ira ord?r to deter the kinds of Soviet aggression wrhich even a
strengthened Shield could not countero
The following sections appraises very stammarilys alter
native means for creating a supplemental European deterrent;
and propose the outlines of a constructive scheme for meetgng
this needo
20 Indeuendeat National Deterrents
The strongest evidence that the TES deterrent does not
fully meet the need in European eyes lies in the costly efforts
.of~the UK and Frances and prospectively perhaps of others to
secure nuclear retaliatory power that is under their own control,
They are motivateds of courses by prestige and many other con?
siderations apart from the fear that [~S retaliatory power might
be withheld in a crisis, Nonetheless their sizeabYe effort
lends credence to their expressed fears about Americana resolum
bona National deterrent forces shoulds therefores be considered
first in our exploration of alternativesa
S E C R E T
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O (a) National Military Considerations
?55; m
The military appeal of national forces lies in the hope
that a missile capability which could assuredly place a few
city destroying warheads on target might be enough to deter the
Soviet Union from an attack upon the country that possesses them,
The task of constructing even such a capability is enormously
difficulte For no European country is such a missile capability
from its own efforts in sight until the latter part of this
decadee if then; Britain has given up on its own missiley and
France has a long way to go;
By the time s~}ch a capability might come into beinge`its
retaliatory power would be uncertain, Protecti}~g such a force9
and assuring its ability to penetrate defenses9 would not be
easy in view of continually advancing arms technology and in
the face of a rich9 resourceful opponent, The only certainty9
if this course be followed is that of high expense, The
military value is con~~ecturalo
Another military implication as equally plain, If such
capabilities are attainedg they will virtually be confined to
deterring the one contingency of mass nuclear assault upon the
country in questions Against any other threat9 their employ-
ment would be known by all to be suicidal9 and hence the
credibility of their employment would be virtually Hilo
(b) Collective Military Implications
If national deterrents offer such uncertain and limited
military rewards for sizeable expensefl their import for a
S E C R E T
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m 5~r m
balanced collective force in IJAT? is clearo They di~rert great
resources from the needed ShieldD while not substituting for
ita They are doubly divisive in the A~lliance9 for they impede
coY.lective preparatiosns while they attest to lacy of faith in
cold dive defenseo For collecti~re efficiencyn a pa?oliferation
of purely national deterrents from purely national efforts is
the worst of all alternativeso
Operationally9 such forces also pose a grave problem, %f
ever they are used9 will they be coordinated in employmexnt with
the NAT? strategic elements? YJracoordinated forces could lead
to the worst sort of targetting~ namely9 everyone hitting Soviet
cities almost exclusivelya %f so9 the Soviets9 with no mayor
cities left as hostages to restrain their behavior9 and with
none of their retaliatory power damagedD codld hardly be
expected to limit their responseo %n a n~xclea~^ worlds when
writs can start by accident as well as designs losixag evea~ the
faiaat hope of t'controlling" general war is extremely scriouso
Coordinated operational control of global strategic elements
is ~^equired,
Qc) PoYitical Considerations
Given these sweeping military drawbacks, should the YES
try to lessen them bar Qi) opposing national military deterrents
or Qii).greatly reducing^their wastes by weapon and other
assistance?
Since the t?IC and9 e~ren more ins~,steaatly9 France are
requesting US assistance an the development of independent
O
O
S ~ ~ I~ F T
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?57, m
O nuclear capabilities it has been argued that meeting these
demands is a condition of inter?allied harmony9 and that denym
ing them will prejudice the allied defense effort Though this
may be true in the short runs the longmrun consequences of
lending such assistance are almost sure to be disruptive of
allied unityo Yielding to French..pr_essures would only encourage
further French demandse And some a.llies9 notably West Germany9
would soon find their under?privileged status intolerable9 and
make demands which other allies would strongly oppose,
To encourage such decentralization of deterrent power would
also increase the risks of accidental or irresponsible uses and
the perception of this possibility would foster further discord
in the Alliances It would9 moreover9 strengthen the world?
O wide proliferation of nuclear capabilities9 with all its
implications for tensionsD risksa and reduced chances for arms
controls
Sti119 can the United States prevent the spread of
independent retaliatory forces? If such ,proliferation is
inevitablea would the STS do best to help its Allies direct
their efforts into the relatively most promising channels9
save them the wasteful drain on their resources9 and shore up
Allied cohesion as best it can?
In fact this proliferation is not inevitable unless we
made it so, Even if it were9 over the longer rung there might
be merit in slowing down the spread, At presents only France
is firmly determined to go aheado If left to their own resourcese
S E C R E T
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even the French might ewerntually fend the effort uxapalatable
rind the results disappmixnting ~~ especially as the crosts and
~,
difficulties of creating an effbctiwe slic~liwery system become
more apparsanto On the other hand9 if the l;~S helps the French
to acquire a national capability at bearable costs9 ariot only
will the French be encouraged to persewere9 beat the ~dK will
be v~,rtually constrained to hang on to an ixadependeant anuclear
forces Vest Germany is certaiaa to claim th? same prie~ilege
before longfl and Italy may be induced t? demand egeual status
as a ~'mn~.ddle powerrt o
,~~
l~iaach9 therefore9 depends upon CIS policyo Natioxnal effoa~t~
may not ~aucceed without l]S a~ido .And even if some spread of
independernt nuclear deterr?aats prowes inewitable9 its scop?
can be gr?atly reducedD the process slowed downy and the raew
clrxb members kept from acquiriang weapons systems which would
giwe them strong confid?nce in their ability to act independ~
ently?
3Q
A Collective Deterrent for NATO
National programs wall seem swan less attractive to
European couantries if a constructive alternat3.ve to independent
national deterrents is put forwardo A mullti~national dete~?rent
is9 in principle9 more attractivefl because it worald avoid or
O
O
great~:y lessen the drawbacks of rnational deterreantso
But an attempt to create sucl~a a multi national deterrent
faces a new probYem that many deem insuperableo Iiow can a mufti=
national force lee depended upon for protection when other members
sEClzE~r
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- 59
may veto its employment? This central problem can9 it is
believed, be solved through the arrangement outlined below.
It is proposed that a multi-national strategic capability
be established in Europe under the command of SACEUR. Its
purpose would be tb give the European members of NATO a
missile threat against the USSR which would be a serious
strategic deterrent. To reliev? European anxieties about the
dependability of such a force in a crisis9 it is proposed that
SACEUR be authorized in advance by the North Atlantic Council
to use the force against key Soviet strategic targets in the
event that the Soviets initiate major nuclear attack,on the
Treaty Area, The force could be used in other contingencies
if and as the Council might decide, The implications of such
a control arrangement will be considered in more detail later
in this report.
The proposed multi-national retaliatory force could not
be brought into being for several years9 given lead-time required
for international negotiation9 procurement and training, There-
fore an interim force of US-manned POLARIS submarines under the
control of SACEUR is proposed which9 while it fallsyshort of
meeting full European demands9 could help to cover the gap,
The proposed interim program would symbolize concretely US
desires for constructive assistance.
Should the NATO members not agree to create its successor9
the interim program would remain as an acceptable alternative,
S E C R E T
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The United States thug need snot ernd ~hcen~lc~ as?t be ~ ~~ap~plic~ant
for cre~tie?n cf the multamanaati?ana~l fcrceg gis~en its ~1~ste wand
prcxblematic~l ~rri~~ls this f?rce would aa~t help t? clmse ~r~y
g?missale gip"?o The US wcu]ld be f~~criaag its Allies b~ kne~.piang
them tc ,yet up the m~nltamn~ti?n~]L farce ~rnd it should view it
b~rg~aixniaag ab?ut the terms man which that force was tm be set
up ~ccc~rdisngllp,
The essential cramp?aexnts a~f the proposed ammterim wand
multimn~ta?n~l deterrent pregr~amffi ~~^? ~~utlined isa p~r~ga~~phs
4 sand $ belmr~9 their ?~rer~ll effect z~nd the ~d??~~n~cy ?f prcp~sed
control ~rreaagemernts as e~v~alu~ted ixn p~r~gr~aph f~,
4o The Interim Prc~r~m ~gNPR?~
(~~ Under the Irnterim Prcga?~m the US would c~ffem~ toy
mike ~ sub?t~abti~l prc~pcrtioaa of U~mm~xnned PO~ARI~ subm~x~ian?~~
~s they became epea~~ti?rnals ~~~il~bl? t~ 1VAT~ t~ be uander the
complete end direct ccantrcl mf SA~EUR in peace wand w~s~o ~Eis
control would be exercised whether cr an?t ill the subm~ria~ne
were deplcg~ed in the ~reaa cf hi$ c~c~am~a~d o
(b) The US would ~uth~ra~e the faring ?f the m~,ssale
(a ~ bq order cf SA~PUR9 ire the e~ea~t cf ~ m~ ~~a? ~ce~iet aaucle~$?
aatt~ck man the Tre~t~ are~~ (ia~ by decasa~n mf NAC ?r ~thex?
pr?cedure ~pprc~ed b~ the NAU ira mthe~? ca~antir~geracieffi a In eithea~
Ira ~ddaticnD this farce Haight b~ ~;upplemented by includ~
ing ?ther US strategic fmrce+~ that ire st~tacned ira Eur?pe cr
withirn NATO c?mm~nd are~ss prcv~ided that the Brattish dad
lakewiseo
0
O
S E C R B T
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S E C R E T 61
case the US would commit itself to comply with the decision,
(c) the US would also retain authority to fire the
missiles without NATO approval, Even sos the arrangment would
assuage European fears as to whether US strategic power would
be used in their defense.
(d) The number of POLARIS submarines in the INPRO fleet
might be as high as 12 or 14 by the mid?196?'s. (If,desireds
merchant vessels or conventional submarines might be substituted
for the POLARIS submarines).
(e) Crews would be American and warheads would remain
under US custody until~,,.the decision of employment has been
made by SACEURs the NAC9 or the President of the United States
as indicated above,
(f) Since the POLARIS submarines involved would be
allocated from the number programmed in any case for the USs
the US would bear the costs of productions maintenance and
operation,
$. The Multi national Strateeic Force NADET)
The NATO Deterrent (NADET) is envisaged as a natural
successor to the Interim Program,
The US would inform the European countries when it set
up the Interim Programs that it stood ready to assist in
establishing this successor a[~^r.ang~megat on two conditions s
(a) NADET must be sufficiently multinational so that
no participating ally could pull out units to be employed as
a national force, For th~.s purposes the fprce should be multi?
S E C R E T
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62.
o
national down
mina.stration9
(b) The
means for its
however9 have
members could
S E C R E T
to and including the firing crewsa and its ad?
ownership and financing should be mdltimnational,
NATO members must be able to agree on an effective
control, This may well be difficulty ~INPRO wouldd
established a natural precedent which the NATO
well follow, If they dide the force could be
employed by SACEUR in the event of large scale nuclear attack
on the Treaty areas and its use in other circumstances would b?
as determined by the Council, By such advance authoritye~~the
NATO members would only be recognizing that in fact a Ruclear
attack on the Treaty area would inevitably trigger use of an
intact NATO strategic force,
To safeguard data on weapons design9 the US would maintain
constructive custody of POLARIS warheadsg undertaking in advance
to release them whenever the force was?~~orc~ered into action under
the agreed procedureso The sole purpose of formal custody would
0
be to preserve security of design data9 since it would not affect
control for uses it should not be objectionable to the Europeanso
If they objected nonetheless and pressed for full NADET
custody in peacetimem the US would have; to decide whether this
change was essential to make NADET an effective response to
European concerns and thus to head off national programso Other-
wise9 this change should be strongly resisted by the USe in
order not to make available weapons design data to the participator
ing nationso Even if custody of the warheads were to be transm
ferred to NADET9 consideration should be given to having missile
S E C R E T
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,SECRET m63~ m
and warhead maintenance provided by the US in installations
required in any case for the US POLARIS submarine fleet,
If the Europeans accepted this proposals we should be
prepared to take part in common financing aa~d manning of the
submarines and supporting facilities as agreed by NATO, In
additions the US would be .providing the warheadsoPOLARIS
submarines from the existing INPRO or new production could
be sold to NADET as ar~d when it stood ready to receive them.
The US would not insist that all NATO members join NADET
if the prescribed conditions were fulfil~.ed, It .might con
eider allowing NADET to be organized under the European Com?
munity or WEUs if they desired to do so and met the prescribed
O conditions and put them at NATO disposal,
If the NATO countries wished to accept NADET without the
proposed multi national character and controls the US should
not agreed Without this features it wound be relatively easy
for NATO countries to withdraw their contributions to NADET
and employ them as national units, Multi national command or
ownership would not be an adequate safeguard against withdrawal
if the .submarine were manned by nationals of one countrya If
servicing facilities were multi nationals this could be an obm
stacle to effective national use over the long runs but it would
not hinder immediate operational use of any for national purposes,
If the European countries concluded that some other weapon
systems than the POLARIS submarine combination was more advan~
tageousg NADET could adopt it, Howevers there are obvious
~.
S E C R E T
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5~+.; m
political advantages in offering what appears to be the single ~ ,
most promising system to our allies, In any events we should
strongly urge adoption of a sea?based systems since this wou~.d
offer great advantages.
In war-times such a system appears to be the least vulnerable
to missile or air attack or to land invasion. A. Soviet first
strike on such a system would cause less incidental damage to
NATO countries and forces, and this would be apparent to the
Europeans beforehand, These advantages would apply as well during
any limited hostilitiess when sea-borne missiles would also be
secure. This invulnerability of sea-borne missiles wo~ild mai~?
them more effective as a deterrent and less trigger?happy in the
event of either a grave international crisis or limited
hostilities,
In peacetimes sea-borne missiles would avoid the "host
country" problems with any claim of special veto. They would
also be less vulnerable to Soviet intelligence and to take
over by national forces. They wound minimize the risks of
sabotage and of nuclear accidents which would generate a strong
popular neutralist reaction, Most importantlys a sea borne
missile force would be "out of sight and out of mind". Instead
of rushing csonspicuously about European roads or railroads, and
n
thus stirring up all sorts of fears and controversiess it would
be undersea most of the time -- visible only when it put into
a relatively small number of ports.
In combinations these advantages are so overwhelming as
S E C R E T
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O to outweigh high costs per submarine, Actually total system
? ~~, m
costs would not be unduly high, Some 200-odd missiles should
be adequate as a strategic deterrent in view of their invulnerm
ability.
6. Evaluation of NADET
(a) Value as Deterrent
How would NADET and a bolstered Shield contribute to
deterrence of Soviet attack on the Treaty area?
(i) For the contingency agreed in advancee large scale
nuclear attack on the Treaty areae NADET would be an effective
deterrent, Its threat of heavy damage would supplement that
of the US strategic force.
w (ii) Conventional attack on the Treaty area by ready Soviet
(~1 forces would be covered by the improved Shield, As indicated
earlier this Shield would be a more credible threat than the
present uncertain threa~t.,~af nuclear reaction,
(iii)Attacks on the Treaty area of greater scopes but
short of large scale nuclear attack9 such as all-out Soviet
conventional attack would be covered in two ways. First9 US
striking power would threaten nuclear retaliation9 as at the
present. Second9 the Soviets could not count on NAC failure
to agree on NADET use under these conditions. Since all?out
Soviet attack would be preceded by Soviet mobilization or
prolonged hostilitiesa there would be time to try to reach agreem
went.
The creation of NADET would thus reinforce the deterrent
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_66r~
SECRET
Q
to Soviet attack on the Treaty-area and the effectiveness of
NATO forces in responding to attack,
(b) Effect on National Programs
Would the proposal satisfy the demand for national
strategic deterrents?
Given the NAC-agreed advance rule of engagement and the
absence-of US veto, the proposal would go far toward meeting
European concernso The major threat would have been covered
in`advancea With a reinforced Shield and NADET, NATO would
thus, have made effective provision against all likely mili?
terry contingentiese The remaining unlikely contingencies
would, if they materialized, leave time for NATO to agree on
NADET action, Since the Soviets could not cunt on non-use O
of NADET, its deterrent value would be at leapt as effective
a threat as are inadequate national forceso The unilateral
US strategic power and'the tactical weapons of other NATO
countri?s would still be available for us?, ?ven if NATO
could not agree on 1~ADETes used
NADET, then, should meet the fundamental need to assuage
European anxieties about the reliability of strategic deterrent?.
Failing agreement on NADET, INPRO will Contribute materially to
meeting this need, Indeed, our mere offer to help treats a multim
national NATO Capability not under US Control, whose use by
European countries would clearly involve the US in nuclear war,'
would probably go far to meet any European concerns as to our
present willingness to use strategic power in Europe~s defense, O
S E C R E T
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(c) Relation ,to Alternatives
The INPRO/NADET proposal would be much better than any
alternative solution, The disadvantages of spreading national
deterrents have already been discussed. The proposal is superior
to adopting the control patte~?n of the proposed MRBM program --
with control being shared by the US9 the host countrye and
SACEUR, The US veto would prevent this arrangement from meetm
ing the European desire for a veto free force, which is behind
the drive for national capabilities, And to fox+ego the US veto
Dyer missiles r~ti~pplied to host countries would create new
problems and tensionse For many allies would consider that
SACEUR~s vetoe by itself, was an inadequate safeguard against
irresponsible use by national crews.
