THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 1947-1977

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STAT
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This book was prepared by the Transition Team
for Mr. Casey's use. We have no further need for
it and thought it mig t be of some interest to you.
You may retain or de troy.
Aito)t? /szA42.v.L.?;*.
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STAT
Date 1/29/81
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Role of the Director of Central Intelligence
1947-1977
Evolution of the Intelligence Community Staff
1960-1980
Organization Under Executive Order 12036
Budget Management.
DCI Functions
Organization Under Old Executive Order 11905
Tab A
Tab B
Tab C
Tab D
Tab E
Tab F
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THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
1947-1977
INTRODUCTION
It has been thirty years since the founding of the
Central Intelligence Agency, which was formed to coordinate
the entire U.S. foreign intelligence effort. Those years
have been marked by uneven but sustained progress toward
effective coordination of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
U.S. foreign intelligence has passed many milestones, and
the one must recently achieved, explicit in Executive Order
12036, "United States Intelligence Activities," represents
an important advance toward that goal.
This paper explains the significance of the changes
directed by President Carter in an historical perspective
It traces the evolution of the Intelligence Community,
pointing out the managerial problems which have evolved with
it, particularly those related to the division of responsi-
bility between the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense. It is, in part, a chronology; but
more than that, by focusing on the more recent past, it
illuminates the fundamental problems which have given rise
to President Carter's decisions of 4 August 1977.
The President has made major decisions which impact
signficantly upon the future of Aierican foreign intelli-
gence. This paper tells how it happened, and what it may
mean for the future.
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IP IIP
Reorganization 1977
On 4 August 1977 President Carter announced a number of
major decisions designed to effect needed changes while
retaining the structural continuity of the Intelligence
Community. The purpose of these changes was to provide for
strong direction by the President and the National Security
Council (NSC), and to centralize the most critical national
intelligence management functions under the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI). The reorganization built on the
experience of the past by strengthening the roles of both
the NSC system and the DCI. Changes were designed to
enhance responsiveness to both the intelligence requirements
of major national-level consumers and the operational needs
of Federal departments and the military services.
The innovative highlights of the recent reorganization
included the following:
o For the first time, major consumers of intelli-
gence were charged to formulate their own sub-
stantive intelligence requirements and consolidate
these through formal mechanisms under athe aegis
of the DCI, thus ensuring that real needs would
drive the intelligence process, and that tech-
nology would be a responder to and not an in-
itiator of intelligence requirements.
2
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o For the first time, the DCI was given full and
exclusive development and approval authority for
the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget
prior to its normal submission to the President
and to Congress, thus establishing central di-
rection, control and cohesiveness of this critical
national management responsibility.
o For the first time, the DCI was formally iden-
tified as having sole peacetime responsibility and
full authority for translating national intelli-
gence requirements and priorities into specific
intelligence collection objectives and targets,
and for assigning these to collection organizations
whether or not they are under his direct line
control, this to be achieved through a newly
instituted, jointly manned National Intelligence
Tasking Center.
Additional aspects of the reorganization are addressed
in a Presidential Executive Order, which recognizes inter
alia that:
o Those staff elements of the Office of the DCI that
support execution of the DCI's Community respon-
sibilities should themselves be considered among
the organizations which comprise the Intelligence
Community. This concept bolsters the sense of
3
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"community" which is essential to the continuity
of effort of the many disparate components which
contribute to the nation's intelligence arm.
o The NSC's Policy Review Committee (see pages 34-
35) must define and set forth substantive require-
ments for national foreign intelligence, and must
establish appropriate priorities for those require-
ments. Because the PRC is composed of the DCI;
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury;
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
and others as deemed appropriate, this PRC mission
will help ensure that intelligence requirements
are articulated and assessed at the highest levels
of Government, which in turn will strengthen
direction of the nation's intelligence effort.
o The DCI shall have full and exclusive authority
for reprogramming National Foreign Intelligence
Program funds, but only after consultation with
the head of the department affected and, of
course, in accordance with congressional guide-
lines. This, combined with the DCI's budget
approval authority, further assists the central
direction and cohesiveness, necessary for the
overall management of intelligence.
4
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o The National Intelligence Tasking Center under
direction of the DCI shall be established as the
central mechanism for coordinating and tasking
intelligence collection activities. This step
recognizes that the prioritized collection re-
quirements set forth by the NSC's Policy Review
Committee must be dealt with by the Intelligence
Community through an orderly and logical process.
o Senior officials of the Intelligence Community, in
discharging their separate duties and responsi-
bilities, must make appropriate use of the capa-
bilities of other elements of the Community in
order to achieve maximum efficiency and assist
other departments and agencies in the Community.
This direction, by the President of the United
States, tends to cement the separate blocks
of intelligence into a coordinated Community
institution.
These measures, now set forth in Executive Order 12036,
were taken to help close a critical gap--which has been
widening over a period of many years--between the growing
responsibilities assigned to the nation's senior intelli-
gence officer and his authority to fulfill those responsi-
bilities. The gap was an outgrowth of the Unique historical
structure of intelligence organizations in this country,
5
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which has evolved as an amorphous grouping of departmental
and other organizational entitites which--while functionally
and purposely different--share some concern with "intelli-
gence" as a single common denominator.
The gap between responsibility and authority has now
been narrowed. The Intelligence Community seems postured,
perhaps better than ever before, to deal now and in the
future with the dynamics of an. everchanging global environ-
ment in fulfilling the vital function of producing excellent
intelligence. The following pages trace the evolution of
the Intelligence Community, keying on the most important
policy implications in the periods of transition.
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The Early Years
The concept of an Intelligence Community has existed in
this country since before World War II, but the Community of
today bears little resemblance to its pre-war predecessor.
In the 1930's there was little recognition of a need for a
unified national intelligence effort. By 1939 representatives
from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the
Interior were assigned overseas with US embassies as attaches,
with their reports funneling back through the State Department,.
but in no sense were their activities viewed as "intelligence"
collection. Military and naval attaches, who had responsi-
bilities for collection of information of intelligence -
value, reported directly to their respective departments.
In Washington the Departments of State, War and Navy and the
FBI constituted the entirety of .the Community, but there was
very little coordination of effort among them.
The necessity for a coordinated intelligence effort was
recognized during World War II and gave rise to the formation
of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In 1941, General
William'Dohovan, who enjoyed a special relationship with the
President, proposed the creation of a service of strategic
information in the United States, reasoning that strategy
was highly dependent upon good information and that collection ._..
-
of information at the national level had no purpose other
than to support strategy development.'jle-Pased his 'views
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41,
to President Roosevelt, thus laying the basis for the instrument
of government which eventually became the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).
While the OSS was conceived as a-wartime expedient, it
provided the earliest nucleus around which the modern Intelli-
gence Community evolved. But the OSS labored aborning. Donovan
was first appointed Coordinator of Strategic Information, directly
responsible to the President. The concept called for the Co-
ordinator to have an advisory panel consisting of the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the heads of the
Army and Navy intelligence services, and corresponding officials
from other Departments concerned. This appointment aroused -much
opposition from the military services, and the word "strategic"
had to be eliminated from Donovan's title in deference to the
statutary responsibilities of the military and naval advisors
to the President.
But the opposition was not focused only on terminology.
The entire concept of centralization of responsibility for
"information" was perceived as a threat to the influence and
authority of the military. The military reaction is important
in histotical perspective as it has survived the decades since
World War-II in one form or another complicating relationships
between the services and the Director of Central Intelligence.
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The war years were marked by a number of changing missions
and shifting relationships among intelligence entities in the H_
Executive Branch. The OSS succeeded the Coordinator o
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Information and was placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
The Foreign Information Service and its broadcasting and
listening facilities were assigned to the Office of War Informa-
tion. The military services,fearful of security leaks, often
felt constrained in releasing intelligence reports and the
results of radio intercepts to the OSS. The OSS felt that
its ability was impaired because its undercover agents abroad
were often denied necessary intelligence and because at home
it frequently enjoyed less than full access to information
..needed for the conduct of strategic studies. The JCS created
regional joint intelligence collection committees in some
theaters for assembly of material and referefice to Washington.
The cooperation of military and civilian agencies should have
helped the OSS, but in practice it threatened the exposure of
OSS agents and delayed the reporting of their material at
assembly points overseas. The JCS Joint Intelligence Committee
functioned in Washington throughout these years to synthesize
military departmental intelligence on the strategic level.
The State Department saw a need to establish its own Office
of Foreign Intelligence to provide a central place for
coordination with other government agencies and with its
own functional and geographic divisions. The Joint Intelli-
gence Committee developed a plan providing for a National
Intelligence Authority comprised of the Secretaries of State,
War, Navy and a JCS representative.
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Throughout this Plied of pulling and pushirirof
intelli-
gence organizations to meet the needs of a nation at war,
111 there was".slowly evolving a concern for the nation's new
responsibilities in peace and, in this context, an adequate
intelligence system. Proposals came from all quarters of
the Executive--OSS, JCS, the military departments, State and
even the Budget Bureau. The basis for all these proposals
stemmed from the potential spread of atomic weapons, the
spectre of a powerful and ambitious Soviet Union in the
post-war period, and the likelihood of new diplomatic and
political pressures in the aftermath of a war which would
re-shape much of the world.
.In 1945 President Truman directed the Secretary of
State to take the lead in developing the program for a
comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence system. OSS
was disestablished. The JCS reviewed the earlier pian for a
1
National Intelligence Authority. Army and Navy committees
were trying to reconcile their differences and find common
ground for a single Defense Department and central intelligence
. service. A variety of schemes evolved, tripped over bureaucratic
issues, end fell short of the utlimate objective of the many
who sought to provide for a central and coordinated intelligence
service.
Navy Secretary Forrestal appointed Ferdinand Eberstadt
to explore the merger of the War and Navy Departments.
Recognizing that scientific advances and changed conditions
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of warfare increased American military and political committments,
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Eberstadt recommended: organization of_the military into
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three coordinated departments--Army, Navy; Air; the close
association of these with the State Department in a National
Security Council; and the establishment of a central intelli-
gency agency to support authoritative information about the
outside world (Admiral Souers, later to become the first
Director of Central Intelligence, wrote the intelligence portion
of this plan). These features of the Eberstadt plan may be
readily recognized as principal measures of the National Security
Act of 1947.
On 22 January 1946, President Truman established a National
Intelligence Authority and a new agency of the Authority named
the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The CIG was an extension
of the Departments of State, War and Navy and was manned and
funded by them. These departmental representatives collectively
formed the Group; it was an assemblage, not a unified institution.
The Group was headed by the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), but he was not one of them. The DCI was appointed by
the President, answered to the National Intelligence Authority,
and attended their meetings as a non-voting member.
The. President also directed that an Intelligence Advisory
Board, wi_th representatives of the principal military and
civilian agencies, be constituted to advise the DCI. In
addition, the FBI was assigned control of security intelligence
within the United States, creating a division between the CIG
and FBI where without careful coordination one could easily
jeopardize the security of both.
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The Intelligence Advisory Board subsequently commissioned
a study which led to the creation in 1947 of the CIA as an
independent agency and successor to the CIG. The CIA was
established in recognition of the continuing need for a
1
U.S. foreign intelligence effort. The same legislation that
created the Agency establis
the National Security Council,
placed CIA subordinate to it, and established three separate
military services within the Department of De
Two years later the Central Intelligence Act of 1949
gave the CIA additional internal authority and the resources
which had been determined to be necessary for it to carry out
its mission. By 1952 the role of the CIA had evolved into some-
thing quite different from the CIG, the mission of which had
been solely coordinative. The Agency was becoming a major
intelligence production center, and was involved in both
technical and clandestine collection, and in covert action.
A Presidential memorandum created the National Security
Agency (NSA) in1952. It appointed the Secretary ofiDefense
national COMINT manager, with responsibility as Executive
Agent f.or what became the largest single U.S. effort to collect
and process intelligence data, and a substantial addition to a
growing Community intelligence organizations.
The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958
provided authority for the creation of separate agencies
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which might be required within DoD. Three years later, in
1961, Secretary McNamara created the Defense Intelligence
Agency, responsible thiough the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
the Secretary of Defense. Since that time the three largest
constituent member agencies of the Community--in terms of
manpower--have been NSA, CIA, and DIA; although the military
services have retained separate integral intelligence organiza-
tions which exceed these in size. Intelligence elements of
State, Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Energy Research and Development Agency have comprised the
balance of the Community, the latter being the successor to
a smaller intelligence. component of the former Atomic Energy
Commission, and in turn having recently been absorbed by the
newly-formed Department df Energy.
Another significant step in the evolution of the Community
occurred in 1961 when President Eisenhower, by Executive
Order, institutionalized the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB)
and formally established the National Photographic Inter-
pretation Center (NPIC). In 1958 the USIB had been created
through merger of the former U.S. Communications Intelligence
2
Board and the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This group
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2. The U.S. Communications Intelligence Board was established
in 1956 to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense on communications intelligence. State, Defense,
FBI, and CIG (later CIA) had two votes; Army, Navy (and later
Air Force) had .one vote; the DCI, although a member, had no
vote. The DCI's Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was
created in 1947 to coordinate intelligence requirements among
Departments. Chaired by the DCI, it included representatives
from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS, the Atomic Energy
Commis.. the others the DCI might invite.
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was made up of the principal members of the Community's component
organizations and chaired by the DCI who was, additionally, the
beneficiary of USIB's deliberations and advice in his role as
the President's senior intelligence advisor. Another refine-
ment of the USIB concept--that it be chaired by the DCI--was
formalized by President Kennedy on 16 January 1962 by memorandum
to DCI McCone, the same year in which NSA became a USIB member.
This instruction also directed Mr. McCone to delegate the
day-to-day operations of CIA to his deputy, who would also
become the CIA. representative to the USIB, so that the DCI
could devote more of his time to Community matters. The DCI
relied to a great extent upon his Deputy for Coordination to
assist him in the latter role. An amalgamation of Community
resources occurred when it was determined that NPIC would be
jointly staffed by photointerpreters from CIA and DIA.
As successive steps were taken toward a Community which
would more fully blend all departmental intelligence groups,
the DCI became aware of a growing need for a supporting
staff which would focus exclusively on Community concerns.
In 1963, Director McCone created the National Intelligence
Programs Evaluation (NIPE) Staff for this purpose and placed
them under his Deputy for Coordination. This small group of
12 to 15 professionals retained its identity for nearly ten
years, until it was superseded by the more extensive Intelli-
gence Community Staff (ICS) under Director Schlesinger, as
discussed later.
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On 4 March 1964, the NSC revised its first formal
intelligence directive; NSCID No. 1, to assign the DCI
(then Admiral Raborn) primary responsibility for guiding
3
the total U.S. intelligence effort. Three years later,
under the leadership of DCI Richard Helms, the Intelligence
Community may be said to have reached figurative maturity.
Although it had'been 21 years since the old CIG had been
formed immediately following World War II, coordination of
the Intelligence Community as an entity continued to be
fraught with problems.
The Impact of World Events
As stated at the outset, this paper keys- on important
policy implications in periods of transition. Its focus is
on internal Community coordination at the management level.
To add to the significance of these matters, it is
important to bear in mind--in.a broad global context--the
national security and foreign policy issues which drove or
affected intelligence during the 1950's and 60's.
The threat of Communism worldwide, with the Soviet Union
in the vangUard, was the single most-dominant concern of this
nation in the 1950's.. The United States was dedicated to
rolling back the frontiers of Communism, with the ever-present
spectre of nuclear holocaust in the background. Throughout
3. NSCID No. 1 was first issued on 12 December 1947. It
established the duties and responsibilities .of the DCI and
prescribed the relationship between the CIA and the intel-
ligence organizations concerning which the IAC (see foot-
note 2) advised him._
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this lieriod of intense Cold War, the effective coordination
of U.S. intelligence activities worldwide presented enormous
problems.
Soviet Premier Kruschev had slammed down the Iron Curtain
and sealed off Russian society from the eyes of an uncertain
world. Concern centered on Soviet intentions, industrial
capacity, nuclear capability, and general technological
development. Periodic crises occurred in Berlin and elsewhere
which created tensions underscoring the dominant concern
over Russian capacity and willingness to wage nuclear
war. Uncertainty, fed by a shortage of reliable information
and great suspicion)led to the missile gap of the 1960's.
This uncertainty drove intelligence toward a more
activist role at all levels. Innovative approaches to the
411 development of collection methods were pursued with vigor, and
a number of technological advances offered promise of sig-
nificant improvement in the quality of the intelligence
gathered and produced. The needs of high-level intelligence
consumers for hard information tended to override dollar con-
siderations during this era.
ate
The situation began to reverse during theit1960's as
program development came to feel the increasing pinch of
resource constraints imposed by competition connected with
requirements to support U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.
Increasingly the DCI's coordinating role focused on the shape
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and course of development of sophisticated collection programs.
Running into hte late 1.969's, many more of these programs were
terminated than continued for reasons of limited resources.
The great technological advances that had been made in the
previous decade; the onset of detente, marked by the beginning
of strategic arms limitations talks with the USSR; and the
peak of U.S. commitment to a complicated Vietnam war came
together to shape and size the intelligence problem. The
DCI, then Director Helms, was deeply involved in the coordina-
tion role in Intelligence Community affairs. The complex,
loosely-defined Intelligence Community began to look ahead
to a new era as the 1960's came to a close.
Entering the 1970's
The "Bross Report" of 20 January 1969 set the stage
for the rush of events which have occurred during the
1970's. John Bross, the Director of the NIPE Staff,
submitted a comprehensive report to the DCI on the
organization of the CIA and the Intelligence Community.
Focusing on the latter, the report addressed the Com-
munity's relationship to the DCI's coordinating responsibility
under three headings:
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? Coordination of the production and dissemination
of substantiire intelligence;
? Machinery for allocating jurisdictional
responsibility among Community components; and
? Guidance and coordination for allocation and use
of resources.
In the early stages of the development of the Community,
it had been intended by the architect's of the intelligence
system that the production ?agency having primary responsibility
for a given subject should have as a more or less exclusive -
franchise the analysis and production-of studies on thaf
subject; State dealt with political topics, Defense with
- military topics, and so on. DCI directives (DCIDs) outlined.
responsibilities and division of labor. Over the years, most
agencies expanded their competence and produced studies on
topics outside the purview of their primary responsibility.
In 1969 such departmental studies were not subject to
formal Community coordination (although National Intelli-
gence Estimates were coordinated), but the close working
relationships among analysts--notably in State, Defense,
and CIA--tended to ameliorate the friction and duplication
which might otherwise have resulted from this condition.
Further, the "USIB machinery" policed the practice
adequately, and the procedures for ensuri.ng the coordination
and dissemination of finished intelligence were generally
working well.
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411 41.oss said little on the subject of
allocating tasks among Community components, except to
note that the National Security Council was the allocating
authority. But he focused on resource manage-
ment, and forecast the problems of the 1970's.
The DCI's primary responsibility for resource
management in 1969 was to ensure that resources used in
the overall U.S. intelligence effort produced intelligence
which responded, insofar as possible, to the real needs
of policymakers. However, given a variety of expensive
and sophisticated technical collection options, and
the ability to collect enormous amounts of data--some of
which was redundant or of marginal interest--and given
limited numbers of operating dollars, the primary ques-
tions were how the DCI could determine how much information
was enough, and how he would know whether sufficient
effort was being applied against the most essential intelli-
gence targets.
The USIB developed Priority National Intelligence
Objectives (PNI0s) in an attempt to refine priorities
and objectives for complex collection programs. The
PNIOs helped provide the DCI's broad guidance to the
Community, but lacked the directive authority that would
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have made their observance mandatory by all Communit
...
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3
elements. Similarly; no common mechanism existea for ex-
amining the totality of the thee largest intelligence programs
(cryptology, reconnaissance, and general Defense intelli-
gence) which aggregated approximately 80% of the nation's
intelligence dollars under the management of the Secretary
of Defense. The need for a consolidated review of
intelligence programs was becoming clearer.
Reasonable arguments existed which supported a
concept of the three major DoD programs as discrete
entities. These were based largely on the formidable
review problem presented by their, size and complexity.
However, the NIPE Staff came to feel that Defense was
less than completely responsive to the DCI's effort
to guide and coordinate the total intelligence effort, and
review and staffing of issues for executive committee
discussion.
4 _
4. An executive committee was responsible for programmatic
and resource review of overhead reconnaissance activities.
