SWEDEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001600080001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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%,vri ny.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
SECRET JOIN1 INIELLPIENCE GROUE,JOIN1 STAFF
SWEDEN
SR-7
Published 6 April 1949 - r
Date:
Oz,.>
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further
dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
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the Department of State
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c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-
mission
f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
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DISTRIBUTION:
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Research and Development Board
Document No.
5
NO CHANGE inrl
Class.DECLASSIF7ED
LJ
SS. CTi:TCED TO:
TS S C
DDA 4 Apr 77
Aut. PDA 17,17G. 77 1763
Date: By:
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Published April 1949 SECRET
SR-7
SWEDEN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
CHAPTER I ? POLITICAL SITUATION
1. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM 3
2. PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS, AND OPERATIONS 5
a. The Riksdag 5
b. The Cabinet 6
c. The Administration 7
d. Judiciary 7
e. Local Government 8
f. The Electorate and the Press 8
3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND ISSUES 9
a. Social Democratic Party 10
b. Liberal (People's) Party 11
c. Agrarian Party 12
d. Conservative Party 13
e. Communist Party 13
4. STABILITY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION 14
CHAPTER II? ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. GENERAL SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT ECONOMIC
SITUATION 15
2. PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION 17-
a. Natural Resources 17
(1) Agriculture 17
(2) Fishing 20
(3) Forests 21
(4) Water Power 22
(5) Iron Ore 23
(6) Other Minerals 23
(7) Coal 24
(8) Shale Oil 26
(9) Uranium 26
b. Industry 26
(1) General 26
(2) Forest Products 27
(3) Iron and Steel 30
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(4) Machinery 34
(5) Shipbuilding 35
(6) Textiles 36
(7) Munitions 38
(8) Chemicals 39
c. Money, Banking, and Government Finance 40
d. Foreign Trade 42
e. Consumers' Cooperatives 49
3. ECONOMIC STABILITY 50
CHAPTER III ? FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. GENESIS OF PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY 51
2. POST WORLD WAR II FOREIGN POLICY 52
3. SIGNIFICANT RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS 53
a. Germany 53
b. Soviet Union 53
c. United States 54
d. United Kingdom 54
e. Norway and Denmark 54
4. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 55
a. United Nations 55
b. European Recovery Plan 56
CHAPTER IV ? MILITARY SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF MILITARY POLICIES 57
2. WAR POTENTIAL 57
a. Manpower 57
b. Natural Resources and Industrial Potential 58
c. Scientific 59
3. BASIC POLICIES AND PRACTICES 60
a. Mission and Strategy of the Armed Forces 60
b. Favored Arms and Techniques 61
c. Military Organization and Duties 61
(1) Military High Command 61
(2) Army 62
(3) Navy 62
(4) Air Force 62
d. Recruitment 63
e. Training 63
(1) Pre-Induction 63
(2) Army 63
(3) Navy 64
(4) Coast Artillery 65
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(5) Air Force 65
4. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES 66
a. General
66
b. Army
66
c. Navy
67
d. Coast Artillery
68
e. Air Force
68
f. Quasi-Military Organizations
69
(1) Home Guard
69
(2) Shooting Association
69
(3) Voluntary Motorcycle Corps
70
(4) Miscellaneous Quasi-Military Organizations
70
(5) Women's Corps (Lottakar)
70
5. ESTIMATE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY
70
CHAPTER V ? STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY .
71
CHAPTER VI? PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US
SECURITY
'73
APPENDIX A ? Topography ? Climate
74
APPENDIX B ? Communications
77
APPENDIX C ? Population Statistics and Characteristics
81
APPENDIX D? Science in Sweden
85
APPENDIX E ? Biographical Section
97
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? SUMMARY
Sweden lies on the direct air routes from the Western Hemisphere to the USSR,
nearer to vital Soviet centers than any other western nation which still retains freedom
of action. The Swedish people are intelligent, industrious, and staunchly democratic.
Their government, friendly to the West, is liberal and stable. The armed forces are
small but competent, and the country has an essentially healthy economy. For these
reasons Sweden is potentially a valuable ally to the United States, and its affairs are
important though not vital to US security.
The Swedes have succeeded since Napoleonic times in keeping out of wars, and
the basis of their present foreign policy is a determination to continue, if possible, to
do so. Traditionally they fear Russia, and ideologically they hate totalitarianism.
Nevertheless, the Swedish Government has steadfastly refused to identify itself with
any concerted western resistance to Soviet policy lest such an alignment provoke Soviet
resentment and imperil Swedish "neutrality." Even more emphatically, the govern-
ment has made plain its determination neither to enter into any western military
alliance nor to engage in prior military planning with any great power. It has earn-
estly endeavored to persuade its Scandinavian neighbors, Norway and Denmark, not
to give ear to the counsels of the West but to join Sweden in a military defense pact
strictly dedicated to neutrality unless attacked. Neither Norway nor Denmark appears
to believe that Scandinavian neutrality has the slightest chance of being respected in
a future war, and both countries are therefore likely to leave Sweden to its own devices
and join an Atlantic Pact if invited to do so. There is little to indicate that even this
development will cause Sweden to change its policy, though isolation will not be wel-
come, and influential Opposition newspapers already urge that the government forsake
a course which they call unrealistic. Swedish military opinion appears to be generally
in agreement with this Opposition view, but the government and the great majority of
the population remain unconvinced. It follows that, although no one doubts the
democratic sympathies of the Swedes, their full political weight is not thrown into the
"cold war" on either side. This official and popular neutrality is not attributable to
dislike for the United States, nor certainly to any lack of constancy in democratic con-
victions. It stems rather from the peaceful tradition of nearly a century and a half,
and from a belief that the chance of remaining unmolested in a future war, however
slim, is yet greater than the hope of preventing war through a common front of the
democratic powers.
Sweden is highly industrialized and yet produces some 90 percent of its own food
requirements. The principal natural resources are comprised in the forests and in
what is probably the world's largest reserve of high-grade magnetite iron ore. Before
1945 almost 90 percent of the ore annually mined was exported, mostly to Germany,
and it formed an important strategic raw material for the Nazis. Shortages of coal and
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report. The information herein is as of 1 January 1949.
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oil limit the scope of Sweden's own industrial expansion, but an abundance of hydro-
electric power partially compensates for the lack of fuels. Swedish labor is highly
skilled, well disciplined, and loyal; Communists are active but their effective influence
is negligible. Airplanes, ships, ordnance, machine tools, and ball-bearings are the
Swedish industrial products of most obvious strategic interest, but none of them can
be manufactured in quantity without imported fuel and supplementary raw materials.
Although Sweden's raw and manufactured products would certainly be useful to the
United States in time of war, the denial of them would not be seriously embarrassing.
The Swedish people are accustomed to a high standard of living and have con-
trived to maintain it even while much of the rest of the world was undergoing economic
depression and war. Their success in this respect has been due partly to the natural
advantages of the country and partly to the enlightened economic policies of the gov-
ernment, which managed to avert the worst manifestations of the trade cycle and
maintained at the same time a system of social legislation widely acclaimed as a model
for the western world. Since the war, however, fortune has begun to frown on the
Swedish economy. It now suffers from the universal afflictions of domestic inflation
and a dollar shortage, and the government is proposing to remedy this condition by a
program which, though far from austerity as measured by British standards, will never-
theless tend to diminish the amenities of Swedish existence. Imports will be cut and
exports increased, capital investment more closely regulated, wages frozen, and taxa-
tion held high enough to insure a budget surplus. Sweden now receives a modest
share of ERP funds, though the government in ratifying the necessary agreements had
to swallow some anxieties as to the political implications which they might contain for
the cherished status of neutrality in the East-West conflict. Thanks to the aid thus
received and to the essentially healthy condition of Swedish economy and morale, it is
believed that the austerities of the economic program will not have to be extended to
lengths which would cause any appreciable public discontent or political instability.
The Swedes believe in guarding their neutrality with the strongest armed forces
feasible for a country possessing limited population and wealth. They have therefore
maintained small but well-balanced forces under a unified command, backed by nu-
merous reserves, and supplied by a workable economic organization. The equipment
of the forces is not entirely up to date; the country's economy is not self-sufficient, and
the national policy has confined the doctrine of the services to one of defense only.
Because of the exhaustion of other countries, however, Sweden now possesses probably
the strongest armed forces in Europe save for those of the USSR, the UK, and perhaps
France. They are the mainstay not only of Sweden's own defense, but of that of all
Scandinavia. The Swedes would like to get further military supplies from the United
States, but up to the present have been quite unwilling to reciprocate by any firm
commitment to use such supplies on behalf of a Western democratic alliance. If war
breaks out, the Soviets will possibly invade Sweden, their most important strategic
objectives being to deny the Scandinavian peninsula to the Western Powers and to
obtain submarine bases on the Atlantic coast of Norway. If such an invasion occurs,
Sweden alone cannot resist for long, and without prior planning it is most unlikely
that assistance can arrive in time to save the country from conquest.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM.
Sweden is said to have been inhabited by the same race for longer than any other
European country, and the Swedes claim to be of virtually pure Teutonic blood.
Whether this claim is anthropologically correct does not greatly matter, but it is re-
markable that the political institutions and cultural characteristics of the people have
evolved in comparative freedom from outside influences. During the Middle Ages as in
modern times Sweden existed upon the periphery of major events. The Swedes oc-
casionally made violent forays into continental Europe, but Europe did not retaliate,
and the Swedish nation developed without benefit of the invasions, folk-wanderings,
and mixings of blood, habits and ideas that fertilized and troubled other communities.
As the somewhat less complete isolation of England behind the Channel made possible
the evolution there of a peculiarly free and stable form of government, so were the
Swedes able almost without molestation to create one of the most democratic of all
modern societies.
Between the years 600 and 800 A.D. a consolidation of various petty Swedish king-
doms began, and about 1200 Sweden started to assume the outlines of a state. After
the extinction of the first ruling family in 1060 the monarchy became elective, depend-
ing as did most European kingdoms upon the support of the nobility and the clergy
but also to some degree upon the farmers. In 1397, largely through the initiative of
Denmark, the kingship passed to a member of the Danish ruling house, and for more
than a century the three countries of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark were ruled by the
same sovereign under an arrangement known as the Union of Kalmar. From time to
time local Swedish potentates were in opposition, but none was able to make good a
title as King. There was a tendency for the generality of the population to revolt
against the rule of Danish monarchs and the officials imported from Holstein who sur-
rounded them. One of these rebellions, led in 1435 by a certain Engelbrekt, was mem-
orable for the summoning of the first Riksdag to contain representatives of the four
estates of nobility, clergy, burgesses, and peasants. The Union of Kalmar came to an
end in 1523 with the election to the Swedish throne of Gustavus Vasa; henceforth
Sweden was entirely separated from Denmark. A few years later Sweden renounced
the Roman Catholic Church (to which it had never been strongly attached) and appro-
priated its property, becoming thereby one of the earliest and most powerful of Protes-
tant countries. In 1544 the monarchy was made hereditary in the family of Gustavus
Vasa, whose reign thus formed one of the turning points in Swedish history.
Under King Gustavus Adolphus, who reigned from 1611 to 1632, Sweden reached
the peak of its military success. For reasons political as well as religious the King took
his army into the Thirty Years' War and campaigned extensively in Germany, holding
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his court as far from home as the cities of Mainz, Frankfurt, and Munich, and mak-
ing Swedish arms famous throughout Europe. Already possessed of Finland and other
territories on the eastern coast of the Baltic, Sweden acquired at the Treaty of West-
phalia in 1648 large portions of Pomerania, the bishopric of Bremen, and other slices
of northern Germany, holding these territories as fiefs of the German Empire. Sweden
thus became a substantial continental power. During the same early decades of the
seventeenth century the country. underwent a remarkable evolution of political insti-
tutions and cultural life, quickened in part by the extensive contacts which the Swedes
now made with European peoples, and in part by the genius of the monarch himself.
Although the reign of Gustavus Adolphus was expensive because of the wars and ad-
ventures of Swedish policy, it was fruitful in the development of institutions. The
king was by no means a tyrant.
At the turn of the century another king of Sweden, Charles XII (1697-1718), pro-
vided Europe with one of the most spectacular careers of modern times. In 1700 this
monarch, then aged under 20, defeated the Russians in a great battle at Narva, and
commenced a chapter of military achievements which made the Swedish Army one of
the most renowned in Europe. After a remarkable series of victories, Charles in 1709
finally suffered one of the most complete of military defeats at the battle of Poltava.
The defeat at Poltava signaled the beginning of the end of the Swedish Baltic Empire;
a further result was that Russia acquired outlets on the Baltic.
The adventures of Charles XII and his autocratic form of government both ex-
hausted and exasperated the Swedes, and upon his death in 1718 they reconstructed
the government in such fashion as to give the Riksdag virtually supreme control. The
eighteenth century was a period of Parliamentary rule, with a considerable strife be-
tween opposing parties curiously known as the "Hats" and the "Caps." Such a system
eventually proved almost as disagreeable as one-man rule, and it was followed in 1772
by another period of domination by strong monarchs and a form of government closely
approaching absolutism. This in turn collapsed in 1809 when King Gustavus IV was
deposed and a new constitution accepted by King Charles XIII. This constitution still
forms the basis of the Swedish governmental system, though it has been so altered by
amendments and by the growth of new practices that it has become scarcely recog-
nizable.
Sweden had lost its eastern Baltic possessions to Peter the Great of Russia, and
gradually was forced to relinquish its territorial acquisitions in Germany and Poland.
In the general settlement of 1814, after the Napoleonic Wars, the conquest of Finland
by Russia was confirmed, but Sweden received Norway, which was taken away from
Denmark in order to compensate Sweden for turning against Napoleon. The Norwe-
gians remained subjects of the Swedish king until 1905, when the union was peaceably
dissolved, but kept their own parliament and local government, and considered them-
selves almost as an independent state. It is an important fact of Swedish history that
with the 1814 territorial adjustments Sweden ceased to have possessions elsewhere
than in the Scandinavian peninsula, and ceased to take a prominent part in European
history.
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King Charles XIII had no heirs, and the Riksdag, casting about for a successor,
chose Napoleon's marshal, Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte. Bernadotte immediately exer-
cised great influence as Crown Prince, and was responsible for conducting the policy
and the arms of Sweden in such fashion as to bring the country out of the Napoleonic
upheaval without serious losses. In 1818 he succeeded to the throne, founding the
dynasty which still reigns.
The 19th century in Sweden was marked by the development of political democracy
and the growth of industrialization; the nation's energies were turned inward and the
now traditional foreign policy of neutrality developed.
2. PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS, AND OPERATIONS.
The Swedish form of government resembles that of the United States in that it is
based upon a written constitution which may be amended only by a specified procedure,
but it bears closer resemblance to that of Great Britain in being a constitutional mon-
archy with a parliamentary rather than a congressional system. The Cabinet is ap-
pointed by the King, but is selected by him so as to command support from the domi-
nating party or parties in the Riksdag, and is responsible for the acts of the government.
Despite the existence of the written constitution, various customs and conventions have
come to be observed and now form almost as important a part of the system of govern-
ment as they do in the United Kingdom; this renders the system somewhat difficult of
description.
There are four fundamental laws, none of which may be amended save by the
specified process. They are: (1) the Constitution of 1809; (2) the law of succession to
the throne, of 1810; (3) the law of freedom of the press, of 1812; and (4) the law de-
fining the organization of the Riksdag, of 1866. Amendment is not difficult; it may be
done by a majority vote in an ordinary session of the Riksdag, followed by another
majority vote in the next session following a general election.
a. The Riksdag.
The Swedes like to trace the continuous history of the Riksdag from its first
full session in 1435 to the present day, and they point out that it was never suppressed.
Throughout the years until 1866 it was curiously organized into four houses, corre-
sponding to the four estates of nobility, clergy, burgesses, and peasants; needless to
say the last of these exerted less influence than the first, but it is remarkable that
genuine small farmers participated in the functions of government in Sweden from
very early times. In 1866 the Riksdag was reorganized into two chambers; the First,
or Upper Chamber having 150 members elected for a term of eight years by the various
municipal and provincial bodies of the country. One-eighth of the First Chamber
comes up for election each year. The Second or Lower Chamber contains 230 members
chosen nowadays by universal suffrage and according to a system of proportional
representation for a term of four years. Regular sessions are held annually, beginning
in January; special sessions may be called.
The two houses have equal powers, and legislative business is carried on to a
considerable degree by a peculiar system of joint committees. There are seven of these
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committees; their size, number, and jurisdiction is laid down in fundamental law. Half
of each committee is chosen from each of the two houses of the Riksdag, and propor-
tionally according to the representation of parties in each house. No bill may be passed
by either Chamber until it has been acted upon by the appropriate committee, which
thus constitutes a miniature Riksdag for the consideration of the measures coming
under its cognizance. Cabinet Ministers, who may speak in either Chamber, are ex-
cluded from the joint committees.
b. The Cabinet.
According to constitutional law the Cabinet must contain the heads of the
government departments and three additional ministers without portfolio. There are
actually eleven departments: Justice, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Social Affairs,
Communications, Finance, Public Worship and Education, Agriculture, Supply and
Commerce.
In the working of the Swedish Cabinet system may be seen one of the widest di-
vergencies between the letter of the constitution and the customs and conventions
which have sprung up to govern its operations. The constitution of 1809 left the King
free to decide questions as he saw fit, even though acts of his had to be countersigned
by the ministry. He could appoint to his council anyone whom he wished. Prior to
the Riksdag reorganization of 1866 it was virtually impossible to construct a system of
Cabinet government on the British model; since 1866 there has been a gradual evolu-
tion towards this system. Nowadays the King does not in actual fact decide questions,
though he is still constitutionally entitled to do so. Since 1905 the King has as a rule
appointed a council more or less directly sustained by some party or party combination
in the Riksdag, but only since 1920 has the parliamentary principle been generally ac-
cepted, even by the King himself. Thus there is no long tradition of Cabinet govern-
ment in Sweden as in England, and the Riksdag has never been so strictly managed by
the ministry as has the House of Commons. Its decisions have frequently differed
considerably from what the government has proposed, and the center of political
gravity long remained very definitely in the representative assembly. This situation
was in part due to the fact that proportional representation did not make possible a
clear parliamentary majority for any one party, and the succession of coalition govern-
ments were weak instruments. Since 1932, however, the increasing strength of the
Social Democratic Party has permitted the formation of much more stable ministries,
and this has tended to increase the power and influence of the Cabinet. The Swedish
system is thus rapidly approaching that of Britain.
There is no constitutional provision that a Cabinet must resign if defeated in
the Riksdag; the King legally can, and as recently as 1914 actually did, maintain in
office a Council unsupported by the parliamentary majority. But the King probably
would not do so again. The Cabinet likewise would probably not resign merely upon
a defeat, but would do so rather "as a result of a realization that the whole political
situation in the Riksdag would make resignation a wise procedure." Swedish Cabinets
have never formed the habit of asking for a dissolution of the Riksdag, nor have they
held their Parliamentary supporters in line by threatening such dissolution.
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c. The Administration.
The numerous boards and offices of the Swedish bureaucracy are nearly all
comprised within one or another of the ministerial departments, and the chiefs of the
administrative units have their contact with the Cabinet through the Minister under
whose department they are listed. However, the Minister does not actually have
control over the boards and offices within his department, and the bureaucracy thus
constitutes a separate hierarchy of its own, which rejoices in a long tradition and an
exceedingly high standard of professional competence. Civil servants are removable
only after trial has been held and judgment given; they cannot even be transferred
from one job to another save at their own request. Their esprit de corps resembles that
of the judiciary.
The Riksdag chooses an official whose title may be translated as "Parliamen-
tary Supervisory Official for Civil Affairs," and whose duty is to take cognizance of the
administrative functioning of the government and to act as a link between the repre-
sentative assembly and the bureaucracy. He is a last resort for complaints against the
administration, and he reports to the Riksdag on the effectiveness with which its policies
are being carried out. A similar official is chosen to oversee military affairs. Thus the
principal connection between the legislative and administrative branches of the gov-
ernment is maintained not as in Britain through Cabinet members, but through
functionaries specially elected for the purpose.
d. Judiciary.
There is a Supreme Court, five Courts of Appeal, and numerous borough and
district courts of first instance. Judges are appointed by the King and are removable
only after proper judicial process. Jury trial is not used except in certain cases in-
volving the freedom of the press. On the other hand, the judges in local courts of first
instance are assisted by a body of twelve citizens elected in each subdivision of the
judge's district for a six-year term. These laymen assist the judge in passing on ques-
tions both of law and of fact, and a certain number (usually seven) serve in all cases
which arise in the district during their term of office. By a unanimous vote the body
of laymen can overrule the judge, but if the laymen disagree the judge decides the
question.
Despite the fact that Sweden has a written Constitution, the judiciary has not
undertaken to pass upon the constitutionality of laws. If an act is passed in proper
form by the Riksdag it becomes law; thus it may be said that the Riksdag, rather than
the judges, is the final interpreter of the Constitution. This situation has not given
rise to any difficulties.
The laws of Sweden have twice been codified, once in the Middle Ages and more
recently in 1734. The latter code is still in force, with some changes, and is esteemed
a masterpiece. Adjudication is founded upon this code and generally upon statute
law rather than upon the body of court precedents, and the general principles are sup-
posed to be easily accessible to the ordinary citizen. A statute book, issued every year
and containing all statutes in force except those that have only a very special bearing,
will be found on the shelves of many Swedish laymen.
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Beside the Swedish Supreme Court there exists a Supreme Administrative
Court to which the citizen may carry appeals from the various administrative bodies
with which he may have dealing. Every decision of an administrative authority which
concerns the rights of a citizen may be complained of within a certain period of time to
the hierarchy of bodies which culminates in the Supreme Administrative Court.
e. Local Government.
For purposes of local government and administration the main division of
Sweden is the /dn. Although each kin is headed by a governor appointed by the cen-
tral government, the /dn enjoys a considerable degree of local autonomy. Five privi-
leged towns are outside the /an jurisdiction; Stockholm constitutes virtually a /dn in
itself, with a special form of government.
f. The Electorate and the Press.
The people of Sweden are highly literate, politically intelligent, and socially
stable almost to the point of stolidity. There are no minority problems whatever;
only an insignificant number of the population are of any other religion than the
Protestant Christian or of any other race and nationality than the prevailing type.
The wandering Lapps of the north give no trouble and seemingly feel no grievances.
There are few very wealthy people in Sweden, and few very poor, and a paternal gov-
ernment has removed from the mass of the population the worst fears and insecurities
arising from the ordinary misfortunes of life. In national as well as international
policies the Swedes boast of adopting the "Middle Way."
Of a total population of 6,800,000 with an electorate numbering 4,699,000,
nearly 4,000,000 voted in the general election of September 1948. The Swedes take their
civic and political duties seriously, but they are not much interested in events outside
their own country. Neutrality and even isolationism are satisfactory doctrines to the
majority, who tend to resent the way in which world events have forced themselves
upon their country.
The press is an active factor in the political life of the nation and, under the
guarantee of the famous "Freedom of the Press and Printing" Act of 1812, has enjoyed
great freedom. (The Act of 1812 is now in process of amendment to provide the gov-
ernment with a constitutional basis for censorship in time of war. The proposed
amendment specifically limits the government's right of censorship to wartime only
and stipulates that any censorship imposed must be reviewed by the courts within
thirty days.) There are 228 newspapers with a combined daily circulation of 3,100,000
copies; of these 195 are directly allied with political parties. The Liberal Party press
with a circulation of one and a half million is by far the largest; it is noteworthy that
this represents a party presently in opposition, and that some of its principal news-
papers (although they represent a minority wing in the party) preach the abandon-
ment of neutrality. Next in circulation to the Liberal press comes the Conservative
with 620,000, while that of the governing Social Democratic Party follows with 500,000
and that of the Agrarians with less than 150,000. The Communists have three news-
papers with a circulation of 50,000, of which Ny Dag, the party's principal mouthPiece,
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claims nearly 30,000. About 95 percent of the adult Swedish population reads at least
one daily paper.
3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND ISSUES.
From the eighteenth century days of the "Hats" and the "Caps" Sweden has been
familiar with political parties, or at least with political factions. Prior to the reform
of the Riksdag in 1866 it was impossible to establish a modern party system, due to the
rigid organization of the Riksdag into four estates sitting in four separate chambers.
After 1866 a fairly well-defined division began to appear between Conservative and
Liberal groups, but it was actually only in the 1890's that parties in the sense of ma-
chines to organize the elections began to appear. It was the workingmen in the Social
Democratic Party of 1889 who started this development. It was also the Social Demo-
cratic Party which in the 1930's, by obtaining substantial control of the Riksdag, began
to give the Swedish governmental system more of the familiar characteristics of the
British parliamentary form.
During World War II partisan issues were subordinated to the task of maintaining
neutrality, and a coalition government was formed in 1940, headed by the Social Demo-
crats but containing members of all parties save the Communist. When the military
threat to the country had passed this coalition was dissolved and replaced by a Social
Democratic Cabinet. The following diagram shows the relative standing of the parties
in the Riksdag; numbers indicate the seats each party holds in the Lower Chamber, as
a result of the elections of September 1948.
LEFT
CENTER
RIGHT
I
I
Agrarian
Fascist
Social
30
Parties
Communist
Democrat
Liberal
Conservative
(non-existent
8
112
57
23
since 1940)
The following table shows the results of the general elections to the Lower Chamber
in 1940, 1944, and 1948:
1940
1944
1948
Votes
Seats
% of
Vote
Votes
Seats
% of
Vote
Votes
Seats
% of
Vote
Soc. Dem.
1,546,804
134
53.8
1,436,571
115
46.6
1,789,440
112
46.2
Cons.
518,346
42
18.0
488,921
39
15.8
478,779
23
12.3
Agr.
344,345
28
12.0
421,094
35
13.7
480,360
30
12.4
Lib.
344,113
23
12.0
398,293
26
12.9
882,414
57
22.8
Comm.
101,424
3
3.5
318,466
15
10.3
244,812
8
6.3
Others
19,385
0.7
22,959
0.7
Total
2,874,417
230
100.0
3,086,304
230
100.0
3,875,805
230
100.0
? Elections to Municipal Councils and Provincial Assemblies in 1942 and 1946 (the
next elections will be held in 1950) :
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1942
1946
Votes
Seats
% of
Vote
Votes
Seats
% of
Vote
Soc. Dem.
1,453,288
825
50.3
1,478,818
742
44.4
Cons.
509,984
276
17.6
494,949
213
14.9
Agr.
380,851
211
13.2
452,793
242
13.6
Lib.
358,183
168
12.4
520,593
244
15.7
Comm.
170,856
41
5.9
372,424
107
11.2
Others
18,404
3
0.6
11,628
3
0.2
Total
2,891,566
1,524
100.0
3,331,205
1,551
100.0
The seats in the First Chamber consisting of 150 members, one-eighth elected each
year for a period of eight years, are distributed as follows:
Social Democrats
85
Conservatives
25
Liberals
16
Agrarians
21
Communists
3
Total
150
a. Social Democratic Party.
The Social Democratic or Labor Party was organized in 1889, developing out of
a number of socialist societies which sprang up during the eighties under the intellectual
leadership of Hjalmar Branting, the great Swedish statesman. The Social Democrats
became champions of the working class and, cooperating initially with the Liberals,
fought for political rights, especially for a broadening of the suffrage. Most of their
reforms, at first resisted, have been accepted by nearly all quarters and during the
1930's were greatly admired by liberal circles throughout the world. Today the Social
Democrats are a constitutional socialist group, moderate socialist in aim and democratic
in method. A radical but minority faction advocates a more Marxist line, but the
party is not guided by its doctrinaire left wing and to a large degree has allayed
bourgeois fears that it will sponsor a violent social revolution.
Now, as from its beginning, the Social Democratic Party is closely associated
with the trade-union movement, which furnishes a solid core of voters. The party was
in fact built up on the basis of collectively affiliated labor unions which today provide
roughly 70 percent of the party's enrolled members. The party also has the electoral
support of lower income groups in general, including farm labor, individual union
members and many intellectuals. The Social Democratic Party has rejected the solici-
tations of the Communists to form a "united labor front" and has conducted an anti-
Communist campaign which has contributed to Communist defeats in labor unions
and elsewhere.
The dominant position which the Social Democrats have achieved primarily
reflects their progressive domestic policies and the great ability of their leader, Per
Albin Hansson, who died in 1946. Since the end of World War I, they have been by far
the largest political group in Sweden; from 1940-1948 they had complete control of
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both chambers of the Riksdag and, although their numerical majority in the Lower
Chamber of the Riksdag was lost in the September 1948 election, they still retain
? their dominant position. Being the majority party they set the pattern for the World
War II Coalition Cabinet which unanimously advocated the Social Democratic policy of
strong defense and strict neutrality.
The party apparently reached its peak in the 1940 election, which resulted in
its controlling more seats in the Riksdag Lower Chamber than the other four parties
combined. A trend away from the Social Democrats began after 1940. In the 1944
election they lost votes notably to the Communists?votes which were not so much pro-
Communist as anti-government since the Communists were the only party not included
in the wartime coalition and voting Communist appeared to be the sole means of
expressing disapproval of government measures. (The popular admiration which the
Communists had gained by their resistance to the Nazis also increased the Communist
vote.) The relatively radical postwar economic program of the Social Democrats
resulted in further losses in the 1946 municipal elections. This program, adopted in
1944, was built around a plan of full employment and nationalization of certain basic
industries. Apparently impressed by the strength of non-labor opposition and suffer-
ing from internal division on the nationalization issue, the Social Democrats took no
step toward implementation of the program. The Communists were quick to exploit
the situation and by adopting the same program and advocating it strongly won con-
siderable support from the Social Democratic left wing. Votes were also lost to the non-
socialist parties due to the fears of moderates that the program might be implemented.
