INTELLIGENCE REPORT TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY SECTION I: POLICY TOWARD THE U.S. AND THE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION OF TAIPEI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 156
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: January 1, 1967
• Content Type: IR

Declassified in Part - 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/01/18 : FVA
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100001
Declassified in Part -
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/01/18 :
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100001
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?Stekr,'
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
RSS No. 0023
n( S6
Intelligence Report
TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
Section I: Policy Toward the U.S. and the
Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei
(Reference Title: POLO XXVI)
?SEGRE-T--
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
SECRET
TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
Section I: Policy Toward the U.S. and the
Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei
This is a working paper of the DD/I Special Research
Staff. It is the first in a series which will include
separate papers on Peking's effort to limit U.S. involve-
ment in countries near China, policy toward Communist
regimes, policy toward countries far from China, and Mao's
doctrines on war and armed revolution.
Mao's policy toward the U.S. in recent years reflects
his willingness to discard shrewd diplomatic behavior and
to make it easier for Peking's opponents to demonstrate
that he, rather than the American leaders, is the intran-
sigent party preventing any improvement in Sino-American
relations. His view that revolutionary elements should
dominate diplomatic tactics in foreign policy has retarded
Peking's effort in recent years to gain international
recognition and has eroded much of the goodwill Chou En-
lai had created among Japanese politicar.and intellectual
figures.
It is the writer's view that Chou has been, and
continues to be, dominated by Mao's general lines on
foreign policy. Chou has tried to make Mao's obsessions
--that is, the fetishes of his "thought," "class struggle,"
and "world revolution"--appear to be ratioral by demon-
strating remarkable dexterity within Mao's intransigent
policy lines. But increasingly since 1964, Chou has had
to work within an even more restricted diplomatic frame-
work, has had to give more tactics the third degree to
make sure they were "revolutionary," and has had to accept
a debasement of diplomacy in which Chinese officials in
1967 mongered Mao's ego-cult from their posts in foreign
embassies and when the established practice of diplomatic
immunity was discarded. In the periods of revolutionary
advance in 1967, Mao apparently permitted fanatics ? .
'(namely, Wang Li.'And Yao Teng-shan) tb -operate rather...
freely under a general (and, therefore, permissive) guide-
line, as witness the attacks on British officials and the
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?????,,V.Imr.?
burning of the charge's office in Peking on 22 August.
But in the subsequent period of revolutionary retreat,
the area of permissive action was drastically constricted,
as witness Chou's "five prohibitions" on embassy attacks
(1 September) and the Central Cbmmittee-State Council
decree specifying that only "competent authorities" are
permitted to carry out and supervise embassy demonstrations
(7 October). Although Chou now presides over a period
of withdrawal from some of the most extreme positions in
foreign policy, he still acts as Mao's subordinate, as
is suggested (among other things) by his sycophantic
speech of 30 September 1967, in which he reiterated, in
the face of foreign diplomats, ludicrous eulogies to Mao's
"thought."
The views expressed in this, the first paper in
the series, are those of the writer and do not reflect
an official position of the Directorate of Intelligence.
The DDI/SRS would welcome comments on this paper/
25X1
?
25X1
?
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SEC RET
TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
Section I: Policy Toward the U.S. and the
Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei
Contents
Page
? The Basic Perspective: Revolutionary Diplomacy....1-12
?
.?i
Introduction. 1.
1
I. Military Conquest of Taiwan Converted to
Political Struggle 4
A. Maneuvering Against a Washington-
Taipei Treaty (1954)........... ....... 6
B. Sino-U.S. Talks: Stress on Political
Maneuver (1955-57).... ... 11
C, Sino-U.S. Talks Interrupted: Stress on
Military Pressure (1958)............. 15
D. The Retreat to Political Struggle
(1958-62).............,.,........... 23
E. Fear of Nationalist Attack (1962) 28
F. Sino-Soviet Differences on "Renunciation
of Force" Issue (1954-64) 37
G. Future of the Taiwan Issue and Sino-U.S.
Relations 40
II. The Issue of UN Entry 46
A: The Demand for Prior Expulsion of the
Nationalists (1950-64) 46
B. Additional Revolutionary Demands
(1965-67) 48
III. Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei 62
A. Breaking Relations with Taipei 62
1. Two Examples 67
a, Laos (1962) 67
b. France (1964) 69
B. Failure of a Major Effort: Japan
(1952-67)........,.... 90
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
a num E,
TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
THE BASIC PERSPECTIVE: REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMACY
In attacking foreign policy problems, Mao Tse-
tung's shrewd behavior--that is, his willingness to act
dexterously on the basis of an informed calculation of
the probable effects of a political move--seems to have
been gradually changed, More than ever before, he seems
to have contempt for the idea that a wise leader must be
alert to everything his aides tell him about the consequ-
ences of major foreign policy moves. As a result, there
are more irrational elements in Chinese Communist foreign
policy than ever before.
Comparing Chinese Communist foreign policy of the
mid-1950s with that of the mid-1960s, the most fundamental
change in Peking's affort against Washington is Mao's
significantly increased willingness to expose himself to
the charge that he is the unreasonable and intransigent
party. Whereas in the earlier period he and Chou En-lai
had worked to put the art of diplomacy at Peking's service,
to make it a sharply pointed political weapon in the in-
ternational struggle against the United States and the
Chinese Nationalists, in recent years Mao has become less
concerned with the matter of avoiding diplomatic blunders.
He apparently is annoyed by the diplomatic road because
it has led to small advances rather than complete victory
on the issues of control of Taiwan, admission to the UN,
and universal diplomatic recognition. Beyond that, the
diplomatic road has cut across the grain of his revolu-
tionary compulsion. It had required a significant down-
grading of the pre-1952 appeal for international revolu-
tion (especially in Asia) and a significant upgrading of
the tactful effort to create pro-Peking and anti-Washing-
ton sentiment in various countries, It had required
practical expediency and maneuvering room, and Mao showed
good sense in the mid-1950s by permitting his chief foreign
policy adviser, Chou En-lai, to exercise his remarkable
diplomatic skill. Whenever Mao has permitted Chou some
leeway to maneuver, the Chinese premier has proven to be
- 1-
SECRRT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
IN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
.he most effective opponent of U.S. policy in the Chinese
leadership. Increasingly in recent years, however, Mao
has acted mafe on his revolutionary compulsion and has
provided Chou with less maneuvering room than ever before.
Chou has had to comply with Mao's
celn with world reiiolution even at times
fence-mending was the immediate problem.
in the final days of his African tour of
Chou had been on the brink of ending effectively a major
effort to refurbish Peking's international image which
had suffered from Chinese. Communist attacks on Indian
forces Ootober-November 1962) and criticism of the partial
test-ban treaty (summer and fall of 1963). Chou had also
made some advances in competing with the USSR and the U.S.
for increased influence in the area, in moving some regimes
c:oser to formal recognition of Peking, and in arguing
for the convening of a second conference. of Afro-Asian
countries, Even Ethiopia's prime minister, who had dis-
puted with Chou on several points, told the U.S. ambassa-
dor (on 6 February 1964) that the Chinese premier had
made an "excellent impression" primarily because his
behavior indicated he was "cultivated, subtle, intelligent,
and conciliatory--not at all like Molotov," When, however,
Chou in Somalia in early February described Africa as an
area "ripe for revolution," the phrase raised deep suspi-
cions among relatively moderate African leaders regarding
Peking's subversive goals on the continent and Chou's
motives in making the trip. Even when, at a later period,
the Chinese Communists acted to reassure African leaders
that they were not trying to bring down their governments,
they seemed to be saying: not now trying. For example,
People's Daily on 28 October 190-stated that the common
.erfemgmlit present" is the West and that Peking does not
call for "socialist" (i.e., Communist-led) revolution in
the present historical stage. But this qualification
as to the timing of a Communist revolution defeated the
diplomatic intention to give reassurance and to dispel
suspicions. Mao's revolutionary compulsion does not mix
well with Chou's diplomatic skill. Nevertheless, Chou
has been willing to comply with this self-defeating in-
congruity in order to retain Mao's favor,
increasing con-
when diplomatic
For example,
winter 1963-64,
-2-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Chou continued to defend Mao's global strategy,
and by December 1964, he declared that Mao's speeches
and statements "reflect the revolutionary will of the
people of the world in a highly concentrated form." By
the fall of 1965, following a series of international
setbacks, Chou had to insist that these developments
would not force Peking to change the policy of support-
ing revolutions everywhere. On the contrary, Chou En-
lai declared that in connection with supporting the "just
causes" of revolution
We will never retreat a single step from
this principled stand, whatever storms may
arise on the international scene and how-
ever much the U.S. imperialists and their
partners may curse and threaten us, even to
the point of imposing a war on us?. .At
present, an excellent revolutionary situa-
tion lies before the people of the whole
world. The revolutionary struggle of all
peoples against U.S. imperialism has never
been so vigorous as today. (Speech of 30
September 1965)
Although he claimed that Peking was also adhering to the
five principles of "peaceful coexistence," Chou's emphasis
was decisively on world revolution and he listed the various
national struggles Peking was supporting, including those
for "national liberation," Mao clearly was in no mood
to concede to domestic and foreign critics that his militant
foreign policy had been wrong, and his aides subsequently
persisted in giving revolution precedence over diplomacy.
Lin Piao was chosen to state the kind of revolu-
tion Mao preferred; on 3 September 1965, Lin's extensive
statement on all aspects of Mao's "people's war" strategy
was depicted as a major pronouncement relevant to global
policy. This statement completed the two-part global
-3-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
1.7 I% A.
strategy that Mao had been developing ever since the in-
tensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the period
1960-1963. Mao had emphasized the first part--the anti-
U.S. "united front"--in a series of five major pronounce-
ments on "revolutionary struggles" in 1963-64. Lin Piao's
statement was the second part. The two parts were depicted
as "the two magic weapons" for defeating the U.S. in the
international arena--"people's war and the united front
against U.S. imperialism"--by Liao Cheng-chih on 26 April
1966.
In a basic sense, the formulator of Peking's
foreign policy strategy is Mao, and it is to his basic
strategy that Chou En-lai must resfond in implementing
a revolutionary foreign policy. But Chou's troubles have
been increased. Since 1965, Mao has been raking it dif-
ficult for him to work effectively even within the con-
fines of the "united front" part of the strategy. By
abusing government leaders of underdeveloped and capital-
ist countries, Mao has violated his own dictum to "unite
all the anti-U.S. forces that can be united." He has
also acted against his own concept of a second intermediate
zone--i.e., the capitalist countries, excluding the U.S.--
by maligning the leaders of Britain and Japan, The forces
that can Le united in either the underdeveloped world
(the first intermediate zone) or in developed countries
(the second intermediate zone) have been reduced drastically
in number.
Mao is an unregenerate Stalinist who believes in
and acts on the dictum that "class struggle" is also an
international conflict and that the struggle ageinFt the
U.S. is irreconcilable, "With U.S. imperialism, peaceful
coexistence will never be possible" (Chou En-lai's speech
of 29 March 1965). Unlike the post-Stalin Soviet leaders,
Mao's view of American presidents has been impervious to
change and there has been no amelioration in his hostile
image of them, as witness Chou's undifferentiated condemna-
tion of "Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson" in
his report of 21-22 December 1964 to the National People's
Congress. On the contrary, each successive president
since President Truman has been depicted, in a ritualistic
formulation, as being worse than the previous one. Further,
-4-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
Republican and Democratic presidential candidates have
been depicted as equally wicked and as similarly repre-
sentative of U.S. monopoly capital and hostile motives.
In contrast to Khrushchev and certain post-Khrushchev
Soviet leaders who have conceded that some American states-
men are "sober-minded," Mao has had his propagandists
reject the concept and attack the Soviets for expressing
it:
In the U.S., whether in power or out, the
ruling cliques consist of wolves,...Whether
Kennedy or Johnson, are they not 'beasts of
the same pack?'. Have not the modern
revisionists long been shouting that there
are also 'clear-headed elements' in U.S.
imperialism? (Peking Red Flag article of
23 September 1964)
Mao's code of undifferentiated hostility to American
presidents is retained with a curious intensity and con-
tinuity, reflecting his determination to sustain Sino-
American tensions so long as Washington does not sur-
render to his demands on the Taiwan issue.
Mao has been aware that a series of foreign policy
defeats in 1965-66--e.g,, in Burundi, Tunisia, Kenya,
Indonesia, Ghana, Dahomey, and the Central African Republic
and in connection with Peking's line on the Japan-ROK
treaty, the second Afro-Asian conference, and the Pakistan-
India war--exposed his global strategy to international
and internal criticism. Although certain of these set-
backs were not specific reactions to Chinese Communist
initiatives--e.g., the coups in Indonesia, Dahomey, the
Central African Republic, and Ghana--others took place in
countries and on issues where the Chinese had tried to
make gains. Mao made an effort to dispel the general im-
pression that he was in any way responsible for any of
these setbacks. In the course of this effort, he has tried
(1) to shunt the blame onto scapegoats, (2) to deny that
Sino-U.S, hosti14.ty reflects a basic policy failure, and
(3) to deny that international isolation is detrimental
to Peking's interests.
25X1
25X1
-5-
SECRET
25X1
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
He has had his propagandists
try to demonstrate that a mysterious "natural" process,
rather than Mao personally, has been responsible for
defeats. "Marxists,., .regard the great international up-
heaval as the natural outcome of the sharpening of the
international class struggle." (People's Daily article
of 1 March 1966) Regarding (2), after his propagandists
declared, in the winter of 1965, that the U.S. was gradu-
ally shifting the "focus of its global strategy" from
Europe to Asia, centering it on the mainland, Peking im-
plicitly denied that this reflected a fundamental failure
of foreign policy. But the argument was weak and, at
points, not credible. It was strained, and it contained
an implicit demand that one of Mao's characteristically
self-defensive dictums should be taken as literal truth:
"To be opposed by our enemy is not a bad thing; it adds
to our honor" (People's Daily Observer article of 20
February 1966 commenting onSecretary Bundy's
speech of 12 February)./
Mao's genuine confidence in the prospect of ad-
vances against the U.S. has changed, In contrast to the
hardline period of 1957-58 when Mao and his foreign policy
aides really seemed to believe that the Communist bloc
could significantly reduce U.S. influence in various coun-
tries by a more aggressive political strategy; and make
"the east wind prevail over the west wind" (Mao's state-
ment in Moscow in November 1957), in recent years their
confidcnce appears to be more contrived, This ersatz
confidence is a result of Mao's split with the Soviet
leaders (destroying the concept of an "east" wind) and
setbacks in 1965-66 (destroying the concept of a receding
"west" wind). Viewed in the context of coups among pro-
Peking revolutionary governments and of failures in
-6-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
25X1
"national liberation movements," Chou's statement of 30
September 1965 that "an excellent revolutionary situa-
tion" now exists in the world does not carry the same con-
viction as the ringing Peking declarations in 1957-58 that
the U.S. will be rolled back "with the force of millions."
Mao's foreign policy aides had to "explain" that, regard-
ing the Communist bloc, first of all it has to be recon-
structed because "a new process of division will inevit-
ably occur in the revolutionary rnnks, and some people
will inevitably drop out; but at the same time, hundreds
of millions of revolutionary people will stream in" (Red-
Flag-People's Daily joint article of 11 November 19657
:-
They also had to "explain" that, regarding the revolution-
ary struggle, "a great upheaval, division, and realign-
ment is taking place in the world.. If the imperialists,
revisionists, and reactionaries get the upper hand in
some places and retrogression sets in temporarily, that
would be a mere twist or turn in the advance of history"
and the tide would "eventually" turn in Peking's favor
(People's Daily article of 4 April 1966). These "explana-
tions" take the line of Mao's old procedure of trying to
convince his cadres (and the populace) that while his
forces may be in the process of retreat before an advanc-
ing enemy and have lost a battle or two--"To ask the revo-
lutionary army to win every battle it fights is asking
the impossible" (People's Daily article of 11 April 1966)--
they will win in II7e- future by pugnacious adherence to
Mao's strategy. The intensity of the 1965-66 articles,
in which Mao's foreign policy aides tried to justify his
world strategy as correct (especially after the coups in
Indonesia and Ghana), apparently reflected their aware-
ness that these and other setbacks had created an extreme
and unprecedented decline in Peking's international
prestige,
Mao's aides apparently convinced him that the general
impression gaining credence among other countries was that
Peking was (1) encircled by its opponents, was (2) aggres-
sive and intransigent, and was (3) isolated. Mao's will-
ingness to try to dispel thIi-general impression was only
temporary. He apparently permitted his aides in late
March 1966 to begin to stress the almost defunct idea of
the Bandung spirit and to downplay the idea of stimulating
-7-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
revolutions everywhere, This was a drastic change from
the previous emphasis on global revolutionary strategy.
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Burma were selected as the
best countries for Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yi to visit in
the effort to demonstrate that Peking was not (1) encircled,
inasmuch as at least one significant ii-c iround the main-
land remained open, (2) was not aggressive, inasmuch as
its policy was peaceful -Ciiiiiistence of the 'Bandung type,
and (3) was not isolated, inasmuch as it still had important
friends and international respect, The People's Daily
editorial of 27 March 1966, published at the start of the
Liu-Chen trip, revived the dictums of the Bandung era of
the mid-1950s and placed the trip in the context of an
"unending flow" of contacts between Peking and its neigh-
bors. The editorial attributed this policy of "peace and
amity" to Mao's October 1949 view of friendly relations,
declaring it to be part of his "socialist foreign policy"
which the PRC has "steadfastly pursued," Only secondary
importance was given to world revolution and to Mao'S
statement on the need to support revolutionary straggles.
Significantly, however, Mao's statement on support-
ing revolution was described in this editorial.as.a policy
which will be "immovable under any circumstances.," This
apparently reflected Mao's inability to resist reassert-
ing and defending his revolutionary strategy even at a
time when his aides had convinced him that Such a'reas-
sertion would be detrimental to Peking's immediate inter-
ests. Late- in the trip, Chen Yi shattered the image
of moderation which he and Liu were projecting in the
earlier part of the trip in West Pakistan and Afghanistan,
and he reasserted. Mao's militant view of global strategy,
making no references to peaceful coexistence (speech in
Dacca of 15 April 1966), Although the Liu-Chen trip was
finally appraised as "a major victory for China's foreign
policy of peace" in the People's Daily editorial of 21
April 1966, elements of the ffiEffuTii-giiirit were gradually
displaced in May by comments on the revolutionary strategy.
-8-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SE( ' I '
By 1 June 1966,
the revolutionary line was forcefully reasserted in a
People's Daily article, which insisted that Peking would
"side with the revolutionary people of all countries,"
would never abandon its "revolutionary stand," and had
never felt isolated and "never will be." In short, the
return to Bandung image-building in March and April 1966
was a temporary change of course, an aberrant shift, and
it was followed by the adamantly revolutionary line, the
line of mobilizing a "united front" against the U.S. and
struggling with "the revolutionary people of all countries"
against the U.S. and USSR "to the end" (Lin Piao keynote
speech of 1 October 1966),
25X1
25X1
Mao's revolutionary compulsion has led to self-
isolation. Although he does not want to concede that
he is the leader of an internationally isolated regime,
his revolutionary compulsion has become so dominant in
recent years that he is unwilling to act tactfully for
any extended period in order to avoid isolation. This
incongruity was demonstrated in his statement
in November 1966 that "we are not afraid of
being isolated and we shall never be isolated." In the
past decade, shifts to the left in Peking's basic foreign
policy seem to have been products of Mao's own refusal
to allow the rational political calculations of his aides
to dominate the fanatical elements in his revolutionary
view of the international process.
Mao's purge of many of his lieutenants, and his
effort to revolutionize those he has retained, was re-
flected in foreign policy in early 1967 by a radical
shift to the left, In order to make the instruments of
his militant diplomacy more revolutionary, he has applied
a form of organizational shock treatment to the Foreign
Ministry and all of its officials. Artificial convulsions
were produced in the Ministry shortly after the establish-
ment within it of a "Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Station"
on 18 January 1967. "Rebels" and Red Guards sent into
each Ministry department or individually assigned to the
Foreign Minister and his deputy ministers, began to subject
the professionals to criticism and surveillance to ensure
that revolutionary vigor dominated their daily routines,
-9-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
J.
A number of ambassadors and part of their staffs, who were
recalled in late 1966, Nece subjected to special indoctrina-
tion courses in Mao's "thought," and diplomats who returned
to their foreign posts in the spring of 1967 were impelled
to preserve their political future by disseminating the
symbols 6quotations and buttons) of Mao's ego-cult This
tactless ritual practice, carried out in Burma, Nepal,
and Cambodia (among other Countries) immediately aroused
nationalistic indignation and created major disputes with
foreign leaders who previously ha C been designated as
"friendly," and even with notorious sychophants of Peking,
Sihanouk ihat this ritual practice, reflecting
an extension to diplomacy of Mao's insatiable craving for
adulation, was encouraged by Mao himself is suggested by
Chou's decision to swim with this tide of irrationality.
Chou in mid-August 1967 asked Cambodia's foreign minister
to permit Overseas Chinese "to show their love for Mao
Tse-tung and Communism" Chou's attitude still seems
to be that of a subordinate who prefers rational policies
but is constantly impelled (even in relatively sane periods)
to comply with the fits of self-love which seize Mao's mind.
His willingness to comply with irrational policies
and, at the same time, to establish a rational procedure
for these policies was reflected in his handling of the
revolutioniza:ion of foreign affairs machinery in 1967.
On the one hand, following formation in January of a "liai-
son station" and Mao's directive in March that Red Guards
and rebels "should not only be internal revolutionaries,
but should also be international revolutionaries," Chou
stated that he gave "full support, come what may, to the
liaison station set up by the revolutionaries to lead
revolution and supervise businss operations" in the Foreign
Ministry, (Chou speech of 26 May) On the other hand,
he criticized outside Red Guard units which had stormed
into the MinisiTi?ciii-13 May and invaded the State Council's
foreign affairs staff office on 29 May. He has also pre-
sided over retreats from the extremes of fanaticism in
certain aspects of foreign policy in 1967. For example,
he tried to deny Red Guard revelations about Peking's real
contempt for the Pyongyang regime in January, made the
fallback speech ending the siege of the Soviet embassy
in February, acquired direct responsibility for running
the Foreign Ministry on 23 August (the same day Red Guards
were ordered to stop their activities within it under the
guidance of Yao Teng-shan), and formulated five prohibi-
tive regulations regarding demonstrations against embassies
on 1 September.
-10-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
The basic source of Mao's current view of foreign
policy strategy is primarily doctrinal, thus by defini-
tion more impervious to change than a less dogmatic and
militant view of the world would be. Increasingly in
recent years, Mao seems to have acted on the following
warning of Stalin against losing the international revo-
lutionary perspective:
The distinctive feature of that danger is
the lack of belief in the international
proletarian revolution; the lack of belief
in its victory; skepticism with regard to
the national liberation movement of the
colonies and dependent countries; the fail-
ure to understand that, without supporting
the revolutionary movement in other countries,
our own country cannot cope with world im-
perialism; the failure to understand that
the victory of socialism in a single country
cannot be final because no country can be
guaranteed against intervention until the
revolution has triumphed at least in a cer-
tain number of countries; the failure to
understand the basic demand of internation-
alism, that the victory of socialism in a
single country is not an aim in itself but
a means for developing and supporting revolu-
tion in other countries. (Stalin's speech
of 9 June 1925)
These propositions have appeared, in various forms, in
Chinese Communist statements on world revolution in recent
years. However, Stalin soon became much more conserva-
tive in pushing international revolution, and he was at-
tacked by Trotsky for his cautious approach to the needs
of foreign revolutionaries. Mao seems to pride himself
on sustaining and stimulating the world revolutionary
process "uninterruptedly," as Peking puts it. Neverthe-
less, he prefers that revolutionary wars be fought by
others and that Chinese military aid should be given in
such a form as not to invite U.S. retaliation against
the mainland,
-11-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SF( :111-4"1'
In the immediate future, tactical shifts in Mao's
foreign policy almost certainly will not dilute this
revolutionary compulsion. The pattern of the past decade
suggests that Mao, so long as he lives, will permit Chou
(who "implements" his foreign policy, as Madame Mao told
Red Guards in September 1967) to return to reality, to
policies calculated to make diplomatic advances, only
for short periods. The worst aberrations probably will
be moderated temporarily, and the prospect for the im-
mediate future seems to be (1) for caution rather than
aggressiveness in exporting Mao's ego-cult, and (2) for
reduced harassment of foreign embassies and diplomats.
These gauche policies probably will not be abandoned
entirely, however. In every case in which a new hard
line has been imposed toward a foreign country in recent
years, the line probably will be retained, because Mao's
dominant practice has been to wage "blow-for-blow" strug-
gles rather than to retreat from tensions once they have
developed in inter-government or inter-party relations.
Expedient policies (primarily the need to revive trade)
probably will be advanced and the extremes of violent
strikes and harassment of personnel will be reduced, but
the new hard line will be sustained, as witness the crude
polenlical attacks on Tokyo and Hong Kong government offi-
cials. Because the moods of Mao's mental caprice and his
craving for international adulation defy rational inquiry,
Judgments about the duration of the relatively rational
periods in policy toward various countries are not worth
much.
-12-
IR IT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Policy toward the U.S. has always been adamantly
hostile, but in the mid-1950s, Mao had permitted Chou
to use his diplomatic skill to deflect from Peking the
real responsibility for intransigence. Chou performed
effectively. However, Chou's leeway for maneuver was
reduced following the interdiction effort against the off-
shore islands in the fall of 1958. The overall Taiwan
Strait situation--the main Sino-American issue for many
years--was placed thereafter in political limbo as a
result of two basic shifts in line. First, Mao retreated
from a policy of using limited military means to attain
the offshore islands, to a policy of avoiding any new
military interdiction effort. Second, he movid?Trom the
relatively flexible political tactic of temporarily
separating the offshores issue from the Taiwan issue to
the political strategy of combining them as territorial
claims to be settled simultaneously.
On the island of Chinmen there are only 80,000
people, and it is now known to the world that
the U.S. does not object [sicj to returning the
islands of Chinmen and Matsu to us, but in
exchange they want to keep Taiwan for themselves.
This would be a disadvantageous deal. It will
be better if we wait. Let Chiang Kai-shek
stay on Chinmen and Matsu and we will get
them back later together with the Pescadores
Islands and Taiwan. (Mao's statement of 3
March 1959
Using this argument, Mao has converted conquest of the
offshore islands into a distant goal and the entire Strait
situation into a political struggle.
Mao has been convinced that Washington is determined
to support the Nationalists on the islands. Further, he
has been forced to accept the consequences of the Sino-
Soviet dispute for his Taiwan Strait policy. The dispute
25X1
25X1
-1-
ARCO FT
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
L-7 12a1.?I 1\12A
has deprived him of the Soviet deterrent statements (which
implied a nuclear shield in defense of the mainland)--state-
ments which, in 1954 and 1958, Mao had considered neces-
sary for going to the brink of war against the American
military capability in the Far East.,
The controlling formulation for the military aspect
of the Taiwan Strait situation--namely, in the Strait
"our war is political war" (PLA General Tu Ping's state-
ment of 10 June 1959)--has become dogma. As for Peking's
military strategy of 1962 in handling a hypothetical Chi-
nese Nationalist attack on the mainland, there apparently
was once a dispute over the alternative plans of luring
the invader in deep or blocking him at the Fukien Front
beaches. People's Daily on 7 September 1967 claimed that
Liu Shrl-chi and Lo?Jia=ching preferred the latter strategy,
and it implied that Lin PiaW,was the advocate of absorbing
the attack farther inland./
This real issue is a sensitive matter, which is
usually avoided by Mao and his aides because detailed
discussion of it would clearly expose the disparity in
the military capability of Washington and Peking. Chou
En-lai commented on it briefly in the context of escala-
tion of the Vietnam war, differentiating between an air
(or naval attack) and a ground attack.
Once the war breaks out, it will have no
boundaries. Some US. strategists want to
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SFCIRFT
bombard China by relying on their air and
naval superiority and avoid a ground war.
This is wishful thinking. Once the war
gets started with air or sea action, it will
not he for the U.S. alone to decide how the
war will continue. If you can come from the
sky, why can't we fight back on the ground?
That is why we say the war will have no
boundaries once it breaks out. (Chou's
four-point statement on Peking's policy to-
ward the U.S. from his interview with Pakistani
correspondent of the paper Dawn on 10 April
1966. NCNA version of 9 May IT66) (emphasis
supplied)
Chou emphasized the PLA's capability to overrun countries
in Indo-china but remained silent on whether the PLA could
interdict, cripple, and turn back a U.S. nuclear weapons
air (or naval) attack on the mainland.
