CURRENT APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF COORDINATION IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00129R000100090002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 9, 1963
• Content Type: PAPER

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INTELLIGENCE REVIEW COURSE
CURRENT APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF COORDINATION
IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
25X1A Presented by
Assistant for Coordination/Director o Central Intelligence
9 April 1963
We entered world War II without a national mechanism to pull
together the intelligence information available to the United States.
During that war, intelligence required for the military conduct of the war
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was coordinated by the Joint Intelligence
Committee. This committee included representatives, not only of the military
services, but also the State Department, the Office of Strategic Services
and the Foreign Economic Administration. However, its function was solely
to support JCS strategic planning, and its coordination was accomplished by
committee vote (the product of a committee is usually the lowest common
denominator).
About one year before the end of the war, studies were under-
taken within the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff concerning the concept of a permanent, centralized, national
intelligence service. The resulting views were presented to the President
who, by Executive Order on 22 January 1946, formally authorized the National
Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group, the forerunners
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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National Security Act of 19+7
You will remember that in 1947, Congress and the White House
were strongly influenced by the Pearl Harbor investigations which showed
the need for an effective national intelligence system. This was
stressed in House and Senate hearings on the National Security Act bill,
and witness after witness testified as to the value of centralized in-
telligence.
There followed very little opposition in Congress to the plan
for a central intelligence service and on July 26, 1947, the National
Security Act became the law of the land and the Central Intelligence
Agency was born.
A review of the Congressional debates indicates that when CIA
was first proposed, Congress was primarily interested in a mechanism
for coordinating foreign intelligence.
The National Security Act established the Central Intelligence
Agency, and authorized the President to appoint a Director of Central
Intelligence, "who shall be the head thereof." This Act also placed
the Agency under the orders of the National Security Council, and
charged the Agency with the duty of making recommendations to the
Council "for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the
departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national
security."
It is pertinent to note that Mr. McConets title is Director
of Central Intelligence. It is not accurate nor proper to refer to him
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as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is of course the
head of the agency, as stated in the law, and is universally referred to
as the Director.
It is not generally known that the law did not charge the CIA
with the responsibility of coordinating the intelligence activities of
other departments and agencies. It did, however, give the Agency
responsibilities for making recommendations to the National Security
Council regarding coordination of intelligence activities related to the
national security.
National Security Council Intelligence Directives
Appropriate recommendations were made and the first directive
received from the Council emphasized, as did Congress, the dominant
importance of coordinating foreign intelligence activities of the
United States. These directives are usually referred to as "non-
skids."
This first NSC Intelligence Directive made the Director of
Central Intelligence, not the Agency, individually responsible for
over-all coordination of the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States. President Kennedy strengthened the authority of the
Director in a recent memorandum to Mr. McCone. I quote:
"In carrying out your newly assigned duties
as Director of Central Intelligence, it is
my wish that you serve as the Government's
principal foreign intelligence officer, and
as such that you undertake, as an integral
part of your responsibility, the coordination
and effective guidance of the total United
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States foreign intelligence effort. As
the Governmentts principal intelligence
officer, you will assure the proper
coordination, correlation,, and evaluation
of intelligence from all sources and its
prompt dissemination to me and to other
recipients as appropriate. In fulfillment
of these tasks I shall expect you to work
closely with the heads of all departments
and agencies having responsibilities.in
the foreign intelligence field."
The Director's major responsibility is that of coordinator
of the total foreign intelligence effort of the United States upon
which he expends about 90% of his efforts. He has delegated his
authority for the day-to-day management of the Agency to General
Carter. In performing his coordination function Mr. McCone>
-(l) maintains liaison with the President, the
White House and the President's Advisory Board on Foreign
Intelligence Activities;
(2) works closely with the heads of agencies and
departments -- State, Defense, AEC, FBI, NASA, and others;
(3) is Chairman of the United States Intelligence
Board which has ten other members -- State, Defense, JCS,
Army, Navy, Air Force, AEC, FBI, NSA, and CIA. General
Carter now represents the CIA, but prior to 30 November 1961
CIA was not represented per se;
(L) makes extensive use of his Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, General Carter; the Chief of Staff of
the CIA, Mr. Kirkpatrick; and the four Deputy Directors of
the Agency, Dr. Cline, Dr. Scoville, Mr. Helms, and Colonel
"Red" White.
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(5) Assigned to the Director's office, is a
Coordination Staff consisting of a full-time group of intelli-
gence professionals owing primary allegiance to the intelligence
community-at-large. The Staff is currently authorized ten
officers. The Assistant for Coordination and Deputy Assistant
are appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence; three
full-time members (one each from the DD/P, DD/I and DD/S) are
detailed from the Central Intelligence Agency, and arrange-
ments have been made for part-time membership from the DD/R.
One full-time member each is detailed from the Departments of
State, Army, Navy, Air Force and the National Security Agency.
There is also a liaison officer from the FBI and the AEC.
The grade structure is GS-15 or above, or Colonels or Navy
Captains. The Staff average is 18 years intelligence
experience per member.
CONCEPTS OF COORDINATION
The term "coordination" has many connotations in our govern-
mental activities. To some it means command or control; to others,
guidance and agreement. Frequently the word "coordination" carries with
it the connotation of passive policing; as if the objective of co-
ordination was the mere identification of duplicative activities and
elimination of the duplication, either by combination of the two
activities or suppression of one of them. The concept of coordination
expressed by the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities
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of the United States Government and followed by the Director's Coordi-
nation Staff is quite different. This concept regards coordination as
an active effort to marshall in orderly fashion available intelligence
resources to achieve agreed ends. Its objective is to improve, in every
possible respect, the intelligence activities of the Government, and much
of the time and effort of the Coordination Staff is devoted to seeking
out means of improvement, developing them into coherent courses of
action, and recommending such action to proper authority.