? At present the Social Democratic government is condemned by business and industrial
circles on the charge that its postwar policies were ill conceived and led to the difficulties
with inflation and dollar shortage which now confront the country. Liberal and Con-
servative authorities protest that the government's deflationary program is even yet
not stringent enough to meet the emergency.
In the election of September 1948 the Social Democrats gave less ground than
had generally been expected and lost only three seats; they thus remained the dominant
party. The anticipated loss was evidently softened by an increase of about 15 percent
in the total organized labor vote (about 80 percent of those eligible voted instead of an
estimated norm of 65 percent) and by a marked shift of votes from the Communists
to the Social Democrats. The election outcome attested to the diligence of the Social
Democrats in getting out the labor vote and reflected, in a decline in Communist votes,
the popular disapproval of the USSR's recent aggressive actions in Eastern Europe.
?
b. Liberal (People's) Party.
The Liberal or People's Party is the largest non-labor party in Sweden. It is
the successor of the old Liberal Party which split in 1923 on the question of prohibition
but was reunited in 1934. Representing no class group, the Liberal Party draws its
membership from middle class businessmen, certain big financial interests, religious
dissenters and intellectuals who are radical in their social views but not necessarily
in their politics. The party is the champion of private industry and small business
and advocates free enterprise with government interference in economic processes
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only to the extent necessary to preserve the capitalist system. It opposes reduction
in defense expenditures but advocates greater economy and more efficient use of gov-
ernment funds, lower taxes and social reform to be effected by gradual adoption of
various social security schemes. The Liberal Party is of particular interest today since
it contains a minority group, made up chiefly of individuals who were strongly pro-
Allied in World War II, who are attempting to pioneer a trend away from strict neu-
trality. This group is the chief proponent of the view that neutrality would be unten-
able in the event of a third World War and that Sweden should seek security in regional
associations such as the North Atlantic Union. The bulk of the party, however, does
not share this view and the Liberal Party officially supports the government's neu-
trality policy.
The Liberal Party made slight increases in its membership during the past
decade but its gains in the 1948 election were spectacular; it more than doubled its 1944
vote, increasing its seats in the Lower Chamber of the Riksdag from 26 to 57. It is
now the second largest political party and the strongest opposition group in Sweden.
Occupying a position a little left of center with political ideas similar to those of the New
Deal, it has grown at the expense of the Conservatives and Social Democrats. Three
reasons in particular account for this sudden rise in the popularity of the Liberal
Party. First, it is in a better position than any other opposition group to capitalize on
current discontents. Higher taxation, continued rationing, and the imposition of
.other irksome controls for which the government is held responsible have caused dis-
satisfaction. While such considerations did not sway the solid labor core of the
Social Democratic Party, they influenced unattached voters who normally vote Social
Democratic. Second, as the most aggressive opposition group, the Liberal Party
appealed to voters who saw in it a real bourgeois challenge to the Social Democrats.
Votes of this type were gained particularly from the Conservatives and from young
voters generally. A third factor in the advance of the Liberal Party is the leadership
of Bertil Ohlin, a professor of economics and an astute parliamentarian and brilliant
debater.
c. Agrarian Party.
The Agrarian Party was formed in 1913 without definite party ancestry and
from its beginning has been organized as a non-socialist farmers' union. Prior to its
formation farmers generally voted with the Conservatives or the Liberals. The party
steadily increased its popular vote until the 1940 election when it received a setback.
It recovered somewhat in the 1944 election but it appears that the Agrarian Party has
reached its peak. In the 1948 election the Agrarians, suffering from the constant drain
of farm population to the cities as well as from internal dissension over whether the
party should become politically more liberal or more conservative, received another
setback and lost five seats in the Riksdag Lower Chamber.
Today the Agrarian Party is made up of farmers with small and medium
sized holdings, the large landowners being generally Conservatives while farm labor
supports the Social Democrats. It advocates measures to improve farm conditions
and protection of domestic agriculture; it stresses economy in government. The
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Agrarians are in principle opposed to socialization but, on grounds of political expedi-
ency, might support it so long as it did not affect agricultural interests. The Agrarians
advocate strong national defense, are friendly toward the US, but strongly isolationist.
In cultural matters they are extremely conservative.
d. Conservative Party.
The Conservative Party is almost a direct descendant from the old Lantmanna
Party?the first of the loosely organized political factions which formed after the reor-
ganization of the Riksdag in 1866. Its membership is drawn chiefly from professional
groups, large landowners, big businessmen and the old aristocracy. Despite its inher-
ited traditions, the Conservative Party is neither reactionary nor non-progressive and
has been able to adjust its policies to more modern political trends. It opposes sociali-
zation but not social reform; it objects to Social Democratic domination of the Con-
federation of Trade Unions but has more or less accepted trade-union direction of
labor. It favors moderate protection for industry against foreign competition and
advocates free enterprise instead of planned economy. The Conservatives are tradi-
tional advocates of strong national defense and are hereditary Russophobes. Among
Swedish political parties, the Conservative Party is the strongest supporter of the
monarchy and the National Church.
e. Communist Party.
Up to 1939 the Communist Party, weakened by internal schisms, had only a
small membership and an insignificant place in Swedish politics. Its membership
increased greatly during the war, however, and today it is reported to have approxi-
mately 40,000 members of which it is estimated that only a small minority would be
unswervingly pro-Soviet. Although the Swedish Communist Party is not openly
affiliated with the Cominform its leaders and press slavishly echo the Moscow-Comin-
form line. Recently there has been a tendency within the party leadership to promote
the actively pro-Cominform members to responsible positions while the more moderate
"nationalist" leaders are given posts of lesser importance or retained as figureheads.
By and large, the USSR's reputation in the west may be taken as a gauge of
the Swedish Communist Party's fortunes. In the 1940 election, the Communists, who
had fallen into public disrepute largely because of their support of the USSR during
the Winter War in Finland, suffered a severe setback. In 1944, when the USSR had
gained the western world's good will for its fight against Nazi Germany, the Commu-
nists made their biggest strides forward, receiving over ten percent of the total vote in
the general election. While undoubtedly a considerable number of the electorate was
swayed by admiration for the Soviets, there were also other reasons for these gains.
Many former left-wing Social Democrats voted the Communist ticket as their sole
means of expressing dissatisfaction with the wartime Coalition Government in which
only the Communists were not included. Rebellion against the Social Democratic
hierarchy in organized labor also swelled the Communist ranks in trade unions; this
was notably true in the war-expanded metal and engineering industries which absorbed
a great number of young and politically inexperienced workers. The Communists
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were also able to exploit the confusion within the Social Democratic Party over imple-
mentation of the Social Democratic postwar economic party; as a result certain radi-
cal Social Democratic labor groups turned to the Communists in protest against what
they regarded as evasion by their own party and contributed to the increased Commu-
nist vote in the 1946 municipal elections.
In 1948, with western regard for the Soviet Union at a low ebb, the Communist
tide in Sweden again turned, and the Communists lost nearly one-half of their previous
parliamentary representation in the general election. Recognition of the threat inher-
ent in Communist tactics, as exemplified in Eastern Europe and notably in Czechoslo-
vakia, resulted earlier in 1948 in an official anti-Communist drive conducted with
public debates and intended to expose Communist tactics. The primary target of
attack was Communist strength in organized labor. In nearly all unions which held
elections after the Prague coup, the Communists were removed from office. While
they suffered a severe setback in the 1948 elections, membership in the Party is not
likely to show a sharp decline immediately. However, with the Communist threat
pushed into public consciousness by recent international developments and by the
government's educational campaign, the trend away from the extreme left, as illus-
trated by this election, is likely to continue.
4. STABILITY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION.
Even though the elections of September 1948 resulted in the Social Democratic
Party losing its majority in the Lower Chamber of the Riksdag, it remains in virtual
control of Swedish politics. The administration is expected to be stable, but it faces
two substantial problems. The first is the necessity of adopting measures to counter
inflation and to increase exports. Should these measures prove either inadequate, and
so fail to stop an inflationary spiral, or unduly harsh and disagreeable for the populace,
there might be serious discontent with the government. The second problem is that
of foreign policy: Sweden stands inflexibly for neutrality and refuses to concert policy
with the western powers while both Norway and Denmark show signs of abandoning
the Swedes to isolation and joining in an Atlantic Pact. Should this happen, the
shock to Swedish sensibilities might be severe but is not likely to alter the present
course of Swedish foreign policy.
These considerations indicate that the Social Democrats may find it difficult to
maintain themselves in power during the years of the coming Riksdag. They will be
closely pressed by the Opposition, and they will suffer for any mistakes they may make.
Providing Sweden escapes invasion, however, any changes in government will assuredly
be made by democratic and parliamentary processes; they will be changes toward the
center rather than toward the left, and they will not affect the essential stability of the
Swedish political and social system.
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CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. GENERAL SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION.
Swedish economy developed gradually and systematically throughout Sweden's
more than a century of freedom from war. By 1830, when the industrial revolution
had already shown its effects on the economies of England and the continent of Europe,
Sweden still remained rural and isolated with more than 80 percent of its population
deriving its living from agriculture. By 1870 the rural population still constituted 72
percent of the total.
Industrialization was hastened, after 1870, by the discovery (outside of Sweden)
of a new method of smelting iron ore, and by the increasing utilization in England and
the countries of the continent of Swedish forest products. By the beginning of the
century Sweden was well on the road to a balanced economy, and by 1930 had brought
its industries to a high level of development. Economic growth was accomplished in
part through the ability to export iron ore and forest products, two of Sweden's greatest
natural resources. The abundant water supply also contributed a great deal to in-
dustrialization, forming an important source of energy.
Although Sweden did not participate in the war and suffered only slight physical
damage, its economy was adversely affected. Its greatest and practically only direct
war loss was the destruction of 600,000 gross tons, or more than one-third, of its mer-
chant fleet. Indirect losses resulted from interferences with the country's foreign
trade and from the necessity of maintaining a high state of military preparedness.
Before the end of the war the Swedish Government prepared plans for a postwar
economic policy, whose object was to combat an expected boom caused by high demand
for peacetime goods, to avoid employment difficulties during the period of demobiliza-
tion and reconversion of industry from wartime to peacetime production, and to insulate
the domestic economy against the effects of depression in other countries, principally
the United States. The measures taken by Sweden after the war to implement this
policy have included: (1) extension of credits to European countries; (2) appreciation
of the krona to offset price increases abroad and to encourage imports; (3) negotiation
of a series of bilateral trade and payments agreements with several European countries,
and (4) immediately after the war, a relaxation of foreign exchange and import
controls.
The failure of Sweden's postwar policies to have the anticipated effect, together
with the slow recovery of Western Europe, were the principal factors contributing to the
rapid depletion of gold and foreign exchange reserves built up during the war when,
because of the blockade and concentration of other countries' production on armaments,
Sweden was prevented from spending its foreign earnings. Other factors which have
contributed to this result have been an excessive internal purchasing power and the
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resulting diversion of export goods to the domestic market. As reserves of gold and
foreign exchange continued to decline the government imposed continuously stricter
import regulations, especially on imports from hard currency areas, but it has delayed
effective measures to deal with the domestic causes of its unfavorable balance of trade.
Economic activity and employment in Sweden have risen above prewar levels. The
general industrial production index (1935=100) rose to 129 in 1946, 130 in 1947, and
reached a high of 136 in April, 1948. Unemployment has been practically nonexistent,
amounting only to 2.8 percent in 1947 and 3.3 percent in 1948. It is estimated that
nearly 40 percent of the working population was employed in industry by 1948. The
last Swedish census, taken in 1940, showed the following occupational distribution of
the labor force:
Total
Percent
Agriculture and related field
864,000
29
Industry and handicraft
1,070,000
36
Communications
202,000
07
Trade and commerce
409,000
13
Administration and free occupation
263,000
09
Domestic work
157,000
05
Unspecified activities
35,000
01
Total
3,000,000
100
Despite many shortages and measures taken to reduce imports, the Swedish stand-
ard of living is still high. Per capita consumption of food items is approximately at
the prewar level although rationing continues for meat, butter and other fats, sugar,
and coffee. Flour, bread and other products of bread grain were derationed effective
2 October 1948. Food production is slightly below the prewar level but nevertheless
approximates 90 percent of requirements.
The cost-of-living index (based on 100 for 1935) rose in 1947 from 157 to 169. This
rise was attributable chiefly to increased taxes and higher prices on foodstuffs, fuel
and light. By comparison with immediate prewar costs, the general cost-of-living index
shows a rise of 56 percent. Taxes are almost trebled, foodstuffs have risen 51 percent,
clothing 65 percent, and fuel and light 74 percent. Rents, which have been the sub-
ject of strict control, rose only by six percent.
Postwar wages have risen faster than the cost of living, and because this has in-
creased domestic demand for both Swedish manufactured and imported consumer
goods, it has contributed to Sweden's "unfavorable" balance of trade. From 1939 to
1948 nominal wages increased by 75 percent for men and 89 percent for women com-
pared with a corresponding cost-of-living increase of roughly 55 percent. The aggre-
gate 1947 wage increases have been estimated to amount to roughly 15 percent. In the
manufacturing industry the 1947 wages including overtime and cost-of-living supple-
ment were on an average 65 cents per hour for adult males and 44 cents for adult
female workers.
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There have been no major postwar strikes except the prolonged metal workers'
strike of 1945. The record low in industrial disputes reached in 1946 appears to have
? been duplicated in 1947. In 1946 only 26,500 workdays were lost as a result of in-
dustrial disputes. The relations between management and labor, particularly the
collective bargaining process, have evolved on the basis of voluntary agreement rather
than on legislation or compulsory arbitration. The Collective Bargaining Act of 1936
largely incorporated earlier practices in labor-management relations.
The two main parties to the Swedish labor market are the Confederation of Trade
Unions (LO) with a 1947 membership of 1,194,181 and the Swedish Employers Federa-
tion (SAF) representing management. LO consists of 45 unions broken down into
8,916 locals. Most of the unions are organized by trades within industries, with nation-
wide collective bargaining, and with policies determined largely by the central or-
ganization. LO membership includes approximately 92 percent of the manual laborers
and totals approximately 38 percent of the country's labor force. Salaried employees,
the "white collar" workers, are organized in a Federation of Salaried Employees (TCU)
with a membership of 220,000 representing 40 percent of this class of employees. Two
other "white collar" organizations, Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation (SACO)
and Statstjeinstemeinnens Riksfeirbund (SR) , each have a membership of about 18,000.
The aggregate unionization in Sweden comprises approximately 23 percent of the entire
population.
No major industries in Sweden are nationalized. The government, however,
owns and operates the telephone, telegraph and radio services, three-fourths of the
? railroad mileage (12,304 kilometers out of a total of 16,712) , and public harbors. In
addition, the governinent owns considerable land, primarily forest land, and has a
monopoly on the external and internal trade in tobacco, liquor, and, to a minor extent,
in sugar. The government owns 50 percent of the stock of AB Aerotransport which in
1948 merged with the privately owned Svensk Interkontinental Lufttrafik AB and be-
came a partner with the airlines of Norway and Denmark in the Scandinavian Airlines
System. One particularly significant government-owned industry is the Norrbotten
Ironworks, which was established in 1940 for the declared purpose of improving the
domestic supply of iron and steel.
The Swedish cooperatives are larger in proportion to population than similar
movements in any other country. The central organization, which is the wholesale
society for the local cooperatives, has also entered into various lines of production.
The local societies in 1947 handled an estimated 13 percent of all retail trade in Sweden.
(See Section e. "Consumers' Cooperatives," page 49.) The cooperatives advocate free
enterprise and compete with both private and State monopolies.
?
2. PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION.
a. Natural Resources.
(1) Agriculture.
Agricultural production is an integral part of Swedish economy. Ap-
proximately one-third of Sweden's present population of 6.8 million people depend
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upon agriculture for a livelihood. While Sweden is the fourth largest country in
Europe, only slightly over 10 percent of the total area of 101,373,130 acres is arable.
Cultivated land in the south of Sweden, which is farmed intensively, comprises 71
percent of that area, but in the far north it is only 0.7 percent. Farms are small as a
rule, more than 50 percent being less than 25 acres.
Before World War II Sweden was 90 percent self-sufficient in the pro-
duction of food considering imports of feed grains, largely corn, in terms of their food
equivalents. The largest deficiency was in edible fats and oils. While some butter
was usually exported, the use of imported oils for the production of edible fats was
nearly twice as large, so that domestic production supplied only about 75 percent of
total fat consumption. Sweden was self-sufficient in the production of sugar and
practically so in the production of bread grains. Some meat was exported, though
the production of meat must be considered in terms of a small deficit when allowance
was made for the use of imported feed to produce the meat. Considerable quantities of
fresh fruit including apples, pears, and citrus fruit were and continue to be imported.
The 1947 food and feed harvest in Sweden was unusually poor owing
largely to a combination of unfavorable weather conditions. The area sown to wheat
and rye in the autumn of 1946, for harvest in 1947, was 20 percent below the previous
year because of unfavorable weather at seeding time. The long and severe winter of
1946-47 killed a large acreage (estimated at 170,000 acres) of fall-sown wheat and rye
and the summer drought of 1947 further reduced the yields of grain as well as most
other crops. The above combination of adverse weather conditions reduced the 1947
bread grain (wheat and rye) harvest about 45 percent below 1946 and about 53 percent
below the average harvest during the 1935-39 prewar period. Smaller yet significant
reductions occurred in the 1947 production of most other food commodities except meat,
as shown in table No. 1. The slight increase in meat production was caused by forced
slaughter of livestock due to the shortage of feed grains.
Table No. 1. Comparison of prewar and postwar production of major
food commodities expressed in 1,000 metric tons:
1935-39
1946
1947
Wheat
707.0
635.8
364.2
Rye
377.0
289.3
142.2
Barley
216.3
182.5
180.7
Oats
1,263.7
781.6
679.4
Mixed Grain
591.01
515.0
434.0
Sugar (beet)
340.0
320.0
275.0
Potatoes
1,813.0
1,941.0
1,678.0
Hay
5,073 1
5,715
3,430
Meat: beef, veal, pork, mutton
and lamb
294.3 2
282.0
300.2
Milk?mil. lbs.
4,643 2
4,709
4,547
1939 only.
'1934-38.
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Table No. 2 summarizes livestock numbers in 1945, 1946, and 1947 com-
pared to prewar averages. It will be noted from this summary that the number of
cattle, hogs, and horses in 1947 range from 6 to 12 percent below prewar averages
whereas the number of sheep has increased by approximately 5 percent.
Table No. 2. Prewar and postwar livestock numbers in thousands:
1947 percent
1936-40
1945
1946
1947
of 1936-40 average
Cattle
2959
2909
2870
2790
94
Hogs
1292
1201
1166
1188
92
Sheep
398
516
482
420
105
Horses
6331
610
593
549
88
'Sept. 1937.
Weather conditions during the planting and growing season for the 1948
crop have been unusually good. Current (October 1948) prospects are for a near rec-
ord 1948 food and feed harvest. It is estimated that stocks of bread grain at the end
of the 1948 production year will considerably exceed minimum stock requirements.
Sweden's agricultural policy aims at developing agriculture in such a way
that in an emergency domestic production will cover the country's minimum food
requirements. This does not represent any great departure from the policy pursued
in prewar times, nor does it imply any marked adjustment in production. The basic
issues of a long-term agricultural policy were placed before the Swedish Riksdag early
in 1947 and on 20 June 1947, the Riksdag approved a committee report embodying the
following principles: (a) that production shall be maintained at a level somewhat
above nine-tenths of domestic requirements; (b) that "rationalization" of agriculture
shall be in direction of farms of sufficient size to permit economical operation and that
the State shall have certain prior rights of land purchase to this end; (c) that the in-
come objective of agriculture shall be comparability with income of other groups; (d)
that the principal means of achieving the income goal shall be by price support through
protection of the domestic market against foreign competition, and by increased effi-
ciency of production through "rationalization" including economic size of farms and
wider use of technical improvements.
The new organization, both central and local, to carry out the policy
adopted by the Riksdag did not commence functioning until 1 July 1948. On that
date a reorganized Central Board operating through 26 regional boards assumed the
responsibility for carrying out the agricultural policy legislation, i.e., to guide the
"rationalization" of agriculture, including regional planning, adjustments in sizes of
farms, improvement of land and buildings, supervising drainage projects, and carry-
ing on certain credit and other activities.
Supplies of draft power and machinery are adequate to maintain field
crop acreage at prewar level, though there is developing a need for tractors, tractor
plows, and spare parts to meet current and accumulated replacement needs and for
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expansion. The shortage of agricultural machinery is attributable to low wartime
replacement, general labor shortage and shortages of iron and steel. Normally do-
mestic production supplies 90 percent of the agricultural machinery and considerable
quantities are exported. The US is the principal supplier of large items of equipment
such as crawler tractors, plows, harvesting machines, and mowers.
In order to broaden the use of agricultural machinery by putting it within
the reach of a large number of independent small farmers, the Minister of Agriculture
in the early part of 1948 proposed a network of "machine stations." The organization
would consist of local cooperative machine stations, regional "machine centrals" for
assisting and complementing the local stations, and a central administrative and
research organization. Under the plan, purchases of machinery would be financed
by State loans up to 80 percent of the cost value payable in ten years. The plan is not
new in Sweden but is an extension of projects already tried on a small scale. Some
machine stations are in operation and special State -credit funds already available.
The postwar use of nitrates as well as other chemical fertilizers has been
considerably above prewar levels. Supplies of phosphates and potash were readily
available in Sweden in 1947 and were sufficient for 1948 without rationing. Nitroge-
nous materials were rationed, however, and are expected to be in short supply for the
1949 fertilizer year. The present nitrate shortage is partially attributable to the short-
age of hydroelectric power in Sweden and Norway brought about by the drought in 1947.
An estimated 75 percent of Sweden's agriculturalists whose principal in-
come is derived from farming are members of the Farmer's Union (Riksf6rbundet
Landsbygdens Folk?RLF) . This is an occupational organization as distinguished from
the economic and political organizations of agriculture. The membership on 31 March
1948 was 191,400 divided among 2,360 local organizations. Of the union membership
about 100,000 have small holdings of less than 25 acres of cultivated land, about 55,000
have 25-50 cultivated acres and about 35,000 have more than 50 acres.
The number of members in farmers' marketing, purchasing, and service
associations affiliated with the Central Federation of Swedish Farmer's Associations, a
cooperative organization, totalled 1,025,405 in the calendar year 1947. Most of the
farmers, however, are members of more than one organization. The total number of
farms which, through membership, is represented in the Central Federation, is ap-
proximately 350,000. This means that practically the whole of Swedish agriculture is
represented in the central organization. The largest number of members is found in
the organizations for livestock and dairy products which had 277,000 and 251,000
members respectively. The credit unions and purchasing associations each had more
than 125,000 members and the forest associations almost 100,000. Total marketings
and purchase in 1947 of cooperative organizations which actually handle the goods,
amounted to 1,935 million crowns (about $700 million) .
(2) Fishing.
Sweden has a long coast line which provides good facilities for a fishing
fleet, but in normal times the fishing industry is not of major importance. It was
subsidized by the government during the war as an incentive to increase catches. As a
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result, catches subsequent to the 1939 salt-water catch of 146,739 tons valued at
$7,830,480, were substantially increased. In 1946 an estimated 20,300 boats of various
sizes and 34,000 workers were engaged in the fishing industry.
Before the war the import of fish was about 50,000 tons a year, valued at
some 22 million crowns. The export was only slightly less in quantity, about 40,000
tons, but was far less in value at 11 million crowns; this was because Swedish fish
imports consisted mainly of the prepared product, while fresh fish dominated the
export. Iceland, Norway, and Denmark provided 75 percent of the Swedish fish import.
More than one-half of Swedish exports went to Germany, but Denmark and Great
Britain were also large buyers.
During the war the import as well as the export of fish was reduced.
After the war, fish imports from the three traditional suppliers started again, but in
smaller quantities than during the last prewar years. The export pattern changed,
however, since the largest prewar buyer of Swedish fish, Germany, was only a limited
market. Under these circumstances, one objective in Swedish commercial negotia-
tions has been to find new markets for Swedish fish, either for deliveries directly from
Swedish fishing boats or for direct commercial deliveries. Postwar markets have been
established in England, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, France, and Italy.
Exports have also been made to Switzerland and South America, and after persistent
attempts an agreement was negotiated for the delivery of fish to the American and
British zones in Germany. When Germany returns to prewar status as an export
market the prospects for Swedish fish exports will be further improved.
(3) Forests.
Forests are concentrated chiefly in the northern district of Norrland,
but important growths also are located in the central and southern parts of Sweden.
The total wooded area of Sweden has been measured at slightly more than 58 million
acres. Of this total slightly less than 5 million acres are deemed worthless growths,
consisting of old waste land, sparsely seeded stands, and retarded thicket stands as
well as marsh areas. The wooded area comprises roughly 56.5 percent of the area
of the country, compared with 23 percent in the US and 33.3 percent in Canada. On
this wooded area, 80 percent of the trees are coniferous, offering an excellent source of
wood for pulp mills. The primary coniferous growths extend southward through
Norrland and the provinces of Kopparberg and Gavleborg. Growths in the sections
lying in the southern part of Sweden are mostly birch.
The annual growth of timber in Sweden is estimated at 58.5 million cubic
meters per year. For a number of prewar years annual cutting exceeded the currently
estimated annual growth. Overcutting was especially prevalent in Norrland, from
which the paper and pulp industry derived the greater part of its wood supply. As a
result it became apparent that unless annual cutting was curtailed, the forest resources
would in time be exhausted and for this and other reasons there has been a steady drop
in cutting for the last three years. A total of 51.9 million cubic meters of timber, solid
measure, was cut in 1946 and this dropped by ten percent to 46.3 million cubic meters
in 1947. Indications are that there will be a further reduction in 1948. Other reasons
for reduced cuttings in the postwar years have been the shortage of labor, adverse
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weather conditions, and dissatisfaction of forest owners over disproportionate prices
paid to them in comparison with the value of wood and pulp in the world market. The
1947 timber cut was distributed as follows:
In Million Cubic Meters
Saw mills
16
Firewood
17.7
Pulp mills
12.6
Total
46.3
In order to offset the evident overcutting which has taken place espe-
cially in Norrland the Forest Research Institute has formulated what amounts to a
20-year plan of reduced cutting and replanting which will apply to all areas. The plan,
so far as practicable, will be carried out under the broadened Forest Protection Act
passed by the Riksdag 21 April 1948. The Institute has estimated that the annual cut
in central Norrland should, for a considerable time, be reduced by at least 30 percent
and that the provinces of Kopparberg and Gavleborg may continue to cut at the same
level as in the years before the war. In other areas in central and south Sweden,
exclusive of Kopparberg and Gavleborg, it is felt that cuttings may be increased by
about three percent per annum. The total result will be a reduction of approximately
five percent in cuttings compared with the immediate prewar period. The plan also
provided for annual cultivation of approximately 240,000 acres throughout all the
forest areas. At the end of the proposed period it is believed that this plan will result
in an annual growth representing the maximum potentialities of the country's soil
resources.
(4) Water Power.
Since coal and oil resources in Sweden are meager, the government began
in 1909 to encourage the development of the country's abundant water power to reduce
dependence on imported fuels. By 1945 Sweden had 1,808,000 Kw. of hydroelectric
capacity and 310,000 Kw. of steam electric capacity. An additional 879,000 Kw. of
hydroelectric capacity is under construction or newly completed and 375,000 additional
Kw. of steam electric capacity is planned.
Today Sweden is the world's third largest consumer, per capita, of electric
current. When fully developed it is estimated that Sweden's water power resources
will have an annual average capacity of 6 million kilowatts. The present total pro-
duction of electricity (largely obtained from water power) is in excess of 14 billion
kilowatt-hours a year, of which 80 percent is used in industry, 5 percent for traction
and 15 percent for street lighting, domestic, and commercial uses.
The state power system is divided into electrical districts which are
grouped into three blocks?the Central Block in the lake region and the south, the
Norrfors Block along the middle Bothnian coast, and the Porjus Block in the far north.
The Porjus Block is of great strategic importance since it includes the third largest
hydroelectric power station in Sweden on which depends the Lulea-Narvik electrified
railway system and the operation of the Kiruna-Gallivare iron mines.
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The government's encouragement of the extensive use of electrical power
in industry has resulted in Sweden becoming increasingly self-sufficient in the pro-
duction of industrial machinery and consumer goods and in the development of a
flourishing industry for the production of electrical machinery and equipment for
export. It should be noted, however, that while increased electrification of Sweden's
economic structure improves its self-sufficiency, it simultaneously renders that struc-
ture more vulnerable by making it dependent upon a few key power plants.
(5) Iron Ore.
Sweden has what is probably the world's largest reserve of high-grade
magnetite iron ore, with a metallic content averaging about 63 percent. Total resources
are estimated at 2 billion tons and represent 3 percent of the estimated world total.
The deposits are found in three regions. The area of oldest production
is the Bergslagen area of central Sweden, where ore .of low phosphorous content used
chiefly by the domestic iron industry is mined. The most recently developed mines?
and the least important?are in the Skelleftea region of Vasterbotten.