The intensification of the Vietnam war seems to
have made it even more necessary for Mao to keep the strug-
gle in the Strait a political matter. The war apparently
has increased his fear that the Chinese Nationalists would
use any resumption of heavy shelling against the offshores
to try to induce Washington to support a major attack
against the mainland (or an airstrike against Mao's nuclear
weapons development facilities). Further, another unsuc-
cessful military interdiction effort against the offshore
islands would again draw attention to the disparity be-
tween the American and the Chinese Communist military
capabilities. Much of the verbal aggressiveness, so long
a standard feature of Mao's demand for the "liberation"
of the NationaU.st-held islands, has been reduced in Peking's
propaganda in recent years.
The unsuccessful interdiction effort of 1958 in-
creased Mao's intransigence on the matter of Sino-Ameri-
can contacts. Shifting from the pre-1958 period, when
the matters of release of U.S. prisoners and visits of
Americans (e.g., dignitaries and newsmen) were discussed,
Mao has had his diplomats insist that a complete surrender
in the Strait must precede discussiou of all other matters.
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
\ a-/
In the Sino-US, talks, we have insisted on
a settlement of the Taiwan issue before
other discussions can proceed--a reversal
of our previous strategy of handling details
before the matter of principle./
In recent years, Mao has become less concerned than ever
before about deflecting international criticism of him-
self as the intransigent party in Sino-American relations.
In contrast with the earlier policy, which was centered
on a major effort to avoid publicizing the crude fact
that the start of even low-level contacts required first
of all a U.S. surrender on the Taiwan issue, the People's
Daily declared on 29 March 1966 that
So long as the U.S. government does not
change its hostile policy toward China
and refuses to pull out its armed forces
from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, the
normalization of Sino-U.S. relations is
entirely out of the question and so is the
solution of such a concrete question as
the exchange of visits between personnel
of the two countries. (emphasis supplaid)
Mao apparently is determined to insist on this obdurate
policy indefinitely, that is, until his death. In attack-
ing Liu Shao-chi, he has had his propagandists adopt an
even more intransigent position, implying thtst a U.S.
withdrawal would not lead to the "development of friendly
relations." (Peolile's Daily article of 16 October 1966)
Regarding participation in the UN, Mao's policy
has been encrusted with an incongruous duality. From the
time of the establishment of his regime, he has insisted
on entry only on his own conditions, and he has added to
these conditions, making them even more difficult for
other countries to accept. Since January 1965, revolu-
tionization of his UN policy was expressed in his shift
from a simple demand for the eviction of the Nationalists
prior to Peking's entry, to an entire series of demands,
all of which militate against the effort to attain that
eviction. Mao has become more contemptuous of the opinion
and political goodwill of member countries, as witness
his demand of March 1965 that "a new organization" should
be established. Chen Yi's ludicrous demands of 29 September
-iv-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
1965 for the UN to submit to various forms of self-
disparagement and Chou En-lai's reiteration of the idea
of "a new, revolutionary UN" on 24 June 1967 indicate
that intelligent foreign policy aides have been impelled
to work within the confines of a self-defeating policy.
If Mao, in his lifetime, were to succeed in expelling
the Nationalists from all UN bodies, the victory would
be less a product of diplomatic skill than an expression
of the view of some national leaders that it is good
policy to mollify the Chinese dictator by handing- to
him gratis China's UN seat.
Chou En-lai has performed brilliantly in the long-
term effort to displace the representatives of Taipei in
various countries and establish Peking's missions. At
an earlier time, temporary flexibility had been tolerated
(and even encouraged) by Mao in order to initiate offi-
cial activities with countries which also maintained diplo-
matic relations with the Chinese Nationalists. In Laos
(1962) and France (1964), tactical "two Chinas" situations
developed. But Mao would not permit these to become
permanent. Mao has permitted only the UK to maintain a
charge in Peking while an official representative, a
consul, is accredited to the "provincial" Taiwan govern-
ment. The successive steps in the effort to induce De
Gaulle to make the final move to break relations with
Taipei (January 1964) suggest that Chou was acting within
a guideline from Mao. This guideline permitted him to
remove France from the doctrinal category of a colonial
power. Mao participated in the effort, and centered his
attention in 1964 on De Gaulle's anti-American obsession.
Toward the conclusion of the successful effort, Mao estab-
lished an identity between himself and the French leader
as two soldiers, and Mao in January 1964 urged a visiting
delegation to ignore "slippery' diplomats (so that formal
relations could begin). Since that time, De Gaulle's
aggressive anti-American attitude has been the principal
factor preserving the thin glaze of political restraint
in Mao's view of relations with Paris. He apparently hopes
that De Gaulle will remove West European countries from
close ties with the U.S. and will pull together a second
"intermediate zone" of capitalist countries.
-v-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
But Mao's refusal to accept permanent "two Chinas" situa-
tions continues to deprive his diplomats of the opportunity
to gain recognition for Peking from other capitalist coun-
tries and then work to displace Chinese Nationalist repre-
sentatives-Yr:6m their capitals. Since the beginning of
his purge in 1966, Mao's willingness to violate the con-
vention of diplomatic immunity has further hampered the
long-term effort to isolate Taipei among the nations.
As of August 1967, the number of countries which had
diplomatic relations with Peking and Taipei was 47 and
62, respectively. SUbsequently, Tunisia (in September) and
Indonesia (in October) have suspended relations with Peking.
Japan, unlike France, has been a difficult country
to move toward recognition, and in the past decade the
prospects for success have been dimmest when Mao's revolu-
tionary compulsion has dominated policy. The policy over
the years has run a zigzag course because Mao has permitted
Chou to maneuver freely in some periods but only within
narrow limits in other periods.
After Mao in the fall of 1955 insisted that the
establishment of diplomatic relations "first" was neces-
sary for the solution of smaller concrete issues, he per-
mitted Chou to begin a general step-by-step policy of non-
official political contacts and semi-official trade ex-
changes. However, the boycott on trade with Japan in may
1958 impeded this gradualistic policy. Chou had to use
his remarkable dexterity to remain within Mao's hard line
while working out a formula for non-governmental trade
with "friendly" firms in 1960. This hard line made ad-
vances in overall policy toward Tokyo difficult for Chou
and for Communists and leftists in Japan. Mao apparently was
-vi-
SECRFT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
defending the self-defeating aspects of this hard line
when he warned Japanese visitors in October 1961 that
"a tortuous road of struggle" lay ahead of Japanese left-
ists.
The intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute
and the need to recuperate economically impelled Mao to
return to a softer li.e, permitting Chou to work out a
semi-governmental trade relationship in October 1962--the
Liao-Takasaki agreement--which facilitated Peking's ad-
vance beyond limited trade with "friendly" firms. In
1964, the softer line remained dominant in policy toward
Tokyo, and doctrine was partly discarded to clear the way
for possible diplomatic recognition of the Peking regime.
Chou in May transgressed doctrine to blur the line between
Japanese businessmen and big capitalists, and Mao himself
in July included them in his anti-American camp: "I can-
not believe at n11 that Japanese monopoly capital would
lean forever toAard US imperialism." However, the Chinese
leaders failed in this effort to cultivate a wider spectrum
of Japanese opinion to press Tokyo to follow De Gaulle's
example, and when, in November 1964, Prime Minister Sato
upset their calculations by acting more openly against
Peking than former Prime Minister Ikeda had acted, Chou
and Chen Yi were impelled to attack the new government
and to impose an unprecedently hard line.
This new line became increasingly crude in mid-
1965, and Peking's hectoring statements included vague
(but unmistakable) military threats against Tokyo for
supporting the U.S. effort in Vietnam. The primary reason
for this unprecedented political cudgeling of Tokyo was
implied in Liao Cheng-chih's complaint of 24 Decemter
1965: Sato is not willing to be the "De Gaulle of Japan."
Peking's attacks took on the aspect of a series of ultima-
tums to Sato to comply with Mao's view on a wide range of
international issues, the intention being to supply pro-
Peking Japanese (and businessmen who desired mainland
business) with a reason to press Tokyo to modify its
China policy.
Mao's line had been changed from a gradual step-
by-step approach to an all-out political attack. More
-vii-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
onv,mr,
importantly, it was shifted to the left as Mao rejected
former allies, including the JCP, which would not associate
itself with his view of Moscow or with his unrealistic
plan for the revolution in Japan. Liu Shao-chi emerged
most prominently as a participant in policy when that
policy became increasingly militant./
Mao's personal responsibility for the open split
with the JCP, after his meeting with its leaders in late
March 1966, indicated once again that, like Stalin, he
dominates his chief aides and has the authority to reject
their advice whenever irrational caprice seizes his mind.
After discarding the JCP central leadership and
supporting only pro-Peking elements among the Japanese
Communists, he apparently has insisted that in recruit-
ing new allies in Japan, his officials require that they
will be obsequiously pro-Peking and will militantly oppose
the government. This shift to the left, partly influ-
enced by his purge on the mainland, has been applied to
business firms trading with Peking. More than ever before,
trade is being revolutionized and tied openly to political
matters. When, therefore, Liao Cheng-chih, who was under
attack for being too willing to trade with non-political
Japanese businessmen, signed a trade protocol with "friendly"
Japanese traders in February 1967, Liao made the protocol
a written, formal appeal for an all-out revolutionary
"struggle" against the government.
However, Peking has stopped short of demanding overthrow
of the government (which it has called for in Indonesia
and Burma). Mao's new
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
?
revolutionary line, which includes vague military threats
against Japan, abuse of some visiting businessmen and
newspaper reporters, and a demand that his "thought" be
disseminated beyond Overseas Chinese to native Japanese
in the country, has provided Tokyo with one of its
easiest periods in resisting pressures for recognition
of the Peking regime.
Chou En-lai must now work in the narrowest poli-
tical framework ever in policy toward Tokyo, especially
at a time when Mao is training "red diplomatic fighters"
who will "never praise the bourgeoisie in an unprincipled
way or curry favor with them" (People's Daily editorial
of 28 June 1967). Because most Japanese leaders, intel-
lectuals, and businessmen are now undifferentiated members
of "the bourgeoisie," the prospect is that Mao's policy
of reducing the categories of acceptable allies will
further erode pro-Peking sentiment in that country. Trade
and non-official contacts will ta%e place against the
backdrop of political hostility and the effort to attain
formal diplomatic relations will be handled by Peking-
controlled leftists (excluding most members of the Japan-
est Communist party), who will Also work to establish a
base for future revolution in Japan.
-ix-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
Section I: Policy toward the U.S. and the
Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei
Introduction
25X1
Mao's foreign policy in the past decade has reflected
his obsession with a few basic concepts, the most funda-
mental being enmity for the U.S. This obsession caused
him to direct Peking's entire foreign policy strategy,
prior to the intensification of his dispute with the post-
Stalinist Soviet leaders, against Washington:
In our international struggle, our strategic
policy is to unite all the forces which can
be united and to point the tip of our sword
at U.S. imperial.ism. This is the whole and
also the core of our strategy. All our work
should evolve around this general strategy.
He has had his aides conduct this strategy in such an un-
compromising way as to indicate that he is neurotically
obsessed with a desire to make advances against this enemy.
For many years in the past decade, governments which have
been willing to accept a hostile view of Washington, or
something close to this view, have been treated as partners
in a common cause. Fragments of this attitude remain in
the ruins of Mao's foreign policy in 1967.
Mao's policy toward the U.S. had center9d on two
basic goals, namely, to destroy the Nationalist regime
on Taiwan and, as a necessary prerequisite for this, to
weaken Washington's determination to defend it. He has
failed to attain either, however, and has been forced
to accept a less decisive goal, namely, that of reducing
Taipei's international prestige.
-1-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9 aim
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
btel.:K1.;1?
The Taiwan issue is also an obsession, a vestige
of the enmity developed during the civil war.* Mao has
even made it the basic reason for rejecting Khrushchev's
policy of improving relations with the U.S. r
Khrushchev's footdragging on this issue since late 1958.
and, subsequently, his depiction of Peking as the real
culprit in sustaining tensions in the Taiwan Strait has
been deeply resented. Maoist Malayans reflected
this resentment by complaining that
Throughout the course of US imperialist
armed occupation of Taiwan, the Tito ?
clique [i.e., the Khrushchev leadership]
blames not the U.S. imperialists but the
PRC for causing 'tension' in the region.
(NCNA's 3 February 1962 broadcast of a
Malayan Monitor commentary)
*Mao has drastically shifted his position. In July
1936, he had told Edgar Snow that he favored "independence"
for the Taiwanese. When, however, Chiang took refuge on
the island in 1949 from the military blows of Communist
forces, the destruction of this Nationalist government
in exile became a revolutionary compulsion. Peking began
to insist on "liberation" as an absolute necessity and
obscured the revolutionary compulsion by using a legal
and historic argument?i.e., Peking has "rights" to this
piece of Chinese territory.
25X1
25X1
25X1
?
25X1
-2-
SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified
Declassified
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Ii1UKIiJ
This charge distorted Khrushchev's early record of sup-
port, and it concealed the warning he directed toward
President Eisenhower in two strong letters in Septerber
1958. Nevertheless, it reflected the change in the nature
of Soviet support after the Offshore island crisis in
the fall of 1958 and after the Sino-Soviet dispute inten-
sified in 1960. The Soviet shift was from propaganda sup-
port for the right to acquire Taiwan to propaganda sup-
port only for the defense of the mainland. This shift
in policy is reflected, on the one hand, in Khrushchev's
speech of 30 September 1954--the Chinese Communist desire
to "liberate Taiwan_is dear and entirely understandable
to the Soviet Union"--and, on the other hand, in his
speech of 2 July 1962, which supported only defense of
the mainland.* Khrushchev's successors now are silent
on the "liberation" aspect and even on defense of the
mainland.
By demanding a complete American surrender--i.e.,
withdrawal of all support from Taipei--Mao hms set Peking's
policy in a mold of inflexibility, closing off all avenues
for an improvement in relations with Washington. His
seizure of some, and probes against other, offshore islands
have been initiatives which strengthened rather than
weakened Washington's determination to support the Nation-
alists. An account of his initiatives way give precision
to an understanding of Chou En-lai's maneuvering within
an inflexible policy. And Chou's brilliant raneuVaqiii
emerges as only a device to conceal Mao's obsessively
sustained demand for an American surrender.
*"He who dares attack the PRC will meet with a crush-
ing rebuff from the great Chinese people, the people of
the Soviet Union, and the entire socialist camp." (For
a discussion of this deterrent statement, see pages 31-32.
-3-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for_Release_2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
I. Military Conquest of Taiwan Converted to Political
Struggle
Mao's obsession with Taiwan-conquest is in fact
a distant goal, but he has tried to sustain it as a live
issue. Mao was impelled to, make seizure of the island
a distant goal when President Truman on 27 June 1950
ordered the Seventh Fleet to be used as a blocking force
in the Taiwan Strait area. Earlier, in the spring of
1950, Peking's public statements had made seizure of the
island a "task" for the same year. Preparations went
forward as U.S. statements convinced Mao and his advisers
that Washington would not intervene against a PLA attack.*
But President Truman's action, triggered by Communist
aggression in Korea, surprised Mao; Peking never again
publicized a precise time-table for _onquest. Postpone-
ment of conquest was attributed to a decisive change in
the balance of opposing forces, reflecting Mao's respect
for the U.S. Seventh Fleet's military capability;
Before 27 June 1950, the problem of liberat-
ing Taiwan pitted the strength of the PLA
against the Chiang remnants, with the help
of the U.S. imperialists in a background posi-
tion. Since 27 June, the problew...pits
the strength of the PLA against the U.S.
*The task was estimated to be extremely difficult even
without the presence of U.S. forces and in the situation
of a direct military showdown with only Nationalist forces.
"I must first of all point out that the liberation of the
islands along the southeast coast, especially Taiwan, is
an extremely big problem and it will involve the biggest
campaign in the history of modern Chinese warfare....
Only when we have fully prepared the material and tech-
nical conditions for overcoming these difficulties can
we smoothly carry out this tremendous military assign-
ment and thoroughly eradicate the Kuomintang remnants."
(General Su Yu's speech to troops of the Third Field
Army published in People's China on 16 February 1950)
-4-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
Declassified
Declassified
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
imperialists, with the KMT bandit remnants
moving into the background. (Article in
Peking World Knowledge of 7 July 1950)
The Chinese Communists later indicated that the island
could have been "liberated 10 years ago if Chiang had been
unprotected" (Chen Yi's statement to newsmen in Geneva
on 23 July 1962). Given the presence of a U.S. military
force which Peking had no capability to destroy without
disar=trous results to itself, the problem for Mao became
political. That is, the U.S. had to be induced or inti-
midated to withdraw. Only after that event could the prob-
lem once again become military.*
*"As soon as the U.S. withdraws its Seventh Fleet
from the Taiwan Strait, the problem immediately will be
simplified. What is left will be the settling of ac-
counts between the Chinese people and the Chiang traitor-
ous group." (Tientsin Ta Kung Pao editorial of 20
November 1954)
But even if the U.S. were to withdraw from the Strait,
Peking would have an extremely difficult military problem
in taking Taiwan./
/First, large
stocks of POL would be accumulated in Fukien Province
and then troops would be massed in the same area; jet
fighters and bombers would then be moved in to Fukien
airfields. This first step would take several months.
Second, the assault would begin with action against and
occupation of Chinmen and Matsu, and then the attack on
Taiwan would follow. The Chinese estimated that this
second step would be completed in about two weeks. General
Jani and his delegation later commented on the serious
POL deficiency on the mainland, which the Chinese acknow-
ledged, and its importance as an impediment to an attack
in the near future.
-5-
SPrit RT 25X1
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for_Release_2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
A. Maneuvering Against a Washington-Taipei
Treaty (1954)
Mao apparently gave Chou the major role in the
political effort to annex Taiwan. Chou stayed within
Mao's concept of an obsessively held goal: "The Chinese
people are determined to liberate Taiwan from the grip
of the US. aggressors and will never relax until they have
achieved that end" (Chou's speech of 23 October 1951).
Chou later devised an ostensibly flexible formulation,
but did not explicitly renounce the use of force against
the island. In the spring of 1954, he stated that "the
Chinese people are willing to strive for the liberation
of Taiwan by peaceful means so far as possible," bring-
ing Mao's position closer to the Soviet line on negotia-
tion and coexistence. Even when, in the summer of 1954,
the Chinese Communists stepped up their clamor for Taiwan
and intensified the military threat to the offshores,
Chou tried to maintain two lines simultaneously and de-
clared in August 1954: Peking "must take determined
action on the liberation of Taiwan," but also "the achieve-
ments of the Geneva conference demonstrate that interna-
tional disputes can be settled by the peaceful means of
negotiation..." /
Chou tried to prevent the indefinite postponement
of conquest from being understood as abandonment of Mao's
goal. He insisted on Peking's right to possess all
Nationalist-held territory, and in January 1955, he pub-
licly rejected any "so-called cease-fire" with Chiang and
reaffirmed that the conquest of Taiwan was an "internal
affair in which foreign interference" would not be
25.X1
25X1
?
-6-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
tolerated.
The Chinese Communists, in one important period,
used limited military measures to try to prevent a mili-
tary alliance from being formalized between the U.S. and
the Nationalists. In July 1954, a Washington-Taipei
mutual security treaty was under consideration. Follow-
ing the Geneva conference settlement on Indochina, the
Chinese Communists increased their forces on the coast
opposite Taiwan and sharply increased their shelling of
Chinmen on 3 September, calculating that this tension
would impel Western and Asian governments to press Washing-
ton to withdraw its protection of the Nationalists, or
at least decide against making a treaty with them. But
Peking's limited military actions (shelling) stimulated,
rather than deterred, Washington to act formally to con-
clude the mutual security treaty, agreement on which was
announced on 1 December 1954, Failure to prevent the
conclusion of the treaty led to resumed shelling of the
offshores and further military preparations on the East
China coast. The Chinese Communists apparently decided
to accept a slightly greater risk by taking some other
form of limited military action in the hope of spiking
the internationally held view that the treaty had stabi-
lized the status of Taiwan as a second, and safely pro-
tected, China.
As the PLA prepared to attack the Tachen Islands,
Chinese Communist spokesmen exploited the deterrent value
of the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950, declaring that
"we are firmly linked with our great friend, the USSR,
in an unbreakable alliance which stands for peace but
which commands such strength as to spell doom for anyone
who tries to violate our rights or borders" (Madame Sun
-7-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
Yat-sen speech of 28 December 1954).* PLA units took I
Chiang Shan on 18 January 1955 and forced the Nationalists
to withdraw from the other Tachen Islands. This action
(which included the use of Communist tactical airstrikes)
reduced Nationalitt holdings to the island complexes of
the Matsus and Chinmen. Politically, it rebuffed Western
efforts to ease tension and attain a cease-fire. Peking
kept alive the political issue of Taiwan by claiming that
the Tachens had become "stepping stones" to the large is-
land. Sporadic artillery duels with the defenders of
Chinmen continued, the political intention being to remind
the world that Mao would not accept the continued exist-
ence of his revolutionary war enemy in the Strait area
indefinitely and would not accept any compromise formula
to ease tension which did not recognize his "right" to
seize the island.
But once again, the Chinese Communists had entered
on a course which strengthened rather than weakened the
U.S. commitment to Taipei. President Eisenhower asked
Congress for authority--which was granted' on'28 January
1955--to employ U.S. forces in the Strait to defend Taiwan
and "related positions"--i.e., the offshores. The Com-
munist leaders' anxiety almost certainly was increased
by U.S. statements regarOng the possible use of atomic
weapons in the Far East.** Mao's spokesmen invoked the
*Madame Sun referred several times to the treaty's
anniversary date as "almost" arrived, suggesting Peking's
intention to exploit its deterrent value at least two
months before its fifth anniversary at a ;time of crucial
need.
**Reflecting considerable concern, the Chinese Commun-
ists picked up and cited Admiral Radford's statement of
2 January 1955 that the U.S. would use atomic weapons if
the Korean war were resumed and that the use of these
weapons in other parts of the Far East would depend on
the actual situation. They interpreted it to be a U.S.
threat intended to deter further PLA operations against
the Nationalists. C1ou En-lai directly attacked the U.S.
for "brandishing atomic weapons" (statement of 24 January
1955), but he probably was a leading proponent of caution
in advising Mao to settle, at least temporarily, for the
Tachens and to avoid further island seizures.
-8-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
25X1
?
the Soviet atomic deterrent more openly and fully than
ever before:
We thank the Government of the Soviet Union.
In his speech at the session of the Supreme
Soviet on 9 February, Marshal N.A. Bulganin
...stated clearly that 'in this noble cause
[to liberate Taiwan] the Chinese people can
count on the help of their true friend, the
great Soviet people.'
The American generals and atomaniacs...
should understand that blackmail with atomic
weapons frightens no one but themselves.
The production of these weapons has long
ceased to be a monopoly of the U.S. They
cannot be used without consideration of
the retaliation this will incur.
The USSR and China are vast in size and
the density of their population is not
very great. But the U.S., Britain, and
France are in a different situation. In
the U.S. the industrial areas are primarily
in the north and 65 percent of its indus-
try is concentrated in areas totalling 9
percent of its whole expanse. Thus the
American maniacs may well become the first
Victims of their own policy of atomic black-
mail....
Here we must express our sincere thanks
especially to our great ally, the USSR.
The USSR, our great ally, is the strong-
est bulwark of peace. The superiority of
her socialist system and the unity and con-
certed efforts of her people not only provided
the Soviet Union with atomic and hydrogen
weapons, which checked the adventurist,
unscrupulous tenaffElis of the atomaniacs,
but also resulted in the completion of 1.n
atomic power plant on July 1, 1954. (Kuo
Mo-jo's speech of 12 February 1955) (emphasis
supplied)
-9-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SRCIR RT
Mao himself, in an unprecedented speech stressing Sino-
Soviet "cooperation" at five points on the occasion of
the fifth anniversary of the treaty, utiliz ed the Soviet
deterrent to imply that Moscow was committed to fight with
Peking "should the imperialists start a war" (speech of
14 February 1955).* Behind this screen of deterrent state-
ments, which came more from Chinese than from Soviet lead-
ers, Mao retreated from the risk of a possible Sino-Ameri-
can military clash to the safer ground of political maneuver.
The Soviet leaders in early 1955 were even more
anxious than Mao to move the Taiwan issue away from limited
military and toward political forms of action, unwilTIEE---
T575eZBEe involved in any military venture in which
Chinese interests were paramount, and Soviet interests
were only marginal.
*On the same day, one regime spokesman was even more
explicit in underscoring the "special significance today"
of the Sino-Soviet treaty "at a time when the U.S. is
openly interfering in China's internal affairs by encroach-
ing on her territory of Taiwan."
-10-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SF.C.R RT
?
?
?
B. Sino-US. Talks: Stress on Political Maneuver
(1955-57)
The result of Mao's retreat was to be Sino-Ameri-
can talks begun in the summer of 1955, but the Chinese
leader remained obsessed with his view of Peking's "right"
to use force in the future. Prior to the start of those
talks, Chou En-lai had made it clear that the only topic
for discussion would be an international one--i.e., ten-
sion created by the U.S. "occupation" of Chinese terri-
tory--and not a domestic one?i.e., a Communist-National-
ist cease-fire. Peking's "right" to seize Taiwan was a
domestic matter which could not be debated. Chou set
forth this position at Bundung in April 1955 and later
made Peking's formal definitive statement on Taiwan and
the American role In his report to the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress (NPC) on 13
May 1955, Chou stated that
Taiwan is China's territory, the people
living in Taiwan are Chinese people, and
the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese
people is China's domestic affair. The
U.S. occupation of Taiwan has created
tension in the Taiwan area, and this con-
stitutes an international issue between
China and the U.S. The two questions
cannot be mixed up.
There is no war between China and the U.S.,
so the question of a so-called ceasefire
does not arise. The Chinese people are
friendly with the American people. The
Chinese people do not want to have a war
with the U.S. To ease tension in the
Taiwan area, the Chinese government is
willing to sit down and enter into negotia-
tions with the U.S. government.
As to the form of negotiations, the Chinese
government supports the Soviet proposal for
a 10-power conference and is also willing
-11 -
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SHURE]:
to consider other forms. However, no negotia-
tions should in the slightest degree affect
the Chinese people's exercise of t:leir
sovereign rights--their just demand and
action to liberate Taiwan. At the same
time, the Chinese government can at no time
agree to participation by the Chiang Kai-
shek clique in any international confer-
ence.
The Chinese people have two possible means
of liberating Taiwan--namely, by war or
peaceful means. The Chinese people are
willing to strive for the liberation of
Taiwan by peaceful means so far as this is
possible. (emphasis supplied)
This position meant that Peking would agree to talk about
inducing the U.S. to withdraw ("ease tension") but would
not negofria-ii-Zease-fire or a renunciation of the use
of force against the Nationalists on Taiwan. In order
to avoid international criticism for not suppressing his
desire to conquer the island, Mao tried to gain credit
for a willingness to talk about (rather than take) Taiwan,
remaining silent on the decisive fact that Peking had
already conceded his forces could not take it. This was
a sophisticated line which probably reflected, in part,
Chou's thinking and advice.
At 'nit time, Mao showed sufficient moderation and
good sense to permit Chou to gain credit among Asian
neutrals for advancing a flexible and "reasonable" policy
and to depict Washington as the inflexible party. It
is a tribute to the diplomatic skill of Chou that he
succeeded in convincing many Asians (and some influential
men in the West) that Peking was moderate (without having
jettisoned Mao's obsessively held goal). Whenever Mao
has permitted Chou some leeway to maneuver, the Chinese
premier has proven to be the most effective opponent of
U.S. Oicy in the Chinese leadership.
-12-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SRC:RFT
?
?
Chou's task was to move Sino-U.S. talks from the
consular to the ambassadorial level, and finally to the
foreign minister level. The U.S. was to accept this
political ascent, or appear to much of the world to be
unreasonable in refusing. Chou used a conciliatory line
on detained nationals to induce the U.S. to move negotia-
tions to a higher level. By the start of the talks (1
August 1955), of 51 Americans known to have been held on
the mainland, 10 were released; by mid-January 1956, 28
more were freed as a result of the agreement reached in
mid-September 1955. Chou had said that "first of all"
the ambassadorial level talks would reach such an agree-
ment, but as negotiations bogged down on the major issue
of renunciation of force, some Americans were retained
as hostages to induce Washington to raise the level of
the talks, or at least to sustain them.* /
/Peking declared publicly
on 18 January 1956 that "it is obvious that only through
a Sino-American conference of foreign ministers will it
be possible to settle the question of relaxation and
elimination of tension in the Taiwan area." Chou was
aware that such a conference would greatly exacerbate
Washington-Taipei relations and induce other governments
to move toward formal recognition of the Peking regime.
Chou's position on the renunciation of force was
slippery. In his speech of 30 July 1955, his formulation
left him free to renounce force without modifying his
previous position. That is, he was free to renounce
force under a clever formulation which would permit him
to demand an American withdrawal but would not oblige the
-13-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
Communists to desist from attacking Taiwan if military
force were necessary.