Prior to 1971 it consisted of the President's Scientific
Advisor, the DCI, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
who was chairman. After 1971, with the creation of the
position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence),
the latter became the DoD member and the DCI became
chairman. .The job of the President's Scientific Advisor
was subsequently abolished. The committee teased to-exist
following issuance of Executive Order 11905, on 18 Februarf
1976. It had been created on 11 August 1965.
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11,
of overhead reconnaissance were difficult to accomplish
?
?
for the complicated matters involved. Similarly, it was
noted that DoD directives providing for the allocation
of intelligence resources, for .initiating program reviews.
and for authorizing project S Ciere is-sued before the DCI
or his representatives were allowed to assess the impact
which changes in allocations or levels of resouites might
have.
The National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) was
created to help to solve these problems.5 The purpose
of the NIRB was to establish bases for independent judg-
ments by the DCI concerning the need for individual
activities or programs. Not designed for routine program
review, the NIRB advised the DCI on collection programs
in light of cost, alternative methods, and gaps in
collection coverage of critical areas and possible risks
to national security. The Board was authorized to draw on
all Community components to assist in its assessments. Like
the USIB, it was 'another forum for management by
negotiation, in the absence of DCI directive authority
S. The NIRB was established by Director Helms in 1968.
His deputy, Admiral Taylor, was appointed chairman
and other members were senior representatives from
the Departments of Defense and State. DIA and NSA
were excluded from membership because, as program
managers, it was their resources which the NIRB--,
would consider for trade-off and adjustment.
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3
commensurate with the responsibilities which he was
assigned. The NIRB drew on the NIPE Staff and USIB
committees for program review dnd staffing.
The need to substantially expand and clarify the role
? of the DCI's Community; Staff was subsequently identified
in the context of the DCI's responsibility for coordina-
tion. The DCI 'S Deputy for Coordination and the NIPE Staff
lacked authority to deal directly with either CIA resource ?
elements and other Community components, even though the Staff
existed to support the DCI in coordinating Community resources
and activities. It was clear that the DCI's Community '
staff needed such authority, and the logic of additional
? roles it should perform began to be heard-with greater
clarity and understanding. The DCI and his advisors
believed that the Community staff should support the NIRB
and maintain the Target Oriented Display (a consolidated
presentation of intelligence resources showing the total and
certain functional categories; it was originated
by the
6
NIPE Staff.) It was also felt that it should represent tne
DCI in reviewing DoD and other departmental
intelligence programs, that it should be
6. The Target Oriented Display is known today as the
Consolidated Intelligence ?Resources Information System
(CIRIS); it is maintained by the IC Staff.
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cha.Kged to refine objectives and priorities for the overall
intelligence effort, and that it should develop a long-
range -*planning capability. Finally, there was a recogni-
tion that it should maintain a competence in systems and
operations analysis and perform Community liaison functions,
including support to the President's Foreign Intelligence
7
Advisory Board (PFIAB).
Key parts of the Community, Executive Branch and the
Congress were beginning to comprehend the sizeable re-
sponsibility which the DCI had for programs, activities,
and resources which he neither directed nor controlled.
Gathering Momentum for Change
8
In a letter to Director Helms on 1 November 1971,
President Nixon noted the urgent need for, increased
efficiency in the allocation of resources devoted to the
intelligence effort. The President directed changes de-
signed to enhance the status of the DCI and to provide him
with the support needed to strengthen his position as
leader of the Community. He instructed the
DCI to give this his primary attention and
7. President Eisenhower founded the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956. It,:
was an appointive body composed of a group of private
citizens who advised the President, but had no authority
over the DCI or the Intelligence Community. President
Kennedy renamed the group the President's Foreign In-
telligence Advisory Board. It functioned as the PFIAB
from 1962 until 4 May 1977, when President Carter
dissolved it.
?. .
8. A following memorandum, dated 5 November 1971, detailed
the President's instructions. It is not cited here be-
cause of its restricting security classification.
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to delegate as much as possible to his deputy the day-to-
day management of the CIA. He further instructed the DCI,
as a matter for priority attention, to plan and review
all intelligence activities, including tactical intelligence
and the allocation of all intelligence resources. In
addition, the President directed specific management actions
based on a study by the staffs of the NSC, OMB, PFIAB,
the President's Science Advisor, and the Intelligence
Community. They included:
? An enhanced leadership role for the DCI in
planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evalu-
ating all intelligence programs and activities,
and in the production of national intelligence.
? Establishment of an NSC Intelligence Committee:
(NSCIC) to give direction and guidance on national
intelligence needs and provide for a continuing
evaluation of intelligence products; and of an
NSC Net Assessment Group to evaluate all intelli-
gence products and to produce net assessments.
? Establishment of an Intelligence Resources Advisory
Committee (IRAC), chaired by the DCI and including
senior members from State, Defense, OMB, and CIA,
to advise the DCI on the preparation of a consoli-
dated intelligence program budget.9
8. The IRAC superseded the NIRB and perpetuated the intent
to provide a Community.forum which would address criti-
cal intelligence resources matters.
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?
? Retention of the USIB (naming the Deputy DCI)
vice chairman) to advise and assist the DCI with
respect to production ef national intelligence
and establishment of national intelligence re-
quirements and priorities.
The President noted that major issues within the
Community had to be addressed, with the DCI playing a major
role in their resolution. He also noted that the DCI
would require an increased and restructured staff to allow
him to discharge his augmented responsibilities. The
President recognized that these actions would not providb
ultimate solutions, and stated that he expected additional
changes in the Community consistent with the attainment
of prescribed national objectives. The letter pro-
vided certain insight into future events. It read:
"By far the largest portion of the intelligence
budget is devoted to collection. It is here that
savings must be sought. Future assignments of
roles and missions within the Intelligence Community
cannot be made satisfactorily by compromises
among agencies. The need to make some savings is
so urgent that I have directed the Office of
_Management and Budget, jointly with the DCI and
Secretary of Defense, to review the FY 1973 budget
for intelligence and to submit specific reductions
from current programs, with particular attention
to tactical intelligence."
Reflecting these broader responsibilities, Director
Helms created the Intelligence Community Staff on I March
1972 to deal with the Community aspects of his expanded
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mission. When Dr. Schlesinger became DCI in early 1973,
he reorganized the IC Staff to make it more representative
of the entire Community, its having previously been manned
by a preponderance of CIA officers. Emphasis on balanced
staffing drawn from the military and other Community organi-
zations has continued to the present.
Organization of the IC Staff reflected the focus of
the DCI on his primary Community responsibilities. Under
the leadership of the DCI's "Community Deputy," the IC
Staff included:
? A-Community Comptroller Group
? A Product Review Group
? A Planning And Evaluation Group
? A Data Support Group
While the Staff concentrated on Community coordination
problems, the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) organiza-
tion, which was created about a year later, largely replaced
the previous office of National Estimates, and extended the
DCI's role and presence throughout the intelligence production
process. Each NIO had a specific area of geographic
or topical responsibility. The NIO concept was an answer
to the continuing problem of finding ways to concentrate
Community resources and activities on problems of major
interest to consumers without incurring the costs and
dislocations of continual reorganization. The NIOs were
assigned no line authority over any Community components,
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but were authorized by the DCI to draw on all Community
resources and charged to view their respective areas of
responsibility and the Communify's total performance
just as the DCI would view them if he had the full time
and expertise to devote to the particular subject area. 10
The restructuring of the IC Staff and the appointment
of the NIOs were key steps taken toward the achievement
of Community objectives. It was the later collaboration
of the IC Staff and NIOs under DCI Colby's direction,
for example, that led to the development of the Key
Intelligence Questions (KIQs). The KIQs were the Commufiity's
response to a national requirement for a single system by
which NSCIC members could specify 'their most importantimmediate
intelligence needs and thereby provite definitive
guidance to the DCI and to managers of national intelligence
programs.
The year 1972 constituted a Community "shakedown
cruise" following the White House guidance of late 1971.
101 The NIOs replaced another organizational entity which
performed the estimating function. The Board of
National Estimates (BNE) had been created in 1950
to provide a forum in which senior experts from out-
side the Community might review estimates drafted by
CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE) Staff.
Over time BNE membership was dominated by senior CIA
analysts, creating an insular BNE-ONE relationship
and diminishing the objectivity which was its charter
to provide. Director Colby abolished both the BNE
and ONE and created the NIOs.
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?
That guidance called for the DCI to develop and submit
a consolidated intelligence program budget, including
tactical intelligence to OMB: The DCI's IC Staff
(Community Comptroller Group), which was charged to
assist the DCI in this task, quickly realized that the
DCI's budget "was not going to be the controlling one
in 1972.."11The *IC Staff thus substituted a National
Intelligence Presidential Memorandum (NIPM) as a
reasonable start in the direction of a substantive
analysis of the national intelligence program. After a
year of struggling with the development of the NIPM,
however, the IC Staff reported to the DCI that, while
. the NIPM was a reasonably good start, it Was, after all,
not a budget and would not become one until the DCI and
Secretary of Defense reached agreement on what was required
and what was possible.
The process of development of the 1972 NIPM served
to underscore the DCI's coordination problem. Nearly
......... --?
..........
every working-level element in or related to the Intelli-
gence Community became involved at one or more points in
the lengthy process:. The IC Staff, the USIB and USIB
mittees, State CIA, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Intelligence), the IRAC and
Corn-
ILIC Staff Director Bronson Tweedy memorandum to DCI,
26 February 1973, "Community Relations and DCI Impact
During 1972," p. 10.
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II,
IRD&C,12 DIA, NSA, the DDS&T, the Services, special
.reconnaissance offices, the NSC Staff, and the OMB
Staff. Program managers were also very involved, as
were the most senior officials in State, CIA and Defense.
Despite thousands of hours of Community review and
coordination, however, in the end the NIPM had
virtually no impact on final budget decisions in-Defense.
From the DCI's viewpoint--tasked as he was to embrace
the responsibility for allocation of intelligence resources--
he found once again that the collegial management
mechanisms of the Community fell short of the results
that greater directive authority might have :produced.
The DCI was discqvering that -the steps taken in 1971
to sti-Crigthen'his leadership in fact served to compound
his earlier problem. He had been assigned vastly greater
responsibilities, but the notion that any real augmentation
of his directive authority accompanied that assignment
was proving illusory in 1972.
12.? Intelligence Research and Development Council, then
an IRAC Subcommittee designed to ensure that Intelli-
gence R&D was synchronized with overall R&D programs
at DoD.
--t.tryt?
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?
Encouraging gains were achieved in the area of maintain-
ing
the DCI's--and the Community's--favorable relations with
Congress. The IC Staff developed a Congressional brief
to support the DCI in his new role as spokesman for the
Community. Director Helms explained that role and demonstrated
to concerned Congressional committees how intelligence entities
meshed to address critical intelligence priorities. Assembling
this data involved the collection of information from Com-
munity elements that had not previously been available in
consolidated form.
Congressional reaction indicated that at the time the
DCI's presentatioa was the clearest view ever presented
to legislators on U.S. intelligence activities, purposes,
and costs. The extent of contact between the IC Staff and
program managers during preparation of the briefing combined
with this encouraging Congressional response to provide the
DCI with considerable new leverage over Community program
managers. This became more apparent in the years to follow.
Important background and precedent for subsequent work within
the Community had been established, and with a helpful outcome.
Another phenomenon was also emerging as a result of
this activity. An era of intensified Congressional interest
in Community activities was commencing. Most attribute the
start of the surge of Congressional interest in intelligence
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IIP
reform to Seymour Hersh of the New York Times, who, in
December 1974, wrote a series of stories on CIA domestic
surveillance. It is certain that these articles had great
impact, but it is also certain that the impact was inten-
sified by an already growing gap between the Congress' high
level of interest in intelligence activities and its some-
what lesser knowledge and understanding of such activities.
The more Congress knew, the more it wanted to know and, beginning
with the DCI's new visibility on the Hill in 1972, it had been
the DCI and the Community itself which had stimulated much of
this interest.
While relations with Congress were changing, the DCI's
difficulties multiplied with his efforts to discharge his
responsibility for Community program review. His Community
staff plunged into program hearings on scores of issues with
officials throughout the Community. However, the success of
the effort was constricted by Defense policies which limited
DCI staff access to review processes within Defense. Intelli
gence Community elements within DoD were obliged to deal with
the IC Staff through the office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Intelligence), thereby limiting the organiza-
tional interface and freedomk of discUssion. ?Further
_
DCI comments and recommendations on the FY 1974 intelligence
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...
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budget received scant attention in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and had little impact.
The Pressures for Change Continue. 1
In a memorandum to all heads of governmental agencies
on 18 April 1973, President Nixon directed the preparation
of major goals and objectives to be accomplished during the
year upcoming for each organization. The Director of OMB
interpreted the directive to pertain to the Intelligence
Community as an entity--not merely CIA--emphasizing that
objectives should be clearly of Presidential significanc.e.
In the implementation of the President's desires for
"management by objective," the tone set for the Community
was one of open and frank communications stressing coopera-
tion. This derived in part from the fact that Director
Schlesinger became the Secretary of Defense almost immediately
following the formulation of the Community's objectives. The
new Secretary of Defense (and former DCI) had envisioned a
coordinated intelligence program which gave reason for the
new DCI, William Colby, and his IC Staff to expect that Com-
munity interaction might be significantly different thereafter.
But the accommodation --which was slight--was to be only
temporary, for Mr. Schlesinger was replaced as secretary
of Defense two-and-a half 'years Tater.
L.
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411 D.irector Colby established this Community objective for
FY 1974:
Authoritative and responsible leadership for
the Community as a whole must be assured.
Toward that end, the USIB became more active as an advisory
body to the DCI than it had been in the previous year or so.
The Treasury member of USIB became a regular participant as
economic intelligence requirements increased. The ASD(I)
and the Under Secretary of the Air Force, both of whom had
large resource responsibilities for major intelligence efforts,
were invited to participate at the USIB when matters affecting
their interests were involved: Similarly, on other occasions,
the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering were to develop
active relations with USIB. Cooperation at the USIB was
apparent and important. It permitted open treatment of
consumer requirements and constructive discourse on the
?
implications of resource constraints. It also elicited important
substantive and procedural commentary on suchl matters as
the KIQs, structural adjustments to improve the family of
intelligence products, and the means to improve what was
beginning to be called the intelligence "nervous system,"
information handling for crisis management.
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1
Also that year the Intelligence Community Staff began
?to focus on the need to develop resource packages showing
relationships between costs and outputs. The Staff set a
course for FY 1975 aimed at the development of a National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) developed around a five-
year projection of needs for all national activities, grouping
national assets irrespective of parent agency or source of
appropriation.
In a year-end report to the President in 1974, the DCI
noted that the Community "requirements machinery" still needed
more attention. His intention was to work through the USIB
to fashion better ways of making judgments on requirements
and for setting collection priorities within budgetary con-
straints. He noted as well that using manpower reductions
as a trade-off for increasing program costs and inflationary
pressures had attenuated program flexibility. In the mean-
while, there was no diminution in expectations of the DCI's
leading role in the Community. A memorandum13 from President
Ford reaffirmed his charge.
You should continue to exercise leadership in
maintaining a proper balance among intelligence
activities by planning and reviewing all intel-
ligence programs and resources. Your views on
intelligence activities, including tactical in-
telligence, should be incorporated in an annual
consolidated program budget which considers the
comparative effectiveness of collection programs
and relative priorities among intelligence targets.
13. Memorandum, 9 October 1974, to DCI Colby, subject:
"Leadership and Management' of the US Foreign Intelligence
Community."
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Tile following year witnessed a continuation of challenges
on the international scene and of programs related to investi-
gations and public exposure of questionable practices of the
past.. The challenges included:
? The growth of Soviet military power;
? Crisis situations such as the fall of
South Vietnam, continuing problems in
the Middle East, and the Mayaguez incident;
? Forced technological improvements needed
to deal with more sophisticated foreign
communications;
? Loss of important overseas collection sites;
' -- ----- -
---
a
and
? The impact of inflation on a dollar budget
that remained relatively constant.
The Community dealt with these challenges on the substantive
front while responding to four separate investigations of
intelligence activities, by the Rockefeller and Murphy Com-
missions and by the Senate and House Select Committees on
Intelligence. The investigations in turn stimulated considerable
internal review of Community management, organization, and
methods of resource allocation. With each study, each in-
vestigation, and each report the organizational problems of
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411 the Community became more apparent. The Congressional
investigations, coupled with an unprecedented level of
criticism in the public media directed toward intelligence
activities, required that major portions of the time and
talent of senior personnel be devoted to activities unrelated
to the production of substantive intelligence or to manage-
ment of Community activities.
On 13 October 1975, Director Colby sent the President
a CIA study of the organization of intelligence which he
believed offered special insights into contemporary intel-
ligence problems. The study concentrated on basic issues to
be considered in a reorganization of American intelligence,
recognizing a need for the structure to be made more efficient
and effective. The study emphasized two points:
? First, the relationship between the DCI,
who had nominal responsibility for all U.S.
intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense,
who had operating authority over the bulk of
its assets. The study concluded that the
relationship was poorly defined, to the
detriment of the development of a coherent
national intelligence structure.
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? Second, the potential conflict of interest
and resulting management ambiguity inherent
in a DCI who was at once head of the Com-
munity and head of an element within the
Community. The conclusion was reached that
this arrangement compromised the DCI's ability
to perform effectively in either role.
After reviewing a range of organizational options, the
study aimed at finding a way to exercise control over the
whole intelligence process while maintaining both Defense
and CIA equities in intelligence matters. It addressed the
possibility of replacing the DCI with two senior managers--
one for substantive matters and one for resource management--
but discarded the idea, noting the seamlessness of the intel-
ligence process and the likelihood that such separation would
damage the Community's performance in both areas. This con-
clusion reinforced an earlier one reached in the "Schlesinger
Study" of the Intelligence Community in 197l14--the essential
need to combine responsibility for control of both substantive
and resource management issues within the Community in one
individual.
14
IT. James Schlesinger, Assistant Director, OMB, 1971.
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The Colby study proposed an intelligence structure with
a greatly strengthened DCI. In each variant of the proposed
solution the DCI became a member of the NSC, confirming his
position as senior advisor to the President on major intel-
ligence issues and increasing his stature vis-a-vis the
Secretaries of State and Defense.
A Community study group was convened in late 1975
to address issues, options, and recommendations
for the reorganization and management of the
Intelligence Community. The study resulted in the major
changes which were promulgated subsegliently by Executive
Order 11905 in February 1976. In the process of the study
group's lengthy and detailed deliberations', certain fundamental
principles of the management and control of U.S. intelligence
were reaffirmed. The study noted that the 1971 Presidential
Directive gave the DCI resource review responsibility for
the entire Community, but provided insufficient directive or
fiscal authority to enable him to meet such responsibility.
Arguments were developed for centralization of intelligence
functions, based Upon the growing resource management task,
the DCI's lack of real authority, the Community's increasing
reliance upon expensive collection systems, and the need to
.....
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serve a growing range of intelligence consumers. Counter-
arguments stressing unimpaired departmental authority were
accorded less weight. Proponents of major organizational change
believed that new institutional arrangements at the top of the
Community were necessary to deal with many complex problems.
Finally, the study group anticipated that the Congressional
Select Committees would be making proposals for reorganization
and suggested that the President would be well advised to set
forth his own proposals "which could be useful as guides for
Congress in its deliberations."
Director Colby recorded his own personal views of the
study group's efforts in a memorandum to the Director of OMB
in December 1975. Among the principles he laid down in stating
his judgment of the way in which American intelligence should
be structured for the future were the following:
? The DCI should have full, easy and regular
access to the President and NSC, but should
not be or act as a partisan political sup-
porter of the Administration.
? The DCI's supporting system should be shaped
to provide the best possible intelligence;
resource allocations, procedures, and organiza-
tion should be driven by substantive goals set
by national needs.
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?
? The DCI should have an officially
established relationship with the Secretaries
of State and Defense that would enable them
to work efficiently together.
? The Department of Defense should be assured
that the intelligence capabilities it needs
in wartime would be available.
? That portion of the Defense budget allotted
to national intelligence resources should
be clearly identified and segregated from .
the Defense budget proper.
,
?