The passive or policing concept of coordination also leads
to conformity and uniformity. Intelligence is one Government activity
that should not only tolerate, but in fact, cherish its "gad-flies" --
the dissenters, the unorthodox, the innovators, the skeptics who
challenge accepted and traditional views -- provided they are true
gad-flies in the Socratic sense, and not chronic complainers. The
Coordination Staff door is always open to the unorthodox, and they can
be sure that their ideas will be weighed fairly and impartially by a
group of men who collectively understand the intelligence community,
and who, more importantly, have no vested interest except in improving
it. Mr. McCone's concept for coordination is "you can nudge 'em, but
you can't push 'em."
Mr. McCone uses his coordination channels to the White House
and with the heads of departments and agencies to deal with the broad
intelligence problem which usually requires a high-level policy decision.
Such things as collection of information by overhead reconnaissance and
the coordination of clandestine activities of the military services with
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similar activities of the CIA are examples of problems requiring high-
level discussion with the heads of departments and agencies.
The Director is also the Chairman of the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB) which is a most important and active forum
for intelligence coordination. The Board advises and assists the DCI.
as he may require in the discharge of his coordination responsibilities.
The Board meets once a week and sometimes every day when the Government
is faced with a crisis situation such. as the Soviet offensive missiles
in Cuba.
For several days during that crisis the Board met every
morning (including weekends) at eight A.M. By ten A.M. Mr. McCone,
in his capacity as the Government's principal foreign intelligence
officer, was off to a meeting with the President and his Executive
Committee. Each day overhead photographic reconnaissance information
was collected, and the evaluated intelligence therefrom was available
to the Board for its meeting the next morning at eight A.M. This
general cycle was repeated for several days, and it is one of the
finest examples.of community coordination of intelligence we have
experienced.
Mr. McCone receives assistance from and. coordinates an
extensive variety of problems by use of the USIB mechanisms. At present
USIB has 15 committees covering a wide field, of intelligence activities
which involves$ in some degree, every member of the intelligence
community. The Committees work in substantive fields which by their
nature can not readily be assigned to one agency to perform.
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The Committee-type of coordination is employed by the USIB
for such intelligence activities as: overhead reconnaissance (COMOR);
interchange and maximum community utilization of intelligence (CODIB);
early warning of intention to engage in aggressive action on the part
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc (Watch); prevention of unauthorized disclosure
of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods (Security);
critical collection problems (CCPC); ;production and exchange of foreign
economic intelligence (EIC); production of intelligence on atomic
energy (JAEIC); production and coordination of guided missile and astro-
nautics intelligence (GMAIC); production and coordination of scientific
and technical intelligence (SIC); policy affecting defectors (IDC);
priorities for clandestine collection of information by the CIA (ICC);
signal intelligence activities (SIGINT); and production of the National
Intelligence Survey.
The Director uses the Senior Staff officers of the CIA for
specific coordination assistance within their assigned specialties of
intelligence production, including National Intelligence Estimates;
intelligence collection, both overt and covert; intelligence research;
and world-Wide support for intelligence activities.
Another category of assistance of a less direct nature, which
the Director receives in his role of coordinator of the foreign intelligence
effort, comprises services of common concern and intelligence of common
concern. These are provided to the intelligence community, as a whole,
by the agency or department assigned the responsibility. (Refer to
the black dots on the second chart for the allocation of the responsibility.)
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In addition to the services shown on this chart the CIA also
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provides, as a service of common concern, for a. National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC)j a Central Reference Facility
D
The Origin and Mission of the Coordination Staff
a e
In 1956 the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities recommended that the DCI establish a sort of
Chief of Staff to run the detailed operation of the Agency so that
the Director could spend more time following and coordinating the
national foreign intelligence activities.
The DCI responded by appointing a fourth Deputy within the
CIA having the title of Coordinator to "assist him in coordination of
the intelligence aati`vities of the Government." The management of the
Age
y continued as before. The new deputy with his staff of two
officers worked primarily on the revisions of National Security Council
Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) and their implementing Director of,
Central Intelligence Directives (DCI:De) but was unable to devote a
major effort to day-to-day 'coordination in the intelligence cormnunitye
Some elements of the intelligence community looked with
distrust and suspicion at the function of the CIA deputy who would look
into their activities. Consequently, a pronounced conflict of interest
developed. This was particularly noted in the overseas clandestine
collection efforts.
Some members of the community did not believe that a major
competitor and ~tor should be their coordinator. In simplest termsQ
the coordinator is then in the position of being both pitcher and umpire.
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During the last half of 1960 the Joint Study Group on Foreign
Intelligence Activities of the United States, Chaired p;y Mr. Kirkpatrick
of CIA, developed 4+3 recommendations. These were then considered by
the National Security Council and their actions were approved by the
President on January 18, 1961.
