GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ENGINEERING ANALYSIS GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000300350035-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 159
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: November 27, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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Basic graphic data upon which this report is based w-as
prepared ~:t HTAUTOMA"t by a joint Army, I\Tavy, CIA Team. in
responIIe to the requirements of GMIC~
Graphics nat presented but referer_ced in this report, as
well 3II tC~ual data provided to the consultants, are attached
as preliminary wori:ing papers. They will be published in the
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GUIDED 1~ffSSILE IT7TELLIGEI`:CE C02?II?ffTTEE
REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL Er;GII`TE~tIrlG AT.ALYSIS ~OL~P
Wa:,hin~ton, D. C.
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QTID? I~QSSILE Tt~rl*~-r T.TGEt4CE CObgil'ITEL
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REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL ENGIPIEFI;ING ANALYSIS GROUP
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pa3e
I. Introductiun 1-2
II. 'General Conclusions 3-~
III. Detailed Conclusions 5-9
IV. Surface-to-Surface B.~_1.listic I~lissiles 10-85
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A. Kapus..ir. Yar 10-~+
1. RanGehead Facilities 10-15
2. Ranee Il~strumentation 1b-20
3. 2~fissile Guidance System Analysis ~-3~
k. Propulsion. System and propellants Analysis 35-36
5. ZiiSGile Di~:ensio-lal Analysis and Launch
Area Utilization ~ . 37-41
G. Development Status k2-4 j
.~. 5
T3ura Tara-Klyuchi 1+8-u
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? 1. Ran;;c:lieacl Facilities 1-;;-51~
2. `rt'St ~a:?~e IIl,"..tl'LtI~C'=itat10:1 jj-~1.
j. b:issile Guicisnce Syste:u Analysis ~2-~+
~. propulsion Syste_:. and propellants Analysis 7J-7?
5. 2~Li.ssile Dirensior_al_ A_rslJsis and Launch
Acea Utilizatio-_ 8O-g3
0
Development S~..atus sl+-RS
V. Kapustir. Ya+r Surface-to-Air riissile Test Ccmpler. 85-91
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VI. Air-to-Surface Missiles 92-105
VII. V1adi~~irovka-I,~:e gall hash Test Activities 107-117
VIII. Earth Satellite Vehicles 118-127
IX. Recommendations 128-129
Appe..dix I - L_torp_ etati c.^_ isuides or ~~tidance S;,~ster. Inte11_i ~encc
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GUIDID MISSILE INTELLIGENCE C02~?;ITTEE
REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL ENGIIy~ERITuG ANALYSIS GROUP
I . IIv'TRODUG~TI ON
This report stumrLS.rizes the studies and resulting conclusions of the
Engineering Analysis Group which was formed to analyze the TAI~IVT data on
the Kapustin Yar and Tyura Tam-Klyuchi missile test ranges. This group was
requested to establish, as completely as ssible from photographic data,
the types, sizes, performance, and develo ent status of Russian missile and
rocket projects. A thorough and complete briefing on the photographic infor-
mation was received and preliminary examination of the data carried out.
It was concluded by this group that only through the use of other available
intelligence information could a reasonable analysis of the TALENT material
be made. Therefore, COMINT, ELINT, RADINT, and other intelligence data was
provided for reference. Particularly in exa~aining photography showing the
Tyura Tam test range instrw-nentation and orientation these other data were
invaluable. Due to the limits of photographic coverage, erroneous conclu-
sions were being drawn which were corrected only by use of the COMINT infor-
oration. Thus, all source information was requested to eliminate obvious
misconceptions and prevent wasted effort.
of the analysis group encompassed all primary
fields associated with missile development, specialty teams were formed.
The format of this report essentially follows this team breakdown. The use
of small teams provided not only the necessary specialist concentration
but also gave continuity to the analysis of facilities common to the various
areas.
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In the body of this report, the ranges, locations, zones, dimen-
sions, and nomenclature are taken from the briefing charts prepared for
OPERATION JAM SESSION. Therefore, reference should be made to the plates
of the zones mentioned in reading this reporto
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25X1
capable research, engineering, and manufacturing organizations exist in sup-
~ B
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1. The Soviet test ranges and ranghead facilities at Kapustin Yar
and Tyura Tam represent a capability and potential that is generally equiva-
lent, and in some respects superior, to that of ghe US. The land area of
-the rangads is well in excess of that devoted to all U5 ranges combined.
At the present time, however, the US ICR'~I launch facilities appear to out-
number those found in the TALENT material.
2. The entire facility complex indicates that the Soviet missile pro-
gram is directed almost exclusively to the develop=cent of mobile systems.
Ewen their 1.a.rgest missiles appear to have been developed for rail mobility.
Of significance also is that the mobility is apparently incorporated from
the beginning of the research and development program. Thus, the operational.
ground support equipment appears to be developed simultaneously with the
missile. `
3. The Soviet programs have evidentally been well planned, bath in
the weapon system and outer space vehicle fields. ~cisting facilities at
Ka.pustin Yar, Tyura Tam, and Klyuchi have the capacity for-supporting the
~nzown Soviet missile programs with considerable expansion in rate of activity
achievable, if required. In addition, Tyura Tam-KLyuchi is capable of sus-
taining both highly energetic propulsion systems and 1.a.rge complex space
vehicles.
~+. These test ranges have at least as many instri:anentation sites as
any of the US ranges, thus indicating that the Soviets attempt to obtain a
large amount of information from each firing.
e 5. The extensive and diversified research and development programs
being conducted on the Soviet missile test ranges indicates that large and
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6. The study reported herein is not considered to have exhausted the
useful data from PROJECT JAM SESSION. The quantity of data alone precluded
this. However, the level of this current effort is believed sufficient to.
provide considerable knowledge on the Soviet missile development programs.
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III. DETAILED COI~CLUSIOidS
S
A. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE $~j,T.TSTIC 2~ff~SILES .
c~
1. Kapustin Yar.
a. The lack: of identifiable main co:rmunications and administra-
tion fe.cilities indicates that complete photographic coverage hss ~`iot,
as yet, been obtained.
b. The overall average rate of fire per pad together with the
apparent reliability of firing indicates an efficiently der-igned and
operated range, as well as high reliability of m_i.ssile components.
c. The development of operational ground equipment appears to
progress simultaneously with development of the rest of the ~aissile
system.
d. There is TALENT evidence of the development of at least some
second generation missile weapons.
e. The areas associated with ballistic missiles appear to have
been developed for mobile syste~^s capable of reasonable accuracy.
f. The long-base "V" and "L" configurations seen in front of the
launch stands are probable range instru.-aentation tracking systems.
(Occasional ELIIJT intercepts of S-Band beacons could be identified ~,rith
these units.)
g. Single station radio-inertial guidance techniques (e.g.,
Corporal RIG) are strongly indicated by TALEi1T for missiles fired
from Zonesl 7, 9-North, and 9-South. These guidance systems are
probably road mobile.
h. The guidance system used at Zone 8 cannot be deter-nined from
TAI~N`I' coverage. It is possible that an all-inertial system is used
with the short-range missiles which are associated with this launching
coMplex.