The Community should be managed with due
regard for resource constraints (Colby in-
tentionally listed this at the end, noting
that too many studies of intelligence placed
excessive emphasis on economy where the
primary focus should be on the production
of 'good intelligence).
Nr. Colby was concerned by the study group's treatment
of the DCI-Secretary of Defense relationship, feeling that
it was a matter of fundamental importance that had not been
adequately confronted and resolved. He saw the problem in
fairly simple terms:
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111
? The DCI was charged with the responsibility
for allocation of all intelligence resources.
? Of the total intelligence budget, Defense then
'controlled 85 percent and the DCI 15 percent.
? On the other hand, while the CIA, overhead
reconnaissance activities, and combined cryptology
made up the bulk of the national intelligence
budget, they then equalled a small percent of
the overall Defense budget.
? Therefore:
ee Defense had a preponderant voice in how
intelligence monies were spent..
,
?? When faced with a choice of goals between
warfighting or intelligence capabilities,
Defense would tend to choose warfighting.
?? Intelligence money was such a small part
of the totality of Defense concerns that
it could not get the attention it deserved.
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111 Director Colby reasoned that the sum of these factors
?
meant that under the current circumstances, the DCI was
able to do his job only with the concurrence of the
Secretary of Defense. In light of these principles and
conclusions, Mr. Colby was critical of the reorganizational
options presented in the study, reasoning that none of
them solved the basic problems of Community management
and resource allocation.
Finally, Director Colby observed that the selection
of any reorganizational option would depend upon a Presi-
dential willingness to make major changes. He noted that
Congress appeared to be moving toward proposing eventual
change, but doubted that the disruption of effort resulting
from an organizational initiative by the Administration
would be justified by the results. He proposed, therefore,
that a move be made to achieve better management of the
.Community in a way that would not require lengthy
Congressional debate. The Colby view came to be known as
"Option 4 Modified," or "Collective Management," which
could be achieved with minimal legislative change. A summary
description of it stated that:
The DCI would continue to be advisor to the
President, coordinator of the Community, and
Director of CIA. The existing structure of
_
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committees and boards would be consolidated
into two, both chaired by the DCI: an NSC
executive committee at the Deputy Secretary
level responsible for all Community manage-
ment and policy ma-eters, and a national
intelligence board at the-USIB Principals
level responsible for substantive production.
To enable the DCI to give full attention to
his Community responsibilities, he would be
provided with a second deputy.
At this point the central concern of both the Senate
and House Select Committee investigations was with the
propriety of intelligence activities, which tended to
give secondary emphasis to the coordination problems now
chronic in the Community. It was politic, therefore, for
any action which the Executive Branch might take to
underscore a bolstering of oversight mechanisms. The
underlying apparent strategy of the Executive in early 1976
was to preempt Congressional action and to co-opt the main
issues of Congressional concern. This was reflected in the
next major milestone in the history of the Community,
.Presidential Executive Order No. 11905, issued on 18 February
1976, entitled "United States Foreign Intelligence
Activities." The Executive Order purported to both clarify
the authority and responsibilities of intelligence depart-
ments and agencies and to establish effective oversight to
assure compliance with law in the management and direction
of intelligence organizations of the national Government.
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Implementation of the Executive Order
The balance of 1976 was devoted to implementing and
testing the provisions of E.6. No. 11905. One of the most
important provisions was the creation of an NSC Committee
on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), chaired by the DCI and
including as other members the Deputy Secretary of Defense
responsible for intelligence matters and the Deputy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.15
The CFI, for the first time, gave the Community leadership
a formal arena in which it might exercise resource control:
over all elements of the NFIP. In theory, the CFI would
receive guidance on the formulation of national intelligence
policies from the NSC and would be ?empowered to control
budget preparation and resource allocation for the NFIP.
The CFI would be a decision-making mechanism which would
rule on resource questions. While the detailed process of
identification, study, and negotiation of resource issues
in the CFI was considered to be a major improvement, pro-
blems of the past nevertheless persisted.
IS. DCI George Bush served as CFI chairman from its
inception until near the end of the Ford Admin-
istration. Other Members were Robert F. Ellsworth,
DoD, and William G. Hyland, NSC.
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?
_The CFI met 19 times in 1976, devoting its primary
attention to formulation of the NFIP budget for FY 1978,
which it forwarded to the President in November. It would
be inaccurate, however, to record that all went smoothly.
Considerable administrative difficulty was encountered
in provision of staff support to the CFI because of
differing interpretations within the Community of CFI
responsibilities. The authority of the CFI was somewhat
ambiguous where it contrasted with statutes and directives
governing Defense Department budget authority. Since
Defense-managed programs still represented about 80%
?
of the NFIP costs, differences among CFI members were
predictable and unavoidable. To be sure, progress was
made toward the central review and rationalization of a
consolidated NFIP budget, but this depended upon an arduous
process of negotiation and persuasion. In late 1976, the
State Department entered an informal petition to add the
Deputy Secretary of State to CFI membership, reasoning that
the allocation of national intelligence resources should
not be divorced from foreign policy considerations and the
interests of that Department.
The stature and duties of the DCI's Community Staff
increased significantly following Executive Order 11905.
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The Order charged the IC Staff to provide support to the
CFI as well as to the DCI. The Staff continued under the
direction of a Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Com-
munity, and an active duty military officer of four-star
rank was eventually appointed to the job.16 Broadened
duties required an increase in the size of the Staff and
a realignment of its major functions. It was restructured
to support the DCI in his Community role in three areas:
resources management (CFI support); collection assessment,
product evaluation and improvement; and coordination and
planning. The IC Staff included the Executive Secretary
to the CFI, who also served as Executive Secretary to the
National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), the successor
to the USIB. The DCI named his Community Deputy (instead of
his "CIA Deputy") to be Vice Chairman of the NFIB and full vot-
ing member. The sense of "community" continued to evolve.
New Adminstration: New Impetus
An early move in President Carter's administration
was to reassign the duties of the CFI to one of the two
new NSC committees (all others were abolished). Henceforth,
the CFI would be known as the NSC Policy Review Committee
16.? Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, US Navy, who served as Deputy
to the DCI for the Intelligence Community during the -
period April 1976-June 1977. This position had, since
1972, been authorized to be held by a military officer=
of three-star rank, or civilian equivalent.
,
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(Intelligence)1 and would include a State Department
member.
On 20 January 1977, President Carter issued instructions
establishing the instrumentalities which would direct the
work of the NSC and participating agencies during his
administration. Among these were the Policy Review
Memoranda (PRM/NSC), to be used to direct the reviews and
analyses to be undertaken by departments and agencies in
the Executive Branch.
PRM/NSC-11 was issued on 22 February 1977. It ordered
a comprehensive review of major foreign intelligence
activities and the organizational structure and functioning
of the Intelligence Commuity. The review was designed to
leaa- to options for dealing with, inter alia, the following:
? Preserving and improving the arrangements of
E.O. No. 11905. .
? Adding to the line authority of the DCI over
national intelligence collection programs.
? Reducing ambiguities in the dual role of the?
DCI as Community manager and as Director of
the CIA. ?
17. The other NSC committee, known as the NSC Special
Coordinationg Committee (SCC) was established on
20 January 1977 by Presidential directive to deal
with "specific cross-cutting issues requiring
coordination in the development of options and the
implementation of Presidential decisions." Chaired
by the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, the SCC included the statutory members
of the NSC or their representatives, and other senior
officials as appropriate.__
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? Insuring the independence of CIA analysis and
production from policy considerations and possibly
separating them from ? collection, operational
and intelligence-related research and development
activities.
President Carter added a hand-written note to PRM/
NSC-11 which directed the NSC Special Coordinating Committee
(SCC) to assess the interrelationships among the various
intelligence agencies and to make appropriate recommendations
to him.
.The PRM contained three principal "tasks." Task -1
pertained to the propriety and legality of intelligence
operations. The Attorney General chaired an interdepartmental
group to address those issues. Task 2, for which the DCI
was directed to chair an interagency group, was to analyze
the role, responsibilities and authorities of the DCI.
Task 3 entailed the development of principles and alterna?
tives. The Task 2 report was largely drafted in the IC
Staff, after several interagency meetings, and was widely
circulated for comment in the Community. The final report
acknowledged that it might "be judged biased by an ICS
point of view" and, indeed, contained several dissenting
footnotes provided by the Department of Defense. That
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111 notwithstanding, the report captured the essence of the
Community coordination problem as it has been traced on
these pages. It said (without apparent dissent):
Historically, US intelligence resource manage-
ment has been largely decentralized, both in the
Community as a whole and in the Department of
Defense, where most of the resources reside. But
pressures to centralize the process of managing
those resources labeled 'national' have been
increasing for several years, culminating last year
in Executive Order 11905.
-- Refinement of the programming and budget
process created by that Order is one way of
enhancing the integrity of national intelligence_
resource management in the future; it has the
significant virtue of an evolutionary approach
that builds on existing organizations and
accumulated experience.
As it,now stands, however, the present system
gives the DCI responsibilities that extend .beyond his
pure management authority to fulfill.
-- It obliges him to proceed on most matters
by persuasion and negotiation. This means that,
to a great extent, initiative in the process lies
with program elements and with outside critics.
As a by-product, this structure places signifi-
cant strain on the DCI in discharging his dual
roles as head of CIA and as Community leader.
The report also observed that the DCI's role as
producer of national intelligence is central to his entire
function, but noted ihat:
One major ingredient of the present national
intelligence process that (the) Community structure
places largely beyond the DCI's influence is the
quality of departmental participation in that process.
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While he can enlarge, strengthen, or reorganize the
analytical elements of CIA, he has little power,
in practice, over the major departmental producers
who also contribute to national intelligence analysis
and production. He reviews their budgets in the
NFIP process and can undertake to evaluate their
performance. But he has no authority to compel the
departments to make changes to meet his own criteria
of improvement.
After 80 pages of discussion, the Task 2 report
identified the central issues by asking these questions:
? If there is to be a national intelligence manager,
with special emphasis on and responsibility for
resource management, who should he be and to whom
should he report?
? Over what elements should he have line authority,
collegial influence, or some advisory responsibility?
Meanwhile, the Task 3 report was developed within a
special working group18 and was forwarded to the SCC on
31 May 1977. Among the several principles postulated in the
report, the principle of efficient management was treated
with greatest elaboration.- The report observed that there
must be sufficient centralizing authority to force painful
choice where it is needed on a rational basis, to compel
programs to be justified on the basis of their ultimate
contribution to intelligence, and to preclude resource
18. Samuel Hoskinson, NSC Staff, Chairman; Vice Admiral
Bobby Inman, DIA; Wheaton Byers, former Executive
Secretary of the PFIAB; Arnold Donohue, OMB; and
Fritz Ermarth, IC Staff.
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allocation purely on the basis of organizational ownership
and "clout." The decisionmaking power of this central
authority, the report continued, must be commensurate with
the responsibility it has to assure efficient resource
management.
The DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, noted in his
Notes from the Director of 13 June that the SCC would
meet on 15 June 1977 to consider the results of NSC/PRM-11
and to begin to formulate recommendations to be presented
to the President. Admiral Turner observed that the study.
pres.ented a wide range of options which primarily addressed
the Intelligence Community and the responsibilities of the
DCI as director 'of that Community, and identified the key
issue as being the authority of the DCI over other elements
of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Thus Director
Turner joined former DCIs Bush, Colby, Schlesinger, Helms
and McCone before him in expressing concern for the effective
management of the US foreign intelligence effort absent
some greater measure of budgeting and operational control
of the Community. This time, however, the climate and ?
opportunity for needed change seemed more favorable than
at any time during the past thirty years.
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?
? Director Turner had established a close
working relationship with the President,
perhaps closer than had any DCI since Allen
Dulles. Unlike any DCI before him, Admiral
Turner established his primary office in the
Old Executive Office Building next to the
While House, placing him close to the national
decisionmaking apparatus. Since occupying
that office he had met (and continues to meet)
routinely with the President--twice a week--
quite apart from cabinet or subcabinet, sub-.
? NSC , or other group meetings. ?
? The Congressional investigations of 1975 created
a shock wave which drove the legislators toward
change in the Intelligence Community. In the
aftermath, the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence (SSCI) was formed in mid-1976 to
oversee intelligence activities, and was fol-
? lowed a year later by the formation of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The SSCI. began drafting legislation for
the reorganization of the Community which would
centralize control under a "Director of National
Intelligence (DNI)" and would greatly strengthen the
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office of the President's senior intelligence
advisor.
? In an address to employees given in the CIA
auditorium on 17 June 77, Senator Inouye,
Chairman of the SSCI, stated that while re-
cent years had provided a time for examination
and reassessment, changes in the organization
and operation of the Community were clearly
needed. He noted, significantly, that the
SSCI was in complete agreement with the
President that comprehensive charter
legislation and a revised Executive Order
were required. He predicted that the DCI
would become a greatly strengthened "DNI" with
eventual overall direction and resource control of
CIA, NSA and overhead reconnaissance activities
(leaving day-to-day operations to others in
each instance).
All of these factors contributed to the milieu in
which the NSC's Special Coordinating Committee met in
mid-June to consider the studies and options resulting
from NSC/PRM-11. The first session got quickly to the
central issue, on which the interests of the DCI and the
Secretary of Defense were divided: control of the assets
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and "resources of NSA and overhead reconnaissance. Both
DoD and DCI representatives nere asked to develop posi-
tions which, discounting all the variants and middle-of-
the-road options, would clearly articulate opposing views.
The SCC met for the second time on 28 July 1977. In
addition to the recommendations submitted by Defense and
Community representatives, OMB presented a separate pro-
posal. The OMB proposal suggested creation of a
"Foreign Assessment Agency," drawn from the NIOs and the
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, and the transfer of
CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology to the De-
partment of Defense.
Details of the final Options proposed by the DCI,
DoD, and the OMB were known by few apart from the
principals who shaped them. Dr. Brzezinski, the
President's Advisor for National Security Affairs, de-
livered the final options to President Carter on 9 July
1977.
No one could predict what the President would
decide
regarding the organization and functions of the Community
of the future. There was widespread agreement, however,
that if a major rearrangement of the Community were to
occur it would be attributed to two critical factors.
The first of these would be the willingness of a
President to undertake and to make changes--a key
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ingfedient that hasi not previously existed in the life of
the Community. The second 4ctor might be described as
a general maturing of outlook leading to the realization
that:
? There was a need for much greater efficiency in
the coordination of U.S. foreign intelligence,
both in the realm of resource control and in
assuring the propriety of intelligence
activities.
? Nobody was in complete charge; that is, the
Community was.fragmented among several de-
? partments and agencies of government, creat-
ing discontinuities of management and
leadership..
? The pressures which had militated for
assignment of greater responsibility to
those involved in leading the nation's
intelligence effort were realistic--both
to insure accountability and to insure
sufficient response to the continuing
need for better intelligence--and that
comparable authority for those assigned the
responsibility was both reasonable and
necessary.
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- While waiting .for President Carter's decision, ele-
ments of the DCI's staff formed an implementation task
force to consider methods of instituting the various
reorganizational options, should any occur. Possible
implementation instruments which were considered included
new legislation, a Presidential executive order, the
reorganization plan (wherein an Executive Branch proposal
becomes effective in the absence of Congressional veto with-
in 60 days), or some combination of executive order and
the reorganization plan, noting that these would facili-
tate early implementation while providing the framework
for a statutory accommodation at a later date.
Finally, on 4 August f977, came the Presidential
announcement of a significant reorganization plan for U.S;
foreign intelligence, the culmination of the 5-month
review (NSC/PRM-11) of intelligence by the NSC. This
was, to be sure, the result of an intensive review; it
also represented a far-reaching and pragmatic attempt
to solve a critical national problem which had been
increasing in complexity--and had defied adequate
solution--for thirty years or more.
Coordination of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort
will continue to encounter complex issues and different
problems. But the historical imbalance between management
?
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responsibility and authority should no longer stand in
the way of effective solutions to such problems.
The Intelligence Community, once a mere concept
and phrase of convenience, has over the years become a
reality. Consisting originally of the intelligence
components of the pre-World War II Departments of War,
Navy, and State, the Community grew by 1961 to include
CIA, NSA, DIA, and elements of the separate military
services. In ensuing years it incorporated intelligence
components of the Treasury Department, the FBI, the old
Atomic Energy Commission and its successor organizations,
and special reconnaissance activities. The Intelligence
Community was o4cially defined for the first time in
1976, by Presidential Executive Order. It has recently
been redefined, also by Executive Order, to include an
element of the Drug Enforcement Administration.
The "Presidential Directive on Reorganization of
the Intelligence Community" (PD-17)_was signed on
4 August 1977. The highlights appear ?the front
section of this paper. The implementing. Presidential
Executive Order is appended.
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? Evolution of the Intelligence Community Staff
1960-1980
A significant early step in the evolution of a coherent National Foreign
Intelligence Community occurred in 1961 when President Eisenhower, by Executive
Order, institutionalized the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB)1 and formally
established the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Refinement
of the USIB concept--that it be chaired by the DCI--was formalized by President
Kennedy on 16 January 1962 by memorandum to DCI McCone, the same year in which
NSA became a USIB member. This instruction also directed Mr. McCone to
delegate the day-to-day operations of CIA to his deputy, who would also become
the CIA representative to the USIB, so that the DCI could devote more of his
time to Community matters.
As successive steps were taken toward a Community which would more fully
integrate National Foreign Intelligence activities, the DCI became aware of a
growing need for a. supporting staff which would focus exclusively on Community
concerns. In 1963, Director McCone created a National Intelligence Programs
Evaluation (NIPE) Staff for this purpose and placed it under his Deputy for
Coordination.
? On 4 March 1964, the NSC revised its first formal intelligence directive,
NSCID No. 1, to assign the DCI (then Admiral Raborn) primary responsibility for
guiding the total U.S. intelligence effort.2 Three years later, under the
leadership of DCI Richard Helms, the Intelligence Community may be said to have
reached figurative maturity--21 years since Congress first enuciated the
principle of a Director Central Intelligence.
On 20 January 1969 John Bross, then Director of the NIPE Staff, submitted
a comprehensive report to the DCI on the organization of the CIA and the
Intelligence Community which set the stage for Community development in the
? 1970's.
2
The DCI's Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was created in 1947 to
coordinate intelligence requirements among Departments. Chaired by the
DCI, it included representatives from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS,
the Atomic Energy Commission, and others the DCI might invite.
NSCID No. 1 was first issued on 12 December 1947. It established the
duties and responsibilities of the DCI and prescribed the relationship.
between the CIA and the intelligence organizations concerning which the
IAC (see footnote I) advised him.
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Focusing on the Community, the report addressed the Community's relationship to
the DCI's coordinating responsibility under three headings:
? Coordination of the production and dissemination of substantive
intelligence;
? Machinery for allocating jurisdictional responsibility among
Community components; and
e Guidance and coordination for allocation and use of resources.
While Bross said little on the subject of allocating tasks among Community
components, except to note that the National Security Council was the
allocating authority, he focused on resource management, noting the DCI's
primary responsibility for resource management was to ensure that resources
used in the overall U.S. intelligence effort produced intelligence which
responded, insofar as possible, to the real needs of policymakers. Given a
variety of expensive and sophisticated technical collection options, and the
ability to collect enormous amounts of data--some of which was redundant or of
marginal interest--and limited numbers of operating dollars, Bross saw as
primary questions: How would the DCI determine how much information was
enough, and how would he know whether sufficient effort was being applied
against the most essential intelligence targets.
These questions remained unanswered despite the efforts of the National
Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) which had been created to establish bases
0 for independent judgments by the DCI concerning the need for individual
activities or programs3. Not designed for routine program review, the NIRB
advised the DCI on collection programs in light of cost, alternative methods
and gaps in collection coverage of critical areas and possible risks to
national security. The Board was authorized to draw on all Community
components to assist in its assessments. like the USIB, it was another forum
for management by negotiation in the absence of DCI directive authority
commensurate with the responsibilities which he was assigned. The NIRB drew on
the NIPE Staff and USIB committees for program review and staffing.
In commenting on the DCI's ability to carry out these tasks the DCI's
Deputy for Coordination and the NIPE Staff--then numbering about a dozen
professionals-- pointed out that their lack of authority to deal directly with
either CIA resource elements and other Community components was a serious
3
?