One of the approved recommendations, No. 29, established the
Coordination Staff. We are not a committee and our decisions are not
always reached by unanimous agreement. The wording in the Joint Study
Group Report describes its composition, purpose and allegiance. I quote
a paragraph:
"To provide for including full-time
professionals into the field of co-
ordination and minimizing the conflict
of interest problem, we propose that
the DCI organize under his Assistant
for Coordinations and as part of his
personal staff, a full-time group of
intelligence professionals owing
primary allegiance to the intelligence
community rather than any one member
agency. Membership on the staff would
be drawn from the foreign intelligence
community-at-large. We believe that
this Coordination Staff should be
charged with assisting the DCI in his
community-wide responsibilities for
coordination of U.S. foreign intelli-
gence activities, including surveys of
departmental intelligence activities
authorized in National Security Council
Intelligence Directive Number 1. The
Staff and its entire membership should
be responsible to the DCI as a
Coordinator and they should be separate
from any operational responsibilities
of CIA or other department or agency."
All support for the Staff, (except pay and personal admini-
strative matters for the members from the Departments of State and
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Defense), is provided by the DCI. In some quarters the inference has
been made that if our Staff members are paid by their own agency their
allegiance to the national effort is not complete. I do not agree with
this line of thinking. Actually, the person who controls the effective-
ness reports of the officer controls the work and the results.
Our mission flows directly from the DCI's authorities and
responsibilities for the coordination of the total United States foreign
intelligence effort, which were clarified and strengthened by the
President's recent memorandum to him. As examples, we are specifically
charged with supporting him in taking leadership and initiative to
develop solutions for coordination problems by identifying and promptly
recommending solutions to such problems especially through surveys of
intelligence activities.
We go about our job by taking the initiative to identify
situations and doing something about them before they become 'acute
problems. Our officers travel throughout the community visiting their
numerous contacts. They are welcome at staff meetings within their own
agencies and gradually a greater sense of trust and confidence in this
Staff is emerging throughout the community. The Staff collectively has
extensive knowledge of community activities and every day brings new
knowledge to our group. Thus, part of our work stimulates elements of
the community to action, which in turn surfaces problems to that we can
contribute to their solutions and assist in expediting action. When
people become aware of the fact that we work for the DCI as the
Coordinator, we find that by merely shoving interest in a problem we
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have a catalytic effect in starting action and keeping it going.
Examples of Coordination Staff Action
Research and Development
Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 39 called upon Defense and
CIA to seek more effective coordination of research and development
activities for intelligence purposes. Several months ago the Coordi-
nation Staff took the lead, working with representatives of the two
agencies, in developing proposals to achieve the desired improvements.
Although for some specific fields of research, such as in communications,
coordination at the technical working level is excellent; nevertheless,
agreement was reached in principle that there should be in both CIA and
Defense, a focal point for the coordination of their scientific and
technical research and development effort.
A further problem, which requires continuous effort, is that
of achieving an awareness by scientists and technicians of intelligence
needs, and recognition that a development originated for another purpose
can be exploited to solve an intelligence problem.
Future Plans and Programs of the Intelligence Community
Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 32 requires that the
United States Intelligence Board review -the future plans and programs of
each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper
allocation of effort at the beginning of each annual budget cycle.
The Coordination Staff, acting on behalf of the Director of
Central Intelligence and the USIB, has action responsibility for this
particular recommendation.
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Ale intelligence community?s efforts in this field were concerned
with Fiscal Year 1963 and 1964.
Examples of coordinated actions proposed by our Staff:
(1) Improved FLINT collection-and processing
equipment.
(2) Coordination in foreign service and attache
coverage of Africa and.Latin America.
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(1i) Improved intelligence support for the planning
of guerilla operations. (Counterinsurgency)
(5) Pointed out the limitation of the collection and
production capabilities of the Department of State at the
present time.
(6) Noted the numerous and uncoordinated program in
the electronic intelligence field.
(7) Discussed problems engendered by the reorganization
of intelligence in the Department of Defense (DOD).
(8) Encouraged centralized management control of
mapping, charting, and geodesy in the DOD.
(9) Proposed a review of the original. concept of the
National Intelligence Survey Program.
(10) Encouraged acceleration in the development of an
adequate and balanced capability in the national photographic effort.
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(11) Pointed out -a need for coordination of the
research effort on the impact of Sino-Soviet Bloc military
and economic aid to non-Bloccountries.
(12) Noted that DIA should re-examine biographical
intelligence. activities in the DOD.
Scientific . and. Technical Intelligence
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board requested
an assessment of the collection, coordination.and analysis of intelligence
on the scientific and technical capabilities.of the Soviet Bloc, with a
view to.effecting improvements.
As a result of consultation with the various elements of the
community concerned.with_collection andanalysis.of scientific intelli-
gence, the Coordination Staff has reached conclusions concerning the
present status of our intelligence in this field, and identified specific
areas where improvements. can be made? In brief, some of those-areas of
improvement are:
(1) Additional steps can be taken now to expand the
flow of intelligence available from unclassified Soviet
scientific and technical literature.
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(3) Of the.highest importance is the further develop-
ment and implementation of a realistic program for the clan-
destine collection of scientific and technical intelligence,
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concentrated on Soviet policy, planning, research and design in
areas of critical scientific and technical importance.
(4) In the development of new technical collection
methods and devices, certain principles should be followed to
ensure effective planning, development and management of such
methods and devices.
(5) Programs of intelligence support to research
and development components of the Government not only
significantly assist the U. S. research and development effort,
but through the use of scientific talent available in the
research and development community, can provide great assistance
in solving problems of intelligence analysis and collection.
Such programs should therefore be continued and strengthened.