...there are two possible ways for the
Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, namely,
by war or by peaceful means. Conditions
permitting, the Chinese people are prepared
to seek the liberation of Taiwan by peace-
ful means. In the course of the liberation
by the Chinese people of the mainland and
the coastal islands, there was no lack of
precedents for peaceful liberation. Provided
that the U.S. does not interfere with China's
internal affairs, the possibility of peace-
ful liberation of Taiwan will continue to
increase. (emphasis supplied)
Chou went on to hint of circumventing the U.S., expressing
a willingness to begin negotiations with "the responsible
local authorities of Taiwan..." This suggested negotia-
tions below the level of Chiang.* However, after several
months of discussions at Geneva of the concept of renun-
ciation of force, the Chinese Communists declared (on
18 January 1956) that they "absolutely cannot accept" any
formula which would permit the U.S. to defend Taiwan
against attack.
To sum up; "negotiations" was conceived by Mao and
Chou as a procedure to improve Peking's chances of attain-
ing international recognition and a withdrawal of Ameri-
can forces from Taiwan. Following such a withdrawal,
"negotiations" would be attempted with the Nationalists
*In 1959, this level was raised to include Chiang and/or
his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who in fact received several
Chinese Communist bids to defect or "negotiate." Chiang
himself was promised a place in the central or "local"
(Taiwan) government in the course of several facetious
statements made by Chou and his aides, and later, in
September 1964, by Mao himself.
-14-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
who, being undefended, would have the choice of simple
surrender or surrender after a major military assault
from the mainland. By no means would'hegotiations" be
permitted to freeze a "two Chinas" status: "It should
be made clear that these would be negotiations between
the central government and local authorities. The Chi-
nese people are firmly opposed to any ideas or plots of
the so-called "two Chinas.'" (Chou's speech of 30 July
1955)
? Military Pressure (1958)
C. Sino-U.S. Talks Interrupted: Stress on
Sino-American talks moved into a complete stale-
mate, and were interrupted in December 1957, when Ambas-
sador Johnson was transferred to Bangkok. Mao refused
to accept further talks between Peking's ambassador and
a U.S. representative of lower rank.* Major internal
developments had impelled him to return to hardline
Stalinist policies by early 1958, and he began to dispute
with Khrushchev, demanding a more aggressive global
strategy for the bloc against the U.S. During discus-
sions with Khrushchev in Moscow in November 1957, Mao
apparently recognized that the Soviet ICBM and earth-
satellite successes could be exploited to make the Soviet
deterrent apply to an interdiction effort against the
offshores. On 23 August 1958, the Chinese began their
interdiction effort against the Chinmen and Matsu island
*In the first years of the Sino-American ambassadorial
meetings, the Chinese often proposed that they be raised
to the foreign minister's level (in order to suggest at
least partial U.S. recognition of Peking). But during
the temporary suspension of these talks (December 1957
to September 1958), the Chinese denied that they had
ever desired acceptance: "The Chinese people...have
never been concerned about U.S. 'recognition.'" (People's
Daily editorial of 18 August 1958) Mao's anti-U.S.
obsession had deopened in the interval.
-15-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
complexes, and on 1 September, Chou, trying to frighten
neutrals into demanding a U.S. retreat, insisted
that the PLA would take both com-
plexes by invasion. But Secretary Dulles' speech of 4
September, in which he implied that the U.S. would regard
an attack on Chinmen as preparation for an attack on Tai-
wan and therefore a reason for war, convinced Mao and
Chou that the U.S. commitment to Chiang was solid. In
their apparent view, it became necessary to convey to
Washington a sign that Peking was willing to avoid a
direct clash with U.S. military forces. But, short of
that, Mao had PLA artillery keep the pressure on the
Chinmen garrison, and he had his diplomats retain the
atmosphere of war crisis, the latter being a form of
international pressure on the U.S.
In order to avoid a direct Sino-U.S. clash, the
Communists officially declared (on 4 September) that
Peking's territorial waters extend 12 miles from a base
line drawn to include all coastal islands. The inten-
tion was to deter the Seventh Fleet from convoying Nation-
alist resupply vessels to the island garrisons. The 4
September declaration warned the U.S. that "no airplane
or military vessel of any foreign country" shall "enter
the territorial waters of China or the skies above" with-
out Peking's permission. Mao and his aides also required
a Soviet statement to keep the U.S. from supporting a
Nationalist counterattack and attained this from Khru-
shchev when the American convoying activity began on 7
September.
In order to continue pressure on Chinmen and the
Mat3us, Chou En-lai, in agreeing on 6 September to a
resumption of ambassadorial-level talks with the U.S.
--reaffirmed Peking's "absolute right" to take the"neces-
sary military action" against Nationalist forces on the
offshores (even after the talks began). Artillery fire
was sustained, hampering the Nationalist resupply ef-
fort--the necessary pressure preparatory to the 15
September Sino-American meeting.
In order to retain a tense atmosphere of war crisis,
Chinese Communist statements claimed that convoying activity
-16-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
25X1
by American forces would place the U.S. in a "most precarioilR
situation involving direct armed conflict with China at 25X1
any moment" (People's Daily editorial of 9 September).*
Careful to control the risk of a clash with the
U.S., the Chinese Communists used the leeway they had to
continue military pressure on the Nationalist garrisons
and psychological pressure on Washington. They clearly
intended to use the general international atmosphere of
apprehension to try to force a U.S.-supported withdrawal
from theeffshores, Peking's propaganda in early, middle,
and late September made a distinction between acquiring
the offshores immediately and acquiring Taiwan later, the
line having been that Chinumn and the Matsus were the
"immediate threat" to the mainland while Taiwan was in
the category of territory which would be "restored, sooner
or later."
Mao's effort became less risky but was not scrapped
after Chou (on 6 September) had agreed to negotiations.
On the contrary, the Warsaw talks became the venue for
trying to attain an American surrender. As the day (15
September) when Sino-American talks would begin moved
closer, the Communists sustained their artillery inter-
diction effort against Nationalist re-supply vessels and
the island garrisons, Mao apparently still viewed the
*Convoying of Nationalist resupply vessels by U.S. Navy
ships, which began on 7 September, had impelled the Chinese
Communists to be more careful about provoking U.S. retali-
tation, but convoying did not make them back away from
the interdiction effort. Shelling of Chinmen was stopped
for one day, but was resumed on the following day, targeted
against Nationalist re-supply vessels within the three-
mile area not covered by the U.S. convoying operation.
-17-
ciprR FT
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
situation
25X1
as containing a small degree of risk, parti-
cularly after American convoying activity began on 7
September, and he may have asked for a Soviet statement
of warning to Washington. In his first letter to Presi-
dent Eisenhower, Khrushchev on the 7th warned the U.S.
against direct involvement which would lead to an Ameri-
can attack on the mainland: "An attack on the PRC...is
an attack on the Soviet Union." The Chinese Communists
exploited this statement extensively. American naval
convoying continued up to the three-mile limit while
Nationalist supply vessels dashed for Chinmen's beach,
?
occasionally receiving hits at the offloading area. The
bombardment of Chinmen during a re-supply effort on 11
September was one of the most intense delivered during
?
the crisis, the intention being interdiction while, on
the same day, the U.S. was given Peking's "fourth warning"
against convoying in mainland-claimed waters. Heavy
and accurate artillery fire harassed Nationalist re-supply
vessels on 13 and 14 September, and Mao apparently still
believed that the U.S. might be induced in the Sino-Ameri-
can talks at Warsaw to apply pressure to Chiang for a
withdrawal.
Accommodation to Mao's demand was in effect the
line advanced by Chou En-lai to worried neutrals after
Wang Ping-nan on 15 September had probed Washington's
willingness to retreat. Chou told
that Peking can accept nothing less than the evacua-
tion of the offshores as a condition for ending the
crisis and, in line with the Chinese Communist emphasis
on the "immediate threat" from the offshores, Chou stated
that his government would be willing to consider Taiwan
as a "separate issue," subject to negotiation after set-
tlement of the immediate offshore island situation, or
after an interval of perhaps "five years." Wang Ping-nan
at W'rsaw reiterated Peking's refusal to agree to a
cease-fire, the calculation being that this should be
reserved as the price for a Nationalist withdrawal.
Further pressure was required as well as a state-
ment warning against a major American military action,
and this was supplied by Khrushchev in his letter of 19
September to President Eisenhower. The Chinese Communists
-18-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
25X1
had already extensively exploited Khrushchev's first warn-
ing that an attack on the mainland was an attack on the
USSR and they went on to deny that Washington could impel
Peking to back away from its effort by means of "atomic
blackmail." Regarding his warning of the 19th--namely,
that an atomic or hydrogen weapons attack on China would
trigger "at once" a rebuff "by the same means" and "May
no one doubt that we shall completely honor our commit-
ments" under the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty--they used it
as psychological-political support for their interdiction
effort, warning the U.S. of retaliation "as Comrade Khru-
shchev" said in his letter. The People's Daily editorial
of 21 September asserted that Chinmen and the Matsus are
"situated in China's inland sea" and that attacks against
Chinmen were part of a "civil war," implying that the U.S.
should discontinue convoying activity. It distinguished
between the immediate issue of the offshores and the
long-range goal of seizing Taiwan. Khrushchev's letter
of the 19th had been intended not only to deter a possible
U.S. attack if a clash occurred, but also to bolster Peking's
demand for 8 U.S. concession. It tried to convey the
impression that accommodation to Peking's demand provided
the only alternative to a major clash--the U.S. must with-
draw its forces from the area, and if such action were
not taken, Peking "will have no other recourse but to
expell the hostile armed forces from its own territory."
There was a real possibility that the Nationalists
would attack mainland artillery emplacements with air-
strikes, and the Communists noted that Chiang and his
lieutenants were trying to convince U.S. officials of this
necessity in mid-September. Peking viewed this prospect
as leading to eventual American involvement in, or support
of, the airstrikes. Khrushchev's warning, therefore,
while specifying only U.S. military action against the
mainland, was also intended to impel Washington to restrain
Chiang from expanding the scope of hostilities. Moreover,
the-antinuation of U.S. naval convoying activity and
night air cover had confronted Mao with a military chal-
lenge he had been unwilling to meet with direct action,
and the political-psychological fiction he had created
of the American "paper tiger" was being exposed as just
that--a fiction intended to conceal Peking's real military
-19-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
QuruPT
inferiority and American superiority. Incongruously, the
Chinese Communists leaned heavily on Khrushchev's deter-
rent statements to dispel the idea of their relative
military weakness, and it is unlikely that they would
have so conceded their reliance on Moscow if they had not
been worried about a possible U.S.-Nationalist attack.
Despite the increasing success of the Nationalists
in resupplying their garrisons in late September, the
Chinese Communists apparently hoped that temporary com-
pliance with the U.S. request for a cease-fire might get
them the islands. Defense Minister Peng Te-hual-rilued
a seven-day cease-fire order (on 6 October and extended
on 12 October)/
_// Militarily,
Peng's order was intended to disengage the U.S. from
any active support Of the Nationalist garrisons. Cessa-
tion of the shelling on condition that the U.S. discon-
tinue convoying activity provided a convenient way for
Peking to further reduce the risk of a Sino-American
clash. On 8 October, Peking issued its 24th "serious
warning" against U.S. naval and air "intrusions."
However, Washington's determination to support
Nationalist garrisons (despite Khrushchev's lettci)-ind
a new move by Asian and African neutrals to debate the
situation in the UN apparently convinced Mao that the in-
terdiction effort not only had failed, but had created
a new problem. This new problem was the appearance of
neutral-initiated proposals for a "two Chinas" settle-
ment, using Peking's own distinction between the offshores
and Taiwan as two separate issues. Chou En-lai and Chen
Yi were given the task of keeping the issue out of the
UN, insisting that Sino-American bilateral talks required
no mediation by third parties.
As the Chinese Communists retreated, they returned
to their pre-September 1958 position, blurring the dis-
tinction between the long-range demand to acquire Taiwan
and the "immediate" demand to get the offshores. By early
-20-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
J
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
October, Taiwan and the offshores were wrapped together
in an undifferentiated package, the message to neutrals
being that the large island could not be separated from
the offshore island issue and considered as a second
China.* Khrushchev, aware of the retreat and the begin-
ning of the end of Mao's effort, tried to dissociate
Moscow from the charge of intervention, making (in a speech
on 5 October) his most explicit statement on the precise
nature of the Soviet commitment. He had viewed the
crisis as a "civil war," he said, and had committed the
USSR only to defense of the mainland: "The USSR will
come to the help of China if the latter is attacked from
without; speaking more concretely, if the U.S. attacks
China." By implication, he was also saying that Ameri-
can "interference" had not constituted a sufficient
provocation to trigger his commitment of defense.
Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist lcaders had
viewed his September letters of deterrence as important
and necessary, and on 15 October, Radio Moscow broadcast
the text of a letter signed by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi,
and Chou En-lai to Khrushchev and Voroshilov. Dated 10
*This concept of an undifferentiated offshores-Taiwan
package was also used by Mao to justify his retreat from
the effort to interdict the offshores. He told leaders
of various Latin American Communist parties in an inter-
view on 3 March 1959 that "You know of the events of
last year. On the island of Chinmen there are only 80,000
people, and it now known to the world that the U.S. does
not object to returning the islands of Chinren and Matsu
to us, but in exchange they want to keep Taiwan for them-
selves. This would be a disadvantageous deal. It will
be better if we wait. Let Chiang Kai-shek stay on Chin-
men and Matsu and we will get them back later together
with the Pescadores Islands and Taiwan. We have a vast
territory and we can live for the time being without these
islands." (Interview extracts reprinted in Izvestiya of
18 June 1959 as taken from article by Costa Rican Commun-
ist leader Eduard Moro Valverde) (emphasis supplied)
-21-
sRcRRT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
October, the letter expressed official gratitude for
Soviet support and, specifically, for the statement by
Khrushchev that "an attack against China was an attack
against the Soviet Union." The letter referred to "U.S.
military provocations" and suggested that Khrushchev's
statement had been "very effective" in "forcing the ag-
gressors to think hard about their fate." When, there-
fore, during intense Sino-Soviet polemics in the fall
of 1963, the Chinese leaders sarcastically stated that
in 1958 there was no possibility that a nuclear war would
break out and "no need for the Soviet Union to support
China with its nuclear weapons," they omitted their use
of Khrushchev's statements to try (1) to deter the U.S.
from convoying activity and (2) to warn the U.S. to re-
strain Chiang from initiating airstrikes against mainland
artillery emplacements.* The Chinese leaders also re-
mained silent on their quick action to extensively exploit
Khrushchev's letters, particularly at a time when they
were still demanding a major U.S. concession regarding
the offshores.
*The Maoist distortion of events was expressed in Pek-
ing's polemical government statement of 1 September 1963:
"In August and September of 1958, the situation in the
Taiwan Strait was indeed very tense as a result of the
aggression and provocations by the U.S.imperialists. The
Soviet leaders tKhrushchev] expressed their support for
China on 7 and 19 September respectively. Although at
that time the situation in the Taiwan Strait was tense,
there was no possibility that a nuclear war would break
out and no need for the Soviet Union to support China
with 3ts nuclear weapons. It was only when they were
clear that this was the situation that the Soviet lead-
ers expressed their support for China." This version
failed to mention the fact that the interdiction effort
was sustained, and on some days intensified, after Khru-
shchev's letter of the 7th, that the Chinese Communists
were not absolutely certain of immunity from Nationalist
counteraction, and that Khrushchev had made the strong-
est and most explicit commitment to defense of the main-
land ever articulated by a Soviet leader.
-22 -
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
?
SECRRT
Mao's hope for a U.S. surrender further declined
when the cease-fire orders of 6 and 12 October "to see
what the opposite sidR was going to do" at Warsaw (quote
from Peng Te-huai's shelling-halt order of the 12th)
resulted only in sustained U.S. support for Chiang's
desire to hold the offshores. Peking began to complain
that the U.S. and Nationalist China were playing "a duet,"
with the U.S. expressing its desire to "reduce the Chiang
army on Chinmen and the Matsus," while the Nationalists
re-emphasized the importance of maintaining troops on
these islands (People's Daily editorial of 21 October
1958). Moreover, the Natioalists were claiming that
the two cease-fire orders represented a "victory" for
them. The Chinese Communists changed course temporarily
to try to demonstrate that Pddng was not acing from weak-
ness (Peng Te-huai ordered resumption of shelling on the
20th), but then reduced the entire situation to a low-
boil with an announcement on the 26th (clarifying Peng
Te-huai's limited-shelling order of the 25th) to the
effect that Chinmen would not be shelled "on even dates"
on the calender. This was a political formulation of
Mao's intended to (1) give credence to the claim that
the Nationalists on Chinmen could maintain their garri-
son only by Communist sufferance, (2) retain flexibility
to fire or not to fire without appearing to accept U.S.
proposals for a de facto cease-fire, and (3) reduce ten-
sion in order to avoid the risk of expanded hostilities
such as Nationalist counteraction supported by the U.S.
D. The Retreat to Political Struggle (1958-62)
Mao's effort was concluded. The problem became
more political than ever before.* As on previous (and
*Mao himself apparently marked out the general line
of retreat by describing the matter as political and by
pretending to be merely reducing the leVii-a-ifielling
(rather than retreating), as witness his egregious con-
cept of shelling on odd days of the calender. "The
guideline determined by Chairman Mao last fall [i.e.,
(footnote continued on page 24)
-23-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
later) occasions, Chou was assigned the task of minimiz-
ing the true scope of Mao443 failure, which he tried to
do at a hastily convened meeting of CCP propaganda of-
ficials in November 1958, establishing a new line by using
the retreat half of Mao's dialectical formulation that
the U.S. as a "paper tiger," should be disparaged strategic-
any, "but taken into account tactically."(
(footnote continued from page 23)
1958] regarding the military struggle on the Fukien Front
is an outstanding example of military struggle subordin-
ated to political struggle. At first, many foreign mili-
tary experts simply could not understand our method of
fighting. They said that China's method of fighting is
unprecedented in military history. They never heard of
not shelling on even days, but shelling on odd days and,
on no-shelling days, permitting the enemy to replenish
ammunition. Later, they came to understand that our war
is political war." (General Tu Ping article in New China
Semi-Monthly of 10 July 1959) Typically, Mao's formula-
tion became a ritualistic concept and mere mention of an
alleged breach of the policy it implied is now considered
to be a major offense against Mao's strategic view. When,
therefore, Lo Jui-ching was under attack for a whole
range of "mistakes," included in the charges was that of
a breach of discipline on this matter. Lo, it was claimed,
failed to recognize that "the struggle in the Taiwan
Strait is not simply a struggle against the Chiang Kai-
shek bandit gang, but primarily one against U.S. imperi-
alism. It is not simply a military problem, but primarily
a political problem." (Peking Combat News article of 30
January 1967)
-24-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
?
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
?
25X1
25X1
iThe self- 25X1
serving aspect of Peking's statements during retreat was
also indicated by the changes made in the text of the 30
October interview that the free-wheeling Chen Yi had given
a Cnnadian re.orter.
Peking disseminated the view that "real" negotia- 25X1
tions with the Nationalists were in progress and that
the Communists were merely using a benevolent policy, not
retreating./
-25-
ARC.R FT
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
The failure of this effort was for Mao the signal
to become more intransigent and to drop the step-by-step
approach that had marked the Warsaw talks during the period
from August 1955 to December 1957. He and his aides for-
mulated a new line, insisting that no real Peking-Washing-
ton discuosions (at Warsaw) could be held on small matters
--that is, on the release of U.S. prisoners, exchange of
newsmen, and visits of prominent Americans--until the basic
matter of U.S. withdrawal from the Strait area was first
agreed upon. On 9 January 1959, Wang Ping-nan insisted
that the talks concentrate on the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from the Strait.**
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
?
Events in
the fall of 1958 in the Strait had significantly reduced
the credibility of Peking's earlier threats that it would
take the offshores by force.
(footnote continued on page 27)
-26-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
?
SECRET
Chou had had a major role in formulating and implementing
the previous strategy. He had depicted the purpose of
Sino-American talks to be: "settling the matter of the
repatriation of civilians of both sides, and to facilitate
further discussions and settlement of certain other practi-
cal matters now at issue between both sides" (speech of
30 July 1955).
But in contrast with his gradual and piecemeal ap-
proach (1955-1957), Chou told Edgar Snow in October 1960
that Washington must accept the "principle" of withdrawal
and that once the principle was agreed upon, the specific
steps as to "when and how" withdrawal would take place
could be settled later. The principle involved was not
(footnote continued from page 26)
Another justification for avoiding a new confronta-
tion was the apparent unwillingness of Khrushchev to
support one again. /
-27-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
bt.UKE1.
one of diplomatic give-and-take, but rather one of total
surrender without compromise. Mao had .Started on the road
to taking even the pretense of flexibility out of the
Chinese Communist negotiating position, and Chou had to
discard the step-by-step approach.*
E. Fear of Nationalist Attack (1962)
In 1962, disillusionment in the party, PLA, and
populace and economic dislocations disturbed the Chinese
Communist leaders as they continued to tidy up the mess
left by Mao's leap forward and commune policies. Their
anxiety was augmented by the appearance of a small threat
from India--firefights along the Sino-Indian border in
the spring of 1962--and a larger assumed threat frow Tai-
wan, i.e., Nationalist plans for an invasion of the Fukien
coast.** They viewed both threats as real and acted on
*Of the few words Mao permitted Edgar Snow to quote
from a long interview of October 1960, the following were
included in his remarks on policy toward the U.S.: "Tai-
wan is China's affair. We will insist on this."
**Chiang Kai-shek had in fact planned an increase in
small-scale operations against the mainland. On 30 May,
he told an American official that he had ordered Nation-
alist intelligence agencies to make intensive efforts to
infiltrate agents onto the mainland. He said that the
Nationalists should make repeated infiltration efforts,
including numerous small airdrops, regardless of the cost.
The Communist leaders apparently were not clear regard-
ing the size of the prospective Nationalist operations,
but they adopted the strategy of expecting the worst--namely,
big ones./
-28-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
the view that the larger one could prove disastrous. They
tried to deter the anticipated Nationalist invasion by
building up a deterrent force in Fukien and by seeking
assurances from Washington that Chiang's plan would not
be supported by the U.S.
They later stated that they believed Chiang was
gearing up for "an invasion" in early April 1962 (Chou
En-lais s statement on 15 Septem-
ber 1962). In early June, they began an air, sea, and
land buildup of military forces in the Foochow !Vilitary
Region opposite Taiwan./
/They tried to deter the Nationalists by
their buildup and by bluster, warning that an attack would
be "suicide" in the face of the "overwhelming superiority
of Chinese Communist armed forces" (broadcast to Taiwan
of 13 June). The main deterrent effort, howevc,r, was
directed toward the U.S. reflecting their view that a
major attack would require considerable U.S. logistic
support.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Washington was urged to prevent Chiang from acting,
at first in ambassadorial talks at Warsaw on 15 June, then
25X1
-29-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SF.C.RRT
in a broadcast of the 23rd, and again in a major speech
by Chen Yi on the 25th. Chen declared that if the U.S.
persists in using the Nationalists "to impose war" on the
Communists, Peking will have "no alternative but to go
along with it to the very end." He implied that the Com-
munist buildup in Fukien was defensive in intent: Peking
had been trying "to ease tension in the Taiwan area,"
had been engaged intalks with the U.S. for more than six
years, and had been striving to attain "by peaceful means"
a U.S. withdrawal from the area.* Despite Washington's
initial assurance that the U.S. had no intention of pro-
viding Chiang with support (conveyed to the Chinese ambas-
sador in Warsaw privately on 15 June), the Communist
leaders were not yet entirely convinced and continued
to underscore U.S. responsibility for any invasion (Chen
Yi and Tao Chu speeches of 1 July). By late June, they
apparently believed that they had a sufficient number
of forces in the region to deter an attack or to handle
it if it came.
The Chinese Communists, still angered by Khru-
shchev's anti-Albanian (read, anti-Chinese) performance
at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, nevertheless
implied Soviet support for their cause. No force on
earth "can disrupt the great socialist camp" was Chen Yi's
*The hinese lea ers' concern with their internal situa-
tion and their fear that the U.S. might move troops from
Thailand into Laos while supporting a Nationalist inva-
sion on the mainland impelled them to take an unprecedent-
edly soft line. In the Wang-Beam talks from March to June
1961, they invited frank, off-the-record discussions and
said they warted a reduction of Sino-American tensions.
Through mid-July 1962, they continued to state privately
to U.S. officials their desire to reduce tensions, point-
ing with satisfaction to the settlement in Laos and sug-
gesting that "further understandings" could be attained
with the U.S. /
-30-
SlRe.RPT
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
SECRET
way of hinting at international support (speech of 25
June). But the Chinese leaders were not provided with
a Soviet deterrent statement until after Washington had
assured them of non-involvement in any Chiang invasion.
In his speech of 2 July, Khrushchev tried to gain credit
in the Communist movement at no real risk to Moscow for
support of Peking, while in fact his warning was vague.
In sharp contrast to the two letters he sent President
Eisenhower in September 1958 regarding Soviet nuclear
retaliation, Khrushchev, avoiding use of his old formula
tion that an attack on the mainland was an attack on the
USSR, stated ambiguously that China would be supported
by the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc in administer-
ing a "crushing rebuff" (unspecified) to any attack on
the mainland.* He did not refer to the Sino-Soviet treaty
and used another weak locution: united Communist parties
"reliably guarantee each socialist country from encroach-
ments by imperialist reaction." Aware of the absence of
a specific Soviet nuclear threat to deter the U.S. and
Nationalists, the Chinese Communists nevertheless tried
to exptoit hts statement, giving it front-page coverage
in People's Daily oli 4 July. The Chinese not only tried
to squeeze some deterrentvalue from Khrushchev's vague
statement, but also tried to puz the best face on strained
Sino-Sovic.t relations, going so far as to imply praise
*His exact words were: "He who dares attack the PRC
will meet with a crushing rebuff from the great Chinese
people, the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the entire
socialist camp." Khrushchev's failure to mention the U.S.
as the attacking party or as the ally supporting the
prospective attackers contrasted sharply with the practice
of the Chinese leaders in specifying the U.S.: "I must
warn the U.S. government again that any military adventure
undertaken by the Chiang gang, regardless of when it
starts and on what scale, would be a responsibility of
the U.S. government" (Chen Yi speech of 12 July). In
Khrushchev's letters to President Eisenhower in September
1958, there was no blurring of the reference to the U.S.
as the prime target of hypothetical Soviet counteraction.
25X1
-31-
SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy_Approved.for_Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
for Khrushchev--an unprecedented action after the behind-
the-scenes showdowns in June and November 1960 and the
polemics at conferences in 1961 and 1962. Mao Tun, the
Chinese delegate to the Moscow World Peace Congress, was
quoted in Pravda on 8 July as saying that the Chinese
people had received Khrushchev's speech "with great joy"
and "are grateful to the Soviet people for their aid."
Mao Tun represented Khrushchev as statilig that the USSR
"is ready, if necessary, to come to the assistance of the
Chinese people" and went on to warn that "The war gamblers
will have to think twice after Nikita Khrushchev's speech."
Peking's "joy" in receiving Khrushchev's speech was a
line so contradictory to the internal Chinese line on
Khrushchev that it was not carried in any Chinese Communist
media. Mao Tun went on to pledge, by way of a reciprocal
friendly action, "close cooperation" of his delegation
with the Soviets at the Moscow World Congress for General
Disarmament and Peace, although the Chinese had attacked
Soviet disarmament policy earlier (in December 1961 at
Stockholm). In a :statement at that time unprecedented
in Pravda, Mao Tun openly referred to "alleged differences
between Chinaand the USSR," implying falsely the exist-
ence of a working alliance. (This same delegation leader
earlier had led a Chinese group in a clash with Soviet
delegates over disarmament in Cairo at the Afro-Asian
Writers Conference in February 1962.)
Never again were the Chinese leaders to profess
such goodwill to Khrushchev, as the mutual bond between
Mao and Khrushchev continued to deteriorate into a rela-
tionship of inveterate hatred. :ally 1962 was the last
time Mao permitted a degree of flexibility to be used in
relations with him, the final favorable reference to him
having been made by Chen Yi, who quoted Khrushchev on a
"crushing rebuff," mentioning him by name--a reference,
however, which was carried only to international audiences
but not in the domestic version of Chen's 12 July speech.
By that time, the Chinese leaders were resting some-
what easier and did not view an attack as imminent. Chiang
Kai-shek had been strongly impressed by the major buildup
in Fukien, and by mid-July, the Nationalists were moving
at a slower pace in preparing operations. A cabinet member
-32-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
told U.S.