The best combination appears to be responsible strategic
backing by US programs and reassurances9 a US strategic POLARIS
capability under SACEUR control9 and the prospect of some form
of a NADET program,
V. Relation of Strategic and Shield Proposals
The proposals for a strengthened Shield and an assured
deterrent are interdependent. The risks of giving our partners
a trigger on nuclear war demand that they join with us in reduc~
ing the likelihood that it need be pulled because of Soviet
provocations in Europe, That NATO agree to strengthen the conven-
tionaltional Shield should be a pr??condition to US implementation
of the NATO collective deterrent, Otherwise the risks would be
S E C R E T
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~~ _ S E C R E T
excessiveo The proposals should be considered, and negotiateds ~_..%
as a package, The Shield buirld?up could begin promptly, and
should have made substantial progress by the time NADET came
into being several years hence,
VIe Broader Political Advantages of Proposals
1, Cementfi~* the Alliance
Strains within NATO have been obvious to all, and some are
so deep rooted that no particular proposal for revised strategy
can do more than mitigate them, Surely, however, these proposals
go far toward; alleviating prospective strains and providing new
opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation,
(a) They avoid the most divisive of strategiese The
proliferation of national strategic deterrents -- surely the
most disruptive courses with its foundation in gnawing doubt
that others' will come to one's defense in the face of the worst
threat -- is countered in two ways, Firsts a strategy foF
limited nuclear war in Europe, which would eventually drive
Europeans toward deterrents of their own if not to neutrality,
is rejected, Second, a constructive alternative is offered in
the form of a NATO strategic deterrent which in extremis can
trigger nuclear war m~ almost certainly involving the US, What
more striking reaffirmation of US determination to defend Europe
could be given? These proposals, in short, recognize the need
c
for inter_allied interdependence and focus upon it,
(b) The proposed strategy lends new credence to the vld
goal,pf.a Shield .in Europes In remvitalizing the old goals and
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T 69 m
O demonstrating its continued utility, it restores the basis for
truly collective action. An integrated Shield, with other associ~
ated capabilities, demands a coalition effort. No single country
can go it alone in this area, and yet together the Sob is well
a within NATO capabilities. The essence of collective `defense by
common effort should once again be restored,
(c) Above all, the proposed policy would make sense from
the Western European point of view, A strategy which relies on
general strategic war or widespread a~-~d intensive use of tactical
nuclear weapons for combatting all but minor forms of Soviet
aggression, will not continue to make sense to Europeans. The
realization of these military facts of life is bound to spread
widely, To refuse to discuss changes in strategy, lest the
O discussion of the need f
h
or c
ange create apprehensions, is a
"heads in the sandn policy. It invites the prospect that the US
will be dragged into change by less well informed alliese rather
than constructively leading the way,
(d) Finally, cohesion would be strengthened because the
first st?ps to implement these proposals could be taken by the
United States quickly without protracted inter>allied negotiao
tion. The proposals for a NATO deterrent could be put forward,. and
US actions to implement its interim phase might begin straight-
away, Initiatives could be taken promptly9 in themselves
evidence of strengthening the Alliances and they could be pressed
as inter allied consensus develops,
Over the longer run, this constructive approach should go
S E C R E T
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,.S E C R E T
- 7Q; -
~,
far to restore European confidence in American maturity and in ~_.-
European security. To restore this confidence is a pre-condition
of a strong Europe9 a strong NAT09 and a strong United States,
That these proposals lend th emselves to this end is their maim
but by no means only, political-military advantage.
2. Consistency with Global Requirements
The proposed policy would increase the flexibility of
NATO military response in the Treaty area and also broaden US _?
and, for that matter, Western -- choices in countering aggression
in the rest of the world. Suitable US strategic forces are
required to back our European allies. Those forces have great
deterrent value elsewhere as well, Without theme the US would
be in a weak position to counter aggression in the Middle East
and Asia where the power of the Soviet Union and of Communist
China to invade and occupy is difficult to balance by creating
sufficient local strength.
,,,
Similarly, a build-up of conventional forces in Europe
would require a modernization of US tactical forcesg permit us to
do so relatively cheaply9 and make US divisions more effective
for operat3,ons in other parts of the world.
3. Avoidance of Extreme Provocation to USSR
While we must be prepared resolutely to counter Soviet
pressuresi and to apply pressures on them when the specific
opportunity is promising, we must also avoid acting provocatively
when to do so does not8 on balance, serve a vital purpose. The
Soviet Union should find the establis~'~ent of a multi-national ~
~ _,:
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T 71, m
deterrent system less provocative than the development of
independent strategic capabilities especially if such a
`development foreshadows the placing of strategic nuclear
weapons into West German handso And a sea based strategic
capability will. be less provocative than the deployment of
MRBMts in Western Germany, The reduced~ciependence of NATO
Shield forces upon nuclear weapons9 and especially upon public
threats to initiate their use to compensate for nomm~uclear
battle ~reaknesse should dissipate Soviet incentives for preen
,..
emptivejnuclear attacko In all these respects the proposed
posture should be conducive to ld~sened tensions and military
stability,
O 4Q Compatibility with Arms Control
One of the merits of the proposed policy is its conm
sistency with continuing effor't$ toward arms controlo It
leaves open a wide range of options should any of them appear
to: be constructive avenues to pr~og~r^es~o First, discouraging
the development of independent national capabilities on the
strategic nuclear level should facilitate rather than impede
agreements and control systems in this areafl and lessen~whatm
ever pressure precedents may have upon the Soviets to assist
China toward such capabilitiese Second9 bu~].ding up nomm~uclear
1
strength will make our posture more symmetrical visma-vis the
Soviet Union than it is now9 and a better position from which
to negotiate regarding any reduction of conventional forceso
S. E G R E T
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_ 72. _.
S E C R E T
0
Third9 our lessened dependence upon tactical nuclear weapons
to compensate for non-nuclear weakness will allow more freedom
to negotiate control of nuclear weapons systems, Fourthe by
reducing the .range of possible aggressions which we cannot deter
or meet without going to the brink of all-out nuclear war9 we
will be in a better position to propose and accept measures
designed to reduce the danger of strategic surprise attack,
0
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
CHAPTER THREE
THE ATLANTIC NATIONS AND THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Table of Contents Pa ~
I, Introduction-----??________________________m_ ~.~_
IIo Natur? of the Problem---_____.~__?___??_______ ~'~,
III, Assistance to Less Developed Countries-?_?m-- 79
IV, Trade Pmoblems of Less Developed Countries?mm $~'
V, Public Order------------m------m_?----_____?- 93.
S E C R E T
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m 73;. m
CHAPTER TMREE
THE ATLANTIC NATIONS AND THE LESS DEyELOPED COUNTRIES
Io Introduction
le Importance
As suggested earlierg the Atlantic nataons face a twom
f?Id task in the coming decadeo ~a) to c~^eate over the Imng?
run a ~,rorld corder congenial to their values and to stable
peaceg and fib) to protect the non=C?mmexnist nations from dom~
ination and this emerging order frmm da?tsruptioan by the Soviet
Blow
This constructive task must fmcus an good measure on the
O less develmped areas m? ~,rhose rapidly evrol~iang course will
largely shape the wmrld in which mrsr children lime, The
stake of the Atlantlc nations in the independence and amiability
of these areas ranks ascend only to their arnterest an defense
of the Atlantic areao
They also have the means to serve that interest, kT$th
less than half the people9 they have over fire times the~GNP
of the less developed areaso If properly ~nsedD their resources
_? both human and material ~~ can play a key role in the future
grmwrth and stability of the less developed nationso
20 Need for Common Stratee~
In planning for the decade aheada the Atlantic nations
should seek agreement on a brmad strategy regarding the less
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m 74, m
S E C R E T
d?~?loped area+~o The nature mf the probl?m9 the imp?rtance
of action by them to m?et it9 and th? general guidelines which
might govern action, Such a strategy is outlined in thi
Chaptea? o
The naequisite actions wi111. have to be car~^ied cut through
many agenci?~ in and cut of the Atlantic C?a~munity,, As indi~
t?d lates?fl NATO can play a ro1Le in establishing a p?litical
consensus as to the nature gaud eargency ?f the task and the
pproach t? it which is ~?quiu~?do Eut NATO is n?t ~= and
should not become om an oa?gan,f~r decisioau ?r actson regarding
1??~ developed ar?aso Ottaer instrum?$atsfl ianclixdiang OECD9 are
bett?r suited to this task,
An agreed basic strategy can make it easier for the
Atlantic nations to concert'?n specific measureso F?u? th?~?
meaasures will then fall into place as mutually reinforcing
parts of a cohex?ent overall ?ffoa?t, Yn the abs?nce ~~
agreed basic strategye on the other hands the Atlanntic nations4
cti?ns towa~?d.less developed areas may be disjointed seed
ineffective, The prob~.em to wrhich these eff?rts are addressed
is complete and difficult- only concerted action that is carried
;out with optimum vigor and.:, ~f f ac~,eaa~y ~ wall hold any pa?a~sp~ct
?~ successa
Such action must be based on a d~asm?n understanding of
the problem and of the Atlantg~ nation~? stake in ito The
bases for such an undea^standing`is suggested in Section II
S-.E C R E'T
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S E C R E T
be?owo Br?ad approaches are ttaen considered in Section III
QAid~9 Section IV QTrade)9 and Section V QPublic Order~~
Taken together9 they outline a basic strategy mn which a
general consensus might be sought among the Atlantic nations
in planning for the l~6?~so
II, Nature of the Problem
1, The Resolution in Less Developed Areas
The less Beveloped areas are nodv passing through a per-
vasive social9 politicals and coon?mic revolutiono New aspiram
tions for ffiaterial improvement and greater personal and
national status are reshaping whole societiese and are
radically changing their relati?ns with the outside world,
O This revolution has reached different stages in various
countrieso Some of the newly-independent African natioaasa for
example9 are barely emerging from cmlonial air feudal statuso
Other c?untries9 such as Nxexicog andias Turkey9 and Taiwan9
have acquired many of the attitudes and institutions required
for Progresso Most less developed countries probably fall
somewhere between these two extremes revolutionary forces
impel them to modernize themselves rapidlyo Xet they are only
partially equipped with the capacity for effective action or
srxitable programming to this ends
2a The Atlantic Nations Stake
To achieve an orderly international communitye the less
developed countries must be able to participate in it as
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
independent9 effective9 and responsible natamnso The Atlantic
natimns share with the less developed cmuntries a ~mamrm?n
interest in ensuring that they develmp into such nationso To
do so9 they w~.ll hive to manage the process of change under
gmvernments which cano
Qa~ remain independent of communist domination and at
peace with their neighbors9
Qb~ maintain a reasonable degree of irntea?nal cohesimn
and stabilityo
?therwise9 weakness and. st~?~fe aa?e all ~to~ likely, as
in the Ba_].kans in the past9 to make the less developed cmun~
tu?ies the fmcus f?a^ .increasingly bittea? gs?eat power rivala?y
mm which would. be equally $?uinaus f?~? them and the g~?eat p?we~?s,
Of coua?se9 this is not the only interest ~hgcch the ,
Atlantic nations share with less developed count~?ieso With
some they also join on political mmattea?s ,mx? for c?llective
securityo 'heir o~er~riding Common interest with the less
developed cmunt~ie~ lies9 , hmwever,~ in having these cmrxxat~?ies
remain independents at peace9 and ~??asonab],y ma?de~?lyo Thy
policy of the Atlantic natimns should gave p~?im~?ity to that
rover?riding interesto Their ability tm influent~e events in
less developed areas is not sm great that they can affmrd to
di~rert their amain effort frmm this essential purpmse,
~o Need fmr Progress -
This purpm~e is unlikely to be fulfilled unless less
S E C: R E T
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S E C R E T
O
developed countries can achieve adequate social and economic
progress under moderate leaderso
The impulse toward mod~^na~a~ion ~~ however ill defined its
gods in many cot~~ntries om is too .powerful in most of them' to be
lomg suppressedo`, If there seems no prospect for i~~ fulfillment
through evolutionary means9 pressures will mount for more rapid
and dramatic eharigeo These pressures mad be expressed in dis~
order and civil war9 they may., be diverted by leaders mho seek
reli?f from internal tensions in external ad~renturesg or they
may be captured by ruthless .and eff?ctive Communist leadershipo
Th? convincing prospect of progress through evolutionary
means will not assur? freedom from turmoils but it should reduce
O the chances of its exploding into internal or external violendefl
and enhance the lkelahopd of` power remaining in modsr-at~ handso
4, Obstacles .to Pre~x?ess,-,
The obstacles to evolutionary progress are formidable and
the task of overcoming them wi119 at bests take decadesa or even
generationso In many.casesfl these countries lack not only needed
skills and experts9 but also9 and more importantly9 a strong
sense of community and the meaa~s for effective governanient o They
have yet to undergo the p~ofoua~d sodial9 cultural9 arrl~l in~ti~.
tutional changes which modernization requireso Shortages of es~
sential resources are madam worse by'the impact of modern medicine
on the growth of po~~latien already close to the margin of sub
sisteraceo Unresolved internal tensions and external grievances
S E C R E T
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m 78; ~.
preoccupy many politically active groups and threaten periodi~
tally to erupt into vio].~hce,
So R~le.,;~a~f the, ~tlari~ic ?'"Nations
Basic responsibility for ovex^com%ng these obstao~`e:s must
rest with the less developed countries, Modernisation is as
much a socialfl cultural and political as an economic ptaenomenon9
its basic mainsprings must be found within the developing society
itselfo Even au-the econi~y must cYearly grasp the
nature of the task, They must be prepareds
(a~ To broaden and intens3.fy their efforts and to assure
.its continuityo
(b~ To subordinate their other purposes visma~vis the-less
developed countries ~m.such as tho promotion of ta~ade ?r mf
political ties .with sp~cafac co~ant~ies ~to t$ae main olajective
of helpiaag.;evolutaon~i~y mid?rni~at~,onb
(c~ To concert their dif~er~nt.nationa~ efforts in a wide.
~ar?iety of fields mo politic~]l,~ cc.canotnio9 cultural fl military
and information mm ~so.~s to s~rv~ this objettiveo
As eacper~.~nce has' sho~na it will be difficult to secure
support for this necessary allocat~.on of resources9 subordination
of other national interest, and c?raccrting of national effortso
- ~ t ~`,
S 'E C R 'E T
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O
Only a solid political consensus as to their vital interests will
provide an adequate basi-~ fore the requisite action- by the
Atlantic nationso
The Atlantic.Commua~ity can. assist the less developed nations
to mmderni~eo
(a) by Providing needed skills and resources
(b) by shaping coan~anerdial relations with these areas so as
to contribute to their.growth~
(c) by strengthening the ability of these nations and of
the international community to cope with threatened breakdowns
of law and ordero
The next three Sections consider these measui?eso
IIIo Assistanc? to Leis b?velo~ed Coixntries
,~
In.providing.financial and technical ass%stance to tine less
developed counta?ies cvez? the coming decade9 the Atlantic nations
will have to considero (a) h?w to ~.ncrease their bapacity to
moderni~ee (b) the role of international and pri'vat~ agenciesg
and (c) the scope of national effort required,
1. Increasing ~apacit~,v to NI?de~ni~e
To modernise theiY? societies and economies9 the less developed
~our~~~~,es face stagger?it~g taskrt~, They must develop the r~gui~ite
instruments for effective action9 mobilise resources9 devise and
carry out suitable interna~`~c?~C~~~?sa and coordinate these ac~
tivities with external aid prog~amsa No outside government or
agency cats p~x^form these tasks for them o- Domestic effort and
S E C R E T
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foreign assistance can be coordinated only within the ~ount~?y
itself9 on the basis of its own programs and prioritieso
Outside agextoies Dana howevera assist the less Bevel?ped
countries tta discharge their taskso
Yndeed9 such outside help may be indispensable ~~ espe~
cially to enable many of them to create the machinery for
starting and ca~?z?ying on developmento To this enda they must
secure (a) advice and sei?vices from a+utside agencies and ex~
pertse and ~b).help in train~~yg local officials and public aa~d
private expertsa Moreover9 the attitudes needed to modernise
are metre likely to be stimulated by intensive exposure to
growth minded societiesa
The less developed nations a~.so need outside resources on
a large scale and with continuity, Such resources should be
furnished in ways which will assist and encourage self help by
the receiving countryo They must foster9 nett hinder, internaY
policies and actions required to modernise their societieso
The desired results are must likely to be attained if
assisting agencies can combine both fa~nancial and technical
assistanceo Advice is more likely to be heeded if backed by
resources9 resources are more lil~ely to be put to good use
if associated with advice and techniC~al aide
In providing both skills~;and resources9 a key object of
outside ,agencies must ~e to help the less developes~ counta?ies
to improve their capacity_to plan9 organi~e~ 'and carry out
programs for constructive change and growtho
S E C R E T
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~o hole of International and Private Agencies
National programs of assistance will continue to be vi~~l~,y
necessary and to haves to cagy a great part of the loado _1F?ba?
certain of these needs9 however international and private
agencies have special advantageso The governments of many less
developed cduntri?~ will be reluctant to expose their innermost
workings to officials of other national states9 or to accept-from
them~the kinds of advice and assistance they most required Znter~-~
national officials or private advisers can develop more intimate
rel~,tio~-s with thc~,se govdrnmentsa they can also be more rigorous
in in~i~'~ing on effective selfmhelp9 since they can be less
inhibited by fear of generating p?litical illmwillo International.