1. See Kapustin Yar Graphic Booker 1 and 3.
5
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i. It is difficult to identify a guidance technique in the TALENT
coverage of Zone 10. Poles on the launch stand may suggest collimation
of inertial components; t~ similarity of Zone 10 and Tyura Tam in this
respect is interesting.
2. Tyura Tam-Klyuchi
a. The existing facilities at Tyura Tam and Klyuchi have the
capacity for supporting the ICB&?i~ESV programs presently noted.
b. The instrumentation complex in the Klyuchi area makes it well
suited for either land or water impacts of ICBM re-entry vehicles.
c. The 60 mile baseline configuration composed of instrumentation
stations 28, 30 and the launch stand (Plate 22, Tyura Tam-Klyuchi Book)
is probably a range instrumentation tracking system.
d. The "Azusa" cross configuration observed at Tyura Tam and
Klyuchi are probably VHF interferometers (e.g., riicrolock) used for
range instrumentation or satellite tracking.
e. The two 110 foot towers observed on the Tyura Tam launch stand
are possible collimation devices for aligning inertial guidance systems
prior to takeoff. Similar towers are observed on the launch stand of
Zone 10 at Kapustin Yar.
o-
f. No reliable estimate of ICBM guidance accuracy can be made
from the present TALENT and COi~IINT coverage of Tyura Tam.
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B. SURFACE-TO-AIR L~SSILES
1. Avery extensive surface-t~ air missile research and develop-
ment test program is apparent in the Kapustin Yar area, Prom which the
system deployed operationally around~Moscow was developed.
2. There is a l.a.ck of evidence of the development of a different
system. Specifically, there is no evidence of the development of a low
altitude or area defense surface-to-air missile system.
3. Present surface-to-air missile flight tests probably do not
extend beyond a range of about 25 nautical miles.
4. From the elaborate surface-to-air missile support and fabri-
cation facilities at Kapustin Yar area, it is logical to expect continu-
ing use of the facility for testing new surface-to-air missile systems.
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C. AIR-TO-~URrACE .iI~~ILE~
2. At least one short-range air-to-.surface ~se~apen system _is oiler ~-
tional. This is prob?.bly a "first generation" s~'ate:-~, nct particularl-;
~.
sophisticated. Characteristics .:.may i ncludc (~ppro :i-_::.~_on~
a. Ranbe - ~5 nautical miles
b. Li,unch altitude - :~ediu::, 15,000 feet
c . Z~unch speed - lo-.,', 250 ?mots
d. Flight path - 3? or legs be1o~:: horizoraal
3. The TALEIIT :~.terial re:reals that the Vladimirovl'.a co::plcx is
a suitable base for ~~ long-ranSe air-to-surface ::is:~ile ::.cf;ivi ~;; , using
the Air Force associated te: t ran;_,e as _ ii rind ~.re^ . I.o wide^cc ci
such activity h~.s been found as ~,?et.
~+. Close lima bet;reen the airport co .p1e_. at Vlac~:..._ -0-:1-- the
support/launch facili ti es at Zones 10-12, ~..nd she Air Force ~ ssoci:,ted
r .nge tot.~.rd I~~.ke ga7lthash suggest facilities for ~__ ad:~anced pro~r~_:~.
The airport and range could support high altitude/sp?cd manned vehicle
,~
research similar to the US X-1, X-2, .nd X-15 prograTns. Zones 10-12
could per*nit firing of a first stage ~d manned last stage glide rocket
as a step to-,rard rianned space flight.
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D. VI,ADI2~ROVKA-LAKE Ra,r.xun~H RXSY G0068 TEST ACTIVITIES
1. The TALENT information is insufficient to confirm or deny the
existence of a new test range.
3. The operations and control of the new test range
appears to be somewhat divorced from that of either Kapustin Yar
missile test range c r Tyura Tam missile test range.
~-. The new test range may be elaborate enough to accommodate any
type of missile or manned vehicle testing restricted only by the confines
of the test range. Race track courses could be flown for long-range
airplanes or cruise missiles.
5? The new test range may or may not be directly connected with
part or all of the new installations (TALENT information) being construc-
ted in Zones 10, 11, 12, 13 and 1~- near to and north of the Vladimirovka
airstrip.
6. Of the many types of activities that may be utilizing this sus-
pected new test range, it seems most logical to connect it with a manned
satellite research test program. However, it should be noted that no
specific evidence from TAI~r or COMIN`r sources is available to support
this conclusion.
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IV. SURFACE-TO-ACE T?T?ISTIC AffSSII,ES
A. KAPUSTIlV YAR
1. Ra.ngehead Facilities
The Kapustin Yar rangehead facilities consist of a large number of
sites and buildings. This section of the report will not include discussion
of the Zones numbered 1 and 2 which have been designated as the surface-to-
air facility. Collateral infox-r..ation infers that the Kapustin Yar range has
been and still is a very active range.
Zone 19, which includes the city of Kapustin Yar zrith an estimated
population of 10 to 15 thousand, is located next to the Volga River, a good
water source. The city is on a railroad. The mediate range area could
encompass as much as 3,250 square miles.
Zone 18, based on TAI.EN'r and collateral information, has been
designated as a possible missile support, static test, and propellant servic-
ing area. The facility is rail-supported and no hard-surfaced roads are seen.
The site is located approximately eight miles from Kapustin Yar. There is
one large building which could be used to completely assemble and check out
a missile larger than the V-2. Other buildings in the area could be used
for component assembly and check out. The area is fenced. A static test
facility appears to be located south and west of the support facility. Col-
lateral information states an engine test stand was disassembled in Germar~y
and moved to the Kapustin Yar area. The facility is served by a railroad.
While this static test unit was in Germany it was used to test a complete
V-2 missile. Enough support buildings are in the area to support an opera-
tion of this type. The pictures do not show a water line in the area.
However, there is a water tower in the
support area.
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Zone 6 is approximately four miles northeast of Zone 18 and appears
to be directly associated with this area. The area is roac~i served. The area
could have been used as a mobile launching site for the early V-2 missiles.
The site now has scrubs or vegetation growing ~~ri.thin the area which might
imply that it i?s no longer in use or has been converted to another use.
In Zone 7, a good hard surfaced road has been constructed to the
support area which is 22 miles from Kapustin Yar. It is of interest to note
what appear to be bunker type buildings which could indicate the storage of
solid propellant rocket motors. The bunkers are large enough to store and
condition rocket engines up to a length of 65 feet. The area has more than
enough support facilities to accom*nodate the operations at the pad complex.
This could also indicate the activity is soalewhat_self sufficient. The lack
of a double security fence and guard buildings could indicate the activity
is no longer research and development in nature. Again the apparent lack
of a service structure in the area suggests a completely mobile-supported
system.