"counterattack"
a Communist
25X1
any
to
a lesser
officials that Taipei's position was that
on the mainland would be in response
military initiative. Chen Yi implied
degree of concern when he mentioned U.S. responsibility
for any Nationalist attack, whether it takes place "sooner
or later," or on "a big of small scale" (speech of 12
July); in mid-July he told newsmen at Geneva that if the
U.S. "restrains" Chiang, "a dangerous situation" will not
?
develop, although "sporadic shelling will take place in
the accustomed [low-level] way;" on 23 July, despite
obvious Soviet ambiguity on the USSR's military alliance
with China, he stated: "We can have differences with the
Russians, but we are both Communist and if someone tries
to touch one of us, we will stand together."*
It was in this general defensive context that
Peking made a renunciation 25X1
of the use of force in the Taiwan area.** However, at
the 15 June Sino-American ambassadorial talks, Wang Ping-
nan had stated that Peking would not (meaning not now)
**Publicly, Chen sustained the standard position: Peking
reserves the right to use force because Taiwan is "an in-
ternal Chinese affair and it is Peking's responsibility
to determine its future:" the recent military buildup
on the mainland "can be, therefore, termed neither defen-
sive nor aggressive." (Press conference of 23 July)
25X1
-33-
SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?EA...tyre 1
press its claims to Nationalist held territory by the use
of force and that Peking had not thus far sought a settle-
ment of the Taiwan issue by force, but the "whole situa-
tion would change" if the Nationalists attacked. On 20
July, Chen Yi told Malcolm MacDonald that Peking would
not attack Chinmen and the Matsus (meaning not now). This
amounted to a renunciation of a temporary nature, being
somewhat more explicit on not using force than Chou's
major formulation of May 1955 (China is "willing to strive
for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means so far
as this is possible"), and repeated by him, Mao, and Chen
in 1959. It was also in this general context of anxiety
that the Chinese leaders for the first time made state-
ments about U.S. policy regarding Taiwan in a vein of
qualified approval. Chen Yi told newsmen at Geneva in
late July that the U.S. had assured Peking at Warsaw it
would not approve or support a Nationalist invasion;
China appreciated this gesture "to a certain extent."
"It is not bad of them." He later said; this U.S. as-
surance was "most welcome." (Chen Yi speech of 1 August;
this favorable reference to the U.S. was not carried in
Peking's domestic broadcast of his speech)
In short, Mao and his lieutenants were more con-
cerned and uncertain about the regime's security in the
summer of 1962 than at any other time in the post-Stalin
period. He was impelled to sanction favorable refer-
ences to Moscow (Khrushchev) and Washington, his two
major enemies. This unusual behavior again indicates that
Mao's irrationality on the issue of a war to annex Taiwan
does not extend to a death wish and that he believes an
American nuclear weapons attack against mainlandtargets
would be disastrous and must be prevented by avoiding
a direct provocation to U.S. military power in the Far
East. And the Maoist position, expressed since the fall
of 1958, exclusively in terms of absorbing a hypothetical
U.S. invasion by falling back to the interior and conduct-
ing guerrilla warfare, is rhetorical "rubbish" (Khru-
shchev's depiction of it in his speech to the June 1963
-34-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
CPSU plenum), as it omits his main fear of U.S. nuclear
Weapons.* Mao has long held, and the PLA has absorbed
his view, that the object of war is "the preservation of
oneself and the destruction of the enemy" and that the
party should fight no engagements--particularly not a
"strategic decisive engagement"--in which victory could
*In this speech, Khrushchev reported that Mao had told
him (apparently during the July-August 1958 discussions)
that in the event of a U.S. attack, the USSR should not
intervene. The Chinese, Mao continued, would fight alone
and retreat as the Soviets had done when attacked by Ger-
many. According to Khrushchev, Mao was talking "rubbish"
in an effort to rebut Marshal Zhukov'E, assertion that
the USSR would defend China. Mao's statement was "rubbish"
apparently because he deliberately avoided the real issue
of a possible nuclear weapons attack (in which case, the
Soviet nuclear deterrent was necessary for the defense
of the mainland) and disc-jigged only on a possible U.S.
ground invasion (in which case the PLA could handle the
purely conventional man-for-man battles).
Mao's strategy--to fight alone and retreat--is relevant
only to a situation in which the Chinese Nationalists
invade and are not supported by the U.S. nuclear capability.
Strategy to meet a purely conventional-forces invasion
apparently was discussed in the Chinese leadership in the
spring and summer of 1962 during the Chinese Communist
buildup for a possible large-scale Nationalist attack.
Lo Jut-ching apparently argued for a plan to engage the
Nationalists on the Fukien Front beaches--referred to as
"blocking the water"--and Liu Shao-chi seems to have sup-
ported this view by arguing that "It will be bad if the
enemy comes in." (People's Daily article of 7 September
1967 attributes thele?g.ta.--Ttiegic views to Lo and Liu in
order to contrast them with the Mao-Lin strategy of luring
the invader in deep and then enveloping his forces.)
-35-
25X1
25X1
SECRET25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
ank.artni
not be definitely guaranteed.* (Problems of Strategy in
the Guerrilla War Against Japan, May 1938)
Mao is still (as in 1958) unprepared and unwilling
to venture an assault against the Seventh Fleet, and al-
though the PLA could seize some of the offshores after
*In On Protracted War (May 1938), Mao laid it down that
the CC1104's policy for "decisive engagements" should be "to
fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every campaign
or battle when victory is certain; to avoid a decisive en-
gagement in every campaign or battle when victory is un-
certain; and to avoid absolutely a strategic decisive en-
gagement which stakes the destiny of the nation." This
and other key passages in Mao's military writings (which
are themselves summations of the military thinking of his
field commanders, such as Chu Te, Peng Te-huai and Lin
Piao) place a high value on caution and reluctance to take
big risks. Although it can be argued that involvement
in the Korean war was such a major risk, Mao and his lieu-
tenants apparently believed that the U.S. would keep the
war limited to the peninsula and would not use its atomic
weapons. That 's, they calculated, rightly, that the big
battles would be fought by conventional armies with World
War II tactics, providing them with an advantage in man-
power to make up for superior U.S. firepower. Mao did
not take a great risk in October 1962 when he unleashed
the PLA to sweep Indian units back from their border posi-
tions because in that assault the calculation was to make
the enemy lose a quick-decision engagement, decisively,
before the major powers (the U.S. and the UK) could decide
on the best means to help in the remote Himalayan border
area.
Reckless ("adventurist") attacks and fighting-without-
preparation are two sins constantly criticized by Mao in
his military writings. It is part of PLA military doc-
trine./
-36-
SECRET
25X1
?
255(1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
absorbing heavy losses, he seems to be unwilling to take
the risk of a majnr U.S. military response against the
mainland.
F. Sino-Soviet Differences on "Renunciation of
Force" Issue (1954-64)
It has always been a glaring contradiction in Sino-
Soviet foreign policy that the Taiwan issue was crucial
to Peking's goals but rnly marginal (or of no importance
whatsoever) to Moscow's goals. Even at an early date in
the 1950s when relations were friendly, the Soviets were
not enthusiastic, at one time expressing understanding
and "support...for the liberation of Taiwan" (Khrushchev's
speech in Peking on 30 September 1954) while avoiding
support for the use of any means to seize the island,
merely "recognizing the rights of China to the island"
(Bulganin's statement at Geneva on 19 July 1955). The
strongest Soviet statements of support, made by Khru-
shchev in September 1958, had centered on defense of the
mainland and may have been soli.ited (if rot demanded) by
the Chinese leaders rather than freely given by the Rus-
sians. Their primary purpose--namely, to sustain the
Sino-Soviet relationship as a meaningful alliance--was
no longer compelling after Mao began to attack Khrushchev's
policies in 1959-60.
Mao, obsessed with the need to sustain rather than
reduce international pressures on Washington, had rejected
Khrubhchev's temperate policy of 1959. His rejection was
converted to hostility when, in October 1959 in Peking,
the Soviet leader made a strong plea for compromise, sug-
gesting that the Taiwan issue should be settled by 'negotia-
tions or shelved. The Chinese subsequently have claimed
that in the talks, Khrushchev stated that the issue was
"an incendiary factor" on the international scene which
could lead to "a great war" because of the conflict between
U.S. support for Taipei and Soviet support for Peking.
According to their account, he went on to say that
-37-
svcR RT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
6.) 116.1s 1
there is more than one way to solve every
complicated question, depending on what
basis you took. For example, after the
October Revolution, there was established
in the Soviet Far East the Far Eastern
Republic, and Lenin recognized it at the
time; this was a temporary concession and
sacrifice, but later on it was united with
Russia. (Quoted in the Chinese government
statement of 1 September 1963)
For Mao, there was only one way (eventual seizure), and
to be told that "concession and sacrifice" was another
way was tantamount to asking him to accept the Nationalist
regime permanently. The Chinese complained that Khru-
shchev, by taking this stand, in effect had asked them
to agree to a "two Chinas" situation. The Soviets did
not deny that Khrushchev had raised the Taiwan issue,
but they did deny he had suggested a "two Chinas" settle-
ment. Nevertheless, their version--namely, that he
merely touched on possible ways to solve the matter, these
being not only military, but peaceful, too (Soviet govern-
ment statement of 21 September 1963)--was an evasion.
Khrushchev was aware that a "peaceful" solution neces-
sarily included a pledge to renounce the use of force,
that is, to accept the status of Taiwan. The Chinesegovernment statement warned that the CCP "has not for-
gotten and never will forget" this plan for "two Chinas."*
*Atcepting the status quo indefinitely had been attacked
as a view of "some people" in private Chinese Communist
materials prior to publicizing Khrushchev's suzerainty
formula in 1963./
25X1
25X1
-38-
SRCIR RT
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18_:.CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
?
On the other hand, Khrushchev would not forget that
he had been dragged into the morass of Mao's Taiwan policy
in 1956
25X1
25X1
\Non-support of the Taiwan issue was one of
the many deprivations which Mao suffered as he disputed 25X1
with the Soviet leader on basic international strategy.
Khrushchev tried to undercut the general basis of Mao's
position on his "right" to capture Taiwan; his proposal
of 31 December 1963 to heads of states calling for a peace-
ful settlement of all "territorial" disputes was an impliclt
rejection of the Chinese leader's refusal to renounce
the use of force.* (At the same time, it exposed the
*The contrast between Peking's and Moscow's position
is sharply revealed when viewed in the context of a strug-
gle for U.S.-defended territory. Chen Yi told
newsmen in November 1960 that "The U.S. occupies Taiwan
but no island off the Soviet coast," implying that unlike
Soviet-U.S. interests, Sino-American interests clash
directly on a territorial matter. Khrushchev in 1962,
on the other hand, seemed to be arguing that Washington-
Moscow relations should not be as tense as Washington-
Peking relations primarily because territory was not an
issue. "Our interests do not clash directly anywhere,
either territorially or economically." (Quoted in Pravda,
27 April 1962)
-39-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
brauttr, I
inflexibility of Mao's position to the ridicule of other
national leaders.) Mao responded by having his clever-
est lieutenant declare, on 24 April 1964, that "boundary
questions" can be solved peacefully, but questions of
"imperialist occupation" are different. Chou En-lai in-
sisted that countries whose territories were occupied
naturally have every right to recover their
lost territories by any means. To ask those
countries...to renounce the use of force in
any circumstances is in fact to ask their
people. .,.to submit to imperialist enslavement.
(emphasis supplied)
G. Future of the Taiwan Issue and Sino-American
Relations
This pugnacious insistence on the right to use
force against Taiwan probably will not be dropped or
moderated so long as Mao lives. Only a less stubborn
and more moderate man than Mao would be willing to re-
nounce force on this issue, or act as if such a renuncia-
tion is implicit in his position. Mao's pugnacious
view has set the pattern for his aides thus far. Reject-
ing any mutual concessions, they apparently see no change
in the status of the island at least for "10 or 20 years"
Chen Yi's statement to newsmen on 23 July 1962). They
have only a very faint glimmer of hope that a National-
ist or Taiwanese insurrection will occur, and they dis-
cuss the matter in a long-range and very indefinite his-
torical perspective.i
-40-
SECRET
25X1
?
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
cFrit FT
25X1
Mao learned in the fall of 1958 that any move to
seize the offshores might work against his effort to
demonstrate the "unity" of Taiwan and the mainland be- 25X1
cause seizure of the offshores might again be viewed by
some neutral. governments as the price of Peking's renuncia-
tion of claims to Taiwan./
/*
For the future, use of force against the offshores
--primarily by shelling from the mainland--will continue
to be a political matt3r. Mao apparently is aware that
jurdannot:make it a real military matter--that is, by
again trying to interdict the islands--because the U.S.
has indicated its intention to prevent a takeover and be-
cause Soviet help with deterrent statements is no longer
available. At the most, he can still use the offshores
to serve as the basis for a synthetic crisis whenever
he decides to terrorize Western and neutral leaders with
the threat of a China-U.S. war, but even this leverage
appears now to have been reduced.
Regarding the future of Sino-Awerican relations,
it will remain bleak while Mao lives. He will continue
*This policy of professing no desire to seize the off-
shores because of the need to prevent the freezing of a
"two Chinas" status in the Taiwan Strait is directly at-
tributed to Mao in Peking New China Semi-Monthly, No. 13,
1959, and indirectly to MaThial Peng Te-huai by A.L.
Strong in Moscow New Times, No, 46, November 1958.
-41-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SF.C.R RT
to insist on a U.S. surrender and will continue to reject
any American initiatives which fall short of indicating
willingness to withdraw from the Taiwan Strait area.*
Chou En-lai made this clear to Edgar Snow in October 1960.**
He made it clear again in his report to the National Peo-
ple's Congress on 21 December 1964: all U.S. armed forces
should withdraw from Taiwan; prior to the settlement of
this "fundamental problem, the settlement of concrete
problems in Sino-American relations is out of the ques-
tion." The Chinese Communists had already acted on this
line, rejecting U.S. overtures (in 1960) for visits to
the mainland of prominent Americans.
We have received bids from Americans to
visit our country. We have welcomed left-
ist Americans, but we have no interest in
American leaders. We reveal this to you
for the first time We were notified of
the wishes of Democrat Stevenson, Mrs.
Roosevelt, former New York Governor Harri-
man, and five Republican senators to visit
our country....
U.S. imperialism still occupies our Taiwan
and adopts an unfair attitude toward China.
If we were to welcome them, it would be
tantamount to yielding to U.S. imperialism.
(Chen Yi interview of 21 November 1960)
*Regarding the possible expansion of Sino-American
talks, he has had his spokesmen reject it: talks will
continue but "We will not have talks other than those
in Warsaw." (Chen Yi statement
in the first week of September 1966)
**In addition to Chou's own remarks, his secretary,
Chiang HsiLo-mai, told Snow that it was true that Peking
had not provided U.S. policy-makers with a rear exit.
"The Chinese are not interested in building any bridges
out of Taiwan for the Americans. They will eventually
get out on our terms."
-42-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
25X1
The Chinese Communists have also refused entry to
less prominent Americans, particularly when there has been
publicity on their pending visit which reflected favorably
on Washington. For example, following a renewed invita-
tion by Peking to ear specialist Dr. Samuel Rosen of
Colombia University in March 1964, publicity in December
regarding official validation of his trip for humanitarian
reasons rankled the Chinese leaders, who demanded that
he cancel his trip, the implication being that it might
make the U.S. look good. ("Washington is trying to make
use of friendly contacts between Chinese and American
scientists to gain political benefits." NCNA dispatch
of 20 December 1964) Nevertheless, to gain "political
benefits" for themselves, the Chinese leaders had pre-
viously insisted on a formal agreement for exchange of
newsmen because this would imply official U.S. recogni-
tion of their regime and create strains in Washington-
Taipei relations.
Peking has made clear Mao's reason for remaining
inflexible on exchanges. They can begin only after the
U.S. surronders on the Taiwan issue. Peking's public com?
ment on the State Department's announcement of 27 Decem-
ber 1965, which eased passport restrictions against the
travel of doctors and public health specialists to the
mainland, reflected sensitivity to having been depicted 25X1
(rightly) as the intransigent party. ("Nauseating hypro-
crisy" was the charge hurled at Washington in the People's
Daily editorial of 1 January /966))
/ Mao's position is so extreme that it is easily
exposed, and when Washington in March 1966 (following
testimony given in Washington by academics) spoke of a
desire to improve relations, his spokesmen were compelled
to search for arguments to discredit this position. They
tried to make Peking appear justified in its hard line
by denying goodwill on the U.S. side, but they were dis-
comfited by -"..e apparent fact that "there are some in Hong
Kong who feel that there are signs of flexibility in the
-43-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SEURET
25X1
American policy," (Wen We Pao editorial of 16 March
1966), and their commentaries reflected concern that this
view might prevail in neutral and some Western countrias:
"Surely nobody will allow himself to be fooled" was the
defensive comment of People's Daily on 29 March 1966.
The party paper on that date also reflected con-
cern over the reception that this U.S. line might get
affiong :hinese on the mainland, the sensitivity displayed
reflecting Mao's suspicion that there might be a reduction
of anti-U.S. sentiment internally at a time when he was
trying to wall-off the PLA, CCP, and populace from the
Western idea of a possible 'peaceful evolution" in the
attitudes of mainland officials. Although the 29 Yarch
article stated that Washington's desire to increase con-
tacts could not change the hostile attitude of Chinese,
it seemed to be warning as well that this attitude should
not change: "The U.S. imperialists think that by mirETNIT
some 'contact' and 'visits' they could weaken the revolu-
tionary will of the great Chinese people and shake their
firm stand of combating U.S. imperialism and supporting
the revolutionary struggle of all peoples. ....The Chinese
people are sober-minded. Neither will they be intimidated
by U.S. imperialism's threats, nor will they believe in
'find words.'" Another article seemed to be directed
precisely at reminding Chinese that they had a "high
degree of hatred, scorn and contempt for the U.S." and
had completely wiped out ideas oW admiring, pleasing,
and fearing" the U.S. (Liberation Army Daily editorial
of 6 April 1966). In short, Peking's reaction to Washing-
ton's statements and the testimony of academic f: was re-
markably irritable and seemed to reflect Mao's morbid
anxiety that the combat zeal and self-sacrificing mental-
ity he was trying to sustain among Chinese on the main-
land would be diluted if young Chinese officials and
cadres were to begin to view the U.S. with any degree
of moderation and reasonableness. He was well aware
that fanatical hostility is an attitude very difficult
to sustain over long periods of time, and that this:is
particularly true if it has to be sustained artifically
(through propaganda and the exclusion of external in-
fluences).
-44-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
The article of 29 March made a distinction between
big and small issues. Continued strains in Sino-American
relations did not stem from disagreement on exchanges of
doctors or newsmen, but rather "primarily from U.S. oc-
cupation" of Taiwan. It reiterated the basic line of the
post-1958 period: "So long as the U.S. government does
not change its hostile policy toward China and refuses
pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan
Strait, the normalization of Sino-U.S, relations is en-
tirely out of the question and so is the solution of such
a concrete question as the exchange of visits between
personnel of the two countries." (emphasis supplied)
On 0 April, Peking attacked the State Department's an-
nouncement on inviting Chinese scientists to visit U.S.
universities, making it clear that small steps were re-
jected (while, in doing so, further exposing itself as
the intransigent party). On the matter of possible ex-
changes in the future, it seems clear that only more
moderate leaders, who, by Mao's death, have been released
from the restrictions of Mao's Taiwan obsession, might
be willing to change the obdurate policy. Mao apparently
will not in his lifetime, and in an attack on Liu Shao-chi,
his propagandists have implied that even a U.S. withdrawal
from Taiwan would not lead to the "development of friendly
relations." (People's Daily article of 16 October 1966)*
ells.werr."
*Regarding possible Sino-American trade, Chen Yi pub-
licly attacked the idea: "Frankly speaking, some Chinese
democrats maintain that the improvement of Sino-U.S, re-
lations will prove advantageous to China. They are right,
because we would be admitted to the UN, be able to import
machines, and obtain American loans; but we do not seek
such petty profits. Our political stand is to oppose
? imperialism and colonialism in the world. Political value
outweighs economic value." (Interview of 21 November 1960)
Regarding possible U.S. aid to Peking, Chen Yi stated?that
? "Even if we receive aid from somewhere, we will refuse
American aid. The American plan to utilize food for peace
[President Kennedy's expressed willingness to send food
as stated on 25 January 1961j is a plan for subversion
and designed to open the way for American occupation."
(Press conference of 29 May 1962)
-45-
25X1
SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
btt..;1(..t1
The Issue of UN Entry
A. The Demand for Prior Expulsion of the Nationalists
(1950-64)
Mao has been aware of the prestige which a place
on the Security Council reflects, and he has complained
about the "thPft of China's UN seat" (interview with
Mitterand as reported in TASS dispatch of 23 February
1961). But his obsession regarding no compromises with
Chiang has impeded, at certain times, his effort to at-
tain the expulsion of the Nationalist representative from
the UN. He seems to have become more adamantly opposed
to any "two Chinas" situation in the UN as his obsession
developed further. in November 1950, he had permitted
his aides to accept an invitation to participate in the
UN debates on Korea, but in 1955, his aides had to refuse
another UN invitation to participate in Security Council
debate over the Taiwan Strait crisis.* Mao seems also
to have become more deprecatory of the value of the UN.
At an earlier time, his spokesmen had conceded the import-
ance of the international organization.** But UN discus-
sion over the years of issues related to Peking's interetts,
*On 3 February 1955, Chou En-lai stated that "only when
the representative of the Chiang clique has been driven
out from the Security Council and the representative of
the PRC is to attend in the name of China, can the PRC
agree to send a representative to take part in the discus-
sions of the Security Council..." This was Chou's reply
to Secretary General Hammarskjold's invitation of 31 Jan-
uary 1955, reflecting Mao's anti-"Two Chinas" obsession.
**"Although the UN, as a result of US manipulation, has
time and again been used to serve American policy, it still
has an important position in international affairs. It
is possible to make the UN play its role in benefitting
world peace." (People's Daily editorial of 2 December
1955)
-46-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
SECRET
25X1
and criticism of Peking's abominations on the international
scene, have impelled Mao and his aides to profess lack
of interest in pressing for the seat which they say is
lawfully theirs. Following the vigorous Maoist suppres-
sion of the Tibetan rebellion in the spring of 1959, and
anticipating UN criticism of this suppression in the fall
meeting of the General Assembly, Chou En-lai in August
1959 told that he should not 25X1
emphasize India's action in placing the matter of repre-
sentation before the UN, as Peking "is not now nvc.cly
anxious to join." When General Assembly censure was pub-
licized, Peking's response was to deprecate the UN: the
resolution on Tibet "will only further lower the prestige
of the UN in the oyes of the Chinese people..." (PRC
government statement of 23 October 1959)
Mao's obsessive refusal to accept any "two Chinas"
representation situation in the UN--an acceptance which
might force Chiang to withdraw his representative--has
led to an immobile policy justified only by the long-
range calculation that obduracy will pay off eventually.*
He has suggested the setting up of a rival UN, as had
Khrushchev. Mao told Edgar Snow on 22 October 1960 that
he could form his own UN.
*Most UN members favor a "two Chinas" resolution, and
if one were introduced, it almost certainly would receive
a majority or even a two-thirds vote. Chiang probably
would not aCcept entry of Mao's representatives and would
withdraw his delegation if Mao's were permitted to sit
in the UN. However, Mao is also unwilling to accept even
a temporary "two Chinas" situation in the international
organization and refused to join until Chiang's men are
expelled. He will not permit his aides to use flexible
tactics because, unlike bilateral relations with some
individual countries, he cannot be certain that Chiang
will withdraw his representatives. He cannot risk a
temporary "two Chinas" situation because his attitude
toward the organization would receive far more interna-
tional publicity than his action toward individual coun-
tries.
-47-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SWityrr
But he has had his aides work to defeat U.S. efforts
to exclude Peking from the organization. Even after the
setback forced on him by the "important question" tactic,*
his aides have worked to gain support from such countries
as Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Nigeria.
But they have insisted on Mao's obsession.
25X1
25X1
?
As for t e
neutral nations' hope that Peking would accept a seat and
then work to have the Nationalisit evicted, the Chinese
Communists called this falling into the "U.S. trap of
two Chinas...China will under no circumstances accept this"
(People's Daily editorial of 4 December 1964).
B. Additional Revolutionary Demands (1965-67)
The revolutionization of various aspects of Mao's
foreign policy in the fall of 1964 and the wild "revolu-
tionary" action of Sukarno at a time when this process
*In 1956, as new members joined the UN, the vote in
favor of putting off debate of the Chinese representa-
tion question (i,e., the procedural device known as the
moratorium) began to decline. This took place primarily
because the new, Afro-Asian members actively worked for
Peking's entry. The voting margin on the moratorium in
1960 was so slim that in 1961 it was found advisable to
abandon the moratorium device and for the first time to
deal directly with the substantive question itself. This
"important question" of changing the representation of
China in the UN required the approval of two-thirds of
those present and voting, and use of the "important ques-
tion" tactic since 1961 has set back Mao's effort to gain
admission on his own uncompromising terms.
-48-
SPCRPT
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
cPCRUT
was developing combined to encourage Mac to press other
countries to withdraw from the UN. Sukarno's move in
pulling his delegation out of the UN on 7 January 1965
provided Mao and his aides with the opportunity to at-
tack the organization openly and to demand thnt it should
be "thoroughly reorganized." (PRC government statement
of 10 January 1965) Mao personally seems to have fired
the first shot in Peking's open attack, as witness the
rusticisms published in the major deprecatory documents.*
He insisted that other countries must view Sukarno's
action as a precedent:
If a country throws off its blind faith in
the UN, recognizes its true essence, and
dares to fight against U.S. imperialist con-
trol of the organization, the latter can
do nothing about it. Don't you see that
U.S. imperialism was seized with panic the
moment Indonesia announced its withdrawal
from that organization? ...This is a
courageous, just, and revolutionary preced-
ent. (People's Daily editorial of 10
January 007-Temphasis supplied)
*Only the barnyard phrases of Mao would have been
printed on the front page of the People's Daily and in
major official statements. The party paper on 10 Janu-
ary front-paged his distinctive scatological style.
"Some people say that the UN is something formidable,
and that the buttocks of a tiger must not be touched:
But President Sukarno has touched the buttocks of this
tiger. This greatly helps liquidate the blind faith in
the UN." (PRC government statement of 10 January) "In
their efforts to overawe and attack Indonesia, the US
and British imperialists have militarily massed a heavy
force and turned 'Malaysia' into a bridgehead, and,
have politically thrust it into the UN Security Council
to raise its status. This is like sh g on one's head
while pointing a sword at his throat.17--(people's Daily
editorial of 10 January)
25X1
-49-
spr:R RT
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
Mao attacked the argument that withdrawal is wrong and
implied that the newly independent countries might want
to followthe Indonesian precedent: "think it over: what
has this so-called world organization been reduced to
after all!" (PRC government statement of 10 January)
He insisted that "now is the time" to end U.S. influ-
ence ("control") and to effect "a thoroughgoing remold-
ing of this so-called world organization" (People's Daily
editorial of 10 January). He did not immediately sur-
face his idea--expressed in 1960 to Edgar Snow--of form-
ing his own UN.
By late January, however, Chou En-lai apparently
was directed to float it as a trial balloon.
I* Chou
was impelled to use arrogant ("revolutionary") language
--which was tactless and harmful to Peking's image on
the international scene--expressing Mao's desire to create
a rival organization:
The UN must correct its mistakes. It must
be reorganized ..Another UN, a revolution-
ary one, may well be set up so that rival
dramas may be staged in competition with
that body,.. (Speech of 24 January 1965)
Chou was thus authorized to go beyond the demand for a
"reorganization" to a demanl for consideration of a new
*The Chinese leaders believed that support for a new
UN would improve their position in Djakarta to the dis-
advantage of that held by the Soviet leaders.
-50-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
4
?
SECRET
UN, and Chen Yl sustained the new line.* By February, in
the course of making, to Afro-Asians, a thinly veiled
demand for withdrawal. Chou complained that
some African and Asian countries believe that
it is better to carry out the struggle inside
the UN by making corrections. Let us invite
them to do so. Indonesia has tried to do the
same thing, without results, and therefore
has withdrawn from the UN. Also, we Chinese
have tried to do so, without results. Indo-
nesia and the PRC have experience in this
matter. We now no longer have trust in the
UN. (Interview with Indonesian journalists
published in Harian Rakjat and broadcast on
3 February 19-65)
He went on to try to mollify these countries by professing
non-interference with their refusal to withdraw--"We are
not going to obstruct them"--and then invited them to
choose one of "two roads." Chou suggested that they
either "reorganize and retool" the UN or consider the
formation of "a revolutionary UN outside the existing
*"Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN is the first step
that will promote such a reorganization. Consideration
can also be given to the setting up of a revolutionary
UN which will differ from the one manipulated by the U.S."