The great ore region is in Lapland at Kiruna and Gallivare?north of the
Arctic Circle?where 80 to 90 percent of Sweden's iron ore is located within an area of
8,000 square kilometers. The mines have undergone large-scale exploitation only in
the past 40 years. They are chiefly open-cut mines and could not be made profitable
until electricity was available to light them during the long, dark Arctic winters. The
Gallivare deposits are estimated at 230 million tons and those at Kiruna at one billion.
? It is the Lapland ore that is chiefly exported. State-owned electric railroads carry the
ore to the Norwegian port of Narvik during the winter months and to Lulea on the
Gulf of Bothnia during the ice-free summer months.
Swedish production of iron ore is dependent on the export market. In
1939 about 13,800,000 metric tons were mined, about 90 percent of which was exported.
During the prewar period Germany was the chief customer and when the war blockade
cut off other markets Germany continued to take Swedish ore in exchange for German
coal and coke. By 1944, however, when the Nazi power was weakening, shipments to
Germany were reduced, and in 1945 iron ore production fell to the lowest figure in many
years?about 3,930,000 tons. A partial recovery in the export market resulted in a
production figure of 6,867,208 tons for 1946 or about 50 percent of 1939 production.
Exports of iron ore rose from 5,316,000 tons in 1946 to 8,451,000 tons in 1947. Roughly
35% of the 1947 production was exported to the UK, and the US has recently been
importing Swedish ore at the rate of about 1 million tons per year because of the excep-
tional shortage of high grade ore in the US. Capacity production of iron ore, however,
will be dependent upon the reopening of the German market.
(6) Other Minerals.
Sweden has important non-ferrous mineral resources, but the shortage
of solid fuels has made the domestic smelting of non-ferrous metals uneconomical.
The general practice has been to import the metals, often exporting the ores in
exchange, except in times of emergency such as existed during the World War II
blockade. Thus in 1945, Sweden produced 2,929 metric tons of zinc but none was
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produced in 1946 or 1947. In 1946, 25,180 metric tons of zinc were imported to satisfy
domestic needs. Small deposits of chromite exist in Sweden and attempts were made
to mine these during the war but were abandoned in 1944 as being uneconomical.
Another example is the aluminum industry, which normally uses imported bauxite
but in emergency can produce aluminum from indigenous andalusite.
Boliden's Gruvaktiebolag (Mining Co.) is Sweden's largest non-ferrous
metal producing company, owning mines, smelters, and refineries in North Sweden.
In 1947, it produced 16,000 tons of copper and other producers 2,000 tons, compared
with imports of 54,000 tons to satisfy Sweden's needs. In 1947, Boliden also produced
10,000 tons of lead; other companies produced 1,000 tons, while 18,000 tons were
imported. With respect to both lead and copper much of the imports had previously
been exported as ore in concentrated form and returned to Sweden as metal. Signifi-
cant quantities of zinc concentrates are shipped to Belgium to be smelted.
The Boliden deposit is a huge mineralized ore-body yielding as high as .5
oz. gold and 1.6 oz. silver per ton, as well as large quantities of copper, lead, and zinc.
This mine is also believed to contain the world's largest deposit of arsenic. Sweden's
output of arsenic runs about 20,000 tons of As203 annually, and since there was a limited
demand abroad in prewar years some has been jettisoned in the ocean. Current output
is being stored while research continues for new uses.
Other minerals produced in Sweden are manganese, tungsten, and nickel.
The production of nickel in 1944 amounted to 713 tons and in 1945, to 494 tons. Pro-
duction was discontinued in 1946 and 3,000 tons were imported that year. In 1946,
production and imports of manganese and tungsten were as follows:
Tungsten
Manganese Ore Concentrates (60% W03)
(In metric tons) (In metric tons)
Produced 12,594 490
Imported 21,612 1,075
(7) Coal.
Sweden's domestic production of coal is small, averaging about 500,000
metric tons; an equal amount of coke made from imported coal and roughly 100,000
metric tons of briquets are produced. Peat produced from extensive peat bogs ?in
southern Sweden is used to supplement available coal supplies. Production in 1947
amounted to 400,000 metric tons compared with more than a million tons in the peak
year of 1945 and 800,000 tons in 1946. The decline in production was attributed pri-
marily to a shortage of labor.
The Swedish economy depends heavily upon imports of coal and coke.
Prewar imports came chiefly from England, Germany, and Poland and normally
averaged about eight million metric tons including roughly two million metric tons of
coke. While imports of coal and coke in 1947 totalled about six million metric tons and
exceeded the 1946 figures of 3.5 million tons, shipment in 1947 included less than
900,000 metric tons of coke. Thus, while the coal situation improved, coke supplies
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declined during the year. During 1946 and 1947 the United States was the main sup-
plier, followed by Poland.
The following tables show the solid fuel imports for 1947 by kinds and
country of origin and their end use for the same year.
Table 1. Imports of solid fuels into Sweden by kinds and countries of
origin for 1947 in metric tons:
Kind Country of Origin Amount
Coal Poland 1,972,570
UK 7,409
US 2,399,098
Coke
Brown coal coke
Brown coal briquets
Total 4,384,697
Belgium 149,315
Germany 170,451
Netherlands 146,736
Poland 375,706
US 30,905
873,113
Czechoslovakia 1,148
Germany 688,047
Total solid fuel imports 5,947,005
Table 2. Consumption of solid fuels by end use and types of fuel for 1947
in metric tons:
Use Amount
Electricity works 261,900
Gas works 754,800
Railways 448,500
Coastwise shipping 174,300
Bunkers 27,300
Industrial 1,949,800
Domestic 1,890,100
5,506,700
Types of fuel
Coal 3,340,400
Brown Coal 257,900
Coke and coke breeze 1,194,000
Brown coal briquets 706,200
Brown coal coke 8,200
5,506,700
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(8) Shale Oil.
Having little or no natural petroleum Sweden has sought to exploit its
extensive deposits of oil shale. Total reserves are estimated at about 5 billion tons
located convenient to rail and water transport. Only the richest deposits have thus
far been developed on a large scale; these are located at Kvarntorp, south of Orebro
and are estimated to contain 11/2 billion tons of oil shale, enough to yield perhaps
400 million barrels of oil. Here a novel and efficient technique is being applied. Huge
electrodes are inserted in the ground distilling the oil from the shale in place. The
oil is then collected in a central condensation plant and subsequently refined. The
annual output of oil from the Kvarntorp plant now exceeds 550,000 barrels-6.5 per-
cent of Sweden's annual prewar oil consumption. It is estimated that oil production
can be increased to 750,000 barrels annually by 1950.
(9) Uranium.
Some of Sweden's black pyritic oil shale deposits have recently been found
to contain recoverable amounts of uranium. Estimates of the total amount of ex-
tractable uranium contained in the deposits vary considerably but an average figure
is 500 million pounds of uranium oxide.
b. Industry.
(1) General.
Sweden is a highly industrialized country. According to the 1940 census,
out of a total working population of approximately 3,000,000 people, 1,070,209 were
employed in industry and handicraft compared with 864,011 in agriculture, out of a
total population of 6,371,432. The growth of the working population between the
date of the last census and the beginning of 1948 is estimated at slightly above 150,000.
Taking into consideration some shift in the labor force from agriculture to industry it
is estimated that nearly 40 percent of the working population or roughly 1,200,000
people were employed in industry by 1948. Despite this increase, the shortage in the
industrial labor market is estimated at nearly 100,000 persons.
The value of industrial production in 1944, the latest year for which offi-
cial statistics are available, totalled 3,118 million dollars, at the official rate of ex-
change of 4.20 crowns-41.00, distributed as follows:
Value of Production
Industry in Million dollars
Mining and Metal Industries 1,038
Foodstuffs Industry 790
Textile and Clothing Industry 317
Paper (including wood-pulp and graphic 'art) 256
Chemical-technical Industry 194
Wood Industry (sawmills, furniture factories, etc.) 184
Public Utilities 127
Clay and Stone Industries (coal mining, peat cutting,
brick & cement manufacture, pottery & glass) 108
Leather Hides and Rubber 104
Total 3,118
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Compared with the basic year 1935 (100) the industrial index at the end
of the war had declined to 91, but by the end of 1947 had climbed to 130 and rose to
? a peak of 136 in April 1948.
Following is a table of production indices for 1938 and 1939 and the
postwar period (base 1935=100) as compiled by the Federation of Swedish Industries:
?
Period
o
.0
?
a a
to
till
0
4.44c,t
:Zt4
Ei
E-4Q
o
? 0).2
1938
117
92
103
112
131
114
107
6,656
1939
124
93
105
124
139
120
115
7,408
1945
106
74
69
129
109
113
110
11,677
1946
128
77
97
142
178
113
109
12,103
1947
130
75
103
139
174
115
109
11,712
1948
Jan
130
75
103
143
176
114
112
973
Feb
133
75
107
149
180
115
116
907
March
134
106
145
184
116
119
919
April
136
109
149
186
116
119
May
134
106
144
180
117
117
June
134
108
150
177
116
115
July
133
108
144
173
117
112
It will be noted from the above table that the iron and steel industry
and the machine industry registered the greatest index rises with increases of 32 and
42 points respectively from 1938 through July 1948. The pulp and paper industry
and the foodstuffs industries remained relatively constant; the textile and clothing
industry rose by 10 points during the same period, while the lumber export industry had
declined by 17 points at the end of 1947. Production of electrical energy has shown
a continuous increase. The slight decline in 1947 is attributable to the shortage of
water caused by the severe drought in the summer of that year. It is doubtful that
the general production index will rise rapidly within the near future; more probably
it will even off near the present level. Though programs to expand electric output
and steel production have been commenced they are being retarded, like industrial
production generally, by shortages of labor and material.
The industries in Sweden are not concentrated in congested localities.
Decentralization, attributable partly to extensively developed inland water transporta-
tion and electric power resources, has prevented urban congestion of industry. In-
dustrial plants, however, are more numerous in the south and central regions than in
the north.
(2) Forest Products.
Forest resources form the basis for Sweden's largest industry. In the
production of wood pulp Sweden ranks next to the US and Canada. The following
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table makes a comparative analysis of approximate wood pulp capacity and produc-
tion figures in 1,000 metric tons for 1937 and the postwar years of 1946 and 1947:
Capacity
Production
1937
1946
1947
1937
1946
1947
Bleaching Capacity
570
1020
Total Chemical
2920
2815
2790
2597
1827
2185
Sulphite Bleached
215
255
558
Sulphite Unbleached
1227
750
742
Total Sulphite
1750
1685
1660
1442
1005
1300
Sulphate Bleached
85
102
170
Sulphate Unbleached
1070
720
715
Total Sulphate
1170
1130
1130
1155
822
885
Total Mechanical
750
800
800
700
550
625
Dissolving
193
241
313
In general, the postwar output of the pulp mills has been only about
eighty percent of capacity. This is partially attributable to the modification and
closing of some mills, but primarily to decreased cutting of timber and the necessity
of allocating timber for fuel in the absence of an adequate supply of coal and oil.
The paper and board mills had a record 'output of more than a million
metric tons during 1947, and operated within six percent of their estimated capacity
of approximately 1,125,000 tons. There has been very little change in capacity during
and after the war other than that brought about by modernization and improvement
in different mills. An analysis of postwar production compared with 1937, in metric
tons, is as follows:
1937
1946
1947
Kraft papers
212,112
230,814
258,966
Newsprint
268,052
263,389
274,337
Greaseproof & Transparent
29,528
25,333
28,861
Sulphite paper, magazine,
wrapping, fine and other paper
288,847
307,927
307,780
Total paper
798,539
827,463
869,944
Boards & Cartons
127,461
146,847
157,869
Grand Total
926,000
974,310
1,027,813
In a normal peacetime year an average of more than 50 percent of the
total value of Swedish exports was derived from forest products. In the years follow-
ing the first world war a large share of the exports in this field consisted of unfinished
products such as plain timbers, pit-props, sleepers, and bleached as well as unbleached
pulp. As it became apparent that forest reserves were being overcut stress was
placed on additional processing in Swedish mills before export. An example is the
well-organized wall-board industry, which by the close of the war was producing from
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fifteen mills. The manufacture of prefabricated houses also is a relatively new in-
dustry which is expanding as a result of the demand for housing throughout the world.
During 1947 the export of complete houses consisted of 11,781 units which nearly
doubled the 1946 figure. While factors such as increased domestic consumption affect
the amount of timber available for export, the following comparative table expressed
in cubic meters indicates the general trend away from export of unfinished products:
1935-39
1947
Sawn Softwood
2,700,000
1,550,000
Planed Softwood
800,000
200,800
Square Timber
108,000
36,600
Sleepers
11,900
41,400
Boxboard
255,000
163,000
In comparison with the foregoing export figures, it is estimated that
Sweden in 1947 consumed domestically 3,260,000 cubic meters of the above types which
represents an increase of 40 percent over prewar years. As a result the government
has gradually tightened building restrictions in an attempt to divert lumber for ex-
port shipment.
Wood pulp constitutes about 30 percent of Sweden's total exports, with
paper and paper products and timber second and third in importance, respectively.
From the standpoint of volume, the same factors which have contributed to the de-
crease in production, namely, decreased cutting, shortage of labor and a continuation
of the wartime necessity of substituting wood for solid and liquid fuels, are reducing
the quantity of exports. Thus, while in 1937, 2.2 million metric tons of all grades of
pulp were exported, the total export in 1947 was 1.7 million metric tons. The same
situation prevails with respect to paper and paper board, though for the additional
reason that domestic consumption has increased. While 1947 production of paper
and paper products exceeded 1937 production, exports in the earlier year amounted to
664,000 and in 1947 to 575,000 metric tons. Domestic consumption of paper and board
has doubled in the last ten years and in 1946 exceeded 525,000 tons. As a result of the
adverse effect on export trade the government has restricted domestic use of paper in
1948 to 411,300 metric tons.
In March and April of 1947, the government removed export price con-
trols on pulp, paper and paper board, and on lumber. This action, combined with
the acute world demand for wood products and the removal of competition in the
Scandinavian countries by cartel agreement, caused an increase in prices far beyond
any reasonable relationship to production costs. Two other events contributed; the
first occurred in April 1946 when the government increased the value of the crown by
over 16 percent, in terms of its relation to the dollar. The second occurred coincident
with the removal of export price controls when the government created a Business
Cycle Equalization Fund which levies a tax of approximately $13.85 on each metric ton
of chemical pulp shipped into the export market, $5.54 for each metric ton of mechani-
cal pulp, and approximately $36.00 per standard of all sawn lumber. The combined
effect of these two pieces of legislation alone has been to raise the export price of pulp
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by about 25%. The increase in over-all export prices of pulp and paper, f.o.b. Swedish
port, in 1947 over 1937 is indicated in the following table:
1937
(per metric ton
average price)'
1947
(per metric ton
average price)'
Bleached Sulphite
$50.00
$169.80
Unbleached Sulphite
40.00
132.15
Bleached Sulphate
56.00
155.00
Unbleached Sulphate
38.00
124.65
Newsprint
34.00
152.90
'One Crown=$0.255.
'One Crown=$0.278.
As world markets readjust and as competition develops from other paper-
producing countries it will no longer be possible for Swedish producers to sell at almost
any price, which was the case in 1946, 1947, and the beginning of 1948. The first
major indication of the changing market came in June 1948 when an estimated 50
percent of US pulp and paper buyers cancelled contracts containing reservations pro-
viding for quarterly adjustment of price. It is estimated that this will decrease
Sweden's dollar earnings by more than 25 million for the second half of 1948. The
immediate result of the contract cancellations was a request from producers that the
export tax collected for the Business Cycle Fund be abolished, and that the value of
the crown in relation to the dollar be decreased to its former level of 3.60. Although
the export tax was removed in October, 1948, producers have not yet indicated a desire
to forego any part of their excessive postwar profit margins.
While the government has repeatedly pointed out to the pulp and paper
industry the continued drop hi gold and dollar exchange and has urged the industry
to export more to the US, the industry has preferred to supply markets where higher
prices were obtainable. While American buyers have taken less of Sweden's national
output other markets such as the Latin American and Asiatic countries have been
receiving considerably larger percentages. During 1947 the US received approximately
28 percent of the total pulp shipped from Sweden compared with a prewar average of
slightly less than 40 percent. Similarly, in 1937 Sweden shipped over 40 percent of
its total export of newsprint to the US, but in 1947 its export to the US was 20 percent.
During the World War II blockade Sweden made extensive use of forest
products to maintain her internal economy. Cloth was made from cellulose, liquid
fuel was extracted from wood tar, automotive vehicles were powered by gas generated
from wood distillation, animal fodder was produced from wood byproducts, and wood
was used as a substitute for coal and oil in industry, transportation and household use.
(3) Iron and Steel.
The iron and steel industry is Sweden's second largest industry. Its ca-
pacity. already has been increased by approximately 30 percent above prewar levels.
Expansion began during the war, and in 1946 the country's largest producers agreed to
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a five-year plan to modernize and enlarge facilities so that the production of pig iron
and steel would be increased by approximately 40 percent. The expansion was made
necessary not only by insufficient imports from Germany but because of greater do-
mestic requirements. The ultimate object of the plan is to attain national self-suffi-
ciency and to increase the industry's export capacity. Implementation of the plan,
however, is being slowed down by shortages of labor and fuel and by quantitative re-
strictions on imports of necessary machinery and equipment from hard currency areas.
As a result, the expansion program probably will not be completed before 1952.
Pig iron capacity in 1947 was estimated at approximately 900,000 metric
tons and ingot steel capacity at about 1,500,000 metric tons. Only a limited number of
existing furnaces are being operated, the remainder being obsolete or beyond repair.
Although some effort is being made to modernize unused capacity, the general trend is
toward construction of new modern furnaces. On 31 December 1947 the following
types and numbers of furnaces were being operated:
Total
In operation
Percentage of
Total in operation
Blast furnaces
71
25
35.2
Lancashire furnaces
60
17
28.3
Bessemer (converter)
15
7
46.7
Martin (open hearth)
64
42
65.6
Electric and crucible
furnaces
71
47
66.2
The largest expansions are being made at Domnarf arts Jarnverk and at
the government-owned Norrbotten iron works. The former is expected to increase
steel ingot capacity from 200,000 to 400,000 metric tons and the government-owned
project is expected to have an annual capacity of 500,000 metric tons of pig iron when
completed. The first stage of expansion of the Norrbotten iron works, which is ex-
pected to be completed by the end of 1950, will be the installation of a new coke blast
furnace with an annual capacity of 200,000 metric tons. Present facilities also are
being increased and a new rolling mill is being constructed. The second stage pro-
vides for installation of another 200,000 metric ton annual capacity blast furnace and
an additional rolling mill.
Limited supplies of electricity and fuel, primarily coke, have prevented a
full postwar utilization of the iron? and steel industry's capacity, but the increasingly
acute shortage of manpower has been the main reason for the failure to increase out-
put. The number of workers employed by the Swedish iron works has continued a
gradual decline from a high on 31 December 1942 of 34,326 to 32,030 on 31 December
1947. This is estimated to be 2,500 short of actual present requirements.
While the total production of pig iron showed a slight increase from 686,500
metric tons in 1946 to 689,900 metric tons in 1947, total ingot steel output in 1947 de-
creased to 1,185,100 metric tons from 1,202,800 metric tons in 1946. The ingot steel
production figures however, are considerably higher than the 1938 output of 972,000
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metric tons while pig iron was far short of the peak 1944 output of 853,800 metric tons.
Steel ingot production in metric tons for 1947 by production method is as follows:
1947
Bessemer (converter)
High quality 5,100
Ordinary 18,800
Thomas 124,000
Martin (open hearth)
High quality 260,800
Ordinary 395,700
Electro-steel
High quality 229,900
Ordinary 150,800
Total 1,185,100
The following table shows the domestic production, imports, exports, and
estimated consumption of finished steel from 1938 to 1947 in thousand metric tons:
Year
Production
Imports
Exports
Apparent
consumption'
1938
708
321
175
853
1939
838
553
174
1,217
1940
840
322
183
978
1941
862
235
207
890
1942
891
274
129
1,036
1943
890
217
108
999
1944
878
222
80
1,021
1945
880
33
97
815
1946
851
467
82
1,236
1947
837
645
86
1,396
Production plus imports, minus exports.
It should be noted that the year of highest production was 1942 and that
the level of production remained both high and constant during the war years when
Sweden was preparing its own defenses and also exporting to Germany. The low year
for both imports and consumption was 1945 when consumption was limited to domestic
production owing to the cessation of imports from Germany and restricted shipments
from formerly occupied Belgium. These two countries, together with France, normally
aceounted for the bulk of Swedish iron and steel imports. In 1947, the peak import
year and also the year of highest domestic consumption, the United States supplied
40 percent of the finished steel imports. The following table of imports for 1947 by
countries of origin, with comparative figures for the years 1936-39 shows clearly how
the United States replaced Germany as a major source of finished steel. (Does not
include tin plate, other metal-coated sheets, cold-rolled and stainless steel.)
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Average import
Import 1947 1936-39
United States
235,000
49,000
Belgium-Luxembourg
195,000
182,000
Germany
119,000
Czechoslovakia
43,000
17,000
France
11,000
59,000
Great Britain
70,000
11,000
Hungary
15,000
Other countries
37,000
44,000
Total
606,000
481,000
The latest year for which figures are available on a break-down of esti-
mated domestic consumption of finished steel is 1945. In that year actual require-
ments were estimated at 1,205,000 metric tons (which was considerably above the avail-
able 815,800 metric tons) distributed as follows:
Metal goods manufacturing
Thousand
Metric tons
and mechanical workshops
521
Shipbuilding
140
Railroads, street railways
93
Building and construction
318
Other industries
133
Total
1,205
Production of sponge iron in 1946 increased by 15.8 percent over the 1945
output. 2,963 metric tons of the 1946 production were exported, 1,414 metric tons
being exported to the US. Production of ferro-alloys increased by 36.8 percent in 1946
in comparison with 1945 but was still 30.7 percent below the 1939 level. The output
of sponge iron and ferro-alloys in 1939, 1945 and 1946 is shown below in metric tons:
1939 1945 1946
Sponge iron
20,229
26,357
30,526
Ferro-alloys
47,364
24,002
32,788
Shortages of fuel as well as labor are expected to cause a slight decline
in the total 1948 output of pig iron, steel ingots and finished steel. For the first four
months, in comparison with the same period in 1947, production of pig iron showed a
slight drop while steel ingots and finished steel registered a slight gain. Conservative
estimates based on the assumption that the manpower shortage will not be alleviated
and that rationing of electric power will be reintroduced during the winter, place fin-
ished steel output at about 800,000 metric tons. Imports of finished steel are not ex-
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pected to exceed 565,000 metric tons owing to anticipated reduction of shipments from
the United States. 1,265,000 metric tons of finished steel are expected to be available
for the domestic market during 1948 compared with an estimated requirement of
1,400,000 metric tons.
Sweden attaches great hopes to -revival of the iron and steel trade with
Germany which it expects will commence with implementation of the trade and pay-
ments agreement with the US and UK occupied zones of Germany. This agreement
was concluded 19 April 1948 and calls for deliveries to Sweden of 50,000 tons of finished
steel, 10,000 tons of pig iron, and coke valued at more than 10 million dollars. In re-
turn Sweden will deliver 1,750,000 tons of iron ore together with other goods.
(4) Machinery.
The machine industry in Sweden has registered a greater increase in pro-
duction over the last ten years than any other industry. Despite this increase, post-
war production has covered only a part of Swedish manufacturers' requirements for
replacements and new installations. Demands for all types of industrial machinery
have been very heavy, and domestic delivery periods which in prewar years had been a
few months, have now been extended to two years or more. Shortage of raw materials,
labor, and fuel have restricted the production not only of industrial machinery but of
all .types of machinery. The volume of 1947 production of industrial machinery was
estimated to be five percent below the 1946 level which was valued at slightly over 140
million dollars. The value of industrial machinery imports including electrical motor
and apparatus rose from 34 million dollars in 1946 to 72 million dollars in 1947. The
corresponding increase in exports was from 40 million dollars to slightly over 48 million
dollars.
Swedish production of construction machinery, which has increased by
over 50 percent since 1938, is still insufficient to satisfy local demands. Production is
still increasing but in general it is confined to lighter types of construction machinery.
Swedish production of small excavators is about fifteen per year. Scrapers, bulldozers,
asphalt finishers, crawl tractors, large excavators, road graders, and rollers are not
made in Sweden but are imported, principally from the United States.
Postwar demand for construction machinery has been very heavy. Public
road and harbor construction and maintenance were neglected during the war years
due to shortage of labor and material which resulted in a huge backlog of construction
projects. Private construction of both industrial property and dwelling units also
increased the demand for construction machinery which, despite large imports in 1947,
far exceeded the supply. Accomplishment of much of this construction, particularly
road construction, will have to be deferred indefinitely owing to the lack of dollar
exchange necessary for the purchase of heavy machinery.
Prewar output of agricultural machinery was adequate to satisfy domes-
tic requirements except for some of the heavier equipment; considerable quantities of
light equipment, such as small ,tractors, are exported. Domestic production of agri-
cultural machinery in 1946 was valued at approximately 16 million dollars but was
inadequate to satisfy demands. Demands have been great in the postwar years owing
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to increased mechanization of farms and to the accumulated need for replacement of
equipment worn out during the war period. The government has given priority of
iron and steel allocation to manufacturers of agricultural equipment and it is felt that
domestic production will soon be adequate to satisfy essential requirements except for
heavier types.
Several Swedish firms completely dominate domestic production in their
respective fields. The Allmtinna Svenska Elecktriska AB (ASEA) is one of the oldest
electrical firms in northern Europe and the largest in Sweden. It produces nearly
everything in the electrical line and has built most of the equipment, including large
generators, which has been used in developing Sweden's extensive hydroelectric net-
work. It has also supplied much of the equipment for electrification of Swedish rail-
roads. The company's production capacity has been increased by 50 percent over
prewar capacity and its output in 1946 was valued in excess of 110 million dollars. In
1946 it employed over 24,000 persons which makes it one of the largest private employers
in Sweden. Some of the company's current production of hydroelectric equipment is
for export to the USSR under the Swedish-Russian credit agreement.
The Atlas Diesel Company of Stockholm is one of the oldest manufacturers
of Diesel engines. It manufactures engines from 30 to 3,000 hp., pneumatic tools, hy-
draulic devices, naval gasoline engines, and other similar products.
AB. Svenska Kullagerfabriken, (SKF) the Swedish ball and roller bear-
ing works, owns a total of seventeen factories throughout the world, five of them located
in Sweden. The total combined daily production of SKF factories is estimated at
400,000 ball bearings. The capacity of the factory in Goteborg, is estimated between
80,000 and 100,000 per day, though output is less owing to a shortage of labor. SKF
owns the Horfors Steel Works which has an annual capacity of over 90,000 metric tons
of finished steel. SKF's annual steel requirement for its Swedish factories is estimated
at approximately 50,000 metric tons. Other SKF subsidiaries are Linkoping Mechani-
cal Works, a machine tool plant, and the Katrineholm Works which manufactures
molds.
Restrictions which have been placed on imports attributable to depleted
foreign exchange reserves will undoubtedly extend to machinery requirements. With
respect to industrial machinery, the 1948 investment program called for an expenditure
of approximately 155 million dollars of which 45 million dollars was to be for imported
machinery, mostly from hard currency areas. The hard currency available will be
considerably less than this amount and part of it also will have to be used to cover out-
standing 1947 commitments. If the shortage becomes serious it will reduce industrial
production and exports. Imports of construction machinery undoubtedly will be given
secondary consideration to imports of industrial machinery. In that event many con-
struction projects will be delayed for a considerable length of time. The shortage of
electrical equipment will also continue and will delay the proposed expansion of the
hydroelectric system.
(5) Shipbuilding.
The present yearly capacity of Swedish shipyards is 440,000 DWT, or 40
percent greater than in 1939. Shipbuilding continued at a high level during 1947 al-
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though shortages of raw material, particularly steel, and skilled labor prevented ca-
pacity production. Nevertheless, Sweden ranked second in the world launching of
ships in 1947.
Fifty-two merchant vessels were launched, totalling 222,598 gross tons.
This represents an increase of slightly more than 75,000 gross tons over the 1946 pro-
duction of 147,400 gross tons and established a record high for tonnage launched in
any one year. With the exception of three 3,800 gross ton steamships, the vessels
launched were all motorships, of which eleven, totalling 109,522 gross tons, were tankers.
Included in the tanker tonnage is the largest merchant vessel ever launched in Sweden,
a floating whale oil factory delivered to Norway.
Nearly 125,000 gross tons or 56 percent of the 1947 launchings will be de-
livered to foreign buyers, primarily to Norway. This represents a decrease from 1946
deliveries of 184,100 gross tons and 1945 deliveries of 278,750 gross tons. In 1945 a
great many ships which had been under construction during the war were delivered to
Norway.
Orders placed during 1947 continued to increase. At the beginning of
1948, including ships launched but not yet delivered, the total of vessels under construc-
tion or ordered from Swedish shipyards was estimated at nearly 1,400,000 gross tons
and 2,100,000 tons dead weight. Norwegian orders account for approximately 870,000
gross tons or about 60 percent of the total. Orders on hand will keep the shipyards
operating at capacity for an estimated minimum of four years. There is a possibility,
however, that the yards will be faced with a slump when the temporary demand for
replacement of tonnage lost during the war has been met.