Zone ti is located a measured 6,800 feet from the launch area of
Zone 7. A good road has been constructed to the area. The apparent support
area is directly adjacent to the pad area.
It is significant to note the lack of a good hard-surfaced road.
is divided by a security fence. The entire area is surrounded by a single
security fence with no apparent guard buildings except a building at the
entrance which would be a security check point.
The above indicators might suggest the following:
a. The pad facilities are possibly used to launch two different
type missiles.
the launching of low thrust, short-range missiles.
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c. The apparent poor road between the support area and pad complex
suggests the area is and/or has been under modifications.
The general orientation and location of the Zone~9 launch facilities,
with respect to Zone 8, indicates the nefor a test site and facility to
handle a larger thrust vehicle. These two launch areas are separated by a
distance 11,500 feet. According to US practice, each of these sites would
be suitable for launching an ICHd type missile. The apparent rs3.ssile check-
out areas are each located approximately one-half mile in back of the launching
pad complex. The entire area is supported with a good road system. Launch
area north is enclosed with a double security fence with identified guard
posts between the double fence. The lack of above-surface buildings and the
appearance of well constructed revet-cents with good entrance roads suggests
the launching operation is mobile supported. The measured distance between
the apparent 1s.unching platform and blockhouse is approximately 200 feet.
However, the blockhouse could have been designed to stand a direct missile
hit.. TALENT information does not reveal the depth and~or thickness of this
structure. Launch area south has the same significant features as covered
for launch area north. The appearance of a dumb-bell configuration appears
to have been a modification to the original facility. This is suggested
in that one end of the dumb-bell is not completed.
The entire Zone 9 facility looks like a prototype ballistic
missile operational launching site.
Zone 10 is a rail and road supported launching complex. The
facility is located approximately 11 nautical miles to the north~of Vladimirovka.
A double security fence encloses the area. Lack of revetments suggests the
major portion of launching operation is rail supported.
A service tower is visible. It
does not appear to resemble any tower in use at a U5 range.
A possible water storage tank does exist w-ithin the pad area. A
blockhouse similar to the one at Tyura Tam has been constructed.
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A second possible launching pad is under construction which could
also be rail supported. The m=asured distance b~tweFn the two pads is
35~ feet. Based on US test range information, each pad could support and
launch a,n ICHM-sized vFhicle . Ho?we.trar-, the required track radii may have been
the determining factor in the pad spacing.
Zone 11 is located bet~?ean Vledimirouka and the launching site OP
Zone 10. The facility is rail- and road-supportsde Sufficient detail does
not permit a conclusion as to the uGe of e.sch building.
The area is enclosed t.?ith a solid fence ~?hieh suggests the activity
is of a classified nature.
A power house is located ?i~?ithin the area, It cannot be d~terznined
whether or not the power is consumed~loally or transmitted ~ other areaso
The area could be a missile component manufacturing and test
The facility in Zone L consists of a large rail drive-through
building. It appears to be a standard Soviet rail seraice building.
The area is enclosed with the double security fence. The entire
area is sti11 under constructiono
It is possible that the area will be used as an assembly and
support facility for launch area, Zone 10.
During the construction period, it is possible that a temporary
facility at Vladimirovka is bAing used to su~ort the launch area, Zone 10.
In addition to detailed study of individual zones in the rangehead
area, an effort was ID3d=_ to evaluat?=_ the ovar-a11 capability of the Kspustin
Yar range. Various ra.nga pFrsonnel and Depa..Y?t-went of D-fence groups have
tried to devise a. reasonable "yard stick" for measuring range capacity
and capability of the US guided missile test facilities. 1Yo such "yard stick"
has beEn found_ HawPVer, from these US stu~es there are general guide
lines which are useful in analyzing tYle ability of a proving ground to
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support the assigned program_~. By these US standards, the Kapustin Yar range
is far from saturated with the known firing rate and there is a l.a.rge growth
potential.
The land area ir_ use at the rang~h=a.d is larger than the total
rangehead areas of all US gu~dF1enis.ilP ranges. This vory large area has
allowed the Soviets to spread their fa~:ilities out and minimize mutual inter-
ference between launching areas. Th= distanc-_. bett..reen launching Zone 1 and
launching Zone 10 is almost Equal t.o thF dis,.anc.e between the Army firing
sites at White Sands Pro;,ing Ground and +he Air Forces launch area at Holloman
Air Force Base. These areas in i`7ew bi?xico .cyan carry on many operations almost
independently of each ot'rer .
White Sands Proving Ground, our largest overland range, is only 100
miles long compared to land impact poin+_.G at Kapustin Yar which are at least
95o nautical-miles dowzrangP. The ability to locate impa.e~.points on the ground and
accurately survey these points greatly simplifies the instrumentation problems
associated with impact. Recovery of critical components can also be accom-
plished in a land impact area. A u:ap st-ady indicates that the Kapustin Yar
range could be extended to a+, least 1300 miles without changing the az3.muth
of fire .
The support facilities for the rangehead area seem more than
adequate to support the present rate of fire. The photography does not appear
to cover all of the support areao An example is communication facilities which
were easily located on the photographs of Tyura Tam, but none were seen on the
Kapustin Yar c:overa.ge.
This suggests that additional coverage (collateral
information indicates north and w?st ~f the pre_ent coverage) might reveal
many additional support facilities such as communication centers, labora-
tories, storage areas, etc.
It is the opinion of this group that the Kapustin Yar range is not
saturated and the firing rate can be substantiall,}r in~,"eased if required. The
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scope of support facil=ities indicates that the Soviets are placing priority
effort on the over-a11 -aissile pro~;rarn and consider range develop::7ent a
vital part of their missile activities. The lack o? proving ground facilities
is not likely to hamper missile ~r~.,rth snd development in the Soviet Union
within the foreseeable future.
I
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2. Range Instrumentation
The scale of the original photography which provided the TALIIVT
material for the Kapustin Yar and Tyura Tam ranges does not allow positive
identification of any instrumentation equipment. However, -by-cc~biging all
c-, _
information available from CO2~?~tT, EISNT, RADIN`I', and collateral sources
with the TAT~.'-3'f' material and by concentrating on the relative positions of
possible instrumentation sites, it is possible to establish a pattern of
instrumentation with a reasonable degree of confidence. Although the inves-
tigation of instrumentation was conduc?-Pd on a complete range basis,
individual areas wi11 be discussed separately in.this report.
The Kapustin Yar rangehead has the heaviest concentration of
probable instrumentation sites observed in any portion of the two ranges.