(Chen Yl speech of 26 January 1965) Chen had been impelled
by Mao's new line to go beyond mere support for Afro-Asian
efforts to increase their seats in major UN organs on "a
fair and reasonable basis" (Chen's speech of 2 October
1963) to a more hectoring position which suggested with-
drawal and forming a rival UN. (In December 1963, the
Chinese Communists had been anxious to cultivate Afro-
Asian opinion and even informed Moscow that they agreed
to a separation of the issues of expanding the Security
Council and ECOSOC prior to the PRC entry into the UN.)
-51-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
UN."* But regarding a Chinese Communist initiative to
call a conference with the intention of establishing a
rival UN, Mao apparently was advised against it. Chen
Yi told in mid-March 1965 that
"For the time being China will abstain from taking such
a step" because "it is necessary to secure the agreement
of all"--a clear sign of Chen's awareness of significant
international opposition to Mao's new obsession. Short
of acting to try to set up a rival UN, Chen said that
countries in the UN "should lead a campaign from within
to reorganize it, while China and the countries that
are not in the UN should foretell, from without, its
reorganization." Wary of adverse international criticism
which had developed, Chen concluded by suggesting that
pullouts would occur in the future, not because of pres-
sure from Peking, but because "it is natural."
In sum, Chou and Chen had implied that Peking
was not seeking entry and they had stated that Peking
would remain outside and would demand a reorganization.**
Thus Mao's basic position on the UN had become more
adamant, and he was far out of step with international
*A variant formulation implied but did not state the
demand for a rival UN. It declared that either the UN
"corrects its mistakes and is thoroughly reorganized
with the desire of the peoples, or it continues to sub-
mit to the dictates of the U.S. and thereby commits
suicide; there is no other way." (People's Daily Irticle
"of TFTebruary 1965) (emphasis supplied) Cffra-ge Com-
munist comment had not yet defined the word, "reorganized,"
which was in fact a euphemism for the process of expell-
ing the Chinesc Nationalists.
**Regarding Mao's intention to stay out, Chou hinted
at it in an interview on 3 February 1965: "Indonesia has
withdrawn from the UN. Is it thinkable that the PRC will
join the UN?" It is important that Chou did not say what
Mao would do if Peking were voted in on his own uncom-
promising terms--i.e., voted in at the same time that the
Nationalist delegation was expelled.
-52-
SECRET
?
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
SECRET
25X1
opinion. But he persisted, typically, in trying to im-
pose his view and in displaying arrogant ("revolutionary")
contempt for all opposition. In an interview on 24 March
1965 with a Palestine Liberation Organization delegation,
Mao complained that the UN was "an illegal organization,"
and told the delegation that "You Arabs are the nucleus
of a new organization which will be better and more repre-
sentative than the present UN organization, We shall
all together create such an organization," The idea ex-
pressed in the final sentence was contemptuous of condi-
tions in the real world,
A "revolutionary" anti-Western UN had become an
obsession; like his other obsessions, this one reflected
his image of himself as a super-revolutionary who will
fight all existing odds and who is buoyed up in the fight
primarily by the unwarranted belief that the odds will
fall his way in the future. Further, this obtession
influenced his foreign policy toward neutrals, In this
sense, his mood was one of irrationality because he was
willing to injure his current policy (by harassing and
even insulting certain friendly neutral governments
which insisted on remaining inside the organization) in
the hope of an illusory future advance. For example, in
mid-April 1965, Algerian Foreign Ministgr Bouteflika com-
plained to the U.S. ambassador in Algiers that the Chinese
Communis were trying to muster support for the idea of
a "revolutionary" UN, but Bouteflika, reflecting his
government's increasing disenchantment with Mao, told the
Chinese that instead of trying to take countries out of
the UN, they should work with others to get the PRC into
that organization,*
*But Mao was_controfled by his obsession. Rather than
adjust and jettison his idea, he persisted. On 11 May,
the Chinese Communist delegate to the 4th AAPSO Conference
in Ghana set forth the entire arrogant Maoist position
on the UN's "crimes," "mistakes," and need for "reorgani-
zation," warning that "it may be necessary to consider
the establishment of revolutionary UN as a rival drama."
This gaucherie provided the -loviets with the opportunity
to join with delegates from several African countries
to attack Mao's idea.
-53-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
I.
?
Chou En-lai, who probably took a calmer and more
balanced view of the UN issue than Mao, was impelled gradu-
ally to harden his position. He probably was more aware
and concerned than Mao that it would be irrational to dis-
card the former position (already inflexible and injurious
to Peking's interests) and implement a new position (even
more inflexible and injurious). He seems to have held
to the former position, namely, that Peking would join
the UN if the Nationalists were expelled from it/
/The former position was retained in
April, and as late as 1 September Peking's public posi-
tion suggested that expulsion of the Nationalists was
still the only real precondition for joining.* Chou had
been equivocal on the matter of Peking's desire to join.
on the one hand assuring the Indonesians in April that
he would not insist on entry, and on the other hand as-
suring in July that his government was mildly
interested in joining the UN if it were reorganized; he
*The only explicitly stated precondition for entry
had been expulsion of the Nationalists. "...the Chinese
government declared long ago that China will have nothing
to do with the UN as long as the latter, under the thumb
of the US, refuses to restore to China its legitimate
rights in it and to throw out the representative of the
Chiang Kai-shek gang from all its organizations. This
firm stand of ours is unshakable..." (People's Daily
editorial of 12 April 1965) (emphasis supplied)--Ii-late
as September, Chinese commentary still centered on one
"mistake" made by the UN: "One of the serious mistakes
it has committed is that the PRC...has long been deprived
of its legitimate rights in the UN, whereas the Chiang
Kai-shek clique, repudiated by the Chinese people, has
up until now usurped China's seat there....The UN must
correct this serious mistake by ousting the Chiang Kai-
shek clique and restoring to the PRC its legitimate
rights." (NCNA "Statement" of 1 September 1965) The
other "mistakes" were not articulated. Although the
still vague concept of UN "reorganization" was reiterated,
it was not made a precondition for entry.
-54 -
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
25X1
also had stated Peking's preference (similar to Sihanouk's
view) for moving the UN from New York to a neutral site,
such as Geneva. Peking praised Ne Win's call for the
"urgent restoration" of PRC rights in publicizing the
Siro-Burmese communique of 1 August. However, after the
Fmnch weekly, Le Nouvel Observateur, on 24 August claimed
that Malraux had been told by the Chinese leaders that
if Peking were reinstated as a full member of the Security
Council, there would be an appropriate framework for dis-
cussing Vietnam within the UN--after this claim, Chou
moved to the harder position, On 12 September, Chou,
after trying to clear his name with Mao and to mollify
Sukarno by attacking the idea of "linking" restoration
of Peking's "legitimate rights" in the UN with the settle-
ment of the Vietnam war, demanded (in replying to questions
of a news agency editor) the voiding of the UN resolution
condemning Peking for its attack in Korea. However, he
did not say that this was a precondition for Peking entry.*
The only explicitiy cited precondition, as precondition,
continued to be expulsion of the Nationalists and restora-
tion of the Communists' claimed seat.
Despite the fact that Chen Yi, in his important
press conference of 29 SeptPmber 1965, raised new demands,
he did not say they were preconditions for Peking's entry
into the organization.** He downplayed the idea of a
*Chou said that the UN's "slander of China as an aggres-
sor" was "one of a series of grave mistakes committed by
the UN?that must be thoroughly corrected, and no bargain-
ing can be tolerated."
**Chen said that "The UN must rectify its mistakes and
undergo a thorough reorganization and reform. It must
admit and correct all its past mistakes, Among other
things, it should cancel its recolution condemning China
and the DPRK as aggressors and adopt a resolution condemn-
ing the US as the aggressor; the UN charter must be re-
viewed and revised jointly by ill countries, big and small;
all independent states should be included in the UN; and
all imperialist puppets should be expelled" (new demands
are emphasizeU)T?Aside from expelling the Nationalists,
(footnote continued on page 56)
-55-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
rival UN by saying that conditions would "no doubt gradu-
ally ripen" for a new UN if the present one failed to be
reorganized. He also continued the practice of remaining
imprecise on what Peking meant by "reforming" or "reor-
ganizing" the UN, reiterating that the aim of such an
overhaul would be to end U.S. "control." However, he
hinted that Peking would not agree to enter even if the
Nationalists were expelled and Peking's "rights" were
restored becnv,......r. the matter of U.S. "control., .would still
remain unsolved," and "today" the organization has become
a place where "two" big powers, the U.S. and USSR, pre-
dominate despite the entry of many smaller Afro-Asian states.*
--(footnote continued from page 55)
which is the absolute prerequisite for Peking's entry,
the Maoist position is ambiguous on when the abovementioned
demands must be implemented. The Chinese Communists them-
selves might rationalize any future act of joining by argu-
ing that they would work to reorganize the UN from within,
as they had suggested, from time to time, that other coun-
tries should do just that. They published Sihanouk's
statement of 24 September 1965 that Cambodia had not with-
drawn: "It remains there so as to wage a struggle of non-
cooperation for the reorganization of the UN, turn it into
a universal organization, and thus fulfill the mission
laid down by the UN Charter."
*Soviet statements began gradually
to downplay the standard line of expelling the National-
ists following Gromyko's New York press conference of 12
October 1962, when he failed to call for expulsion in com-
menting on the representation issue. This reflection of
Khrushchev's dispute with Mao was carried over into the
post-Khrushchev period, but for tactical reasons, the new
Soviet leadership has not replaced the standard position
with a "two Chinas" position. The most explicit and
sharpest Peking complaint regarding declining Soviet
enthusiasm attacked Grcmyko and Federenko for their cri-
tical and perfunctory speeches in the 1965 UN sessions,
and the conclusion wna drawn that, in contrast to Khrush-
chev's open "cooperation" with the U.S., the new leaders
(footnote continued On page 57)
-56-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
SECRET
25X1
Mao seems to have taken the position (through his
aides) that he desires membership less than ever before,
but that he still desires it a little. His supporters 25X1
for admission had misread the statements of his spokesmen
to mean that, because Peking had raised impossible demands,
Mao no longer desired entry at all. r
While Mao insisted that his aides surface additional
demands, he did not try to stop the eleven sponsoring
countries from introducing the customary UN resolution
calling for Peking's admission and Taiwan's ouster in early
November 1965. He continued to demand a hard wording of
the resolution, i.e., explicit reference to the need to
expel the Nationalists.* He may have felt that this
(footnote continued from page 56)
"have drawn lesslns from Khrushchev's downfall and now in-
creasingly arrange their deals with the U.S. through the
UN." They prefer to arrange "deals" with the U.S. in UN
corridors where they can "hide themselves among the hun-
dred-odd countries of the UN." (People's Daily editorial 25X1
of 27 December 1965)
-57-
SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
obduracy had not hurt his cause, and the People's Daily
editorial of 19 November claimed that there had been
slippage in the U.S. position as a result of the General
Assembly vote, which it depicted as a "humiliating set-
back" to efforts aimed at keeping Peking from taking its
"rightful place."* The editorial set forth the signifi-
cant distinction basic to Peking's position, namely, the
difference between the absolute prerequisite of expelling
the Nationalists, on the one hand, and a series of demands,
on the other hand.
To return to the path of its purposes and
principles, the UN zw.Ist free itself from the
control of the U.S., rectify all its mistakes,
and undergo a thorough reorganization and
reform. To expel the elements of the Chiang
Kai-shek clique from the UN and restore its
lawful rights to China is an indispensable
step for the UN to rectify its mistakes and
undergo a thorough reorganization.
But merely doing this is far from enough.
The UN must also resolutely condemn U.S.
imperialism, the biggest aggressor of con-
temporary times, and cancel its slanderous
resolution condemning China and the DPRK
as aggressors and all its other erroneous
resolutions. The UN Charter must be reviewed
and revised by all countries of the world.
*On the procedural vote--i.e., on the ruling that the
issue is an "important question" and thus needs a two-
thirds vote for approval--56 favored the procedural rul-
ing, 49 opposed, and 11 abstained. On the substantive
vote--i.e., the vote on the resolution calling for expul-
sion of the Nationalists--taken in the General Assembly
on 17 November, the U.S. failed to attain a plurality
for the first ime. The vote was 47 for admission, 47
against, and 20 abstentions; Peking gained eight new
African supporters and lost two while Taiwan won two
and lost nine.
-58-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
Its membership must include all independent
countries to the exclusion of all imperial-
ist puppets. (emphasis supplied)
While Mao has adopted a posture of indifference, and even
contempt, for joining--"As a matter of fact, the U.S. may
keep China out of the UN for 1,000 or even 10,000 years
without harming China one iota," (People's Daily editorial
of 19 November)--he has permitted his spokesmen to sustain
a distinction which could be used as justification for
entry at some future date,*
As with other foreign policy positions which have
been predominantly irrational, Mao has permitted a small
part to be rational. He has permitted his aides to stress
the rational part when Peking seemed to be gaining new
votes. For example, still exuberant over the increase in
General Assembly support, Chou stated that "of late, during
the 20th session of the UN General Assembly, Albania and
Cambodia, together with many other countries, persisted
in the fight to expel the Chiang Kai-shek clique and to
restore to China its legitimate rights in the UN" (Speech
of 29 November 1965), The ideas of withdrawal for other
countries and a rival UN were drastically soft-pedalled
in subsequent months, and no mention was made of the
specific series of demands raised by Chen Vi on 29 Septem-
ber. Indonesia returned to the UN in 1966, and this
*Regarding disparagement oi the 'den of entry while
the UN is still under U.S. "control," one Chinese Com-
munist has stated that as long as such a condition exists,
"China will not accept the invitation to join the UN even
if 100 UN planes come to Peking with invitations" (Liao
Cheng-chih interview with Japanese journalists published
in Tokyo Mainichi. on 25 December 1965). Liao failed to
say what Peking's reaction would be if the Nationalists
were expelled, that is, whether this very act would not
be used by Mao and his aides as the opportunity for de-
claring that U.S. "control" was slipping away, permitting
Peking to take its "rightful place."
-59-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
down-playing procedure was carried through to the time
of the General Assembly meetings in 1966. It was sus-
tained even when Peking, in a commentary on 22 November
1966, denounced the Italian "study committee" proposal
and, in a commentary on the 24th, denounced Canada's
"two Chinas" plan; Chen's demands were not revived.
Peking demanded only the expulsion of the Nationalists
and, vaguely, called for an end to American and Soviet
use of the UN as a political "marketplace." This prac-
tice was retained even after the Albanian resolution,
calling for expulsion of the Nationalists and seating
of the Communists, was rejected on 29 November 1966 by
a 57-46 majority. (Peking did not acknowledge the magni-
tude of the defeat, and the silence maintained by its
media for two days thereafter strongly suggested that
Mao and his aides had anticipated a favorable vote and
were exasperated by their setback. Peking's greatest
loss of supporters was among the African countries, where
leaders had been angered by Chinese Communist appeals for
"revolution" on the continent and by Peking's political
interference in the war over Kashmir territory.) Peking
on 1 and 2 December 1966 broke silence, but merely re-
peated the old demands for ending U.S. "control" and for
reorganizing the UN and rectifying its "mistakes." The
commentaries did not raise all of the demands that Chen
Yi had publicized on 29 September 1965, and they did not
say, as he had, that Peking "may as well stay out of a
UN like this."
Although Peking thus far has not returned to the
fanatically adamant series of demanls set forth by Chen
Yi on 29 September 1965, Mao's obsession of a rival UN
-60-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
SECRET
has been revived. Chou En-lai, in his speech at a 24 June
1967 reception in Peking for visiting President Kaunda
of Zambia, repeated what he had said (on 24 January 1965):
regarding the struggle of Afro-Asian nations inside the
UN if the goal of reorganization is not attained, "then
the possibility that a new revolutionary UN will be set
up will increase." This act of revival suggests that the
Chinese Communist leaders will continue to reassert vari-
ous parts of the adamant Maoist position at various tines
while Mao lives, professing only a qualified desire to
enter the UN. However, when General Assembly voting is
about to begin every fall, they will probably continue
to agree to have one of their supporters--most likely,
the Albanians--introduce the standard resolution calling
for the restoration of their "legitimate seat" and expul-
sion of the Nationalist representative from the organiza-
tion. They may well agree to join if voted in, provided
that the Nationalists are expelled from all UN bodies,
their justification being that they would then be able
to join with other nations inside the organization to
struggle to reorganize it.
-61-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85 25X1
T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
III. Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei
A, Breaking Relations With Taipei
Even before the Seventh Fleet was positioned as
a blocking force against Communist invasion, Mao had begun
his effort to isolate Taipei among the nations by denying
it was in any sense the government of China, insisting
that other governments make a similar denial. He did
not, however, say when this denial must be made and his
ambiguity on this -Poiiit was deliberate, reflecting one
of the most flexible (in a tactica2 sense) aspects of
his entire foreign policy. Chou En- lai was the man who
carried out this policy.
Chou's partial success in isolating Taipei was
due to the leeway he had in applying a principle. Any
country desiring diplomatic relations with Peking was
required, on principle, to sever diplomatic relations
with the Nationalists. But major statements regarding
this principle--e.g., those in the Common Program of 1949
and in Chou En-lai's report of 1959--were significantly
ambiguous on the matter of when relations with Taipei
must be broken, providing Chou with manuevering room in
moving governments toward the Communists and away from
the Nationalists.* In this way, countries willing to
*"Article 5g7? The Central People's Government of the
PRC may negotiate and establish diplomatic relations on
the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect
for territory and sovereignty with foreign governments
which sever relatlons with the KMT reactionaries and adopt
a friendly attitude towards the PRC." (Common Program
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Confer-
ence, 29 September 1949) (emphasis supplied)
"No plot to carve up Chinese territory and create
'two Chinas' can be tolerated by the Chinese people. In
accordance with this principle, any country that desires
(footnote continued on page 63)
-62-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
ljeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
SECRET
break away from Washington's apparent position (that is,
opposing reccgnition of Peking but, if unavoidable, ac-
cepting dual Chinese representation) were not rebuffed
immediately. Chou counted on the Nationalists to play
a key role in preventing an indefinite dual representa-
tion situation (Taipei's position being against recogni-
tion of Peking and against acceptance of an unavoidable
dual representation arrangement).
It appears that Mao's opportunism and flexibility
--reflected in his willingness to tolerate a "two Chinas"
situation (not in name) temporarily in order to force the
Nationalists to withdraw their diplomatic representatives--
were greater than Chiang's, as witness the leeway he per-
mitted his advisers in moving toward the UK and Laos in
response to their moves toward Peking. Chiang, however,
made a better showing regarding France's move toward
recognition.
Formal recognition of Peking by the UK on 6 Janu-
ary 1950 opened the way to Sino-British negotiations by
a "Negotiating Representative"--an anomalous situation
for London, which was seeking an ambassadorial exchange.
It permitted the Chinese Communists to hold up their reply
to the British recognition initiative until after the
tensions stirred up by the Korean war subsided while con-
tinuing to press.London's'i'epresentative" for the closure
of British firms on the mainland. Although diplomatic
(footnote continued from page 62)
to establish diplomatic relations with our country must
sever so-called diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-
shek clique and respect our country's legitimate rights
in international affairs. We are willing to enter into
contacts and cooperation with other countries in inter-
national organizations and conferences, but we will not
participate in any international activities in which a
situation of 'two Chinas' may arise." (Chou En-lai's
report on government work to the National People's Con-
gress given on 18 April 1959) (emphasis supplied)
-63-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
25X1
relations
were established on 17 June 1954 (after
Eden
had chided Chou En-lai at the Geneva conference for not
having a diplomat in London), the Communists did not
permit the British to send an ambassador, limiting repre-
sentation to the level of charge d'affaires in order to
remind London of their irritation with (1) the continued
presence of a British consul on Taiwan (accredited to the
"provincial,"
rather than the Nationalist, government)
and (2) the distinction the UK maintained between diplo-
matic relations with Peking, on the one hand, and support
for the U.S. position--not to permit the Communists to
seize Taiwan--on the other hand. Nevertheless, Mao and
his advisers did not make withdrawal of the consul on
Taiwan a condition for the exchange of charge-level
?
diplomats in 1954. Subsequently, they tolerated a "two
Chinas" situation in fact--that is, with a British charge
in Peking and a consul in Tamsui (north of Taipei), which
was tantamount to recognition of the independent status
of T4iwan--in the hope of eventually splitting the British
from the Americans.
Mao apparently will not agree to an ambassadorial
exchange until the UK consul is withdrawn and London
chan es its ?osition on the status o a a
I Later, the Chinese
Communist leaders indirectly (i.e., using the Hong Kong
Wen Wei Pao on 13 October 1964) criticized Harold Wilson's
campaign proposal to exchange ambassadors with Peking by
-64 -
SF.CIRRT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
?
?
SECRET
stating that so long as Britain follows a "two Chinas"
policy and supports international trusteeship for Taiwan,
"she is blocking her own ambassador's way to China."*
25X1
The policy to accept temporarily a "two Chinas"
situation with countries showing some degree of goodwill
or amenable to pressure to cut ties with Taipei at an
early date opened the way for the Chinese Communists to
"work over" friendly governments prior to the establish-
ment of full diplomatic relations. Chou En-lai had referred
not only to "full," but also to "partial" diplomatic rela-
tions in his report to the NPC on 18 September 1959, sug-
gesting that Mao had made it a policy to get what could
be had (such as a trade office, an NCNA office, or just
an agreement to exchange individual visitors) despite the
existence of relations between a particular government
and Taipei.** This opportunistic departure from the anti-
*Despite occasional requests, London has not been per-
mitted to raise its mission in Peking to ambassadorial
level, and the status of its charge has been qualified
and insecure. Statements from high-level British officials
regarding the Taiwan issue have usually provoked a hot
Maoist reaction, and the charge has had to acquiesce
from time to time in verbal "floggings" from Chinese Com-
munist Foreign Ministry officials. For example, the
charge was "flogged" in this way in 'lay 1964 after Foreign
Secretary Butler had depicted the Taiwan issue as "an
international problem," and when he declared that Britain
"would be glad to take part in any conference on the future
of Taiwan, provided it took into account the wishes of
the inhabitants of Nationalist China," the People's Daily
on 12 May thundered that Britain had thus far only ".partial
diplomatic relations with China."
**Even countries which have not been disposed to cut
ties with the Nationalists have been approached, and
Peking has not broken off contacts until signs of com-
plete intransigence have become clear. For example, the
Chinese Communists began a step-by-step approach to Beirut
in 1956, but when, in April 1960, this flexibility had
not gained them any advantage, they gave up their four-
year effort to obtain recognition, closing their trade
office following clear signs of increasing Chinese Nation-
alist influence in Lebanon.
-65-
SRCRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
two Chinas "principle" (a "principle" rigorously held to
in Sino-American matters) and this use of flexibility to
gain eventual formal recognition was authoritatively
sanctioned in the Foreign Ministry directive of January
1961:
In the case of "two Chinas," we oppose firmly
the conspiratorial activities of the US. and
Chiang Kai-shek for the creation of 'two
Chinas.' We do not carry on any oZficial
activities with countries which recognize
Chiang.
Having made this categorical statement of "principle,"
the directive proceeded to shelve it in the name of the
"tactir: of flexibility" in actual conditions:
Nevertheless, in consideration of the actual
conditions in Africa and Latin America and
the special relations Chiang and the U.S. have
in these countries and for the purpose of
seeking a right opportunity for establishing
our beachhead in Africa and Latin America
and of preventing the U.S. and Chiang from
carrying out their conspiracy, our strategy
adopted in Africa and Latin America is dif-
ferent from that adopted in Europe and Asia.
While Cuba still had diplomatic relations
with Chiang, we established official con-
tacts with Cuba. When Guinea was receiving
Chiang's envoy from Libya, our ambassador
reported for dul,y. We understand the
predicament of those countries in Africa
which express their wish to have friendly
relations with us but previously had estab-
lished diplomatic relations with Chiang only
because of the pressure from imperialism.*
*The Chinese Nationalists also showed tactical skill,
and they moved their ambassador to Senegal in 1960 and
kept him there despite Dakar's announced intention also
to recognize Peking. The Chinese Communists reversed
their earlier decision to send representatives to the
(footnote continued on page 67)
-66-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SF.CRFT
Although the directive stated that this flexiblity was
a strategy for approaching countries in Africa and Latin
America rather than those in Asia and Europe, the cases
of Laos and France indicate that even this distinctive
limitation was dropped in the name of expedient diplomacy.
1. Two Examples
a. Laos (1962)
At a time when the Nationalists maintained consul-
level relations with Laos, Souvanna Phouma agreed to sign
a joint statement with a Chinese Communist delegation on
establishing diplomatic relations (25 April 1961), Chou
En-lai thereupon started an exercise to exploit this
newly acquired consul-level opportunity to force the Na-
tionalists to withdraw, but did not appoint an ambassa-
dor while the Nationalists remained. On 14 November, the
Chinese Communist ambassador to Hanoi presented his cre-
dentials to Souvanna only as Peking's "economic and cul-
tural representative" and took up his new post in the
Plaine des Jarres; on 17 November, Peking's consul general
took up his post in Communist-held Phong Saly. Chou ap-
parently was anxious to establish higher level representa-
tion following the 11 June 1962 agreement to form a coali-
tion government/
and when, on 2 July, the Souvanna
government announced that it had recognized the Peking
regime (among others), the Chinese Communists moved quickly
to displace the Nationalist representatives. They sent
their "economic and cultural representative" from the
(footnote continued from page 66)
independence celebrations because Senegal had rejected
their demand that the Nationalist ambassador should be
ejected. Senegal today has recogniz.id both Peking and
Taipei, but has ties with neither.
-67-
RFC:RFT
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
Plaine to Vientiane (accompanied by Communist leader Soup-
hannouvong) on 11 July and presented him, Liu Chun, as
the new charge d'affaires with "a letter of appointment"
to Souvannas acting foreign minister. Angered by the
higher level to which Peking had moved the "two Chinas"
situation in Laos, the Nationalists, who prior to the
establishment of the coalition government had agreed with
Vientiane for an exchange of ambassadors, at first were
reluctant to have their ambassador (sent from Thailand
to be concurrently ambassador to Laos) present his cre-
dentials, but finally did i'.after the Chinese Communist
charge had presented his own).
The Chinese Communists made the Nationalist ambas-
sador the carget of gauche maneuvering. On 3 August 1962,
as Souvanna stepped off his plane on returning to Vientiane,
the unaccredited Chinese Communist charge rushed up and
inserted himself just in front of Taipei's ambassador
in the reception line, seized Souvanna's hand, and said
that he represented the only legal government of China
and thousands of Chinese in Laos. After he and another
Chinese Communist diplomat completed their maneuver,
Souvanna brushed them aside and shook the hand of the .
Nationalist ambassador in order to demonstrate to Taipei
that he desired the "two Chinas" situation to continue.
But he also continued to move toward Peking on the
diplomatic level. Although his government had recognized
Peking on 2 July and made known its intention to establish
relations, formal approval from the cabinet of the coali-
tion government was not given until 4 Sepi:ember (and pub-
licized on the 7th). This formal action was viewed by
Taipei as the last insult, and Chiang apparently decided
not to endure any others./
/ On
7 September, the Nationalist government announced its
decision to withdraw the ambassador and his embassy staff
and formally broke off diplomatic relations with the
angry statement that "we cannot allow Laos to become a
testing ground for a 'two Chinas' arrangement." (Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statement of 7 September 1962) Yet
this is precisely what the Chincse Communists had "allowed,"
-68-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
having anticipated that Chiang would not rlay the oppor-
tunist after Souvanna had informed him, indirectly, that
his (Chiang's) representative would have to share an un-
common responsibility with a common enemy.*
b. France (1964)
Chou En-lai calculated correctly again in 1963
that the operative factor in inducing a Nationalist with-
drawal from France would be a temporary "two Chinas"
situation. Mao personally participated in the effort.
De Gaulle's officious anti-American attitude was viewed
by the Chinese Communist leaders as providing thel, with
an opportunity to turn Paris irrevocably away from Wash-
ington's ally (Taipei). Their operation demonstrated
that Mao (as well as Chou) was more willing than Chiang
to be duplicitous about "two Chinas" and as opportunistic
as the Soviet leaders in friendly dealings with a West-
ern capitalist government.
Cutting ecross the strong revolutionary and anti-
imperialist line they themselves had arrogantly advanced
in the series of "open letters" in 1963, the Chinese Com-
munist leaders had to climb down from a doctrinal high
horse and cast about for some idea--almost any idea--which
would indicate a common Sino-French goal or grievance.
They had hinted cautiously in the spring of 1963 at "cer-
tain new developments in the capitalist forces of France,
which are beginning to be bold enough to stand up to the
U.S." (Red Flag article of 4 March 1963; this important
article placedwall" capitalist countries in a large front
against the U.S.) But they held back in providing a
-,----177----Cil?C-1Thelleseommunists have tried to eliminate all
aspects of the Chinese Nationalist presence ani in late
August 1967 their prol;ests to Souvanna Phouma impelled
the Prime Minister to ask the head of the unofficiel
Nationalist "economic mission" to leave Laos.