The NIRB was established by Director Helms in 1968. His deputy, Admiral
Taylor, was appointed chairman. Other members were senior representatives
from the Departments of Defense and State. DIA and NSA were excluded from
membership because, as Program Managers, it was their resources which the
NIRB would consider for trade-off and adjustment.
2
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DCI Helms and his advisors believed that: A Community staff should
support the NIRB, maintain the Target Oriented Display (a consolidated
presentation of National Foreign Intelligence Resources showing geotopic focus
and functional composition);4 represent the DCI in reviewing DoD and other
departmental intelligence programs; refine objectives and priorities for the
overall intelligence effort; and develop a long-range planning capability.
There was a recognition that such a staff should maintain a competence in
systems and operations analysis and perform Community liaison functions,
including support to the President's Foreign Advisory Board (PFIAB).5
In a letter to Director Helms on 1 November 1971,6 President Nixon noted
the urgent need for increased efficiency in the allocation of resources devoted
to the intelligence effort. The President directed changes designed to enhance
the status of the DCI and to provide him with the support needed to strengthen
his position as leader of the Community. He instructed the DCI to focus his
primary attention on community leadership tasks -- to plan and review all U.S.
foreign intelligence activities, including tactical intelligence, and the
allocation of all U.S. foreign intelligence resources. To implement these
directives, the President mandated a group of specific management actions,
based on a study of National Foreign Intelligence management needs by the
staffs of the NSC, OMB, PFIAB, the President's Science Advisor, and the
Intelligence Community, i.e.:
? An enhanced leadership role for the DCI in planning, reviewing,
coordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and
activities, and in the production of national intelligence.
? Establishment of an NSC Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) to give
direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for
a continuing evaluation of intelligence products; and of an NSC Net
Assessment Group to evaluate all intelligence products and to produce
net assessments.
4 The Target Oriented Display is known today as the Consolidated
Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS); it is maintained by the
IC Staff.
President Eisenhower founded the President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956. It was an appointive body
composed of a group of private citizens who advised the President, but had
no authority over the DCI or the Intelligence Community. President
Kennedy renamed the group the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board. It functioned as the PFIAB from 1962 until 4 May 1977, when
President Carter dissolved it.
6 A following memorandum, dated 5 November 1971, detailed the President's
instructions. It is not cited here because of its restricting security
classification.
3
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? Establishment of an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC),
chaired by the DCI and including senior members from State, Defense,
OMB, and CIA, to advise the QCI on the preparation of a consolidated
intelligence prograill budget./
? Retention of the USIB (naming the Deputy DCI vice chairman) to advise
and assist the DCI with respect to production of national
intelligence and establishment of national intelligence requirements
and priorities.
In providing this directive, the President noted that the DCI would
require an increased and restructured staff to allow him to discharge his
augmented responsibilities. Recognizing that these actions would not provide
ultimate solutions, the President stated that he expected additional changes in
the Community, consistent with the attainment of prescribed national
objectives.
Reflecting these broader responsibilities, Director Helms created the
Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) on I March 1972 to deal with the Community
aspects of his expanded mission, and named Bronson Tweedy as its Director.
When Dr. Schlesinger became DCI in early 1973, he reorganized the IC Staff to
make it more representative of the entire Community, it having previously been
manned by a preponderance of CIA officers.
Under Lt. Gen. Lew Allen who succeeded Bronson Tweedy as Director, the IC
Staff reflected the focus of the DCI on his Community management
responsibilities. Organizationally, the IC Staff included:
? A Community Comptroller Group
? A Product Review Group
? A Planning and Evaluation Group
? A Data Support Group
The "Product Review Division" (PRD) had the task of regularly appraising
intelligence articles and studies, "testing them for objectivity, balance and
responsiveness."
?????
7 The IRAC superseded the NIRB and perpetuated the intent to provide a
Community forum which would address critical intelligence resources matters.
4
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The CIA's Intelligence Directorate had no formal or independent system for
quality control, depending instead upon its regular review and coordination
0 process. Most of PRO'S attention during the period was directed to the conduct
of community-wide post mortems.on particular crises -- for example, the 1973 '
Middle East war, the Cyprus crisis in 1974, the Indian nuclear detonation and
the Mayaguez incident. The Division was involved in changing the daily Central
Intelligence Bulletin from a CIA publication into a community publication (now
called the National Intelligence Bulletin). PRD participated in discussions
leading to the transformation of the old Watch Committee into the DCI's Special
Assistant for Warning, with a Strategic Warning Staff.
PRD was not significantly involved in the development of new analytic
methods, in resource allocation for production elements, or in training or
recruitment issues-. Contact with consumers of intelligence products was on an
irregular basis (mostly for post mortems), although PRD was at work, through
other CIA organizations, collecting consumer reactions on particular papers of
concern to the USIB. The Division had no authority to order changes in the
management of production which might affect the quality of the product, rather
it was in the position of making recommendations to the USIB and encouraging
their implementation.
The National Intelligence Officer (Nb) organization, which was created
about a year later under DCI Colby, replaced the previous office of National
Estimates, and extended the DCI's role and presence throughout the intelligence
production process. Each NIO had a specific area of geographic, or topical,
responsibility. The NIO concept was an answer to the continuing problem of
1111 finding ways to concentrate Community capabilities on substantive problems of
major interest to consumers without incurring the costs and dislocations of
continual reorganization. The NIOs, given no line authority over any Community
component, were authorized by the DCI to draw on all Community entities. Their
mission was to view their respective areas of responsibility, and the
Community's total performance, thereto just as the DCI would view them if he
had the full time and expertise to devote to the particular subject area.8
Collaboration of the IC Staff and NIOs under DCI Colby's direction, for
example, led to the development of Key Intelligence Questions (Kips) and an
attempt to evaluate the Community's performance in addressing/satisfying these
questions. The KIQs were the Community's response to a national requirement
for a single system by which NSCIC members could specify their most important
immediate intelligence needs and thereby provide definitive guidance to the DCI
alyi to managers of national intelligence programs. The KIQ personnel
ev KEP, was a joint ICS/NIO attempt to measure and evaluate IC
performance with respect to annually defined KIQs.
8
?
The NIOs replaced the Board of National Estimates (BNE) had been created
in 1950 to provide a forum in which senior experts from outside the
Community might review estimates drafted by CIA's Office of"National
Estimates (ONE) Staff. Over time BNE membership was dominated by senior
CIA analysts, creating an insular BNE-ONE relationship and diminishing the
objectivity which was its charter. Director Colby abolished both the BNE
and ONE and created the NIOs.
5
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Responding to the White House guidance of late 1971, which called for the
DCI to develop and submit a consolidated intelligence program budget (including
tactical intelligence) to OMB,. the Community Comptroller Group of the DCI's IC
Staff prepared a National Intelligence Presidential Memorandum (NIPM) as a
start in the direction of disciplined substantive analysis of the National
Intelligence Program.
The process of development of the 1972 NIPM served to underscore the DCI's
coordination problem. Nearly every working-level element in, or related to,
the Intelligence Community became involved at one or more points in the lengthy
process: The IC Staff, the USIB and USIB Committees, State, CIA, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), the IRAC and IRD&C, DIA, NSA, the DDS&T,
the Services, Special Reconnaissance offices, the NSC Staff, the OMB Staff,
Program Managers and most senior officials in State, CIA and Defense. Despite
thousands of hours of review and coordination, the NIPM had virtually no impact
on final budget decisions. From the DCI's viewpoint--tasked as he was to
embrace the responsibility for allocation of intelligence resources--he found
once again that the collegial management mechanisms of the Community were
inadequate. The effort was constricted by Defense policies which limited DCI
staff access to review processes within Defense. (Intelligence Community
elements within DoD were obliged to deal with the IC Staff through the office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), thereby limiting the
organizational interface and freedom of discussion).
In a memorandum to all heads of governmental agencies on 18 April 1973,
President Nixon directed the preparation of major goals and objectives to be
accomplished during the upcoming year for each organization. The Director of
OMB interpreted the directive to pertain to the Intelligence Community as an
entity--not merely CIA--emphasizing that objectives should be clearly of
Presidential significance. As a consequence, Director Colby established as his
Community objective the assurance of authoritative and responsible leadership
for the Community as a whole.
Toward that end, the USIB became more active as an advisory body to the
DCI. The Treasury member of USIB became a regular participant as economic
intelligence requirements increased. The ASD(I) and the Under Secretary of the
Air Force, both of whom had large resource responsibilities for major
intelligence efforts, were invited to particpate at the USIB when matters
affecting their interests were involved. Similarly, on other occasions, the
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of Defense
Re_arch and Engineering were to develop active relations with USIB.
Cooperation at the USIB was apparent and important. It permitted open
treatment of consumer requirements and constructive discourse on the
implications of resource constraints. It also elicited important substantive
and procedural commentary on such matters as the KIQs, structural adjustments
to improve the family of intelligence products, and the means to improve what
was beginning to be called the intelligence "nervous system," information
handling for crisis management.
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?
Also that year the Intelligence Community Staff, under the leadership of
Lt.Gen Dan Graham, USA, later replaced by Lt.Gen Sam Wilson, USA, focused on
the need to develop resource packages showing relationships between costs and.
outputs. The Staff set a course for FY 1975 aimed at the development of a
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) developed around a five-year
projection of needs for all national activities, grouping national assets
irrespective of parent agency or source of appropriation.
In a year-end report to the President in 1974, the DCI noted that the
Community "requirements machinery" still needed more attention. His intention
was to work through the USIB to fashion better ways of making judgments on
requirements, and for setting collection priorities within budgetary
constraints. He.noted as well that using manpower reductions as a trade-off
for increasing program costs and inflationary pressures had attenuated program
flexibility. In the meanwhile, there was no diminution in expectations of the
DCI's role in the Community. A memorandum9 from President Ford reaffirmed his
charge.
You should continue to exercise leadership in maintaining a proper
balance among intelligence activities by planning and reviewing all
intelligence programs and resources. Your views on intelligence
activities, including tactical intelligence, should be incorporated
in an annual consolidated program budget which considers the
comparative effectiveness of collection programs and relative
priorities among intelligence targets.
The following year witnessed a series of investigations and public
exposure of questionable practices of the past. Four separate investigations
of intelligence activities, by the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions and by
the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence stimulated considerable
internal review of Community management, organization, and methods of resource
allocation.
On 13 October 1975, Director Colby sent the President a CIA study of the
organization of intelligence which he believed offered special insights into
contemporary intelligence problems. The study, in concentrating on basic
issues to be considered in a reorganization of American intelligence,
recognized a need for the structure to be made more efficient and effective.
In addressing issues, options, and recommendations for the reorganization and
management of the Intelligence Community, study noted that the 1971
sidential directive gave the DCI resource review responsibility for the
entire Community, but did not provide directive or fiscal authority to enable
him to meet such responsibility. Arguments were developed for centralization
of intelligence functions, based upon the growing resource management task, the
DCI's lack of real authority, the Community's increasing reliance upon
expensive collection systems, and the need to serve a growing range of
intelligence consumers. The study group, anticipating that the-Congressional
Select Committees would be making proposals for reorganization, suggested that
the President would be well advised to set forth his own proposals "which could
be useful as guides for Congress in its deliberations."
9
Memorandum, 9 October 1974, to DCI Colby, subject: "Leadership and
Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Comuni--..y."
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In commenting on the study, Director Colby observed that the selection of
? any reorganization option would depend upon a presidential willingness to make
major changes. He noted that Congress appeared to be moving toward proposing.
eventual change, but doubted that the disruption of effort resulting from an
organizational initiative by the Administration would be justified by the
results. He proposed, therefore, that a move be made to achieve better
management of the Community in a way that would not require lengthy
congressional debate. The Colby view came to be known as "Option 4 Modified,"
or "Collective Management," which could be achieved with minimal legislative
change. In essence it held:
The DCI would continue to be advisor to the President, coordinator of
the Community, and Director of CIA. The existing structure of
committees and boards would be consolidated into two, both chaired by
the DCI: An NSC executive committee at the Deputy Secretary level
responsible for all Community management and policy matters, and a
national intelligence board at the USIB Principals level responsible
for substantive production. To enable the DCI to give full attention
to his Community responsibilities, he would be provided with a second
deputy.
Presidential Executive Order No. 11905, issued on 18 February 1976,
entitled "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities" in taking cognizance
of the DCI's recommendation clarified the authority and responsibilities of
intelligence departments .and agencies and established effective oversight to
assure compliance with law in the management and direction of intelligence
organizations of the national Government. One of the most important provisions
of E.O. 11905 was the creation of an NSC Committee on Foreign Intelligence
(CFI), chaired by the DCI and including as other members the Deputy Secretary
of Defense responsible for intelligence matters and the Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.10 The CFI, for the first time, gave
the Community leadership a formal arena in which it might exercise resource
control over all elements of the NFIP. In theory, the CFI would receive
guidance on the formulation of national intelligence policies from the NSC and
would be empowered to control budget preparation and resource allocation for
the NFIP--a decision-making mechanism which would rule on resource questions.
While the detailed process of identification, study, and negotiation of
resource issues in the CFI was considered to be a major improvement, past
problems persisted.
The CFI met 19 times in 1976, devoting its primary attention to
formulation of the FY 1978 NFIP budget which was forwarded to the President in
November. Differing interpretations within the Community of CFI
responsibilities made this an arduos task because the authority of the CFI was
ambiguous where it appeared to conflict with statues governing Defense
Department budget authority. Since Defense-managed programs still represented
about 80 percent of the NFIP resources, differences among CFI members were
predictable and unavoidable. Progress was made. toward central review and
10
DCI George Bush served as CFI chairman from its inception until near the
end of the Ford Administration. Other members were Robert F. Ellsworth,
DoD, and William G. Hyland, NSC.
8
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rationalization of a consolidated NFIP budget, but this depended upon a
protracted process of negotiation and persuasion. In late 1976, the State
411 Department entered an informal petition to add the Deputy Secretary of State to
CFI membership, reasoning that the allocation of national intelligence
resources should not be divorced from foreign policy considerations and the
interests of that Department.
The stature and duties of the DCI's Community Staff increased
significantly following Executive Order 11905, which charged the IC Staff to
Provide support to the CFI, as well as to the DCI. The Staff continued under
the direction of a Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, and an
active duty military officer of four-star rank was eventually appointed to the
job. 11 Broadened duties required an increase in the size of the Staff and a
realignment of its major functions. It was restructured to support the DCI in
his Community role in three areas: Resources management (CFI support);
collection assessment, product evaluation and improvement; and coordination and
planning. The IC Staff included the Executive Secretary to the CFI, who also
served as Executive Secretary to the National Foreign Intelligence Board
(NFIB), the successor to the USIB. The DCI named his Community Deputy (instead
of his "CIA Deputy") to be Vice Chairman of the NFIB and full voting member.
An early move in President Carter's administration was to reassign the
duties of the CFI to one of the two new NSC committees (all others were
abolished). Henceforth,4 the CFI would be known as the NSC Policy Review
Committee Intelligencelc and would include a State Department member.
On 20 January 1977, President Carter issued instructions establishing the
instrumentalities which would direct the work of the NSC and participating
agencies during his administration. Among these were the Policy Review
Memoranda (PRM/NSC), to be used to direct the reviews and analyses to be
undertaken by departments and agencies in the Executive Branch.
PRM/NSC-11 was issued on 22 February 1977. It ordered a comprehensive
review of major foreign intelligence activities and the organizational
structure and functioning of the Intelligence Community. The review was
designed to lead to options for dealing with, inter alia, the following:
? Preserving and improving the arrangements of E.O. No. 11905.
? Adding to the line authority of the DCI over national intelligence
collection programs.
?
11
12
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, U.S. Navy, who served as Deputy to the DCI for
the Intelligence Community during the period April 1976 - June 1977. This
position had, since 1972, been authorized to be held by a military officer
of three-star rank, or civilian equivalent.
The other NSC committee, known as the NSC Special Coordinating Committee
(SCC) was established on 20 January 1977 by Presidential directive to deal
with ."specific cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the
development of options and the implementation of presidential decisions."
Chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
the SCC included the statutory members of the !!SC or their
representatives, and other senior officials as appropriate.
9
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Reducing ambiguities in the dual role of the DCI as Community Manager
and as Director of the CIA.
? Ensuring the independence of CIA analysis and production from policy
considerations and possibly separating them from collection,
operational and intelligence-related research and development
activities.
President Carter added a hand-written note to PRM/NSC-11 which directed
the NSC Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) to assess the inter-relationships
among the various intelligence agencies and to make appropriate recommendations
to him.
The PRM contained three principal "tasks." Task 1 pertained to the
propriety and legality of intelligence operations. (The Attorney General
chaired an interdepartmental group to address those issues.) Task 2, for which
the DCI was directed to chair an interagency group, was to analyze the role,
responsibilities and authorities of the DCI. Task 3 entailed the development
of principles and alternatives. The Task 2 report was largely drafted in the
IC Staff, after several interagency meetings, and was widely circulated for
comment in the Community. The final report acknowledged that it might "be
judged biased by an ICS point of view" and, indeed, contained several
dissenting footnotes provided by the Department of Defense. Footnotes,
notwithstanding, the report captured the essence of the Community coordination
problem. It said (without apparent dissent):
Historical
decentralized,
Defense, where
the process of
increasing for
11905.
ly, U.S. intelligence resource management has been largely
both in the Community as a whole and in the Department of
most of the resources reside. But pressures to centralize
managing those resources labeled "national" have been
several years, culminating last year in Executive Order
-- Refinement of the programming and budget process created by
that Order is one way of enhancing the integrity of national
intelligence resource management in the future; it has the
significant virtue of an evolutionary approach that builds on
existing organizations and accumulated experience.
As it now stands, however, the present system gives the DCI
responsibilities that extend beyond his pure management authority to
fulfill.
-- It obliges him to proceed on most matters by persuasion and
negotiation. This means, that, to a great extent, initiative in the
process lies with program elements and outside critics. As a
by-product, this structure places significant strain on the DCI in
discharging his dual roles as head of CIA and as Community leader.
10
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The report also observed that the DCI's role as producer of national
intelligence is central to his entire function, but noted that:
411 One major ingredient of the present national intelligence process
that (the) Community structure places largely beyond the DCI's influence
is the quality of departmental participation in that process. While he
can enlarge, strengthen, or reorganize the analytical elements of CIA, he
has little power, in practice, over the major departmental producers who
also contribute to national intelligence analysis and production. He
reviews their budgets in the NFIP process and can undertake to evaluate
their performance. But he has no authority to compel the departments to
make changes to meet his own criteria of improvement.
After 80 pages of discussion, the Task 2 report identified the central
issues by asking these questions:
? If there is to be a national intelligence manager, with special
emphasis on and responsibility for resource management, who should he
be and to whom should he report?
? Over what elements should he have line authority, collegial
influence, or some advisory responsibility?
Meanwhile, the Task 3 report was developed within a special working
group13 and was forwarded to the SCC on 31 May 1977. Among the several
principles postulated in the report, the principle of efficient management was
treated with greatest elaboration. The report observed that there must be
sufficient centralizing authority to force painful choice where it is needed on
a rational basis, to compel programs to be justified on the basis of their
ultimate contribution to intelligence, and to preclude resource allocation
purely on the basis of organizational ownership and "clout." The decision-
making power of this central authority, the report continued, must be
commensurate with the responsibility it has to assure efficient resource
management.
The DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, noted in his Notes from the Director
of 13 June that the SCC would meet on 15 June 1977 to consider the results of
NSC/PRM-11 and to begin to formulate recommendations to be presented to the
President. Admiral Turner observed that the study presented a wide range of
options which primarily addressed the Intelligence Community and the
xe.sponsibilities of the DCI as director of that Community, and identified the
k issue as being the authority of the DCI over other elements of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program. Thus Director Turner joined former DCIs Bush,
Colby, Schlesinger, Helms and McCone in expressing concern for the effective
management of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort, absent some greater measure
of budgeting and operational control of the Community.
13 Samuel Hoskinson, NSC Staff, Chairman; Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, DIA;
Wheaton Byers, former Executive Secretary of the PFIAB; Arnold Donohue,
OMB; and Fritz Ermarth, IC Staff.
11
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The NSC's Special Coordinating Committee met in mid-June to consider the
studies and options resulting from NSC/PRM-11. The first session got quickly.
to the central issue, on which the interests of the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense were divided: Control of the assets and resources of NSA and overhead
reconnaissance. Both DoD and DCI representatives were asked to develop
positions which, discounting all the variants and middle-of-the-road options,
would clearly articulate opposing views.