The pattern of these facilities suggests that each launching area has its
own network of measurement equipment which has been located to provide op-
timum coverage from the missile systP~ under test. This range appears to
have at least as many instrument sites as any of the US ranges, thus
indicatie~ that the Soviets attempt to obtain max.~nn~m information from each
missile firing. r~ny large pe~nent structures are used to house instrumen-
tation equipment and, in addition, the system of roads throughout the
rangehead, small cleared areas along these roads, and z~ultiple cable scars
connecting these cleared areas, would indicate that mobile instrumentation
is used to augment the permanent systems. 2.obile instrumentation is further
indicated by the large number of probable van-type vehicles in the motor
pools at the various launch support areas.
One distinguishing characteristic of the-Kapustin Yar rangehead
is the existence of at least four separate possible instrumentation networks
which are Laid out in precise patterns. Such patterns could relate to
either guidance or instrumentation, and the TALII3T material does not pro-
vide sufficient detail to determine which function is assigned to these
networks. A guidance system with base lines from 3 to 10 miles in length
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is not consistent with mobile missile systems because of time consuming
survey and installation problems, 1=nding support to the dESignation of
these networks as instrumentation system_~. That these are instrumentation
is also indicated by the fact that then=~ are perma.nent~type buildi ngs at
the terminal points on these patter?-~s. Guidance systP~:G-which were intended
for mobile use would probably usr ~~_hicular-mounted equipment.
Collateral information shows that thA Soviets had fu11 access to
early German dopp~ler development of the type which lead to the TJS designed
DOVAP system. Soviet competence in the radar field is apparent from work
done in the surface-to-air guidance system. The patterns of instrument
sites in the rangehead would suggest the possible use of some electronic
system which compares data from a numbQr of measurement points and recon-
structs trajectory data by triane~ulat?ion. The DOVAP system is use3 in this
manner and also provides high accuracy velocity measurement.
The. Soviets received the
SCR-58~+ from the US and are known to have manufactured a Soviet version.
This same equipment is sti11 the principal radsr in use on X11 US missile
ranges. Although there are no instrument sites where such radar equipment
can be identified, there are maser areas where such equipment might we11 be
located.
Telemetry receiving stations cannot be located by the TAT.F.RPT
coverage; however, there are ~rfew characteristics which would clearly identify
such a station even with larger scale photography. Pre-flight calibration
of missile-borne telemetry equipment would probably reYSire telemetry
receiving equipment in the-~`icinity of each launch area and this equipment
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cc?.Lld easily serve as an in-?flight facility. A rnimber of support zones in
the rangehead could contain telemetry receiving facilities which would not
be visible oa the photognaphy.
Collateral information also indicates that optical instruments of
the Askania cinetheodolite types were in use on the range at the time of the
first V-2 firings Again, t?he TAI.3~V`r' material does not shave any such equip-
went. The many roads throughout the area and many sma11 unidentified objects
would be consistent -rith a variety of optical instruments.
In ~~mmar3r~ the Kapustin Yar rangehead arFa appears to be heavily
instrumented. No positive identification of instrumentation types is
possible due to the scale of photography. Sources other than TALF'~' would
indicate that the following types of instrumentation might be in use on this
range: radar, telemetry, doppler systems, and optical instruments (cine-
theodolites . The pattern and density of probable instrumentation facilities
in consistent with the use of all of these systems. ~ '
that aerial photography can provide significant
information on the range instrumentation systems in use, even with increased
scale. EI.2NT techniques including flights over the area with suitable
receiver equipment would probably provide more information regarding instru-
mentation systems and techniques.
Photographic coverage extends due east from the rangehead to a
distance of approximately 225 nautical miles. The width of the coverage is
approximately 38 wiles. A study of this downrange area revealed very few
possible impact points or impact instrumentation sites. In fact, the only
areas which show definite patterns of stations suitable-for instrumentation
impact are centered approximately 35 miles downrange and 210 miles downrange.
which are within the mAT.~a*r coverage. A careful examination of these points
failed to indicate any impacts or instrumentation.
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There are several p6ssible explanations for the Lack of visible
a. Mobile instruments ma~=~ be in use and moved to the impact
areas only for firing operation:. The road nits in the downrange area
appear adequate to support this type o. operation. Some COALLIdT material
supports this explanation since references have been made to moving
stations. Mobile instrumentation would require bases of operaticn in
the general vicinity of the imnaet areas but such bases could be located
out of the area covered by TAT.Fi`~'I'. Aircraft support of the downrange
instrumentation stations is r-e~t~larly reported and no airfields
are shown in the coverage. Again this-would indicate the possibility of
instrumentation support bas=s located outside the area covered by T,QT.~.nrr
raterial.
b. I~pa.ct areas may have v~=ry limited instrumentation coverage
and thus not be visible on the photographs.
is considered highly unlikely that equipment to perform these functions
could be so sma11 that soIIL in~iieators would not be detected on the
photographs.
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The possible existence of range instrumentation activity at a
distance of 210 miles from the launch area is not compatible with CONiINT or
FZIN'I' information. The facilities seen in this area cannot be definitely
cls.ssed as instrumentation. These facilities could be communication relay
stations connecting more distant goints?f~n the range or, of course, these
sites may not have any direct? elationsriip to the Kapustin Yar range.
There is no photographic r_overage of?the 300, 650, or 950 mile
impact areas. These areas are not trE.atad in this report.
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mArFnrr; The photographic intelligence available. on Kapustin Yar
is based upon the flyover. Using the areas as labeled by
the photographic interpreters, the following features may be distinguished:
In Zone ~:
a. Unidentified objects 1200 feet aft of the launching pad,
syn~etric with respect to the firing line (east), 300 feet apart.
b. The support area is close to the firing pad.
c. Othertirise, photography of the area is marginal.
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a. Trailerized installation to"t.est of launch pads.
(1) 3300 feet from launching pads to installation.
(2) No direct road from pads to install~.tion, access
indirect.
(3) Semi-cleared area in front of a major trailer facinJ
pads, clear line-of-sight to both pads ._
(~+) Access to support area, but definitely in eleaa?
from support area.
b. Used but unoccupied area to west of field launchers.
(1) 1700 feet from launchers to used area.
(2) No direct road from 1a.unchers to used area.
c. launch area contains several small trailers near launcher.
d. Forward "instrumentation" set up for Zone 7 (Plate 17,
Book 1).
(1) Two legs 58,000 feet, broken at 29,300 feet.
(2) Apex at Zone 7 support area.
(3) Oriented toward assumed 300 mile area (100? azi.m-uth
from north).
In Zone 8:
a. Support area to immediate rear of launcher.
b. P7o immediately evident site similar to trailerized instal-
lation back of Zrne 7 except for conglomerate area 6500 feet to
rear (Plate 7) cabled to support area.
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~ i r r~
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c. Certain support buildings have concrerte dri~re-in roads; are
i
possibly set on somew}~.t more firm fcundation than buildings of Zone 7
support. ~'
d. Zone 8 does not appear to have been planned at the game time
as Zone 7.
e. Whole installation is launcher-centered..
In Zone 9:
a. Two trailerized installations to west of each launch pado
(1) 526o feet due west of both north and south launch
areas.