USIB Structure
The Coordination Staff has completed a report on the subject
of the committee structure of the USIB. In preparing this report, the
Staff consulted knowledgeable individuals within the intelligence
communityt including the chairmen of several of the committees, and sought
to develop a rationale that would provide USIB with the type of support
that it requires to meet its broad responsibilities and, at the same time
permit desirable modifications in the committee structure. We concluded.
that such desirable modifications would be those that:
(1) recognize the generally greater cohesiveness of
the intelligence community occasioned both by the experience
and mutual confidence gained over the past 15 years, and by the
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potential for greater coordination within the Department of
Defense resulting from the establishment of the DIA;
(2) recognize that services of common concern, like
assigned functions of primary responsibility, are essentially
functions which can and should be charged directly to an
individual agency, both for the principal conduct of the
particular service or function and for its coordination
throughout the community;
(3) recognize that USIB needs, on a permanent basis,
only those committees that are clearly required to support
functions specified for USIB in NSCID No. 1 or to coordinate
certain important functional programs (other than services of
common concern) which are carried out by several agencies to
meet their own and community needs.
Applying those principles, the Staff concluded:
(1) that the following USIB committees should be
disestablished and their general functions reassigned to an
individual agency:
(a) Committee on International Communism
(State)
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(c) Committee on Exploitation of Foreign
Language Publications (CIA)
(d) Committee on Procurement of Foreign
Publications (CiA)
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(g) Emergency Planning Steering Committee (DC.I)
(h) Space Surveillance Intelligence Support
Committee (DOD)
Requirements
Joint Study Group Recommendations 21 and 22 are concerned with
the problem of requirements, specifically the establishment of a central
requirements registry. The Coordination Staff initially took the lead.
in exploring various possible means whereby the general intent of these
recommendations could be met by the intelligence community, particularly
through the initiation of specific remedial actions relating to require-
ments procedures in the community. As a result of the examination, CIA
is now developing procedures for machine processing and recording of all
requirements originating in and levied upon CIA. The Defense Intelli-
gence Agency is also developing prodedures for machine processing of
its requirements. The Coordination Staff has encouraged and assisted.
the two agencies in working together to ensure that their machine
systems are compatible and, insofar as possible, interchangeable.
As a result of consultation and discussion with elements of
the intelligence community, the Coordination Staff has concluded that
Recommendations 21 and 22, as stated by the Joint Study Group, do not,
in fact, meet a present need of the intelligence community and that
implementation would pose severe administrative and operational
difficulties. This conclusion was further strengthened by an analysis
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of all existing community requirements concerning Indonesia which the
Staff undertook on its own initiative. Consequently, the Staff
recommendations to USIB would suspend further efforts to implement
Recommendations 21 and 22. The Staff believes that many, if not most
of the problems which hitherto have been associated with the requirements
process, are,. in fact, parts of the broader problem of managing and
directing available collection assets. We have addressed this broader
problem and plan to identify and recommend additional steps which may
lead to more efficient and effective use of collection facilities.
The Coordination Staff is presently examining the National
Intelligence Survey (NHS) Program. You may be interested in our
summary of pre6Limi Aary findings and the broad principles we have
recommended for revising it.
Summary of Preliminary Findings
1. The NIS is a valid and highly. essential program due, in
large part, to the fact that it is an authoritative,.coordinated,
interdepartmental publication which is extensively used at both national
and lower governmental levels.
2. The NIS Program has unquestionably stimulated and supported
the collection and analysis of essential basic intelligence on most
world areas.
3. The NIS Program, however, has reached unmanageable#
proportions since there is not available in being or in prospect'
increased production capability required for timely revision and
updating.as well as for continued initial production of new NIS.
1j. A great amount of detailed and transitory material has
been introduced into the NIS Program.by agencies and individual analysts
in an effort to use it as the vehicle for many forms of intelligence
for.many differing needs. The result has been delays in production
scheduling in early coverage of new areas and in maintenance of a
reasonably stable, accurate and timely product.
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5. Among the other principal factors which have adversely
affected NIS production are uncertainty as to the identity of the users
of the NIS product, changed and expanded requirements, the turnover and
shift of analytical personnel, problems of performing editorial and
substantive review in a consistent and timely fashion, and, the impact
of crisis situations.
6. The utility of the NIS Program is also affected adversely
by the physical bulk of the individual NISs, classification, academic
stylization, and problems relating to the assignment of priorities.
7. Deficiencies in the arrangements for, and conduct of,
managerial responsibilities have also been factors leading to the
Program's present complexity.
8. A revised NIS should be directed primarily toward meeting
governmental needs for the basic intelligence required as a foundation
for strategic and highs=level operational planning and for the
development of foreign policy.
Its composition should reflect emphasis on well-rounded, up-to-date,
basic and relatively static intelligence accompanied by only such
detail as may be desirable to meet the needs of such users regarding
the particular area covered by each NIS.
Recommendations
1. Approve revision of the NIS Program in accordance with
the following broad principles:
a. The NIS Program should be redesigned primarily
toward meeting governmental needs for the basic-type intelli-
gence required as a foundation for strategic and high-level
operational planning and for the development of foreign. policy.
It should not also attempt, as at present, to meet the needs
of lower-level planning and. operational elements in the
Armed Forces and Department of State and of all other Govern-
ment agencies which require basic intelligence for the accomplish-
ment of their missions.
b. The NIS should contain only that essential,
relatively static basic intelligence determined to be specifically
required for each area covered.
c. Reliance should be placed primarily upon other
departmental and interdepartmental intelligence production to
meet needs for more detailed and specialized types of basic
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intelligence, including those required for lower-level
operational planning.
War Planning
The Staff has a. continuing sort of "Watch Dog" task in planning
for war or emergencies e In this we limit our efforts to seeing to it
that the interests of the Director, in his capacity as the Government's
principi,l foreign intelligence officer and national coordinator of the
Government's foreign intelligence effort, are protected and recognized
in war plans.