O and private efforts will also be less likely to serve as a
O
precedent for Soviet activitie~so
The Atlantic nations shorx~.d9 th~refoa^e9 undertake to expand
and makes more effective relevant international and private aid
programs over the next decadeo They ~?uld propose and take
various actions to these ended ''
a ~ UN Special Fund and ether ._~N -Programs
It would be useful to have an international ager~.cy sp~~;ifim
tally charged with helping less developed countries to plan their
overall development ;programs and to create aneed~d institutions,
With expanded functions and resourcesa the iJN Special Fund could
become such an agency for Administx?ativ~ Asai~tance~ {in addition
to financing other pre~investm~nt pa?o~e~ts ass it nom does),
S E C R E T
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m 8~ o
The Special Fund might also talcs fiver policy direction of the
Expanded UN Technical Assistance ~'~ogram9 i~hich is now managed
by a UN Secx^etar~,at and IAN specialised agencies, Finally the
United Nations :program (APEX) for provision of international
civil servants to work fdr the goverrunents of less developed
;-countries ~houYd be exp~~tded and played on a peraaanent basis9
and QI'EX might also be p~.a+~ed under policy direction of the
Special Ftli~d9 to ensure ghat it is~~f~ectively geared into an
?vermall mddernizatioai effoa~t, ~ _
(b) IBRD and.IMF
The IBRD and INdF could ~laay`"an expanding rgle ixt helping
governments of 1?ss devel?p~d'countries to handle their basic
problems, Their missions to these countries and resident~~adm n,
,;
visers can help in analysis of and advice on their programso
The Atlantic nations should also support a continuing enlarge
merit in the resources of the Banks affiliate9-the International
Development Assoc~.ation~ once it gets underway, They sh?uld
encourage the IBRD and IrIF to organise consortiums to deal with
especially large, or difficult development or stabilisation
problemso If the European continental countries are to accept
this basic approach9 the Bank"s top management will have to
include m?re officials from these countrieso
(c) Private Skills
The Atlantic nations should s~courage increased techn~.cal as~
sistance and related efforts by their private agencieso As one
,`
S E C R E T
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S E C R ~ ~
~t~g~ t~ that ~nc~9 tb~y m~gtat ~~t~sb]L~~~a ~ ~~~~g~~~a~nt ~~n~~u~
t? p~?m?t~ gnc~~~is~~dl ~?a~t~~t~ end ~s~~ta~iaag~~ b~t~r~~~n ~~~~~ ~
p~^mf~~~a?n~g9 ~.~b~$^9 ~ncfl bea~~n~~~ ~~?g~aa~.~~ati~n~9 ~ch~~7L
o g~? o
aan~~v~a~~bt~~~9 end g?~~]L ~ncfl maan~.~np~g gm~~~nm~~at~ gau tlz~ ]L~~
d~~?]L?p~c~ ~ra~ the t'at~.~nt~~ c~ansat~~~~a S~~~n ~ ~~nt~~ ~?~~nll~fl
~~~~ ~?~~x?ca~t ~ncfl t~?~~.aa ~an~]1~f~~e~ ~~cang p~?p11~ f~?m tb~
~t~~antg~ n~t~a~sa$ t~ wm~?k ~n ~~~~ ~~~~b?p~c$ ~~~~~ o
~a~a ~c~cfl~.t~~na t~~ C~ant~~ m~gR~at ~~n~?aas^~g~ ~anc~ ~~~~~t ~texcfl~a
s.n b~tln the At~L~aata~ ~gncfl g~~
cfl~~~Il~p~~i sn~t~?n~9 ~f p~'?b~~
$xn t~n~ ~c~~a~1 ~ncfl g91a~~~~~~1 ~~~~mm~~~ e~fl~a~c~b b
~~ ~l~~~c~t~~ man
m~dl~u?nn.~~tb~n ?f ~.~~~ d~~~]Lavp~~ ~?annt~~~ffi o ~eac~b u?~~~~~~h
mag)fat u?~mm~v~ ~?m~ of th? ?Y~fg~~~n~g~s ~n 1zsn~a~IL~c~g~ ~rl~~.~lh
~aarru^~aatt]Ly h~mp~m min Q ~ ~tt~mptffi t~ ~~~~ tv~bth a~n~ ~f the m?~t
O ~fl~.f f acaxlt end cmmplL~s~ tm~kffi t~a~t b~~ ~~~~ b~~au anandl~~?t~fl~~m~ o ~Ct
~~~~ls~ ~~~? p~m~~d~a ~ ~mn~t~?aa~t~a~~ f ?~~~ f ?a? the ~~tie~~,tta~~~ ?~
pmll~t~u~~glp anf 1Lca~nta~~ ~c~a~b~s~~ ~nc~ ffi~s.~aut~~t~ a~n ~ea~
d~~~~op~d c~~rxnta^a~~ ~ncfl ~~cp~,~~ t~x~ffi ts~ IL~Ye~ ~c~ta~i~ta~~ ~n the
At~~anta~ an~t~~n~s thaw h~gpbng t~ g~sa~~?,~t? ~~m~ ~f tta~ ~ttbta~,c~~
~~ ~~ will ~~ the kan?v~~.~clg~ ~~ ~~~aug~?~;~i f~u?
~~t~?ra, S~~h ~ C?nt~~ ~~aa~c~ p~~b~b1l~ fanxn~t~?an e~?~t ~icf~~t~~~~~~
~.f ~.t ~~~~ ~~t cap ~~n ~ mass~c~ ~vaabg~~~y~a?~~~t~ b~~~~9 ~~~~ ?v~? IDAC
might ~?an~ad~s? the n~~c~ f~~? tb~ ~~rat~~ ~,~ ~ )~a~~lpf'anll f~~~t~ ~t?~po
~ o S~?~~ mf N~tn,man~]l off?~t
~h~ 3L~~~ d~e~~I1.np~cfl ~?caant~?~~~ ~nmt ~n~~ n~~~ m?~~ off
~b~9 they ~ls~ ~~1~ u?~~caga?~ ~~.c~ ~n ~ ~cab~t~nt~.~~L11~ ga~~~t~~
O
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.., S ~ . ~ . R ~_ _7~
~~~b~o A~ tfl~~g~ a~~e~~a$?~ ~ne~c~~~fl ~fl~~]171~ sand ~g~a~c~~,~~~ t~a~~s~
~b~g~.t~ t~ ~~~ ~~p~t~b ~~~~~t~,e~~71~ ~~.Il~ ~~c~~~~~~ o A d~ublL~~ag
~~? ~~~~n t~?~bg~ang ?f the p~~~~uat ~Ile~~ ~~ t~c~hsn~c~~]L ~~adl ~"~an~ari~~~t]1
~ndl may ~~~1L b~ a~ec~~~~~~ ~n~ ~n~~~~n~ ~~~~? ~t~a~ au~~t~ e~~~~sfl~o
~b~ At7l~xat$c g~~t$maa~ ~h~u~,cY aa~ucfl~$?t~~~ t~ m~~t t~a~~ ~~~d ~~
to pu~~~~~~ ~~~a~t~aac~ nan the ~m~an~nt~ that c~~~ b~ ~~~~~ta~~~~
~~~d t? ~as~mm~t~ m~cl~s~~as.~~$~~~n9 ~~dl ~t? ~? tb~~ bn ~ ~v~gv ~~na~~a
da~t~abrnt~~ tta~ baaa^d~aa ~~?g~nat~b~~ ~m?~g t~n~ffio ~~a~~ ash?~n1Lcfl
nau~~?~~~~ aa~t~~n~ta~~a~l ~nc~ ~~b~~t~ gs~?~g~?~ma~ ~Il~ang tfla~ Ila~~
~1L~?~~c~~ c~~~~aa~~~d o gh~~ ~b?rn~c~ ~]l~? ,~nnb~t~~at~.~~7L~ ~~p~~~u~ t~~~~
a~~taa~n~]1 P~?g~?~am~9 arh~.~~n v~~t1~1 ~t~~,IL fln~~~ t? c~~~?~?~ ffiaa~kn c~~ t~z~
~~~~10
~~~ha~~~~71. ~~cfl
Thy IDEEC might h~g~ tm ~tamaa]L~4~ ~~e~~mmd~d ~~t$~~u~~1 t~c~a~
a~~~~~ a~~d p~?~gm~m~o ~t m~.g~at ~11~~ ~~~~t~>~~ ~~c~l~ ~un~gv~~?t~,~g
~~ta~~tB~~ ~~ Q ~ ~ ~~g~~~s~~~~ ~~' the ~~~~ "?tltaa~di ~~aa~ntu?~ t~~~a~a~~ug
px~mgs^~m"? 9 ta~ac~~a~ ~hi~h ~m~~a~gpn t~~s~.an~~~ ~~~.~~t~d ~~di ~A~a~s~~~dl
bq At7l~~utt~c~ sn~$~~aa~ (~~ ~~~ m~~~ b~ t~a~ ~S ~ ~~^? tx?~~rm~~ ~.~ the
m~~t ~g~~~?~ps?a~t~ E~ax?mp~~~a ~~c~~Il~t~~ ~aa~ c~~ant~~IL~~~~fl ~?~~~?~~t~
m~ait ?f ~~~?p~a~a~ ~dlm~$aa~tx?~t~~?~9 ~~~z~~t~~~9 ~a~acfl t~c~haa~c~~~un~ ixa
~tn~g~m~?t ?~ ~a~tac~an~~ ~nd1 UN t~~h~a~.~~IL ~~~g~t~ra~~ gv~?~g~?~m~o
(b~ ~gsa~ra~~~~. ~~d
IDg~~~affi~~~n ~,aa the ID~C m~~ h~~1p t~ ~a~cflen~~ m?~?~ ~~~~~t~aa~~
i~~^mm ~t~t~~ ash?~e ~cros~?m~.~ p~~at~?an ~~ ~tg~?snga ~~~ ~th~ ~~m~
paa~?p?~~~fl the No~?th ~tl~rat~~ ~?garn~~.~ might s?~~i~w9 ~~??m times
O
t? tam~fl the cfl~f~aa~~ end ~~~aa~ffi~c~ mid ben~c~~~~ b~asng ~~~~?~~~ b~ O
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SECREfi 085. m
various Atlantic nationso Periodic reports by the proposed Dem
v~lopment Ce~at?r on development needs and aid p~mgrams might also
help to generate public suppoi^~'fmr expanded ac~+ion by European
governtnents~ o
DAC discussion may als? help to ensure that aid under
national programs is provided on terms whip#~ are consistent with
its purpose9 i,eo9 as grants or ].ongRterm loans on flea able termso
Many Atlantic nations are now neore reluctant to provide acid on _
these terms than to provide short term export credits on -"hard"
termso But export credits simply mill not do the j?bo ~tiTher?
national instruments for providing ald on more generous terms
do not exist9 they will need to be created,
O (c) Criteria .,for National-Pro~rams
The Atlant~.c nations should seek to agree9 in the OECD ~r
DAC9 on criteria for' natior~ai a3ci programs which would reinforce
m,c~asures for se].f~help by receiving cauntriesa In general these
criteria should not be sacrifa,ced f~or,shortmterm political bene~
fit~o The viabil~:iy and irtdepehacience ,~f the ~;ess developed
countries will nod be attained by sho~t~~erm actions i~ they do
not master the long term task of modernil~ationo 6ilhere the IBRD
or IMF has made an overall st~}dy of the program of a less
developed countrya it might be useful for the Atlantic nations tp
consult with the Bank or Fund about the relation of their
national to the broader programo
The Atlantic nations should generally not be diverted from
S E C R E T
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m, 86
their oven purposes in a~a effort to "counter" Soviet aid pa?~m~
gramso They should recognise that Soviet efforts mill best
be frustrated by moderni~atiori of less developed ~?uaatries,~
and concentrate their ov,rn activities maixnly on prmm?ting that
process, In some casesa they vaill have to ~~~ aid to prevent
Soviet doaninatior~ of very sensitive areas of the less devel~
oiled countries national lifeo Abetter v~ay to avert this
danger9 however9 ~ill~>be to encourage assistance to these
sensitive areas throt}gh multilateral chanr~~]ls o
~ d ~ Pr,~? date Inve+~tment
While private investment cannot meet the greater part
of the 1??? developed countries" need for external capital
it can provide some resourc?~ and it can also expose th?se
countries to private skills and methods of doing bui~iness
which gill contribute to economic gro~th, The Atlantic natid~ns
?hm~xld try to increase the p?lot~ of private investor?n~ to less
,.
developed erase over the nett decade9 international and
private agencies should make clear tm less developed countries
the local policies and practices that will be weeded t? attract
private ~,nvestment o Studies by tree pa?opmsed Develcp>aaent ~eaater
might aYso help tm identify s?me of tYq~ obstacles t? private
investment and the measaalres that might be taken to rem?ve them
by both the Atlantic and ],ass developed nationso
S E ~ R ~ T
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~8'~m
IV, Trade Problems of Less Develot~ed Countries
l to R?le of Trade
I Trade alone as dearly nmt an adequate ans~~~ for the developG
I
went needs of the lest developed coaxntraeso" -Dut it is equally
clear that trade policy must not undo but complerr~ent vahat aid
policy a~.ms at accomplishing,, For these c?untries9 experts are
O
fi~or~eoverg if econ?mic growth is ever to be self~sustaanaxag9 the
less developed count~^ies must have relatively free access to
markets for their manufactured goods as well as primary product
~ . .
roughly ten times as large a source of foreign exchange as capital
assistanceo Indeed9 an s?me years9 declines in c?mmodaty prices
have cut foreign exchange income by more than total aid receaptso
~4,t present9 the Atlantic nations import roughly twenty times
as much from the LDCBS as d??s the Soviet Dl?co They have a
strong mutual interest in maintaining and expanding this trade9
in fact9 it is a vital interest f?r I~lestern Purope which ~,s highly
dependent on the LDC?s f?r crucial ra~aa material and energy am~
portso So far9 in seeking to re~?raent LDC trade9 the Soviet
Dloc has meanly eaeploated specific critical, products ~su~h as
Guinea banana,s9 Cuban sugar9 Pgyptaan cotton and Iceland ~'ash~o
lag the future9 given the Soviet resource allt~~ati?n pattern9 the
bloc may become more attractive for the LDCgs both as a s?ux^ce of
investment g?ods and as a market f?r c?nsumer manufacturesa This
is n?t necessarily bad an atself9 but it as essential t? prevdnt
the 81oc fr?m developing e~cclusive or pred?minant trading po~
sations with the LDC g s ~nrhieh would certainly be es~ploated for
S P C FZ E T
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8i~ m
politicaY pearposese
20 Commodity Price Inst~bi~.ities
Qa) Effects arad Cause
Irnstabilities in internationaY commodity prices often have
avers economic repercussions osa LDC?so Either boom or bust
conditions care seriousYy unbalance economic developments ~?r?~
?ver9 the adverse econ?mic effects extend ov?r irat? the sociaY
and political spheres as ~,vell,
Thes? instabilities are rece~,ving more study9 ?specially
a.n the GATT and the iJN ~ but this ~eorYt has nit so far led ter any
very promising shortmreul solutioraso While variations en the
supply sid? are one mad or smurce of the wide fleacteaat~,ons irn
pricesD another ins large ,shifts in demand by the industrial
rnaticraso These arise ndt only frmm cyclical developments beat
aYso from sudden changes in stocl~piling policies arad~ n?t inG
frequentlya from efforts of the advaauced countries to stab~,lize
their domestic prices .and shieYd their producers from oeatside
competitionQ The hesitant approacT~ of the Atlantic c?untries
to stabilization problems affecting foreign prodeacer?s con
tracts sharply ~s.th their domestic stabilization policiesa
particularly in agriculturea
Qb) Remedies
The longmrun correctives for this situation are doubtles~a
ae so often ar~t~ed o ( i ) sustained gro~th9 a minimeam of cyclatca7L
fleactuation9 and sound domestic commodity policies in the
developed nationsa and Qii) diversification of the economies
S E C R E T
0
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S E C R E T
~$9G
of the d~DC~so But these are no answers for short run situ
ations which the Sov~,ets stand ready to exploit by dramatic
bids for surpluses and longterm pu~chas~ commitmentsa
It is politically essentialfl thereforea that the At~
lantic States mo and particularly tae United States which
ha~~~?resisted such ideas most stronglLy ~~ examine together
means ~ox~ reducing s~~cific comr~md~ty pr$c?~ instak~ilitie
and for? mitigating adver~~ effects of wide market variations
on overall LDC export ea~?ning
In considering methods, it is necessary to distinguish
betwveen mineralsfl for wvhich supplies change only graduallyfl
and agricultural commodities9 v?here supply and often demand
as r~ell are unstableo for nonferrous minerals9 for example9
an iaaternationally administered buffer ~atock might stabilise
the market at manageable costs and r~ithout:s~ri?us diisad~
vantageso Agricultural commodities, ~aowevera px?oba~]Ly c~snG
not be dealt ~niith in this ~nrady o
To help prevent disrupting import and development pro
grams9 it might be feasible to provide compensatory financing
to ensure an LDC that its export foreig~a e~schaa~ge earnings
in one year would not fall below a certain percentage such
as 90%~ of export earnings in a t'normal ye~srt'9 based o~n a
moving average of a previous period, This and other possi~
bilities should be discussed in DAC or the OECD bearing in
mind that the IMF should probably manage any agreed schemed
S E C 1Z E T
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m g?