Despite foreign exchange difficulties and shortages of steel and labor,
1948 production held up. By the end of June 1948 merchant vessels under construction
totalled 241,980 gross tons compared with total world tonnage under construction on
the same date of 4,021,889 gross tons. Out of the latter figure 55 percent is under
construction in Great Britain. France has risen to second place with 331,216 gross
tons, followed by Sweden. In further comparison, the United States and Denmark are
in seventh and eighth place respectively with 162,072 and 118,711 gross tons under
construction at the end of June.
Swedish shipbuilding is concentrated in 15 yards possessing 43 beds with
an estimated capacity of 443,300 DWT. Goteborg is the chief shipbuilding center fol-
lowed by Malmo, Stockholm, and Landskrona. Other yards are located in Oskarshamn,
Halsingborg, Gavle, Kalmar, Marstrand, and Salvesborg. Because of more favorable
climatic conditions, milder winters and ice-free harbors, the largest percentage of ship-
building is concentrated on the West coast of Sweden.
(6) Textiles.
The textile industry is carried on primarily in Southwestern Sweden,
Boras being considered the center. Important textile mills are also located in Olingsas
and Norrkoping. Except for synthetic fiber (rayon) and small quantities of wool all
raw material for the textile industry must be imported. The same situation exists
with respect to textile machinery since Sweden has no plants capable of producing it
in required quantity.
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While 1947 production was estimated at nearly 25 percent below minimum
capacity, it was nevertheless at approximately the same volume as in 1946 and in normal
prewar years. The supply of raw materials was on the whole satisfactory but shortages
of labor, electric power, and to some extent a lack of spare parts and machinery replace-
ments prevented a full utilization of the industry's capacity.
The following rough estimates in metric tons are illustrative of 1947 pro-
duction: cotton yarn, 23,000 tons; woolen yarn, 14,000 tons; worsted yarns, 3,500 tons;
spun rayon yarn, 3,500 tons; cotton fabrics, 3,000 tons.
The volume of cotton and wool imports for 1947 was slightly lower than
for 1946, while volume imports of yarns as well as of fabrics, knit goods and other
manufactured products showed a substantial increase. The value of textile imports
in 1947 reached an all time high of nearly 300 million dollars compared with roughly
170 million dollars in 1946. While the value of 1947 imports was almost four times the
average for the immediate prewar years, the quantity of raw materials remained about
the same and the quantity of manufactured goods was about twice the prewar average.
Present annual cotton consumption is estimated at about 26,000 metric
tons while estimated capacity of the cotton mills is 32,000 metric tons. Swedish cot-
ton consumption before the war averaged about 30,000 metric tons. The US was the
chief cotton supplier until 1941 when Brazil assumed this role. In 1947 the US re-
gained some of its former importance although Brazil still remained the chief source
of supply. The radical changes in Sweden's sources of supply of cotton during the war
were owing principally to the blockade. Present factors controlling the total volume
of imports and their distribution by countries are Sweden's shortage of hard currencies
and the relatively high price of American cotton.
The annual production of cotton cloth by the Swedish cotton weaving
mills averaged 20,000 metric tons during 1938-40. From this figure it dropped to an
annual average of 14,100 metric tons for the year 1941 through 1944. After 1944 the
production recovered rapidly to an estimated 19,000 tons in 1946 and 18,000 tons in
1947. It is estimated that over 80 percent of the cotton cloth sold in Sweden at present
is manufactured domestically. Imports of cotton cloth totalled 1,147 metric tons in
1946 and 6,503 metric tons in 1947. The prewar average was slightly over 5,000 metric
tons.
Domestic production of wool is very small, having averaged approximately
'700 metric tons from 1938 to 1947. Because of the limited domestic production most
of the wool consumed is imported. Imports fell sharply during the war and consump-
tion was met to a large extent by means of synthetic fiber and reduction in stocks.
Imports of wool from 1938 to 1947 were as follows, in metric tons:
Year
Volume
1938
9,860
1944
6,861
1945
7,739
1946
19,216
1947
17,020
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Of the 1946 imports, 27 percent were from Argentina, 25 percent from
Australia, 19 percent from South Africa and 13 percent from Uruguay. In addition to
the estimated annual consumption needs of 15,000 tons of wool, approximately 3,500
tons of worsted yarns and woven goods are also imported.
The development of synthetic fiber (rayon) production in Sweden has
been based on a definite policy aiming at maximum self-sufficiency in textiles. This
policy was determined prior to the war but restrictions on imports caused by the war ac-
celerated the program to expand production of synthetics in an effort to obtain a supply
of substitute fibers and thus to be less dependent on cotton import. Production of
rayon staple fiber increased steadily from 937 metric tons in 1938 to 15,000 metric tons
in 1944. However, there was a slight decline in production during 1945 and 1946. The
increase in production has eliminated imports and permitted an export of 2,567 metric
tons in 1945 and 8,717 metric tons in 1946. The increased output of rayon staple fiber
will have a significant bearing on cotton consumption and to a lesser extent on wool
consumption, since it can be cut and mixed or blended with appropriate fiber lengths
of either cotton or wool.
Production of rayon filament yarn increased from 803 metric tons in
1938 to 1,700 metric tons in 1946. Imports in 1946 amounted to 2,556 metric tons.
The limited expansion of filament yarn production is accounted for by the fact that it
does not extensively displace cotton and cannot be processed on standard cotton ma-
chinery since it is produced in continuous lengths.
(7) Munitions.
Most of Sweden's munitions plants are located in the more highly indus-
trialized central and southern portions of the country. Production is divided between
a few government arsenals which manufacture small arms and ammunition and the
more important private arms producers. The industry expanded considerably during
the rearmament period beginning in 1940 in order to meet Sweden's defense require-
ments. Largest expansions were made in facilities for the production of tanks and
automatic weapons.
Aktiebolaget Bofors and its subsidiaries are by far the most important of
Swedish armament plants. In addition to manufacturing armament the company
owns and operates its own mines and railways and produces at its own iron and steel
works about 40,000 tons of high-grade steel annually, which is used for finished ordnance
pieces and for armor plate. Before World War II, Bofors was the chief source of ar-
tillery weapons for the Scandinavian countries. About 85 percent of the prewar pro-
duction was exported. AB. Bofors Nobelkrut is the chemical and explosives division of
Bofors and supplies the explosives for the firm's production of artillery shells.
Prewar expansion of Bofors led to the acquisition of two subsidiary plants
for the manufacture of gun forgings, gun mounts, turrets, military tractors, and other
ordnance products. Nydquist and Holm AB. an important producer of locomotives and
diesel engines was acquired in 1936, and a short time later AB Tidaholmsverken, a
manufacturer of bus and truck bodies, was taken over. The acquisition of these two
plants permitted utilization of the main plants at Bofors for production of finished gun
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barrels and accessories and the final assembly of weapons. The expansion of Bofors
which started before the war was continued in 1940 by the construction of branch
plants at Svarta and Karlskoga.
Other privately owned armament plants are the AB Landsverk plant
which prior to and during the war manufactured tanks and armored vehicles; Husk-
varna Vapenfabrik AB which manufactured small arms and ammunition; and AB
Norma Projektilfabrik, a source of shells, bombs, and small arms ammunition.
Peak war production was achieved near the end of 1942 when munitions
of an estimated value of $300,000 were being delivered to the Swedish army daily.
Replacement of all important categories of arms had been effected in early 1943 and
materiel in excess of army needs was being stockpiled. War production tapered off
rapidly after 1943. As a result of accumulated stocks of weapons and ammunition,
none of which was used by the armed forces, Swedish internal requirements dropped
abruptly on termination of the war in Europe.
The bulk of postwar arms production has been for export, but in common
with Swedish industry generally, production has been limited by shortages of fuel, raw
material, and skilled labor. The government has adopted a postwar policy which it
hopes will maintain adequate reserve of armament manufacturing capacity and to
some extent is appropriating money to support research and development of new
equipment. The munitions industry at present is operating at considerably less than
capacity but is believed capable of meeting current Swedish military requirements ex-
cept in heavy tanks and in the field of electronics, particularly radar equipment.
(8) Chemicals.
Prior to World War II Sweden depended principally on imports for its
supply of chemical requirements. With the outbreak of war the development of a
chemical industry became imperative, and a surprisingly diversified industry in heavy
and organic chemicals, plastics, and medicinals was established. This achievement is
all the more remarkable in view of the lack of coal and petroleum and the limited
indigenous resources of raw materials. Utilization of cellulose and waste liquors from
pulp manufacture were intensively developed and Swedish chemists have been par-
ticularly successful in producing a high purity cellulose for the rayon and plastics in-
dustries. Abundant hydroelectric power has stimulated development of electro-chemi-
cals.
Extension of research along applied rather than fundamental lines by
government, universities, and industry contributed materially to the development of
the industry.
Another significant development has been the expansion of the industry
through companies primarily engaged in other industries. Thus, the Bofors company
which is important as a munitions manufacturer, produces synthetic organic chemicals
from the same raw materials used in making explosives, and the Boliden Mines Com-
pany, in connection with its metal mine operation, is a large producer of pyrites, raw
material for the manufacture of sulphuric acid.
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c. Money, Banking, and Government Finance.
Sweden's basic currency unit is the krona (crown) whose fractional unit is the
ore (one krona equals 100 Ore). Sweden abandoned the gold standard in 1931 and
became a member of the sterling area in 1933 when the crown was pegged to the pound
sterling. Immediately prior to the outbreak of World War II, on 28 August 1939, the
crown was pegged to the United States dollar at a selling rate of 4.20 crowns per dollar.
A new rate of 3.60 crowns to the dollar (one crown?$0.27778) was established 13 July
1946 for the declared purpose of offsetting price increases abroad and to encourage
imports.
Sweden has a well-developed banking system to support the country's trade
and general economy. The Central Bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank), controlled
by the Riksdag (Parliament), has the sole right to issue bank notes. The discount
rate of the Riksbank guides the rate policy of the other banks and banking institutions.
The Riksbank is largely a bankers' bank and its direct relations with the public and
business world are comparatively small. Its activities are mainly confined to lend-
ing to commercial banks, savings banks, and agricultural credit associations and the
buying and selling of foreign and domestic securities in pursuance of the monetary
policy established by the Riksdag. Through the Foreign Exchange Control office
(Valutakontoret), which is subordinate to it, the Riksbank supervises the flow of foreign
currencies and issues regulations to other banks governing their foreign exchange
transactions.
Though there are 22 privately owned commercial banks, about two-thirds of
the banking business is handled by four large banks: Svenska Handelsbanken, Skandi-
naviska Banken, Goteborgs Bank and Stockholms Enskilda Bank. The first three
have branches throughout the country. Handelsbanken, with about 300, has the
largest number of branch offices. There are 458 private savings banks, 84 of which
hold 73 percent of the total savings-bank deposits, and the Postal Savings Bank, with
headquarters in Stockholm had 4,337 branch offices at the end of 1946.
Sweden's postwar fiscal and monetary policy was declared to be directed
towards two objectives: (1) to maintain the internal stability of the currency, i.e., to
maintain the equilibrium between wages and prices; and (2) to maintain an adequate
reserve of foreign exchange. The first objective has been realized within reasonable
limits, though wages in general have risen 25 percent above the cost of living in com-
parison with prewar levels, resulting in considerable excess purchasing power. The
loss of foreign exchange, however, has been so extensive that it indicates a failure to
attain the second objective. The rapid deterioration of Sweden's foreign exchange po-
sition caused the government to tighten its control over imports and foreign exchange
early in 1947 and these restrictions have continually been made more stringent. (See
Foreign Trade, p. 42.)
In response to a great postwar demand for liquid funds, the commercial banks,
savings banks, and insurance companies have gradually sold their large holdings of
Treasury bills and Government bonds acquired during the war. This resulted during
certain periods in very large offers of bonds which threatened to lower their market
value and to affect a corresponding rise in the effective interest rate.
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The government has adhered with determination to a policy of preventing a
rise in the rates of interest on the theory that a rise in interest rates would increase
? the cost of living sufficiently to outweigh its effect in checking the expansion of in-
vestments. Thus, the Riksbank, in pursuance of this policy has had to purchase the
bulk of government bonds offered for sale which has in turn increased the availability
of loanable funds. The Riksbank's note circulation, instead of showing a desired
postwar constriction, has continued to expand as shown in the following table:
Swedish Note Circulation and note cover
(In millions of Kronor)
Net Swedish Other
Foreign Treasury Domestic
At end Note cir- Gold Exchange Bills & note
of: culation Reserves Reserve Bonds cover
Dec.
1938
1061
1332
750
106
50
Dec.
1945
2782
2024
758
434
32
Dec.
1946
2877
1371
538
1544
172
Dec.
1947
2895
379
346
2746
127
Mar.
1948
2730
348
219
2534
141
June
1948
2824
307
79
3064
60
It should also be noted from the above table that Swedish Treasury bills and
bonds held as note cover have increased in direct proportions to the depletion of gold
and net foreign exchange reserves. The Riksbank Act of 1934 fixed the note issue
limit at twice the gold reserve plus 350 million kronor. Because of the decline in gold
and foreign exchange reserves it became necessary for the government to increase the
legally authorized proportion of other note cover. For this purpose the government in
1947 issued two decrees making it possible to use an increasing proportion of the
steadily growing Riksbank holding of Treasury bills and notes. The second decree in-
creased the note issue limit to twice the gold reserve plus 2,500 million kronor.
Other factors which have contributed to the increase of consumer spending
funds and inflationary pressure have been the abolishment of the retail sales tax on 1
January 1947 which released about 300 million kronor; decreased income tax rates in
the lower income brackets, effective 1 January 1948; increased wages, and payment
from 1 January 1948 of a general child-support subsidy of 260 kronor per child up to the
age of 16 years.
During 1946 gross public and private investments totaled 1,280 million dol-
lars. Of this 353 million was utilized for housing and 325 million for private industry.
While private Swedish investments have expanded greatly since the end of the war,
they slowed down somewhat in 1947, showing an increase of 12 percent over 1946 com-
pared with the 1946 increase of 33 percent over 1945. In both years the total increase
was due chiefly to larger industrial investments but these also slowed down, showing
corresponding increases of only 25 percent in 1947 compared with a 50 percent increase
in 1946. Similar trends were displayed by agriculture, private dwelling construction
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and shipbuilding investments. The 1947 increase in investments was practically ab-
sorbed by the rise in prices and costs.
The total Swedish national debt as of 31 December 1947 was 3,136 million dol-
lars, compared with approximately 700 million dollars at the outbreak of the war. This
is broken down roughly into 74 percent in the funded debt and 26 percent in the floating
debt. The increase in the national debt corresponds closely to the budget deficit in-
curred during the war years, which on 30 June 1945 stood at approximately 2,087 million
dollars. Small surpluses of revenue over expenditures during succeeding fiscal years
which have been transferred to the budget deficit account, by 30 June 1948 had reduced
the balance to approximately 1,919 million dollars. The budget adopted for the fiscal
year 1948-1949 does not indicate a serious intention of bringing about a substantial
reduction of the accumulated budget deficit and national debt.
The Swedish government operates under two budgets, one for ordinary operat-
ing expenses and the other for capital investments. The ordinary budget has enjoyed
a surplus since the end of the war while the capital budget has shown a deficit. Pre-
liminary estimates indicate that because of an increase in revenue from taxes, govern-
ment finances for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1948 will show a surplus of approxi-
mately 125 million dollars. The income from Capital Assets, on the other hand, is
expected to be about 13 million dollars less than estimated in the budget. The Postal
Service, Telephone and Telegraph Service, State Railroads, and State Waterfalls will
show an income less than that estimated while State Forests and Lands will yield
slightly more than originally estimated.
The budget of estimated receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year commenc-
ing 1 July 1948 is balanced at roughly 1,325 million dollars, with a surplus of 180
million dollars and current operating expenditures of 1,145 million dollars. Over-
balancing the budget carries out the government's policy to absorb some of the excessive
purchasing power which now exists. A series of revenue measures also have been
adopted to offset the deficits which have occurred in previous fiscal years in the Capital
Assets budget.
Taxation in Sweden takes roughly 19 percent of the gross national product in
the form of excises, customs duties, and taxes on incomes, capital, inheritances and
gifts.
d. Foreign Trade.
Foreign trade is essential to Sweden's economy, hence fluctuations therein are
quickly reflected in the general level of the country's prosperity. For more than half
a century Swedish foreign trade has had a moderate net import balance which in the
years immediately preceding World War II was offset by returns from foreign invest-
ments, shipping services, foreign tourists, and other invisible income. The substantial
prewar import balance with the dollar area was covered by exports to other areas and
by income derived from shipping services.
Swedish imports consist largely of raw materials and fuel while exports, though
fairly diversified, are composed chiefly of a few major classes of goods such as wood, pulp,
paper, wood products, iron ore, and iron and steel. The countries which constitute
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sources of Swedish imports are not, as a general rule, the destinations of its exports,
thus Sweden's prewar trade had a distinct multilateral character. While the Swedish
government continues to express official support of unrestricted multilateral trade as a
long term objective, as a matter of expediency it has had to pursue a postwar policy
of bilateralism.
The bulk of Sweden's prewar trade was carried on with European countries;
Great Britain and Germany, the two most important countries in this regard, accounted
for more than 35 percent of the total. Germany, the chief source of imports, supplied
such important goods as coal and coke, chemicals, textiles, iron and steel, and machin-
ery, while Great Britain, the leading export market, received wood products, pulp and
paper, butter and pork, iron and steel manufactures, and iron ore. In 1938, Swedish
exports were valued at approximately 440 million dollars and imports at approximately
500 million dollars. The following table, showing the extent to which Great Britain,
Germany, and the United States shared in Sweden's exports and imports for 1938,
1946, and 1947, indicates to some extent how Sweden has had to shift its trade since the
war:
Distribution of Sweden's Foreign Trade
SHARE IN TOTAL IMPORTS SHARE IN TOTAL EXPORTS
(percent) (percent)
1938 1946 1947 1938 1946 1947
?
Great Britain
12
10
9
24
15
15
Germany
22
1
2
18
0.7
0.6
United States
16
24
32
9
7
11
Total
50
35
43
51
22.7
26.6
Other
50
65
57
49
77.3
73.4
100
100
100
100
100
100
?
After the outbreak of the war and the establishment of the Skagerrak blockade,
Swedish markets were confined almost exclusively to the Nazi-dominated countries.
Through its trade with Germany and the negotiation of trade and barter agreements
with Denmark, Norway, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, France, and Italy, Sweden was
able, in spite of the war and blockade, to keep her economy functioning with reasonable
success.
Sweden's postwar foreign trade has passed through two distinct phases. First,
immediately after the war, there was a comparatively high level of export, while import
opportunities were strictly limited. This imbalance resulted in an export surplus of
187.2 million dollars in 1945, with the consequence that gold and foreign exchange
holdings increased to 760.6 million dollars. This period was also marked by the exten-
sion of credits to various foreign governments which ultimately totalled nearly one
billion dollars. The largest credit granted during this period was that extended to the
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USSR in the amount of 278 million dollars. Substantial credits were also established
in favor of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Great Britain, and a few other countries.
The second phase of Sweden's postwar foreign trade became apparent in the
middle of 1946, after which there was a reversed trend in the country's trade balance.
During the final phases of the war Sweden had to depend almost entirely on existing
stocks of goods and material. It was, perhaps, only natural, therefore, that an import
boom should develop as soon as foreign supplies again became available. Faced with
the loss of the relatively cheap German products and the inability of a devastated
Europe to supply the expanded demand, Sweden was obliged to reorient its foreign
trade. An effort was made to satisfy import requirements by purchases from countries
whose economies had not suffered physical damage, such as the United States and
South American countries. Thus, although the value of Sweden's exports to European
countries in 1946 was 27.7 million dollars greater than its imports, its imports from
other areas, particularly the United States, were at such a high level that an over-all
net import surplus of 234 million dollars resulted.
To prevent foreign price increases from disturbing the domestic price level,
the government in July 1946 raised the international value of the Swedish krona by 14
percent, altering it from 4.20 kronor to 3.60 kronor to the US dollar. Although this
stimulated imports, it had an adverse effect on exports. Thus, whereas the volume of
1946 exports amounted to 66 percent of that in 1938, imports reached 95 percent of the
1938 volume, although their composition had changed considerably. Imports of many
basic necessities and raw materials still suffered from world shortages, whereas in the
absence of rigid import controls, imports of luxury items increased disproportionately.
In 1947 the value of Sweden's foreign trade reached a record high of 2,332
million dollars. Despite progressively enforced import regulations after 1947, the value
of imports rose to 1,437 million dollars, which was more than 50 percent greater than
in 1946. The value of exports, on the other hand, rose by little more than 25 percent
to 895 million dollars, and this increase was owing principally to the advance in export
prices rather than an increase in volume, Sweden's export price index rose from 153
in 1946 (1937=100) to 184 in 1947; the import price index, on the other hand, rose
more slowly, increasing from 202 to 213, during the same period. In 1947 Sweden had
an import balance of 542 million dollars, which was more than double that in 1946.
More than half of Sweden's imports in 1947 came from the Western Hemisphere,
whereas that region took only a fourth of its exports; imports from the United States
were valued at approximately 453 million dollars while exports to the United States
amounted to 97 million dollars, constituting 32 and 11 percent of the total, respectively.
In comparison, the average annual net import balance with the US in the immediate
prewar period, 1936-38 was only 41 million dollars.
As a result of the continued import balance of trade, foreign currency reserves
declined rapidly. Net holdings of gold and foreign exchange, totalling some 760 million
dollars at the end of 1945, declined to 610 million by the end of 1946, and to approxi-
mately 160 million by 31 December 1947. By May 1948 only 64 million dollars
remained, reflecting a decrease of more than 90 percent in slightly more than two years.
Foreign holdings continued to decline gradually during May and June 1948, but by
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October totalled roughly 100 million dollars. Sweden's dollar balances were virtually
exhausted by 1948 and a general requisitioning of hard currency assets was effected
in October. Sterling balances, apart from 25 million pounds in blocked account, were
exhausted by April 1948.
Sweden's postwar trade problems must be viewed against the general economic
background of the country. Because of the slow recovery of European production and
international trade, Sweden has been unable to import sufficient quantities of indus-
trial equipment and raw materials from European countries, its customary sources
of supply. Since the war, Germany has been practically eliminated, both as a source
of imports and as an outlet for exports. Hence, the increase of foreign trade with the
Western Hemisphere has added to Sweden's import surplus with that area. Concur-
rently, in August 1947, it became apparent that Great Britain's postwar dollar shortage
would preclude Sweden from counterbalancing the unfavorable trade balance with the
Western Hemisphere by means of exports and shipping services to the sterling area.
Internal factors have also contributed to Sweden's critical postwar foreign
trade situation. It would appear that the government's domestic anti-inflationary
program, directed toward stabilizing living costs, that is, insulating the Swedish econ-
omy from world-wide trends, has contributed to the present balance-of-payment difficul-
ties by making it more difficult to export and less difficult to import. Under the
domestic stabilization program, home markets have been supplied at the expense of
export sales, and measures to restrict the importation of luxury items and effectively
allocate foreign exchange were undertaken tardily.
In order to cope with the loss of gold and foreign exchange reserves, and to
assure that the limited earnings of hard currency would be used for the most urgent
needs, particularly for imports from the dollar area, rigid import restrictions were
finally imposed in March 1947; this measure was intended to be a virtual embargo on all
imports except those vital to Swedish industry. Authority for imposition of controls
was based on the exchange control law of June 1939, as implemented by subsequent
decrees. Although the Government established the basis of a complete system of
exchange control, in February 1940 control was exercised only in nominal fashion and
licenses were liberally granted until the measure of 15 March 1947 was invoked.
Thereafter, licenses were required for imports not specifically placed on a free list, and
a coordinated relationship was established between the authorities responsible for
exchange control and those for licensing imports.
Imports restrictions were continually tightened in the last half of 1947 and in
November of that year the government further exercised its power under the Exchange
Control law by requisitioning certain private assets held by Swedish nationals in hard
currency countries. Restrictions were also placed on the right of foreign companies
to remove their earnings from the country. Despite increasingly severe import restric-
tions, Sweden's balance-of-payments position has continued to deteriorate. This
unfavorable situation has been attributed primarily to liberal transitional policies
regarding import licenses and the unforeseen suspension of British sterling converti-
bility in August 1947.
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Since the end of the war, nearly all exports have been subject to control; such
regulation has been exercised: (1) to assure an adequate domestic supply of scarce
commodities; (2) to channel exports to countries able to pay in hard currency; (3) to
ensure the fulfillment of Sweden's commitments under bilateral agreements; and (4)
to supplement official foreign-exchange control measures.
Following the huge import surplus of 1947, the Government announced a for-
eign trade policy for 1948 designed to achieve a balance of trade with the hard currency
countries. The plan called for a small increase in the total volume of exports and,
wherever possible, a shift of exports from soft to hard currency areas. Although the
plan provided for only a slight reduction in the total value of imports, it was estimated
this would result in a 25 percent reduction in volume from 1947. Imports from
hard currency areas were to be reduced to approximately half their 1947 value. Theo-
retically, the plan permitted imports sufficient to satisfy Sweden's minimum essential
needs from hard currency countries; it was believed, however, that the contemplated
reductions could be borne without serious hardship. The plan has not operated as
effectively as its designers had hoped. The value of total imports in the first half of
1948 actually exceeded that during the comparable period in 1947, although there was
substantial decrease in imports from the United States. The increased value reflects
both a rise in prices and the inability to put the plan into effect quickly. The result,
of course, has been a further drain on gold and foreign exchange reserves requiring
further import restrictions. In June of 1948 imports from hard currency countries,
excluding Switzerland, the Western Zone of Germany, and some South American
countries, for the second half of 1948, were limited to 50 million dollars. Of this
amount, 25 million dollars has been allocated for fuel, 16.6 million dollars for industrial
equipment and raw materials, and the balance of 8.4 million dollars for miscellaneous
items. In view of the time required to make a restrictive policy fully effective it is
doubtful whether the new regulations will operate in time to prevent further depletion
of Sweden's gold and foreign exchange reserves.
Aware of the fact that Sweden's gold and foreign exchange reserves might
soon become exhausted, and recognizing the danger to its economy of further import
reductions, the government became increasingly interested in the possibility of obtain-
ing foreign aid. While European recovery has been a fundamental objective in Swe-
den's foreign policy, and although there was little doubt that Sweden would ratify the
OEEC convention, as late as June 1948, no decision in principle had been made with
respect to use of ECA credit. The approaching foreign exchange crisis apparently
outweighed objections that the Marshall Plan would involve Sweden politically, and
on 20 July 1948 the Riksdag ratified the bilateral ECA agreement without a dissenting
vote except by Communist members. Sweden requested a third quarter ECA credit
for the period September?December 1948. Indications are that ECA assistance will
be in the form of loans and conditional grants, which may approximate 50 million
dollars by 31 May 1949.
Sweden can play an important part in European reconstruction by furnishing
certain vitally needed commodities in large volume; these items include wood pulp and
paper, lumber and wallboard needed for industrial reconstruction and for relieving the
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critical housing shortage, pit props for European mines, and iron ore for steel indus-
tries. Without aid, Sweden's capacity to produce these important commodities would
? decline. Even with ECA aid, however, Sweden will have to increase exports relative to
imports, as a long-range policy for balancing its accounts. Perhaps the most effective
means of increasing exports would be a drastic restriction of home consumption and
the acceptance of a more austere standard of living, thereby neutralizing domestic
purchasing power.
Although, in principle, Sweden endorses a multilateral trade policy, continued
commodity shortages, scarcity of foreign exchange, and the general disruption of the
European economy have prompted it to pursue a course of short-term bilateral trading.
Through bilateral trade and payments agreements Sweden has sought: to achieve an
over-all trade balance, to market luxury articles in countries which could not otherwise
afford them, to divert as far as possible importations from hard currency to soft cur-
rency areas and, more basically, to revive and extend its foreign trade wherever possible.
By 1948 Sweden had negotiated bilateral trade and payments agreements with Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Bizone,
French Zone, and Russian Zone) , Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, Spain, Switzer-
land, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Trade with these countries has not expanded to the
extent that was anticipated. Imports from the agreement countries amounted to
58.0 and 46.9 percent of total imports in 1947 and 1948, respectively, compared with
49.4 percent in 1946. Exports during 1947 and 1948 amounted to 64.2 and 63.2 per-
? cent compared with 67.2 percent in 1946. Of the existing agreements only those with
the USSR, Poland, and Yugoslavia provide for settlement of net debit balances in gold
or dollars.
Trade with the USSR is regulated by two agreements, the Commodity Ex-
change and Payments Agreement of 7 September 1940, which was extended with modi-
fications for a period of five years on 7 October 1946, and a credit agreement also signed
on the latter date. Under the Commodity Exchange and Payments agreement, an
exchange of goods amounting to 27.7 million dollars in each direction was planned for
the year. Debit balances in excess of 139 thousand dollars were to be paid in gold or
dollars. During the first year covered by the agreement both exports and imports
were smaller than contemplated; moreover, Sweden ended the year with an import
surplus estimated at ten million dollars which it was required to pay in gold and dollars
to the USSR. (This estimate includes payments to the Soviet Occupation Zone of Ger-
many made pursuant to a trade and payments agreement negotiated on 21 May 1947.)
By a supplementary protocol dated 17 December 1947, trade between Sweden and the
USSR for 1948 was fixed at a value of 8.3 million dollars in each direction exclusive of
trade with the Soviet Zone of Germany.