This is particularly pertinent at this time in relation to the
national level emergency planning and the war'planning of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. We.are looking forward to the time when CIA Headquarters also
has adequate war and emergency plans, but this is not a responsibility of
the Director's Coordination Staff. When the DOD and CIA plans are in
being, we hope that the intelligence community will then undertake to
establish specific arrangements for anticipating its problems and planning
its activities for general war and emergencies shit rt of war.
Questions?
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Staff Members:
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COORDINATION STAFF BRIEFING
Monday, 19 February - 3:00
Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
Col. Donald W. Bernier,
(DD /S )
CIA (DD/I) F
Capt. Raymond A. Kotrla, USN G
Col. Edwin A. Loberg, USAF H
NSA I
CIA (DD/P)
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THE COORDINATION STAFF OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DU)
BRIEFING OF THE DIRECTOR
19:-February 1962
INTRODUCTION
This briefing will cover four topics (1) origin and mission of
the Staff; (2) how we go about our job; (3) what the staff has done,
is doing and problems programmed; and (1i) some indication of
acceptance of the staff in its community role.
I will conclude by presenting charts showing the structure of the
intelligence community for coordination ana command followed by the
national allocations of responsibility for the production of foreign
intelligence, and. concluding with the mechanisms for Coordination in
the Collection, Production and Support fields.
First, The Origin and Mission of the Staff
In 1956 the President's Board of consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities recommended that the DCI establish a sort of Chief of Staff
to run the detailed operation of the Agency so that the Director could
spend more time following and coordinating the national foreign intelli-
gence activities.
The DCI responded by appointing a fourth Deputy within the CIA
having the title of Coordinator to "assist him in coordination of the
intelligence activities of the Government." The management of the
Agency continued as before. The new deputy with his staff of two
officers worked primarily on the revision.s.of National Security Council
Intelligence Directives (NSCID s) and their implementing Director of
Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's) but was unable to devote any
major effort to day-to-day coordination in the intelligence community.
Some elements of the intelligence community looked.'aaith distrust
and suspicion at the function of the CIA deputy who would look into
their activities. Consequently, a pronounced conflict of interest
developed. This was particularly noted in the overseas clandestine
collection efforts.
Some members of the community did not believe that a major
competitor and operator should be their coordinator. In simplest terms,
the coordinator is then in the position of being both pitcher and
umpire.
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Upon the retirement of the position of a CIA
25X1A Deputy for Coordination was abolished and anew position was created.
on the personal staff of the Director of Central Intelligence with
title of Assistant for Coordination. I took over this d:aty on 1 July
25X1A 1960 and was told by Mr. Dulles to assist Mr. Kirkpatrick with his Joint
Study Group activities. II Deputy Assistant for Coordination, was
a member of the Joint Study Group and the background. thus acquired by
both of us has been invaluable in shaping and guiding the Coordination
Staff.
During the last half of 1960 this Joint Study Group on Foreign
Intelligence Activities.of the United States developed 43 recommendations.
These were then considered by the National Security Council and. their
actions were approved by the President on January 18, 1961.
One of the approved recommendations, No. 29, established your
Coordination Staff. We are not a committee and our decisions are not
always reached by unanimous agreement. The wording in the Joint Study
Group Report describes its composition, purpose and allegiance. I quote
a paragraph, "To provide for including full-time professionals into the
field of coordination and minimizing the conflict of interest problem, we
propose that the DCI organize under his Assistant for Coordination, and
as part of his personal staff, a full-time group of intelligence pro-
fessionals owing primary allegiance to the intelligence community rather
than any one member agency. Membership on the staff would be drawn from
the foreign intelligence community-at-large. We believe that this
Coordination Staff should be charged. with assisting the DCI in his
community-wide responsibilities for coordination of U. S. foreign intelli-
gence activities, including surveys of departmental intelligence activities
authorized in National Security Council Intelligence Directive Humber 1.
The Staff and its entire membership should be responsible to the DC:i as
a Coordinator and they should be separate from any operational responsi-
bilities of CIA or other department or Agency." End Quote.
25X1 The members of the Staff with the exception of I nd myself
were selected by the DCI after nominations had been received, from the
departments or agencies. The intelligence experience level is high.
Four of the officers have more than 20 years intelligence experience.
Five have from 10 to 20 years and one has less than ten years. The Staff
average is 16 years per member covering the entire spectrum of intelli-
gence activities. As to knowledge about the Central Intelligence Agency,
six of us know a great deal about the DD/P area, five have a good. working
knowledge about the DD/I area and two know the DD/S area. We have been
together as a full staff for six months. A liaison officer has been
designated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Mr. William. O. Cregar)
and the Atomic Energy Commission (Dr. Charles H. .Reichardt).
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All support for 'the staff, except pay and personal administrative
matters, is provided by the DCI. In some quarters the inference has been
made that if our Staff members are paid by their own agency their
allegiance to the national effort is not complete. I do not agree with
this line of thinking. Actually, the person who controls the effectiveness
reports of the officer controls the work and the results. In the case
of this Staff, you sign our effectiveness reports.
Our mission flows directly from your authorities and. responsibilities
for the coordination of the total United. States foreign intelligence
effort, which was clarified and strengthened by the President's recent
m.emorandum to you. As examples, we are specifically charged, with
supporting you in taking leadership and initiative to develop solutions
for coordination problems by identifying and promptly recommending
solutions to such problems especially through surveys of intelligence
activities. We are also responsible to you as Chairman of the united
States Intelligence Board (USIB) to review the future plans and programs
of each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper
allocation of effort at the beginning of each budget cycle.