25X1
-69-
SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SEC R Rie
basic, doctrinally coherent rationale for their policy
of flexibility in maneuvering for French recognition.
They acted first, leaving their doctrinal position, which
had been rigid in the wake of their advance, to be adjusted
later.
France is "China's greates ally," Chou En-lai had
declared (in a speech of 29 ;January 1963,
because it was "also struggling
for independence;" while Peking was opposing the U.S. from
the left, Paris was "digging at the bottom of the American
wall from the right." By the spring of 1963, the Chinese
began to probe De Gaulle's attitude on recognition in a
series of steps, starting with economic matters. In May,
Peking's vice minister of Foreign Trade met with French
officials in Switzerland; in October, the Georges-Picot
mission was encouraged to explore the matter of an ex-
change of technical missions and data, When Georges-Picot
discussed Sino-French trade, the Chinese leaders insisted
that a serious exchange could not develop without diplo-
matic relations. Ex-Premier Edgar Faure(
in November) told the AFP
correspondent in New Delhi that these Chinese leaders
had specified "no conditions" regarding French relations
with Taipei.*
*Faure took this line in his article in Figaro on 9
January 1964, declaring that France would accept "no pre-
conditions" to recognition and that, in his opinion, Paris
would have no obligation to withdraw recognition from Tai-
pei. However, he reflected some sensitivity on the matter
of whether recognition would impel the Nationalists to
break off relations: he dodged the issue of what French
representation in Taiwan should be and denied that he had
told the Chinese Communists that the problem of French
relations with Taipei was academic because the National-
ists would break immediately upon French recognition. In
(footnote continued on page 71)
-70-
FCR RT
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/01/18 : FVA
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100001
Declassified in Part -
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/01/18 :
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100001
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
OVAAMII I
But Ambassador Bohlen's report of what Faure told
him in Paris after his trip to the mainland seems to be
the most plausible. That is, the Chinese leaders, while
"basically" insisting that there would have to be a com-
plete rupture with Chiang, nevertheless were somewhat
taken with Faure's suggestion to set aside the whole ques-
tion of French representation on Taiwan. He also told
Bohlen that in reporting to De Gaulle, he suggested three
possibilities for action: (1) do nothing and leave things
as they were; (2) start at an intermediate step with the
appointment of a permanent trade mission to Peking; or
(3) go the whole way and extend recognition to the main-
land regime. He recommended the third course to the
General, was not sure which he would decide on, and then
ventured the conjecture, as a student of the General's
psychology, that he would go "whole hog" and recognize
the Communist government.
For their part, the Chinese Communist leaders
tried to induce De Gaulle to make the recognition leap
by acting as moderate and reasonable men, less anxious
to discuss world revolution than the independence of
all nations, particularly those nations advancing anti-
(footnote continued from page 70)
short, Faure mace it an open boast that the French had
not accepted conditions detrimental to the Nationalists,
hypocritically concealing the true nature of the situa-
tion: he and De Gaulle's advisers had calculated that
the Nationalists themselves would break relations, reliev-
ing Paris of the blame and making De Gaulle appear to
have been high-minded throughout the maneuver
-71-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
American policies.* They even tried to depict France as
having discarded colonial policies (and as having become
acceptable as a good imperialist country), but were care-
ful to use a formulation which did not touch on the embar-
rassing matter of French colonial possessions. Chen Yi,
who had joined Chou in Africa, told the Algerian foreign
minister in late December 1963 that "We believe there is
an important and positive role which France could play
in Asia, now that France is no longer engaged in any
colonial war." (emphasis supplied) At the same time,
Chou was 'Fated as stating to President Ben Bella that
De Gaulle's independence contributed to a healthy balance
of power in the world, which Peking believes is in the
interest of world peace. Chou continued his exposition:
"In this contest, it way not be unthinkable that France
would like to redress the unjust discrimination that has
befallen some of the nations of the world because of
the policy of atomic monopoly which prevails today."
These tributes to French independence and goodwill, in-
tended as pragmatic justifications for Mao's drive for
recognition, did not contain an adequate expanation of
how a capitalist leader could suddenly develop a benevol-
ent aspect. The "explanation" was to come at a time when
Peking was vulnerable to attack by the Soviets on the
*Chou En-lai stressed this mutuality of interest at
the farewell banquet for Edgar Faure in Peking on 31
October 1963: "We...both suffered from foreign occupa-
tion in the anti-fascist war and carried out protracted
resistance to this occupation. Now both our people are
striving for the sovereignty and-lEdependence of their
countries. This is what we have in common and is a tie
making for friendly exchanges." (emphasis supplied) This
was Chou's subtle way of aligning De Gaulle with Mao in
a common cause, first against the fascist powers and then
against the U.S. Chou flattered De Gaulle personally in
Conakry in a statement to Edgar Snow on 23 January 1964:
he is "courageous in facing realities and dares to act
accordingly"--a characterization which contrasts with
earlier imagery depicting the General, in Peking media,
as the representative of "big finance" rather than a
daring statesman.
-72-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
NI-41:1/1-4"1"
matter of opportunistic maneuvering with a major capital-
ist country for purely national interests,
In the course of what seemed to be a routine discus-
sion of U.S. troubles with its allies, the People's Daily
editorial of 21 January 1964 made several statements?inZh
were strikingly moderate (and unprecedented) when compared
to earlier Chinese Communist attacks on the Western demo-
cracies. Because leaders of these countries allegedly
want to free themselves of U.S. control,
They therefore have something in common with
the socialist countries and the various
peoples,
The editorial went on to establish a new position that
rulers in these countries have a "dual character"--that
is, they are on the one hand expluiters, but, on the
other hand, opponents of the U.S. (This is strikingly
similar to the tactical formula Mao had employed during
the Chinese revolution, which depicted the national
capitalists as allies of the CCP because of their "dual
character"--that is, as exploiters, but at the same time
as opponents of foreign imperialism,) In extension of
the latter point, the editorial stated that "there is
not a single country or people in the world today which
is not subjected to the aggression and threats of U.S.
imperialism." In this way providing room for the French,
it also served as "the objective basis for the establish-
ment of the broadest united front against U.S. imperial-
ism."
Mao's move toward the French required a minor modi-
fication in his own concept of 1946 on the "intermediate
zone" in the world. This concept, advanced by Mao in
August 1946 to Anna Louise Strong, already had been re-
fined, in the 4 March 1963 Red Flag article, to include
not just "many" but "all" capitalist countries in a large
front against the U.S. The 21 January editorial stated
that there really were two intermediate zones (not just
one), the first including countries of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America and the second consisting of "the whole of
Western Europe, Australasia, Canada, and other capitalist
-73-
SPCR RT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
anurkEl
countries" (other than the U.S.). This separation into
two zones enabled the Chinese to argue that the under-
developed countries (zone one) are in the forefront of
the anti-U.S. struggle while the capitalist countries
(zone two) are not far behind even though exploitation
of the worker is a feature of their governments by defini-
tion.
Mao personally seems to have sanctioned this doc-
trinal innovation--namely, that leaders in major capital-
ist countries have a "dual character," the good half
being ani-U.S.--a more radical revision of basic doctrine
than Khru3hchev's Leninist description of some of these
leaders as "sober-minded." On 30 January 1964, Mao per-
sonally departed from a dogmatic doctrinal line-which
placed all "imperialists" in one camp and all bloc coun-
tries in the other camp. He also lifted France out of
the category of "colonial" power. He explained
I his view of the second inter-
mediate zone, called the "third world" by the French.
France can regain all of its influence in
Asia. It has completed its decolonization
and we know quite well that it does not
want to come back here just for commerical
purposes. France itself Germany, Italy,
Great Britain (provided it stops being the
courtier of the U.S.), Japan, and we our-
selves--there you have the third world.
(?en5)7-asis supplied)
He avoided saying that France still maintained colonies.
He placed Peking in the same camp of the major democracies
(excluding the U.S. and USSR on non-doctrinal grounds).
-74-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
SECRET
To return to developments regarding the problem
of establishing Sino-French relations, the Chinese Com-
munist plan to avoid insisting explicitly that the French
must break off relations with the Nationalists (holding
such a demand in reserve until after Paris announced
its intention to establish diplomatic relations)apparently
did not begin to worry the French until January 1964.
On 21 January, a key French official told a U.S. enbassy
officer that Peking might reject a "two Chinas" arrange-
ment, and this prospect seemed to be presaged by a Chinese
Communist attack on the concept emanating from their em-
bassy in Mali. He reiterated the French position--namely,
De Gaulle had accepted "no conditions" (meaning no condi-
tions explicitly stated) on recognition which required
that Paris rupture relations with Taipei. His attitude
reflected official French concern that Chiang might not
take the initiative to break off relations (Paris ana--
Peking had calculated he would). American officials
were encouraged by this sign and acted to persuade Chiang
to avoid such an initiative, hoping to deter an exchange
of missions or, failing in that, to place the responsibility
-75-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
ant, rc it I
for any Paris-Taipei rupture clearly on De Gaulle, the
real instigator of the rupture.*
Chiang was alerted to De Gaulle's plan to cast the
first stone to shatter Paris-Taipei relations and then to
deny that such a result had been intended.** "When De
Gaulle's announcement comes, it will not include termina-
tion of relations with the Government of the Republic of
China (GRC)....Our cue is to sit tight and force De Gaulle
or the Chinese Communists to make the next move....Maybe
in the long run we cannot keep our own embassy in Paris
comfortably, but we should stay there as long as we can"
(Taipei China News editorial of 22 January). De Gaulle
still hosed Chian would ac
*De Gaulle had been encouraged to act on recognition
by Faure, Georges-Picot, and business and "intellectual"
groups, according to a statement made to U.S. officials
in Hong Kong by the French Consul General Military Liaison
Officer on 8 January. This officer stated that he had
underestimated the pressures being exerted by these men
and had overestimated the ability of the French military
and civil service professionals to counter this action.
His view was that the Ouai and the Ministry of Defense
had been cut out of policy formation on the China issue
and he held that communications between Paris and the
local French Consul General had confirmed this view.
Faure was used as the trouble-shooter on this matter
by the General, by-passing the professional officers in
Paris and Hong Kong.
-76-
qPrR
25X1
25X1'
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SFCR FT
On 26 January, a Nationalist spokesman pub-
licly declared Taipei's opposition to any "two Chinas"
arrangement, but then proceeded cautiously: "Should
France announce recognition of the Chinese Communists,
we will decide to break relations with France in principle,
but the question of when to break relations involves a
subtle technique and must be 'considered carefully."
When, therefore, on the 27th, Peking and Paris
simultaneously announced their "mutual agreement to
establish diplomatic relations" and to "appoint their
ambassadors within three months," Taipei condemned it
(in the same evening), rejected any "two Chinas" formula-
tion, but did not sever relations with Paris. Chiang
had been persuaded to allow De Gaulle the privilege of
taking the responsibility for his own action rather than
passing it off on others,
Both De Gaulle and Mao apparently were taken by
surprise by Chiang's restraint, and Mao' lost no time
in applying pressure on Paris by having ecimmetitaries make
explicit what had been implicit in Sino-French discussions
of the mechanics of recognition:
...recognition of the government of the
PRC by any country implies that it ceases
to recognize the Chiang Kai-shek group,...
and naturally it cannot permit the repre-
sentatives of this group to be present side
by side with representatives of the PRC
in that country or in any international
organization. (NCNA's 28 January account
of People's Daily editorial of the 29th)
(emphasis supplied)
However, De Gaulle kept to his plan to have Chiang make
the final break and on the 28th, a French spokesman re-
jected the Maoist demand, declaring that "France has no
intention or desire to break relations with the Chinese
Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek." Responding
specifically to the statement of Paking's Foreign Ministry
-77--
SECRRT
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
(see footnote)O, French spokesmen were quoted by AFP on
the 28th as reiterating the line that recognition was
extended "without any condition" and that the Peking
statement commits only "the Peking authorities," not the
French. The spokesmen also declared that Peking's posi-
tion had not been reflected in the Sino-French communi-
ques announcing the establishment of relations and "if
the government of Peking sees things thus, that's its
business." AFP also reported on the same day that a
French spokesran conceded that the Communists might be
demanding expulsion of the Nationhlists from Paris, but
"this is out of the question." France, he said, was
recognizing Peking as the effective government of the
territory which it governed--i.e., the mainland--while
the CRC continued to be recognized as the effective
government of Taiwan.**
Regarding De Gaulle's maneuvering to impel Chiang
to make the break, the AFP account had French spokesman
asserting that if Taipei rejects the line taken by Paris,
"it is up to them to take their responsibility, not
France." As the Taipei China Post noted in an editorial
on the 28th, "By biding his time, De Gaulle hopes to goad
Free China into breaking off ties to keep his own hands
lily white."
*Mao's flexibility in earlier French-Chinese discussions
on recognition was to avoid making a specific demand for
Paris to break with Taipei until he had De Gaulle's state-
ment of recognition in his pocket. His spokesman later
insisted that it was with the "understanding" that France
would cease to recognize Chiang's government and would
not permit his representatives to be present "side by side"
with Peking's representatives that the agreement was
reached to establish diplomaLic relations. (Peking Foreign
Ministry statement of 28 January).
**This part of the statement was detrimental to the
Nationalist position and provocative, as it was made in
full knowledge that this formulation previously had been
unacceptable to Taipei.
-78-
SECRRT
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
?
S 111 1-1"I '
Nationalist restraint* led to a situation (described
by Ambassador Kohler as "a game of diplomatic mah Jong
between the Emperor of the West and the twin Emperors of
the East"). De Gaulle had to walk a rougher road than
he had planned, and his dilemma demonstrated to other
governments that Peking would not permit them to sustain
a "two Chinas" formula after they had extended recogni-
tion. (Japan, for example, was warned against using De
Gaulle's procedure as an example, against "establishing
relations with Peking while keeping the French consulate
in Taiwan intact"--Peking broadcast to Japan on 26 Janu-
ary).
Mao personally had played an active role. He had
flattered De Gaulle for his anti-Americanism in the inter-
view on 30 January with visiting French parliamentarians,
who were later described (by Paris journalists) as hav-
ing been thoroughly exposed to all the power of seduction
of this great historic figure. The seducer began the
interview by displaying his admiration for French culture
--"I have read Diderot and in fact all of your encycloped-
ists...I have read Fourier. But above all, I am a great
admirer of Napoleon. I know every one of his works."
Mao then employed his favorite political style--that is,
a rusticism--to attack the U.S. and USSR for the partial
test ban treaty: "Have they consulted General De Gaulle?
The Moscow Treaty is a fraud. Those two countries must
not come and sh on our heads." Having in this manner
defined the common ground (or barnyard) on which he and
De Gaulle stood, he asserted (incorrectly) that France
had "completed its decolonization," and then indirectly
asked that ambassadors be exchanged as soon as possible
*On 29 January, Reuters quoted Nationalist Economic
Minister Yang as saying that "We are waiting for France
to initiate the break. If France does not break rela-
tions with us, we will still maintain relations as long
as it suits us." On the same day, the Nationalist
charge in Tokyo stated that his government would not
immediately withdraw its embassy from Paris.
-79-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SEURET
without troubling over diplomatic maneuvering:
General De Gaulle is a soldier; I too am
one--I served under arms for 12 years. Not
one of you is a diplomat, correct? Then I
can freely say, let us distrust diplomats;
they are too slippery. (Interview with
French parliamentarians, printed in the
Gaullist daily paper, Paris-Presse-L'
Intransigent, 21 February 1964)
Mao was at the very center of the effort to make De Gaulle
take steps that would lead Chiang to withdraw his repre-
sentatives, and the overall effect of Chinese Communist
pressures was to make the General move faster than he
had desired in cutting ties with Chiang,
The French on 29 January released information which
was designed to anger Chiang and provoke him into with-
drawing his diplomats immediately. AFP was informed in
Paris that Peking had designated its charge and that the
French would soon name their charge;1
De Gaulle maintained the
fiction that he was not forcing a break--even as he took
steps to exchange charges with Peking--and in his press
conference on tne 31st, he praised Chiang's "worth, nobility
of soul, and patriotism" while remaining silent on the
behind-the-scenes steps he was taking to destroy future
relations with Taipei? Having implied that Chiang was
an honorable soldier but not the head of the government
of China,* having stated that Peking controlled "almost
*De Gaulle's effort to soften the blow as it fell on
Chiang apparently irritated Mao and his advisers, who were
already vexed by what they considered to be dilatory
tactics. NCNA reported cn 1 February from Paris that De
Gaulle had "honored" Chiang (who really was a "traitor
(footnote continued on page 81)
-80-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
25X1
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
NI-1A H I
the whole of China" (taking account of the fact that Taiwan
was not under Mao's control), and having rejected the
"two Chinas" formulation (opposed by both Mao and Chiang),
he prepared to inform Chiang that recognition of Peking
would be implemented by sendinr; the French charge to the
mainland.
De Gaulle may have thought he could attain and sus-
tain a "two Chinas" arrangement, but the Chinese Commun-
ists had dispelled that idea with Peking's statement on
28 January. As for Chiang, he could tolerate a situation
where Paris ambiguously declared it would recognize both
Chinese governments without defining what this meant, but
he was unwilling to accept the implication of the General's
statement: The Chinese Communist representative would
be accredited from "almost the whole of China," implying
that the Nationalist charge would be henceforth accredited
from Taiwan only. On 6 February a Foreign Office official
in Paris told Ambassador Bohlen that the Isrench had not
recently talked with the Nationalist charge and that "if
he doesn't draw the obvious conclusions" they will have
to inform him that France has ceased to recognize Taipei
as the government of China. Nevertheless, Chisag did
not withdraw his charge and embarrassed the French by
having the Nationalist UNESCO delegation transferred to
the Chinese embassy, complicating French plans for acquir-
ing real estate reciprocally in Peking.
Mao's advisers sustained the pressure, and Chou
En-lai declared at a press conference in the Somali
(footnote continued from page 80)
repudiated long ago by the Chinese people"), referred to
Peking's "implacable control of the masses," and even
asserted that French recognition implied no approval of
"the present Chinese regime." De Gaulle was considered
to be, therefore, a partial friend only, whose loyalties
were mixed and whose euologies (unlike Sihanouk's) were
misdirected, This 31 January news conference detracted
from Mao's earner professed view of the General as some-
thing like a comrade-in-arms. ?
?
25X1
-81-
stu-Arirr
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/1.8_:_CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
Republic on 4 February that "From the day France announced
the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the
personnel of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Paris lost their
qualifications as Chinese diplomatic representatives."
When, however, at the same press conference, Chou used
a mild diplomatic formulation intended to suggest no Chinese
Communist pressure--the intention "attributed to France"
not to break relations with Chiang was "a mere procedural
question or a question of courtesy" (AP and Reuters ver-
sion)--NCNA did not report it because it implied that
the matter concerned only the French government, which
might do as it desired, Chou's diplomatic language was
intended to deflect criticism that Peking was interfer-
ing in internal French matters. But Mao apparently was
concerned at that point only with the need to force De
Gaulle to get on with the job of expelling the National-
ist officials.
As the Nationalists continued to hold their posi-
tion in their Paris embassy and Vice President Chen Cheng
declared that they would "fight to the last man" (state-
ment of 8 February), De Gaulle prepared to concede to
Mao by making the crucial move to "break" (preparation
was reported in Le Monde of 7 February).
This message, Chiang told Ambassador Wright, ended
the period of maneuver, and now every effort would be
rade to assure that in the eyes of the world the onus for
the break rested with the French. Early in the morning
of 11 February, Chiang's Foreign Ministry referred to the
crucial message and asserted that by this action Paris
"has damaged beyond repair" Taipei-Paris relations, which
were severed on the 10th as a consequence.* The French
*The Nationalist embassy was closed on the 20th, but
the Nationalist UNESCO delegation remained as occupants
of their building. Peking's charge, who arrived with his
staff on the 23rd, was impelled to purchase property else-
where for Ambassador Huang Chen (a Long March veteran
and former Major General) who arrived in June.
-82-
SECRET
25X1
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
?
worked hard to deny that De Gaulle had capitulated to
Mao's demands, and De Gaulle was left in the position of
a man who had rejected a former ally for a new one (and
one about whom he had not expressed a favorable opinion)
--all this to parade his contempt for Washingto,..*
Mao's diplomats moved quickly to make Paris' reco-
gnition snowball into a campaign in other countries. In
February 1964, Peking and the Congo (B) agreed to establish
diplomatic relations and PRC diplomats arrived even while
the Taipei diplomatic mission was still there. Chiang
finally withdrew his mission in mid-April 1964. This and
earlier activity pointed up the fatuous nature of Mao's
professions to be above "soliciting" recognition of his
regime. He had bragged to French Senator Mitterand in
1961 that
If we are not wanted here or there we can
wait ten years, thirty years, one hundred
years. China will always be China. It is
not soliciting anything. In one hundred
years it will be even more difficult to
ignore it. No, we are not in a hurry. Time
is our good ally. China must above all
*De Gaulle had several ways of trying to justify reco-
gnition of a regime whose treatment of democratic legal
procedure was abominable.
-83-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
L1 Li J L. 12A I.
devote itself to the building of social-
ism. (TASS dispatch of 23 February 1961)
But the almost Taoist possiveness suggested by Mao in that
interview had never been part of his foreign policy. And
in 1964, he tried vigorously to gain recognition. One
tactic was to send a "goodwill" delegation led by Vice
Minister of Foreign Trade Lu Hsu-chang (accompanied by
their ambassador to Mali and the Vice Chairman of the
Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries)
to west and central Africa, starting in late July 1964.
They made no headway in visits to Niger and Nigeria. But
other governments, influenced partly by the French action
and partly by pressure from sister governments complied:
Tunisia in January, the Congo (B) in February, the Central
African Republic (CAR) in September, Tanzania and Zambia
in October, Dahomey in November, and (after clear signs
of ground preparation in November) Mauritania in July
1965.* Recognition from these seven states represented
a considerable success and a blow to Taipei's prestige
*Mao's principle of rejecting any "two Chinas" or dual
representation situation after relations have been estab-
lished was demonstrated by Peking's demand to have the
government of the CAR expell Nationalist representatives.
Within a few days after the issuance of the joint communi-
que announcing the establishment of formal Peking-Bangui
relations in late September 1964, the People's Daily on
3 October insisted that "from the day of the reTiiiiii" of
the joint communique, Taipei's officials in Bangui "can
no longer pass themselves off as diplomatic representa-
tives of China."
However, in countries where the government has continued
to drag its feet on expelling the Nationalists, the Chinese
Communists have accepted a temporary situation (which would
be construed as dual representation although Peking rejects
the concept). For example, following Dahomey's recogni-
tion of Peking as the "sole legal government" of China in
early November 1964, the Chinese Communist charge presented
his credentials (in late December) despite the continued
presence of Taipei's charge.
-84-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
in Africa
of its position
averted,
Washington
presence
25X1
was
from
that the
would
which might have led to an overall deterioration
on the continent. Such a disaster
however by (1) sustained and firm support
and (2) suspicions among some states
of a Chinese Communist diplomatic mission
open the way to subversive activity. Ethiopia, Niger,
Nigeria, Chad, and the Cameroon did not move with the
current, although some of their officials had been tempted.
By early January 1965, Ethiopia had made no additional
moves* and Niger's President Diori told U.S. embassy of-
ficials that the presidents of Chad and the Cameroon had
agreed with his view that no Chinese diplomatic missions
?
should be accepted at that time. Diori had cited the
speech with which the Chinese Communists had moved into
the CAR and the extent of Peking's activities elsewhere
in Africa as factors promoting increased caution. By the
close of 1965, Taipei came away from its encounter with
Peking in Africa with some prestige remaining and with
a position of ties with roughly one-half of the contin-
ent's countries, the other half having established rela-
tions with the mainland regime.
?
?
As of August .1967, the number of countries which
had diplomatic relations with Peking and Taipei was 47
and 62, respectively, and 18 countries did not have rela-
tions with either. Djakarta "suspended" its relations
with Peking in October 1967.
De Gaulle's recognition had paid off handsomely
for Mao, who again had permitted tactical flexibility to
guide his diplomats as they developed contacts with coun-
tries which already had official relations with Taipei.
Once contacts were established, they worked on the host
government to reject "two Chinas" by expelling the
*During his visit in late January 1964, Chou En-lai
had persuaded Emperor Haile Selassie to agree to "norma-
lize" relations and Peking's ambassador to Cairo was
sent to Addis Ababa in mid-November to try to get the
Emperor to follow through, but was rebuffed.
-85-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
bhUlkhl
Nationalist representatives. Mao did not score a success
with Western European governments in 1964, but established
some footholds by way of trade and NCNA offices (or agree-
ments looking to setting up of such offices) in Austria,
Italy, and West Germany.
Yet his strategic inflexibility--that is, his dictum
that no temporaryritTiicirihinas" situation will be permanently
accepted--made it clear to Western governments that the
French example had not solved the dual representation
dilemma for any of them, and their hopes of seizing upon
a breakthrough in the "two Chinas" tangle were quickly
dispelled. Were Mao to accept a more nearly permanent
dual representation policy, he might eventually score
heavily in Africa, Europe,* Japan, Austria, New Zealand
and the Americas, but such prolonged acquiescence in a
tandem situation with diplomats of his civil war enemy
and continuing opponent is more than his revolutionary
animosity will permit him to bear.
In Moscow, De Gaulle's recognition action, which
impeded the Soviet effort to isolate Peking and restrict
the spread of its influence, was not enthusiastically re-
ceived. Short and uninspired commentaries in Pravda and
lzvestia on 28 January 1964 underscored French "realism"
hut avoided any reference to Mao's realism, except to
4.mply that his maneuvering conceded the validity of Mos-
cow's position in the Sino-Soviet polemic on improving
international relations and on "peaceful coexistence."
The Soviets denied they were "displeased" (Pravda comment-
ary of 28 January) with De Gaulle's action, but in fact,
they were considerably piqued.r
*Recognition by France' was the only act of establish-
ing relations by a Western power since the Netherlands
announced recognition in March 1950, American support
and Chinese Communist belligerency having been the major
factors detering other powers from breaking with Taipei.
-86 -
SF.CIR F.T
25X1
?
25X1
?
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
25X1
Mao's new tie with Paris left him open to the
charge of opportunism and hypocrisy, and the Soviet lead-
ers attacked his chauvinistic diplomacy as inconsistent
with his revolutionary preaching. Presidium member M.
Suslov, speaking against the CCP on a wide range of issues,
made a direct attack on the Chinese leaders at the CPSU
central committee plenum on 14 February 1964 (precisely
on the 14th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty). Sus-
by started by likening the Chinese leaders to a "bour-
geois" statesman, Palmerston, whose principle of foreign
policy was, "We have no eternal allies and eternal enemies;
only our interests are eternal for us." He then implied
that Mao's preaching had been insincere because it did
not correspond to the practice of the preacher:
The CCP leaders themselves, when the subject
is practical steps in the international arena,
prefer to act not at all from positions of
revolutionary struggle with imperialism....
Chinese propaganda boils down its struggle
with imperialism to a struggle with the U.S.,
by-passing its allies--Japanese, West German,
and French imperialists.. Great suspicion
is aroused by the so-called theory put forward
by the Chinese leaders of an intermediate
zone, which regards West Germany, Britian,
-87-
SRC:RFT
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
France, and Japan as countries enslaved to
US, imperialism. This embellishes the imperi-
alists of Britain, France, Japan, and especi-
ally West Germany...One must say that the
ruling circles of the imperialist power have
given away the secret of Chinese policy. They
understand that the revolutionary phrases of
the Chinese leaders are not directed against
imperialism at all.
This strong Soviet polemical position exposed Mao's op-
portunism in moving toward Paris, and Chinese Communist
materials in March 1964 reflected considerable sensitivity
in arguing that the Soviets do not see the "growing divi-
sions within imperialism" and have "a wrong theory of
dealing with imperialism as a monolithic whole" (NCNA version
of speecteby.New Zealand Party Secretary General Wilcox--a
"bought" Mao man--given at the Kwangtung Provincial Com-
mittee CCP School, printed in People's Daily and Red Flag
on 17 March--one month after it had beeirigien).*--Actarly,
*ro defend Mao's non-revolutionary willingness to ac-
cept De Gaulle's gesture of recognition and act on it,
a People's Daily article of 7 March 1964 very defensively
suiTailT-tTIT support for Paris was necessary because
the "U.S.-French struggle is the focal point of the realign-
ment of forces now underway." While at this time the con-
cept of "realignment" was used to justify a successful
Chinese effort, this same concept was later used (in late
1965 and early 1966) to try to rationalize the series of
major Chinese defeats. The "realignment" concept was
used on both occasions--first to defend a non-revolution-
ary opportunistic success and later to defend a series
of revolutionary failures--because it implied the working
out of "natural" forces, incapable of being controlled
by even the best revolutionary leader. In defending a
series of foreign policy faiures, various Chinese lead-
ers probably were quoting from a high-level party formula-
tion which may have been produced in September and October
1965 to justify reverses. "...all kinds of political
forces are now going through a process of drastic differ-
entiation and regrouping." (Liu Ning-yi statement of
(footnote continued on page 89)
-88-
SPC.R FT
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECR irr
25X1
?