Thus far Soviet deliveries have more closely approximated the goals set by the
agreement than those by Sweden. As of 1 July 1948 Sweden had contracted to pur-
chase Soviet goods, chiefly wheat, manganese ore, apatite, asbestos and potassium salts
? totalling 11 million dollars and had contracted to export chiefly iron, steel, ball bear-
ings, tungsten wire, cattle, and rags, valued at approximately 6.4 million dollars.
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Under these contracts, Soviet deliveries during the first half of 1948 amounted to 6.5
million dollars and Swedish deliveries to only 1.9 million dollars. No payments have
been made on its payments deficit since September 1947 so that accumulated balances
due the Soviets 1 July 1948 totalled approximately 11 million dollars. Discussions at
that time resulted in an agreement that the balance should be settled primarily by
Swedish exports.
The Swedish-Soviet Credit Agreement, also of 7 October 1946, made available
to the USSR 278 million dollars for purchases in Sweden over a period of five years of
stipulated heavy industrial equipment and related commodities, as well as for the pay-
ment of certain claims and previous credits. The total amount of goods purchasable
on credit from Sweden amounts to 241.6 million dollars. The remainder of the credit,
or 36.7 million dollars, is set aside for payment of Swedish personnel installing machin-
ery in the USSR, shipping costs, payment of claims on property nationalized by the
Soviets in the Baltic States, and to cover a previous credit to Russia amounting to
approximately 10 million dollars.
During 1947 Soviet orders negotiated or placed with Swedish firms under the
Credit Agreement totalled approximately 80 million dollars. Actual shipments, how-
ever, were valued at only about 5 million dollars. During the year an additional 15
million dollars was utilized for advance payment to Swedish manufacturers, for effect-
ing deliveries to the USSR, and in payment of claims for nationalized properties. In
the first half of 1948 Soviet representatives, at the request of Swedish firms, permitted
a downward revision in several contracts, relating particularly to the delivery of heavy
electrical equipment. Thus, as of 30 June 1948 the value of Soviet orders still totalled
no more than 80 million dollars. Swedish deliveries as of that date amounted to
roughly 8 million dollars, and the total amount of the credit used was approximately
25 million dollars.
Both the Swedish and Soviet governments recognize that orders have not been
placed under the credit agreement to the extent anticipated. The usual Soviet com-
plaint has been that Swedish prices are too high and that periods of delivery are unac-
ceptable. Swedish manufacturers, generally opposed to the Social Democratic gov-
ernment whom they feel responsible for the agreement, prefer to trade with the West
and have been hesitant to accept Soviet orders. They have also been reluctant to
make what they feel to be uneconomic plant expansions and have, therefore, looked
adversely on Soviet orders for heavy machinery requiring special tooling and long
periods of manufacture. Although the government has been severely criticized for
negotiating the agreement, it has refused to seek its modification, contending that the
agreement is adjusting itself to Swedish capacity for implementation. While the
Soviets through the agreement may have acquired a means of exerting influence over
Swedish economy, such influence has not yet become evident and would in any event
be limited inasmuch as the Swedish Government is not required to guarantee contem-
plated deliveries.
The exchange of goods between the United States and Sweden is governed
by a reciprocal trade agreement concluded in 1935. Thus, after Sweden imposed quan-
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titative import restrictions in March of 1947, discussions were held between the two gov-
ernments concerning features which were in violation of the agreement. In view of
Sweden's foreign exchange difficulties, an understanding was reached providing for
temporary modification of certain provisions of the 1935 agreement. In effect, it was
agreed that the Swedish government might discriminate against the United States in
licensing imports if failure to do so would result in a restriction of Sweden's over-all
volume of trade. Sweden agreed that a certain minimum volume of imports would be
paid for on a current basis and that no further reductions of imports were to be made
without equitable transitional regulations. As previously mentioned foreign exchange
holdings declined rapidly and for that reason the government in December 1947 ini-
tiated further discussions on Swedish-American trade. These discussions resulted in a
revised understanding permitting Sweden to control the transfer of earnings and
remittances and to further reduce its imports from the United States with special
attention being given during the transitional period to "hardship cases."
e. Consumers' Cooperatives.
The Kooperativa Forbundet (cooperative union) , started in the 19th century
as a purchasing pool, has grown into an important factor in the Swedish economy.
Retail outlets for the central organization are local cooperative societies which at the
end of 1947 totalled more than 700, representing approximately 880,000 members or
nearly one-half the families in Sweden. All the local societies belong to Kooperativa
Forbundet, the central organization, which is owned and controlled by them. The
central organization is the wholesale society of the cooperative movement and is the
central buying organization for the local societies. In addition it operates more than
twenty production plants so that many of the goods which it delivers to the local socie-
ties are manufactured in its own factories. Kooperativa Forbundet also sells goods to
the government and to private firms. The local societies, on the other hand, are not
compelled to buy from it.
At the end of 1946 the combined assets of the central organization and its
subsidiaries totalled about 143 million dollars and its total sales amounted to 164 million
dollars. Goods sold to the local societies were valued at 107 million dollars. The 1946
turnover of the local societies, however, amounted to 316 million dollars, an increase
of nearly 16 percent from 1945. In 1947 the turnover of the local societies increased
by another 13 percent to 356 million dollars. It is estimated that the consumer
cooperatives in 1947 handled more than 20 percent of the retail food trade and approxi-
mately 13 percent of all retail trade in Sweden.
The Kooperativa F6rbundet operates flour, oatmeal, and margarine factories
in addition to plants for the production of clothing and footwear; its rubber goods fac-
tory and its porcelain plants for the production of bathroom fixtures are the largest in
Sweden in their respective lines. The cooperative electric bulb factory employs some
1,600 people and has subsidiaries in Glasgow and Oslo. Forest products are the basis
of several cooperative industries, including the production of paper pulp, insulating
material and wallboard. A recent venture has been the formation of a petroleum
cooperative which now handles about 10 percent of the petroleum business in Sweden.
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Aside from the Union's economic activities it also operates a cooperative college
near Stockholm and is the leading publisher of books on economics and social subjects
as well as publishing several popular periodicals.
3. ECONOMIC STABILITY.
A mild inflationary tendency has characterized the postwar Swedish economy.
This tendency has contributed to the unfavorable balance of trade and to the resultant
reduction of Sweden's net gold and foreign exchange reserves to a minimum working
balance. Now that the quadrennial elections are over, however, the government has
adopted a new economic plan and submitted its self-aid program to the OEEC. The
government is emphasizing increased exports through closer cooperation between indus-
try and labor, increased production of export goods and other measures to channel goods
into the export market but is doing very little to remedy the superfluity of consumer
spending funds. The government has rejected proposals for depreciating the value of
the krona and proposals for raising discount rates and increasing taxes. In order to
promote cooperation with industry the government has tacitly shelved socialization
plans and has promised to reduce controls over industry. While the government, pos-
sibly for political reasons, hopes to avoid a reduction in the standard of living it is
nevertheless felt that to achieve the objects of the new economic program there will
eventually have to be some reduction of excess domestic purchasing power. With ECA
assistance, however, industrial production should remain close to the present level and
it should rise moderately after completion of the industrial expansion program which is
now being slowed down owing to shortages of material and labor. A balance of trade,
especially with the Western Hemisphere, is expected by 1952.
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. GENESIS OF PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY.
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The basic policy governing Sweden's present foreign relations dates back to the
early 19th century when, together with other small European states, she abandoned
ideas of active participation in the political maneuverings and military exploits of the
European powers and took refuge in neutrality. The Swedes realized that with the
spread of conscription and the steady advance of war techniques a small country with
limited manpower and insufficient resources could not compete for military prestige
with great powers. The recollection that, by great expenditures of men and resources
in frequent wars, Sweden had built an empire only to lose it to stronger powers greatly
influenced the Swedes in this realization and in fact, in view of the general exhaustion
of the country, made it practically obligatory. Recognizing their weakness and the
dangers inherent in their proximity to the centers of power politics on the continent,
Sweden decided that her independence might well depend on avoiding friction and
thus resolved to keep away from alignments and seek security in neutrality.
The term "neutrality" applied to Swedish foreign policy is incorrectly used .if
411 defined in the strictest sense. So determined are the Swedes to keep out of war that
their policy is commonly described as one of "neutrality" whether or not other nations
are engaged in conflict. When war actually breaks out, Sweden seeks to be recognized
as a neutral and to isolate herself from the struggle; she is furthermore prepared to
support this position by maintaining a defense force sufficiently strong to make an
attack on her more costly than the advantages to be gained would justify. Even in
time of peace Sweden seeks to remain "neutral" by avoiding political commitments
from which extrication would be difficult in the event of war, but she participates
wholeheartedly in international organizations * so long as no such entangling com-
mitment is required. Sweden's entire peacetime foreign policy is characterized by
the desire for international cooperation which will realize collective security, and by
the fear that if she participates too actively she will not be treated as a neutral in case
international cooperation breaks down and war occurs. Unrealistic as such a policy
may seem, Sweden has since the Napoleonic era successfully avoided war; the wisdom
of being prepared to pursue armed neutrality during an emergency was proven once
again?to Swedish satisfaction?by the experiences of Denmark and Norway in World
War II.
Sweden was an eager participant in the League of Nations, seeing in the collective
security provisions of the Covenant a shield to protect small countries. The League
also offered an opportunity to participate actively in international affairs without
?
* Thus Sweden's "neutrality" is not carried quite to the logical extreme of Switzerland's; the
latter country, furthermore, has its neutrality guaranteed by international treaty.
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joining a big power bloc. Sweden has especially sought to promote political, economic,
and cultural collaboration among the Scandinavian countries, but even this has not
been allowed to lead beyond the bounds of neutrality. In 1864, for example, Sweden
stayed aloof from Prussia's war on Denmark, and during World War II fired no shot
in defense of Norway or Denmark.
In summary, Sweden's foreign policy has been based on a determination to main-
tain correct relations with all major powers, to participate in international programs
so far as her ability to be neutral in time of war is not compromised and, in the event
of war, to trust to neutrality backed up by arms to prevent encroachment on her
independence.
2. POST WORLD WAR II FOREIGN POLICY.
Sweden emerged from World War II relatively sound and whole economically,
determined to continue the "Middle Way," and convinced that for a small nation sur-
rounded by strong neighbors impartiality between conflicting power groups is the safest
course, well worth the uncertainty and guile it entails.
Peacetime policy was officially embarked upon when, at the opening of the Riksdag
in the fall of 1945, the government announced its intention of seeking membership in
the United Nations, thus pledging cooperation for the preservation of world peace.
Under the terms of the UN Charter, Sweden thereby agreed?technically, at least?to
forego neutrality if requested by UN to assist in the enforcement of a UN decision.
The Swedes undertook UN participation with something less than enthusiasm, in part
at least as a result of disillusionment over the failure of the League of Nations, and
were apprehensive that the East-West antagonism emerging in the UN might place
Sweden in the position she had consistently avoided: that of being required to take
sides with one of the great powers. The Swedes realized, however, that more than
ever before a peaceful future and the freedom of small nations depended upon some
international accord.
Despite Sweden's reluctance to make commitments which might be interpreted as
"choosing sides" between East and West, postwar international developments occa-
sionally have forced the government to take a definite stand on international prob-
lems. In unison with Norway and Denmark, Sweden has committed itself?if with
reservations?on three major points: (1) the European recovery plan has been em-
braced so far as its economic aspects are concerned, while its political and potential
military implications have been carefully ignored; (2) Communism has been officially
denounced; although the government was reluctant to risk offending the USSR by such
a step, it yielded to the point of view of the other Scandinavian countries and the anti-
Communist campaign, once adopted, has been pursued with sincerity; and (3) official
conferences to explore the possibility of military collaboration with Norway and Den-
mark have been agreed to, although Sweden's insistence that any bloc formed be
committed to neutrality makes mutual agreement unlikely.
The government's policy of armed neutrality has practically unanimous support.
However, neither the government nor the Swedish people as a whole are complacent
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as to the future success of neutrality. Most Swedes realize that in the event of a
third war Sweden's chances of remaining neutral will be significantly less than in
previous wars, but they are willing to gamble on any chance that might preserve
Swedish independence and prevent the country becoming a battle ground.
3. SIGNIFICANT RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS.
a. Germany.
Sweden's relations with Germany are based on long-established public atti-
tudes. For centuries Germanic influence has been strong in Sweden. Business and
cultural connections have been numerous and mutually beneficial. During the Nazi
regime the Swedish attitude was generally one of disapproval, especially after Nazi
policies led to war and the occupation of two Nordic states, but disapproval was tem-
pered by past friendly relations and the existence of kindred racial characteristics.
Today, Sweden's relations with Germany consist principally of business deals arranged
with, or subject to the control of, the occupation authorities while the Swedish Govern-
ment awaits a change in the great powers' policies toward their defeated enemy.
Sweden desires and hopes to see the political and economic rehabilitation of Germany
proceed at a rapid rate. Revival of the commercial ties between the two countries is in
Sweden's interest. In addition, there is considerable support in Sweden for a strong
(but nonaggressive) Germany to provide some counterweight to the present dominant
position of Soviet Russia in Central and Eastern Europe.
b. Soviet Union.
For centuries, Swedish-Russian relations were marked by almost constant
warfare for control of the Baltic littoral. Despite the existence of peaceful relations
since 1809, the traditional fear of Russia is still prevalent; indeed, it has been intensi-
fied by the threat inherent in Communist ideology to the individualistic society of
Sweden, although diplomatic relations with the USSR have continued without inter-
ruption since March 1924.
While Sweden remains fundamentally anti-Russian, the end of World War II
left the strategic situation in northern Europe so altered that the government has felt
impelled to revise its policy toward the USSR. The security which the European bal-
ance of power provided in the 19th century and which after World War I resulted from
Russian and German weakness and the presence of intervening states has disappeared.
Soviet power extends to the Baltic; the weakness otthe other European nations provides
no counterpoise to it, and US power is far removed from Sweden. Sweden turned to
the international security organization for any support she might need in the future
against the Soviet Union. The UN, however, will serve Sweden's security interest only
insofar as it promotes the solidarity of the Great Powers and establishes a forum for the
mobilization of world opinion against aggression.
Viewing this situation, Sweden concluded that her immediate security lay in
friendly relations with the USSR. and embarked on a good-neighbor policy toward the
Kremlin while carefully maintaining elsewhere an independent foreign policy that
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would not offend the Soviets. Swedish desire to be a friendly neighbor found expres-
sion in November 1946 when a billion-kronor trade and credit agreement was concluded
with the USSR. Swedish fear of displeasing the Kremlin was exhibited when the
European nations gathered at Paris in the summer of 1947 to consider Secretary Mar-
shall's proposal concerning economic collaboration: Sweden indicated willingness to
participate on the express understanding that no political commitments were involved.
In other words, Sweden wants to give the USSR no opportunity to accuse her of joining
a Western or anti-Soviet bloc.
In summary, the Swedes believe that their future security with respect to the
USSR will be contingent upon the effectiveness of UN and the successful pursuit of
correct relations with the Kremlin.
c. United States.
Sweden's prewar political orientation was completely western. A long history
of mutually beneficial trade between the US and Sweden was coupled with cultural,
technical, and scientific interchange. The US was the land of opportunity to Sweden
and, although from time to time, particularly in the post World War I period, the
dominant Social Democratic Party recalled that the American capitalistic system is
theoretically anathema to socialist doctrine, in practice there were no serious conflicts
of ideology. After World War II, however, while Sweden's friendly attitude toward the
US underwent no fundamental change, the increased stature of the USSR made it
expedient for Sweden to divide her attentions between the two great powers in order
to avoid the appearance of having "chosen sides."
d. United Kingdom.
The UK is traditionally one of Sweden's most important markets and Anglo-
Swedish relations have been marked by the same friendliness as Swedish-US relations.
The existence of socialist governments in both countries has developed no especial
friendliness based on socialist sympathies, but the Swedish and British trade unions
maintain close contact. However, Sweden's desire to be on friendly terms with all
but aligned with none has resulted in the same adjustment in her official attitude
toward the UK as toward the US.
e. Norway and Denmark.
Sweden's relations with Norway and Denmark are so close and friendly that a
Nordic Union of the three Scandinavian states has been discussed for centuries.
Few concrete results have been obtained, and during World War II when Sweden
remained neutral after Norway and Denmark were occupied by Germany, the ties
were severely strained. However, despite Norwegian resentment of Swedish conduct
during World War II, consultation on mutual problems was resumed shortly after
liberation. Since that time UN issues, international economic matters and foreign
policy questions of many types have been discussed and a joint stand generally agreed
upon. After the Danish elections in October 1947 the bonds of union were strength-
ened by the existence of Social Democratic governments in all three countries. In
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1948 several joint policies were agreed upon, including (1) campaigns to counteract
Communist influence to be carried on in each of the three countries, (2) establishment
of a Joint Nordic Committee for Economic Collaboration to study questions of common
interest to the economy of the Scandinavian countries, and (3) formation of a Joint
Defense Committee to explore possibilities of Scandinavian military collaboration.
The Joint Nordic Committee for Economic Collaboration is studying and
recommending practical steps leading to greater economic cooperation in Scandinavia
with a Nordic Customs Union as a possible but future goal. Such questions as common
tariff policy, increased freedom of trade and rationalization of production are being
examined. However, not only are there serious obstacles to the establishment of a
Nordic Customs Union because of the competitive nature of the Scandinavian econo-
mies, but Norway is opposed and Sweden only mildly interested.
Common cultural ties have led to the formation of numerous inter-Scandi-
navian organizations and, both through their efforts and through government arrange-
ments, considerable progress has been made in social and cultural cooperation. The
Nordic Interparliamentary Group, composed of the separate interparliamentary groups
in the three countries, is active and influential in this field. The inter-Scandinavian
society "Norden" has been active since the end of World War I in fostering a kind of
pan-Scandinavian movement and in promoting official and unofficial cooperation.
Following World War II, largely as a reaction to the threat posed to Scandi-
navian security by the growing rift between East and West, the Scandinavian gov-
ernments began to give serious consideration to military collaboration. Sweden,
initially unwilling to risk compromising her position as a neutral, later agreed
to explore possibilities of military cooperation without reference to political considera-
tions, and a Joint Defense Committee was set up in September 1948. Some degree of
unanimity apparently has been reached on the technical problems of military coordina-
tion but, when the question of forming a military alliance is discussed, Sweden is almost
certain to refuse to participate unless the proposed alliance is committed to neutrality.
Since this view is likely to be opposed in Norway and unpopular in Denmark, the for-
mation of a Scandinavian military bloc remains highly uncertain.
4. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
a. United Nations.
Although aware of the necessity of joining the UN, the Swedes in general
showed little enthusiasm for the organization. The fear in Sweden, as in other small
nations, was that the UN had within it the same seeds of dissolution and failure as
the late League of Nations. Yet, as a small nation in a world dominated by two or
three great powers, the Swedes had no recourse but to work through the new organ-
ization. Sweden's membership did not become a subject of partisan debate in Swedish
politics, and she was admitted in November 1946.
Sweden entered the UN with two main ideas: (1) that the organization was
the only existing means to a lasting peace; and (2) that Sweden would cooperate as
fully as her policy of neutrality toward East-West quarrels would permit.
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Sweden realizes that the success of the UN depends upon reasonable harmony
among the Big Three, on which in turn hinges her own security. She is therefore
alarmed over the growing rift between the western democracies and the USSR.
During 1947, wary of identifying herself with either side, Sweden tended to regard
East-West disputes as a Great Power quarrel which Swedish policy had neither caused
nor could cure, and as a consequence frequently abstained from voting on issues where
there was a clear East-West division; this abstention was often excused by the Swedes
as a desire not to increase the tension. In the 1948 sessions, however, Sweden's
policy was more positive and in several cases, e.g. disarmament and control of atomic
weapons, Sweden definitely lined up with the West. Two main factors account for
this modification of policy: (1) sincere endorsement of the merits of the Western
position and (2) realization that world opinion is now so clearly aligned and Sweden's
Western sympathies so well known that abstaining from voting would be censured in
the West as moral cowardice but would not win increased good will in the East.
b. European Recovery Plan.
The course of the European recovery plan in Sweden from the time of Secre-
tary Marshall's Harvard speech of 5 June 1947 to the final passage of the ECA agree-
ment by the Swedish Riksdag on 20 July 1948 reveals the flexibility of Swedish neu-
trality. The immediate reaction of enthusiasm gradually turned to scepticism when
it became apparent that the Plan would be met by strong Soviet opposition. After
the withdrawal of the USSR from the Paris conference, convened for the purpose of
considering the Plan, Sweden reluctantly agreed to participate but reiterated a deter-
mination to avoid any political implications. Sweden, at that time relatively well off
financially and not expecting to derive substantial direct benefit from American aid,
viewed participation indifferently; some left-wing circles even suggested that the Plan
was designed primarily to avert a depression in the US.
After the US Congress had voted interim aid for France, Italy, and Austria
in December 1947, and after the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, Swedish
opinion veered to the view that the Marshall Plan was vital to European recovery and
an effective means to halt Communist aggression. The government, reluctant to
make an abrupt about-face, however, continued on the cautious line of favoring the
economic aspects of ERP but condemning any political implications. Meanwhile,
Sweden's gold and foreign exchange reserves had decreased to a critical level. The
ensuing internal economic difficulties viewed against the background of the approach-
ing general election together with further assurances of the non-political nature of
the Marshall Plan prompted the Swedish Riksdag to approve the ECA agreement in
July 1948 without a dissenting vote except from Communist members.
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CHAPTER IV
MILITARY SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF MILITARY POLICIES.
Stemming from a national policy of armed neutrality, Sweden's military policies
are aimed at the maintenance of strong, up-to-date, armed forces designed for defensive
purposes only. The foundations of the national and resultant military policies lie in
three conflicting traditions. First and foremost of these is a desire for peace. For
over 135 years, or from Napoleonic times, Sweden has devoted itself to peaceful pur-
suits and, in so doing, has gradually transformed its previously aggressive and warlike
attitude into a defensive one. Also during this period Sweden, by managing to stay
neutral, has enjoyed a prosperity and stability which has greatly strengthened the
national determination to continue at peace. Yet, despite the establishment of this
tradition, a pride has survived in the military exploits of Kings Gustavus Adolphus
and Charles XII. Hence there is also a military tradition which has kept alive a high
respect for the military profession and a consideration that military service is a
civic duty.
The last, and perhaps oldest, of the three traditions is fear of Russia. With
two brief exceptions, one during the extremely remote threat of war with Norway in
1905 and another during the more imminent threat of German invasion in World War
II, Sweden has from time immemorial organized her defensive system with the prime
consideration that Russia is the potential aggressor.
The experiences of World Wars I and II confirmed the Swedes in their con-
victions of the value of peace and a neutrality backed by armed might. Threats of a
third world conflict in which Scandinavia would occupy a position of strategic im-
portance seem to have intensified these convictions even further, for Sweden has
developed well-balanced land, sea, and air forces, backed them by substantial and readily
mobilized reserves, and striven for their complete modernization. But the purpose of
these forces is held clearly in view: they are not for military adventures, and it is
hoped that they are not for use in a third world war; they are primarily to protect
the neutrality of Sweden by making its violation so costly as to deter the attempt.
2. WAR POTENTIAL.
a. Manpower.
Out of a total population in excess of 6.8 million, Sweden has over 1,100,000
males within the conscription age limits of 20 to 4'7 and considered fit for military
service. A large majority of these men have received limited training under the
existing conscription system and about 850,000 are considered available for military
service in event of an emergency. Because of equipment limitations, however, it is
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estimated that no more than 725,000 would be utilized by the Armed Forces in their
wartime tactical and administrative organizations. An estimated 100,000 men, con-
sisting of those over and under the conscription age, would be in the organized Home
Guard.
The Swedish reserves are organized to the extent that each man has been
assigned to wartime "paper" units with each unit having an assembly point in the
military district in which the reserves assigned to it normally live. At such assembly
points available stocks of supplies and equipment have been distributed. To become
militarily effective after call to active duty, these reserves must receive unit and com-
bined training.
With respect to the use of women there is a program underway to expand the
existing quasi-military Women's Corps (Lottaka'r) for training and use as a regular
branch of the armed forces in duties similar to those of the US Women's Army Corps.
It has been estimated that approximately 350,000 women (ages 20-50) would be avail-
able for this type of duty.
b. Natural Resources and Industrial Potential.
Sweden's economic military potential, i.e., the ability to produce weapons,
equipment, and other supplies necessary to sustain its armed forces, is limited by an
almost negligible supply of coal and petroleum. Other compensating characteristics
of the economy, however, raise the economic war potential. On the basis of output
of certain raw materials and intermediate and final manufactures used in immense
quantities during the last war, Sweden would rank not higher than 9th among the
nations of the world. Based on estimated annual current productive capacity and
excluding the UK and the USSR, Sweden would rank approximately as follows among
the countries of Europe in the production of essential raw materials and manufactures:
Rank Quantity
Electric Power 4th 14.0 billion KWH
Iron Ore 2nd 8.2 million MT
(metal content)
Steel 6th 1.2 million MT
Nonferrous Metal Ores:
Copper 6th 9.6 thousand MT
(metal content)
Bauxite 9th 10.4 thousand MT
(metal content)
Lead 6th 11.4 thousand MT
(metal content)
Zinc 6th 36.0 thousand MT
(metal content)
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Refined Nonferrous Metals:
Copper
Aluminum
Lead
Zinc
Sulphuric Acid
Motor Vehicles
Airplanes
Arms and Ammunition
Shipbuilding
Rank
4th
7th
9th
12th
8th
4th
2nd
4th
5th
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Quantity
16.6 thousand MT
3.9 thousand MT
10.4 thousand MT
2.9 thousand MT
125.0 thousand MT
20,000
1.5 million pounds
of airframe
weight
6 Percent of US
capacity
275,000 gross tons
On the basis of relative importance allotted to the above raw materials and
products in accordance with their essentiality in the prosecution of war, and consider-
ing that production of coal and petroleum and petroleum refining capacity are negli-
gible, Sweden nevertheless would have an economic war potential exceeded in Europe
only by the UK, the USSR, Germany, France, and the Benelux countries.
Sweden's economic war potential is based primarily on its iron ore resources,
hydroelectric power capacity, the high state of development of its industries and the
skill of its labor force. Swedish output of iron ore exceeds that of the UK and ap-
proaches USSR output exclusive of the satellites. Prior to the termination of World
War II plans were already developed for the increase of iron and steel output by 40
percent and for the expansion of the electric power system. When fully developed
it is estimated that the hydroelectric system will have an annual output of 6.5 million
KW. It should be pointed out, however, that the destruction of a few key power plants
could cause serious dislocation of industry.
While the aircraft industry is expanding and produces fighters and light
bombers, it would not be capable of meeting airforce requirements in the event of war.
The Bofors Company, together with smaller producers and government arsenals, are
capable of meeting the requirements of the military forces for small arms, artillery,
explosives, and ammunition. Bofors has recently contracted with the Philips Company
of the Netherlands for the production and assembly of VT fuzes. With the assistance
of the domestic automobile industry it produces tanks up to 22 tons. Swedish manu-
facturers can meet communications requirements although not with equipment equal
to latest US types nor with modern radar and sonar. The shipbuilding industry
ranked second in world launching of ships in 1947 with 222,598 gross tons.
c. Scientific.
Sweden is making much effort to expand and modernize its research program
in all scientific fields. In view of the importance and diversity of this program a
somewhat detailed summary of Swedish scientific activities has been attached as Ap-
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pendix D. In brief, Swedish scientific capabilities are generally adequate to meet the
demands of the nation's armed forces and industry. Swedish scientists, though few
in number, are thoroughly trained and highly respected. The trend is toward ever-
increasing coordination of scientific effort, with the government exercising a major role
by financial support to universities, institutes, and individuals, joint state-private con-
trol of nominally private institutions, and creation of policy committees. Some prog-
ress is being made in major fields of interest including atomic energy, guided missiles,
chemical warfare, electronics, and aeronautics; but work to date is almost entirely
along established lines of endeavor.
3. BASIC POLICIES AND PRACTICES.
a. Mission and Strategy of the Armed Forces.
The primary mission of the Swedish Armed Forces is to defend Sweden against
an aggressor. To carry out this mission, military leaders are responsible for the
maintenance of the armed forces in a maximum state of military preparedness and
serviceability. Plans and organization of the Armed Forces are directed toward re-
sistance to aggression by coordinated defensive action within Sweden proper. Extensive
reorganization would be necessary to conduct offensive action and current information
eliminates the possibility that such action is contemplated.
In detail, the geographical defense organization divides Sweden into regions,
with Army, Navy, and Air Force Commands generally conforming to these regions.
Available information indicates that the defensive strategy contains the following ele-
ments: (a) initial, perimeter (chiefly coastal) defense; (b) northeastern defense based
on Boden; and, (c) central defense based on Stockholm. The Swedes believe that an
attempt at invasion of their territory would be temporarily checked by a perimeter de-
laying action. In the northeast, along the Finnish frontier, attack would be met by out-
post forces of the northeastern defense zone, with air support. If the attack was di-
rected against any point along the lengthy coastline, the mission of opposing the ene-
my's initial effort would fall chiefly on the Air Force and Navy (including coastal defense
forces) , plus Army local defense troops which would be shifted as required from key
concentration points. Defense of the northern frontiers would have to be based on
delaying actions fought by infantry-artillery combat teams concentrated at main
ingress portals to Sweden and Norway. Since the mountainous nature of this terrain
is looked upon as a considerable natural barrier in itself, only a minimum defense along
this frontier would be offered. It is also believed that Gotland is and would be well
fortified and strongly held as a strong point in perimeter defense.