S E C R B T
3 o Ex~anafoaa ?f ADC Exporter
(~~ Pro~pect~
~~~? suatas.ned economgc grc~~vth9 ~B~ exg~ort~ ~a~.1ll ha~? t?
expaxad ~ub~tantially t? Pad f mr Imp?rt? of Irn~e~tment g~od~ laud
ram materlal~ beyond wrh~at can be f gnaxnced b~ aa~I~t~snce o het fl
e~Ith f ev,~ exc~gtimne 9 past trendy offer little hope f ~~? ~~af fI~
cientl.y rapid growth of the tradltla~nal exp?rta ~sf the le~~
developed countrieso
Imports of primary products into the ixadu~trial ~ountrie,~
tend to ripe relativ?~.~ ~l?wly for three rea~on~s F'is~~t~ ~hift~
an the pattern of their demand to coxasumer durables end ~e~?~ice~
reduce the relative'amounta of raw material
re~yuired ~~ total
output rieeafl ~econd9 ~ub~tituteaa ?~g~?cfially ~y~athetic~~ tend
to replaces Imported raaa materaal~9 third9 protect~,on~L~m 1Limit
some prodlictt~ s e o g o s o].l fl w~ol9 lead a end zinc o
Imports'c~ 'food~tuff~ from the lee, dea~elmped countries
also tend to be held dmwn (l~ by protectloni~t agrlc~nlttt~ral
pollcles~ ( 2 ~ by low inc?me ela~ticlt~,e~ of demand9 said ( ~ ~ iatl
some caseae such ~,~ cof~'ee9 by hlgh excl~e taxes foxy re?e~a~aeo
Under theme c?radltlon~a If the le~~ developed coua~trie~ are
to expand their foreign exch~,~age ea~rniraga tm meet their need
for economic growth9 they will have to develop wide~? market
manufactures an the advanced coaaa~trle~a The product~fl tyg~ioally9
would be from labor?Intesnsiv~e gndustraes beaaef~.ting from 1ow~
wage costso By shifting fr?m such product,~~ the more dr~~el?ped
Q
co~antrles9 often handicapped by m~,npmwer sh?rtages9 could employ
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S ~ ~ R ~ T
their labor more productively in capital~intensi~e industrie~o
Yn generals however9 economic policies in the developed
countries tend to hamper rather than to entourage such shiftsfl
and thug sharply conflict both with their foreign policy
interests and the economic requirements for faster growth at
' home as well a;~ in the 3.e~s developed countriesa
(b) Item dies
In these circumstabcesa the c,~xtl,y promising cours? is to
revive restrictive Comm?s^cl,al ~pnd de~mest~,c ~aapp?rt -pol,icies so
as to px??vide better ~aarkets for the LDO e s o This wo~,d ?bvi?
ously help these countries expand their earrings of foreign ex~
change to buy capital. goods needed to di~rer~ify and industrialm
O ire their economieso Just as obviouslLy~ it raises the question
mf how the industrialized countries are to avoid tk~e disruption
of their economies from a possible fYood of low~wage cost impmrtso
There are no painless ways tm proaanote LDC ~ s e~sports but
some ways as^e less painful than othex?s,
(i) One way to minimise ttmark~t disruption" danger
would be for the Atlantic nations to lib~ra~i~e their re~
strictions together9 so that the brunt of tie increase i~a any
,,
product would.. tend to be sg%ar~d by all o
(ii) Anmther way its fir the Atlantic nations to accept the
need for mechaaiisms to fac3.]Litate tkae adjustment of domestic
agriculture8 iridustx?ya and ~laboY^ to new ~om~etitive conditionso
(iii) F~here export contr?l,s on the rates of expert expansion
0
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S .~ ~~ R E T.
:~ :,
of a product are not feasible because there are too many supra
pliers, various methods should be explored, Tariff guotasa
mult^laterally negotiateda offer one possibilityo Another
might be ~a) to impose t?mporarily higher dut^es against im~
ports of manufactures from low~wage countries subject_to the
condition that the degree of discrimination be progressively
reduceda and (b~ to apply the p~?oceeds from such duties in part
to assist adjustments in the importing countries and in part as
grants to promote economic devil?pmc~nt in the exporting coun~
trieso Such arrangements would assist orderly adjustment to
serve the interests of tie developed and the less developed
countries alike,
Th? tre~itment of Japan by the Western European countrie
does not offer a hopeful prospect to underdeveloped countri?s
that aspire to ach~.eve Japangs industrial statu~aa Thus9 Euro~
peen countries which hays not yet done so should acemrd Japan
most=favored nation treatment in the GATT to demonstrate their
interest in the plight of th? countries struggl^ng to a,ndust~?im
aline their e~onomieso
Q.o Organization of Atlantic Response
A strong case can be made for the view that the trade
problems of the I,DC~s are best handled in GATTo Eu~t the
global answer might uyell be facilitated by examination in a
smaller group9 such as OECA or NATOo
First9 the GATT negotiating procedures do not readily al~
low for a group of countries making similar concessions in the
S E C R E T
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S E C R P T
m93~
same products9 so some s~e~iah kind ~f ~mnsu],tation am?ng such
countries, r~ou~.d be r~e~tiod ixs~' any case if such a preposah were to
be developed, ~Seconda the case for adhering to such concessions
in the face of greater imports must be based on as strong a
domestic pohiticah footing,as possible which might be better
created through afireement in some Atlantic or "defense~ori?ntedn
organisation, In any case, ho~aever9 any agr?ement ~.n the I~AfiD
or OECD mould be carried out. in GATTo Third9 if the objective
is to provide a hiberah package for the LDC"s without "compen~
sation" in the trade=negotiating sense9 the LDC~s may be more
understanding of outside discussion than is supposed,
If the Atlantic nations are to s~nrvive~ the LDS problem9 in~
,f1 chiding its, trade aspects9 must be effectiv?ly dealt ~~,tho
`lJ biberal cOmmerc3ah policies am?ng the Atl~sntic States are ima
portant~ but with respect to the ~DC~s the penalties for faihure
could be to impair our overall security position, P?r primary
products at heast9 the objective shouted be duty free entry into
the devehoped Atlantic nationsD from ahl sources of supply ~~
not just9 for ezcamp~.e9 from EEC associated areas or frpm Common
taeahth countries, It i~ foxy NATO anci the OECD tc~ demonstrate
whether they can usefuh],.y help in the trade f~e7~d9 but the
presumpt.~,~n is that they can and mLtst o
~a Pubhic Order
ho The Named.
Neither the broad range of aid and trade actions propo~~d in
S E C R E T
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gt~
. , ,~_i
this paper nor' the efforts of less developed countries themselves
can assure success in modernising their societieso For this and
other reasons9 here will be a continixing Banger that turmoil
in these countries r,~ill periodically :?rup't into wid~~pTb+~~d dis~
order during th? next decade, :~ di~t~t^:dei~ ~duYd f~t?ther s~t?
back ?~forts at moder~i~ationo It"would create oppox?tunit~?~ for
Communist intervention =~ r~ith consequ?nt risk of Co~ununist take
over or epre2~tling .hostilities o
20 Security As~ist~nce.
It should b~ a m~j,ox~ "goal ~f .the .Atl~nntic nations to enhance
the capacity of the less, developed countries to avert such dis~
ordero To this endo
(a) They should stand ready to help the less developed ~;
,~~
countries train and maintain effective internal security forces,
(b) They should encourage the UN to help these countries
train and officer their foresee As in the economic field, T7N
efforts may sometimes be more welcome than national aid and may
help to preclude other national (i,e,9 Soviet) assistanceo The iJN
has not9 outside the Congo9 yet helped less developed countries
to set up eff~otive internal security forces9 but there is no
Treason why it should not.do soo
3 o tJN Forces
The tltlantic nations should seek to enhance UN capabilities
for coping with disorder in less developed areas over the coming
decadea. The need is illustrated by the Congoo Only the ITnited
~~;
S E C R E T
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9~
N ation~ could deploy ~'cir?ces to restore order there without gluing
a pretext for Soviet intervea~tion or generating lasting African
hostility to~,yard the `d~st,o
(a) Th? Atlantio; nat3.on~ shod respond,to the efforts of the
UN Secretary~General to sec~:tre ear~a~arking of national contingents
for service in future United Nations forces (by states other than
permanent members of the Security Council)o These forces mould
be used9 as might be agreed by the states providing and requesting
the forces and by the UNa in such tasks as remestablishing law
and order or policing borders and demarcation lineso Atlantic
nat~,ons which do not earmark forces should earmark transport or
other logistic facilitieso Atlantic nations which do earmark
forces should make a special. ?ffort to tram these forces for
the specialized types of duty involved, The Atlantic nations
should also encourage ot~-er countries to respond to the Secretary
Generals ~~forts and should b? prepared to assist them in training
and equipping earmarked forces for UN dutiesa
(b) The Atlantic nations should press in the UN for steps
to improve UM force standmby arrangements9 such as by activatiang
a permanent.headquartersQ establishing a UN training cad~?e9 and
perhaps erecting UN training facilities in a neutral countryo
They should urge that comparable standby arrangements be estab~
fished in the observer fielda so that the UN can respond promptly
and effectively to re;~u~e~t's9 for observer personnel such as
were received from Lebanon in 19,58 and Laos in 1.9590
S E C R E T
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96 ~?
These are initial stepso Other more amb~;taous measua?e
to fulfill this long range objective may will become feasib~.e
and desirable over the next decadeo
The attitudes of some o~ the Atlantic nations toward the
a
UN will be an obstacle to 'taking the proposed measureso The
need for ~1 act^~n is sufficiently clear and importantQ how=
ever9 to warrant a specaal attempt to overcome this obstacle
and to create some hope that the attempt will ~dcceedo
4, Bloc Ax?ession
There may lie occasions when loyal and i~I3 forces will not
suffice to restore t~~ stability and independence of less
developed countries9 particularly if Bloc or Bloc supported
forces should interven~o The Atlantic nations should mainG
fain a capability for meting such,threat,~ through limited
n
operations9 which will miniini~e the risks of genea~al warn
The need for such a capability will grow over the next
decadefl as turmoil in less developed areas continues and
the Communists intensify their efforts to exploit ito The
United States and its allies shoezld~,gea~ their long range
military plans and programs to this prospecto
The best course would be for national capabilities for
limited operations to be separate from any military contrib~
utions to NATO,
As a second best9 if the NATO Shield forces are strength
ened as prmpo~ed9 some of them Qincluding some IJS forces) might
S E C R E T
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_ . _ .., ~ 9`~ b
be specifically designated and prepared to serve as national,
reserves which could be deployed for limited operations
elsewhere ~.n event of emergen~~y o Their use would involve a
calculated risk a~n the: NATO ~s~ea anti should require consent
of the Allianceo. If certain US forces in Europe were thus
to be designated as available9 in case of need9 to ffieet
eanergencies elsewrherefl the questgon as to whether these
forces should be placed on a "no~dependents" basis may
warrant study,
S_E ~ R E T
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O
S E C R E T
CHAPTER FDUR
RELATIO1dS WITH THE COIKMUNIST BLOC
Table of Contents Pa e
Io Basic Principles--?---?__emm___-?____?____~_m ~9
IIe Econmmic Relations-----_?____??____m??___?_?- 102
III, Information and Cultural Exchanges--??-?_?-??~~Q5
C IV, Psych?logical Warfare-?____-____o___?om_??__? X08
V, NATO and Arms Controls--?~_??_??-?___m____m_? ~.t~9
S E C R E T
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- e 9g;
CHAPTER FOUR
RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST?BLOC
,,
Io Basic Principles
1o Need for Claritp of Purpose
The contest between the Atlantic nations and the Bloc
over what kind of world order?wl-emerge from this century
of change takes placee in apparent paradox against a backm
ground of increasing public and private interchange between
them, The trend toward more intensive East?West economic
relations and cultural and other exchanges bids fair to
continue during the 1960~se though it may be interrupted
from time to time by shifts in Soviet policy or periods of
O tension,
This trend poses a serious dilemma for the Atlantic
nations expanding East-West contacts and negotiations
enhance an impression of "peaceful co?existence" which may
undermine their resolution to face the hard tasks of conm
tinning competition, It is difficult for democratic l~o~ie~
ties to understand the need for a policy which seems to call
at the same time for increased preparedness and for closer
relations with the enemy,
That policy has already created some confusion in the
Atlantic nationse The problem cannot be met by relaxing the
effort either to compete or to improve relations with the Bloca
each of these efforts serves the interests of the Atlantic
O
S E C R E T
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O
nationso These nations must mach a common understanding
that both are neces+sarys and try to combine them into a
single coherent policyo They must bring home to public __
opinion in the Atlantic nations the basic need for Botha
(a) a continuing awareness of Bloc hostilitys even when
the Bloc is following a soft line;
(b) a continuing desire to improve relations with the
Blocs even when tensions are at their peak,
20 Shorten and I.on~?term Goals
Better r?lations with the Bloc not only advance current
policy goalsg they also help to stimulate pressures for
change within the Communist system and thus to promote evolum
tionary tendencieso They may exert at least marginal leverage 0
toward bringing closer the time when a muting of S?viet aggresm
sivenesss internal changers a weakening of satellite links with
the USSRs or Sino?Soviet schism may permit smme form of lasting
detentes This long?term goal needs to be bo~?ne in minds even
as the Atlantic nations concert their relati?ns with the Bloc
for more immediate purposeso
~e Need for Coordination
More effective coordination of Atlantic policies on Fasten
tVest relations is essential to serve these ends,
While continuance of bilateral approaches mm especially
in the cultural field ?? seems preferable to any NATO assume=
tion of an operational roles sole reliance on bilateral
S E C R E T
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101 m
relations can lead -- and has led -- to confusion and seen
conflict among tt~e policies of member nationso The t~lliance
should9 therefore, seek. both (a) to coordinate these policiesn
so as to assure that they scree agr?ed objectiees9 and (b)
to promote wider exchanges of intelligence derived from
contacts with the Blow
4o Specific Components
The treatment here of relations with the Bloc is intended
to illustrate the basic concepts outlined aboves as they
affect three different kinds of relations
(a) Those relationss especially in the economic fields
which we choose not to prevents because they will not signifio
O cantly damage our strategic interests unless they get out of
hando
(b) Those relations, notably exchan~es9 which we delib-
erately seek to develop because of the strategic advantages
that we see in them, The Communist states may also encourage;
.these relations for quite dissimilar reasonso The USSR9 for
example, looks upon exchanges of industry and similar dele-
gations largely as a means of learning new techniques9 while
we look upon them as a me:ans of "opining up"' Soviet soci?tyo
(c) Those relations, particularly in the field of d~.?
armament9 which we seek to develop on the basis of a possible
mutual interest with the Sovietso
S E C R E T
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102 ~? S E C R E T
II. Economic Relations
1. Trade with the Bloc
Trade between the NATO and Communsst countries is an impor?
taut means of direct contact, and will probably continue to
ga~ow with the Blocs industrialization and modification of its
autarchic trade policy. t~h~i~e US~Soviet trade is likely to
remain minors European NATO ti?ad?~ with the Soviet Bloc alre~dy~~
amounted to around $4 billion in 19$80 '
The European NATO powers and Canada feel that expansion of
this trade would have both economic and political advantages.
They are eager to seize the commercial opportunities and doubt
that Bloc gains from such trade would become sufficiently large
to affect the balance of powero The current level of Bloc
imports from the NATO powers is smalls they argue when com?
pared with the B1ocQS annual rate of capital formation. More-
overs the goods must be paid fors which is an offsetting costs
and it?ms embodying advanced technology closely related to
military power are excluded by strategic trade controls. Many
Europeans also see commercial r?lations as a vehicle for m?re
normal political relationso They consider that normal treat
meat of Communist countries in as many ways as possiblesis
necessary if t?nsions and antagonisms are to be reduced.