The SCC met for the second time on 28 July 1977. In addition to the
recommendations submitted by Defense and Community representatives, OMB
presented a separate proposal. The OMB proposal suggested creation of a
"Foreign Assessment Agency," drawn from the NIOs and the CIA's Directorate of
Intelligence, and the transfer of CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology
to the Department of Defense.
The "Presidential Directive on Reorganization of the Intelligence
Community" (PD-17) was signed on 4 August 1977. On that date President Carter
announced a number of major decisions designed to effect needed changes while
retaining the structural continuity of the Intelligence Community. The purpose
of the changes was to provide for strong direction by the President and the
National Security Council (NSC), and to centralize the most critical national
intelligence management functions under the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI). The reorganization built on the experience of the past by strengthening
the roles of both the NSC system and the DCI. Changes were designed to enhance
responsiveness to both the intelligence requirements of major national-level
consumers and the operational needs of Federal departments and the military
services.
These measures, now set forth in Executive Order 12036, were taken to help
close a critical gap--which had been widening over a period of many
years--between the growing responsibilities assigned to the DCI and his
authority to fulfill those responsibilities.
The DCI outlined in his Notes from the Director of February 1978 the
following:
"I want to clarify some of the organizational changes that have taken
place as a result of Executive Order 12036.
As you know, the Executive Order was promulgated on 26 January 1978
and assigned the DCI significantly increased responsibilities:
For tasking of all Intelligence Community collection assets and
dissemination of the results;
For formulating the national intelligence budget; and
For ensuring the production of national intelligence estimates.
12
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4 ?, ? it
deo.
To meet the first two of these responsibilities, tasking and
budgeting, I have elected to split the existing Intelligence Community '
Staff: One-half under a new Deputy for Collection Tasking, the other
under a Deputy for Resource Management. The former will manage the
existing collection committees; in addition, he will establish a National
Intelligence tasking Center. This Center will attempt to ensure that for
any given collection problem we utilize the full resources of the
Intelligence Community and do so in a coordinated manner. The Deputy for
Resource Management will be responsible for supporting me in my new "full
and exclusive" responsibility for preparing the National Foreign
Intelligence Program Budget and submitting it to the Office of Management
and Budget and the President. The division of the IC Staff into these two
components is subject to congressional approval which we hope for shortly.
The third new responsibility above is simply a somewhat more explicit
statement of the DCI's traditional role in producing National Intelligence
Estimates. Under the new Executive Order, I am empowered to require
participation of other agencies in developing National Estimates, but not
to interfere with their normal analytic work. We want separate and
independent centers of analysis in our Intelligence Community. In order
to carry out the national estimating role in a more coordinated manner, we
have, as you know, merged the old NIO and DDI structures into the National
Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). Those two organizations always worked
very closely together.
The following chart depicts this planned new organization, including
those components under the direct jurisdiction of the DCI and the
components of the CIA, and briefly describes the major responsibilities of
each."
Organization Under New Executive Order
DCIA
CI
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so. Naomi toolbars. Tettsag Cow. (NITO. witteh * On, stelhorenor =Wane
OOOVIOON? Waal.) &II NOtliffROOP timilTIO Of do INOILOOlf0, Cattoreety. He esablel*
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ElCIA
DEPUTY
DIRECTOR for
SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY
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on the TOINIMI011 al aettord mitilatemot. *Hi to to On. IN acesephied mad what a
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4 TO. DIMON Davao, jos aohttineambea Irapes** tot orptertiti adotatatraxitly
Hsi latelagence CasHattay aompariarat wear the ainaisition .4tH DCI 4/ oieil as
perlanaing Han Witt at otairati He onil caatinor to row all he tanned Imam* Of tat
Dewar Etinoetor I. Asioussatattion a/ it: 1:14
5 The Dews Darsas. Jo. Osoveno* sod tie &vett Daste. kw Sneeze pod
larhotoiagono.44conanat to no.. all met: promentv staged totem* for the Catertl
lateingenee ast..
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Organization Under Executive Order 12036
DCI
DCIA
DDCI
General
Counsel
111111111=1.?????????111
Deputy Director
for Resource
Management
Legislative
C oujnsel
Deputy Director
for Collection
Tasking
I nspector
General
Deputy :Director
for National
Foreign
Assesment
-
Public Affairs
Deputy Director
fqr ?
Administration
Comptroller
Equal
Employment
0 pportunity
Deputy Director
for Science
& Technology
CIA
Deputy Director
for Operations
Intelligence Community
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I
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Director of Central Intelligence Command Responsibilities
Personnel Policy,
Planning, and
Management
General
Counsel
DCI
DCIA
DOCI ?
1
Inspector Legislative
General Cotinsel
I
Public Affairs
Comptroller
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
STAFF
,Community &
Legislative Liaison
Staff
Information Resources
Off ice
Program Assessment
Office
Program & Budget
Off ice
Policy Guidance
Staff
COLLECTION
TASKING
STAFF
National Collection
Planning Office
PHOTINT
Tasking Office
SIGINT
Tasking Office
HUMINT
Tasking Office
DIRECTORATE
OF
ADMINISTRATION
-t
Office of
Commuhications
if
Office cA Logistics
Office of
Data Fiocessing
Office of Security
al Office of Training
and Education
Office of Finance
Office of
Medical Services
Office of
Information Services
NATIONAL FOREIGN
ASSESSMENT CENTER
1
Office ofl Scientific
and Weapons Research
Office of
EconomiC Research
IOffice of Geographic &
Societal jResearch
DIRECTORATE
OF
OPERATIONS
National Intelligence
Council
Office of
Current Operations
Office of
Political Analysis
Office of
Central IReference
Office of
Strategii Research
ri Intelligence
Community
Office of
Imager) Analysis
1
ElCIA
II
DIRECTORATE-
OF
SCIENCE
AND
TECHNOLOGY
Office of Development
& Engineering
Office of
SIGINT Operations
Office of Research
& Development
Office of
Technical Service
I_Foreign Broadcast
Information Service
National Photographic
Interpretation Center
August 1980
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
BOARD
PRESIDENT
NSC SPECIAL
COORDINATION COMMITTEE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
TASKING CENTER
NATIONAL FOREIGN
ASSESSMENT CENTER
NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
ENERGY
DEPARTMENT
1085-77
.1
NSC POLICY REVIEW
COMMITTEE
1
NATIONAL FOREIGN-
INTELLIGENCE BOARD
BUDGET & EVALUATION
STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
STATE
DEPARTMENT
TREASURY
DEPARTMENT
ARMY
DIRECTION
RECOMMENDATION/
GUIDANCE/ADVICE
NAVY
'AIR FORCE
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
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111.
Organization of Intelligence Community Under Executive Order 12036
OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
SPECIAL COORDINATION
COMMITTEE
THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Advisory
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INTELLIGENCE
OVERSIGHT BOARD
DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Advisory
POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
icc
Deputy to DCI
Gi
for
National Intelligence
Deputy to DCI
for
Resource Management
Deputy to DCI
for
Collection Tasking
Deputy to DCI cc,
for
Support
k a
Ntt. .... ?. -ii- -........
-.......
Budget approval, 'm
?
collection tasking, production coordination ?
?
OMOOMMIOMMEMOOMMOMMOMOMOM IIOMMOMMMOOMOMMMEMOMOMMOM MOMMOMMOMMOSIIMINOMMOMOMMOMMENSMOMM
-
_
_
STATE
DEFENSE
CIA '(/('')
TREASURY
JUSTICE
ENERGY
?INR
?NSA?DIA?Spec. Recon.?Army .Navy ?Air Force
*FBI ?DEA
2547-80
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FOR OFF ONLY
. Presidential Directive/NSC-17
TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
August 4, 1977
SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Intelligence Community
I have reviewed the results of the PRM/NSC-11 studies relating to
organization of the Intelligence Community and subsequent SCC
deliberations and have reached the following conclusions:
1. The National Security Council will continue to act as the
highest organizational entity that provides guidance and
direction to the development and formulation of national
intelligence activities. To this end, the Policy Review
Committee, chaired by the DCI and to include the Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury,
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and other attendees as deemed appropriate by the chairman;
will meet as an intelligence requirements committee. The
primary function of the PRC intelligence requirement
meetings will be to define and prioritize substantive
intelligenc requirements and evaluate analytical
product performance. The PRC will submit semiannual
reports to the NSC on its activities.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence will have during
peacetime full tasking responsibility and authority for
translating PRC-validated national intelligence requirements
into specific intelligence collection objectives and targets
and assigning these to intelligence collection organizations.
For these purposes a National Intelligence Tasking Center
jointly manned by civilian and military personnel will be
established under the direction of the DCI to task all national
intelligence collection systems. The Tasking Center will also
MR?OF.F1-6-tAt;;;ISETA6
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? 111
?
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
be responsible for ensuring that the resulting intelligence
flow is routed immediately to relevant components and
commands. In periods of crisis or during war the power
to task collection facilities may be delegated to the Secretary
of Defense upon the express direction of the President.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence will have full and exclusive
authority for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP) budget prior to its presentation (through usual procedures)
to the President, for its presentation to Congress, reprogramming
of NFIP funds and monitoring program implentation. In
response to DCI guidance, the departments and agencies of the
NFIP will submit their proposed national program budgets to
the DCI and assure that the DCI has all information necessary
to perform his budgetary responsibilities. The National Foreign
Intelligence Board will advise the DCI on all of his budgetary
responsibilities in the same manner as it does on national intelligence
production and other activities of common concern.
Department heads will retain the right to reclama DCI budget
decisions to the President.
4. The DCI will be provided with adequate staff support to ensure his
full access to relevant information and the capability to carry out
program audits and evaluation.
5. The Director of Central Intelligence will continue to act as the
primary adviser to the National Security Council and the President
on substantive foreign intelligence and to have full responsibility
for production of national intelligence in appropriate consultation
with departmental analytical centers. He will retain all other powers
provided to him under relevant statutes and executive orders.
6. Apart from the foregoing, authority to hire and fire personnel and to
give day-to-day direction to implement assigned tasks will remain
with the heads of the relevant Departments and Agencies. All other
organizational and operational arrangements and responsibilities
assigned under existing statutes and executive orders shall remain
in full effect. Personnel administration, management and support
activites, operational implemention of DCI tasking, and audit/
inspector general functions will remain as presently assigned under
departmental arrangements.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
?--- ........
..........
...
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..
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall
draft an Executive Order to implement the above decisions for review
by the NSC Special Coordination Committee and my approval. This
will provide the basis for consultation with Congress on the development
of appropriate charter legislation.
i
FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY
/s/
Jimmy Carter
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?
A. CONTENTS OF PD/NSC.-17, 4 AUGUST 1977
1. NSC at top of intelligence bureaucracy.
2. PRC as intelligence requirements committee.
3. DCI to have full tasking responsibility and authority to translate
[PRO] requirements into collection objectives and to assign these.
4. NITC under DCI to task all national collection systems and
to disseminate the "resulting intelligence flow."
5. DCI to have full and exclusive authority to approye NFIP budget,
to reprogram and to monitor program implementation.
? 6. DCI to have "adequate" staff support to carry out program
audits and evaluations.
7. DCI still primary intelligence adviser to NSC and President.
8. DCI has full responsibility for production of national
intelligence [in "appropriate" consultation].
. DCI to retain all existing statutory and E. 0. powers.
10. DCI does not have day-to-day control over other departments
and agencies.
11. This Directive does not affect existing statutory and E.O.
"organizational and operational arrangements and responsibilities."
12. Present "departmental arrangements" as to "personnel admin-
istration, management and support activities, operational implementation
of DCI tasking, and audit/inspector general functions" remain intact.
?13. The new E. O. 11905 is to "provide the basis for consultation
with" the Congress on charter legislation.
- ....... ......... . . . ... ... ? ...... .....
........... ? ? ? -
? ..... ? ......
- ...
....... ... ...............
- ? ..... ?
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...................
B. DCI VIEWS AS CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM TO
BRZEZINSKI, 3 SEPTEMBER 1977
1. DCI should retain the basic authorities and duties granted him
in the National Security Act.
2. DCI should remain head of CIA.
3. Authorities and duties given the CIA under the National Security
Act should be granted the DCI as DCI rather than as head of CIA (in
order to be able to assign and transfer these duties and authorities).
4. An "Office of the DCI" should be established as the Director's
IC management mechanism as part of the IC.
5. DCI should have statutory flexibility to establish such Deputy
Director positions as deemed necessary.
? 6. DCI should have statutory authority to direct and supervise the
collection of foreign intellgence (tasking authority).
7. DCI should have authority to establish necessary mechanisms
for tasking authority (and to detail personnel).
8. CIA should be charged with responsibility to collect intelligence
and to carry out special projects.
9. DCI should be granted the authority to produce and coordinate
intelligence, and should be responsible for producing and disseminating
intelligence and for levying analytical tasks.
10. DCI should have full and exclusive authority to approve the
NFIP budget.
11. DCI should provide guidance for program and budget develop-
ment to program managers and heads of component activities.
12. DCI should have exclusive authority to reprogram.
. .. _
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...
2
............. .
r? :It' ? t ". " ? ? -
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?
13. DCI should have exclusive authority to utilize the CIA
Contingency Reserve.
14. CIA should have its own statutory charter.
15. The administrative and support authorities granted the CIA
under the 1949 Act should remain intact and supplemented.
16. DCI should be specifically granted the authority to be the .
primary adviser to the Congress on intelligence matters.
17. Consideration should be given to establishing a single joint
intelligence oversight committee.
C. 5 SEPTEMBER 1977 DRAFT REVISION OF E.O. 11905 ?
1. Defines IC and NFLP as including "staff elements of the Office
of the" DCI "that support execution of the Director's" IC responsibilities.
2. Establishes the PRC to establish and prioritize national foreign
intelligence requirements.
3. Establishes the SCC to consider, develop, approve and report
on special activities and sensitive operations, and to develop policies
on counterintelligence.
4. The DCI shall be the President's primary adviser on national
foreign intelligence.
5. The DCI shall act as executive head of the CIA.
6. The DCI shall act as executive head of staff elements neces-
sary for the discharge of his IC responsibilities.
7. The DCI shall act as the principal spokesman to the Congress
for the IC.
3
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......... 4
ila.....0**Ikeit *O. **X. .
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? 8. The DCI shall have full and excluive authority for approval
of the NFIP budget and shall provide guidance for program and
budget development.
9. Heads of component agencies and departments shall consult
with the DCI to develop rates of obligation for funds appropriated to
elements of the NFIP.
10. The DCI shall have full and exclusive authority to reprogram,
subject to guidelines, consultation and Presidential review.
11. The DCI shall have full responsibility to produce and dissemin-
ate intelligence subject to appropriate consultation.
12. The DCI shall have authority, to levy analytical tasks.
13. The DCI shall direct, operate and control the activities of
the NITC.
14. The DCI shall insure implementation at special activities.
15. The DCI shall work with the Attorney General to develop
procedures relating to the legality and propriety of intelligence
activities.
16. The DCI shall establish such other committees or advisory
groups as deemed appropriate.
17. The DCI may appoint officers in the CIA and in the staff
elements of the Office of the DCI as necessary, and they shall have
such authority as the DCI may prescribe in accordance with statute
and E. 0.
18. Establishes the NITC under the "direction, control and manage-
ment" of the DCI; as the Director's "central mechanism" for trans-
lating PRC-developed requirements and priorities into collection
objectives and targets and for assigning targets and objectives.
19. Establishes the NFIB to advise the DCI.
..........
. . ..
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..
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36,74
[3195-01]
presidential documents
Title 3?The President
Executive Order 12036
? January 24, 1978
United States Intelligence Activities
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of
the United States of America including the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, and as President of the United States of America, in order to provide
for the organization and control of United States foreign intelligence activities, it
is hereby ordered as follows:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(FR page)
SECTION I DIRECTION, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
1-1 National Security Council [3675)
(-2 NSC Policy Review Committee 3675)
1-3 NSC Special Coordination Committee 36751
1-4 National Foreign Intelligence Board 3676
1-5 National Intelligence Tasking Center 36771
I -6 The Director of Central Intelligence 3677]
(-7 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community [3679]
1-8 The Central Intelligence Agency 3680)
1-9 The Department of State 3681)
1-10 The Department of the Treasury 3681]
1-11 The Department of Defense 3681
1-12 Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense 3682
1-13 The Department of Energy 3684
1-14 The Fedt-ral Bureau of Investigation [3684]
1-15 The Drug Enforcement Administration [3684]
SECTION 2 RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
2-1 Adherence to Law [3684]
2-2 Restrictions on Certain Collection Techniques [3685]
2-201 General Provisions 3685]
2-202 Electronic Surveillance [3685]
2-203 Television Cameras and Other Monitoring 36851
2-204 Physical Searches 3685]
2-205 Mail Surveillance 3685]
2-206 Physical Surveillance 36851
2-207 Undisclosed Participation in Domestic Organizations 3686]
2-208 Collection of Nonpublicly Available Information t 3686]
2-3 Additional Restrictions and Limitations 3687]
2-301 Tax Information 36871
2-302 Restrictions on Experimentation 3687]
2-303 Restrictions on Contracting 3687]
2-304 Restrictions on Personnel Assigned to Other Agencies 36871
2-305 Prohibition on Assassination 36871
2-306 Restrictions on Special Activities 36871
2-307 Restrictions on Indirect Participation in Prohibited Activities 3688]
2-308 Restrictions on Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities 3688]
2-309 Permissible Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities 3688]
2-310 Permissible Dissemination and Storage of Information [3688]
SECTION 3 OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
3-1 Intelligence Oversight Board (3688)
3-2 Inspectors General and General Counsel [3689]
3-3 Attorney General [3689]
3-4 Congressional Intelligence Committees [3689]
SECTION 4 GENERAL PROVISIONS
4-1 Implementation [3690)
4-2 Definitions [3690]
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 43, NO. 18?THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1978
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IP
THE PRESIDENT
SECTION 1
DIRECTION, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
I-1. National Security Council.
1-101. Purpose. The National Security Council (NSC) was established by
the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with reipect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national
security. The NSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides
review of, guidance for, and direction to the conduct of all national foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence activities.
1-102. Committees. The NSC Policy Review Committee and Special Coor-
dination Committee; in accordance with procedures established by the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, shall assist in carrying out the
NSC's responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field.
1-2. NSC Policy Review Committee.
1-201. Membership. The NSC Policy Review Committee (PRC), when car-
rying out responsibilities assigned in this Order, shall be chaired by the Director
of Central Intelligence and composed of the Vice President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, or their designees, and other senior officials, as appropriate.
1-202. Duties. The PRC shall:
(a) Establish requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence;
(b) Review the National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget pro-
posals and report to the President as to whether the resource allocations for
intelligence capabilities are responsive to the intelligence requirements of the
members of the NSC.
(c) Conduct periodic reviews of national foreign intelligence products,
evaluate the quality of the intelligence product, develop policy guidance to
ensure quality intelligence and to meet changing intelligence requirements; and
(d) Submit an annual report on its activities to the NSC.
1-203. Appeals. Recommendations of the PRC on intelligence matters may
be appealed to the President or the NSC by any member of PRC.
1-3. NSC Special Coordination Committee.
1-301. Membership. The NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC) is
chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its
membership includes the statutory members of the NSC and other senior
officials, as appropriate.
1-302. Special Activities. The SCC shall consider and submit to the Presi-
dent a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each special activity.
When meeting for this purpose, the members of the SCC shall include the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Director of Central Intelligence.
1-303. Sensitive Foreign Intelligence Collection Operations. Under standards
established by the President, proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collec-
tion operations shall be reported to the Chairman by the Director of Central
Intelligence for appropriate review and approval. When meeting for the purpose
of reviewing proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations,
? Certain technical terms are defined in Section 4-2.
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 43, NO. 18?THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1978
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03676 THE PRESIDENT
the members of the SCC shall include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Attorney General, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, the Director of Central intelligence, and such other members
designated by the Chairman to ensure proper consideration of these operations.