We go about our job by taking the initiative to identify situations
and doing something about them before they become problems. 0ir
officers travel throughout the community visiting their numerous contacts.
They are welcome at staff meetings within their own agencies and gradually
a greater sense of trust and, confidence in this Staff is emerging throughout
the community. The Staff collectively has extensive knowledge of comm:Lnity
activities and every day brings new knowledge to our group. .part
of our work stimulates elements,of the community to action, which in turn
surfaces problems so that we can contribute to their solutions and. assist
in expediting action. When people become aware of the fact that we work
for you as the Coordinator, we find that by merely showing interest in
a problem we have a catalytic effect in starting action and keeping it
going. We, of course, have other well defined. jobs such as following
up on the implementation of Study Group recommendations; following the
activities of the USIB and its committees; and the like.
Once when you were speaking about coordination at an, early meeting
with your deputies you said that your experience had been, "yo;. can
nudge l em but you can't push 'em.." We have a similar expression in the
Staff, "you can lead horses to water but you can't make them. Our problem is to find ways of getting them to drink.
The Joint Study Group gave five principles for achieving coordj.nr?ation.
1. Leadership in developing and adapting new intelligence
programs;
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2. Initiative in identifying problem areas and instances
of duplicate effort or missing effort;
3. Investigation of these problem areas, if necessary
through use of the right to survey intelligence activities;
4. Solution of these problems to the extent possible by
agreed cooperative action of relevant parties under leadership
of the coordinator;
5. Recommendation of solutions to higher authority when
common agreement is not promptly forthcoming, with indication of
the position of the various parties.
The Joint Study Group was confident that if all members of the
intelligence community were to become convinced that the coordinative
authority envisaged in the basic laws of the community were of this
nature much of the reluctance and. apprehension that now remain would
disappear. We find these principles effective.
Here are some of the things the Staff has done, what it is doing
and items to be looked into:
Research and Development
Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 39 called upon Defense and. CIA
to seek more effective coordination of research and development activities
for intelligence purposes. Several months ago the Coordination Staff
took the lead, working with representatives of the two agencies, in
developing proposals to achieve the desired improvements. Although
for some specific fields of research, such as in communications, coordination
at the technical working level is excellent, nevertheless, agreement
was reached in principle that there should be in both CIA and Defense, a
focal point for the coordination of their scientific and technical
research and development effort. Similarly, agreement has bee."I reached
that, in the case of research and development projects intended. to
meet national intelligence needs, the views of the community, TJSIB,
as to the intelligence usefulness or value of the proposed project should
be obtained before a decision is made to proceed or not to proceed with
the project.
A further problem, which requires continuous effort, is that of
achieving an awareness by scientists and technicians of intelligence
needs, and recognition that a development originated for another purpose
can be exploited to solve an intelligence problem.
Final decisions have not yet been reached in the Department, of
Defense as to the relative functions and responsibilities of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (VIA) and the Director of Defense Research and.
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Engineering in this area. When this decision has been made it should
be possible to establish regular procedures which will ensure effective
coordination.
This Staff indorses your recent decision for a Deputy Director for
Research in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Future Plans and Programs of the Intelligence Community
Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 32 requires that the United
States Intelligence Board review the future plans and programs of
each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper
allocation of effort at the beginning of each annual budget cycle.
The Coordination Staff, acting on behalf of the Director of
Central Intelligence and the USIB, has action responsibility for this
particular recommendation.
The intelligence community's initial effort in this field was
concerned with Fiscal Year 1963. The Coordination Staff, in concert with
representatives of the USIB member agencies developed instructions
for reporting and analyzing FY 1963 plans and programs. This effort
resulted in four recommendations being submitted to and approved by the
USIB five months ago. These recommendations consisted of USIB endorse-
ments as follows:
a. Improved ELINT collection and processing equipment.
b. Coordination in foreign service and attache coverage of
Africa and Latin America.
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d. Improved intelligence support for the planning of guerilla
operations.
Proposed FY 196+ instructions, based upon the lessons learned last
year, have been prepared by this Staff and turned over to the 'TSIB
Secretariat for processing.
a. They were developed in closer concert with those in the
various agencies who will be preparing the reports.
b. Rigid reporting categories have been avoided by permitting
some freedom on the part of each agency in deciding what is to be
reported. This is to be agreed upon in advance between individual
agency and Coordination Staff representatives.
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c. Reports submitted will be prepared largely from existing
programming systems. This will not only. facilitate reporting, but
it will also facilitate actions by the agencies when considering
USIB-approved recommendations.
We believe that the results of this review will be of considerable
assistance to you in the event that you are called upon to comment on
the intelligence plans and programs of other agencies during the annual
review by the Bureau of the Budget.
Scientific and Technical Intelligence
Recommendation No. 15 of the 4 October meeting of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board requested an assessment of the
collection, coordination and analysis of intelligence on the scientific
and technical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc! with a view to effecting
improvements. The Acting DCI assigned to the Coordination Staff responsi-
bility for undertaking the necessary examination and preparation of the
draft report.
As a result of consultation with the various elements of the
community concerned with collection and analysis of scientific intelli-
gence, the Coordination Staff has reached conclusions concerning the
present status of our intelligence in this field, and identified specific
areas where improvements can be made. In brief,, some of these areas
of improvement are-
a. Additional steps can be taken now to expand the flow
of intelligence available from unclassified Soviet scientific
and technical literature.