(2) I7o direct road from pads to installation. Access
from south installation to south pad remarkably indirect
(3) Clear line-of-sight from installations to pads.
(~) Cabling from installations to pads.
(5) Van with possible antenna on roof in Zone 9-South.
b. South launch area (Plate 1, rook 1)
(1) Construction camp to south in non-interference position
with respect to pad and installation mentioned above.
(2) D~zmb-bell shaped cleared areas oriented +7~ t.o north.
Each area 1000 feet from pad. Areas are part of a recent
modification; no objects in areas at moment..
(3 ) Whole area being modif ied; support. area be in;;
expanded. .
(~+) South guidance installation less formal than north
area; fewer vehicles; installation not fenced.
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c . Support complex: evidentally plan_Zed with bct ^ Zcne ~?-ITorth
and 9-South ; n mir_d. Lsunchin~ pa 3 furtt:e=- s=par ated Iran in
Zone 8.
d. Control center at apex of roads to launching pads is cabled
to forward stations in a ~V" pattern, 58,000 Peet on a sire, bi~-
93 to north. Dome-shaped build_n;_,s~ at u11 stations.
sector bearin; ? ~ ~ +?
In Zone 10:
a. Three-station t`L" base line forward of launcher.
(1) 100,000 feet from launcher.
(2) Oriented with extended 1e~ to the east. '
(3) Each lei 65,000 feet, extension of east lei; by
3~+, 000 feet .
(~+) Each facility fer_ced, relatively large bufldin`s
(not trailers), domed structures on roofs, probabl?r t1~re~ dor.:es
at each site.
,(5) Firing line bisects nortr.-south 1e;;.-
(6) Stations cabled together and bac~~ to electronics
installation and~or launch area.
b. Three station "L" base line aft of launcher.
(1) 38,500 Feet aft of launcher.
(2) Oriented with east-west leg at 100? aziLmath from
north.
(3) Each 1eS 18,500 feet long.
(~+) Outrigger facilities nct fenced. Center facility
fenced.
(5) Facilities cabled together and to electronics
installation and to Zone 11 (Toi;en racer a^_d rail turn-
around) .
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r, 'y`1? _1cc ~_ _.~_` c. ._~.c' __. -_u .----~..t_.:,__ ~~ emu-, ~ __ -t_.U_ ~~__ ?i-_:
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T~'~?T??-IGENGE GUIDES. Because the various intelligence sources
give only partial indications oP guidance techniques, it is important to
26
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introduce model guidance systems at the outset. Five general classes of
guidance systems are considered here. Significant features of each system
which might appear in ?'ALII~TT, CO?~LINrr, ELIIVT, and REIDIN'I' intelligence are
0
then enumerated on the basis?of our own experience. By comparing these
intelligence guides for the available data, an estimation of probable
guidance techniques for successive areas scan be developed in a systematic
e
vay. The accuracy of such systems can then be inferred from typical
performance as well as occasional COBffTdT breakouts. (See Appendix I.)
SUGGES'I'ID ON: Based on the foregoing intelligence,
certain limited conclusions are sug;ested. In Zone ~+, oblique photo~-aphy
is too severe a limitation to permit guidance identification. Whatever
guidance technique is in use, however, is located within about 1000 feet
of the launcher.
In Zone 7, a single-point radio guidance station is located
33~ feet to the rear of the launcher. The guidance system is probably
designed for ranges on the order of 300 miles. The resemblance to the
US Corporal configuration is striking. An out-in-the-field version is
tested in the ~*R*~diate area.
In Zone 8, the close proximity of support and the blocking of
line-of-sight to the rear by support installations suggests both short
(less than 300 miles) range and inertial guidance. The drive-in roads in
the support area provide indicators that the buildings are used as clean
rooms for testing precision instruments such as gyroscope$ and accelerom-
eters. I~:o apparent evidence exists that this area was once a radio-guidance
area, or that the area was planned at the same time as Zone 7. The apparent
ale is less than five years.
In Zone 9, single-point radio guidance station
probably designed for 650
mile missile is reasonably consistent with the re_._rtively complete intelli-
gence picture. In addition, Zone 9-South has recently been modified,
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.,
probably for testing a new or modified configurations (e.g., 950 mile missile
or stages missiles for pre-ICBM or pre-ESV test.) South area was a less
formal version of Zone 9-North before modification, was planned with care,
aad vas designed to accommodate a fairly high firing rate.
The dissimilarity of the instrumentation in Zone 10 to that any-
where else in Kapustin Yar or Tyura Tam is particularly striking. There
are indicators of a rail-launched system development. This, coupled with
lack of what would be reasonable radio guidance sites for such development,
implies either inertial guidance or radio guidance aboard a railroad car.
2nertial gn~dance might be indicated by the "collima.tion poles" in the
launch area. (See Tyura Tam discussion, Part B. of this section.)
TAT.F'N*P information now suggests that the shorter range missiles may
be inertially guided, quite mobile, and in their second generation. The
300, 650, and probably the 950 missiles are probably guided by radio techniques.
There are indicators that inertial instruments are used in the missile as
part of the guidance system. The guidance station is single-point, trailerized,
capable of operating from little more than a cleared area. Frequency of the
radio guidance is unknown, although microwave frequencies are suspect. (It
should be remembered that the USSR started with not only the German ideas
oh guidance, but also a considerable body of useful US radar equipment and
design knovledge.)
ACCURACY ESTIMATES: There are two approaches to the problem of
estimating guidance accuracy for the Soviet system.
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The second method associates most probable
guidance system types with the various pads and thus hopefully to particulRr
ranges of firings. Component accuracies in US programs allow one to set a
reasonable limit on the guidance accuracy vhich can be achieved with such
systems. Unfortunately, neither of these approaches yields an estimate which
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The SMITIG Report2 sn.nmarizes the reports of nose ::one and~or
booster impacts which have been broken out from range traffic.
75
Dec.
'S5
150
March
'S~
30o
I,~ay ' S~+
650
Aug.
' S~+
April 'S7 6
June 'S7 26
June. 'S7 ~+3
Tvov. ' S6 '+6
These imports are usually made with respect to a fired reference (i,e., short
8 km., right 1 km.). It is agreed that an aiming point offset from the
reference point is probably used for each shot so that the previous esti~~.tes
of range and lateral errors at 650 nautical miles of ~ R= 6 km. and
?c L 1 km. are unduly pessimistic. The demand for impact coordinates
strongly
suggests that the Soviets have taken or arE taking the logical steps which
would improve the impact accuracy at the 650 nautical ~i1e range.