?
the Soviet leaders have been as opportunistic as the Chi-
nese in dealing with Western governments, but they have
not professed to be unalterably anti-imperialist with the
same frequency, intensity, and explicitness as have the
Chinese.
The Chinese leaders have continued to justify their
official contacts with Paris by centering their comment-
ary on De Gaulle's anti-American obsession. They have
even tried to portray him as being more anti-American than
the Soviet leaders:
There are a number of questions over which
China and De Gaulle have conflicting views
--De Gaulle advocating the neutrality of
Vietnam--but our measure of the good and
the bad is based on the degree of one's op-
position to the U.S. By this standard,
President De Gaulle is greater than Brezh-
nev, first secretary of the CPSU, and
Premier Kosygin. (Liao Cheng-chih inter-
view with Japanese correspondents on 24
December 1965)
(footnote continued from page 88)
5 November 1965) "The world is going through a process
of great upheaval, great division, and great reorganiza-
tion." (Chou En-lai statement of 29 November 1965). In
each case, the Chinese indicated that the reverses would
not force them to revise Mao's policy of pushing forward
Ili revolution in various countries. On the contrary,
Liu and Chou, using the same formulation, insisted that
the world revolutionary struggle "is developing in depth"
and that "new" revolutionary storms are rising against
the U.S. Chou probably had personal doubts about the
policy of pushing revolution even before the defeats of
the summer and fall of 1965, but his statement suggests
that it was necessary for him to comply with Mao's sus-
tained revolutionary compulsion in foreign policy.
-89-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Despite the frictions which developed in Peking-Paris re-
lations in the wake of the aberrations of Mao's purge in
1966, the Chinese leaders continue to point to the justi-
fication of De Gaulle's anti-Americanism.
B. Failure of a Major Effort: Japan (1952-67)
When Japan's sovereign status was established in
the peace treaty effective in April 1952, Mao and his aides
had already established their policy of eroding U.S. and
Chinese Nationalist influence in Tokyo. While seeking
to gain recognition from Tokyo, the Chinese Communists
tried to prevent the expansion of treaty relations with
Taipei (which had been established in April 1952 on the
basis of Premier Yoshida's December 1951 letter to gecre-
tary Dulles) and to destroy support for the bilateral
security treaty (which permitted continued stationing of
U.S. forces in Japan). Chou En-lai, entrusted with the
major role in planning and implementing Japan policy,
seems to have been at his natural best when permitted
to advance a policy of maneuver and finesse. Chou ap-
parently has complied with the hardest aspects of this
policy and seems to have implemented Mao's will in every
shift.
*Peking's first private (non-official) trade agreement
with Japanese businessmen was signed in June 1952. The
left-socialists used it to demand a reduction of the re-
strictions on trade with the mainland, as did the JCP.
The Chinese Communists tried, in the fall of 1953, to get
Tokyo to sever relations immediately with Taipei as a
precondition for expanded trade, but when this hard line
proved unsuccessful throughout 1954, it was downplayed
and replaced by a gradual, "step by step" approach.
-90-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
a
?
25X1
25X1
By May 1956, Chou was again smiling upon Japanese
visitors, assuring them that "war criminals" would be re-
patriated. By June, the NPC was reported to have taken
up a new policy of leniency, and in August, most of the
"war criminals" had been returned to Japan, where Peking's
prestige was given a new lift at a time when Moscow's was
being tarnished in discussions about Soviet retention of
the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.-
-91-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
' J ?
/Chou's efforts led to the sign-
ing of the fourth agreement in Yarch 1958, and he persisted
in maintaining a Chinese Communist trade mission despite
the Japanese government's refusal in April to recognize
the mission's right to raise the PRC flag. However, when
that flag was torn down from the PRC trade office in
Nagasaki in May, and when the incident was publicized
internationally, Chou had no recourse but to drop his
conciliatory line. Probably reflecting Mao's decision
to retaliate, Peking's actions thereafter suggested no
nuance of restraint: all trade was suspended, Japanese
firms were boycotted, the Sino-Japanese fishing agree-
ment was not renewed, some Japanese fishing boats were
seized, and Chen Yi (on 9 May) was permitted to exercise
his vituperative powers, denouncing Premier Kishi as an
"imperialist" And. an "idiot."
The crude Maoist acts of boycott and suspension
of existing contracts angered political and business
leaders in Japan, impeding the widely anticipated advance
of the JSP in the elections and whittling down the good
will Chou had been building in Japan. This policy, com-
bined with nppeals beyond the government to the "Japan-
ese people" to abrogate the security treaty with the U.S.,
had the net effect of backfiring on Mao, making it easier
for Tokyo to sustain close relations with Washington and
Taipei.
Policy toward Japan was further frozen in this
peculiarly Maoist period of revolutionary fanaticism, in-
ternally expressed in the aberrations of the commune and
"leap forward" programs, and externally expressed in re-
jecting Soviet strategy toward the U.S. and in the inter-
diction effort against the offshores. In August 1958,
Peking, in a hectoring way, raised six conditions for
resumption of Sino-Japanese relations: the government
of Premier Kishi must (1) change its hostile attitude
toward China, (2) stop promoting the "two Chinas" concept,
(3) stop interfering with efforts to restore diplomatic
relations, (4) apologize for the Nagasaki flag incident,
-92-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
?
(5) openly declare its intention to restore formal rela-
tions, and (6) send a delegation to negotiate differences.
The final three demands were unrealistic, vindictive, and
arrogant. They apparently reflected Mao's intervention
(in the same way that Peking's November 1964 demands on
the post-Khrushchev leadership later reflected his personal
style).*
25X1
After Chou's conciliatory line was reinstituted
in august 1960 (almost simultaneously with Khrushchev's
withdrawal of Soviet technicians from the mainland), the
final three demands were dropped. Mao apparently was
convinced of the need for some trade with Japan and per-
mitted Chou to begin to climb down from the limb on which
Mao had placed him following the Nagasaki flag incident.
The policy during the intervening boycott period
had been to trade, irregularly, only with small-and-medium-
sized firms, rather than with the bigger "monopoly capi-
talists," which were closer to the government (Chou's state-
ment to a Hong Kong Communist newspaper editor in July
1959). These small firms were designated by Peking as
"friendly," thus circumventing the government-subsidized
Japan-China Export/Import Association, which had been set
up prior to the Nagasaki flag incident as the focal point
for semi-governmental trade with the mainland. In August
1960, Chou supplemented his "three political principles"
with "three trade principles" to cover Sino-Japanese com-
merce.** In this way, Chou, who was credited with formu1ating25X1
**Chou almost certainly had primary responsibility for
formulating the principles which were the guidelines for
Sino-Japanese trade. (Chou already had gained credit for
formulating the five principles of peaceful coexistence
and was later to set forth the eight principles on Chinese
(footnote continued on page 94)
-93-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
anurcni
the "friendly" firm trade policy, pre-empted any future
break in trade exchanges (which had left Japanese firms
holding breached contracts and had embittered Japanese
opinion), maintained a degree of contact with Japanese
business interests, and avoided giving the impression
that Mao's boycott against the "government" had been
ended.(
(77075inote continued from page 93)
Communist aid to underdeveloped countries. These are among
the few pieces of originality which Mao has conceded him.)
Chou's political principles are: (1) not regarding Peking
with hostility, (2) not participating in the U.S. "plot"
to create two Chinas, and (3) working toward the normaliza-
tion of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. His trade
principles are: (1) to work toward the conclusion of
trade agreements, (2) in the mean-
time, to conclude and successfully carry out private trade
agreements, and (3) to give "special consideration" to
certain industries and commodities (i.e., Japanese small-
medium enterprises). Tokyo was provided with considerable
latitude by Chou's loosely formulated requirement that
it must always be "working toward" formal ties with Peking.
-94-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
I
25X1
In this way, easing out of the confines of Mao's punitive
boycott palicy, Chou was able to devise a means for making
trade arrangements, based on "friendship," which could
eventually lead back to the establishment of more regular
trade and then a Chinese Communist trade office in Japan.
In devising this policy, Chou displayed again his remark-
able dexterity, his ability to maneuver within the narrow
boundaries of an absurdly inflexible Maoist policy and
to argue Mao into a little more rationality. 25X1
Chou did not take a softer line toward the Ikeda
government, but worked out a differentiated approach, which
sustained contacts with some businessmen and made new ones
with other traders./
However, in the fall of 1962, at a time when the
regime was still struggling to recuperate economically
and competition with the USSR was extended to all coun-
tries, Mao apparently was persuaded to move again toward
a semi-governmental and regular trade relationship. Chou
took a conciliatory line in a series of initiatives. He
invited the pro-Peking LDP member, Matsumura, to Peking 25X1
to increase trade and political contacts on a stee-bv-
step basis,_
:Chou told
Matsumura publicly that he envisaged political gains beyond
economic progress:
We hold that it should be possible to develop
political relations and economic relations
-95-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for,Release.2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
between the two countries by linking them
together, as well as by developing them side
by side Moreover, these relations should
influence and promote each other, and not
the contrary.
Chou's point was that his policy of "gradual and cumula-
tive methods" of advance should pave the way for Tokyo's
recognition of Peking and should not be separated from
that crucial goal by a fanciful hope of retaining ties
with Taipei indefinitely. He was urging Tokyo to drop
its line that politics and trade were separable. He was
also implying that a sustained advance had been impeded
by Ikeda's acceptance of U.S. policy on the issue of
Chinese representation in the UN and should not be repeated
in the form of overt opposition.*
*Japan and four other countries including the U.S.
sponsored a resolution in 1961 to set the matter of Pek-
ing's UN entry as an "important question" requiring a deci-
sion by a two-thirds majority. When, on 15 December, this
anti-Peking resolution was adopted, the Chinese Commun-
ists denounced Ikeda in a sustained campaign which made
it difficult for pro-Peking Japanese political figures
to increase trade and other relations.r
the speech of the UN delegate and Japan's vote
were "unnecessary and provocative;" admission would have
been defeated without any action by Japan; Peking would
have been satisfied if the Japanese delegate had remained
(footnote continued on page 97)
-96-
SECRET
25X1
I
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
p
25X11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
?
?
The Chou-Matsumura "political understanding" (Chou's
term) was used as an opening wedge in the effort to return
trade to the semi-governmental status it had had in 1958.
Next, LDP member Takasaki (who, in October, signed a memo-
randum for trade from 1963-1967) was used by Chou to un-
derscore the political significance of expanding Sino-
Japanese trade,,
/ Although Peking was "displeaied" with Ikeda's
political attitude, Chou recognized his "difficult posi-
tion" and for that reason would not allow anything to
become an "obstacle to improved trade relations." This
dexterity was retained by Chen Yi who, in describing the
memorandum and annexed documents on over-all Sino-Japanese
trade which had been signed in October by Liao Cheng-chih
(with Takasaki), declared that they represented
a private treaty, in one way, and a govern-
ment-to-government treaty, in another way,
because those who signed the treaty for
China are responsible Chinese government
officials and those who signed for Japan
are responsible members of the Liberal
Democratic Party or representatives of
(footnote continued from page 96)
silent and abstained when the vote was taken. This was
not the last time that Chou was impelled to hint to Tokyo
his awareness of Japan's political commitment to the U.S.
and his desire that his flexible policy should not be
impeded by vanguard opposition to Peking's UN entry.
-97 -
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
bEL:104:1'
business circles who have close relations
with the government. (Press conference
for Japanese reporters on 9 November 1962)
The Liao-Takasaki memorandum specified the items to he
exported by each country and agreed that trade would
total $500 million both ways during the first five years,
beginning in 1963--the first document since the Maoist
boycott of 1958 to re-establish a regular channel for
trade expansion.
Chou, appareatly concerned that the Ikeda cabinet
might not approve the memorandum and the deferred payment
terms and interest rates stipulated in it, played down
the political aspects of the agreement in November and
December, while his subordinates pressed Japanese business-
men to begin "concrete" negotiations on the purchase of
fertilizer, steel, agricultural machinery, and the vinylon
plant. He gradually succeeded in dispelling fears among
Japanese traders that high political demands would be
raised immediately after government approval, but his re-
assurance effort had to be carried out well intL 1963.
On 11 September 1963, Liao Cheng-chih reassured
the Japanese that although Peking would not "compromise"
on the "two Chinas" issue--i.e., Japan's relations with
the Chinese Nationalists--there was "no alternative at
present but to go ahead with the step-by-step formula."
The Chinese also formed a China-Japan Friendship Associa-
tion (CJFA) and prepared to double the number of Chinese
political activists ("cultural delegations") to be sent
to Japan in 1964. While Premier Ikeda continued to op-
pose any rapid expansion of trade or credit, other Japan-
ese political figures were encouraged by Chou's concilia-
tory line to work for an expansion of trade, and his im-
plementation of the September 1962 understanding to ex-
pedite Sino-Japanese trade, augmented optimism in Japan.
The Chinese Communist goal was long-range, targeted on
one fine day in the future: "Chiang's ambassador is in
Tokyo. If we sent an ambassador, this would be recognizing
-98-
SECRET
25X1
4
25X1
?
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
two Chinas. This is impossible for us....[Howeverj, if
we promote friendly relations, one day Japan will prob-
ably expel Chiang's ambassador and conclude relations
with us." (Chen Yi statement to Japanese reporters on
28 October 1963)
The main devevelopment in early 1964--i.e., De
Gaulle's recognition of Peking--apparently convinced the
Chinese that Ikeda might be influenced by the pressure
of Japanese opinion to move toward recognition. Chou
tried to exploit De Gaulle's initiative and, apparently
with Mao's concurrence, removed purely doctrinal obstacles
from the road of recognition. A partial beginning had
been made in January, when the Peking Ta Kung Pao on the
28th had laid it down that "part of theThii-eafaialists"
in Japan could be included in the anti-U.S. united front.
Chou followed this up on 14 May when he told LDP members
that he no longer regarded Japanese businessmen as repre-
sentatives of "monopoly capital," that he welcomed their
visits, and that the Chinese had much to learn from them.
Chao An-po stated in late March, with sore exaggeration,
that the demand in Japan for formal relations "has been
growing in intensity...since France's establishment of
diplomatic ties with China." Chou and his aides tried
to convince the Japanese that his step-by-step formula
was not a dogma and that "courageous steps" (toward
recognition) should be taken. Nan Han-chen on 9 April
at first denied that Peking was pressing for an inter-
governmental trade agreement, but then declared that the
step-by-step trade expansion formula was too "time-con-
suming." Chen Yi on 7 May stated economic
and political relations should improve "at the same time,"
and on the 14th Nan made the point emphatic during a
-99-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
visit to Japan.* Chou on 16 May told
that
Even if there is an increase in the trade
volume, personnel travel, exchange of tech-
nical and cultural individuals, and good-
will,table tennis matches, the 'step-by-
step' formula w:.11 be meaningless unless
its quality is changed. I urge Japan to
change the quality of its policy and at
an opportune time, take a step forward.
The "step forward" implied recognition on the De Gaulle
precedent, but Chou did not want to be tied to an explicit
statement, to an appearance of pushing too hard and setting
a precondition for increased trade. He did not want to
jeopardize important advances just then in the making.
Chou and his aides in April had concluded two agree-
ments with Matsumura that represented a tactical gain.
These were for a mutual exchange of eight newspaper report-
ers and the opening of trade liaison offices staffed by
five men each, the Takasaki office in Peking and the Liao
office in Tokyo. The agreements were semi-governmental,
as the Japanese government had to approve them.
However, Chou rejected bids for postal, meteorological,
and telecommunication agreements because these would have
*Nan said that "The one step forward [in trade] and
two steps backward [in politics] is a formula that will
not work."
Chen Yi attacked the Japanese formula that "politics
and economics are separate." He said: "Quite frankly...
the meaning of the thesis...is that politically the atti-
tude of non-recognition of China should be maintained"
while limited progress continued in trade. He complained
that the Japanese were using the step-by-step formula to
maintain the "status quo" in Sino-Japanese political rela-
tions. (Interview with Japanese visitor of 7 May 1964)
-100-
SECRET
25X1
?
?
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
SFCR
required a direct exchange with the Japanese government
departments concerned (rather than mere governmental ap-
proval of non-governmental trade and news arrangementiT.
This exchange would have established a situation which
Tokyo preferred?i.e., acceptance of the Japanese concept
of "one China, one Taiwan." Chen Yi made the definitive
statement on this matter in an interview with Japanese
reporters on 7 May 1964:
[The Japanese government] should sincerely
settle the big problem of normalizing rela-
tions between China and Japan step by step.
As soon as diplomatic relations between the
two countries are resumed, other concrete
issues will easily be solved through friendly
negotiations. (emphasis supplied)
"Other concrete issues" referred to concluding government-
to-government agreements, settling the issue of war repara-
tions, and permitting the Japan Air Lines to operate across
the mainland. From Tokyo's viewpoint, these were not pr-xss-
ing matters, being only second in importance to trade and
to sustaining close relations with Washington and Taipei.
Short of formal government-to-government agree-
ments, Tokyo apparently was willing to consider contacts
between Chinese Communist and Japanese officials, On 14
May 1964, Chou had used LDP members to convey Peking's
interest in establishing such contacts. He suggested that
these might start in Hong Kong, informally (between NCNA
and Japanese consulate officials), or in Paris; later,
formal contacts in other countries could be started between
the Japanese and Chinese Communist ambassadors. Ikeda
apparently was interestcd, and on 26 June, he seems to
have tried to probe the U.S. attitude by having a Japanese
consulate official in Hong Kong inform U.S. personnel
there that Tokyo had decided to permit Japanese officials
to make contact with NCNA and Bank of China officers in
the British colony. But plans for sustaining these con-
tacts and expanding them in other countries were discarded
-101 -
SFC.12 FT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
 ?MI
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved foilefeases-2-012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
following Sato's accession to the premiership in November
and the development of the Maoist hard line against him.*
Before Sato took over, however, Chou tried to per-
suade Tokyo to avoid statements which he would be impelled
to rebut. During the mid-May 1964 discussions with LDP
members, one of Chou's aides, Chiao Kuan-hua, stressed
the Chinese permier's forbearance. Chiao, describing
himself as the anonymous author of some editorials in the
Peking People's Daily, recounted his editorial criticiz-
ing British Foreign Minister Butler for supporting the
concept of "self-determination" for Taiwan. In the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs draft of the editorial, he had also
severely attacked Premier Ikeda and Foreign Minister
Ohira for defending a similar concept, but "Premier Chou"
had deleted the attack.** Chou himself told the LDP
-102-
SECRET
25X1
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SEC.:KEY
25X1
?
?
?
visitors that Ikeda's 29 February 1964 statement in the
Diet (regarding the "undefined" status of Taiwan) had
aroused a "very strong reaction" in Peking, where a deci-
sion to lodge a formal protest with Tokyo had not yet
been reached. He implied that restraint was still the
dominant consideration of the Chinese leaders, but he
also indicated that Japanese officials should themselves
show forbearance in return. Chou said that Peking didn't
care about statements from jurists and journalists regard-
ing Taiwan, but those from government officials were
"most important," and he asked Matsumura to stress this
view to Ikeda. Although Mao had provided Chou with the
leeway necessary for maintaining dexterity in handling
policytoward Japan, Chou must have been aware that this
relative freedom was a transient matter, allowed to
endure only for so long as Mao saw it was creating re-
striint on Tokyo's side.*
Chou continued to absorb small insults and tried
to maintain his moderate course. He remained silent
about the visit on 13 August of an important Chinese
Nationalist official in Tokyo which coincided with the
arrival of the five Chinese Communist trade liaison per-
sonnel led by Sun Ping-hua to open the trade office. On
14 August he agreed to implement the Liao-Matsumura agree-
ment of April on exchanging newsmen, and on the 15th he
permitted Sun Ping-hua to hint about a higher-level visit
of Chinese Communist officials (including Liao Cheng-chih)
to Japan in the fall. On 17 October, one day after the
Japanese were angered by news of Peking's first atom bomb
test and shortly after JSP Secretary General Narita (visit-
ing Peking) had argued with Chang Hsi-jo about his (Narita's)
*Using his global concept of two intermediate zones
(see pages 72 and 74 ), Mao sustained the flexibility
Chou needed to advance his policy toward Japan. Mao
placed Japan in the second zone, together with other
capitalist countries (excluding the U.S.), and stated
that "I cannot believe at all that Japanese monopoly
capital would lean forever toward U.S. imperialism."
(Interview with Japanese Socialist on 10 July 1964)
-103-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
protest over the test, Chou tried to mollify the JSP
delegation and Japanese opinion-makers generally. He
told Narita that he "understands" their feelings but,
in view of the U.S. semi-circle around the mainland and
the missile base on Okinawa--a dig at the Japanese for
permitting it--he hoped Tokyo would "understand" Peking's
security requirements. Chou also stated that Sino-Jap-
anese friendship could not be advanced if the issues Of
Taiwan and Okinawa were left as they were, but his main
theme was the promotion of more contacts. On JSP initia-
tive, Chou permitted a comment on a non-aggression treaty
to appear in the joint statement concluded with the dele-
gation in order to give Narita something to cite as an
"achievement" when he returned to Japan.*
Mao himself, in the summer of 1964, had tried to
use contacts with the JSP to influence Japanese opinion,
not So much against the U.S. as against the USSR. Speaking
*The wording made formal recognition a pre-condition
for such a treaty: "The Chinese side also states that
under condition that both governments recognize each
other on the basis of equality as the only lawful govern-
ment of their respective countries and conclude a peace
treaty, the Chinese and Japanese governments could, if
the Japanese wished, at the same time conclude a treaty
of mutual nonaggression based on the Five Principles.
The Japanese side expressed heartfelt approval of this."
25X1
?
-104-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
SEGRE'l'
to anti-mainstream leader Sasaki on 10 July, Mao had tried
to make the Soviet leaders look like imperialist land
thieves, while he defended Japan's right to demand the
return of the Southern Kuriles. However, the accusation
backfired when the Japanese press interpreted it, correctly,
as an anti-Soviet ploy and a play for public opinion in
Japan. Chou had to bail out his principal, insisting,
in a conversation with a JSP Diet member on 19 July, that
the press had "erred" because as far back as January 1957,
Chou had told the Soviet leaders they had taken "too much
territory," and Mao's recent statement was not a new charge.*
His defense of Mao was undoubtedly viewed by the Titter
as yet another sign of Chou's loyalty.**
Mao and Chou looked for further advances with the
accession of Sato, who had previously established a reputa-
tion for desiring a policy toward Peking which was "inde-
pendent" of Washington's. By 9 November 1964, when Sato
took over from Ikeda, Chou's policy of suppleness and
maneuver had led to a high point of contact with Japan
and it was unprecedented in its moderation toward a coun-
try which did not recognize the Peking regime. Within
two weeks, however, Nao's reaction to Sato's unexpected
hard line cracked the fine glaze which Chou had been so
*The Soviets hammered hard at the Maoist hypocrisy un-
derlying the incident. They pointed out that the Chinese
themselves earlier had said, in a government statement on
15 August 1951, that "the Kurile Islands must be handed
over and the southern part of Sakhalin and all its adjacent
islands returned to the Soviet Union." (Cited in Pravda
on 2 September 1964)
-105 -
sF.r.R F.T
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release,2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
long in perfecting, it is not credible that Chou would
have marred his own handiwork if Mao had not directed him
to do so.
After having permitted Chou to tolerate small in-
sults from journalists in July and the JSP in October,
Mao apparently was not willing to have him tolerate major
rebukes from the Japanese government. In his view, that
was precisely what had been hurled at his regime in the
speeches of Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina to the Diet
on 21 November. These men made it clear that Tokyo would
maintain official diplomatic relations with Taipei while
trading only through private channels with Peking ("separat-
ing economic matters from politics"); they rejected the idea
of expelling the Chinese Nationalist representative from
the UN on the eve of the 1964 session, expressed regret
over Peking's first atom bomb test--a "poorly considered"
Chinese Communist action--"strongly demanded" that Peking'
should "refrain from conducting further tests and take
the initiative to accede to the partial nuclear test ban
speedily," and advocated the strengthening of ties with
the U.S. The new government, on the very same day, took
concrete action, denying entry to the CCP delegation led
by Peng Chen which was to attend the JCP's 9th Congress--
on the grounds that, once in Japan, it "would aggravate
the conflicts and strife in the country and would be
inimical to Japan's interests and security." And this
from Sato, a man who, earlier in November, the Chinese
Communist leaders believed would be as friendly as, or
even friendlier than, Ikeda had been.* Mao apparently
decided that careful cultivation of Japanese opinion would
*They had some hope that he would follow the example
of De Gaulle in recognizing the Peking regime. Liao
Cheng-chih had complained that information received from
an LDP official had led Chinese Communist Officials to
"look forward to the realization" of Sato becoming the
"De Gaulle of Japan," but that this had not occurred and
that the LDP official had "let us down." (Liao Cheng-
chih interview of 24 December 1965) Chen Yi indicated
that Sato had beeL the real source of Peking's miscalcula-
tion: "Before he became prime minister, Sato told Nan
Han-chen...that he would not separate economics from
politics, but as soon as he attained power, he did an
about-face. We do not like this." (Chen's statement to
LDP visitor on 6 September 1967 printed in Tokyo Yomiuri
of 7 September)
-106-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
have to take second place to a punitive attack against
Sato to teach him a lesson in servility. There was a
method in this Maoist plan, but madness was its over-ill
effect on Chou's policy.
Maoist shouting began in a Foreign Ministry state-
ment on 21 November 1964; it continued on the 23rd in a
People's Daily commentary which "warned" Sato against his
"perverte-r?iriti-Peking course; it was sustained on the
25th in a People's Daily Observer article which predicted
Japan's iriVOTWITat in a "nuclear holocaust" if it con-
tinued to allow the U.S. to "drag Japan further into its
nuclear strategic system." This threat was made roughly
one month after the Chinese Communists exploded their
first atom bomb and is an early instance of nuclear sabre-
rattling. Mao's new feeling of strength--i.e., that Peking
had become a nuclear power--may have intensified his re-
action to Sato's stand.
Psychological warfare was also started on the trade
front, where the Chinese Communists had a real capability
to act. They did not revert to the 1958 policy of com-
plete boycott, but rather maintained a policy of selective
delays in concluding contracts. On 27 November, Sun Ping-
hua, head of the Liao trade office in Tokyo, notified the
Takasaki office there that he had been instructed not to
sign the $80-million dollar fertilizer purchase contract
for 1965; a Chinese Communist official in the Liao office
"explained" that this was Peking's way of showing "disap-
proval" of Sato's overall policy of hostility toward China,
However, Chou again showed his dexterity, on the one hand
attacking Sato's policy as being "full of contradictions,"
while on the other hand reassuring Tokyo that the Liao-
Takasaki trade agreement (for the period 1963 to 1967)
would be fulfilled "without fail" (interview with Kyodo
correspondent in early December 1964). Chou and his aidesapparently were under new instructions (almost certainly
from Mao) to hit back at Sato's anti-China moves and state-
ments without permitting any one of them to pass unanswered.
This was Mao's "tit-for-tat struggle" concept, represent-
ing a shift from Chou's policy of not retaliating for every
insult. Despite Chou's maneuvering, the struggle concept
significantly hardened the line toward Japan.
-107-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
Working within the narrow confines of this line,
Chou and his aides tried to apply the pressure of Japanese
opinion on Sato to make him less outspoken in defending
U.S. policy on Taiwan and Vietnam. By 30 December, they
threatened a reduction of trade with Japan if Sato should
decide, after his visit to Washington, against government-
supported credit (through Export-Import Bank funds) for
three pending trade agreements. At the same time, they
rejected a meeting with Tokyo's Foreign Ministry China
Section chief because the Japanese government had refused
to allow a Japanese lawyer to defend Chinese Communist
officials under arrest in Brazilf
/ Chen "appreciated" the fact that Sato in
Washington had made no decision to align Japan with U.S.
nuclear strategy, to arm Japan with U.S. nuclear weapons,
or to make the security treaty a permanent pact--all mat-
ters of major concern for Peking. But Chen attacked Sato
for voting with the U.S. in the UN on the "important ques-
tion" issue; he attacked him on other grounds?i.e., for
reversing his earlier position on not separating trade
and politics as rigidly as Ikeda had done. This Chen
Yi attack was intended to have domestic repercussions in
Japan to the detriment of Sato's foreign policy, and a
People's Daily Observer article on 20 January 1965 stated
that his pro-U.S. course "will only increase dissatis-
faction among broad sections of the Japanese people."