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d. Steps should be taken to clarify the responsibilities .of
the National Security Agency (NSA) and the other departments and
agencies for telemetry analysis.
e. In the development of new technical collection methods and
devices, certain principles should be followed to ensure effective
planning,, development and management of such methods and devices..
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f. Programs.of intelligence support to research and
development components of the government not only significantly
assist the U. S. research and development effort, but through
the use of scientific talent available in the research and
development community, can provide great assistance in solving
problems of intelligence analysis and collection. Such programs
should therefore be continued and strengthened, under staff
supervision.
g. A qualified scientist should be assigned to the Board of
National Estimates, to facilitate the use of outside scientific
talents in the consideration of national estimates involving
science and technology.
Further examination is now under way concerning (a) the possible
further use which deb the intelligence community of such
or-yanizations as
etc., and (b) the organization an
functioning of a national reconnaissance organization.
Fr1
USIB Structure
The Coordination Staff has recently completed a draft memorandum,
.which will be sent to you as Chairman of the United States Intelligence
Board, on the subject of the committee structure of the USIB. In
preparing this memorandum., '.-the Staff consulted knowledgeable individuals
within the intelligence community, including the chairmen of several
of the committees, and sought to develop a rationale that would provide
USIB with the type of support that it requires to meet its broad
responsibilities and at the same time permit desirable modifications in
the present USIB committee structure. In our draft we concluded that
such desirable modifications would be those that:
a. recognize the generally greater cohesiveness-of the intelli-
gence community occasioned both by the experience and mutual
confidence gained over the past 15 years, and by the potential
for greater coordination within the Department of Defense resulting
from the establishment of the DIA;
b. recognize that services of common concern, like assigned
functions of primary responsibility, are essentially functions
which can and should be charged directly to an individual agency,
both for the principal conduct of the particular service or function
and for its coordination throughout the community;
c. recognize that USIB needs, on a permanent basis, only those
committees that are clearly required to support functions specified
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for USIB in NSCID No. 1 or to coordinate certain important
functional programs (other than services.of common concern) which
are carried out by several agencies to meet their own and
community needs.
Applying those principles, the Staff concluded:
a. that the following USIB committees should be disestablished.
and their general functions reassigned town individual agency:
(1)
Committee on International Communism (State)
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(3)
Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language
Publications (CIA)
(4+)
Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications (CIA)
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(6)
National Intelligence Survey Committee (CIA)
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(8)
Emergency Planning Steering Committee (DCI)
(9)
Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee (DOD)
Note: Recent USIB action assigned responsibility for
coordinating space surveillance requirements
to the Guided Missile and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee.
Requirements
Joint Study Group Recommendations 21 and 22 are concerned with the
problem of requirements. The Coordination Staff initially took the
lead in exploring various possible means whereby the general intent of
these recommendations could be met by the intelligence community,
particularly through the initiation of specific remedial actions relating
to requirements procedures in the community. The Staff recommended,
and the DCI approved, exploration of six possible projects in this field.
The Coordination Staff,, working with the agencies concerned, is completing
an examination of these projects. As a ,result of the examination to
date, CIA is now developing procedures for machine processing and
recording of all requirements originating in and levied upon CIA.
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The Defense Intelligence Agency is also developing procedures for
machine processing of its requirements. The Coordination Staff has
encouraged and assisted the two agencies in working together to
ensure that their machine systems are compatible and, in so far as
possible, interchangeable.
implementation would pose severe administrative and operational
As a result of consultation and discussion with elements of the
intelligence community, the Coordination Staff has concluded that
Recommendations 21 and 22, as stated by the Joint Study Group, do not,
in fact, meet a present need of the intelligence community and that
We have addressed this broader problem,
-Critical Collection Problems.Committee,.and plan to identify and
recommend additional steps which may lead to more efficient and
effective use of collection facilities.
in part, in our recommendations concerning strengthening of the USIB
USIB Activities
In addition to its review of the USIB committee structure, the
Coordination Staff follows most of the.USIB activities in order to
advise and assist the DCI as Chairman of USIB relating to coordination
problems. The Staff submits to the DCI its comments and recommendations
.whenever requested or deemed appropriate regarding any interagency
coordination problems being considered by USIB. The Staff has also from
time to time been requested by USIB to study certain problems such as
the need for an ad hoc committee to coordinate requirements in
Southeast Asia. The USIB has also approved a procedure whereby the
Coordination Staff is responsible for reviewing all new plans for
periodic intelligence publications in Washington to prevent duplication.
Reports for the DCI
The Coordination Staff has assembled information and prepared certain
reports for the DCI to submit to the White House relating to the imple-
mentation of recommendations by the Joint Study Group and by the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Reports regarding the
status of all JSG recommendations-have been prepared as-of 1 May and
21 August 1961, and another semiannual report due 1 March 1962 is in
preparation by the Staff. The Staff has.also contributed portions.of
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reports and briefings by the DCI to the President's Board relative
to recommendations concerning the coordination of the foreign intelligence
effort and the status of preparations and tests of plans for CIA wax-time
operations in overseas commands.
r~?
Rev?~sionw of NSCIDs.and DCIDs
The Coordination Staff advises and assists the DCI regarding
revisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directives and
Director of Central Intelligence Directives designed to achieve
improved coordination within the intelligence community. For example,
the Staff has prepared draft amendments to NSCID No. 1 relating to the
proposed changes in the USIB membership. The Staff has also participated
with a USIBcommittee in drafting revisions of the DCID on Biographic
Intelligence.