1-304. Counterintelligence. The SCC shall develop policy with respect to the
conduct of counterintelligence activities. When meeting for this purpose the
members of the SCC shall include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the
Director of the FBI. The SCC's counterintelligence functions shall include:
(a) Developing standards and doctrine for the counterintelligence activities
of. the United States;
(b) Resolving interagency differences concerning implementation of coun-
terintelligence policy;
(c) Developing and monitoring guidelines consistent with this Order for the
maintenance of central records of counterintelligence information;
(d) Submitting to the President an overall annual assessment of the relative
threat to United States interests from intelligence and security services of
foreign powers and from international terrorist activities, including an assess-
ment of the effectiveness of the United States counterintelligence activities; and
(e) Approving counterintelligence activities which, under such standards as
may be established by the President, require SCC approval.
1-305. Required Membership. The SCC shall discharge the responsibilities
assigned by sections 1-302 through 1-304 only after consideration in a meeting
at which all designated members are present or, in unusual circumstances when
any such member is unavailable, when a designated representative of the
member attends.
1-306. Additional Duties. The SCC shall also:
(a) Conduct an annual review of ongoing special activities and sensitive
national foreign intelligence collection operations and report thereon to the
NSC; and
(b) Carry out such other coordination and review activities as the President
may direct.
1-307. Appeals. Any member of the SCC may appeal any decision to the
President or the NSC.
1-4. National Foreign Intelligence Board.
1-401. Establishment and Duties. There is established a National Foreign
Intelligence Board (NFIB) to advise the Director of Central Intelligence con-
cerning:
(a) Production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence;
(b) The National Foreign Intelligence Program budget;
(c) Interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information;
(d) Arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters;
(e) The protection of intelligence sources and methods;
(f) Activities of common concern; and
(g) Other matters referred to it by the Director of Central Intelligence.
1-402. Membership. The NFIB shall be chaired by the Director of Central
Intelligence and shall include other appropriate officers of the CIA, the Office of
the Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of State, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the
Department of Energy, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the offices within the
Department of Defense for reconnaissance programs, the National Security
Agency and the FBI. A representative of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs may attend meetings of the NFIB as an observer.
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THE PRESIDENT ,
1-403. Restricted Membership and Observers. When the NFIB meets for the
purpose of section 1-401(a), it shall be composed solely of the senior intelli-
gence officers of the designated agencies. The senior intelligence officers of the
Army, Navy and Air Force may attend all meetings of the NFIB as observers.
1-5. National Intelligence Tasking Center.
1-501. Establishment. There is established a National Intelligence Tasking
Center (NITC) under the direction, control and management of the Director of
Central Intelligence for coordinating and tasking national foreign intelligence
collection activities. The NITC shall be staffed jointly by civilian and military
personnel including designated representatives of the chiefs of each of the
Department of Defense intelligence organizations engaged in national foreign
intelligence activities. Other agencies within the Intelligence Community may
also designate representatives.
1-502. Responsibilities. The NITC shall be the central mechanism by which
the Director of Central Intelligence:
(a) Translates national foreign intelligence requirements and priorities
developed by the PRC into specific collection objectives and targets for the
Intelligence Community;
(b) Assigns targets and objectives to national foreign intelligence collection
organizations and systems;
(c) Ensures the timely dissemination and exploitation of data for national
foreign intelligence purposes gathered by national foreign intelligence collec-
tion means, and ensures the resulting intelligence flow is routed immediately to
relevant components and commands;
(d) Provides advisory tasking concerning collection of national foreign
intelligence to departments and agencies having information collection capabil-
ities or intelligence assets that are not a part of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program. Particular emphasis shall be placed on increasing the contribution of
departments or agencies to the collection of information through overt means.
1-503. Resolution of Conflicts. The NITC shall have the authority to resolve
conflicts of priority. Any PRC member may appeal such a resolution to the PRC;
pending the PRC's decision, the tasking remains in effect.
1-504. Transfer of Authority. All responsibilities and authorities of the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence concerning the NITC shall be transferred to the
Secretary of Defense upon the express direction of the President. To maintain
readiness for such transfer, the Secretary of Defense shall, with advance
agreement of the Director of Central Intelligence, assume temporarily during
regular practice exercises all responsibilities and authorities of the Director of
Central Intelligence concerning the NITC.
1-6. The Director of Central Intelligence.
1-601. Duties. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
directly to the NSC and, in addition to the duties specified elsewhere in this
Order, shall:
(a) Act as the primary adviser to the President and the NSC on national
foreign intelligence and provide the President and other officials in the Ex-
ecutive Branch with national foreign intelligence;
(b) Be the head of the CIA and of such staff elements as may be required for
discharge of the Director's Intelligence Community responsibilities;
(c) Act, in appropriate consultation with the departments and agencies, as
the Intelligence Community's principal spokesperson to the Congress, the news
media and the public, and facilitate the use of national foreign intelligence
products by the Congress in a secure manner;
(d) Develop, consistent with the requirements and priorities established by
the PRC, such objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community as will
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4 el0 I 0 THE PRESIDENT
enhance capabilities for responding to expected future needs for national
foreign intelligence;
(e) Promote the development and maintenance of services of common
concern by designated foreign intelligence organizations on behalf of the
Intelligence Community;
(1) Ensure implementation of special activities;
(g) Formulate policies concerning intelligence arrangements with foreign
governments, and coordinate intelligence relationships between agencies of the
Intelligence Community and the intelligence or internal security services of
foreign governments;
(h) Conduct a program to protect against overclassification of foreign
intelligence information;
(i) Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common
security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence
systems, information and products;
(j) Participate in the development of procedures required to be approved by
the Attorney General governing the conduct of intelligence activities;
(k) Establish uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for
the transmission of critical national foreign intelligence, and advise the Secretary
of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence
Community for the transmission of such intelligence;
(1) Provide appropriate intelligence to departments and agencies not within
the Intelligence Community; and
(m) Establish appropriate committees or other advisory groups to assist in
the execution of the foregoing responsibilities.
I --602. National Foreign Intelligence Program Budget. The Director of Central
Intelligence shall, to the extent consistent with applicable law, have full and
exclusive authority for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget submitted to the President. Pursuant to this authority:
(a) The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide guidance for program
and budget development to program managers and heads of component
activities and to department and agency heads;
(b) The heads of departments and agencies involved in the National Foreign
Intelligence Program shall ensure timely development and submission to the
Director of Central Intelligence of proposed national programs and budgets in
the format designated by the Director of Central Intelligence, by the program
managers and heads of component activities, and shall also ensure that the
Director of Central Intelligence is provided, in a timely and responsive manner,
all information necessary to perform the Director's program and budget respon-
sibilities;
(c) The Director of Central Intelligence shall review and evaluate the
national program and budget submissions and, with the advice of the NFIB and
the departments and agencies concerned, develop the consolidated National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget and present it to the President through the
Office of Management and Budget;
(d) The Director of Central Intelligence shall present and justify the
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget to the Congress;
(e) The heads of the departments and agencies shall, in consultation with
the Director of Central Intelligence, establish rates of obligation for appro-
priated funds;
(f) The Director of Central Intelligence shall have full and exclusive
authority for reprogramming National Foreign Intelligence Program funds, in
accord with guidelines established by the Office of Management and Budget, but
shall do so only after consultation with the head of the department affected and
appropriate consultation with the Congress;
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THE PRESIDENT 3679
(g) The departments and agencies may appeal to the President decisions by
the Director of Central Intelligence on budget or reprogramming matters of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(h) The Director of Central Intelligence shall monitor National Foreign
Intelligence Program implementation and may conduct program and perfor-
mance audits and evaluations.
1-603. Responsibility For National Foreign Intelligence. The Director of Central
Intelligence shall have full responsibility for production and dissemination of
national foreign intelligence and have authority to levy analytic tasks on
departmental intelligence production organizatiOns, in consultation with those
organizations. In doing so, the Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that
diverse points of view are considered fully and that differences of judgment
within the Intelligence Community are brought to the attention of national
policymakers.
1-604. Protection of Sources, Methods and Procedures. The Director of Central
Intelligence shall ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence
sources, methods and analytical procedures, provided that this responsibility
shall be limited within the United States to:
(a) Using lawful means to protect against disclosure by present or former
employees of the CIA or the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, or by
persons or organizations presently or formerly under contract with such entities;
and
(b) Providing policy, guidance and technical assistance to departments and
agencies regarding protection of intelligence information, including information
that may reveal intelligence sources and methods.
1-605. Responsibility of Executive Branch Agencies. The heads of all Executive
Branch departments and agencies shall, in accordance with law and relevant
Attorney General procedures, give the Director of Central Intelligence access to
all information relevant to the national intelligence needs of the United States
and shall give due consideration to requests from the Director of Central
Intelligence for appropriate support for CIA activities.
1-606. Access to CIA Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence, shall,
in accordance with law and relevant Attorney General procedures, give the
heads of the departments and agencies access to all intelligence, developed by
the CIA or the staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, relevant to the national intelligence needs of the departments and
agencies.
1-7. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community. The senior officials of each of
the agencies within the Intelligence Community shall:
1-701. Ensure that all activities of their agencies are carried out in
accordance with applicable law;
1-702. Make use of the capabilities of other agencies within the Intelli-
gence Community in order to achieve efficiency and mutual assistance;
1-703. Contribute in their areas of responsibility to the national foreign
intelligence products;
1-704. Establish internal policies and guidelines governing employee
conduct and ensure that such are made known to each employee;
1-705. Provide for strong, independent, internal means to identify, in-
spect, and report on unlawful or improper activity;
1-706. Report to the Attorney General evidence of possible violations of
federal criminal law by an employee of their department or agency, and report
to the Attorney General evidence of possible violations by any other person of
those federal criminal laws specified in guidelines adopted by the Attorney
General;
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THE PRESIDENT
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1-707. In any case involving serious or continuing breaches of security,
recommend to the Attorney General that the case be referred to the FBI for
further investigation;
1-708. Furnish the Director of Central Intelligence, the PRC and the SCC,
in accordance with applicable law and Attorney General procedures, the infor-
mation required for the performance of their respective duties;
1-709. Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and keep the Director
of Central Intelligence appropriately informed, concerning any intelligence
activities of their organizations which raise questions of legality or propriety;
1-710. Protect intelligenciand intelligence sources and methods consistent
with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence and the NSC;
1-711. Disseminate intelligence to cooperating foreign governments under
arrangements established or agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence;
1-712. Execute programs to protect against overclassification of foreign
intelligence;
1-713. Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the Intelligence
Oversight Board; and
1-714. Ensure that the Inspectors General and General Counsel of their
agencies have access to any information necessary to perform their duties
assigned by this Order.
1-8. The Central Intelligence Agency. All duties and responsibilities of the CIA shall
be related to the intelligence functions set out below. As authorized by the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the CIA Act of 1949, as amended,
and other laws, regulations and directives, the CIA, under the direction of the
NSC, shall:
1-801. Collect foreign intelligence, including information not otherwise
obtainable, and develop, conduct, or provide support for technical and other
programs which collect national foreign intelligence. The collection of informa-
tion within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI as required by
procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Attorney General;
1-802. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to the national
security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military,
geographic and sociological intelligence to meet the needs of the President, the
NSC, and other elements of the United States Government;
1-803. Collect, produce and disseminate intelligence on foreign aspects of
narcotics production and trafficking;
1-804. Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States and
coordinate counterintelligence activities conducted outside the United States by
other agencies within the Intelligence Community;
1-805. Without assuming or performing any internal security functions,
conduct counterintelligence activities within the United States, but only in
coordination with the FBI and subject to the approval of the Attorney General;
1-806. Produce and disseminate counterintelligence studies and reports;
1-807. Coordinate the collection outside the United States of intelligence
information not otherwise obtainable;
1-808. Conduct special activities approved by the President and carry out
such activities consistent with applicable law;
1-809. Conduct services of common concern for the Intelligence Com-
munity as directed by the NSC;
1-810. Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement
of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions;
1-811. Protect the security of its installations, activities, information and
personnel by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants,
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THE PRESIDENT 3681
employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA
as are necessary;
1-812. Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within
and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions
described in sectiong 1-801 through 1-811 above, including procurement and
essential cover and proprietary arrangements.
1-813. Provide legal and legislative services and other administrative
support to the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
1-9. The Department of State. The Secretary of State shall:
1-901. Overtly collect foreign political, sociological, economic, scientific,
technical, political-military and associated biographic information;
1-902. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United
States foreign policy as required for the execution of the Secretary's responsibil-
ities;
1-903. Disseminate, as appropriate, reports received from United States
diplomatic and consular posts abroad;
1-904. Coordinate with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that
national foreign intelligence activities are useful to and consistent with United
States foreign policy;
1-905. Transmit reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community
to the Chiefs of United States Missions abroad; and
1-906. Support Chiefs of Mission in discharging their statutory responsi-
bilities for direction and coordination of mission activities.
1-10. The Department of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury shall:
1-1001. Overtly collect foreign financial and monetary information;
1-1002. Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of
general foreign economic information;
1-1003. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United
States economic policy as required for the execution of the Secretary's responsi-
bilities; and
1-1004. Conduct, through the United States Secret Service, activities to
determine the existence and capability of surveillance equipment being used
against the President of the United States, the Executive Office of the President,
and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury or the President, other
Secret Service protectees and United States officials. No information shall be
acquired intentionally through such activities except to protect against such
surveillance, and those activities shall be conducted pursuant to procedures
agreed upon by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.
1-11. The Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall:
1-1101. Collect national foreign intelligence and be responsive to collec-
tion tasking by the NITC;
1-1102. Collect, produce and disseminate foreign military and military-
related intelligence information, including scientific, technical, political, geo-
graphic and economic information as required for execution of the Secretary's
responsibilities;
1-1103. Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill national and
tactical foreign intelligence requirements;
1-1104. Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of
Defense components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA,
and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to proce-
dures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, and
produce and disseminate counterintelligence studies and reports;
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3682 THE PRERDENT
1-1105. Direct, operate, control and provide fiscal 'management for the
National Security Agency and for defense and military intelligence and national
reconnaissance entities;
1-1106. Conduct, as the executive agent of the United States Government,
signals intelligence and communications security activities, except as otherwise
directed by the NSC;
1-1107. Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as
defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States
Government;
1-1108. Review budget data and information on Department of Defense
programs within the National Foreign Intelligence Program and review budgets
submitted by program managers to the Director of Central Intelligence to
ensure the appropriate relationship of the National Foreign Intelligence Pro-
gram elements to the other elements of the Defense program;
1-1109. Monitor, evaluate and conduct performance audits of Department
of Defense intelligence programs;
1-1110. Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement
of technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions;
1-1111. Together with the Director of Central Intelligence, ensure that
there is no unnecessary overlap between national foreign intelligence programs
and Department of Defense intelligence programs and provide the Director of
Central Intelligence all information necessary for this purpose;
1-1112. Protect the security of Department of Defense installations, activi-
ties, information and personnel by appropriate means including such investiga-
tions of applicants, employees, contractors and other persons with similar
associations with the Department of Defense as are necessary; and
1-1113. Conduct such administrative and technical support activities with-
in and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions
described in sections 1-1101 through 1-1112 above.
1-12. Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out the
responsibilities assigned in sections 1-1101 through 1-1113, the Secretary of
Defense is authorized to utilize the following:
1-1201. Defense Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities shall include:
(a) Production or, through tasking and coordination, provision of military
and military-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies;
(b) Provision of military intelligence for national foreign intelligence prod-
ucts;
(c) Coordination of all Department of Defense intelligence collection
requirements for departmental needs;
(d) Management of the Defense Attache system; and
(e) Provision of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence staff support as
directed by the Joint ChieSs of Staff.
1-1202. National Security Agency (NSA), whose responsibilities shall include:
(a) Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for
signals intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control
over certain operations that are conducted- through other elements of the
Intelligence Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals
intelligence activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of
Defense;
(b) Control of signals intelligence collection and processing activities,
including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and
tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders;
(c) Collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelli-
gence purposes in accordance with tasking by the NITC;
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*MI ? (d) Processing ottlirgnals intelligence data for national foreirintelligence
purposes consistent with standards for timeliness established by the Director of
Central Intelligence;
(e) Dissemination of signals intelligence information for national foreign
intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the
military services, in accordance with guidance from the NITC;
(0 Collection, processing, and dissemination of signals intelligence infor-
mation for counterintelligence purposes;
(g) Provision of signals intelligence support for the conduct of military
operations in accordance with tasking, priorities and standards of timeliness
assigned by the Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use
of national collection systems, these systems will be tasked within existing
guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(h) Executing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive
agent for the communications security of the United States Government;
(i) Conduct of research and development to meet needs of the United States
for signals intelligence and communications security;
(j) Protection of the security a its installations, activities, information and
personnel by appropriate means including such investigations of applicants,
employees, contractors and other persons with similar associations with the NSA
as are necessary; and
(k) Prescribing, within its field of authorized operations, security regulations
covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribu-
tion ?of signals intelligence and communications security material within and
among the elements under control of the Director of the NSA, and exercising
the necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations.
1-1203. Offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance
programs, whose responsibilities shall include:
(a) Carrying out consolidated reconnaissance programs for specialized
intelligence;
(b) Responding to tasking through the NITC; and
(c) Delegating authority to the various departments and agencies for
research, development, proturement, and operation of designated means of
collection.
1-1204. The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military
services, whose responsibilities shall include:
(a) Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related
foreign intelligence, including information on indications and warnings, foreign
capabilities, plans and- weapons systems, scientific and technical developments
and narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted in
response to national foreign intelligence requirements, it will be tasked by the
NITC. Collection of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable,
outside the United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection
within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;
(b) Conduct of counterintelligence activities outside the United States in
coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the
FBI, and production and dissemination of counterintelligence studies or
reports; and
(c) Monitoring of the development, procurement and management of
tactical intelligence systems and equipment and conducting related research,
development, and test and evaluation activities.
1-1205. Other offices within the Department of Defense appropriate for conduct
of the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of
Defense. If such other offices are used for intelligence purposes, the provisions
of Sections 2-101 through 2-309 of this Order shall apply to those offices when
? used for those purposes.
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3684 lir THE PRESIDENT
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1-13. The Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy shall:
1-1301. Participate with the Department of State in overtly collecting
political, economic and technical information with respect to foreign energy
matters;
1-1302. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence necessary for the
Secretary's responsibilities;
1-1303. Participate in formulating intelligence collection and analysis
requirements where the special expert capability of the Department can
contribute; and
1-1304. Provide expert technical, analytical and research capability to other
agencies within the Intelligence Community.
1-14. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under the supervision of the Attorney
General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish,
the Director of the FBI shall:
1-1401. Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coor-
dinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence
Community. When a counterintelligence activity of the FBI involves military or
civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with
the Department of Defense;
1-1402. Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in
coordination with the CIA, subject to the approval of the Director of Central
Intelligence;
1-1403. Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of
the Intelligence Community designated by the President, lawful activities under-
taken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection
requirements of other agencies within the Intelligence Community;
1-1404. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence, counterintelligence
and counterintelligence studies and reports; and
1-1405. Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement
of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.
1-15. The Drug Enforcement Administration. Under the supervision of the Attorney
General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish,
the Administrator of DEA shall:
1-1501. Collect, produce and disseminate intelligence on the foreign and
domestic aspects of narcotics production and trafficking in coordination with
other agencies with responsibilities in these areas;
1-1502. Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of
general foreign political, economic and agricultural information relating to
narcotics production and trafficking; and
1-1503. Coordinate with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure
that the foreign narcotics intelligence activities of DEA are consistent with other
foreign intelligence programs.
SECTION 2
RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
2-1. Adherence to Law.
2-101. Purpose. Information about the capabilities, intentions and activities
of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents is essential to
informed decision-making in the areas of national defense and foreign relations.
The measures employed to acquire such information should be responsive to
legitimate governmental needs and must be conducted in a manner that
preserves and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties.
2-102. Principles of Interpretation. Sections 2-201 through 2-309 set forth
limitations which, in addition to other applicable laws, are intended to achieve
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THE PRESIDENT 3685
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the proper balance between protection of individual rights and acquisition of
essential information. Those sections do not authorize any activity not
authorized by sections 1-101 through 1-1503 and do not provide any exemp-
tion from any other law:
2-2. Restrictivils on Certain Collection Techniques.
2-201. General Provisions.
(a) The activities described in Sections 2-202 through 2-208 shall be
undertaken only as permitted by this Order and by procedures established by
the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Those
procedures shall protect constitutional rights and privacy, ensure that informa-
tion is gathered by the least intrusive means possible, and limit use of such
information to lawful governmental purposes.