A second line of defense in the northeast would be the partially completed line
of fortifications based on Boden. This line is designed to control important communica-
tions from Finland through northern Sweden to Narvik in Norway. The final defense
of the central area, which contains the greater part of Sweden's critical industries
represent the major all-out effort, in the hope that this most important area could
be held until aid from outside could arrive.
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b. Favored Arms and Techniques.
Arms and techniques in Sweden's Armed Forces are designed to conform to
her defensive policy, geographic location, and terrain characteristics. The Army
emphasizes defensive fighting on the home ground, utilizing permanent fortifications
and defensible terrain features to the utmost. Special conditions in Sweden, such as
snowbound seasons, extensive forests, and scarcity of roads, have caused particular
attention to be paid to guerrilla and small unit tactics, with little or no consideration
being given to large unit tactics (division and above). These same conditions have
also dictated the use of light mobile combat arms and equipment. The Navy, though
possessing a general tactical concept that is obsolete, is cognizant of World War II
advances and aims at development of a fast, light but hardhitting force which can,
in cooperation with the land based Air Force, meet the needs of a shallow-water coast-
line defense. The Air Force, at present, uses conventional defensive tactics in the
employment of their fighter force, concentrating the maximum number of planes avail-
able on initial efforts. Much effort is being expended to develop a homogeneous, highly
mobile striking force featuring high altitude interceptors and low-level fighter bombers
operating from secret, dispersed airfields. Nightfighter training is being pursued and
jet fighter tactical doctrine based on operational capabilities of available jet aircraft is
being formulated. All branches of the services are seriously lacking in the equipment
and techniques for proper use of radio and radar. With respect to combined operations,
little progress has yet been made owing to lack of attention and funds and to friction
between the services.
c. Military Organization and Duties.
(1) Military High Command.
Being vested with all executive authority, the King is the nominal Su-
preme Commander of the Armed Forces. Actual control, however, is exercised by the
Minister of Defense who is charged with administering all matters pertaining to the
Armed Forces. The Defense Minister is the only representative of the Armed Forces
at cabinet level as there are no separate civilian ministers for the Army, Navy, or Air
Force. He confines his work to the political aspects of defense, delegating authority
to his subordinate, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, for actual military
control and supervision of the three coequal components, Army, Navy,. and Air Force.
The Ministry of Defense includes a section of the Crown Chancery, which handles
matters of a financial and legal nature, and the Command and Liaison Office, which
has Army, Navy, and Air sections and decides governmental matters of a command
nature. This office is not subordinate to any purely military authority and is charged
with such other activities as liaison with foreign attaches and decorations of military
personnel. The Commander-in-Chief is held responsible for maintaining the Armed
Forces in a state of maximum military preparedness and serviceability and has direct
command of field commanders in wartime. He is assisted by a joint defense staff com-
posed of personnel from, and operated as a general staff for, all three services. Eco-
nomic and technical problems of the Minister of Defense are handled by certain cen-
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tral governmental offices which occupy positions relatively independent of respective
service commanders. These offices are: the Defense Civil Administration, Defense
Medical Administration, Board of War Supply, Defense Factory Administration, De-
fense Research Institute, and the Military Fortifications and Building Board.
(2) Army.
The Commander of the Army is responsible for up-to-date organization,
equipment, and efficiency of both the Army and Home Guard. In peacetime he also has
operational command of all land forces of Sweden, including the Home Guard. In
wartime he retains responsibility only for administration, including the procurement
and training of recruits. He is assisted by the Army Command consisting of the Army
Staff, Army Administration, Central Conscript Bureau (for all three services), Army
Inspectorate, and the Home Guard Commander. Geographically, the chain of com-
mand to troops is through the seven Military Districts, into which the country is divided
with one of the districts on Gotland Island. Each Military District is subdivided into
a number of "Defense Areas." Functionally, the Army is organized into Infantry,
Cavalry, Artillery, Antiaircraft Artillery, and Armored Force as the combat arms and
Engineer, Signal, Supply or Transportation, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Medical, Veter-
inary, and Judge Advocate Department as the non-combatant branches or services.
Tactically, the Swedish Army contains no units larger than regiments during peace-
time. Corps and divisions would be formed during wartime.
(3) Navy.
The Chief of the Navy is responsible for up-to-date organization, equip-
ment, and efficiency in the Navy and Coast Artillery. He is assisted by the Navy Com-
mand which includes the Naval Staff, Coast Artillery Inspectorate, Branch Inspectors,
and Naval Administration. Geographically, the Navy is organized into six Naval Dis-
tricts, five along the Swedish coastline and the sixth on Gotland. The Coast Artillery
Defense organization conforms to these districts for command and administration with
the Coast Artillery Inspector mainly responsible for inspection and training. The
Navy's tactical organization consists of a Coastal Fleet (with varying numbers of war-
ships and submarines) with subordinate divisions functionally organized. In addition
there is a Training Task Force comprising older ships. There is no naval air arm.
(4) Air Force.
The Air Force Commander has responsibility for the up-to-date organ-
ization, equipment and training of the Air Force only. He is assisted by the Air Com-
mand which includes the Air Staff, the Air Surgeon General, and the Air Administra-
tion. Geographically, the Air Force is organized into five Fying Base Districts each
responsible for supply and the maintenance of buildings and aerodromes within its
specified area. The Air Force performs a purely tactical defense role with fighter,
ground attack, and reconnaissance units. Tactical organization consists of four Eska-
ders (equivalent of US Wings) with a total of seventeen subordinate tactical flotillas
(equivalent of US Groups). Each flotilla is composed of three divisions (equivalent
of US Squadrons) which are further broken down into three flights.
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d. Recruitment.
Compulsory military service was instituted in 1812, and is considered by
Swedes as a civic duty. Initially the required training lasted only a few days; in 1901
the period was extended to 240 and in 1914 to 340 days. Between the two World Wars
the compulsory service period was reduced but after the invasion of Norway and Den-
mark in 1940, it was increased to 12 months. In the summer of 1948, the training period
was changed to 9 months' basic training with 3 monthly refresher courses for the Army
and Coast Artillery, while the 12-month training period for Navy and Air Force re-
mained unchanged. In a national emergency, all inductees can be required to remain
in active service for an additional 180 days. General administration of the system
is handled by the Central Conscription Bureau under the Army Commander. This
bureau keeps statistics for the whole country and coordinates the requirements of all
the services. There are 21 registration or conscription areas with a recruiting board
for each area established under a designated army regiment.
Up to 1941 military training and service were selective and considerable num-
bers of men, though physically qualified, were not called up. As of 1 January 1942,
however, every Swedish male between 20 and 47 years of age became liable for military
service. Of approximately 48,000 men reaching military age each year, about 35,000
are inducted, with the remainder representing deferments and exemptions. Of those
inducted about 25,000 normally go into the Army (mainly infantry) , 5,000 into the
Navy and Coast Artillery, and 5,000 into the Air Force. Opportunity is given inductees
for training as both commissioned and non-commissioned officers.
e. Training.
(1) Pre-Induction..
Preliminary military training is given in a number of ways. Military
instruction, totalling about one week devoted to target practice, is given in high
school, and voluntary shooting clubs for boys 14-20 have a membership of approxi-
mately 320,000. Four hours weekly of Home Guard training is given teen-age boys
(17-20) who may volunteer for training. Instruction consists primarily in infantry
squad tactics and marksmanship. Physical conditioning consisting of gymnastics
totals five hours weekly and is obligatory, and there is field and track work, including
cross-country running. Finally there are extension courses for both teen-age boys
and girls, devoted to civil defense training such as first aid, fire fighting, etc.
(2) Army.
The Army calls up its annual quota of recruits in the spring and divides
them into two groups. Those in Group "I", which is by far the larger, are assigned to
a particular branch of the service and to the unit nearest their residence. With this
unit each recruit receives his basic training and to it he generally belongs for 17 years;
he is then transferred to a local defense unit in his home area. Group "K" includes
graduates of secondary schools, volunteers, and men with special qualifications. After
completion of the basic training period, the soldier is assigned to his war organiza-
tion. During the summer months, emphasis is placed upon individual recruit training
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in the regiment. In addition to physical conditioning and gunnery, the infantry recruit
is instructed in marksmanship, map reading, scouting, patrolling, and special subjects
such as demolition, first aid, etc. Unit training, usually given during the winter
months, includes maneuvers, combat firing and defense against airborne attack;
emphasis is placed on snow, forest, and mountain fighting. Tactical unit training
above that of the regiment is extremely rare.
In the third and eighth years after conscript training the men are
required to serve an additional month. Usually this refresher training is accomplished
during winter maneuvers, when partial mobilization of wartime units is held. This is
the only time the conscript trains with the unit to which he will be attached in time of
war. A final 30-day re-schooling course, normally taken during the seventeenth year,
aims at qualifying the older soldier for service with a local defense unit.
All mentally and physically qualified men are eligible for officer training,
although those selected are preponderantly high school (equivalent to 2 years of col-
lege in US) and university graduates assigned to Group "K" at time of induction. All
officer candidates must complete basic training plus a six months' NCO course. Reserve
officer training totals two years, while the course for regular army officers requires three.
In addition, all officers are required to attend specialized courses at one of the infantry,
artillery, cavalry, or engineering schools maintained by the Army. For NCO's the total
training period, including 9 months' basic training, is 15 months plus the required
refresher courses.
There is a Swedish Military Academy composed of (1) the War College at
Karlberg (near Stockholm) which all officer candidates attend for one year; (2) the
Defense College at Uppsala, at which Army, Navy, and Air Force officer candidates are
trained, and (3) the Army NCO School at Uppsala. In addition, the Army maintains
the Royal Staff College at Stockholm where a two-year course is designed to train
officers for higher echelon duties.
(3) Navy.
The Navy calls up about 3,000 conscripts annually, in quarterly incre-
ments. Recruits are usually given basic training in their home naval district for 3
months after which the majority go to sea for the remaining nine months. The
remainder spend a second 3-month period at specialist schools either in Stockholm or
Karlskrona studying radar, sound signals, radio, etc. For their last six months this
group joins the other at sea. About 660 regulars are enlisted annually for 41/2 years.
Enlisted reserves are considered too old for sea duty after 10 years and are transferred
to the Coast Artillery Reserve or the Army Reserve. Officer training at the Naval
Academy requires 31/2 years and includes four cruises. About 150 candidates are in
training at one time, with executive, coast artillery, and paymaster trainees in the
ratio of 8 : 5 : 2 respectively. There is a continuous process of elimination; the loss is
expected to be, and usually is, nearly 50 percent of the original entry. Instruction is
not based on foreign doctrines, but rather on traditions and experiences of the Swedish
Navy dating back to the 15th century. Upon graduation the midshipmen are assigned
to coastal units for fleet training. Two years after graduation, specialist post-graduate
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work is obligatory, and after five years every officer is required to attend a course at the
Naval War College.
Engineering cadets take a four-year course at the Institute of Technology
in Stockholm. After graduation, they spend two years in various industrial plants
and then receive their commissions.
Merchant marine officers desiring to receive a commission in the Naval
Reserve are required to complete a 11/2 year course at the Naval Academy.
(4) Coast Artillery.
About 1,900 conscripts are called up for each 9-month cycle. The first
seven months are devoted to basic training and the remaining two to firing instruction
at one of the various forts. About 150 regulars are enlisted annually for a period of
41/2 years. Enlisted reserves remain in the Coast Artillery Reserve for about 25 years,
after which they are transferred to the Home Guard or other civilian defense organ-
izations.
A firing school near Stockholm is the only training institution main-
tained by the Coast Artillery. After 2 years' basic training, one-half of which is spent
at sea, an officer candidate is promoted to cadet. He then receives theoretical instruc-
tion at the Naval Academy, attends two command courses with Coast Artillery troop
units and takes another tour of sea duty. The last semester is devoted to tactical in-
struction and a firing course. After completion of the prescribed 31/4-year training,
the cadet is commissioned a 2nd lieutenant.
(5) Air Force.
The Air Force calls up about 5,000 recruits in two annual increments.
Recruits are stationed at all air force installations and after four weeks' basic train-
ing are assigned to a specialized category in one of the four Eskctders (Wings). Each
recruit is allowed some choice of station and specialty. Two-thirds of the enlisted
reserves stay in the Air Force Reserve for 10 years, after which they are transferred to
the Air Force Administration and remain until they are 47 years old. The other
one-third comprises technicians who remain in the Air Force Reserve for their entire
term. Technical and signal training is accomplished at Vasteras and gunner train-
ing at Lulea.
As a result of a recent change, there are no enlisted pilots. Each year
approximately 220 officer cadets and contract airmen enter the Central Flying Training
School at Ljungbyhed for primary and basic pilot training. The course lasts 10 months
and consists of 160 hours flying time plus ground instruction in technical air subjects.
Trainees are then farmed out to Wings for one year where they complete 150 hours of
basic operational flying. From this point they are separated. The officer cadets enter
the Flight Cadet School at Uppsala for training as officers, and after one year and 60
hours of flying, those completing the course are commissioned. Contract airmen are
of three grades based on educational backgrounds. They receive 150-200 hours ad-
ditional flying training and general educational training proportionate to their prior
schooling. Those selected for commission pass on to Uppsala with, the remainder con-
tinuing as contract airmen for 61/2 years after which time they leave the service.
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There is an Air Staff 'College at Stockholm with administrative, staff and
technical training courses for officers. All officers are expected to pass the administra-
tive course five to six years after commissioning and before attending either the staff
or technical schools. The staff school has the object of training officers for staff duties
at higher levels; it alternates yearly with the technical school which trains officers
for duties in the technical fields.
4. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES.
a. General.
Latest available figures give the over-all strength of the Swedish Armed
Forces at close to 74,000 men. More than half of this strength consists of conscripts
in training. Maximum wartime strength after mobilization should swell the total to
an estimated 825,000 including Home Guard.
While efficiency of personnel is generally high, fighting qualities are unknown
as they have never been combat tested. However, the average Swede possesses the
traits of a superior soldier and with proper leadership, can be expected to render a good
account of himself. Younger officers can be expected to provide good leadership, but
the older officers are to a great extent "hidebound."
b. Army.
The Swedish Army numbers about 50,000 men consisting of approximately
3,500 officers, 13,000 enlisted men, 25,000 annual conscripts undergoing basic training,
and 8,000 conscripts held over for leadership training. The peacetime army has no
tactical units larger than regiments, of which there are 38-19 infantry, 7 artillery, 4
cavalry, 4 armored, 3 anti-aircraft, and 1 signal. Each regiment with its cadre of key
officers and enlisted personnel is operated as a training center for the annual conscripts
assigned to it. For this reason there are no units ready for combat. In addition to
these regiments there are 13 kdr, which are between the regiment and battalion in size.
Fifty percent of the troops are located in the industrial area from Stockholm
west to Goteborg, 10 percent near the Swedish-Finnish border, 15 percent facing
Denmark, and the remainder scattered throughout the country.
Under the 1943 organization well prepared plans exist for a rapid recall of
conscripts and reserves. The most expeditious means of notification are to be used,
such as radio, newspapers, posters, and personal notices. Each man knows his unit
and mobilization stations; available arms and equipment are stored at these stations
and units can be formed in a matter of hours, once the personnel becomes available.
In case of sudden attack, each man will proceed to his unit forthwith. If this is not
possible, he will join another unit, and if that fails he will attach himself to the Home
Guard. According to these plans, Sweden could probably accomplish initial mobiliza-
tion of key personnel in 72 hours, but several more weeks would be required to com-
plete mobilization and prepare the units for field service. Under their own standards
and available stocks of equipment it is estimated that this mobilization would not
exceed 350,000 men organized into 12 divisions. Approximately 350,000 additional
men would probably be utilized in local defense and Home Guard units.
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By US standards, the Swedish Army is poorly equipped. Automatic weapons,
armored vehicles and anti-aircraft show a marked deficiency for modern warfare. In
addition to some obsolete light tanks of Swedish and foreign manufacture the army
is reported to have about three hundred 24-ton tanks (75 mm gun). Multiple auto-
matic guns on motor carriages, such as the USA M-16 and M-17, are non-existent. Most
of the Swedish artillery is 75 mm. or larger and represents a heterogeneous collection
with many types obsolete. The supply of motorized vehicles is inadequate. Horse and
even dog-drawn military vehicles are still widely used and transport vehicles are a key
shortage. Other major shortages are in radar, anti-aircraft automatic weapons and
communications equipment. Maintenance is, in general, of high standard.
Efforts are being made, mainly through the medium of the Swedish Bofors
Company, to modernize present equipment where possible and to develop and manu-
facture improved models of nearly all equipment.
c. Navy.
The active personnel strength of the Navy presently exceeds 9,000. This in-
cludes 505 officers, 258 staff officers (these are partly naval, partly coast artillery officers,
the two services having combined staffs), 1,550 warrant officers, 3,800 regular enlisted
men, and 3,000 conscripts. There are approximately 185 vessels in the Navy with 115
of these of combat types. Owing to budget limitations and lack of skilled engineering
personnel, only a portion of these ships are currently in commission. While those in
commission plus some in reserve could be readied in two weeks, others cannot be con-
sidered active as units for a somewhat longer period. The time required would depend
upon the type of duty to be performed (anti-submarine, AA, convoy, escort patrol, etc.) .
Personnel mobilization is another limiting factor, owing to uncertainty as to the number
of merchant marine reserves whose ships would be in home ports at any given time,
and the demands of civilian industry. To remedy this, mobilization plans specify
recall of pensioned civilian and ex-navy personnel for whom a period of refresher
training for gunnery, operational and tactical purposes would be necessary. Once fully
mobilized the Navy would number over 42,000.
The three naval bases are located at Stockholm, Karlskrona, and Goteborg;
each ship has one of these three bases as its home port. The principal combat force
is the Coastal Fleet, usually located on the east coast. Major combat vessels include
3 cruisers, 15 destroyers, 6 escort vessels, 25 submarines, and 23 motor torpedo boats.
Two of the cruisers are modern and the navy has a small destroyer program of sound
design. The submarine service is the elite of the navy but no new submarines are being
built at present, possibly owing to a desire to watch the rapid development in design
prior to re-equipping.
With the exception of the two new cruisers, and two new destroyers, the fleet
is generally lacking in modern armament. In general, the navy is inexperienced in
present-day methods such as anti-submarine warfare, employment of radar and sonar,
and AA fire control technique. However, very gradual modernization of existing ships
is in progress. Relatively new vessels are being equipped with additional AA defense
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and new technical aids; radar and sonar gear are being installed in some of the de-
stroyers; and it is intended to make Schnorkel standard equipment on all submarines.
d. Coast Artillery.
Active personnel strength in the Coast Artillery totals approximately 3,300.
This includes 235 officers, 520 warrant officers, 610 regular enlisted men and 1,900 con-
scripts. The staff officers are included above under (c) Navy, the two services having
combined staffs. The major units are five regiments with one each located at Vaxholm
Karlskrona, Gotland, Alvsborg, and HarnOsand. Coast Artillery Defense District head-
quarters are located at Stockholm, Blekinge, Goteborg, Gotland, and Hemsii. Main
equipment is immobile seafront and mobile anti-aircraft artillery plus floating batteries
and minefields. A number of patrol craft and minelayers have been assigned by the
Navy to the various District commands.
Little information is available on mobilization plans for the Coast Artillery.
Because of the fixed nature of coast artillery defenses it is safe to assume, however, that
this branch of the Armed Forces can man all positions in a very short time. It is
estimated that the total reserve strength approximates 35,000.
e. Air Force.
Present Air Force strength is 11,687 with 1,147 officers and 10,540 enlisted
men, including conscripts. There are 1,502 pilots including officer cadets and contract
airmen.
The Air Force is considered Sweden's first line of defense against attack.
It is estimated that the AF in an emergency could mobilize, disperse, and be ready for
action within 72 hours. Approximately 32,000 semi-skilled draftees swell the mobilized
strength to approximately 44,000 men. Trained replacements would remain at home
until ordered up as reinforcements. Complete reliance on imports of fuel would un-
doubtedly prove a limiting factor in a total mobilization.
AF officers are proficient in the various specialized fields and the officer pilots
demonstrate skill in handling aircraft. The reserve and enlisted pilots rank somewhat
below the active officer pilots in proficiency.
There are twenty flotillas (US Groups) in the Swedish Air Force. Nine
fighter, two light-bomber, two dive-bomber, one torpedo-bomber, and three reconnais-
sance groups make up the major operational units. One of the light bomber units is in
the process of conversion to night-fighters. Of the four main tactical groupings,
Eskaclers (US Wings) , into which the operational units are organized, Groups 1, 3 and
4 have headquarters at Stockholm. The fourth, Group 2, has headquarters at Giite-
borg, nearly 300 miles west-southwest of Stockholm on the Kattegat.
Current information indicates a total aircraft strength of 1,474, of which
1,011 are in tactical units to include 140 light bomber, 263 attack, 513 fighter and 201
reconnaissance. Except for 69 Vampire jets and 111 P-51D's, nearly all aircraft are
obsolete. This situation is being partly overcome by the purchase of additional Vam-
pire jets from Great Britain (210 airframes now on order for delivery by 1951) and of
Spitfires for reconnaissance and Mosquitoes for night fighter duties. Also the Swedish
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fighter type, J-21, is being converted to jet propulsion and a new Swedish type jet
fighter, the J-29, is now undergoing flight tests with production scheduled by 1950.
510 J-29's are to be delivered by October 1953. Engines for the Vampire airframes and
the J-29's are to be British designed jets produced by the Swedes under a manufac-
turing license from Great Britain.
Sweden is divided into five flying base districts with headquarters in Angelholm
(south), Goteborg (west), Stockholm (east), Ostersund (north), and Lulea (far north).
The Districts are responsible for the maintenance of some 40 secret airfields to be used
in case of attack. Airfields in Sweden are generally grass, but work is underway to
hard-surface most of the runways. The airfields, are, in the main, adequate for day-
light fighter operations only, with none considered usable by US heavy or medium
bomber types. Numerous underground hangars and workshops are in operation. Air
Force plans call for sufficient underground installations within four or five years to
house the entire fighter force.
f. Quasi-Military Organizations.
(1) Home Guard.
The Home Guard (Hemvarn) is a government-supported, semi-military or-
ganization numbering about 100,000 volunteers, its maximum authorized strength.
Men below and above draft age (20 to 47) plus those of draft age deferred or exempt
from military service are eligible. Units are immobile, and organized wherever people
live; they are attached to and operate with the regular administrative and tactical
units of the army in time of war when the Defense Commander takes operational
command. The Home Guard's official wartime missions are: (1) to perform security
and guard duties; (2) to maintain organized resistance; (3) to cooperate with regular
forces; and (4) to relieve military units of line-of-communication work. Unofficially
Home Guard units will also be intelligence-gathering agencies and will resist infiltrating
elements in unit areas. The weekly four-hour training periods under qualified in-
structors consist primarily of infantry squad tactics and marksmanship training with
small arms and hand grenades. At a special school Home Guard commanders are
given a two-weeks' training course by regular army officers in small unit tactics and
other military skills. This school trains about 2,000 men annually. Communist in-
filtration in the Home Guard is reportedly very low.
(2) Shooting Association.
This semi-military organization is composed of a series of local clubs with
a central board in Stockholm. As of January 1947, there were 2,430 shooting clubs
with 242,153 members; 540 pistol clubs with 15,089 members, and 173 sport shooting
clubs with 3,119 members. Excellent instruction in small arms marksmanship and
simple musketry is given. Any Swede may become a member, including regular and
reserve military personnel. Free ammunition is supplied by the Government. At
present, only rifles and pistols may be used, but arrangements are under discussion to
permit military members to practice with automatic hand weapons. The clubs have
little military value as most of their members are carried on the rolls of the regular,
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reserve, or Home Guard forces; however, the Association fulfills its mission in that it
raises the standard of marksmanship of the populace as a whole.
(3) Voluntary Motorcycle Corps.
This semi-military organization under Army control trains about 300
volunteers annually. These motorcyclists are used in the emergency organizations,
both military and civilian. In addition, the Army trains its own motorcyclists.
(4) Miscellaneous Quasi-military Organizations.
The Army also maintains a voluntary nursing organization and voluntary
veterinary and canine clubs. The Navy supports a Voluntary Sea Defense Corps and
a Navy Youth Activity, the members of which are believed to be regular and reserve
navy personnel. The Air Force maintains a private flying club. At the beginning of
1948 the Club had issued 1,184 private flying licenses with the largest group of trainees
consisting of Air Force personnel.
(5) Women's Corps (Lottaketr).
This corps, the Swedish equivalent of the WAC as to duties, is under the
control of the Defense Ministry and currently numbers about 94,000 women. While
it was never integrated with the defense forces, its membership exceeded 100,000 during
World War II: women enrolled voluntarily and were given a modicum of training for
duties such as canteen work, ambulance driving, nursing, aircraft spotting and clerical
work. The High Command is expanding the program for the training and use of
women as a regular branch of the armed forces; the Lottas will be provided with
military uniforms and will receive military rating and pay.
The Women's Automobile Auxiliary under Army control, has a total of
1,300 members. Altogether, it has trained and registered 4,000 female truck drivers.
5. ESTIMATE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY.
As a result of basic national policy, Sweden's military capabilities are purely
defensive. Attainment of any degree of offensive capability would require time for
extensive reorganization. In addition, there are a number of deficiencies in man-
power and economic resources, and equipment and training, which seriously limit
Sweden's military capability. Yet, in comparison with other small nations, Sweden
has Armed Forces that are strong, well trained, and well equipped. Backed by sub-
stantial readily mobilized reserves, these forces could, at present, successfully defend
Sweden against any small nation, and probably any combination of small nations, that
could bring arms to bear against it. In comparison with the great powers, however,
Sweden's Armed Forces suffer in almost every respect and without substantial aid from
outside could not hope to do more than delay a determined attack by a major power
for a period of four to six weeks.
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? CHAPTER V
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
Geographic position causes Sweden to be of great though not vital strategic im-
portance to the US. This factor of position, together with certain economic and po-
litical considerations and a small but useful military capability, make Sweden po-
tentially a valuable ally.
The Scandinavian peninsula, of which Sweden forms the greater part, lies across
the most direct air approaches to western USSR from the Western Hemisphere. From
its southern part the entrance to the Baltic Sea may be controlled, and the main east-
west lines of communication through Germany are within easy range. Therefore, if
allied with the US and successfully defended against Soviet invasion, Sweden could
provide bases (a) for offensive sea and air action against arctic and western Russia,
(b) for bottling up Soviet naval forces in the Baltic and neutralizing important naval
facilities, and (c) for operations on the flank of all Soviet communications with Central
and Western Europe. Sweden could also provide fighter bases and anti-aircraft and
early warning sites valuable in countering Soviet air operations against western targets.
Sweden is, in short, the nearest to vital Soviet centers of all western democratic coun-
tries save Finland, and Finland has already passed virtually under Soviet control.
Conversely, in Soviet hands Sweden would provide offensive and defensive air
bases, early warning facilities, and other installations. US air attacks launched from
Greenland, Iceland, the United Kingdom, or carriers operating in the North Atlantic,
would be hindered. But the most important Soviet objective in Scandinavia would
probably be the long Atlantic coast of Norway with its admirable submarine bases for
attacks against North Atlantic shipping. It is possible that the Soviets would attempt
to occupy this coast without molesting Sweden. It is also possible, however, that their
forces would pass through Swedish territory; and for US military strategy, one of the
most important functions of Sweden is as a barrier against hostile occupation of the
Norwegian coast. In the event of general war, a Swedish alliance would thus be
valuable to the United States.
As to Sweden's economy, denial of its strategic materials would not affect US
security, but its large, high-grade iron ore resources and capacity to manufacture
ball-bearings, pit-props, other mining equipment and machinery, electrical equipment,
and ships can contribute substantially to an integrated Western European economy,
and thus to the reconstruction of Western Europe.
Finally, the staunchly democratic character of the Swedish government and people
permits no doubt of their Western sympathies and would render them a strengthen-
ing political and moral force in a Western coalition whether in peace or war. But the
Swedish government still hopes that the country may remain neutral in a third World
? War as it has in the first two. Realizing its significant strategic relationship to Soviet
Russia, Sweden has assiduously sought to avoid giving offense to that country, and par-
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ticularly to avoid any semblance of political commitment to the Western Powers as
against the Soviet Union. Although not complacent about the possibility of neutrality
succeeding, Sweden has urged this policy on Norway and Denmark as providing the
best chance of avoiding war. Both reject the idea of isolated Scandanavian neutrality
but as yet are hesitant to break up their close family relationship with Sweden by mak-
ing formal commitments to the west. Thus far the differences of opinion among the
three countries have prevented the foundation of a firm Scandinavian bloc which could
carry a good deal of weight in European affairs.
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CHAPTER VI
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
Only one significant development affecting US security could happen in Sweden;
this would be an abandonment of the policy of non-alignment with either side of the
East-West dispute. Otherwise, Swedish efforts will be directed toward: ensuring a
continued weakening of Communist influence; the improvement of economic condi-
tions; expansion of normal trade patterns with Western Europe, which is important
both to continued Swedish westward orientation and to reconstruction in Western
Europe; and a strengthening of the Armed Forces to ensure the attainment of a high
state of preparedness along more modern lines.