The real hope for this approach lies in the possibility of
intercepting both the intended and actual impact coordinates. Range to
impact was predicted for seven flights, which are shown in Table 1, page 30<
Comparison of
these results with the reported impact (Gauss-Ks-aeger) coordinates suggests
that these ranges are only coarse indications which could be used by down-
range impact stations for searching, orientation, etc< The two firings to
650 nautical miles on 16 November and 5 December 196 i:nfortunately did not
2. TI-GM-57, No. 7, Vol. II, 1 July 1957, p F2~.
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include the necessary absolute impact coordinates. The ^0 Feuruar;;~ 195.1
firing to 150 nautical miles is beset with the same proble~., as is t1:e
19 September 1956 firing to 150 nautical miles, trhere the predicted range
was indicated to be 56 Ism. (?) ~~+ nautical r~:ile~~ A1t.houjh t'_~ -s~ resuli~ s
are somewhat discouraging, it i s apparent that the ~?i~ht combi T~~tion of
COP~ffTd'I' breakouts would clarify the problem enormously- and iL is hoped that
intensive decrypting effort can be devoted to such traffic on both ranges.
TALENT, COi~1INT, and ELIIvT have indicated that a US "Corporal-t.
radio-inertial guidance system is a possible s~~ste:,: to associate ?w-ith the
flights which are launched from Zones 7, 9-I:orth, and 9-South to the 300,
650, and possibly 950 nautical mile areas. Tire Corporal system measures
range with an S-band pulsed radar (essentially an SCR 58~+) and elevation
and azimuth angle wth a conical scan technique. Range rate is measured
by a CW doppler technique on x+50 mc. trhich is doubled in the r~.issile and
retransmitted at 900 mc. Steering, strutoff, and range correctior_ c.oi::man~ws
are transmitted to the missile by the pulse and CZ?7 systems. Lnese cor.:..ands
are used to override the programed auto-pilot ~::*hich uses t~?,*o degx-ee of
freedom gyros. Body fixed accelerometers are used to measure the range
correction which is applied at re-entry_ The nominal slant range at shut-
off for Corporal usage is about 15 miles and the system produced range and
lateral errors of
~~ R 300 yd .
p L = 100 3rd.
at ranges of 25 to 75 nautical i:iles. The design is based on equip:ent
(i.e., 58~+'s) which ~-as developed duecond
stage of the Soviet IC~d may well be correspondingly larger than it Titan
counterpart. Such a Spt~nik? launcher coald deli Ter an additional t-,?ro and
one-half tons or so of warhead and guidance equipment to a range of 5500
nautical miles, i.e., from Tyura Tarn and other launching sites in Russia to
the US. This payload differential is about right, eacpeeially if one :Aces
some allowance for the presu?~ption that their nuclear weapons technology,
i.e., their ability to snake light, high-yield, theriaonuclear warheads, :gay
not be quite as advanced as ours.
Optical observations indicate that the tt~~o rocket .stages, 1957 OC 1
and 1957 ~, are about equally bright, and hence are probably the same size.
It is very likely that the Soviets went out to the launching stand
on their first satellite attempt -,rith a comfortable velocity margin -- on
the order of 1000 to 1500 feet per second. The invest.nent of about
half of the margin in increased payload on the second attempt ?.:ou1d have
enabled them to put the 1120 pounds of payload into orbit ;,-ith the same
launching vehicle.
The appsrent nonchalance with which the Soviets launched their
second satellite in accordance kith prior announce:^ents connected z~ith their
~+Uth ar,n; versary celebration :supports the view that they probabl;,s did not
attempt to use anything fund.a_=_entally ne::, such as a third stage for e~a:.iple,
in their second satellite attempt. True, they allowed a cushion by launching
four drys early. Even this, however, ~:..*ould not have left very much time for
preparing another vehicle on the ].lunching stand if the first try rent a:-sill
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have net de_,.onstrated such a capability. Their frequencies, 20 .ac. and ZOO mc.,
orbits be determined with a high degree of accuracy . So far, th?~ Soz fief.-
The use of satellites _:.s navi`~,ational aids -.;ou1d re:iuire that the
it i:- , ~-?~b,blc that before veri? loz,:,; So~riet recornai~ -s.-ic^ ^~tellite~
:~ri11 be surve~-ing the US on ;~. s~':',te_aatic bn.sis.
they: to e.:ploit their orbitzl psylcad c,pacity to considerable extent. Thus,
it is reasonable to ~uppo~e tY1at they- s.re developir_g or have ~~lrcau--
developed reccnnais_:ance and cc _ _unic_.ticn~~ o.iuip--:cr_t -::hick ;:ou1d enable
Their pro r~~ :~_, appe~..r to be -..-e11 plunne3 :end intef-r:-, ;;od. Iienco ,
;with their far f lu--, ~ :;ubc: marine ~ i~,et .
has beer_ poste ibl~ h~_-etofore .
E. OBSERVAI^IOi:S OI`1 TF~ ~OVIL1'S' ~'~PPARIii;r DEVELOP: ~_:~' :~TATU AIdD i~LATL:D
,~.A?1'I'ERS
1. Earth Su.tell-i.tc Vehicle
The Soviets' abilit~~ to ?gut ever 1000 pound.; into orbit gives -the:-:
the potential capability to dog. nu:b~or of thin-- :::uch _:~ore effectively than
are far fro-1 optiMwa for this plu-pose, due to ionospheric effeetc--.
The carr,~ing of a doh; as early as the second satellite ::t tempt
indicates that the Soviets are headed straight toward the goal off' putting
a ^ian into space at the earliest possible :::o-tent. Si,snificantly, ,ae arc
told that the second satellite also carried coy=:ic r-sy instru.::entation.
Correlated measures of the dog's physiolo~-ical resctior_s snd the cosmic ray
intensities would be expected to be atte:apted in any definitivepace
_nedicine experiment.
2. Surf.~.ce-to-Surface Ballistic 2?iis~iles
t` The Soviets have made exten>ive use of roil facilities at Tyura
Tarn in the launching area r-fight at the launchin stand and in the possible
launching area B, ;:hick is :in line ;with the flight ps.th and the launch
stand, and ~.ay be associated ~:ith guidance operation.:.
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'ihere is a strcn pos:~ibility that the Soviets may be pla.nnir_~
to develop version.: of their ICIii?i and/or IRB:d vehicles which could be
hsn3.led and fired entirel;,- by means of rail-borne e uip_nent . If the Soviets
aid develop such systems, every ra~l~ard ~.nd e:ttensive siding in the Soviet
Union s~ould beco;ne a potential ICI~i and/or IRffi?1 launchinS site.
large railyards near key cities would probably not be used for
this purpose, since the city and the ICBi?4 or IRSbi launcher ~rould present a
dual target. Also, security would probably be more difi'icult to naintain
there. Any inconspicious railsiding facility of appropriate cs.p.3city would
serve reasonably well, however, especially if it were associated ;.rith a
factor, building or an industrial installation :?,hich night already be in
a secure area for other rea-sons . In fact, du;rny installations of- this type
could be established to facilitate the ca.-.ouf'lage.