(b) Activities described in sections 2-202 through 2-205 for which a warrant
would be required if undertaken for law enforcement rather than intelligence
purposes shall not be undertaken against a United States person without a
judicial warrant, unless the President has authorized the type of activity involved
and the Attorney General has both approved the particular activity and deter-
mined that there is probable cause to believe that the United States person is an
agent of a foreign power.
2-202. Electronic Surveillance. The CIA may not engage in any electronic
surveillance within the United States. No agency within the Intelligence Com-
munity shall engage in any electronic surveillance directed against a United
States person abroad or designed to intercept a communication sent from, or
intended for receipt within, the United States except as permitted by the
procedures established pursuant to section 2-201. Training of personnel by
agencies in the Intelligence Commnunity in the use of electronic communica-
tions equipment, testing by such agencies of such equipment, and the use of
measures to determine the existence and capability of electronic surveillance
equipment being used unlawfully shall not be prohibited and shall also be
governed by such procedures. Such activities shall be limited in scope and
duration to those necessary to carry out the training, testing or countermeasures
purpose. No information de,rived from communications intercepted in the
course of such training, testing or use of countermeasures may be retained or
used for any other purpose.
2-203. Television Cameras and Other Monitoring. No agency within the Intelli-
gence Community shall use any electronic or mechanical device surreptitiously
and continuously to monitor any person within the United States, or any United
States person abroad, except as permitted by the procedures established
pursuant to Section 2-201.
2-204. Physical Searches. No agency within the Intelligence Community
except the FBI may conduct any unconsented physical searches within the
United States. All such searches conducted by the FBI, as well as all such
searches conducted by any agency within the Intelligence Community outside
the United States and directed against United States persons, shall be under-
taken only as permitted by procedures established pursuant to Section 2-201.
2-205. Mail Surveillance. No agency within the Intelligence Community
shall open mail or examine envelopes in United States postal channels, except in
accordance with applicable statutes and regulations. No agency within the
Intelligence Community shall open mail of a United States person abroad except
as permitted by procedures established pursuant to Section 2-201.
2-206. Physical Surveillance. The FBI may conduct physical surveillance
directed against United States persons or others only in the course of a lawful
investigation. Other agencies within the Intelligence Community may not
undertake any physical surveillance directed against a United States person
unless:
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THE PRESIDENT
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(a) The surveillance is conducted outside the United States and the person
being surveilled is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power',
engaging in international terrorist activities, or engaging in narcotics production
or trafficking;
(b) The surveillance is conducted solely for the purpose of identifying a
person who is in contact with someone who is the subject of a foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence investigation; or
(c) That person is being surveilled for the purpose of protecting foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure or is the subject of a lawful counterintelligence, personnel, physical or
communications security investigation.
(d) No surveillance under paragraph (c) of this section may be conducted
within the United States unless the person being surveilled is a present
employee, intelligence agency contractor or employee of such a contractor, or is
a military person employed by a non-intelligence element of a military service.
Outside the United States such surveillance may also be conducted against a
former employee, intelligence agency contractor or employee of a contractor or
a civilian person employed by a non-intelligence element of an agency within the
Intelligence Community. A person who is in contact with such a present or
former employee or contractor may also be surveilled, but only to the extent
necessary to identify that person.
2-207. Undisclosed Participation in Domestic Organizations. No employees may
join, or otherwise participate in, any organization within the United States on
behalf of any agency within the Intelligence Community without disclosing their
intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organization, except as
permitted by procedures established pursuant to Section 2-201. Such proce-
dures shall provide for disclosure of such affiliation in all cases unless the agency
head or a designee approved by the Attorney General finds that non-disclosure
is essential to achieving lawful purposes, and that finding is subject to review by
the Attorney General. Those procedures shall further limit undisclosed partici-
pation to cases where:
(a) The participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in the course of a
lawful investigation;
(b) The organization concerned is composed primarily of individuals who
are not United States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf
of a foreign power; or
(c) The participation is strictly limited in its nature, scope arid duration to
that necessary for other lawful purposes relating to foreign intelligence and is a
type of participation approved by the Attorney General and set forth in a public
document. No such participation may be undertaken for the purpose of influenc-
ing the activity of the organization or its members.
2-208. Collection of Nonpublicly Available Information. No agency within the
Intelligence Community may collect, disseminate or store information concern-
ing the activities of United States persons that is not available publicly, unless it
does so with their consent or as permitted by procedures established pursuant to
Section 2-201. Those procedures shall limit collection, storage or dissemination
to the following types of information:
(a) Information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations
or activities that constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence;
(b) Information arising out of a lawful counterintelligence or personnel,
physical or communications security investigation;
(c) Information concerning present or former employees, present or former
intelligence agency contractors or their present or former employees, or appli-
cants for any such employment or contracting, which is needed co protect
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods from unautho-
rized disclosure;
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THE PRESIDENT
3687
(d) Information needed solely to identify individuals in contact with those
persons described in paragraph (c) of this section or with someone who is the
subject of a lawful foreign intelligence or counterintelligence investigation;
(e) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be
potential sources or contacts, but only for the purpose of determining the
suitability or .credibility of such persons;
(f) Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
gathered abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted in compliance with
Section 2-202 or from cooperating sources in the United States;
(g) Information about a person who is reasonably believed to be acting on---)
behalf of a foreign power, engaging in international terrorist activities or
narcotics production or trafficking, or endangering the safety of a person '
protected by the United States Secret Service or the Department of State;
(h) Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at
specific United States persons;
(i) Information concerning United States persons abroad that is obtained in
response to requests from the Department of State for support of its consular
responsibilities relating to the welfare of those persons;
(j) Information collected, received, disseminated or stored by the FBI and
necessary to fulfill its lawful investigative responsibilities; or
(k) Information concerning persons or activities that pose a clear threat to
any facility or personnel of an agency within the Intelligence Community. Such
information may be retained only by the agency threatened and, if appropriate,
by the United States Secret Service and the FBI.
2-3. Additional Restrictions and Limitations.
2-301. Tax Information. No agency within the Intelligence Community shall
examine tax returns or tax information except as permitted by applicable law.
2-302. Restrictions oz Experimentation. No agency within the Intelligence
Community shall sponsor, contract for, or conduct research on human subjects
except in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. The subject's informed consent shall be documented as
required by those guidelines.
2-303. Restrictions on Contracting. No agency within the Intelligence Com-
munity shall enter into a contract or arrangement for the provision of goods or
services with private companies or institutions in the United States unless the
agency sponsorship is known to the appropriate officials of the company or
institution. In the case of any company or institution other than an academic
institution, intelligence agency sponsorship may be concealed where it is
determined, pursuant to procedures approved by the Attorney General, that
such concealment is necessary to maintain essential cover or proprietary ar-
rangements for authorized intelligence purposes.
2-304. Restrictions on Personnel Assigned to Other Agencies. An employee
detailed to another agency within the federal government shall be responsible to
the host agency and shall not report to the parent agency on the affairs of the
host agency unless so directed by the host agency. The head of the host agency,
and any successor, shall be informed of the employee's relationship with the
parent agency.
2-305. Prohibition on Assassination. No person employed by or acting on
behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, assassination.
2-306. Restrictions an Special Activities. No component of the United States
Government except an agency within the Intelligence Community may conduct
any special activity. No such agency except the CIA (or the military services in
wartime) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines, with
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4,0515 THE PRESIDENT
the SCC's advice, that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular
objective.
? 2-307. Restrictions on Indirect Participation in Prohibited Activities. No agency of
the Intelligence Community shall request or otherwise encourage, directly or
indirectly, any person, organization, or government agency to undertake activi-
ties forbidden by this Order or by applicable law.
2-308. Restrictions on Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities. Agencies with-
in the Intelligence Community other than the FBI shall not, except as expressly
authorized by law:
(a) Provide services, equipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (or its successor agencies) or to state or local
police organizations of the United States; or
(b) Participate in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United
States.
2-309. Permissible Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities. The restrictions in
Section 2-308 shall not preclude:
(a) Cooperation with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose
of protecting the personnel and facilities of any agency within the Intelligence
Community;
(b) Participation in law enforcement activities, in accordance with law and
this Order, to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign
powers, international narcotics production and trafficking, or international
terrorist activities; or
(c) Provision of specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of
expert personnel for use by any department or agency or, when lives are
endangered, to support local law enforcement agencies. Provision of assistance
by expert personnel shall be governed by procedures approved by the Attorney
General.
2-310. Permissible Dissemination and Storage of Information. Nothing in Sec-
tions 2-201 through 2-309 of this Order shall prohibit:
(a) Dissemination to appropriate law enforcement agencies of information
which indicates involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local or
foreign laws;
(b) Storage of information required by law to be retained;
(c) Dissemination of information covered by Section 2-208 (a)-(j) to
agencies within the Intelligence Community or entities of cooperating foreign
governments; or
(d) Lawful storage or dissemination of information solely for administrative
purposes not related to intelligence or security.
?
SECTION 3
OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
3-1. Intelligence Oversight Board.
3-101. Membership. The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (I0B)
shall function within the White House. The IOB shall have three members who
shall be appointed by the President and who shall be from outside the
government and be qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of
background and experience. No member shall have any personal interest in any
contractual relationship with any agency within the Intelligence Community.
One member shall be designated by the President as chairman.
3-102. Duties. The IOB shall:
(a) Review periodically the practices and procedures of the Inspectors
General and General Counsel with responsibilities for agencies within the
Intelligence Community for discovering and reporting to the IOB intelligence
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 43, NO. 18-THURSDAY, JANUARY 26,1978
1 ,
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?
e.
?
THE PRESIDENT
activities that raise questions of legality or propriety, and consider written ind
oral reports referred under Section 3-201;
(b) Review periodically for adequacy the internal guidelines of each agency
within the Intelligence Community concerning the legality or propriety of intelli-
gence activities;
(c) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the President on its findings;
and report in a timely manner to the President any intelligence activities that
raise serious questions of legality or propriety;
(d) Forward to the Attorney General, in a timely manner, reports received
concerning intelligence activities in which a question of legality has been raised
or which the IOB believes to involve questions of legality; and
(e) Conduct such investigations of the intelligence activities of agencies
within the Intelligence Community as the Board deems necessary to carry out its
functions under this Order.
3-103. Restriction on Staff No person who serves on the staff of the IOB
shall have any contractual or employment relationship with any agency within
the Intelligence Community.
3-2. Inspectors General and General Counsel. Inspectors General and General
Counsel with responsibility for agencies within the Intelligence Community
shall:
3-201. Transmit timely reports to the IOB concerning any intelligence
activities that come to their attention and that raise questions of legality or
propriety;
3-202. Promptly report to the IOB actions taken concerning the Board's
findings on intelligence activities that raise questions of legality or propriety;
3-203. Provide to the IOB information requested concerning the legality
or propriety of intelligence activities within their respective agencies;
3-204. Formulate practices and procedures for discovering and reporting
to the IOB intelligence activities that raise questions of legality or propriety; and
3-205. Report to the IOB any occasion on which the Inspectors General
or General Counsel were directed not to report any intelligence activity to the
IOB which they believed raised questions of legality or propriety.
3-3. Attorney General. The Attorney General shall:
3-301. Receive and consider reports from agencies within the Intelligence
Community forwarded by the I0B;
3-302. Report to the President in a timely fashion any intelligence activi-
ties which raise questions of legality;
3-303. Report to the IOB and to the President in a timely fashion
decisions made or actions taken in response to reports from agencies within the
Intelligence Community forwarded to the Attorney General by the I0B;
3-304. Inform the IOB of legal opinions affecting the operations of the
Intelligence Community; and
3-305. Establish or approve procedures, as required by this Order, for the
conduct of intelligence activities. Such procedures shall ensure compliance with
law, protect constitutional rights and priyaey, and ensure that any intelligence
activity within the United States or directed against any United States person is
conducted by the least intrusive means possible. The procedures shall also
ensure that any use, dissemination and storage of information about United
States persons acquired through intelligence activities is limited to that neces-
sary to achieve lawful governmental purposes.
3-4. Congressional Intelligence Committees. Under such procedures as the President
may establish and consistent with applicable authorities and duties, including
those conferred by the Constitution upon the Executive and Legislative
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THE PRESIDENT
3690
;
?
?
Branches and by law to protect sources and methods, the Director of Central
Intelligence and heads of departments and agencies of the United States
involved in intelligence activities shall:
3-401. Keep the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate fully
and currently informed concerning intelligence activities, including any signifi-
cant anticipated activities which are the responsibility of, or engaged in, by such
department or agency. This requirement does not constitute a condition
precedent to the implementation of such intelligence activities;
3-402. Provide any information or document in the possession, custody, or
control of the department or agency or person paid by such department or
agency, within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence of the House of Representatives or the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate, upon the request of such committee; and
3-403. Report in a timely fashion to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of ,Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate information relating to intelligence activities that are
illegal or improper and corrective actions that are taken or planned.
SECTION 4
GENERAL PROVISIONS
4-1. Implementation.
4-101. Except as provided in section 4-105 of this section, this Order shall
supersede Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activi-
ties," dated February 18, 1976; Executive Order 11985, same subject, dated
May 13,1977; and Executive Order 11994, same subject, dated June 1,1977.
4-102. The NSC, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General and the
Director of Central Intelligence shall issue such appropriate directives and
procedures as are necessary to implement this Order.
4-103. Heads of agencies within the Intelligence Community shall issue
appropriate supplementary directives and proceAures consistent with this
Order.
4-104. The Attorney General shall have sole authority to issue and revise
procedures required by section 2-201 for the activities of the FBI relating to
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
4-105. Where intelligence activities under this Order are to be conducted
pursuant to procedures approved or agreed to by the Attorney General, those
activities may be conducted under terms and conditions of Executive Order
11905 and any procedures promulgated thereunder until such Attorney General
procedures are established. Such Attorney General procedures shall be estab-
lished as expeditiously as possible after the issuance of this Order.
4-106. In some instances, the documents that implement this Order will
be classified because of the sensitivity of the information and its relation to
national security. All instructions contained in classified documents will be
consistent with this Order. All procedures promulgated pursuant to this Order
will be made available to the Congressional intelligence committees in accor-
dance with Section 3-402.
4-107. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions of this Order shall apply
to activities both within and outside the United States, and all references to law
are to applicable laws of the United States, including the Constitution and this
Order. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to apply to or interfere with any
authorized civil or criminal law enforcement responsibility of any department or
agency.
4-2. Definitions. For the purposes of this Order, the following terms shall have
these meanings:
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 43, NO. 18?THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1978
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IP
?
?
?
THE PRESIDENT 3691
4-201. Communications security means protective measures taken to deny
unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications of the
United States Government related to national security and to ensure the
authenticity of such telecommunications.
4-202. Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities con-
ducted to protect against espionage and other clandestine intelligence activities,
sabotage, international terrorist activities or assassinations conducted for or on
behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including personnel,
physical, document, or communications security programs.
4-203. Elect ronk Surveillance means acquisition of a nonpublic communica-
tion by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an
electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication,
without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communi-
cation, but not including the use of-radio direction finding equipment solely to
determine the location of a transmitter.
4-204. Employee means a person employed by, assigned to, or acting for an
agency within the Intelligence Community.
4-205. Foreign Intelligence means information relating to the capabilities,
intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but riot
including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist
activities.
4-206. Intelligence means foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
4-207. Intelligence Community and agency or agencies within the Intelligence
Community refer to the following organizations:
(a) The Central Intelligence Agency '(CIA);
(b) The National Security Agency (NSA);
(c) The Defense Intelligence Agency;
(d) The Offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of
specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
(e) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
(0 The intelligence elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy,
and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); and
(g) The staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
4-208. Intelligence product means the estimates, memoranda and other
reports produced from the analysis of available information.
4-209. International terrorist activities means any activity or activities which:
(a) involves killing, causing serious bodily harm, kidnapping, or violent
destruction of property, or an attempt or credible threat to commit such acts;
and
(b) appears intended to endanger a protectee of the Secret Service or the
Department of State or to further political, social or economic goals by
intimidating or coercing a civilian population or any segment thereof, influenc-
ing the policy of a government or international organization by intimidation or
coercion, or obtaining widespread publicity for a group or its cause; and
(c) transcends national boundaries in terms of the means by which it is
accomplished, the civilian population, government, or international organiza-
tion it appears intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which its
perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
4-210. The National Foreign Intelligence Program includes the programs listed
below, but its composition shall be subject to review by the National Security
Council and modification by the President.
(a) The programs of the CIA;
(b) The Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelli-
gence Program, and the programs of the offices within the Department of
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IIP
'3692 THE PRESIDENT
Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through
reconnaissance except such elements as the Director of Central Intelligence and
the Secretary .of Defense agree should be excluded;
(c) Other programs of agencies within the Intelligence Community desig-
nated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the
department or by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelli-
gence activities;
(d) Activities of the staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(e) Activities to acquire the intelligence required for the planning and
conduct of tactical operations by the United States military forces are not
included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
4-211. Physical surveillance means an unconsented, systematic and deliber-
ate observation of a person by any means on a continuing basis, or unconsented
acquisition of a nonpublic communication by a person not a party thereto or
visibly present thereat through any means not involving electronic surveillance.
This definition does not include overhead reconnaissance not directed at
specific United States persons.
4-212. Special activities means activities conducted abroad in support of
national foreign policy objectives which are designed to further official United
States programs and policies abroad and which are planned and executed so
that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged
publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but not including diplomatic
activity or the collection and production of intelligence or related support
functions.
4-213. United States, when used to describe a place, includes the territories
of the United States.
4-214. United States person means a citizen of the United States, an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an unincorporated association orga-
nized in the United States or substantially composed of United States citizens or
aliens admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation incorporated in the
United States.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 24, 1978.
[FR Doc. 78-2420 Filed 1-25-78; 11:12 am]
EDITORIAL NOTE: The President's statement and remarks of Jan. 24,1978, on signing Executive
Order 12036, are printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 14, No. 4).
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 43, NO. 18?THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1978
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'
?
The Intelligence Community
DIRECTOR
of CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE (DCI)
DCI STAFF ELEMENTS
for the INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Earg--
r
Department of Defense Elements
Departmental Intelligence Elements (Other than DoD)
Independent Agency
........
??? ..........
..........
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GUIDANCE
Major Documentation
Legislative and Executive. . .
National Security Act of 1947
Executive Order 11905 (1976)
Executive Order 12036 (1978)
Statutes and Executive Orders Governing Member Organizations
National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs)
NSC Semi-Annual Review of Intelligence
Presidential Spring Review
410
DCI and Community . . .
Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCI Ds)
DCI Program and Resource Guidance
DCI Annual Report on the Intelligence Community
PRC Requirements and Resource Comments
DCI Goals for the Intelligence Community
National Foreign Intelligence Requirements and Priorities
National Intelligence Topics
National Collection Plans (SIGINT, Imagery, HUMINT, etc.)
2467-80
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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
? DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
? General Defense Intelligence Program:
? Defense Intelligence Agency
? Intelligence elements of Army, Navy, Air Force
? Consolidated Cryptologic Program:
? National Security Agency
? Intelligence elements of Army, Navy, Air Force
? ? Special Air Force Program
25X1
? DoD/Foreign Counterintelligence Program
? Central Intelligence Agency Program
? Department of Treasury Program
? Office of Intelligence Support
? Department of State Program:
? Bureau of Intelligence Research
? Department of Energy Program:
? Office of International Security Affairs
? Office of Current Reports
? Federal Bureau of Intelligence Foreign Counterintelligence Program
? Intelligence Community Staff Program
? Resource Management
? ? Collection Tasking
2466-80
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?
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? Resource and Management Control of NFIP viTrin the National Security Council System
OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT
& BUDGET
r.z,o
THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
? PRESIDENT
? V. PRESIDENT
? SEC. STATE
? SEC. DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
OVERSIGHT
BOARD
NSC STAFF
POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE
? DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELL.(ch)
? DEPUTY SEC. OF DEFENSE
? DEP. UNDER SEC. OF STATE
(POL. AFFAIRS)
? DEP. ASST. TO PRES. FOR NAT'L.
SECURITY AFFAIRS
INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY STAFF
(ICS)
DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
DEFENSE (OAD/C31)
Military Service Intel'.