Observer was wrong, as this crude cudgeling strategy in-
creased popular distaste for Peking's tactics.
The hardened line on Japan was implemented by Chen
Yi in an even cruder way during his 4 February interview
with Japanese members of the Takasaki trade office in Peking.
Sato's continued refusal to approve the use of government-
supported Export-Import Bank funds evoked even more Maoist
shouting in an unsuccessful attempt to scare him into a
backdown. Chen shouted in a "loud and aggressive tone"
-108-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
81-4:CR
that Sato
he was "afraid
acting in
(made in
government
25X1
because
and was
promise
give
to
was "much worse" than Ikeda, particularly
of displeasing Chiang Kai-shek"
compliance with the Yoshida Letter's
May 1964, pledging that Japan would not
credit to Peking to buy plants), refusing
sell Peking the second vinylon plant through loans ob-
tained from the Export-Import Bank. Chen made it clear
that obtaining loans from a private bank was not the real
issue (it was only "a small problem"); the political
?
point--that is, "whether or not Japan will allow Chiang
Kai-shek to be connected with Sino-Japanese relations"--
was the "highly important political problem." He warned 25X1
that there
could be no "real progress" in trade if Sato
still refused
government-sponsored credits,1
/ Peking did not buy the $30-million plant and
a clear defeat of its pressure tactics 25X1
had to accept
against the Yoshida Letter and Taipei influence in Tokyo.
-109-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
On balance, although political
?110?
SECRET
25X1
25X1
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-_RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
?
?
1-1.t tc ri
issues were increasingly tied to trade, Sino-Japanese com-
merical interchange continued to increase. In November
1965, Liao Cheng-chih told that trade would move
from $400 million in 1965 to $500 million in 1966.
As suggested earlier, Sino-Japanese relations,
which had been on a downward spiral since Sato took over
from Ikeda in November 1964, were worsened by Peking's
demand that he end his support for U.S. policy on Vietnam.
In September 1965, Chen raised the spectre of Japanese
collusion with other major powers in an attack on the
mainland:
We welcome U.S. imperialism to come and come
early; come with the Indian reactionary
nationalists, come with the British imperi-
alists, come with the Japanese militarists.
We are certain to win even if the modern
revisionist leadership in the north combines
with them....China is a large country; even
if the U.S. and its lackeys send several mil-
lion troops to the China mainland, it will
not be enough. (Chen Yi Press Conference
of 29 September 1965)
By casting the Japanese in the light of something more
than political opponents, Chen apparently tried to stimulate
more anti-Sato opinion in Japan than had yet arisen and
to warn implicitly against Diet ratification of the Japan-
ROK treaty. He failed on both scores, and when the Lower
House ratified the treaty in November, Peking depicted
it as part of the military alliance allegedly under con-
struction by the U.S. to serve as the instrument for a
major war in Asia which would include an attack against
China. (People's Daily editorial of 15 November 1965;
the editorial used-ririivage from Chen's press conference
of 29 September to reiterate the hypothetical prospect
of Japanese participation in an attack on the mainland.)
Kuo Mo-jo tried to conceal this policy defeat on the
Japan-ROK treaty by devising a weak rationalization: the
U.S. "had to step up its collusion" with "reactionary
forces" in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan because it was
in trouble in Vietnam (speech of 19 November).
-111-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
The new style in policy toward Japan which gradually
replaced Chou's step-by-step approach had appeared in late
November 1964 and, increasingly thereafter, Chinese Com-
munist statements appeared to be little more than simple
ultimatums. That is, Sato was instructed
either to comply on a large range of issues
or Peking would attack his administration as being incap-
able of promoting Sino-Japanese contacts (Liao Cheng-chih
interview of 30 August 1965), Ambassadorial-level talks
between Japanese and Chinese Communist officials were un-
acceptable until Tokyo agreed to discuss "all" matters
at issue the ke one a arently being support of Washing-
ton
* Acting on this line, Chinese Communist
officials were said to be taking an increasingly rigid
attitude in refusing to develop contacts with Japanese
embassy personnel in Switzerland/
Mao seems to have insisted \ Ithat relations
with Tokyo would develop rapidly and in an anti-American
direction, or not at all, The Chinese Communists made
no effort, as Chou had made earlier, to cover up the un-
compromising aspect of this policy, and a take-it-or-
leave-it attitude pervaded their statements.
Developments in the Vietnam war and Mao's apprehen-
sion that it might escalate eventually to the mainland
impelled him to take a harder line to mobilize all possi-
ble international forces against the U.S. and its allies.
-112-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
?
?
SEUREI
By the fall of 1965, Mao
tried to put a more militant spirit into policy toward
Japan. For example, increasingly obsessed with the
radical political potential of young people, he stressed
the "important role" which Japanese youth must play in
the "harsh and tense" situation (interview with Japanese
delegation leaders on 25 November 1965).** Other lead-
ers, including Liu Shao.-chi, Chou En-lai and Peng Chen,
outlined a four-point action program for the visitors:
they were asked to strengthen (1) contacts between the
youth of Japan and the mainland, (2) the "common struggle"
25X1
25X1
**Peng Chen apparently had had a major role in imple-
menting the Youth Exchange Program with the JCP and other
Japanese leftists. On 14 'June 1966, as CCP-JCP relations
deteriorated and after Peng Chen had been purged, the
head of the jCP's cultural department suggested to other
leaders that youths "who feel greatly indebted to Peng
Chen for his assistance during their visits to China"
under the program should not be retained in the Sino-
Japanese Friendship Association.
Peng was later blamed for taking a moderate line; in
fact, he was no more moderate than Chou. On 9 September
1966, a newspaper of the Mao Tse-tung Red Guards of People's
University made an "Urgent Proposal for the China-Japan
Youth Interchange Program," demanding that it should be
warlike--unlike the first interchange program which had
been "peacefully conducted by the former Peking Municipal
Committee." Among the Red Guard proposals were; instill
people's war theory in the minds of Japanese youth, train
them to participate in revolution, and require daily study
of Japanese editions of Mao's works.
-113-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
against the U.S., 0) the effort to establish diplomatic
relations with Peking, and support for Hanoi in the
war. On 12 December, Liao Cheng-chih spoke to the dele-
gations in Shanghai on the need to struggle against U.S.
policy in Japan by forming a "people's front", of which
the delegations were said to be a symbol.
jOn 24
November, an NCNA official in Tokyo was quoted as saying
that the Chinese Communists believed the .JCP was shifting
away from its "full support" of Peking's positions and
that clear signs of JCP-CCP differences would emerge with-
in six months. The same official was quoted as pointing
to the jCP's relative passivity in creating opposition
to the japan-ROK treaty and its failure to incite violent
political action against it as a clear example of the JCP's
reject4.on of CCP advice.,
Sato,
Sato, however, was still their main target and they
suggested that his support of escalation in Vietnam might
lead to a China-U.S, war and then a Sino-Japanese war.*
*This line did na?Nurt Sato politically as much as it
helped him to argue for greater recognition of the Chinese
Communist potential nuclear threat. His statement to the
Diet in late November 1965 reflected his desire to tighten
Tokyo's control over shipments to the mainland of goods
on the COCOM list which were useful for Peking's nuclear
weapons program. He said that Pe:ing "is a threat with-
out being armed with nuclear weapons. This threat to
Japan is real, now that China is a nuclear power." It
also helped him in gaining ratification in November of
the Japan-ROK treaty on the argument that Japan needed
alliances directed toward increased security.
-114-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
?
25X1
?
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
Sato, however, was not impelled to criticize U.S.
policy in Vietnam. Moreover, he prepared to impose more
stringent measures to proclude violations of COCOM re-
strictions on shipments of strategic goods, especially
Missile guidance systems equipment, to the mainland.
These Chinese Communist threats, taken together with
Ambassador Reischauer'e suggestions in January 1966 and
representations made to the Japanese in Washington one
year earlier, may have convinced Sato of the need for a
harder attitude toward COCOM violations. Nevertheless,
liaTi-policy of attacking Sato on Vietnam was sustained.
-115-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
His propagandists apparently were directed to
publicize threats implying the use of nuclears:
U.S. nuclear protection cannot protect
Japan. Quite the contrary, when U.S. im-
perialism launches a war in Asia, Japan
will be involved in it, whether or not it
wants to be, and will bring upon itself
grave consequences. (People's Daily Com-
mentator article of 15 March l97
Althoughthis article tried to qualify the threat
by discussing the defensive nature of Peking's nuclear
capability and the Chinese Communist adherence to the
doctrine of non-first use, by raising the issue to a Jap-
anese public, Mao was running the risk of creating the
opposite effect namely, Japanese criticism of A-bomb rat.,
tling. But that risk was disregarded, and on 11 August
1966 Chen Yi used visiting JSP members to convey the
following threat: Peking will support the Vietnamese at
all costs, even if this results in a conflict with the
U.S., in which event all parts of Asia where the U.S.
maintains military bases would be drawn in "and this in-
Chen stated that U.S. bases in
Japan will become targets of military operations if war
breaks out, and Peking will "dispatch military forces to
Japan to assist the Japanese people to rid themselves
of the American aggressors." The dispatch of PLA troops
to Japan is even more unreal and demagogic in substance
than the implied threat to use Chinese Communist nuclears,
suggesting that the Chinese leaders believed they could
*Regarding the danger to Japan if it were to act uni-
laterally to become involved in Vietnam, Chen later threat-
ened that "Under present conditions, if Japan involves
itself in the war, it will benefit the U.S. and not Japan,
and Japan will be hit hard." (Statement made on 7 July
1967 to visiting LDP Diet member Toluma Utsunomiya printed
in Tokyo Yomiuri of 8 July 1967)
-116 -
SF.CR FT
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
?
?
frighten Japanese opinion-makers without establishing
credibility for their threats. Even though opinion-
makers had no reason to believe the threat, it may have
been intended for use as political pressure on Sato from
popular opinion which was more susceptible to ludicrous
Chinese threats.
25X1
Unrealistic statements outlining a wild program
of armed struggle were made to the Japanese Communists
at about the same time these crude threats were being
made against the government. CCP leaders, including Liu
Shao-chi,L insisted to Miyamoto in 25X1
March 1966 that he must prepare the JCP for "armed strug-
gle" to oppose the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security
Treaty in 1970 because the U.S. was preparing for an
eventual attack on China. This apparently was Mao's
egregious way of dictating a new line to the JCP which
would have the main element of the Chinese model in it.
This new line was to replace the line of "peaceful tran-
sition" and was to be imposed regardless of political
realities in Japan. U.S. bases were to be the targets.
the
Chinese leaders told Miyamoto that he should be prepar-
ing the party to wage "guerrilla warfare against American
military bases in Japan" and should "reconsider"--i.e.,
abandon--the concept of peaceful transition to socialism
as defined in the JCP's program.
j*
*JO, Secretary General Miyamoto confirmed this later
as the CCP position as conveyed to him in Peking in March
1966: "China's view was that preparations are necessary
for the outbreak of a Sino-U.S, war--a third world war.
Imperialism's war strength can be diverted more effectively
by tens of thousands of people armed with weapons than
by one million party members or mass movements. In other
words, they did not say that Japan should immediately launch
an armed uprising." (Interview published in Tokyo Akahata
on 28 July 1967) (emphasis supplied)
-117-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
Akahata on 13 February 1967 complained that pro-CCP
"flunkeys" had always been calling for violent revolution,
drawing on the documents of "a certain party," but were
"now openly stating that under the present circumstances
Japan must have a people's war or armed struggle."
Once again, a hard and unrealistic line had been
introduced into Sino-Japanese relations which seems to
have gone beyond anything which Chou En-lai would have
permitted on his own initiative.*
A new area of concern developed with the rise of
a friendly atmosphere between Tokyo and Moscow on Soviet
initiative in early 1966, the Russian intention having
been to cultivate Japan as a counterforce to Peking in
Asia. The Soviets became less anxious than previously
to weaken the strength which Japan draws from its security
relationships with the U.S. and during Foreign Minister
*Although Liu Sh1B=Fhi is now depicted as the man who
desired a reduction of Peking's support to foreign revolu-
tionaries, Liu in fact appears to have been as directly
involved as Chou in trying to induce the Japanese Commun-
ists to act in a revolutionary way and to accept Mao's
course of "armed struggle."
-118-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SEC RE!'
?
?
Shiina's visit to Moscow in January 1966, Gromyko toned
down his statements on the Ua and declared that the USSR
does not wish to harm Japanese relations with "third coun-
tries". The Maoist response--to clear signs that the CCP
dispute with the CPSU leaders was having a softening ef-
fect on Tokyo-Moscow relations--was to attack both govern-
ments openly; Japan is "following the U.S. and is aligning
itself with the USSR to oppose China" and Moscow wants
to "collude" with Tokyo because the Russians oppose Peking
(People's Daily Observer article of 4 February 1966).
This stritegy of cudgeling Tokyo deterred neither the
Soviet leaders nor Sato from signing a five-year trade
agreement; the Soviets were encouraged by these Maoist
complaints, and later made concessions in the talks on
fishing matters (in April 1967).
Mao had no real leverage on Sato, who still separ-
ated trade from politics. Vituperation did not prevent
Sato from refusing (on 29 March 1966) to permit the Chinese
to send a delegation, prospectively to have been led by
Liao Cheng-chih, to hold discussions with Sasaki and other
JSP officials. The grounds for refusal were that previous
attacks by Peking's officials in Japan had constituted
interference in domestic affairs. Peking reacted with
a threat--Sato will "push the Japanese nation again into
the abyss of disaster" (People's Daily Commentator article
of 5 April 1966), and with the cancellation of some visas
for Japanese travel to the mainland. If Mao could see
that he was helping Sato, he did not care.F
25X1
25X1
Peking's
third nuclear explosion (on 9 May 1966) enabled the govern-
ment and press to play up the potential threat to Japan
of a nuclear China.
The Sato government was alert, however, to Peking's
failure to reduce or stop Japan-China trade and tried to
avoid the impression that Japan was an important link in
a containment policy against the mainland. The Chinese
-119-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
indicated that they had not barred the door.
The hard political line was not duplicated in the field
of trade, and, despite the overt Peking position that
politics and trade are inseparable, the Chinese Communists
in fact kept them separate in most of 1966.
The Maoist purge and the hard line toward Sato did
not result in a reduction of trade in 1966.* The Chinese
were deliberate in assuring the Japanese that this would
not occur. Sun Ping-hua, head of the Liao trade office
in Tokyo, was quoted in September 1966 as pledging that
the total amount of transactions between Japan and the
mainland at the Canton fair would be "double" the highest
previous figure. At the preliminary Liao-Takasaki trade
talks in mid-September, the Chinese agreed to pay cash
for purchases instead of using the deferred payment system,
and the ac uiesced in most other Japanese proposals.
the U.S. embassy in Tokyo in October esti-
mated that the 300-350 "friendly firms" accounted for 60
to 65 percent of the total trade. The Chinese on 21 Nov-
ember signed the final agreement on the level of trade
under the fifth and final year of the Liao-Takasaki agree-
ment; they did not stall or try tc disrupt the negotiations.
The Yoshida Letter issue has also been shelved, and the
*In 1967, however, the Japanese became increasingly
pessimistic about the future of Sino-Japanese trade which,
in the first six months of the year, was about 13 percent
below that of the same period in 1966.
-120-
SECRFT
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIATRDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
4
?
25X1
Chinese have not used it as a pretext to curtail trade.
Chou told LDP members on 12 September 1966 that although
restoration ef diplomatic relations was "an important
problem," the interchange of people and trade at present
was "even more important," inasmuch as it is obvious that
diplomatic relations "cannot be restored in a short time."
Mao's purge and his ubiquitous demand that revolu-
tionary attitudes must prevail in all aspects of Chinese
CommuniSt activity, however, eliminated a different part
of Chou En-lai's differentiated policy, namely, the part
in which Peking professed non-interference in Japan-U.S.
relations. As late as December 1966, Chen Yi was still
permitted to profess(
25X1
that Peking had no desire to inter-
fere with these relations. But by 27 February 1967, the
linc had been shifted, apparently after the Chinese Foreign
Ministry and its officials had been opened up to criticism
by Maoist Red Guards. On that day, during the signing
of the protocol on "friendly" trade, Liao Cheng-chih, who
had been subjected to Red Guard criticism sessions in
January, urged the Japanese "friendly" trade negotiators
"to struggle against Washington, Moscow, the Sato-Kishi-
Kaya government, and traitors in Yoyegi [JCP leadership
headquarters]."* This formulation reflected the shift
*The protocol replaced the private trade agreement for
the promotion of "friendly" trade signed on 15 December
1962 between representatives of the Japan-China Trade Pro-
motion Association and the China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade. It reflected the hard line: by
contrast with the 1962 agreement, it was highly polemical
and contained sycophantic praise for Mao's purge and
"thought," it committed the newly-favored Japan Interna-
tional Trade Promotion Association (purged of pro-JCP
elements) to struggle against "U.S. imperialism, Japanese
reactionism, and Soviet revisionism," and it stated Mao's
policy to "eradicate" the "evil influence" of the JCP from
Japanese-Chinese trade. The comparatively non-polemical
1962 agreement had been arranged and signed by Nan Han-chen.
-121-
S1CRRT 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
'cr. I
to a more black-and-white differentiation of enemies (the
Sato government must be struggled against rather than
cultivated by a step-by-step approach) and a greater desire
to put them all in the same camp, the black camp of im-
perialism and revisionsm, which were equally pejorative
terms in. Mao's vocabulary. Mao had more enemies, to fight
in Japan than ever before--the result of an uncompromis-
ing.nnti-American, anti-Soviet line and of a demanding
temper. But Mao apparently does not pay for his unful-
filled hopes, by any proportionate depression of spirit
and seems to have an ability to fly over a present policy
setback by beginning to hope for a new kind of future.
Mao's new future required new men (or remade old
ones). His purge extended into the group responsible for
implementing the step-by-step policy. Several men, includ-
ing Nan Han-chen, chairman of the Chinese Committee for
the Promotion of International Trade, fell from favor AR4
were no longer seen by Japanese who negotiated with the
Committee.*
*Nan Han-chen had to accept the benefits of Maoist mental
therapy--i.e., Mao's version of the Bolshevik practice
of subjecting scapegoats to "criticism and self-criticism."
Since January 1967, Liao Cheng-chih, another scapegoat,
has had to accept a major part of the blame for the earlier
Japan policy, but Chinese officials in the Liao trade of-
fice in Tokyo reassured anxious Japanese trade negotiators
that criticism of Liao was different from that of men as-
sociated organizationally with Liu Shao-chi and that Liao
would "pass the test" of loyalty to Mao. Chen Yi, too,
has been subjected to the process of accepting blame for
Mao's and Chou's earlier policies. He and Liao probably
will continue to be subjected to a protracted routine of
psychological abasement, but they probably will not be
purged. . ?
Red Guard persecution of Liao provides a revealing
example of Mao's use of the scapegoat procedure. Liao
has had to take the blame for the formulation of policy
which was not his main job in dealing with Japanese, namely,
(footnote continued on page 123)
-132-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SIi(It 1-1" 1 '
Liao's
27 February
The Japanese
the Foreign
tressed"
25X1
of
and
be "dis-
attack on the JCP at the trade session
took the Japanese delegation by surprise.
Ministry of International Trade (MITI)
Ministry were soon afterward said to
over the vituperation in the protocol which
stated that the U.S. is the "common enemy" of the people
of the world (this had been an earlier formulation which
the Chinese had solicited from former JSP leader Asanuma
at political meetings in Peking, but which had been
kept
out of trade matters) and referred to the U.S. as
"gang-
sters." This was embarrassing to men in Japan who hoped
for expanded Sino-Japanese contacts, and most of the Jap-
?
anese press did not report on this anti-American aspect
of the protocol. The Japanese government and businessmen
were further distressed by the political activity of Sun
Ping-hua, chief of the Liao trade office in Tokyo, who
was obviously instructed from Peking to attack the JCP
for provoking a fight between 20 Chinese students and
members of the pro-JCP Sino-Japanese Friendship Associa-
tion on 2 and 3 March. On 6 March, Sun made a public
statement of political protest, declaring that the "Jap-
anese revisionists" were Soviet "pawns" and "betrayers"
of the international Communist movement, and, shifting
to an attack on the police for inaction, he concluded
with a "demand" that the government immediately punish
the pro-JCP group. On the previous day, Sun, apparently
acting on an instruction from Peking to take a hard revo-
lutionary line, told a meeting of "friendly" firm repre-
sentatives of the pro-Peking Japan International Trade
Promotion Association (JITPA) that all future business
with the mainland would depend on their willingness to
comply with Peking's policy on the JCP.* After this warning,
(foOtnote continued from page 122)
responsibility for failing to assess correctly the anti-
Peking course of the JCP, Other Chinese Communist offi-
cials (including Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen, and Chou En-
lai) were directly involved in assessing the attitudes
of JCP leaders, but Liao is the main target of Red Guard
criticism.
*Mao personally sanctioned JITPA and praised its director
on 4 October 1967.
-123-
SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SECRET
the jITPA called for a revolutionary "struggle against
revisionism"--a campaign to begin on 2 April led by
"friendly" firms at the hall where the fight had taken
place. Sun was recalled to Peking in mid-April, and his
last major act before that time was to demand that photos
of the struggle meeting at the hall should be sent to
Peking (for fuel in the fight against the JCP and to ap-
ply pressure on the government to punish the men who had
attacked the Chinese students).* (The students had placed
anti-JCP slogans on their dormitory walls, virtually in-
viting retaliation.) On 6 March, Liao Cheng-chih said
that Sato's failure to protect the students WdS another
sign of hostility and that he might reduce the activities
of the trade office in Peking or recall senior Chinese
trade representatives from Tokyo. Actually, he did not
act on this threat and trade was sustained.
The new Maoist revolutionary approach to influenc-
ing opinion in Japan required a drastic reconstruction
of the CCP's basis of support and a major effort to replace
JCP influence in Japan's contacts with the mainland. Once
again, the chief "trade" official engaged in political
organizational activity. On 23 March, Sun Ping-hua pre-
sided at the founding meeting of ,the China News Agency
(CNA)--a replacement for the JCP-controlled Asian News
Service--charged with the job of relaying NCNA stories
and photographs to Japanese audiences. Sun said that the
CNA would "disseminate the great thought of Yao Tse-tung,
explain China's socialist revolution and socialist con-
struction, and promote the solidarity and friendship of
the Chinese and Japanese people". (
-124-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
25X1
By 11 April, Chinese-influenced -rganizations were defend-
ing Mao's claims to world revolutionary leadership offer-
ing a distorted version of his purge, and praising the
new-born charisma of Lin Piao while attacking the CPSO
and the JCP by name (joint statement issued by the Inter-
national Trade Promotion Association of Western Japan
and the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade on 11 April 1967). Liao and officials of Peking's
Ministry of Foreign Trade were at the signing ceremony,
and the joint statement clearly indicated that the new
requirement for "friendly"firms seeking trade was more
open and explicit support of Mao's political attacks on
-125-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1
a wide range of enemies. On 18 April, Sun Ping-hua's
deputy in Tokyo demanded that leading members of the
Tokyo Overseas Chinese Association should make plans for
the possible withdrawal of the Chinese Communist trade
office from Japan in 1970 so that they too could with-
draw This demand may have reflected Mao's desire to
create the impression that Sino-Japanese trade contacts
would deteriorate if the Japan-U.S. security treaty was
to be kept intact in 1970. The inference was: Overseas
Chinese in Japan must begin immediately to prepare an
effective organization to act as a "stay-behind" asset
to support Peking. The real intention seems to have been
to attain immediat support from the Overseas Chinese com-
munity for closer supervision from Peking, to remove
Chinese Nationalist influence, and to generate support
for Mao, "love of Mao Tse-tung" having been newly stipu-
lated as one of the fundamental principles to guide the
thoughts of Chinese in Japano*
When, on 15 May, an official of Peking's Ministry
of Foreign Trade attacked Sato's "new reactionary policy"
(i.e? the banning, under COCOM restrictions, of 17 items
of scientific equipment from display at the prospective
Tientsin exhibition), representatives of "friendly" firms
*Closer supervisiiiii?was indicated in statements made
by two Chinese officials at the mid-July 1967 discussion
meetings of the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Association who
declared that Overseas Chinese would be mobilized to sup-
port various kinds of Peking's activities in Japan. The
center of these activities was said to be the Liao-Takasaki
office building which would serve as a "quasi-official
embassy" housing trade officials, an Overseas Chinese work
unit, and NCNA personnel. Indoctrination of businessmen
who were to visit the mainland apparently is one of the
work 'nit's functions, and in late August 1967, the Liao-
Takasaki office used the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Associa-
tion to send out requests to firms expecting to attend
the Canton trade fair in the fall, instructing them to
send their representatives to preparatory "study sessions."
-126-
SECRET
?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
4
Sift: 1.4 I
responded. They held a denunciatory meeting in Tokyo,
put forward "demands" that Sato lift the ban and rescind
all other COCOM restrictions, and sent a five-man dele-
gation to protest to the Minister of International Trade
and Industry, Wataro Kanno. Their activities gained them
only a strong rebuff from Kanno, and Peking was left to
lament that Sato, after all these years, "still sticks"
to the COCOM regulations--an indirect admission of a major
defeat for one aspect of Mao's policy toward Japan. (NCNA
dispatch of 31 May 1967)
Even in its moderate stages, Mao's policy toward
Japan has been a failure. Tokyo continues to maintain
close ties with the U.S. and Taiwan and has refused to
recognize the Peking regime. The small successes in
changing Japanese attitudes, attained by the flexible
approach of Chou En-lai, have not been expanded into any
major victory. More importantly, Mao undoubtedly is aware
of the basic failure and may now believe (more than Chou
believes) that there is nothing to lose in advancing the
new revolutionary line. But the effect of this new line
and the impact in Japan of news of his purge have been
making it easy for Tokyo to resist pressures for a con-
ciliatory line toward China. A Japanese Foreign Ministry
spokesman stated on 22 September 1966 that the Red Guard
movement "has had a most deep and profound effect on the
Japanese people, particularly the intellectuals, and it
has caused them to observe China in a different light."
Chou almost certainly has informed Mao that Japanese good-
will is being rapidly dissipated, and Chou has probably
been the leader who encouraged Chen Yl to try to reassure
Japanese visitors that there was nothing abominable in
Red Guard abominations? But such efforts have had no ef-
fect, and the change to a criticial attitude toward Peking
in the Japanese press, among intellectuals and leftists,
and in parts of the business community has produced :or
Tokyo's Foreign Mtnistry what one official described (to
a U.S. embassy officer in August 1967) as "the easiest
period in many years on the China question."
The drastic shift away from a step-by-step approach
(i.e., exploiting contacts with the JCP and various poli-
tical and economic interest groups, including conservative
-127-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
bt,UK14,1
25X1
"big capitalists") to a more revolutionary struggle line
against Tokyo (i.e., exploiting aggressive pro-Peking
leftists and mobilizing Overseas Chinese) required a
defense of Mao for previously having sanctioned the gra-
dual approach and alliance with tha jCP. The main part
of this defense required the use of Mao's scapegoat pro-
cedure, which had been employed by the Chinese leader for
many years after he had acquired it from observing Stalin's
practice.
The scapegoat procedure required (1) suppression
or distortion of Mao's own earlier sanction for the policy
and (2) attribution of the discarded policy to junior
foreign policy officials whose lower position in the lead-
ership hierarchy made them vulnerable to the distorted
charges. Regarding (1), although the record indicates
that Mao personally included the "monopoly capitalists"
in the gradual effort to pressure Tokyo toward recognition,
Peking now avoids all mention of the fact, Regarding (2),
a Red Guard newspaper on 18 June 1967 attacked Liao Cheng-
chih--a japan specialist, a subordinate of Chou En-lai,
and the Deputy Director of Chou's State Council Foreign
Affairs Office--for formulating the line which Mao himself
had formulated (i.e., that "we must also work on the mono-
poly capitalists"). In addition to clearing Mao's name
by this scapegoat procedure, Chou has used it in an ef-
fort to clear his own record, inasmuch as he has been the
most active "rightist" (i.e., rational mind) in Japan
policy. Chou has continued to be the dominant figure in
policy toward Japan/
But Chou must now work in the narrowest political
framework ever in policy toward Tokyo, especially at a
time when Mao is training "red diplomatic fighters" who
will "never praise the bourgeoisie in an unprincipled way
or curry favor with them" (People's Daily editorial of
28 June 1967). Because most Japanese faders, intellectuals,
and businessmen are now undifferentiated members of "the
bourgeoisie," the prospect is that his policy of reducing
the categories of acceptable allies will further erode
-128-
SECRET
?
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
SEURE1'
pro-Peking sentiment in that country. Trade and non-offi-
cial contacts will take place against the backdrop of
political hostility, and the effort to attain formal
diplomatic relations will be further impeded.
-129-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010025-9
25X1