Such launching facilities would be almost as dirFicult to discover
as rissile firing submarines. A systc-:: of launching sites of this type
would pose an unusually grave threat since it could, to an alar-ain; de;ree,
be effectively invisible even to reconnaissance satellites and hence.
relatively invulnerable to retaliation.
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F. CONCLUSIOTdS AND RECO:~dE'i~ATIOiIS
The evidence acquired in cor~e? ion -?ith the Soviet satellite
launchings and from other sources indic::.te:> that the So-~riots no~:r possess
a :~ultista~e rocket -.which is capable of delive~-in~ therzorucle~.r ~.arheads
in the megator. range from Ty-ura ^t am and/or other 1au_*ichinS sites in the
Sovi. et Union to the U5 .
2. Reco.~endations
a. Intelligence reco:~:nendation:~
(1) It is reco:r:raended that all is telli~ence ?acilitie~
including TALETIT, CObZITIT, ELIPdT, RADIT:'T, ar_d all other types, be
alerted and prepared to search continually for an~r evidence ~:-hich
indicates that the Soviets are establishing a system of rail-borne
ICBtd and/or IRB'i~? launchint; sites . Correlation of photographic
overflights, radio e-;ission ferret ?light, and other intelligence
activities are especially i^?.portant.
Several potential tell-tale indicators co:a~ to mind.
For el:a-nple, if the ton? 80 foot rail c~:.r~ asua_i1y seen in passen-
.;er service, or at T;,~ura Ta.:, sho;r up persistsntl;y at a factory
or an isolated siding, the location becoes suspect. The factory
might; of course, be a.n ICff~4 or an IR~d :nar_u?acturing i'acility,
in which case it would be o? interest from thin point of ~riew also.
I? the numbers and types of personnel involved and the ?10-:: o?
:.iaterials and e~uip:rents into the buildings did not jibe ~,rith those
efpocted of an actual ::.anufacturir_g operation; however, the ?.ctor of the
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Copy
E,
moontaatch type minitro.clz I?Sark II facilities on I+O me _
:could b? useful here. ~
(8) Ali effort should be :_s.de to observe any connections
between the satellite activ-hies at Tyura Tarn and the possible
:..nned very-high-altitude ::.nd preparatory- space flight activities
at Vladimirovka. -
b. General defen:,e reco:..mendations
(1) It is recommended that AIC~?i detection and warning facili-
ties be established as close to Tyura Tam as possible a1on~ the
paths from Tyura Tam to tJB targets, since Tyura Tam ma.y be or
become an operational ICB:i site.
(2) It is recommended thF.i.t a.n AICBT+~i detection facility be
established at Pearl Harbor_ The initial passage of Soviet sat-
ellites over this region sill afford an unusually realistic
opportunity to test our IC~?i detection capability under r~iniruu,..
i~rarnin~ conditions .
(~) It is r~co-~mended thst the ntiuabers of operation,21.
i
.~
ICB`i,I's and IR~:`s no:T planned for U5 forces be re-exa*nined. Such
a reassessment appears to be _a11ed for by the e~:istence or even
merely the possible e:~:i.stence of the very- nrsaerous, well-ca.~nouflaged
potential Soviet rail-borne ICB~d and/or IRD'd launching sites.
(i+) It is recc-;~ended that the Defense Depart~uent look into
the possibility o:C el:plolti nr, the rail-borne IC11~4 and/or IR$?i
launching site camcufla~e techniques as it continues the IC$S and
IRRTd develop~-rent progra~a .
(7) It z~ reco~~ended tht the Defen~~ Depart__ent look into
3.nti-s~telli to .--_~si1e s;-._te_~:
0
capability. Such a ~ ste.~~ could be un out~ro~rt?: of n AICL~?1
develop:. ent pror,r~~~-. 1'he effort he>>:: .:~u1c bc, per2~ap~, tc ruin
the satellite . ,- ste... ~ a ..~.e~:rs i cr ~ ~ ~ grin; .:
^or_r_c~'t co_::~ur_ic:_tin",
etc. r.rthe?- th?~_~ ~,. .:ctu~al,, knoc~_ it do.r_ i.c , ch..n;;c i ;,- obit.
1.-,?T
the possibility of d,~v~lop ~ n~ an
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IX. RECOi~u~~I7DATIOIyS
A. TALENT COVERAGE
1. The e~~:isting TALII~iT coverage is excellent from a technical
and operational vie:~-point`. FIo::ever, it is reco..-:ended that the scale be
improved, either through the use of longer focal length lenses or ~ 1o;.-er
altitude. This is necessary to obtain :Wore detailed analysis of the :~issile
system characteristics and capabilities than is obtainable from the present
coverage.
2. Additional TALENT coverage should be coordinated ~~rith COP?ffI:T
and~or Soviet releases of impending range activities to maximize the intelli-
gence gain from such an operation.
3. A second TALII~3T coverage of the FG?.pustin Yar and Tyura Tam-
KLyuchi :aissile test ranges, in the near future, would be extremely valuable
for co:nparison purposes to detect changes and trends. SnO:~ cover photography
would possibly reveal more distinct patterns of instru::~entation facilities
and rocket engine test activities.
~+. The Kapustin Yar area should be covered fro:a Stalingrad
southeast through Kapustin Yar, thence due east through Tyura Tam to Lake
La1~?sh. This coverage should reveal the F~.pustin Yar co:~~~znications control
center and all instrumentation and impact areas, including the 950 nautical
Wile impact zone.
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E , - --'~~sL RECO:~L':i,1:DATi 0. i
..1":.~' ~.1~.-rl~;ll ET.Tj 1 ~ ~I:-- -_i,'~_ O'.,h~~ _"_-LG'11.1 ', -_.'_ ._:=i-1.t~ =i'~~-- - _ _1~~ ~..- --~~ - -'-_.
.1. A CC I1tlTltl"C~ ,.__"1'.1 1nC-= C':::.%i'-S C `_ _-.~-_- .-__ _ __ ,-_
~~ ~CL _ _ l; ._ ., i _'?,jGi _~-.:~;. .1:7C'~~.. F'....: V:`I' ~. CUC:_ _l:_n~?.ti_'CL __,_'~1 __.L-- _
_ ~cc-._._-_ ..d ~._ .~:~ _::t-- -..-.. _ .~th;_. _cr ;he Dui--. _ _ilance ,^ -- -
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1
1
1'~PP~ ~~ I
II.7TERFiZETATI01: GUIDES FO?3 isiJ2DAI:CE SYSTEi: II:'I'.FI.I~ZG.~;C)/
1. ALI,-INERTIAL
Carious types of inertial ~:.idance systems can be used fcr ballistic
missile.-. A simple auto-pilot with body-1 i;;ed accelerometers and an analogy ~e
computer provides moderate accuracy i'or short range f1i~,hts. ~1t ICBI.1 ranges,
however, it is generally necessary- to ccL:bine gyroscopes and accelerometers
on a stable platforr t?lith three degrees of freedo~:. .; missile-borne digital
conrp~ater is usually required for IC~'M rar_~es, but ar_ analo,-ue ccWputer can
be used fa SZt Bbi rar_ges. 2easurez:~ent of the ce_^p~nert of velccity alon.; the
i
t~1z'Llst dlreCtiOn 1S least aCCUr2tr' iri a_^. 1L'e= tial SySt2r If ': e^~' h1~,}2
accuracy is recurred, it is loical tc supplerent the platfor b~r r..eastu-in~
this 1or_gitudinal corponent. cf velocit;,~ be doppler techniques with ~. siL~le
radio s~.-ste:~. ;1e class all of these systems broadly as inertial s;;-ster..s.