In view of th?se attitudes the US could make little
headway in any effort to slow down the growth of this trade.
Such an effort would place a severe strain on the Alliance
S E C R E T
0
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.,~ X03 m
O
ands in the absence of military hostilitiese would undoubtedly
be unsuccessful,
On the other handy the NATO countries could and should
be persuaded to continue sufficient controls on the export
of strategic goods to prevent an undue contribution to the
military strength of the Bloco These controls have gradually
contracted since 1954 and are now limited to atomic energy
materialse implements of ware or clo,~ely r?lated itemse equip?
ment incorporating advanced technology which has a direct
bearing on military potential and which the Soviets cannot
produce at all or in sufficient quantitye and certain strategic
materials which are in critical short supply in the Bloc in
O relation to its military needso
This present system of controls is generally accepted by
the participating countries and puts no strain on the Alliances
It prevents direct Western assistance to Soviet military capa~
bilities and helps to avoid creating an image of the Atlantic
countries granting to their avowed enemies sh?vels with which
to bury themo Its chief importance lies in the fact that it
keeps in operation a system which can be .expanded or contracted
as the occasion demands (the Korean War was one such occasion),
20 Credits
Limiting the amount of long-t?rm credits made available
to the Bloc by NATO memb?rs pr?vides a second safe-guard
S E C R E T
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-., 104 .~
against assisting Soviet growtho These credits make a unim
lateral economic contribution to the Bloc which cannot be
justified by any resulting political or economic advantage
to the Atlantic nationse Moreover, in the eyes of the less
developed countries at leasta large scale credits would
constitute a major element of confusion and contradiction
in the Atlantic nations" policy toward the Bloce
Agreement should be reached in the Alliance on a general
policy concerning the extent of long term credits. Such an
agreement should not be overly difficult to secure or imple-
ments since virtually, all the private credits are guaranteed
by governmentso '
An attempt to establish too definite or narrow a limit
on the amount of private credits to the Blocs howevers
would involve political difficulties at this times given the
desires of other members of the Alliance to expand their
econ?mic relations with the Soviet Union, Since all outm
standing credits to the USSR total only $35o million and
net credits actually used ar? likely to b? even less it is
not necessary to seep drastic action to limit credits but
only agreement concerning their extents
~. Dependence on Trade with the_Bloc
It would also be wise for certain Atlantic countries to
avoid becoming so dependent on trade crith the Communist
countries that it could be manipulated for political purposeso
S E C R E T
O
O
O
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~05~
Since the GATT rules are inadequate to cover the special
problems raised by trade between centrally?planned and free
economiesg it may be desirable to work out a multilaterally
agreed framework for this type of traded
(a) Atlantic nations should avoid giving more favorable
import commitments to Communist than to nonmCommunist
countriesa
(b) They should conduct trade with the Bloc in converti~
ble currencies wherever feasiblee since otherwise the-Bloc
could frequently force them to import undesired commodities
or to extend credits in payment for imports or for repayment
of old loaned
O (c) Finall~-~ the Atlantic countries should consult with
each other and with other non?Communist countries regarding
appropriat? measures9 when the Bloc appears to be playing one
normCommunist country off against the othere or to be taking
action which would disrupt the economy of a nonmCommunist
country,
III, Information and Cultural Exchanges
The intensification and possible redirection of the
existing information and cultural exchanges provides one way
of bringing Western influence to bear on Soviet leadership
and society, Bilateral arrangements for such exchanges
remain preferable to any general W?stern agreement adminis~-
tared by the Alliance, The common interest should9 however9
0
S E C R E T
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m 106
b? asscired by (a) NATObwide agreement on the ..general long-
range objectives of exchanges and formulation of guidelines
to eliminate conflicts and to assure maximum results; and
(b) an effective system for making information derived from
these exchanges available to all NATO members on a system-
atic and continuing basise
1, Agreement on Obiectives and Guidelines
Specific exchange programs should be left to the member
statesg but their, programs should be in accordance with a
general agreement which wouldo
(a) reduce duplication and conflict of effort, particu-
larly in the field of industrial and technological exchanges;
(b) prevent the Bloc from playing off one NATO country
against another in cultural contacts;
(c) focus NATO action on the areas of special difficultys
such as radio jamminge censorships and similar barriers to
the flow of information;
(d) develop an Alliance-wide consensus as to the need to
intensify existing programs and Alliance-wide suggestions
concerning new programs;
(e) provide joint financing of desirable projects by
the larger members of the Allianc~a
2, Pooling of..Informati.on
A mechar-ism already e~r~.sts in the Alliance whereby infor?
oration resulting from exchanges can be collected and made
0
S E C R E T
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0
X07 ~ -
mailable to the member stateso This systems howevers should
be formalized and broadenedo A useful device would be to
circulate periodic questionnairess similar to the one eireu-
lated by the Seer"etary-General before the abortive Summit
in 19608 requesting all members to report and assess their
experience in East-Hlest exchangeso The purpose would be to
contribute to a common anderstanding of the Soviet position
and ob~eetive,~ and to provide general information on Soviet
aetivitieso The International Staff could analyze this
information and de~-elop appropriate eonclusionso
The information which is shared among members of the
Alliance might also be made available to a wider audience
0 within the Allianeeo At presents there is little indication
that any basic intelligence is developed on the Soviet Union
as a result of exchange programss or that any information which
is developed goes beyond the staffs administering the programss
Semi annual meetings are holds howevers by officers responsible
for exchange proga^ams in the USs UI~s Germanys F'ranees and
Italy to compare notes on the negotiation and implementation of
these programso Although there is no eonneetion between this
group and NATOs the group could be instructed to ensure that
any intelligence or information which might be useful in
determining lmng~range objectives should be developed and
transmitted to NATO,
0
S E C R E T
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-108- S E C RET
IV, PB~cholo~;ica1 Gtlarfare
to Need and Means for Greater Coordination
Trade relations and informational or cultural exchanges
will have only limited strategic value unless they are conm
ducted within the Framework of a broad NATO strategy stressing
pspchcvlogical impact, In this field of psychmlogical warfare9
the USSR9 which orchestrates all aspecte~ of its relations with
O
non~Communist States to serve it,~ political objectives seams
well ahead of the Allianceo '
Sex^ious consideration should be given to greater use of
the Alliance in concerting peace?time psychological warfare
as a means of furthering long?range Alliance objectiveso
While the responsibility for marshalling resources and carry-
ing out psychological warfare programs should ..remain in the O
hands of the member states their efforts need to b? coordinated
to achieve optimum resultso The International Staff could be
used for necessary consultation and liaison9 as well as for
providing new ideas and encouraging national action,
Some initiatives have already been taken to focus attention
on the need for psychological warfare and on mechanisms to
carry it Data For escample9 the German resolution of 9 March9
19609 proposed a comprehensive plan for cooperation and coordina~
tion of efforts which might be used in the event of hostilitieso
The German proposals might be thoroughly explored and broadened
in scope to include peace-time activities9 as an initial basis
for greater emphasis on this key field o
S E C R E T
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Q
2, Content
One broad purpose for psychological warfare might be to
encourage doubts and self-qucstioning in the top level Soviet
bureaucracyo ~iThile the best methods of doing this are for
expert determination9 they should probably go beyond merely
seeking verbal victories over the Communistsa Polemical de-
bate on the relative merits of x?ival ideologies is unlikely
to affect Soviet policy,
That is required is a serious effort to introduce new
approaches and new argumentation which might have an intel-
lectual impact on the Soviet leadership e. Skillful psycho?
logical warfare should present a range of views to the Soviet
,~
leaders which9 by stressing the fact of diversity in the
modern worlde might induce self doubts about their judgments
and the infallibility of their system,
V o NATO and Arm, Gdnti~ols
A major tasl~ of the Atlantic Community in its relations
with the USSR during the 196o~s should be to explore any oppor~
tunny for progress in areas of mutual interest9 especially
arms control, The Atlantic nations and the USSR have a common
interest in trying to reduce the risks of allmout nuclear war
by rational arms controlse. Few developments could have a
greater impact on NATO security than progress in this field,
NATO must be prepared to meet this problem in the 1960~s
both on the plane of political maneuver and on that of
S E C R E T
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~, 110' -~
S E C R E T
O
substantive negotiat}ono
1o Political Maneuver
Up to now disarmament has been primarily an area of
political and propaganda maneuvero tdhether Soviet attitudes
will change sufficiently over the next decade to permit fruit-
ful negotiation cannot b? predicted, The USSRy like other
nationss as groping in this fielde The high value which it
sets on secrecy as a security asset may long bar acceptance
of the degree of inspection required fear certain types of
arms control agreementso
Un the other hand9 the Soviets have a real stake in
avoiding nuclear conflict and in inhibiting the Atlantic
nations from threatening nuclear force to counter develop
manta which they believe serve the Bloces interestso They
may come to regard agreements9 even with the sacrifice of
secrecy involved9 as worthwhile to this end, Their apparent
willingness to accept some degree of inspection to assure a
nuclear test ban must be viewed in this lighto
In any evente we must face the certainty of further
Soviet political warfare initiativ?s centered around the "ban
the bomb" and nuniversal disarmament'" themeso Agitation of
these issues which capitalize on underlying fears of nuclear
devastatioraa has already had considerable impacto As a consem
quencee NATU is faced with growing anxiety over the effects
of use of nuclear wreaponso These increasing political
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
inhibitions especially in a pea^iod of nuclear "stalemates'
may erode the credibility of NATO strategic That strategic
even if revised as proposed in this report9 would still
depend on the threat of strategic retaliation to deter .
certain types of aggression, It is essential9 therefore9
that NATO counter these Soviet "disarmament'" initiatives
on the political and propaganda warfare planes
20 Substantive Negotiations
Arms control agreements may offer potentially great
benefits as well as risks to NATO?s securityo It is
imperative that both be understoodo The first requirem
ment is to achieve consensus within the Alliance on the
relative risks and advantages which various options might
have and on the kinds of arms control agreements which
could enhance rather than weaken NATO,
These might include measures
(a) to reduce the risk of accidental or unintentional
(b) to avert an indiscriminate spread of national
nuclear weapons capabilities9
(c) to stabilise doterrence anti reduce its bard?ng
(d) to enhance regional security in particular areass
such as Europea
S E C R E T
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A major task for NATO should be to explore these-and
other possibilitiese to see which of them would serve its
interest. Joint study and planning by at least the major
NATO powers might be useful. NATO agreement should be
sought9 on the basis of such study, as to basic objectives
and guidelines for negotiating with the USSR in this field,
If such a NATO agreement could be reached9 a new
approach to the actual task of negotiation might be feasible.
Experience has shown the difficulty of several Atlantic
nations trying jointly to negotiate with the USSR about arms
control. The possibility of .reaching agreements consistent
with NATO policy could more z?eadily be explored if one
Atlantic nation9 i.e,9 the US9 did the negotiating within
the framework of an agreed allied position, The US could
then consult regularly with a steering group of the major
Atlantic nations most directly (e.g,a its four partners in
the late Ten Nation Disarmament Committee)9 and also consult
with the North Atlantic Council as at present. Allied
consent would, of course9 need to be obtained to any agree-
went that emerged.
There would doubtless be serious obstacles to securing
allied agreement on such a new approach to disarmament negoti?
ations. On the other hand9 it seems doubtful that agre??
merits can be secured if negotiations are conducted by more
than two or three nations, The choice for the Alliance may
S E C R E T
O
O
O
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x S E~ R E T m X13, ~.
a
be between some change in the existing negotiating method and
a continuing haunting doubt as to ~rhether the possibilities
for reaching arms control agreements with the USSR have been
fully explored,
S E C R E T
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a?
~~
~~
~ f1 ~
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESOURCES OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY
Table of Contents Page
Io Growth and the Use of. Resources-------------- 115
II, Coordination ?f Nayional Economic Policies
for Growth--?__.,______.~_____?____,~________.,__ hq
III, Trade and Economic Integration--------------- 1~]:
IV, Atlantic Community Payments Problem------__-- 12T
V, Scientific~Research and Manpower------------- 1~8
VIo NATO Military Production Pooling and Research
and Development_____________________s________ 3~?.
S E C R E T
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~I~A~FT~~ ~I~E
O
RES~URGES ?F T)f~E AI?ILA~TTI~__~Q;UNI~%
I o Growth and the ~.gee? ?f I~~~,?ur~~e~
To respond t? the chal:bengee ~?rafronting theraa9 the
Atlantic nations w~~.]l ha~re to assure the steady and rapid
growth of their economies and effect~.ve use of their resmurcesa
They atau+~t be canncerned wdith the gr?wth and use of re,aoux^ces o
Qa~ t? aaseet expanding needsa Qb- to pr?vide a basis for liberal
trade and ?ther policiee9 and Qc~ to offset Bloc p~nwea^o
1, T? 1~6eet Ex~sandn.na' Needs
?ver the decade9 the needle t~ be asst by the Atlantic
natl.ons affiay well prove to be very great o Population array
grow by soaanething like 10 percent in Western Europ? and 17
pendent in North Aaaaerica, Increasing ixrban~zatione together
with demands for improved schoolsn ho,epitals9 and comrnunicatiotisD
will' add heavily to the c?et of social overheado Ianproveanente
in per+~onal consumption will be sought and in aanany cases
are urgently neededo Techn?~.a~gic,al developanents in weapons
and competition in water space assay becoasae increasingly
co+~tly o High leve~ts of invrestamerat wall be needed to provide
the ba,~is for continu~:d gr?wtho Pina11y9 a greater material
contributimn to econoasaic de~rel?psasent abroad will be required
as the decade progresseso Vl~.gorous econ?sayic growth with
high eataplo~ataent wild. be needed t? acc
these. coaaspeting c]l,aians o
a~odate and reconcile
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20 As a Basis f?r Liberal Policies
A climate of growth will also be necessary for broader
reasonso Growth will encourage techn?lmgical pr?gress and
facilitate adaptation to changing cmmpetitive conditions and
shifts .in dernando It will ease adjusfrments by countries
within and without the new regional trading groups in Western .
Eur?peo Expansion in the Western industrial countries will
also strengthen demand for LDC exports of primary products
and the capacity mf Atlantic nations to absmrb without undue.'
disturbance more imp?rts of manufactures from the low-wage
countrieso rdore generallya c?nditions of rising demand
and employment are indispensaple t? the pursuit of liberal
grade policies which9 in turn9 contribute to further growths
3o Tc ?ffset soviet Growth
Finallye rapid growth is essential to the maintenance
of. the Atlantic power p?sition visma-vis the Com~aunist Bloco
The Atlantic nations now have a B to 1 superiority ,over the
Bloc in teraas of total output of goods and services and a
22 to 1 superiority in industrial production, ~hl~ Bloc
is expected to gs^ow at roach faster ratesg h?wever9 and to
devote a r>auch larger proporti~vn to building national powero
Total ,output of goods and service by tine NATO countries
is expected to risen with steady growth9 frol~a about $8$0
billion in 1~6? to something like $lfl~?0 billion in 197U9
.while the cmrrespcnding t?tal fir the ~ortamuahist B1?c is
s E G R E T
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-. T17. ;- _
0
expected to rise from about $400 billion to $~$? billion
over the same periodo
The NATO countries would thus maintain a considerable
superiority in total output in 19700 Over the decade as a
wholes however9 their added output will not greatly exceed
that of the Blocs By 19709 annual increments to output
may be of about the same order of magnitude for the Bloc
and for the Alliance,
But relative Bloc p?wer will be greater than the totals
suggest, By 1970 Bloc investment will about equal that of
the NATO countries in absolute amountsa And more of
it will be devoted to direct industrial investment which
may then considerably exceed similar investments by NATO
countries in absolute termso~ This is9 of course9 a key
factor in the projected faster rate of growth in total.
output in the Bloc than in the NATO countra.eso Thus for
selected purpcases9 mm whether this be investment9 outer
space9 military me~ans9 or foreign aid ?? the Communist
countries will be abbe to allocate resources rivaling or
exceeding those spent by the Western countries9 as a group,
to say nothing of the US alonee
Even today9 though total TJS investment considerably
exceeds that in the ~TSSR9 the amount investe.d~in industry
is probably of ab?ut the same size in the two countries,
S E C R E T
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O
The Atlantic nations ~,?uld clearly carry significantly
greater burdens fr.?m present resources with little sacrifice
in material welldbeingo In the next dec~ade9 they could
assume still greater burdensa if they achieve steady growtl~e
But neglect ?f growth could rapidly and gravely impair
Atlantic capability t? respond to the challenges which it,
faces,
4a Common Actions Required
? In the coming decade no single nationp?; not even the
United Statese well be able to provide all the resources
needed for the tasks aheado The Atlantic natiornc~;area in
fact9 interdependent, In recognition of this facia they.