With respect to the neutrality issue, Sweden will continue its efforts to induce
Norway and Denmark to form the Scandinavian Defense Alliance, presently under
discussion, on a basis of joint neutrality. This effort will probably fail, since Norway
and Denmark realize that the strategic value of Scandinavia (particularly the Nor-
wegian coast) to Soviet Russia will probably override any respect for a neutrality pact
and that their future security is more dependent on obtaining military aid from the
West than on maintaining Nordic solidarity. Sweden may, therefore, shortly be con-
fronted with the alternative of modifying her neutrality stand or proceeding alone in
a divided Scandinavia. Faced with such a choice, Sweden cannot be expected to do
more than modify its neutrality to the extent necessary to form a Scandinavian alliance
for joint military defense purposes but without Swedish commitments outside Scan-
dinavia.
Because of the limited capability of Sweden's Armed Forces acting alone, the
natural difficulty of defending the country against Soviet attack, and the apparent
determination of the Swedish Government to postpone any commitment to the West-
ern Powers until the very moment of such attack (thus eliminating prior military
planning for concerted defensive action), it is extremely doubtful that Sweden could
be saved from Soviet domination in event of war.
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APPENDIX A
TOPOGRAPHY?CLIMATE
1. TOPOGRAPHY.
Sweden, including lakes covering about 14,500 square miles, comprises the eastern
two-thirds of the Scandinavian Peninsula and is slightly larger in area than California
(173,000 square miles) or one and one-half times the size of the British Isles. The two
large islands of Oland and Gotland off the southeastern coast in the Baltic also belong
to Sweden. The country is bounded in the west by Norway and in the east and south
by the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea. In the northeast there is a land boundary
with Finland. Sweden is nearly 1,000 miles in length from north to south, and its
greatest breadth is about 250 miles.
Densely forested Norrland, the northern part, accounts for more than half of the
total area of the country and contains the principal rivers and forests and most of
the mineral wealth. It consists of a series of plateaus which slope gently to the south-
east from the Norwegian border to the Gulf of Bothnia. These plateaus attain eleva-
tions up to 5,000 feet near the Norwegian border, with isolated peaks rising a few
thousand feet higher. This mountain barrier is lowest west of Ostersund where good
roads lead to the Trondheim Fjord. Approaching the Gulf of Bothnia, the terrain is
rolling hill country. The entire area is parcelled by hundreds of rivers flowing south-
eastward through deep and narrow valleys, often flanked by precipitous cliffs and con-
taining narrow fingerlakes up to 80 miles long,
Central Sweden, or Svealand, is the main lowland area of the country. The ter-
rain consists principally of undulating, cultivated plains with scattered rocky hills;
poor land in this area is still forested. Four large lakes?Vanern (2,124 square miles) ,
Vattern (734 square miles) , Hjalmaren (185 square miles) , and Malaren (440 square
miles)?occupy a large part of the plain.
Gotaland, or the southern part of Sweden, is an undulating plain interspersed with
many lakes and canals; it is heavily populated and intensively cultivated.
The coastline is predominantly rocky, with innumerable small off-shore islands
and shoals. Local knowledge is required for approaching almost any part of the
Swedish coast and in many parts the extinguishing of light houses and the removal
of buoys prohibits approach of any craft. Typical coastal areas have narrow, rocky,
short beaches, ending abruptly in hills or cliffs, although some beach terrain is to be
found in southern Sweden and on the Baltic in the Gavle area, north of Stockholm.
The limestone islands of Oland and Gotland are located off the southeast coast.
To the west they end in precipitous cliffs, 100 to 200 feet high, while eastward the land
slopes gently to the sea.
2. CLIMATE.
Several factors contribute toward variations of climate in Sweden's several regions.
The land runs through more than 13 1/2 ? of latitude; about 15 percent of its area is within
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the Arctic Circle; the boundary mountains are sufficiently high to be much colder than
the adjacent coastal lands, but are not high enough to shut out entirely the warming
effects of those drifts of wind and water from the southwest which give Norway a
remarkable climate; the southeastern and southern borders are washed by the sea; the
piercing winter winds from the great Russian pool of cooled atmosphere sweep west-
ward over the Swedish lowlands or reach the mountain tops. February is the coldest
month and has a mean temperature of below freezing over Sweden. Stockholm aver-
ages 25.7?F., Goteborg 30.4?, but the coldest region is in the heart of Lappland Where
Karesuando, near the Finnish border has a mean of 5.2?. In some northern parts frost
occurs in every month with Karesuando having only 5 months above freezing. July
is the warmest month with the mean at Stockholm 62?F., Goteborg 62.2?, and Kare-
suando 54.2?. The summer is short but a high of 88? has been recorded in Lappland.
The relative length of seasons shows contrasts resembling those of temperature.
Ice forms in the north in October and breaks up in May or June, while in the inlands
the corresponding months are late November and April. Ice-covering of the lakes
ranges from 100 days annually in the south to upward of 200 days in the north but
local increases in the ice period occur in some highlands areas. Drifting ice usually
appears in Kattegat Sound in January with obstruction later due largely to drift ice
from the Baltic. In an exceptional winter the Sound may be completely frozen over.
Ice conditions in the Baltic vary considerably from year to year but usually navigation
in the southern part of the Gulf of Bothnia is impeded from the end of November to
early May. In the north the gulf is covered with ice from November to mid-May.
The average rainfall for Sweden increases, on the whole, from north to south,
reaching a maximum toward the southwest. Thus, the annual average rainfall varies
from 16.5 inches in the far north to 35 inches for locales in the southwest. Heaviest
precipitation occurs in the latter half of summer and the lightest in February and
March. The proportion of total precipitation which falls as snow ranges from 36
percent in the north to 9 percent in the south. Snow lies for an average of 140 to 190
days in the north and 47 days in the south. Thunderstorms are rare in the winter
occurring mostly between May and September, and on a maximum of three or four
days in July. On the east coast fog occurs mostly in the spring and autumn with
midsummer the clearest time. Elsewhere winter is the season of most fog, which is
present about seven days a month from December to February. Inland fog is often
very local.
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? APPENDIX B
COMMUNICATIONS
1. HARBORS.
Sweden has some 40 major ports, generally modern and well equipped. The prin-
cipal ones are Stockholm, Goteborg, Malmo, Halsingborg, and Tralleborg. Many Swed-
ish ports, distributed principally along the Baltic coastline, are natural harbors formed
at the mouths of rivers emptying into the sea. Most of the ports in the northern half
of Sweden are ice-bound for long periods during the winter months; the major ones
to the south are kept open for navigation the year around.
2. NAVIGABLE INLAND WATERWAYS.
Ten canals link up with the country's highway system. Only four are deep enough
to admit vessels of any considerable size: (1) Trollhattan Canal connecting the Skager-
rak with Lake Vanern; (2/3) the Sodertalje and Hammarby Canals, both connecting
Lake MaJaren with the Baltic Sea; and (4) the Falsterbo Canal in the extreme south,
permitting large vessels to pass from the Baltic to the Kattegat. A series of lakes
and rivers in south central Sweden, joined together by canals in 1832, form what is
known as the G6ta Canal, representing a 240-mile cross-country inland waterway from
GOteborg on the North Sea to the Baltic. In addition, numerous rivers useful for trans-
portation and for floating timber radiate toward the central and northern coasts.
3. ROADS.
The State highway system, generally paralleling the main railroad lines, is cen-
tered in the southern half of Sweden, serving the farms, the cities, and the major indus-
tries. At the end of 1946, there was a total of about 56,000 miles of public highways,
or approximately one mile of road for every 3.3 square miles of area. In addition, there
are about 12,000 miles of so-called "private roads", although in the more important
cases the state contributes 60 percent of the maintenance. A route numbering system
has been adopted but is not yet in operation. It should be noted that Sweden is one
of the few countries where traffic goes to the left.
One State highway runs along the entire east coast from Malmo as far north as
Haparanda and extends into Finland. Other main trunk highways run inland from
Stockholm to MalmO; from Stockholm to Goteborg, with a branch to Halsingborg, and
from Stockholm cross-country to Oslo. From Oslo a trunk highway runs inland some
distance to GOteborg then parallels the Kattegat coastline and the Sound to Malmo.
Another arterial highway runs inland the entire length of the country from Halsingborg
to Karesuando on the Swedish-Finnish frontier. Considering the generally rugged ter-
rain, the highway network is well developed in the northern half of the country.
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The most common form of road surfacing is surface-treated macadamized gravel,
of which there were about 53,000 miles by the end of 1946. Road building was practi-
cally at a standstill during the war. While no new arterial highways are currently
under construction or projected, a comprehensive reconstruction and repair program of
existing roads has been put into effect. This plan includes the strengthening of
bridges to carry a maximum axle load of 14,000 kg. (13.8 tons) with a maximum wheel
pressure of 7,000 kg. Currently only a small part of the road system can stand a pres-
sure of even 3,000 kg.
4. RAILWAYS.
Sweden has the greatest European railway mileage per capita (2.67 km. per 1,000
inhabitants), and the railways have to compete with well developed bus and coastal
steamship services. As of July 1945, there were 10,448 miles of State-owned and private
standard-gauge lines. Eighty percent of railroad traffic is now electrically hauled;
power failure would drastically reduce Swedish railway capacity since the available
steam locomotive park is totally inadequate. The Swedish railway system fulfills both
peacetime and military needs.
The strategic main lines are: In Norrland, the east-west Lulea-Narvik line, single-
track, completely electrified with power supplied by separate generators in the Porjus
power plant. This line serves the iron ore mines at Kiruna and Gallivare; a short line
from Boden runs to Tornio where it connects with the broader Soviet-gauge rail net in
Finland. It also joins the north-south electrified Malmo-Tornio line, running the
entire length of the country. In central Sweden, at Laxa and Hallsberg, other main
lines branch off from the basic north-south artery to Stockholm, Oslo, and Goteborg.
Laxa and Hallsberg control the Stockholm-Oslo and the long Tornio-Lulea-Malmo lines.
The destruction of these two key transportation centers would seriously cripple trans-
portation of through line traffic. From Brake, in north-central Sweden, a through
line runs to Trondheim in Norway. This is another vital key point on the north-south
main line. Other transportation nuclei of strategic importance are at Malmo, Halsing-
borg, Stockholm, Avesta, and Lulea.
The work of electrifying the railways, considered of major economic and strategic
importance owing to Swedish lack of natural fuel, progressed throughout the war; it
was partially dicontinued on 1 July 1947 due to shortage of labor and materials.
Train ferries, starting from Tralleborg, Malmo and Halsingborg connect with Den-
mark and Germany. Although in themselves not vital to the interior transportation
systems, they have considerable strategic value as links with the European mainland.
5. MERCHANT MARINE.
The Swedish merchant fleet ranked tenth in the world before the war, with
1,619,000 GRT. During the period 1939-45 it was somewhat reduced by war action.
About 80 percent of Swedish merchant vessels of 2,000 tons and over were engaged in
Allied service outside the Skagerrak blockade.
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At the beginning of 1947, the Swedish Shipowners' Association, to which all major
shipowners belong, comprised 168 shipping firms with 538 vessels totalling 1,478,493
GRT (2,268,097 dwt.) ; 13,837 men were employed on these vessels. About 173,000 gross
tons were added to the fleet in 1947. It is estimated that about 50 percent of the
merchant fleet is over 20 years of age and considered obsolete; 1.3 percent of the ves-
sels are under 10 years of age, and 2.3 percent are under 5 years old. The following
table indicates the total ocean-going merchant fleet by type of vessels at the beginning
of 1947:
301 Steam vessels
176 Motor vessels
2 Tank steamers
56 Motor tankers
3 Tank lighters
481,464 GRT
685,301 GRT
688 GRT
301,365 GRT
675 GRT
Total 1,478,493 GRT
Net earnings of the merchant marine in 1946 amounted to approximately 350 million
kronor, or approximately 100 million dollars; earnings were increased by 13 million
dollars in 1947.
6. COMMERCIAL AVIATION.
International commercial aviation was placed on a solid basis when the Govern-
ment-controlled ABA (AB Aerotransport) was founded in 1924. Before World War II,
ABA operated regular routes to Finland and England. By the summer of 1940, inaugu-
ration of an air service to the US via Iceland and Greenland was under consideration,
but was abandoned because of the war.
SILA (Svensk Interkontinental Lufttrafik AB) was established during the war and
is privately owned. Its shares are held by ABA (50% government owned) , business,
industrial, and shipping companies.
SILA with the DDL (The Danish Airlines) and DNL (The Norwegian Airlines)
comprises SAS (Scandinavian Airlines System) which was established in July 1946.
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway formed a joint service in this company to operate air-
lines to North and South America, Africa and the Far East, while ABA and the airlines
of Norway and Denmark operated concurrent and competing traffic in Europe until 18
April 1948. On the latter date ABA and SILA merged from an operational standpoint,
though technical merger had to await Swedish Riksdag approval which was given in
July 1948, and their activities are now coordinated under SAS. The merger of ABA
and SILA and the joinder of this new company to SAS practically effects a 100 percent
consolidation of Scandinavian airlines and eliminates Scandinavian competition in
Europe in the same manner that such competition was eliminated in intercontinental
traffic by the original SAS organization. It is estimated that SAS, when it receives the
DC-6's and Boeing Stratocruisers now on order in the US, will have between 90 and 100
planes which will make it one of the world's largest single airlines.
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The most important commercial airdromes in Sweden are (1) Bromma, near Stock-
holm, furnished with latest American communications, weather and air navigation
equipment, and (2) Torslanda, near Goteborg. There are two fully equipped flying
boat bases at Stockholm and Karlskrona. The most northerly airdrome is at Kiruna.
7. ELECTRIC COMMUNICATIONS.
a. Telephones.
The government owns the telephone system. In the number of telephones
relative to population, Sweden is exceeded only by the US. There are about 18.3 tele-
phones per 100 population. In 1945, there were 6,877 telephone exchanges and
1,583,389 miles of telephone wire.
b. Telegraph.
The Royal Telegraph Office owns and directs the telegraph system. The local
administration of the network is arranged in six districts, with centers in Malmo,
GOteborg, Norrkoping, Stockholm, Gavle, and Sundsvall. In 1945, there were 4,389
telegraph stations connected by 5,066 miles of wire. The service is adequate to the
needs of the country.
c. Cables.
Sweden possesses extensive international cable connections, although the only
direct contacts are with her northern neighbors.
d. Radio.
The Swedish radio system is government-owned. There are 33 broadcasting
stations, the three largest being Motala (150 KW) , Falun (100 KW) and Horby (60 KW) .
The government charges an annual license fee of Kr. 10 ($2.80) for each radio receiving
set. In October 1948 the number of licensed radio sets was 2,000,000.
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? APPENDIX C
?
?
POPULATION STATISTICS AND CHARACTERISTICS
1. STATISTICS.
At the beginning of 1948, the population of Sweden numbered 6,842,046 (6.1 mil-
lions in 1930), averaging only about 40 persons per square mile. The Malmo, Goteborg,
and Stockholm areas have the heaviest population, whereas the provinces bordering
on Norway and those in the extreme north are the most sparsely settled. MalmOhus
Province in the extreme south has about 269 persons per square mile, while in Norrland,
in northernmost Sweden, there are less than 11 persons per square mile.
2. RACE.
The Swedes are of virtually pure Teutonic blood although individual groups of
Scots and Walloons, about 7,000 Jews, and a sizable population of Finns (about
34,000) have settled in Sweden.
The most distinct ethnic minority is the Lapp population of about 7,000 living
in the far northern area. The exact racial origin of the Lapps is unknown but physi-
cally, linguistically, and culturally they are entirely distinct from the Swedes. Physi-
cally they are midway between the Asiatic Mongoloids and the European Alpines;
their language belongs to the Finno-Ugrian group. In general, they subscribe to
the Christian faith. Fishing and settled agriculture occupy many, but more than
half of them are still nomadic and make a living from their herds of reindeer. The
Lapps are scattered throughout the strategically important area of the Lappland iron
mines. There is no evidence that they are dissatisfied with Swedish rule.
3. ALIENS.
The number of foreign residents in Sweden is about 178,000 (23,700 in 1939), of
which roughly 87,000 are gainfully employed. These aliens are mainly workers from
the other Scandinavian countries and refugees from the Baltic States. Approximately
4,300 laborers, mainly Italians, Sudeten Germans, and Hungarians, have been imported
to work on a contract basis.
4. RELIGION.
Sweden has a National Church (Lutheran) which includes practically the entire
population. Approximately 400,000 adults are members of dissenting Protestant
groups, most of which, however, have not formally severed their connection with the
National Church. In addition there are several Protestant sects completely divorced
from the National Church, about 5,000 Roman Catholics and 7,000 Jews, all of which
enjoy complete freedom of worship.
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5. LANGUAGE.
The language of the country is Swedish, a member of the Scandinavian or North-
Germanic group. The knowledge of foreign languages, especially German and English,
is widespread. In recent years the latter has taken precedence and English-speaking
persons can move about freely in Sweden without an interpreter.
6. EDUCATION.
The illiteracy percentage of 0.3 percent is the lowest in the world. This is all the
more impressive when it is remembered that the nomadic Lapps make up most of
this ratio.
The Swedish public school system, covering the school age from seven to fourteen,
has attained a high degree of competence. There are numerous higher elementary and
secondary schools; a new education bill has been passed, but not yet put into effect, to
streamline their confusing arrangement. In 1947, 8,444 students were registered at the
four Swedish universities?Uppsala, Lund, Stockholm and Goteborg. Of these uni-
versities, Uppsala and Lund are supported by the state while Stockholm and Goteborg
are privately and municipally supported. In addition to the four universities, there are
numerous specialized technical schools; among the more notable are the Karolinska
Medical Institute, Chalmers Institute of Technology at Goteborg and the Royal Insti-
tute of Technology at Stockholm.
Many scientific agencies help to keep Sweden among the leading states in certain
lines of industry. Among the more notable ones are the Schools of Mines at Stockholm
and Filipstad, a State-supported College of Forestry, and a Commercial University
College. Several academies sponsor research, as the Academy of Sciences and the
Academy of Engineering Research. There is also a Metallographical Institute and a
Cellulose Research Laboratory.
7. SIGNIFICANT PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS.
A homogeneous people with no racial conflicts, the Swedes are deeply rooted in
an ancient culture. In this atmosphere, social and economic forms have evolved with
far less conflict than in most other countries. Long after the industrial revolution
had begun to change much of Europe, Sweden remained remote and rural. As late
as 1830, more than 80 percent of the people lived off the soil, and by 1870 the rural
population still constituted 72 percent. With the rapid development of native indus-
try after 1860, the Swedes began to borrow social and economic forms from the Euro-
pean mainland and from England. These they modified and adapted to their own
ends. Protected from wars and imperialist rivalries by a wide strip of sea, the political
and economic life of Sweden progressed slowly and carefully. Out of this evolutionary
growth came a way of life that is characterized by stability, order, and sanity which
sets Sweden, as well as Denmark and Norway, quite apart from the rest of the
Continent.
Vestiges of an older privileged society still linger and an elaborate ceremonial per-
sists. Though small in numbers, the noble families exercise a subtle? influence in the
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realm of manners and custom. The average Swede, however, is not old fashioned;
keeping up with the present has become almost a fetish. The arts are generously sup-
ported, and the attention given to science and invention is widespread. The pursuit of
physical fitness has become a cult in all strata of the nation. The Swedes are to a
high degree mechanically minded, and have established a creditable tradition in the
manufacture of precision instruments. Swedish engineers have an enviable record of
achievement both in Sweden and abroad.
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APPENDIX D
SCIENCE IN SWEDEN
I. INTRODUCTION.
In a discussion of the status of Swedish science and technology, it is necessary to
remember that Sweden's population is only 6,800,000 ? about equal to that of Texas,
but occupying an area two-thirds the size of that state ? with inhabitants concentrated
in a few large cities. Swedish scientists, though few in number compared with those
of the US, are thoroughly trained and highly respected, both in their own country and
abroad. In the past 30 years, Sweden has had three Nobel Prize winners, one in
physics and two in chemistry. Outstanding recent contributions to original research
have included the developing of new tools and new techniques in the biochemical and
physicochemical study of high-molecular-weight materials. In the field of applied
research, Sweden has contributed important practical developments in forestry and
forest products. Although exact figures are not available for comparison, it has been
estimated that Sweden's expenditures for research in 1947-1948 represented approxi-
mately one-half of one percent of those of the United States, while its total budget was
three and one-half percent of the US budget.
2. ORGANIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
The goal of research organization in Sweden is the maintaining of a delicate
balance between organic structure and individual freedom. To this end, Sweden has
evolved a pattern in which education, state, and industry provide a tripartite nucleus
for the grouping together of institutes, research councils, academies, universities, and
related units. Within this whole body of organized research, individual Swedish
scientists are provided with the means to participate in a variety of research activities.
In order to facilitate government-industry cooperation, the Swedish Government
appointed, in 1940, a committee of experts under Gosta Maim, which recommended
the formation of such advisory councils as the State Council of Technical Research
(1942), the Council of Research on Natural Science (1946) , and the Atomic Research
Committee (1945).
The government also maintains a number of State laboratories and institutes, one
of the most important being the Research Institute of the Defense Forces, which carries
on research in chemistry, physics; and teletechnics as related to the national defense.
The State also owns the Swedish Peat Utilization Company and the Swedish Shale
Oil Company; the latter's plant at Kvarntorp in Narke, near the shale beds, is producing
not only shale oil but uranium from shale ash. Sweden is interested in atomic energy
as a substitute for coal, oil, and wood, and to supplement hydroelectric power.
Sweden's two principal academies, the Royal Academy of Science and the Royal
Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences, have established a number of research
institutes in pure and applied science.
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Advanced scientific education in Sweden is mostly concentrated in two State
Universities (Lund and Uppsala), one smaller, private and municipal university (Stock-
holm), and two technological institutions (Royal Institute of Technology and Chalmers
Institute of Technology). The universities are supervised by a government official,
the Chancellor of the Universities; the two technical schools are governed by a common
board of directors with representatives from both State and Industry.
The most important industrial research commission is the Jernkontoret
Forskningsverksamhet, controlled by the Swedish Ironmasters' Association. This
commission cooperates closely with educational institutions and with steel works and
their laboratories.
In recent years several cooperative research institutes have grown up, which
operate under an agreement by which the government provides buildings plus funds
for basic research, while industry provides all equipment plus funds for applied re-
search. Two of the largest and most important cooperative institutes are the Swedish
Wood Research Institute and the Institute for Metal Research.
3. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TRAINING.
As early as 1944, the Kemikontoret, a group representing the Swedish chemical
industry called attention to the fact that Sweden's shortage of scientific personnel was
attributable in part to the very rigorous standards in mathematics, chemistry, and
physics required of students entering the schools of higher learning. Fewer than half
of those who applied were accepted. The Kemikontoret recommended that a more
realistic approach to entrance requirements be taken. They further recommended
that there be an increase in the teaching staffs, more time set aside for research, the
appointment of outstanding foreign scientists and technologists, and a joint directorate
for the two technical institutes (Chalmers and the Royal Institute) with industry
receiving increased representation beyond that allowed in 1944. Some improvement
has been made as a result of these and other recommendations, but Swedish needs for
scientists and engineers are still far from being fulfilled.
The two state universities, Lund and Uppsala, and the two technical institutes,
Chalmers and the Royal, are the educational centers for scientific and technological
training.
At the universities, the degree of doctor of philosophy may be obtained only after
the candidate has qualified in all preliminary work and has prepared, published, and
publicly defended his thesis. The highest academic title is that of "docent", given
to a Fil. Dr. (Ph.D.) who has passed his examination with honors. The degree, Fil. Dr.,
normally requires about twelve years of undergraduate plus graduate training.
Of the 4,795 students enrolled at the Universities of Lund and Stockholm in the
spring of 1947, approximately twenty-two percent were studying mathematics and
the natural sciences, under the direction of twenty-nine full professors of science. At
the University of Uppsala there were twenty-one full professors. No figures are avail-
able for the number of science students.
The degree of doctor of technology (Tekn. Dr.), like that of Fil. Dr., may be
attained after six years of successful study in the lower schools plus additional prep-
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aration in a chosen field leading to the publication and public defense of an approved
dissertation. As in the universities, the title of "docent" is awarded to a doctor of
technology who graduates with honors.
In the autumn of 1946, there were in total about 3,000 students and 80 full
professors at Chalmers and the Royal Institute. In an effort to meet the ever-growing
demands for technical workers, both institutes plan to expand their enrollment by fifty
percent; but the fact that this quota will not be met until 1960 is indicative of Sweden's
scientific and technical labor problem.
4. PHYSICS AND ELECTRONICS.
a. Atomic and Nuclear Physics.
There are no indications that Sweden is working on atomic-energy problems
for bomb production. Motivated by the acute fuels shortage, Swedish scientists are
directing their efforts toward developing atomic energy as a substitute for coal and oil.
According to one estimate, production of power at a low level from atomic energy will
begin within the next two or three years.
Only a few of Sweden's outstanding scientists were interested in nuclear physics
before World War II, but since then many have left their original specialties for this
field. Close liaison exists among the Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and French sci-
entists on matters pertaining to atomic energy.
Plans for a pile, or uranium reactor, have not yet been completely crystallized;
instead they are being kept flexible in the hope that current laboratory research will
point the way towards the best possible construction.
At the Chalmers Institute of Technology, the Royal Institute of Technology, the
University of Uppsala, and the Nobel Institute, new facilities for nuclear research are
under construction. The few, but brilliant, theoretical nuclear physicists at these four
locations are active and productive in the study of meson fields, nuclear interactions,
and quantum electrodynamics. Other studies include the theory of the diffusion and
slowing down of neutrons, the exchange forces in nuclear three- and four-body prob-
lems, and the photographic-plate techniques for investigating nuclear processes.
(1) Cyclotrons.
Sweden has one 32-in, cyclotron in operation, and two new ones under
construction. The larger of these, a 100-in, one, will be located at the Institute of
Physical Chemistry at Uppsala; the other, 88-in, in diameter, is being built by ASEA
for the Nobel Institute at Stockholm.
(2) Beta-ray Spectroscopy.
Beta-ray spectroscopy is one of the most powerful tools for the study of
energy levels of complex nuclei, and Sweden's Nobel Institute for Physics is one of the
world's leading centers for this kind of research. About seven scientists at the Institute
are providing able leadership in the intensive investigation of medium and heavy nuclei.
Their several new beta-ray spectroscopes of the axial focussing type are being used, in
addition, to investigate the application of tracer elements in other branches of physics,
and in biology and engineering. Some attention is being given to counters and counter
circuits.
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(3) Uranium Production.
Indications are that uranium production is disappointingly slow. Sweden
claims, however, that, from the enriched oil shale ("kolm") and from the residue of
oil distillation, production will eventually reach nine tons of uranium a year. Esti-
mated from the practical, economic point of view, Sweden's total resources of uranium
are about 100,000 tons. (For further discussion of shale, see Applied Research and
Engineering.)
b. Electronics Research.
Research in electronics is strong in some phases, weak in others. Radar is cne
of the weak phases, the decisive reason being the lack in number of scientific personnel
and technicians. On the other hand, telecommunications as represented by the devel-
opments at L. M. Ericsson AB (in conjunction with the Chalmers Institute) is develop-
ing strongly. In the field of antenna research Sweden has long been in the forefront
and, as a corollary, a high degree of competence in the field of propagation of radio
waves is exhibited. Nuclear electronic instrumentation is not voluminous although
adequate technical skill is available.
(1) Radar and Microwaves.
What little radar equipment Sweden has is composed mostly of obsolete
German sets and a few modern installations for weather forecasting and ship naviga-
tion. The Defense Research Institute, however, has a program for radar development.
In addition, research on microwaves has been started at two institutes of technology:
Chalmers and the Royal Institute. There is also evidence that investigations into new
techniques for ultra-high frequencies, including microwave propagation, are being
carried on.
(2) Vacuum-Tube Developments.
Sweden, forced by World War II into producing the vacuum tubes
formerly purchased from abroad, has become virtually self-sufficient in this medium.
Tube types, however, are largely modeled on those of the United States, Britain, and
Holland.
An interesting development at the Royal Institute of Technology is the
new electronic-switch tube called the "trochotron." The "trochotron," extensively
tested in Britain, can be used reliably under certain conditions as a scalar for counters
or for memory devices in high-speed calculating machines; but in general it possesses
only a slight advantage over the more conventional installations.
Research on the travelling-wave tube has so far not achieved favorable
signal-to-noise ratios. The work is being done at the Chalmers Institute in collabora-
tion with the L. M. Ericsson Company.
(3) Gutded Missiles, VT Fuzes, and Servomechanisms.
The latest Swedish electronics development in guided missiles, is the use
of (a) radio guidance on mid-course, and (b) the Swedish toss bombsight at terminal
flight. Successful work has been concluded on a VT fuze for free-falling and glide
bombs, limited, however, to low accelerations. (See also Technology, Ordnance.) Direct
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sale to eastern governments of either of these two items is unlikely. The now separate
Army, Navy, and Air Force Guided Missile Sections are being combined into one unified
bureau.
In the field of servomechanisms, Sweden has progressed at a pace com-
mensurate with that of the United States and Great Britain.
(4) Television.
Television research in Sweden has been almost non-existent. Whatever
research is now being done will have military precedence. Television sets for Swedish
homes will not become a reality for at least five years.
(5) Additional Electronic Items.
(a) Considerable attention has been given by Swedish scientists to the
directional characteristics of atmospherics and to radar studies of the phenomena of
the lower atmosphere.
(b) At the Nobel Institute for Physics, an electron microscope has been
constructed, and at the Physics Institute, Uppsala, one of the first mass spectrometers
in Sweden, has been completed.
(c) Based on years of previous research, Swedish scientists are carrying
forward the further development of the electromagnetic theory of antennas and the
formulas for calculating their impedances.