The above types of inertial s;.rsters are distinct in t~:-~ir intern l
zror'-sings, but are about equal_l~~ difficult to observe i^_ rizcto~ aphy. The
ound ha_-zd1_~_n;~ ~.nd alp gn_*-e^+ egL:i n ~ent which is usually associated w:i tip
inertial reference syster.:s is n_-obably t_~e best TAI~;'T indicator. The
&bser_ce of elcetro,:~.gnet=i C COi'S.:t.`_2.1.cat1~~T1 Z71th g~'OUl?d :tatio,ls__exce~t 'or
research and develapr:ent telel:retry--:,_~"e.; it difficult to study ite,~t= ?1~v_
;raided ~;issiles by- ELI;:;T techn~.ques.
~... TAI.._F'? 1
~Po_ iii-.-o ~
- ~
0
(1) I:i ~ht f i^d `,round checkout a~:d~or ecliir~.tien equip-
:_.ent near launcher .
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(2) Survey points should be oriented toward launcher and
be in clear within several hundred feet of stand for all
weather operation. ~
(3) Co11i~a,tion units would probably be in line-of-fire
for research and development flights--not necessary for opera-
tional sites.
(~+) Nearly all activity would be launcher-centered.
~tegative
(5) Absence of cabling between launch area and outlying
racking sites.
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1
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C op;;r
TAT.F. ~ jT
(Positive)
(1) Possibly sar..e as a11-inertial.
(2) Guidance station lccated 1,:_thin cne to three i..i1e.; c~'
launcher, prc;bably rea?~Y:.rd and Frith c1Par line-o?-sight.
(3) Survey points should be centered on dtzic:~.nce mite.
(l+) Possible cable ccn-!ec-lions bett~een ~uida~lee ._,..~~te 4nd
launcher.
(5) Rcad ~ rc:~: ~;~~idai:ce cite to 1.at~cizer would probably be
in J_ine-or -si~;iit.
(v) Possibility ci' radar co11i._.atior. poles near ~uidance?
site uut not in li:.o-o~-1_re.
? (() Possibly- co::r._on ~_dance s:_te f'or 5ever4.1 1at2nc:_~:ra:,
especi4L;,r in operational sites zrit.. c~_ustered launc'_:ol?:,.
1
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F~~les in US:
._. JIJPITI~'c - RIG- _TPL-Doto,'c1a.
~ . 11TLAS - A::~~?~... (013) .
c. T1 Air - '_':TL (olc? cerr:;.c~n)
3 . S Ii: GLE L~ACKIT~?G FZADAR
~_ SjrSteIll Z7:1=CY! Ci~p?iid.`_ pI'L:u2'11y' OII ~~...'iy_" C7~.~.. :.~ ~--_...~ ~:i~. :r~10'.:~. -
aII3 posi tiOn `JeC"tOT'S O1 t_C ?=:_ ~~ilC 1: _.C?I'E' t C?2':_C~: c.. _ .1Gi .. :>;,_V i __... I-,i_ iaLlt O-
pi1e;, of zlode~t accuracy : _ u ua ~ 1y e~:_p~ o,,-ec ~ ~ ~ 1-- . -->riicr. _ ~ cr. i~:e _ ~dio.
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1
A single trackingradar can measure the position of the mi;;sile by
modulation ranging and simultaneous lobing angle-tracking techniques. The
radial and lateral components of velocity can be derived from the position
data by differentiation. At ICBDS ranges, this requires a very precise
tracker, with angular accuracies of the order of tenth of mils. Considera-
tions of mechanical instability and radio propaation angle-of-arrival
scintillations mean that such radars are difficult to build and ~-La.intain.
Collimation procedures for the tracl.er usually require adcLtional mound
support equipment. The computatior_ of velocities from this data means -that
smoothing intervals of 10 to 60 secor_ds ;rust be used to reduce the high
frequency noise accentuated by the differentiation process. A vernier
(predictable) thrust stage is almost surely required. An air-bprne beacon
zrhich replies to the upgoing conrand modulation train is probably used.
The radio frequency would probably lie between S- and X-bands.
a . TAT,F"dT
(Positive)
(1) Single guidance staticr_ to rear of launcher and probably
in line-of-ii-e fo. research and development fli~hta.
(2 ) See r_u y~ers (1)
section.
(2) , ( 2E j , and ( 5 1 in Radio Inertial
(3) T3ecessary radar col"! i::ation target or beacon pole near
guidance station, not :in fiz?in~ sector _ ( Dimensions of telephone
pole.)
(1+) Dlinirai_. of ;aidance chec?:out activity r_ea~~ launcher.
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~_. 0~-~ ~Ou.3CE~
...~..a_1~_. __: US:
a. '1'AI~ - ETL.
~;~ . CORPORAL - JPL-G'-~=' : J_1~:~. .
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~+. THEE II~EPE:DEI:- =2~._DA_~3 .,
its rar_~e from t_r_?ec _. _-_~c~ ~c:. - ~_ _ - -
car modulati^n ray -` r - ~e ~_:--= c?_~, _. ~ - - - ~ - _ -
measure:~?ert of a~~;~;z:?a~ l?ca- - ~ - -
r
the pe~itio?-_ b;- difi'e_?e._~~,_ at_~c
Pract_cal tease 1 Cre~ . `-?-- _ ,._
coz:_"~~:rat. on s'.-~o~?1c' ?~ cc_^t~_ ,_-_ c-- _ _:e ;:, _-- - --
li-e ~~~_istar.ce t~etwce,: t;:e ~?aca-.r; _ ., ~or.-:~ra?~. c ,.
Pr=rclPle s;;~ch~c~ _._.~t=- :7 ~?c' - _ ?_ ~ ---
are rsde a.t o1~~ ~? .1-: d e ? :_ - -_.. .. ., ~ r-,
accurate t^ ~~.11_~ sc,....:_.. u~~ ._ _ ~.;,,
_'ada2- and t at a . ~::- -- _ ..
CC~,..~?:d~ can t:"=eri ~:_ T`3:;:~Cri
- ada.r .
~. i to eac rada ~ ,,-," - - -~'- - ?,c , ~ _.
frequer_cics. S- c- X-~~ - -- - _ -:~._ ., .:.-.,-