shoulds
~a) coordinate ecpn?mic policy to attain sustained
and rapid economic growth
(b) consistently seep to reduce and remove restrictions
on trade with the goal of moving t?ward free trade at least
among the advanced nations9
(c) extend mutual exchange rate guarantees on central
bank. holdings of Atlantic State currencies and ,restrict
shifts in reserves,
(~d- create and maintain conditions conducive to maximum
scientific and technical pr?gresse
(e) Promote Alliance wide cooperati?n in weapons
researche development and productiono
O
S E C R E T
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0
.~ 119 ~ m .~
This Chapter discusses in turn these policy imperativeso
IIo Coordination ?f rational Economic Policies for Growth
Ecohomic policy coordination among key economies is
essential if sustained growth is to be achieved in the Free
World ,
1, Basic Reasons for Policv Coordination
The post?war economic growth record of the Atlantic
nations is spottyo Some states9 such as Germany and Frances
have attained impressive growth rateso Others notably the
US and the UKe have increased their output much more slowly
in recent yearso But m?st of them have experienced strains
of one kind or another which they have combatted with varying
degrees of successo Nduch remains to be doneQ by each nations
to ensure high and sustained rates of economic expansigne
without undue bursts of investments major inflation9 or
rather instabilities which necessitate counter measureso
The success of any one country in pursuing this objective
is conditioned by economic events and policies in other
countries9 especially the industrially developed ones,
Economic growth can proceed more rapidly if the major free
economies expand in step9 with concerted action to minimize
the rgsks to the balance of payments and to facilitate
correction of any difficulties without national restrictive
policies, The successful coordination of national policies
therefore becomes a matter of urgent c?ncern to the Atlantic
O countrieso
S E?~RE T
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O
20 ~I~plications of Economic Policy Coox^dination
Economic policy coordination has many implicationse two
of which need to be explicitly recognizedo
(a~ In formulating and applying its economic poli~.~e~s9~%.
each nation must take fully into account possible repercus
signs on other co~xntrieso To do thisa there must be willingness
to discuss freely all aspects of domestic economic policieso
In particular9 the IBS and other governments must be prepared
to discuss their budgetary and ~aonetary policies as a matter
,of common concern, IBS reluctance to do than has contributed
to European skepticism about the utility of the pr?posed
OECD, A change in IJS domestkc attitudes is essential for
success,
(b~ National governments mmust also seek to arrive at
a concerted view of appropriate policy objectiveso They
have actually assigned widely different pr?ior~ities to growth-
fostering investments9 to collective security9 to aid to
less developed countx^ies9 and to the immediate expansion of
consumptiono Such wide variations in pri?rities hardly seem
appropriate in a situation where c?mmon effox?ts are essential,
30 1~%achinery f?r Economic Policy Cooa?dination
The OECD should be a useful forum for econ?ffiic policy
coordinationo Without restricted Committees9 howevea^fl the
OECD is pr?bably already too large for effective action,
l~dore partgdipants impede co?rdinati?na inhibit frank discus
si?ne and lessen the px^?spects f?r fruitful c?nclusionso O
S E C R E T
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Some degree of OECD wide discussion is necessary of only
for. political reasonso
But the primary need as to concert economic policy
among the key economies the US9 the UK and members of
the European Economic Co~munaty, Together these countries
produce over ~?~ of Free World GNPo Within the OECD just
as within NAT?g methods should be developed for these nations
to work together more intamatelyo
As a minimum stepe meetings of the DECD Economic Policy
Committee should generally be based on preparatory work done
in a restricted Committee of senior economists of the highest
standing from the OECD Secre~:ariat9 the European Economic
Commassiong and the Governments of the United Statese
IInited ICangdom9 France, Germany and %talya Economists
could be co~o~ted from other states as appropriate9 on an
ad hoc basis,
As the European Community develops its members wall
be engaged more intimately in meshing a broad range of
economic policies and activstieso Their joint work will
greatly facilitate measures for wider coordination among
the Atlantic natsons~ especially if Britain and.other
European nations ultimately become members of the Community,
I%%o Trade and Economic %nte~ration
The Atlantic nations must consistently seek to reduce
and ~"emove trade restrictsons which are detrimental both
to the economic strength of the Atlantic Community and to
S E C IZ E T
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~. 1;22;; m m
its political cohesiono
S E C IZ E T
,1, The Atlantic Trading Pattern
The Atlantic States are linked to one another and to
the rest of the world by a highly developed trading system,
Over $O~ of. the total external trade of all NATO countries
is carried out among themselveso~ But almost a119 in
varying degree9 are highly dependent on raw materials and
energy imports from the rest of the worldo
The welfare of these highly interdependent economies
depends significantly on avoiding increased trade restrictionse
their rapid economic gr?wth on removing existing restrictionso
The marked progress within the past two years toward removing
.all quota restrictions on industrial goods9 has shifted
attention to the problems of agricultural trade and tariff
reduction,
2s Effects of Economic Integration
The Six member states of European Communities have
sought economic integration far beyond the mere removal of
trade barriersg with an ultimate political objective, The
Six are in the process of removing all gove~?nment barriers
to .the flow of tradee services9 laborfl and capita]. amongst
themselves of controlling private restrictions on competitions
and of evolving common commercials agriculturals and general
NATO countries account for 60j bf Free World trade9
EEC countries account for 24~ of Free World trades and EFTA
countries for 18%0
S E C R E T
O
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~,3 ,
Q
economic policieso
Their conviction is that increased competition8 speciali-
zation9 and economies of scale will lead to more rational
resource allocation9 more rapid growth ratese and higher
real incomes for their citizenso To cushion the internal
adjustment problems9 a European Bank has been provided to help
industry reconvert and a Social Fund established to help
labor adapt to the new system,
The adjustment problems for non?member countries will
vary with the extent and composition of their trade with
the Sixo In generals the Common Market willo (a) displace
some third country exportsa as internal tariffs disappear;
(b) absorb more imports as its economy expands9 (c) make
ite producers more competitive within the EEC and elsewhere9
and tend to hold domestic and attract outside capitalo
Expanding external trade should compensate for injury
to some specific outside producers and iridustriese especially
if the Six reduce the common external tariff on a multilateral
nondiscriminatory basis9 as planned,
3o Wider Trading Area
In purely economic termse formation of a still wider
European trading area should be beneficial, Thus a
Europe wide Customs Union should produce more economic
benefits than either the EEC or the EFTA separately9 but
also more adjustment problems for the US and other third
countrieso An Atlantic grouping theoretically would be still
S b C lZ E T
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betters at least for those in its In practical termse
howevers the test should be what is politically attainable
and. desirable in terms of national and Atlantic interest,
Certainly the IIS sh?uld~not oppose f?rmatimn of a broader
European trading area merely because it could complicate
US balance of payments prob7,emso By the same tokens the
political potential of the Six country integrations which
is discussed in Chapter 6s should not be c?mpromised merely
to ease the trade problems of other European stateso These
can be handled in other wayso
The best solution would be for the tJK to accept the
philosophy of the Common I~iarket and directly negotiate its
adherence on terms which did not sacrifice the political
institutions orsobjectives of the Sixo The UK should
be encouraged to adopt this courses In any cases the EEC
should be encouraged to follow liberal policies to mitigate
the difficulties of otherse particularly states such as
Austria and Switzerlands highly dependent on trade with
the EEC but apparently unable to join for political reasonso
Failing broader EEC memberships the Atlantic nations
can gradually adjust to the new situations At the end of
the EEC and EFTA transitional periodsa Atlantic economic
relations would be much the same as at present between
national states except that the number ?f units will have
been reducede facilitating intra~Atlantic area coordinations
S E C IZ E T
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a
and the truly integrated groupe the EECe will be stronger
than the sum of its parts otherwise would have been,
The long?range problem is to prevent integrated arease
such as the EEC and the i7S9 from turning inwarc~~and erecting
or maintaining restrictions detrimental to the strength
of the Atlantic area as a wholeo F?or the long?range problem9
as for the short?run adjustment problemse what is initally
i
required is reduction of tariffso The ultimate goal should
be to nao~re toward free trade at least among the advanced
countrieso
In this process9 the US must be in a position to play
a major roles by being ready to negotiate substantial
O further tariff concessions in GATT, 'Otherwise it will
have little leverage to assure that the EEC and EFTA
follow liberal trading policies or to prevent revival of
the Six?Seven quarrel with all its attendant strains on
the Allianceo
Thus to meet the Atlantic trading needsa like those
of the LDCBS~ the D'S should revise its trade agreement
legislation to permit negotiation of substantial tariff
reductions in GATTe preferably on an acrossmthe~board basis,
but perhaps by broad categories of products, Domestic
measures should also be adopted to facilitate adjustment
by US industry and labor to an increased volume df imports,
3o The OECD and Trade
O Trade problems are of world?wide concer?ne With
S E C R E T
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-~ 1:26''.-~ .
convertibility there is no longer a financial reason for..
discrimination against dollar imports and consequently
little reason for eactension of the OEEC Code of Trade
Liberalizationo The primary forums in which to discuss
exchange restrictions, QRs9 and tariffs are now certainly
the I1KF and GATTo
The DECD cans howevere play a limited role in support
of GATT and 1NSF, The OECD could and should study specific
trade problems of the Atlantic area but their resolution
should normally be left for negotiation .in GATT or bilaterallyb
The OECD might also focus attention on sectors where
misallocation of effort is so glaring that remedies could
significantly free resources for more rational used At
least three sectors merit such priority attentions agriculturee
energye and shipbuilding, Greater European acceptance of
agricultural and energy imp?rts could undoubtedly free
substantial numbers of European. workers for more productive
occupationso Greater American reliance on the European
merchant marine and shipbuilding industries could .free
unquestionably US lab?r and capital for more
productive employmento
In these ways9 among others the economic strength of
the Alliance as a whole might be increased, These are
precisely the sectorss however9 where social considerations
loom largest and special interest groups are well entrenchedo
S E C R E T
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i
Despite limited prospects for success9 the DECD should endeavor
to develop coordinated Atlantic agricultural8: energy and
shipping policieso
IVo Atlantic Community Payments Problems
1, Reasons for Concern about Payments Relations
The declining ratio of iTS gold holdings to short-term
liabilities to foreigners is a matter of c~~acerno But
clearly the ~JS should not be diverted by this concern from
carrying out vital aid and defense policiese The more
relevant limiations on our capabilitiesa as on those of our
a~llie~9 are limitations on real resourceso
It is truee however9 that shifts of liquid balances from
one center to another raise questions as to ways of strengthen-
ing the international payments mechanism, The existence
in any country of large foreign owned balances is~~both an exp res-
sign of confidence in the strength of its currency and a
potential threat to it in time of straino In a world
where both the dollar and the Pound Sterling are widely
used as reserves for other national currencies sudden
shifts of large dollar or sterling valances by central.
banks could easily destroy confidence a.n one or another of
these currencies with disastrous effects on the entire
structure of international finance9 trade and production,
In these circumstance+~e some critics regard as anach-
r^onistic and undesirable a system whereby one or more national
0
S E C R E T
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--~ 1~8~ ,
currencies serve as international reserve mddia, They would
favor the creation of a special medium and of a central
bank for central banked
2, ..Remedies
The situation does not appears howevers to c3a11 for
so radical a solution ?r for one which would require major
changes in the IMF?o On the contrarys the grant of an
exchange guarantee would go far to reduce the risk that a
crisis of confidence in the dollar might develop, Consequentlys
quiet US entry into the EMA with ate provisions for mutual
exchange rate guarantee could contribute significantly to
the financial stability of tY~e free world,
In this connections the US shoulde together tivith the UKe
seek commitments that other OECD member states would hold
a minimum proportion of their national reserves in dollars
or sterling and not shift reserves9 without full consultAm
bons from one currency to another or into gold,
While these measures would add needed strength to the
international payments mechanisms they area of course9 no
remedy for situations involving structural balance of
payment difficultieso
V, .Sdientafic Research and 1wlanuower
1, Nature of the Problem
The future of the West is dependent in large part on
the rate of scientific and technological advanced Efforts
of the Atlantic states to progress jointly in these fields
S E C R E T
0
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would be desirable for social and economic reasons in a
world devoid of Communists given Soviet concentration on
.science and its military applicationsa Such efforts are
imperativeo
Soviet achievements in the miseil~ field furnish
" dramatic evidence of existing Communist scientific and
technological capabilitiesa At the same time, available
statistics, while inadequatee strongly suggest that the USSR
is building toward a commanding lead over the Atlantic States
as a whole in the education of engineers and technicians,
and in annual graduation of science majorso Thp long run
implications .in terms of relative Communist 'aloe and
Atlantic Community ability to deal with global security
and economic development problems are most serious,
The Atlantic nations shoulde therefore, endeavor to
create and maintain conditions conducive to maximum
scientific and technical progresso They must make optimum
use of existing scientific and technological capabilities;
they must also maintain future superiority in face of major
? Soviet efforts to forge ahead,
tahatever the future, the scientific and technological
resources of the Atlantic Community are today substantially
superior to those of the Soviet Bloca The scientists,
engineers, laboratoriese universitiesa and factories of
these nations constitute an enormii~aus asset mm an asset
S E C R E T
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which presently is not being fully utilizedo It is imperative
that the Atlantic States make new efforts to draw on this
asset,
The .NATO Science Committee9 the NATO Science Advisor
and the OEEC Science and Manpower Committee have made a useful
beginning but their two principal activities to date need,
to be stepped up and additional activities initiated,
2e .Principal Current Activities
(a) Comparison of National Efforts
In part these Atlantic agencies "examine" national
effortse point out shortcomingse compare pplicies~ and
encourage appropriate national corrective actionso
Thus9 the long-run educational problem depends for
its solution primarily on national decisionse inter alia9
to emphasize mathematics in primary and secondary schools,
to provide additional research facilitiese to raise teacher
salaries and to adapt traditional university organizational
patterns to new problems,
.International collaboration can help induce actions
and decisions suitable to the needso For examplee the
pending report ~dlncreasing the Effectiveness of Western
Science"se sponsored by the NATO Science Committees outlines
numerous ways to improve the current situation, Its proposals
are. often not dramatic9 but this is an area for persistence
and NATO should c?ncentrate on building awareness of the
dangers of failure and stimulating national efforts,
S E C Pw E T
_,~
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Greater efforts should be made to bring men responsible
for national science policy in member governments together
regularly to compare problems to indicate successful solutions
in their own countriese and to become better aware of
problems that exist elsewherea
(b~ Joint Research
The Science C?mmittee has attempted to identify
scientific fields such as oceanographye meteorologya and
space research that require or would benefit from joint
research, It has also sponsored fellowships and other
common educational activitieso
Here too much more could be donee especially in
applied researche More generous financing for the fellow-
ship programe for conferencesa and for exchanges of individuals
for research purposes could enormmusly speed the research
process within the Atlantic Community, .