NSA
(DIR)
Special
AF
US/AF
DIA
(DIR)
USA
(ACSI)
USN
(DNI)
USAF
(ACSI)
DNI
9 1 8 - 7 7
SPECIAL COORDINATING
COMMITTEE
? SEC. OF STATE
? SEC. OF DEFENSE
? ASST. TO PRES. FOR NAT'L
SECURITY AFFAIRS
? CHAIRMAN, JCS
? DIR.OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFIB
ENIO STRUCTURE
.11
CIA
STATE
TREAS
FBI
ERDA
INR
(DIR)
(DIR)
(SP. ASST.
(ASST. DIR)
(D/AA)
TO SEC)
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NFIP PROGRAMMING ? BUDGETING CYCLE
? MILESTONES
January-February DCI issues program and resource guidance based on past year budgetary cycle results
February-May Program managers and heads of component activities develop programs and accomplish
internal reviews
May President's spring review
Mid-June/Mid-July NFIP Program Review: DCI, program managers, heads of component activities,
department/agency officials, D/DCl/RM and N FIB participation
Mid-July NFIB advises DCI on the tentative NF IP
Mid-July DCI briefs PRC(I) on the tentative NFIP
Late July DCI program decisions distributed to program managers and heads of component
activities for possible appeal
Early September Budget hearing schedule announced
Mid-September Budget submissions except DOD delivered to DCI, OMB and departments/agencies
Early October DOD budget submissions delivered to DCI, OMB, and departments/agencies
Mid-September/
Mid-October Joint DCI, OMB budget hearings. Issues presented to DCI for decision
? Late October Recommended ZBB rankings issued
Early November N FIB advises DCI on NFIP budget
Early November DCI briefs PRC(I) on tentative NFIP
Early November DCI tentative budget decisions issued, transmitted to program managers, heads of
component activities, and departments/agencies
Early November Program managers and heads of component activities submit reclama material to DCI on
the tentative budget decision
Mid-November Consolidated NFIP subject is submitted through OMB to president
Early December Tentative presidential decisions on NFIP budget are issued
Mid-December Joint (DCI, OMB) appeals forwarded to president
Mid-December Final presidential decision
Early January President's budget to Congress, program managers and heads of component activities
submit congressional budget justification books to DCI for submission to Congress
February-May DCI, departments/agencies, program managers and heads of component activities
defend the president's budget before Congress
May-August DCI establishes executive branch positions for appealing Congressional actions on
IIIauthorizations or appropriations
October-September . Follow execution--allocation, financial plans, reprogramming
2546-80
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nrir riuyiami nuuyui t.yuc
?
F
PROGRAM/RESOURCE GUIDANCE
? Set Goals and Objectives
? Establish Basic IC Policy
? Initiate Studies and Evaluations to Support
Program Review
PROGRAM SUBMISSION REVIEW
? Program Managers Submit Plans and
Programs
? DCI Reviews Program; Makes Decisions
PLANNING
? Set Goals and Objectives
? Make Basic Policy Decisions
? Develop Plans and Programs
BUDGET SUBMISSION REVIEW
? Program Managers Submit Recommended
Budgets
? Joint DCI, OMB and Dept/Agency Hear-
ings/Issues and Tradeoffs
? Scrubs
? DCI Makes Budget Decisions
PRESIDENT'S BUDGET/JUSTIFICATION
? OMB Issue Papers/NSC Advice
? Presidential Decisions
? Congressional Justification Books Prepared
ZERO BASE BUDGETING
? Detailed Identification Evaluation &
Ranking of All Activities, Alternatives
and Costs Necessary to Achieve Goals
EVALUATION
? Test Program Against Plan
? Review Actual/Projected Performance
? Make Goals/Cost Tradeoffs
? Rank All Activities in Priority Importance
BUDGET
? Final Budget Preparation
? Budget Justification
FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY
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11.
Collection Systems and Organizations
Tasking National Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence
D/DCI for Collection Tasking
National Intelligence
Tasking Center
? Translates NSC/PRC intelligence requirements and priorities into specific
collection targets/objectives.
? Assigns targets/objectives to national intelligence collection organizations
and systems.
? Establishes standards for timely processing and dissemination of data.
? Provides advisory tasking or guidance to departments and agencies not a part
of the NFIP.
1138-77
I 2-o 3
-
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?
NSC Policy Review Committee
(Intelligence)
Define Intelligence
Requirements
Evaluate Intelligence
Performance
1092-77
Establish
Priorities for
Collection/Production
Develop Policy
for
Intelligence Product
DCI-Chairman
Sec of State
Sec of Defense
? Sec of Treasury
Chairman JCS
Asst to Pres for
National Security Affairs
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?
IP 1110
NSC Special Coordination Committee
(Intelligence)
1093-77
Submit Policy
Recommendations on
Special Activities
Develop Counterintelligence
Policy
Approve Sensitive
Collection Operations
Review Counterintelligence
and Special Activity
Performance
Asst to President for Nati Sec Aff, Chairman
Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Others
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Control and Direction
/-27-3?
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES
NSC
POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
DCI (chairman)
Asst to President for
Nat'l Security Affairs
Chairman', JCS
1094-77
? Define requirements for national foreign intelligence
? Establish priorities among national foreign intelligence requirements
? Conduct periodic review of national foreign intelligence products
? Evaluate analytic intelligence performance
? Develop policy for assuring high quality in intelligence products
? Submit annual report to the NSC on PRC activities
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Control and Direction
z-o3
RESOURCE CONTROL
DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
FULL AND EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY FOR APPROVAL OF THE
NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET
SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT
? Review and evaluate all national program and budget submissions
? Present and justify the approved NFIP budget to the Congress
? Have full and exclusive authority for reprogramming NFIP funds
? Monitor NFIP implementation
? Conduct program and performance audits and evaluations
1095-77
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Control and Direction
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
SENSITIVE COLLECTION OPERATIONS
NATIONAL FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
?
1 V) 3
NSC SPECIAL
COORDINATION COMMITTEE
? Chairman Asst to the President for Nat'l Security Affairs
? Members Attorney General (1 and 3 only)
Secretary of State Chairman, JCS (1 and 3 only)
Secretary of Defense Director, OMB (1 and 3 only)
DCI Director, FBI (3 only)
(1) Make policy recommendation to President on each special
activity in support of national foreign policy objectives
(2) Approve sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations
(3) Develop policy for objectives, priorities, direction and
conduct of national foreign counterintelligence activities
1096-77
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Oversight of Foreign !nth ligence Activities
tz036
EXECUTIVE
? The President
? Intelligence Oversight Board
? National Security Council
? NSC Special Coordination Committee
? NSC Policy Review Committee
LEGISLATIVE
? Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
? House Select Committee on Intelligence
? Intelligence Operations Subcommittee of the Defense Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Appropriations
? Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations
? Intelligence Subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees
? Leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
? Subcommittee on Oversight of the House International Relations Committee
695-77
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OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
?
tie36
Intelligence Oversight Board
? THOMAS L. FARMER ? WILLIAM SCRANTON
chairman
? ALBERT GORE
? Consider reports of Community IG's & General Counsels
concerning questionable activities
? Review procedures of IG's & General Counsels
? Report to President & Atty General on questionable activities
? Staff Support from non-intelligence community personnel
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?
Control and Direction
f-Z-236.
POLICY DEVELOPMENT
National Security Council
? President ?Vice President
?Secretary ? Secretary
of of
State Defense
? PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR AND DIRECTION TO
CONDUCT OF
? NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
? FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
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?
Production of National Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence
D/DCI for National Intelligence
National Foreign Assessment Center
National
Intelligence
Officers
CIA
Directorate of
Intelligence
DCI
Committees
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?
Control and Direction
CZ-05g
PRODUCTION of NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Director of Central Intelligence
President's primary advisor on Foreign Intelligence
? National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) advises the
DO with respect to production, review and coordination
of national foreign intelligence
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DCI COMMITTEES
COLLECTION
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMI REX)
SIGINT Committee
Human Sources Committee (HRC)
Interagency Defector Committee (IDC)
PRODUCTION
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)
Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC)
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC)
Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC)
SUPPORT
Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC)
Committee on Exchanges (COMEX)
Security Committee
Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC)
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?
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(Nine Dem./Eight Rep.)
Senator Inouye
Chairman
12-036
Senator Goldwater
Vice Chairman
Subcommittees
Intelligence and the Rights of Americans Sen. Bayh, Ch.
Collection, Production and Quality Sen. Stevenson, Ch.
Budget Authorization Sen. Hathaway, Ch.
Charters and Guidelines Sen. Huddleston, Ch.
Secrecy and Disclosure Sen. Biden, Ch.
Investigations Sen. Morgan, Ch.
Professional Staff: 21
1103-77
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41,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(Nine Dem./four Rep.)
Rep. Edward P. Boland (D.,Mass.)
Chairman
Subcommittees
Program and Budget Authorization Rep. Bill D. Burlison (D.,Mo.) Ch.
Legislation Rep. Morgan F. Murphy (D., ILL.) Ch.
Oversight Rep. Les Aspin (D.,Wis.) Ch.
Evaluation Rep. Charles Rose (D.,N.C.) Ch.
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Organization Under Old Executive Order 11905
Deputy for National
Intelligence Officers
Director of I Deputy to DCI for the
Central Intelligence
DDIC I
General
Counsel
Legislative
Counsel
Inspector
General
Intelligence Community
Program & Budget
Collection Committees
Comptroller
Directorate of
Intelligence
1624-78
Directorate of
Administration
Directorate of
Science &
Technology
CIA
Directorate of
Operations
Intelligence Community
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I!
i
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? iiii
ROLE OF THE DCI IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE POLICY
AD N I STejra
? President
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
?Vice President ?Secretary of State
(DCI serves as adviser to the council)
?Secretary of Defense
White House
Situation Room
Asst to Pres for Nat'l
Sec Affairs
NSC Staff
OPERATIONS
ADVISORY GROUP
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l
Security Affairs (Chmn)
? Sec of State
? Sec of Defense
? DCI
? Chairman, JCS
? Observers:
Attorney General
Director, OMB
SENIOR REVIEW GROUP
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l
Security Affairs (Chmn)
? Dep Sec of State
? Dep Sec of Defense
? DCI
? Chairman, JCS
COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
? DCI (Chmn)
? Dep Sec of Defense
for Intelligence
? Dep Asst to Pres for
Nat'l Security Affairs
-.5;144.1
(1.010.?, CO- eile)
VERIFICATION PANEL
? Sec of State (Chmn)
? Dep Sec of State
? Dep Sec of Defense
? DCI
? Chairman, JCS
? Director, ACDA
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l
Security Affairs
DEFENSE REVIEW PANEL
? Sec of Defense (Chmn)
? Dep Sec of State
? Dep Sec of Defense
?DCI
?Chairman, JCS
? Director, OMB
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l
Security Affairs
UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
? Dep Sec of State (Chmn)
? Dep Sec of Defense
? Chairman, JCS
?DCI
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l Security Affairs
INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUPS (Regional)
WASHINGTON SPECIAL
ACTIONS GROUP
? Sec of State (Chmn)
? Dep Sec of State
? Dep Sec of Defense
? DCI
? Chairman, JCS
? Asst to Pres for Nat'l
Security Affairs
A Representative of:
? State 'Defense CIA/NIOS ?NSC ?JCS
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'ON 5
Control and Direction
MANAGEMENT and RESOURCES CONTROL
CovteonForeign Intellig nce (CFI)
? Deputy Secretary, Defense
? DCI
(Chairman)
? Dep. Asst. to President
for Nat'l Sec. Affairs
Staff Support by Intelligence Community Staff
? Control Budget preparation and resource allocation for NFIP
(excl. Tactical)
? Establish management policies for the NIP
? Implement policy decisions of NSC
(Collection and Production of National Intelligence)
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1r 11 Ili ill IiIII
ri ..
? ihi
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i i '' ' ' ' '
Control and Direction
OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
ii
?????????...."wernme.........
ii
Intelligence Oversight Board
, .............
? STEPHEN AILES
Cy'v-
? R-0-BERLD_MURPHY 0, LEO CHEkNE
? Consider reports of Community IG's & General Counsels
concerning questionable activities
? Review procedures of IG's & General Counsels
? Report to President & Atty General on questionable activities
? Staff Support from non-intelligence community personnel
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Control and Direction
COVERT ACTION and SPECIAL OPERATIONS
\,
Opeeations Advisory Group
(Operatibris, Group)
? DCI
? Secretary ? Asst. to President
of for
State Nat'l Sec. Affairs
(Chairman)
o5
? Secretary ? Chairman
of JCS
Defense
? Director 0 M B
Observers
? Attorney General
? Consider & make recommendations to President on all
proposals for special missions
? Submit periodic review to N S C on ongoing missions
? Meet formally to carry out its responsibility to make
recommendations to the President.
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Li;11.1.
21_413:Z1
THE TWO DDCI'S
THE DEPUTY FOR THE COMMUNITY -- ryt
? Vice Chair and provide Executive Secretary for the NFIB and CFI
? Direct the Intelligence CommunitNIStaff (which is staff for CFI)
? Make recommendations on NFIP Programs
EtA51.\ 117 5
? Monitor within Intelligence Community Policy and Program Directives of the
President, NSC, CFI, Intelligence Oversight Board and DCI
? Evaluate programs and products of NFIB
? Advise DCI on Intelligence Community matters
? Coordinate activities and provide staff for all DCI Committees
? Assist DCI in discharging his responsibilities listed in NSCID 1 as Head of the
Intelligence Community
THE DEPUTY FOR THE CIA 1
? Manage and operate CIA
? Act as CIA member to NFIB
? Manager of CIA element of NFIB
? Provide production support to DCI
? Carry out, under DCI, functions assigned to CIA under E.O. 11905
? Assist DCI in discharging his responsibilities listed in NSCID 7 as Head of CIA
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............ ? ...
...
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ICS INVOLVEMENT IN RESPONSIBILITIES
ASSIGNED TO THE DCI IN E.O. 11905
(Part I)
Supporting ICS
The DCI Shall: Office
Chair the CFI All
Head CIA & ICS All
Develop & Submit NFIP budget to CFI OPBD
Be President's primary foreign intelligence advisor All
Provide intelligence to Executive Branch
1?11111,
Develop national intelligence requirements &
priorities OPP & OPEI
Suppervise production & dissemination of national
intelligence
Ensure implementation of special activities . . . .
in support of foreign policy objectivies . .
=MEM
Ensure propriety of White House requests
to intelligence Community ES
........... ? ? ?
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?
ICS INVOLVEMENT IN RESPONSIBILITIES
ASSIGNED TO THE DCI IN E.O. 11905
(Part II)
The DCI Shall:
Protect intelligence sources, methods & analytical
procedures
Downgrade & declassify foreign intelligence
Ensure strong IG capability
Establish common security standards
Supporting ICS
Office
OPP
All
=dm.
OPP
Be spokesman to the Congress All
Promote development & maintenance by CIA
of services of common concern
Establish criteria for CRITIC intelligence OPEI
Establish committees of collectors, producers
& users of intelligence OPEI
Consult with users to ensure intelligence relevance,
timeliness, & quality OPEI
41???
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111,
ICS INVOLVEMENT IN NFIB ACTIVITIES
NFIB Advisory Responsibilities Supporting ICS
(DCID 1/8) Office
Review national products OPEI
Coordinate national products
Maintain consumer/producer interface
ONINMEN. ,M??????
IMMM? 1????????
Develop procedures to identify consumer needs OPEI
Establish objectives/requirements/priorities OPEI & OPP
Protect sensitive sources, methods and information . OPP & OPEI
Develop policies for arrangements with foreign
Governments ES & OPEN
Such other matters as the DCI assigns All
:
r
4.:11111 11
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........ .. . ...
...
-
-4,41 .......
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ICS INVOLVEMENT IN CFI
RESPONSIBILITIES
CFI Tasks from E.O. 11905
?
Supporting ICS
Office
Control NFIP budget preparation and resource
allocation OPBD
Establish policy priorities for national intelligence
collection and production
All
Establish policy for management of intelligence OPP, OPEI & ES
Provide guidance on national/tactical intelligence
relationship All
Ensure Commuinity compliance with NSC
policy direction All
Designate activities to be included in NFIP OPBD
..........
..........
. . ... -""
.................
. ..
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1 II I ji ;iI1 IF ji 1.11!
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'' ' R
Organization of Intelligence Community Staff
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY DEPUTY .r)
Deputy/DCI
Assoc Deputy/DCI (C) 17?
Executive Officer
Executive Staff
CFUNFIB Executive Secretariat
Support Staff
Registry
PLY
rAt,vsikOrse"
Cr re?.4,t,IAT
vNet4 7:45,40/(vFfrc,
Ke
Office of Policy
and Planning
Policy and Plans
Division
HInformation Handling
Division
Security
Committee
Office of Program &
Budget Development
Data Support Group
AProgram & Budget
Development Div.
.1 Program Analysis
Division
Office of Performance,
Evaluation & Improvement
Integration Staff
SIGINT
Division
Imagery
Division
Human Resources
Division
.1Production,Assessment
& Improvement Div,
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)
rk.)1Ne.(L c.;.;Ji11
?
=Al,
Annex
"Director of Central Intelligence
,O, //9D5
(1) The Director of Central Intelligence,
pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947,
shall be responsible directly to the National
Security Council and the President. He shall:
(i) Chair the CFI.
(ii) Act as executive head of the
CIA and Intelligence Community staff.
(iii) Ensure the development and
submission of a budget for the National
Foreign Intelligence Program to the CFI.
(iv) Act as the President's primary
adviser on foreign intelligence and
provide him and other officials in the
Executive branch with foreign intelligence,
including National Intelligence Estimates;
develop national intelligence require-
ments and priorities; and supervise produc-
tion and dissemination of national intel-
ligence.
(v) Ensure appropriate implementation
of special activities in support of na-
tional foreign policy objectives.
(vi) Establish procedures to ensure
the propriety of requests, and responses
thereto, from the White House Staff or
other Executive departments and agencies
to the Intelligence Community.
(vii) Ensure that appropriate programs
are developed which properly protect in-
telligence sources, methods and analytical
procedures. His responsibility within
the United States shall be limited to:
.7:7=
? .......
........ ? ---?
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.11111, Vide ire Noe I NI Gm I
(A) Protection by lawful means
against disclosure by present or
former employees of the Central In-
telligence Agency or persons, or
employees of persons or organizations,
presently or formerly under contact
with the Agency;
(B) providing leadership, guidance
and technical assistance to other
government departments and agencies
performing foreign intelligence ac-
tivities; and
(C) in cases involving serious or
continuing security violations, re-
commending to the Attorney General
that the case be referred to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for
further investigation.
(viii) Establish a vigorous program
to downgrade and declassify foreign in-
telligence information as appropriate and
consistent with Executive Order No. 11652.
(ix) Ensure the existence of strong
Inspector General capabilities in all
elements of the Intelligence Community
and that each Inspector General submits
quarterly to the Intelligence Oversight
Board a report which sets forth any
questionable activities in which that
intelligence organization has engaged
or is engaged.
(x) Ensure the establishment, by
the Intelligence Community, of common
security standards for managing and
handling foreign intelligence systems,
information and products, and for granting
access thereto.
A - 2
..................
.....
__
-?
? -
====
?so -0""
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koci\idga I
(Z0110
(xi) Act as the principal spokesman
to the Congress for the Intelligence Com-
munity and facilitate the use of foreign
intelligence products by Congress.
(xii) Promote the development and
maintenance by the Central Intelligence
Agency of services of common concern to
the Intelligence Community organizations,
including multi-discipline analysis, na-
tional level intelligence products, and a
national level current intelligence publi-
cation.
(xiii) Establish uniform criteria for
the identification, selection, and designa-
tion of relative priorities for the trans-
mission of critical intelligence, and pro-
vide the Secretary of Defense with con-
tinuing guidance as to the communications
requirements of the Intelligence Community
for the transmission of such intelligence.
(xiy) Establish such committees of
collectors. Producers and users of in-
telligence, to assist in his conduct of
his responsibilities as he deems appropriate.
(xv) Consult with users and_pro-
ducers of intelligence, including the
Departments of State, Treasury, and De-
fense, the military services, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the EnergyRe-
search and Development Administration,
and the Council of Economic Advisor, to
ensure the timeliness, relevancy and
quality of the intelligence product."
A-3
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