(d) So far as is known, no infrared research other than that in spectro-
scopy is being done in Sweden today.
c. Astrophysics.
Sweden has long been prominent in the astronomical and astrophysical fields.
At the Royal Institute of Technology research continues on the cause of the aurora.
A theory of sunspot formation has also been evolved, in which magnetic whirl
rings generated by convection in the solar core are shown to have the eleven-year period
as their transit time. In addition, studies have been made of the solar general mag-
netic field and the geomagnetism of solar rotation.
Cosmological research on the origin of the chemical elements has been a sub-
ject of research at the Institute for Mechanics and Mathematical Physics at the Uni-
versity of Stockholm.
d. X-rays and Crystallography.
Sweden has played a long and honorable role in this field, beginning with
R?ntgen himself. One of the chiefs centers is still at the Physics Institute of Uppsala.
Sweden's comprehensive interest in X-rays has led to a fairly intensive interest
in crystallography. It may be that neutron diffraction studies will soon also receive
attention.
Recent work in crystallography includes a study of the crystal structures of
lawsonite, bismutite, and beyerite, and a quantum-mechanical calculation of the
cohesive energy, interionic distances, and elastic constants of lithium, sodium, and
potassium chlorides.
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e. Applied Mathematics.
Following a visit to the United States, a commission of Swedish mathematicians
recommended that a high-speed computing machine be purchased for immediate use
and that another be built in Sweden.
f. Other Areas of Investigation.
(1) Optics.
Work on optical and infrared spectra is being pursued fairly extensively.
The Physics Institute at Lund has recently become concerned with such optical prob-
lems as the Stark effect, dispersion in gases, and analysis of atomic spectra.
(2) Radiofrequency Spectroscopy.
A beginning has been made in the field of radiofrequency spectroscopy
with the devising of equations for the frequencies of the longitudinal, torsional, and
lateral vibrations of rod-shaped cylindrical molecules. The possibility of investigating
the vibrations of polar macro-molecules by measurement of dielectric properties is un-
der discussion.
(3) Low Temperature.
In the low temperature area the properties of liquid Helium II have been
receiving further study.
(4) Metals.
Research in the theory of metals includes the electric and magnetic prop-
erties of metals and alloys, the order-disorder transformations, and the kinetics of
precipitation in alloys.
(5) Acoustics.
Although the total effort is not impressive, an increase in emphasis on
acoustics is apparent from an article giving standards for acoustical definitions and
measurement methods.
5. CHEMISTRY.
With but few in the field Sweden is nonetheless a dominant figure in the chemical
field among the nations of northern Europe.
a. Organic Chemistry and Biochemistry.
At the University of Uppsala, an oil-resistant rubber, called Svedoprene after
its originator Theodor Svedberg, was produced on a commercial scale during the last
war. Although it is a useful material, it is costly.* At the University of Lund, progress
is being made, under the guidance of Lennart Smith, on resins and intermediates from
retene. At both Uppsala and Lund, research projects on organic compounds of sulfur
are aimed primarily towards the development of new elastomers and plasticisers.
At the Royal Institute of Technology, Holger Erdtman's group is working on
lignin, lignanes, humic acids, the fungicidic constituents of coniferous heartwood, and
on the symbiotic and antibiotic substances from fungi and microorganisms which
destroy wood and pulp. Further research on the utilization of the by-products of wood
* Svedoprene is comparable in some respects to US Neoprene.
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and on new methods of cellulose manufacture is being conducted at the Wood Products
Research Institute, under Erik Hagglund.
In the industrial chemical laboratories, alcohols, fusel oils, turpentines, tall
oil, DDT, wood preservatives, amino resins, alkyds, phenolics, chlorinated solvents, and
derivatives of benzene and toluene are being developed or intensively investigated. One
Stockholm firm has recently begun producing penicillin on a scale intended to supply
the major portion of Swedish requirements for this antibiotic.
b. Physical Chemistry.
Swedish physical chemists have earned a world-wide reputation by their con-
tributions to the chemistry of high-molecular-weight materials and to the development
of experimental techniques for basic physical-chemistry research. Their methods for
studying various protein and cellulosic systems have been adopted or further developed,
in all the major countries, for they are of considerable practical significance in such
fields as plastics, rubber and textile technologies.
Consequently these Swedish scientists experience ease in obtaining funds for
research institutes and equipment.
The Institute of Physical Chemistry at Uppsala leads in its field in the Scandi-
navian countries; in certain areas, particularly sedimentation analysis and electrodif-
fusion phenomena, it ranks first in the world. This institute has also entered the
field of nuclear reactions, supplied with funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, but
it is not yet clear whether the emphasis will be on the chemical or physical aspects.
During the last thirty years the Institute has developed, and also constructed for other
laboratories, items of precision equipment for measuring the basic properties of large
molecules.
Several Swedish laboratories possess such modern physical-chemistry tools
as large optical and mass spectrographs, electron microscopes, X-ray and ultrasonic
equipment. The reputations of the leading personalities, creators of new experimental
approaches, have attracted to Sweden for study promising young scientists from many
other countries.
c. Chemical Warfare.
Sweden's efforts in military chemistry have been limited to the defensive
aspects only. "Pentamin," a successful anti-mustard gas agent, an anti-gas liquid for
winter conditions, claimed to be superior to a similar British product, and some pro-
tective clothing and facial masks comprise the extent of known Swedish chemical-
warfare developments.
6. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE.
Sweden is fully aware of the importance of biological warfare, but to date has
shown no evidence of taking vigorous steps even towards the development of defensive
measures. The proposed appropriation for all medical defensive research for the year
1948 amounts to only 415,000 crowns. And according to Dr. Gunnar Olin, Head of
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the State Bacteriological Laboratory at Stockholm, no provisions have been made for
mass immunization in the event of a biological-warfare attack.
Two of Dr. Olin's associates, Dr. Hans Ericsson and Dr. Sven Gard, have been
assigned to the full-time study of biological warfare. Professor E. Torsten Teorell,
M.D., Director of the Institute of Physiology at Uppsala, and Professor Hilding Berg-
lund, M.D., Professor of Surgery at the University of Stockholm, have been appointed
biological warfare advisors. These actions are the most decisive taken thus far.
An American source who talked with Olin, Gard, and Ericsson in January of 1948
reports that Ericsson had completed a digest of the unclassified Rosebury-Kabat
analysis of possible BW agents. Although Ericsson was enthusiastic, he seemed con-
fused about the proper approach to take in the drawing up of a domestic program for
BW. Dr. Gard, Professor of Bacteriology at the Caroline Institute, stated that, in his
opinion, viruses ? with the possible exception of the psitticosis virus ? were not suit-
able agents for biological warfare. As Dr. Gard is being considered for the position of
Professor of Virology and as other countries have already progressed far enough to be
convinced of the feasibility of using certain viruses in BW, it is apparent that Sweden
is lagging behind in biological warfare research.
7. APPLIED RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING.
Consistent with her position as a small but highly industrialized nation, Sweden
has well qualified personnel and excellent, modern facilities for both applied industrial
research and experimental engineering. Prior to World War II, Sweden had approxi-
mately 125 privately owned industrial laboratories, staffed with about 2,000 workers of
whom 350 were technically trained. In 1939 over half of these laboratories belonged
to the steel and engineering industries. Currently, several firms are operating new
laboratories, each with facilities for 10 to 30 trained researchers and 20 to 40 assistants.
Two other types of applied research laboratories are the state research institute and
the semi-industrial branch institutes, the latter administered by trade associations but
financed jointly by industry and the state.
Scientists for Sweden's industrial-research programs are trained primarily at the
two institutes of technology, which have together somewhat fewer than 3,000 students,
of whom only one-third graduate in either the engineering or natural sciences. The
greatly increased national research program, together with the restrictive educational
system, is straining the recruitment potential of technological personnel.
Present efforts in applied research are directed towards those exportable products
having the most beneficial effect on the national economy, for example, steel, lumber,
engineering products, and substitute and synthetic fuels. Swedish industrial research
excels in those industries which depend on an abundant electrical power supply, as in
the electrosmelting of metals and other metallurgical processes. Sweden's metal-
lurgists are more comprehensively trained than those of the US, particularly in the
field of high-temperature alloys.
Since the war, there has been an estimated increase of 100 to 300 percent in the
production of precision equipment. Special emphasis is placed on automatic and
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precision measuring devices, on control instruments, and on antifriction and ball
bearings, in which field Sweden leads the world outside the United States.
For many years, Sweden's fuel technologists have been working to perfect methods
for extracting oil from shale and for utilizing sulphite alcohol to augment the limited
amounts of motor fuel obtained from shale. The importance of the Swedish work with
shale oil lies in the development of a continuous process rather than the batch processes
used in all other countries, including the United States. Plans are well advanced
towards the recovery of C3 and C4 constituents, which will eventually serve as a source
of raw materials for the growing chemical industry. By means of the so-called
Ljungstrom method, oil can be produced without removing the shale from the ground,
and moreover this method makes possible the refining of gasoline and Diesel oil con-
forming to US Navy specifications, a feat that our own oil technologists have not yet
been able to duplicate.
The 1,500,000 tons of shale mined each year yield approximately 100,000 metric
tons of oil products, from which gasoline with an octane rating of 70 to 72 can be made.
Swedish engineers have exhibited a high order of inventive design and creativeness
in their underground assembly lines.
8. TECHNOLOGY.
a. Ordnance.
? The Bofors Company, one of the world's leading manufacturers of armaments,
is at present concentrating on the following projects: a VT fuze for use with artillery;
a squeeze bore attachment for gun barrels; a multiple-mount, recoilless, 18-gun
aggregate called the Stalin organ; and several types of automatic weapons.
The Stalin Organ is an assembly of 18 recoilless, 10.5-cm. guns, arranged in
three tiers of six guns each. Although four Stalin Organs are under development, the
project may be abandoned (a) because of the proportionately high quantity of propel-
lant necessary to achieve the desired muzzle velocity and (b) because, unless a brisk
breeze is blowing, the gun position becomes unbearable during the two to three min-
utes following the simultaneous burning of the 81 kg. of powder.
In the field of automatic weapons, Sweden prefers to purchase the actual
weapons or the manufacturing rights to them from other countries, including the
United States. Objectives of present Swedish Army automatic weapons include a ma-
chine pistol of about 2.5 kg. weight, an automatic or semi-automatic rifle similar to the
Garand, a light machine gun with a bipod and tripod mount, anti-aircraft weapons
for close-in defense of ground troops, and the conversion of the present 6.5 mm.
Browning-type gun to the US caliber .30. Development of the above weapons is slow.
?
b. Rockets and Guided Missiles.
In addition to the armaments projects referred to in Section a. (above) , the
Bofors Company has under development short-range rockets and guided missiles and
a solid, slow-burning powder for rocket fuel.
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There is no evidence that Sweden is attempting the development of a long-
range guided missile or rocket. The emphasis, rather, is on the perfection of a 300-
mile range, V-1 type which is equipped with a turbojet engine, and on a 40-to-140-
mile-range V-1, equipped with an intermittent jet engine. To date, both developments
lack satisfactory power plants.
At Bofors and elsewhere, other Swedish developments in rockets and guided
missiles comprise:
(1) an experimental missile, the 300-LT-F02 (formerly designated as the
250-LT) for catapult-launching from an airplane;
(2) an anti-warship and anti-merchant marine projectile, Missile 301, to be
launched from the 21-R fighter or the 18-B bomber, in above-the-waterline attacks; -
(3) a second anti-ship projectile, Missile 303, also carried by the 18-B, for
below-the-waterline proximity hits;
(4) Missile 311-LT, for which the 300-LT-F0 Missile is a prototype; and
(5) Missile 321, still in the developmental stage, designed for radar homing,
a mach number of 1.5, and a range of 5 km.* It is for this projectile that Bofors is
compounding a solid, slow-burning powder for fuel.
Apparently progress has been slow on the tests of surface-to-surface
missile 300-LT-F02 by the Svenska Aeroplan Aktiebolaget (SAAB). This missile is a
prototype for a larger missile (311-LT), a copy of the German V-1, on which construc-
tion is expected to start in the near future. Judging from the tests on the 300-LT,
guidance progress has been made only to the extent that lateral and vertical control
can be obtained. It is believed that this missile is intended to operate at a height of
not over 10 meters and will be used primarily for shipping targets. A small radar
altimeter will be utilized for altitude control.
Contrary to the abundance of information on work devoted to develop-
ment of V-1 type missiles, it has been reported that the Guided Missiles Bureau (Robot-
Vapen. Byra) of Sweden is concentrating its main efforts upon the task of developing
medium range guided missiles of two types, a surface-to-surface supersonic rocket,
and an air-to-ground/sea supersonic rocket.
The Swedish Air Force has under development a new pulsejet engine
consisting of ten ducts to form a cylinder. It is believed that this engine is the power
plant for missile 311-LT and, if so, five of these engine have been built and tested.
Hydrogen peroxide is also under investigation as a fuel for airborne
weapons, for submarines, and for torpedoes.
c. Aeronautics.
The most significant Swedish airplane, now undergoing component and model
tests, is the J-29 ? a single seater, mono-jet fighter, powered by a de Havilland Ghost
II engine with air intake in the nose. The original design specifies a mach number of
0.87 but the maximum obtainable speed will probably be closer to 0.8.
* Data on maximum range/altitude, trajectory velocity, Operating altitude, guidance, war-
head and fuze, et cetera, are given in a more detailed report being prepared by OSI.
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Project 1100 is a joint Air Force-SAAB effort. Although "1100" has been
active for some time, progress has been retarded by lack of agreement between the two
cognizant organizations. Preliminary plans have been drawn up for testing Project
1100 in the 6-by-5-inch wind tunnel at the Royal Institute of Technology.
The Swedish Air Force has under development a new pulsejet engine con-
sisting of ten ducts joined to form a cylinder. A small experimental model is now
under construction with the ultimate objective of using the final production design as
a power source for guided missiles.
Also under development and test is an axial flow turbine having eight stages
of compression and a single stage turbine. In July of 1948, in an actual run at 7,800
RPM, tests results gave a compressor ratio of 3:1 and an efficiency of 86 percent. The
turbine efficiency was 88 percent.
One phase of Sweden's efforts to develop its own turbojet engine is the produc-
tion of an alloy suitable for turbine blade and wheel operations at temperatures up to
800? C. Present attempts are centered on a steel alloy with varying percentages of
Ni, Cr, Mo, W, Cb, and Fe, similar to alloys developed for this purpose in the United
States and England.
There have been no reports on the development of ceramic materials for high-
temperature use in air weapons and jet engines.
d. Wind Tunnels.
All operating Swedish wind tunnels are located in or near Stockholm, at the
Royal Institute of Technology or the Aeronautical Research Institute (FFA). These
seven tunnels allow tests in speeds up to Mach 3; a proposed new tunnel for the Defense
Research Institute (FOA) will allow tests up to Mach 4.
At the Royal Institute of Technology, the Division of Aeronautics operates a
low speed tunnel (10 to 100 mph), built in the early 1930's after German designs of that
time. The hand-operated six-component balance system, while extremely slow, is very
accurate.
The Division of Steam Engineering has three tunnels, "A," "B," and "C,"
operating from a common compressor chamber. Tunnel "A" was built primarily for
dynamic problems (Flygmotor AB) , tunnel "B" for aerodynamic problems (Swedish
Air Force), and tunnel "C" for ballistic investigations (Bofors).
The Aeronautical Research Institute has three wind tunnels in operation,
providing air speeds from 224 mph to Mach 2.50. The supersonic tunnel (Mach 1.4
to 2.5) is designed to take schlieren photographs.
By the autumn of 1948 the Royal Institute of Technology expects to have
completed a supersonic tunnel which will be equipped for schlieren photography.
After studying wind tunnels in other countries, the Aeronautics Research
Institute recommended to the Defense Research Institute (FOA) that three new
tunnels be constructed. Essentially, the recommendation specifies a combination of
one subsonic, continuous-operating, return-circuit type coupled to two supersonic
induction types so as to use the closed-throat return circuit of the former as a pressure
chamber. The estimated power requirement for the combined installation is 40,000 hp.
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e. Ship Propellers.
Significant advantages are claimed for the variable pitch propeller, "Kamewa,"
produced by the Karlstad Mekaniska Werkstad. When used in submarines, the pro-
peller's efficiency can be adjusted to varying conditions, as with Schnorkel and electric-
motor operation. The hydraulic system for varying the blades will operate against
any pressure, moving the blades from one extreme to the other in 23.5 sec. The
variable-pitch propeller installation is about twice the weight of the standard
installation.
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? APPENDIX E
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
GUSTAV V.
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King of Sweden. Born 1858, ascended to throne 1907. Highly respected and
held in great affection by the Swedish people; possesses much personal dignity; social
position more democratic than that of the King of England, and with fewer ceremonial
trappings. Gustav's long reign has given him the status of a Swedish institution and
he has considerably more influence in State affairs than is usual with European
constitutional monarchs.
During World War II the King was personally pro-German but neither pro-Nazi
nor anti-democratic, extremely anti-USSR and convinced of the merits of Swedish
neutrality. He was and is determined to go down in history as Sweden's Peace King,
and thus is opposed to any policy which might upset the neutrality of the country.
GUSTAF ADOLF.
Crown Prince and heir to the throne of Sweden. Born 1882. Extremely well
liked; his second wife, Crown Princess Louise (Lady Louise Mountbatten) has con-
tributed to his popularity in Sweden and is held in great affection for her numerous
charitable works. The Crown Prince is a recognized archaeologist and a well-known
sportsman. He is intelligent and well-informed and exercises some political influence,
but this is naturally limited by the authority of the King and the Crown Prince's own
great filial reverende. He is friendly to the US and very pro-British. Between West
and East he is definitely pro-West.
ANDERSSON, SVEN.
Minister without Portfolio and Secretary of the Social Democratic Party. Born
in Goteborg in 1910. Trained as a carpenter; formal schooling ceased before university
level. Possesses 20 years of practical political experience, starting with the Gdteborg
Labor Association for which he eventually became representative from 1938 to 1940.
Member of the Lower House of the Riksdag in 1940, moved to the Upper House in 1944
and became temporary party secretary in 1945. Andersson is energetic, pleasant, and
direct, and his leanings appear to be definitely anti-Communist. He is understood to
have long favored military cooperation in Scandinavia, and his recent cabinet appoint-
ment appears to have placed him in line to succeed Allan Vougt as Defense Minister
in the near future.
Boox, KLAS.
? Recently appointed Executive Director of the Bank of Sweden, replacing Ivar Rooth
who resigned in protest against government financial policy. Previously Chief of the
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Commercial Division of the Foreign Office; considered to be a financial and banking
expert. It is believed that his policies with respect to the bank will follow closely the
socialist economic theories of Finance Minister Wigforss.
ERLANDER, TAGE FRITIOF.
Prime Minister. Born 1901. Educated at Lund University. Although he had
held cabinet posts prior to his appointment as Prime Minister, he was chiefly known
as an intellectual and loyal party man. Served in the Lower Chamber of the Riksdag
from 1933 to 1935, entered the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1938 (as an under-secretary)
and was appointed Minister without Portfolio to handle labor problems in 1944.
Became a member of the Upper Chamber of the Riksdag and Minister of Education
and Ecclesiastical Affairs in 1945. Became Prime Minister in 1946, and was elected
chairman of the Social Democratic Party; is likely to retain both positions as long as
the Social Democrats stay in power.
An able and diligent administrator, Erlander's rapid rise can be attributed to the
early recognition given him by Wigforss. At the time of his appointment he was con-
sidered to be a figurehead for the influential Wigforss; subsequent events have shown
him capable of independent action.
His leanings are anti-Communist and he is opposed to formation of power blocs and
alliances, preferring to work through the United Nations Organization, but on the
question of neutrality he is less doctrinaire and more resilient than Foreign Minister
*Linden.
HAMMARSKJOLD, DAG HJALMER AGNE CARL.
Vice-Chairman, Executive Committee, Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC) and until recently Chairman, Board of Directors, Bank of Sweden.
Born July 29, 1905. Has Ph.D, 1934, from Uppsala University. One of the most im-
portant and influential men in Sweden, exercising almost unquestioned authority over
Swedish foreign financial matters. Politically non-partisan, he enjoys the full con-
fidence of the government, as evidenced by the great number of missions he has
headed. Definitely pro-Western, he is said to lean over backwards to be fair in dealings
with United States officials. He is described as a man of thorough scholarship, unusual
technical competence, and great resourcefulness in reaching solutions to economic
problems.
JUNG, HELGE VICTOR (GENERAL).
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Born in Malmo in 1886 of a middle
class family. Commissioned in 1906; instructor at the Staff College in 1926. Chief
of the Army Staff in 1937. Promoted to Major General in 1938; afterwards com-
manded the II and IV Military Districts. In 1944 promoted to Lieutenant-General
and then to Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces.
No aristocrat, Jung is a self-made man. He lacks polish and has made many
enemies, particularly in the naval hierarchy, although all admit that he is clever and
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dynamic. A disciplinarian and a driver, he has constantly worked to foster military
preparedness. Politically Jung is anti-Communist and now appears strongly pro-US.
He reportedly has considerable influence with the Minister of Defense and the Riksdag,
but in practice keeps out of all matters which do not directly concern the military
establishment. General Jung has high professional ability which is not, however, as
outstanding as that of some other Swedish officers.
LAGER, FRITJOF.
Secretary of Swedish Communist Party (appointment announced November 1948) .
Born 1905. Previously political editor of Ny Dag; has steadily risen in power within
the Swedish Communist Party (SKP) since the end of the war and is reported to be
the real head of the party, although Sven Linderot remains the titular leader. Member
of the Lower Chamber of the Riksdag for Stockholm district and in last general election
(September 1948) headed SKP election ticket over his Riksdag seniors. Generally
considered the SKP's most faithful "Moscowite," and reportedly the Cominform's liaison
with the SKP.
LINDEROT, SVEN.
Chairman of Swedish Communist Party (SKP) since 1933. Born 1889. Officially
Linderot is the party leader but he is probably subordinate to Fritjof Lager, newly
appointed Party Secretary, who is reportedly considered more reliable by Moscow and
the Cominform. Linderot represents the more moderate "nationalist" wing of the
party. Communist member of the Upper Chamber of the Riksdag; his greatest asset
in Swedish politics is his pleasant personality, a quality which has made his position
as a revolutionary leader less frightening to his non-Communist political opponents.
MYRDAL, GUNNAR.
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE) . Born December 6, 1898. Has an LL.B. from the University of Stockholm and
an honorary LL.D. from Harvard University, 1938. Myrdal has long been a prominent
figure in Swedish public life and has been recognized as a financial, economic, and
sociological expert. He is one of the leaders of the left wing of the Swedish Social
Democratic Party. In general, an admirer of the United States, he has criticized
various aspects of American life. He is not strongly pro-Russian, although as Sweden's
Minister of Commerce, together with Finance Minister Wigforss, he pushed through
the generally unpopular Swedish-Soviet credit agreement of 1946, arguing that Sweden
should not tie herself to the American economic cycle which he felt was headed for a
postwar depression. He is still criticized for unwarrantedly seeming to favor Soviet
views in his present position on ECE. His considerable ego leads him to believe
himself uniquely fitted to gauge the temper of the Russian people, whom he describes
as a primitive, simple folk who can be handled if properly understood.
OHLIN, BERTIL.
Chairman, Liberal Party, and as such virtual leader of the non-Socialist opposition
to the present Social Democratic Government. Born April 23, 1899. Received Ph.D.
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from Stockholm University; studied at Cambridge and Harvard. Though not a pro-
found scholar, he has an international reputation as an economist. He served as
Minister of Commerce for a short period under the wartime coalition government and
has been a member of many government boards and delegations. As a member of
the Lower Chamber he is leader of the Liberal Party group in the Riksdag. He is
essentially pro-Western and pro-American but not a strong leader on international
affairs. Ohlin is described as a free trade economist who favors government inter-
ference with economic processes only to the extent necessary to preserve the capitalistic
system. Thus, he favors both the social legislation of the Social Democratic Party and
free enterprise as advocated by the Conservative Party; consequently, he is trusted by
neither group. Ohlin is described as an intellectual opportunist with a great deal of
political shrewdness.
SVEDBERG, THEODOR.
Born 1884. Ph.D., Uppsala, 1908; Professor of Physical Chemistry, Uppsala, 1912.
Member of the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences, 1913. Professor of Colloid Chem-
istry, University of Wisconsin, 1923. Collaborated with Gard and Tiselius on the pro-
duction of an anti-polio vaccine.
Member: Royal Society of London, 1944; Swedish Military Academy, 1946; and the
Scientific Society of Uppsala, The Royal Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA) , and
the Physiographical Society.
Honorary doctorates from practically every large university in the world.
TINGSTEN, HERBERT.
Editor-in-chief, Liberal newspaper Dagens Nyheter (Sweden's most widely read
daily). Born 1896. Formerly professor of political science at Stockholm University
and one of the leading members of the Social Democratic Party; as such he enjoyed
high reputation for integrity and clarity of thought. In 1945 he withdrew from the
Social Democratic Party on the grounds that planned economy as advocated by the
Social Democrats was incompatible with political freedom; joined the Liberal Party
and in 1946 became chief editor of Dagens Nyheter. He is an outspoken opponent of
all forms of totalitarianism, very pro-US, and writes vehemently against present-day
Soviet policies. His paper is one of the few powerful advocates in Sweden of an
alliance with the Western Powers, and Tingsten personally is the most vociferous mem-
ber of the group within the Liberal Party opposed to neutrality.
TISELIUS, ARNE.
Born 1902. Ph.D., Uppsala, 1930; Professor of Physical Chemistry, Princeton,
1934-35; Docent, 1938; Professor of Biochemistry, Institute of Physical Chemistry,
Uppsala, 1938. Member of Swedish Royal Academy, 1939; Chairman of the Board of
Wenner Gren's Institutet, 1941; Member of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1943;
was Chairman of Sweden's Atom Committee in 1945, resigned in 1947. Chairman of
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the National Science Research Council, 1946. Received Nobel prize in chemistry
November 4, 1948 for discoveries in biochemistry and inventions of important labora-
tory apparatus. Author of numerous publications, including those on the analysis
of mixtures of fatty and amino acids and on physiologically important albumin
substances. Collaborated with Gard and Svedberg in the production of an anti-polio
vaccine.
UNDEN, OSTEN.
Minister for Foreign Affairs since July, 1945. Born 1886. Received LL.D. from
Lund University, 1912. Since latter date has either taught law or been connected with
government primarily in legal capacities. His rather inflexible emphasis on the legal
rights and duties of States has made it difficult for him to adjust himself in the midst
of recent sharp Great Power differences. As Foreign Minister he has continued to
demonstrate his lifelong belief that international cooperation is the best solution to
world political problems. Because of increasing East-West tension, however, he has
gradually lost faith in the ability of the UN to preserve peace and has fallen back on an
obstinate and academic adherence to Sweden's traditional policy of neutrality. In
his dogmatic defense of neutrality he has shown recent indications of slight wavering,
possibly owing to a belated and more realistic concept of Soviet aims and policies. Per-
sonally, Unden is described as an upright and high-principled man with marked intel-
lectual and personal reserve. He is not really sympathetic with any foreign civilization,
4111 and though not anti-American can certainly not be described as strongly pro-American.
?
SIEGBAHN, KARL MANNE GEORGE.
Born 1886. Dr. Sc., University of Lund, 1911; Nobel Prize in Physics, 1924; Honor-
ary Doctorate, Freiburg University, 1931; awarded Hughes Medal by the Royal Society
of London, 1934; Director of Research, Nobel Institute for Experimental Physics (in
charge of cyclotron there, with a staff of about 40 technicians of whom 20 have had
academic training) ; awarded Rumford Medal, 1940; Honorary Doctorate, University of
Bucharest, 1942; Honorary Doctorate, University of Oslo, 1946. Member of Sweden's
Atom Committee. Probably Sweden's foremost nuclear physicist.
VOUGT, ALLAN.
Minister of Defense. Born in Stockholm in 1895. Studied at Uppsala University
and in England and France. Since 1928 has held various posts in the Riksdag, includ-
ing that of Social Democratic leader in the Lower Chamber. Became Minister of
Defense in 1945, and is considered a strict adherent to the party line. He is anti-
Russian, and though reported unenthusiastic about the United States, he has made
special efforts to cultivate both the United States and Great Britain. Vougt is
extremely capable but has been subject to severe criticism from the public because he
was the chief spokesman for the appeasement policy of the Riksdag toward the Germans
in 1940-42. In the months just prior to the September 1948 elections, he was bitterly
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attacked by his old critics on foreign policy and strategic problems. It is generally
expected in Sweden that he will be replaced as Defense Minister at an opportune time.
WIGFORSS, ERNST JOHANNES.
Minister of Finance, a position he has occupied on three different occasions: 1925-26;
1932-36 and from September 1936, to date. Born 1881. Educated at Lund University.
Member of the governing body of the Swedish Social Democratic Party since 1920;
member of the Lower Chamber of the Riksdag since 1929. One of the most influential
men in the Swedish Government, but because of his doctrinaire socialism also one of
the most controversial. His theories have evoked a great deal of criticism from the
business community. He is very pro-British, friendly to the United States and although
anti-Soviet, .& favors extension of Swedish-USSR trade, partly for the purpose of
keeping on friendly terms with the USSR.
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NO CHANGE in Class. 0
IADECLASSIFIED
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DDA Y.cmo, 4 Apr 77
Auth; DA TIM 77 1763
Date t L._ By:
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
3538-STATE-1949
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