3, Additional Activities
~a) Inst~.tute of Science and Technolo~v
Une educational pra~blem that should be tackled as a
matter^ of priority is establishment in Europe of a graduate
Institute of Science and Technology roughly comparable to
the Massachusetts Institute of Technologyo l~To educational
area in Europe has been more neglected than engineering,
Creation of a full?fledged modern Institute of Science and
Technology would require large resourcesa perhaps in excess
O of national capabilitiese
S E,C R E T
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It should9 therefore9 be undertaken on an international
basis9 with the US providing some initial organizational
and professional talento The US should make known its
willingness to cooperate in such a venture either on an
Atlantic basis or more likely in support... of the European
Universitye plans for which are well advanced,
(b) C?operation.in Applied Research
The Science Committee and the` Science Advisor have been
active in fields of basic research but do not yet have
major programs in applied research csr technological areaso
Here the normal barriers to communication between technical
people are greater9 as a result arf military or commercial
secrecy and the lack of as effective an international
"'community"' ,
The NATO Science Committee might be able to fill an
important role by establishing a mechanism to examine
specific scientific and technical fields (as opposed to
national programs) to identify weakness9 gapsy duplication
and special opportunities, Such a mechanism could point
out opportunities for sharing of facilities and exchange
of personnel9 highlight weak and strP~ng areas to help
avoid waste9 identify neglected arease and uncover duplication,
The common understanding that would result could lead to
more extensive joint planning and joint research,
S E C It E T
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(c) Scientific Advice for SHAPE
The NATO Science Advisor and Science Committee have
been active in prova.ding advice for the military side of
NATO and in working ,jointly with the military on technical
questionso It would seeme howevere that this relationship
could be further expanded with beneficial results,
The Science Committee could be the sponsor of technical
studies of interest to the military, It could form scientific
panelse consisting of leading scientists from NATO countries9
to advise on the technical aspects of various military
problems such as limited warfare8 communicationse etco These
studies and panels would provide objectivee unbiased advice
on the military problems of NATO and would also involve
Eus?opean scientists more intimately in the military side
of the Alliance,
It is hard to know a.n advance how much is feasible in
these last two fields of possible activityo The effort
would have to be built up over time and approached subject
by subject in scientific research or development fields,
For some-major problems and arease industrial or other obstacles
will make progress slowe but the attempt is essential to
tap the great scientific and technological potential now
unrealized in the advanced free nationso It may not be
decisive Howe but it could be in the future as the USSR
continues to devote extensive resources to technological
O advance, Without better scientific integration, the non-
: E G R E T
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S E C It E T
communist nations may gradually fall behind,
A series of meetings of top science policy people of
the member countries`~should be held to explore how such
NATO mechanisms might work9 what their advantages would be,
and precisely what subjects might be tackled, Clearly
such activities would eventually require a fairly large
staff .and the formation of many advisory panels, presumably
in the NATO Science Advisores office, If the mechanisms
worked at all, a decade of systematic effort might yield
results highly significant for the strength c~ the West,
4o NATO and the OEEC-OECD in Science
Though both NATO and the OEEC~OECD have science
programs, there has been to date little overlap in
their efforts, The,OEEC has concentrated more on education
in the sciences and particularly on developing curricula,
attacking specific problems in one or another countryo
NATOB on the ether hande has taken a broader approach -
of instituting large new programs such as research grants
and joint .caceanographic research programs, The international
staffs have worked closely together, Programs do not
compete but are complementary to each other, this situation
must~be maintained in the futureo
VIo NATO 141ilitarv Production Pooling and Research and Development
to The Nature of the Problem
~?ew areas have been as promising in potential8 but. so
frustrating in practice9 as that of inter allied cooperation
S R E T
O
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O
,~ -_
in weapons development and pr
ducti?no The facts of mutual
dependence for security have simply not permeated national
defense establishmentso There are indeed current prd~gX?ams
f?r the declassification and exchange of technical informati onfl
joint researchg weapons standardization9 and common production
but so far they do not go far ena~ugh below the, surface to
meei~ the fundamental problem,
If integration of national military forces is to be
effective9 standardization of equipment is imperativeo It
would be highly perilous9 in the technol?gical race with
the S?vietss t? fail t? tap the full resources of European
as well as American ingenuit~o Above a119 a failure to .
seek c?llective effort in munitions production tends to
discredit the collective character of the Allianceo
2, Existing Programs
Progress made in recent years supports the belief
that existing programs can and should be inten~sifiedo The
Ndutual Weapons Development Program ~MWDP) of the United
States has been successful in fostering R and D programs
in Europe, .Recent pr?grams have secured coordinated large-
scale products?n in Europe ?f s?ph~sticated weapon systems9
eog,9 the Fml?4 airplane and the HAWK gr?und?to?air missiles
These programs achieve weapons standareiization automaticallya
They stand9 more?ver9 as sya~b?ls ?f a break through in
exchanging sensitive weapons inf?rmati?n among the allies,
O
S E ~ R
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S E C R E T
Tn addition9 the establishment of NATO technical
centers like that for Air Defense and research groups
like that for Air R and D (AGARD) is very promising, Zhe
Aar Defense technical center is now being complemented
by NATO centers for anti-submarine research and .for~.ground
iaarfareo
There is scope both for other centers and for an
extension of the work of the centers already in existence
beyond the purely technical evaluation of weapons,
weapon innovation and invention, The evolution of the Air
Defense Technical Center to evaluate the proposed air defense
system for Europe as a whole is perhaps the first major
case in pointo Care should be taken, however, to prevent
the new centers from developing in isolation from each
other, In the future, it should even be possible and
desirable to establish operations research groups for NATO,
similar to those for the military services in the USo
There is reason for qualified ?ptimism about production
and R and D in NAT? in the extent of recent progress,
which can be used as a bases for future development, New
impetus may be provided by the changes in strategy recom-
mended elsewhere in this Reporto Yesterdays weapons will
not do for effective non?nuclear defense, A re-vitalized
and qualitatively strengthened Shield will require new.
ideas9 new tactical cot~ceptsg and new means of implementation,
S E C R E T
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Technicaily9 the comparatively unexploited area of non
nuclear weapons offers great chances for possibly revolu-
tionary advancee politically9 the new program would be less
prejudiced by old national fixationso
3 o Prosrams for 1~Tew Weapons
The objective should be new weapons programs sparked
by change in strategyo But how are they to be achieved?
Yt would hardly be feasible to carry on a~fully integrated
inter allied program of concurrent research9 development and
production for a specific novel weapon or class of weaponso
'The administration of such an effort by 15 countries would
be too cumbersomeo
Firms or even so~ae gover~nnents will not undertake
multiple attacks upon difficult technical problems without
a good prospecb or subsequent pr~?oduction contractso If
production contracts are not achieved9 the firms lose both
money and prestigeo Some way should be found to reduce
these penalties9 and to make It and D separably profitable
without assurance of production contractso
iZ and D programs should try to meet this problem,
The current Idiutual Weapons Development .Program of the
United States with its allies9 for example9 works well in
terms of proved technical accomplishment from small budgets,
But with budgets so smalll and pressures so great for tangible
proofs of early pa~egress~ incentives are strong to bet
0
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S E C R E T
MWDP funds on the certain and rewarding projectso What is
needede in additions in view of the nature of R and D
is the means to dev?te considerable resources to more
imaginative and risky ventu~eso
4,. A NATO Mi~.itary Research Corporation
The establishment of an autonomous NATO Military
Research Corporation with sizeable financial resources to
invest in weaponry research contracts and technical studies
of military problems, such as comtnunications~ logistics9
-and weapon system requirements might assist in solving
many basic R and D problems of the Alliance,
In liaison with SHAPE ?nd the Science,Committee9 such
a Corporation w?uld provide a means of obtaining unbiased
non_national technical advice on the military problems
of NATO and would also serve to involve. European scientists
and industry mire intimately in military problemso Ultimately,
if .the Corporation proved to be of value in the R and D
fields it might be adopted to assist the NATO staff in
organizing common production planso
So Production Problems
Standardizing the military equipment of the NATO
members would obv%ously produce great advantages in economy9
convenience and effectivenesso The difficulties are also
apparent and well documented by experience,
Time has not been available for any careful study of
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
~-3~~s
this fieldo It seems essential to stress its importance9
however9 and t? submit a few commentsa especially ?n
standardizing through agreed programs for joint or common
production or specialized productiono
(a) In connection with possible NATO common production
schemes9 infrastructure programs do not necessarily provide
an entirely adequate pattern, Common financing for programs
of common benefit is very at~ractive~ as are the features
of free competitive bidding within the Alliance and procedures
such as duty free entry to minimize costs, But for these
advantages a price has been paid in terms of delay, Since
lead-times in weapons must b~: cuta not lengthened9 traditional
,infrastructure procedures would have to be revised before
application to weapon programsa
(b) For. straight productions assuming technical
possibilities are fairly well knowns concentration on one
or a few suppliers will best serve the interest of economy
and expeditions Concentrating production of a specific
item in one nation will be toleratedfl however only if
at is reciprocated for other itemso Unless the US
becomes a significant buyer of material produced in
Europe9 as it shoulde then European~p~?oduction to replace
US sources for European military uses must be encouragedo
Where the NATO members can standardize on specific weapons
for all NAT? fmrces and work out an acceptable balance of
t
O
S E ~?R E T
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S E C R E T
ntwo-way*' trades this is the simplest way to obtain the
benefits of specializations The obstacles are clearly
seriouso
(c) Given the political and economic realities,
coordinated production of a particular item may be a more
feasible way to obtain the benefits from standardizing
upon one weapon for all NATO fortes, This solution is far
better than the present method of separate national pro-
duction without much mutual trade, Thus9 the embryonic
coanmon production programs should be acc'e~.erated9 but the
NATO members should also take more steps toward the
simpler solution of adopting weapons developed or produced
elsewhere as the US did9 for example9 in adopting the
French SS-11 anti-tank missile instead of one developed
here,
Requirements for Weapons Cooperation
The requirements for cooperation in weapons that emerge
from these considerations areo
(a) to establish a new need for non nuclear weaponry;
(b) to expand technical centerse advisory groupse and
operating research centers to explore mutual weapon systems
problems;
(c) to formulate bolder MGVDP programsa try to make R
and D programs .profitable in themselvesfl whether followed
by production contracts or Hots and to get scientific and
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
engineering groups in NAT? countries competing in research
and the early stages. of de~relopment~
(d) to establish an autonom?us ~7ATD lyiil3.tary Research
Corporation with substantial financial resources to further
these specific objectives
~e) to facilitate the exchange of technical information
even furtherg
(f) t~ intensify efforts to secure coordinated pro
duction of major materiel; in Europe which will9 among
other'meritsfl foster s$andardization~
(g) to move toward mare reciprocal purchase of weapons
and especially move US buyinb of European?developed
weap~ans,
Care must be exercised to avoid grandiose multi national
programs before R and~D has moved through early testing
phasese to mitigate any uneconomic spreading of production
among too many suppliersg and to ensure that multi-national
schemes will be consistent with acceptable lead-timesa
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
CHAPTER SIX
THE REQUISITE POT.ITICAI, FRt~ME~IORIC
Table mf Cout?nt~._ P
Io The Political Pr?blemm?~~~mooom~.m?oom?mo?mmom-~~~:
II, The Evolving Relatien~ ammr~g the Atlaxatic
III o Structure of the Atla~atic Comm~itymm?mmo~??a ~-
I~Po Improving Joint P?licy~Makir~gm~=~?ommm~omm~~,~ ~~
Vo Public Supportmm~~~~mm~~G~m~~m~
S E C R E T
moo?mo~omoom :~~8,.
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CHAPTER SlX
THE RE4iJISITE . P.OLITICAI. ~'R.~D2Ei~lORIC
Io The Political Problem
To meet the formidable cha~,lenge before us will require
clarity of purpose9 large resources9 and steady effort over
an exteaaded periodo the basic issues of security9 stability9
and growth cannot be resolved fmr decadeso '
Even if the Atlantic Community were a single state9 able
to speak with one voice and decide and act as a uanitn it
would find great difficulty ia~ meeting the tasks facing ito
The ~a.in problem is not resourceso As has been Saida the
O members of the Community can produce adequate means both
human and mat?riala to respond to the longers aasd the oppor~
tunitieso But the problems are extremely complex and stubm
born, .Even as a unified democracya the Atlantic Community
would fined it hard to marshall and apply its means over the
long~~term when the danger is not imminent assault but gradaaal
er~~sion o '
The Atlantic nations area however, far from unified,
IdAT09 of coursefl reflects the national interests and outlooks
of fifteen sovereign nations9 varying in sire from Ice~,and
to the IJS, Each has its own backgro~xndD its own traditions9
and its own concept of national interesto In influence arad
^ respons~,bs.iitiesa they range from the global to the parochialo
S E C R E T
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Se~~h vrar?gat~,~ns crv~at~ ~nh~r?~nt px~?~r~~ms ~n era t~l~,~,arac~
ma?gan~,~~d mn a bases ?f ~?v~r??~gn ~gaaal~,tyo Duu?~,ng the .~_.~'S~~"sfl
whirl tla~ main assumes w~~~ the r~~mv~r^y and Comm?n d~f~ras~ ?f
T+~'?st~rn Easa??p~9 a~~, m?mb?a~sa ~,a~g~ and sma11.>I,.~ s&aar?~d ~, c~mata?n.
fm~us bm~~ad]Ly rasp?nsa~r? t~ the Lasko N~r~9 ~nmw?~r~a?9 as t~n~
AtS.antac nat~~ns faces a m~a?~ ~~mpl~x sit mf ~.ssues9 there ~s
].~~~ cmnsensus as t? hmw tm meet themd S?vget stress ~n
detea~ate and cmexbsten~e dampens the ~mpetras fmr? a ~?mm?n
ta?ategy and the w~,71~ t? da~ert resmur?~es fr?mm ~?caa~, weY.far?e
t~ defense and f~re~,gra affa~rso The br~ad~r spe~traam ~f mmeces~
eery act~mn tends t~ r~~dern the gap betweern the ~aa?ge and sma~,~. o
The key ~ss~ae fmr the rne~t decade may be whethea~ the
~.tgant~c natgmns ~~ amd espec~al~~y th?~se wath mmst power and
$rxf~uen~e ~~ wrb~~. be atr>~e tc aaaake tta?aa? pexternt~,a~ eff'ect~ere
~.ra tlae strragg~e t? ca?eate arad defend a ~~,ab1Le w?rld ?~der con
geraiai t? free sm~iet~,e
Tn dm so w31~. require re~at~.?ns
and institutions t? Emcees their p?iitica~, wiY.l and sense ?f
At preseaat9 th~~I strtu~taare ~f r~elati~ras arad irastitaat~,?ras
r~ithin the tltlarati~ ~~ma~nuaraity pis bra tr?arasitimn o any aner~r insti~
tote?ns ?r meth?ds wi7L~, have tm take acc?u~t mf existia~g ~?xa~
diti~ns and trends o
I~ o The Evmlwirn~
~ o Relati~re Strene~th crf Forceps
The re~r~,val, of Europe sia~ce i9$0 has greatly m?dified
S ~ ~ iZ E T ~
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Y~S~~_
the power x?elationship between Western Eua^ope and the ~So
In the last decade9 the US was dominant in the Al~Lianceo It
provided the St~C swo~?d mn which lEaanrope ~ ~ securitq was based
contributed most to the SACEtT1Z shieYd,~ and provided the
sinews both for European economic recoverq and its rearmamento
Todag9 the European states have made a phenomenal economic
recovergg their rate of economic expansion exceeds that of
the T7S,`~,l~ar from requiring US economic assistance9 Western
Europe is now cma~peting vigorous~Lq with the US in world
marketso Simultaneouslg9 the growth a~f soviet economic and
miYitarq powe~? has raised some doubts in European ages regard
ing a~elative LTS s~trengtho
Both their recoverq wand their doubts have contributed
to a new dense of p~~,itical independegac? in Western Eunre~p~aD
with some revival of nationaYismo With new self~confidence,~
the Europeans aspire to an influehce aaad a rose reflecting
their strength om or their p~tentialo Theq are x?estive math
their past position and seeking in various wags to correct ito
~o The European Community
The creation of the European Communitg9 under coarmaon
institutions9 is in part prompted'bq this a~pirationa The
progress toward integration" ixa cesntinexnta~, k-'estern Europe has
been one of the striking featisa?es. of the past decadeo The
dgnamism of the movement to date and its inher~aat Yogic ~ug~
gent that still greater unitq is likelq to be achieved in tine
S ~ ~ IZ E T
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newt decade despite differing ~onc~pts cf. the~O?mmua~ity ans~
thc~ re~.at~dns am?ng its',. memb?~~ o
From the European vi~wpoia~t9 greater ttxnity i~ esi~ential
if Eua?op?~ns ar? ten have any signif~.cant cmx~tr?S~ of :.their
axwn destinies axed exercise appreciabie infiueaac? in a ~amr~d
inhabited by p?ve?rs ?f the siz? of the t~S g the USSR and Red
Chigaao Equa~,~,y iraportant9 Eurmp~an rxnity cmuld heap sm~ly?
cnr ~nitigat? many of the divisive c]Lash?~ of interest nmw cmnm
frmnt~.ng the At~.antic natimnso In terms of rdstnurces and
GN~'n the ~.argest European members represent oni~' ~O ten. ~,~
percent as mach as the ~Bnited Stateso With such disparity9
eq~na~ infiuence mn common p?7Licy is cut ?f the question9
whatever the f?x~i~s mr fictions, , The resaxit is frequent Eric=
ti?n and frustr~timnD l~ading~ to uxai~,ateral xaatimxaa~. acti?n,
A Europe aisle tai act a~ an effeactive ?ntity eeould dam
serve and could.exerci~e c?mparable influexace ?n common
pmli~y and actiono Dispensing res?urces much nearer to thos?