Staff Briefings
We are frequently requested to.give briefings on the subject of
the DCI's coordination of the foreign intelligence effort, and the
related activities of the Coordination Staff. These briefings are
.normally arranged by the CIA Office of Training, either in special
cases for key officials or as part of the regular training or
orientation courses.
Staff Initiated Projects
Based upon its knowledge or observation, the Coordination Staff
has examined problems of interagency coordination with a view to
determining whether recommendations for action by the DCI may be
warranted. Problems of this type which the Staff is currently. planning
to examine are:
a. The adequacy of support by the intelligence community
to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
b. Production of basic intelligence studies:or reports by
.various agencies in support of operations, in addition to basic
intelligence contributions to the National Intelligence Surveys.
c. Effectiveness. of the coordination and use by the
intelligence community of .external research facilities outside
government.
d. Arrangements for production within the community of
research on international Communism, especially the activities
of international organizations and interrelations between
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Examples of Requests to the Coordination Staff for Assistance:
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3. A request from two members of theZommittee on International
Communism that the Coordination Staff look into the problem of
community capability for the production of intelligence on international
Communism, in the light of recent reductions in staff and budget of
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)i Department of State, and
the recent abolition of the senior staff on international Communism in CIA..
1+.. A request for guidance from members of the War Plans Staff
of DD/P concerning the handling of hot war intelligence requirements
originated by the overseas commands and transmitted to the Agency by the
Joint Chiefs.of Staff (JCS). Incidentally,. CIA does not have a head-
quarters.level war plan. Many field plans are however in being.
5. A query from Mr. Sherman Kent and GeneralCabell as to what the
United States Intelligence Board (USIB) should do about emergency
planning. The Coordination Staff's survey led to incorporation of its
findings regarding emergency planning in the Staff's report on the UUSIB
committee structure which will be submitted to you about 12 March.
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9. Mr. of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, former. member of the Central Intelligence Agency Board of
25X1A National Estimates, discussed with 0 at the request of
Mr. William C. Foster, means of ensuring adequate intelligence support
for that agency from the community. After exploring various possibilities,
25X1A undertook to prepare a definite statement of that agency's
.needs and desires for further discussion with the Coordination Staff.
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11. Requirement Registry. As a result of a-request from the, Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Staff was able to bring DLA and CIA
together and ensure their effective collaboration in developing
compatible requirements registries.
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13. Translation of Soviet Electronic Journals. At the request of
the Office of Scientific Intelligence OSI of CIA, the Staff initiated
and supported actions by the Committee on Exploitation of Foreign
Language Publications to ensure the continuation of the translation of
these important Soviet journals.
ii. Electric Power Facility Project. At the request of the Office
of Research and Reports (ORR) of CIA, the Staff examined an apparent
case of uncoordinated duplication in the mapping of electric power
lines in the USSR, and determined that the duplication was inadvertent,
and that there was, in fact, a well coordinated project under way in
Defense.
Charts
In conclusion I will show five charts which were prepared
specifically for briefing you. The exercise turned out to be an
effective educational device.for ourselves and useful in briefing
others.
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-T1014 MECHANISMS FOR SECRET
CO0RD1'1NA7i'1'*0_`N AT WASHINGTON LEVEL
.C"1c'Y11Y1 LT CYl
P
CRITICAL COLLECTION
PROBLEMS
CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS
DCID 212 25X1 C
e pRpCUREMENT FOREIGN
PUBLICATIONS
COMMITTEE (CCPC)
CIA ASSISTED !Y' COMMITTEE &
PROCUREMENT o FOREIGN LANGUAGE DCID 215 25X1
OIIIRLIrATiANC (1Dgnr1T1RI
OBJECTIVES 0 REQUIREMENTS ;?ot COMMITTEE oft, OVERHEAD
OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE RECONNAISSANCE (COMDR)
ESPIONAGE 0 COUNTER- INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES ABROAD
DC I (DD/P)
REQUIREMENTS kltl
CLANDESTINE COLLECTION
COMINT 4' ELINT
DCID 217 25X1
DCID 511
INTER-AGENCY CLANDESTINE COLLECTION DCID 5j5
PRIORITIES COMMITTEE (IPC)
COMINT -ELINT COMMITTEE ~ ?CID 6/1 ~
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DJcT1ON MECHANISMS FOR
O INAT I WASH I l-T N LEVEL
Subject
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SURVEY (NI$)
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE
GUIDED MISSILES ~
ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
Mechanism
CIA BOARD *
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
DCID 1/1
WATCH COMMITTEE DC ID 1/5
CIA OFFICE* NSCID-3
BASIC INTELLIGENCE
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE(EIC)
DCID 3/125X1A
JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE DCID 3113
COMMITTEE (JAEIC)
GUIDED MISSILE e
ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE DCID 3/4
COMMITTEE (GMAIC,
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE (SIC)
SECRET
Authority
or DireCtiv?
DCID 3/5
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SUPPORT
MECHANISMS FOR
OORt T AT WASHINGTON LE r`E..
SECRET
Authority
Subject Mechanism or Directive
REFERENCE SERVICES COMMITTEE o-rL DOCUMENTATION DCID 1/4
SECURITY SECURITY COMMITTEE DCID 1/11
i tAV VITf'1T ION O' rWktf iN CLA, AjSISI to UCIL f4
LANGUAGE PULICATIONS COMMITTEE EXPLOITATION
FOREIGN LANGUAGE
PUBLICATIONS (CEFLP)
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PHOTO INTERPRETATION CIA -NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC NSCID - 8
INTERPRETATION CENTER
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