?f the Un~,ted States Bauch a Eurmp~ cmtxld ~e~an gn the genta~,ne
partnership cf equal,s,
3o The UK and "Outer Savant'
One ?f the ?bstaclesa hmwev~r9 to the creatimn ?f ffiuch
a partn?rship is the p?sit~?n ?f the Uni$,eci I~ingd?m axed tine
?Gcalled "Outer Sev,~n", Br?~,tain faces difficu~.t ch~aiceso
In the~.r attitude t?ward European integrati?n9 the British
have been t?rn between the recc~gniti?n that clmse Franc?~
S E O R E T
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S E C R E T
Germaxa a?elations can enhance Talestern strength and the fear
that t~i~ coalescence of the Six would inevitably impair
Britain's position, .._
~Jith three times the peop~.e and resources9 the Community
threatens to relegate the UK t~ a much smaller role in the
Atlantic Communityo The British economic alliance in thy:
"Seven" with neutral stat?s and NATO members has only a
limited politic all basise ~lhatever its economic advantages
for its members9 its political future as a regional group
appears highly uncertaino
If integration continues9 the European Community will
more and more be a sourc? of great military and economic powers
whose membersa if they act as a unitf,will have a formidable
voice in the decisions of the Allianceo The adherence of
Britain would9 of course9 greatly strengthen the Communitieso
If the tJK stays outs its relative economic and political pma
sition will be weakened with adverse effects on the Alliance,
Conseci~tently9 a reappraisal of the British relation to tFa~;
Communities would be in the common interesto
~o The Broader Need
The diversity of interest and ?a~t~Look ?f its ffiembers anti
the differing national approaches to the restructuring of
Europe -sev~r?ely ?train the cohesion of the Al1~,ance and the
capacity of its members to concert'their efforts for creative
defense as well as for their nonmilitary tasksp
S E C it E `T
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m . 1~-8
The Atlantic nations haves ho~rre~era recogni~e~R the need
to find firmer bases for ~ooperation9 especially in the poli~
tical and ~~onomic fields aaad beyond the NATO area o ~Siaice-~
the Report of the Committee of Three in i956~ the NATO ~ousa~
cal has made real prog~a?ess ?in closer consultation among the
memb?r?,regarding proposed p?licy and actionso The mcbr+~
active rose of the Sec~etary~G?neral has also been an imm
portent forward stepo Doubtless existing prop?daxres stilll
leave much rmom fos^ improv~nento They fall short of pr?~
d~,ucing the common strategy or priorities r?~guired for con
ducting th? v~orld~wid? efforto
~In the economic fi?ld9 the decision to reconstitute
OEEC with the STS and Caaaada as faall memb?rs was a r~c~mg~
nation of the n?ed for as n?~ orientati?n and dir?etion in
Atlaantip institutions, The n?w OECD can b? of great valu?
in enabling the Atlantic Community to concert ec?rae~mic
polici~as within the Atlantic area and to reorient thinking
and resotarces of its members to ~, e,~orld~wid~ perspe~tiv
focussed especiall,?y on ps~oblems of ec?na~pmic deve~e~pment o
The analysis of earlier c~saptersa howev~r~ leas reG
peatedly indicated the need for a at~ore Integrated point
effort by the Atlantic nations over the c?ming decad?o The
question is hoaa common strategy and priorit~s caa~ be attalnedo
Should it be sought through new insA;?itution~? Can tkid
existing agencies be made mores effective
O
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Ill, :Structure of the Atlantic Com~raunit~
1, .Atlantic Confederation?
In the perspective of the next decade9 should the At=
lantic nations set themselves the g~nal of creating an Atlantic
Community or Confederation with comanon institutior~~?
Whatever may ultimateYy developfl a number of factors
argue against such a decision as of notro
~?or the coming decade, the urgcrat need is for capability
to create unified policies and to mobili~~ resourpes and
effort to carry them Dote An Atlantic Confederation w~xuld
be relevant to these demands exnYy ~.f it were delegated sub?
stantial powers for decision and actin, .Merely ceremonial
or formal, institutions without real transfers of authority
would be of no valu? for these purposes,
The situation is not ripe for such measures in the near
futttreb Conditions migt}t change radically and rapidly if
experience demonstrates that existing and prospective insti~
tutions are cle~x?ly inadequate cr ineffective to cope with
the challenges of the coming decadeo At present,~political
opinion certainly does not appear tm be at that point in the
united States9 and probably in other countries as wello
A decision to move toward an Atlantic Union before the
necessary domestic political, support has developed for such
far reaching action would risk failure at the outseto It
O daould also create new divisive forces within the Alliance,
S E C R E T
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150 ~~
S ~ ~ R ~ T
~eopardi~e the de~el,opment of European integration9 and gen~
erate serious political problems within the individual
stateso It might divert attention and energies from the
Saxviet threat and the plight of the ~,~,~~ developed countries
in order to concentrate on political problems involving West
?rn in,~titutions9 three perpetuating the parochial viewpoint
r~hich prevailed during much of the last decadeo
All th?se factors s?em to dictate a flexibll,e and
gradualist approach baseei on adapting end suppler?nt-~.ng
existing institutionse This .does not mean ta~~,.ng a decision
against the concept mf an Atlantic ~?nfederation as an ulti~
mate goal,, On th? contrarya?thy option to creat? it should
not b? foreclosed either by decision or spedific...actions~o
F?or th? present9 ho54~'?ver,~ the best m?~aa~a~ toJ $'ost~r its pro
pacts mill be to develop concrete mays of wtrrking together
and to encourage the progress to European itategr~tiono
2, The .Atlantic Interest in European ~nte~ration
As the Oommittee oft Threes suggest~d9 mcavres toward AtU
lantic cooperation and European amity shoult$ be cc~mplementaryo
]Cndeed9 the broad interests of the Atlantic Commun~.ty ~voxald
be served by utilising the polit~:dal and ecdnomic gains of
Western Europe xhich h~~ve already been achieved and r~hich can
be expected to develop in the n?~ct decades
A strong political and ecmnomic unit fad Western Europe9
in alliance with the IIS9 would contribute d~~isively to the
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S ~ C ~ ~ T
political cohesions economic health9 and military strength of
the Atlantic Community as a wholes The development of common
~tnropean institutions provides an organic basis for contain
J ing national rivalries.: and promoting pranco~German friend
ship and cooperationo
Such an entityD able to combine the resources of its
members and to unify their policies would supply the essential
foundation for equal partnership with th? united Stateso Its
existence should facilitate the creation of clos?r. links and
joint agencies or institutions between Europe and the United
States9 and thereby enhance the strength and cohesion of the
O Atlantic Communityo
Consequently9 suppmrt for ~asx?opean integration and the
principles on which it is based are in the interest of the
Allianceo ~t should become increasingly cl?ar to the ~Inited
Kingdom that its interests would be similarly serveda It
would be g~?eatly to the long range benefit of the Atlantis
Coanmunity if the tTK were to join the Commtanities rn~ithout
reservations which would cripple their eff~etiven?ssa
3o NATO and OECD
The foregoing analysis leads to a pragmatic approach to
Atlantic institutionso Ov~r~the ~~ming decade? the Atlantic
nations will clearly have to coll~sborate much more closely
to discharge the key tasks discussed in this rep?rto The
O forum and instruments would9 however9 be selected according
S E C It ~ T
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x:52 ^~
S E ~~ R E T
to what ~~ beat suited to the specific activities, The mili~
taa~g~ m~a~ures mould obviously be carried out through NATO9
and mould require building on and developing the unified
command and supparting structure for the NADPT proposal and
f'or expansion of joint research and development and ~,reapons
programs, In the economic fielda in addition to national
actions9 heavy reliance would b~ placed for ~ecut~,on on
~. ,.
international agencies (such as the IBRD9 IDt~9, IMPS TYN
Special Punch ?PEIC and other IAN agenciesfl sand G~TT~ for.
reasons already consideredo
But major policy fields would remain in the political
and economic areaso The question might be raised whether
these should be divided between ATA,TU and ~PCD -as ~notr~ c~mnt~m~
plated err consolidated in NAB?o ~~~ conversion ?f OEPC
into ?ECD involves changes ~.ri membership and functionsa tine
new act~.vities alight easi~,y lave been centex?ed gn the Nt~TO
Council and Staff, ~niithout rehearsing the reasonsa howrever9
there appear good grounds for not fdglowing this courses but
centering the economic functions primarily in another atlantic
instrumento The efforts to coordinate economic policies to
foster economic growth ~:n the less developed countries and
to regularise trade relations seem sufficiently specia~.i~ed
to benefit from an expert staff concentrating mainly on themo
These activities acre more l~.kely to evolve and develop in
response to need and experience under those conditionso
S P C IZ P T
~- i
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S.ECItET
The role ?~ OECD9 ho~ever9 ~.~ not ~itlaout difficultieso
Should the DECD becomes next to NATO9 the second maj?~ insti~
tutiona~. tie b~txeen th? Atlantic nations9 its ?perations may
be affected by the presence of the European neural stateso
Thin fact can b? o~ certain advantage in terms of possible
r~l.ations r~ith the LDCe~ or as an attractive force for Soviet
European satelliteso On the ether hand9 ?the presences of the
n?utra7,s gr?atly complicates t~? task of a~afl~ing the OECD an
effective instrument for undertaking programs which have a
predominant political utcxti,vati?n~ especially those involving
burden=sharingo The determination of the limits imposed by
the n?utrals and the problems of some smaller states9 h?~?ver,~
O can be resolved only in the light of actual experiences gained
in the operation of the nt~v~, or~gani~ation a Those lim~,t~+tion
could also be largely mitigated by th? prop~sa,ls in the
following section of this chapter,
I~Ioreover9 the functions of OECD need not preclude any
economic activity on the part of NATO, The Economic Committee
and the Council might still concern th?msel.vss with "strate~
sic" issues such ass
(a ) Dasic discixssions of the n~ata~.x?e fl aiaagni~~de ar~d
urgency of the LDC problemsa
(b) Continued appraisal. of bloc economic activities and
relations with the LDC's and NATO members9 and obtaini~ig a con
census regarding appropriate counteraction by NANO member
O
S E C R E T
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~c~ Considering c?mmoia positions on issu?~ of ece~nomic
import arising in broader forums particularly organisations
in v~hich the T+~est and the ~ovi~t E~;o~ are broth pies?nt e
both NATO aaad OECD may also be viewed as partial
burden sharing e~cercises9 the one concentrated on th? de~
Tense burden ~m the other on the aid burdeno N~~.th?r
burden~stnaring probl?m9 ho~ever~, can rationally be dealt
e~ith s?parately or in istalation from the overall economic
situation and reso~.rce allocation pattern of the m?mber
states r~ehich is analysed by OECI),~ or in the isolation from
the overall political situation and pattern of national
intere~ats of member states9 which is analysed by NATO, The
?mphasis on political and defens? considerations in NATO and
on gen?ral economic and aid considerations 3.n the OECD can
probably never be fully reconcileda It oan be minimised by
establishing closest cooperation bets?en the tv~o Secretaries
ats9 by joint representations as suggested below~9 and by
efforts of the member states to follov~ compatible policies
in both organi~ationso
IV o Imt~rovin~ Joint Policy Niakin~
The key problem~in meeting-the challenge ?f the 1~608s
remainso How to improve the machinery of the Atlantic
nations for making and carrying out a joint stx?ategy for per
forming the main tasks, FIor~ can they ara~ive at consense~.s
regarding the threats confront~;ng them9 and a coherent
S E C 1~ E T
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fram~~ork of prior~iti~s and policies ~'or~ m~~ting th~m~
Thy Noa?th Atlant~,c council ~~ thes lcg~,cal fcx?a~m foa? this
?ffmrto Expea~ienc~ has shmxn hove hax?d it mill b~ to ta?ans~
c~nd national and pax^ochia~, concerns to ad~arac~ the la~g~r
int?r?sts cif the Atlantic Communityo C~x~tainly no d~~ices
or machinery can substitute fmr liv'?ly av~ar~n?~~ mf the
urgent necessity to rn~ork toga~ther as the pric? of sa~rvival,
but procedures and instrr~nac~nts can smmetim~as assist in the
growth of such avn~areness and in demising measures to gi~r?
gt practical meaning, Three such steps are suggested belo~nvo
la .A NATO Steerine~ Grouy
The ~nride disparity in por~er and ressponsibilit?~ among
O members of IJAT~ should b? recognized in its machinery 'for
consultations Th? small?~ m?mbers should accept the-fact
that the stronger members must bear the major burdens
especially outside the Treaty areao To reflect this fact
and assist in mos?~ intimate discussion and coordination ?f
policy NATU shc~u~d establish a restricted Steering ~om~
mittee of the council,
The Gounc~,l and its supporting ~omm~.ttee structure
should continue as the forum in r~vhich general problems are
discussed and in which NATO decisions as such are talon un~
animouslya The Steering Committee ~oulda
O
~a) prepare proposals on European matters of general
concern9 such as security and specific issues lilze Ber~,in
S E ~ I~ E T
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~56~: ~, .
S E C R E T
and disarma~mente which would be submitted to the Council as
a whole for consideration and approval,
(b) discuss and concert policies of the members of the
Steering Group on extra~European matterso The Council
would be kept informed of these discussionso
The Steering Group might be composed initially of the
US9 UK9 Erance9 Germanya and ltaly9 and perhaps Canadao In
time9.~ it could consist of the US and~the European Community
when it could speak for its memberso The interests of the
smaller states need not b? impaired by such an arrangemento
First9 their interests would be safeguarded by participation
in the existing Council mechanismo Secondlya the Secretarym
General could attend the Steering Group9 r~ith authority to
consult other interested member states, pinally9 reprem
sentatives of the smaller members could be added as ad hoc
members when the Group discussed any matters in which they
might have specific cmt~cernso
~o Atlantic Policy Planniasg
The essence of this report is~ that the Atlantic nations
have certain basic int?rests in common which they will neg~
lest at their peril and which must take precedence over
their more narrow national purposes or interestsa At times9
these common interests are downgraded or overlooked despite
consultation am?ng the`NATO memberso It would be valuable
to have some regular method for reasserting the wider
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~.ntere~t~ and for analy~~ng the oond~t~,on~ and mea~ure~ f?~
advancing themo The Seoretary~General,9 .gin recea~t year~,~ ham
sought to do th~,s to some extentp but the nature e~f hay po~
i ~~,t~on ~acapo~e~ certa~,n ~.ne~capab~,e l~m~tat~on~o
~~ a meaner for overcoming theme daff~,cu],t~,e~ and contr~b~
ut~ng to a more con~i~tent ba~~c approach ~t ~~ suggested
that N.~TO create an Atlant~,c PoY.icy Group to recomsaend long
range plans and po~ic~eso Spec~,f~cal~y9 the Group should be
charged with o
(a) analy~~ng the overGal~, pos~.t~,on of the Atlantic
natlonr ~n relation to the world s~,tuat~on~
(b) defln~,ng mor? prec~.~e~,y the common interests of the
O Atlant~,c nata,ons~ and
and should be eacpected to devot? perhapa~ a third of their time
to the work of the Groupo
selveso They should have no operational responsibilitie
(c) proposing pcal~cles to advance the common interests,
Thies Group should be lim~.ted to three or four people of
international r~puteo It should be entirely separate from
berth the International Sed~etariat and from the Gounci~,,~ and
should report to the G?uncil at tl~e Pe~reign 14I~,n~sters ~ level o
Members of the Group should not ~~ any sense represent
national states~g they should be chosen for theix? breadth of
view and independent judgments and should speak only for them
S E C R E T
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m ~589m
SE~R~T
Independent forint~lation of common ob~eoti~es and
policies unhampered by considerations of national inter?sts
~,nd conflicts ~c~~tld pro~id? the framework for long range
polic~e~o
3 a ~tr~.nt Rey~?esentation in NATO and the OECD
Eff~cti~e comrdinati?n of policf.es in NATO and OECD ~nrill
make it necess~.ry to go beyond the linkage provided solely
through common direction from homed The i~S should seek the
agreement of the IRt and the key EEC member states to main
twin or establish a single national delegation to NATO ~snd
the OECD under the overall direction of one man ~vho mould be
the Ferman?nt Representative of his Government to both organ
i~ationso To fulfill, the functions otxtlin?d above these
officials shoa~ld ha?~ a positi?n or rank in their governments
enabling them to spear authoritatively for their ,governments
and to play an active,. part in their policy~m~kia~go They
might form the base from r~rhich wmuld evolve reatx~icted execu~
tive bodies in both os?gani~ations,
Va Public Support
The developiaent of public support is a basso necessity
if the Atlantic Community is to endured To help widen under
standing of the common problems confronting the Atlantic
nations and to build consensus for their collective solution
several steps might be takeno
S E C R E T
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S E C, It .E T
. ~5~m.
~~
to The NAT? and ?EEC infmrinat~?n pm~.cgraffis sh?aald be
expanded tm pr?mcte support fmr the activities ?f NATm and
?ECDo
~o The annual cmnference ?f NAT? Parliannentariansg
which has been a useful un?fficial b?dy9 rmight extend its
sc?pe tm review the activities ?f DECD as well as NATOo 7Ct
cmuld receive and debate each year repnrts frutm tl,he S~ca~etaries~
General cf NATU and the ?ECD as well as analytgcal rep?x^ts
and pml~.cy prmp~sals fr?am the Atlantic fl'clicy Advisa~rso
ats deliberatimns cmuld i~nake a naa~anr c?ntributg?n tev tine
sense mf cm~mmn pnnrpmse ava?~rag the Atlantic nati?nso The'
~.
pmssibility mf c?nverting the c?nference int? an ?fficial
Atlantic Assembly ~inight alsm be explc~~edo
3~ The Atlantic 1Cnstituts9 which is well advanced
under private sp?nsmrsHip9 emultd develmp int?a valuable
f?rum fmr private and mixed public private activities
related tc the Atlantic area, If s?fl na?dest public subsidy
wmuld ~eeffi well justifiedo
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