CHINESE MISSILE ENCYCLOPEDIA SECTION II: MISSILE AND MISSILE EQUIPMENT STORAGE AND HANDLING FACILITIES DEPLOYED STRATEGIC SSM FACILITIES

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP84T00171R000301550001-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
85
Document Creation Date: 
December 28, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 11, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 1, 1983
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP84T00171R000301550001-8.pdf3.72 MB
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 lt~fEBV~1~'ii?aA? ~ ~.~ ?~Q~~25X1 ~~~~ (~Q40 0 0 K~ Oa4C~G3pG3~Q~00a QC~a4~Q o~c~;~c ~l,g~~~o0~~ [~-~Q~Q~Dopc~~ 0 o~ ~c~Q~o~~;~-~~o~~]o~~aOQ ~~~ ~]a~~o~c~ ~c~~o~~c~~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Q Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR Holders of Z-14662/82, RCA-01/0015/82, Chinese Deployed Strategic Rocket Forces Facilities Encyclopedia (S) SUBJECT Replacement of Preface and Following Pages with Attached Pages (Z-12122/83, RCA-01/0015/82) Please replace the Preface of Section I of the "Chinese Missile Encyclopedia (S)," the Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms, and the List of Installations with the enclosed pages, which carry the same page numbers as the originals. These new pages are important to making maximum use of the material already contained in the encyclopedia and of Section II: "Missile and Missile Equipment Storage and Handling Facilities (S)," which is being distributed separately. ($) East Asian Forces Division Imagery Exploitation Group National Photographic Interpretation Center WNINTEL Z-12122/83 SECRET R CA-01/0015/82 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 SECRET PREFACE 1. When. complete, this report will be a compendium of information on all deployed Chinese SRF facilities that have been identified throughout China. A description of each facility and a summary of activity will be included in the compendium. (S/WN) 2. The compendium will be divided into four sections with appropriate subsections. Publication will be by subsection. Sections I and II will contain descriptions and overviews of the deployed launch facilities and support facilities. Sections III and IV will address the training and the C3 facilities. (S/WN) 3. An introduction will be provided at the beginning of each section and subsection. Following that, each launch complex, launch group, LS, or specific and general support facility will be described in a series of formatted individual reports which meet the basic reporting requirements. In addition to the textual information, each individual report will contain an annotated photograph; each complex and group report will contain an annotated map of all specific and related facilities. (S/WN) 4. All available satellite imagery was used in the preparation of this report. Descriptions were derived from the latest available imagery. Activity summaries and construction chronologies were based on all imagery from negation date to the information cutoff date, which will be indicated in each individual report. The photograph accompanying each report is not necessarily the latest imagery avail- able but was chosen because it best represents the facilities described. (S/WN) 5. The information in this report supersedes that presented in all earlier NPIC basic reports because more recent coverage is available and all that photography has been reviewed. The earlier NPIC reports are listed by control number in the appropriate subsections. Comments and discussion by the imagery analyst are consolidated under the heading Imagery Analyst's Comments. (S/WN) 6. The pagination includes the section number (rendered in Roman numeral) and subsection letter, the geographic place name of the specific facility, and sequential numbering of all similar installations with that place name. Figure numbers are in numerical order by place name. (S/WN) 7. Additional subsections will be published until the compendium is completed. New and undated reports will be issued as necessary or as new information becomes available. (S/WN) Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed to the Missile Section, Strate?ic Forces Branch, East Asian Forces Division, Imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC, (S) WNINTEL ~ - Z-12122/83 SECRET R CA-01/0015/82 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 SECRET J ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BOQ Bachelor officers quarters C3 Command, control, and communications CEP Circular error probable CP Command post CSRF Chinese Strategic Rocket Forces CSA Chinese surface-to-air (missile); followed by system number designator CSS Chinese surface-to-surface (missile); followed by a system number designator CSS-1 Chinese MRBM CSS-2 Chinese IRBM CSS-3 Chinese ICBM CSS-4 Chinese ICBM CSS-NX-3 Chinese SLBM FTP Field training position GSE Ground support equipment ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile km kilometer LS Launch site LSG Launch site garrison MR Military region MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile PLA People's Liberation Army POL Petroleum, oil, and lubricant Radcom Radio communications RIM Receiving, inspection, and maintenance RTP Rail-to-road transfer point RV Reentry vehicle Sigint Signal intelligence SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile SRF Strategic Rocket Forces SRBM Short-range ballistic missile SSM Surface-to-surface missile T/E Transporter/erector TMC Truck-mounted crane TTF Technical training facility Z-12122/83 SECRET RCA-01 /0015/82 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 SECRET LIST OF INSTALLATIONS (As of December 1983) Baoji SSM RTP Beijing Poss SSM 2nd Artl Natl HQ Danzhou SSM Tech Tng Fac Datong SSM Fld Gar Datong SSM RTP Da Qaidam SSM Lch Site 01 Da Qaidam SSM Lch Site 02 Delingha Poss SSM RPT Delingha SSM Prob Regt HQ CP/Bnk Delingha SSM Regt HQ CP Delingha SSM Regt Spt Area A Delingha SSM Regt HQ CP Delingha SSM Lch Site 01 Delingha SSM Lch Site 02 Delingha SSM Lch Site 03 Delingha SSM Lch Site 04 Delingha SSM Tunnel Spt Fac West Delingha SSM Regt Tunnel Spt Fac East Dengshahe SSM Fld Gar Dengshahe SSM Fld Tng Fac Dengshahe SSM Trn Lch Site 1 Dengshahe SSM Fld Gar North Dengshahe SSM RTP 1 Dengshahe SSM RTP 2 Dianhu SSM Spt Fac Fengrun SSM Fld Gar Fengrun SSM Fld Tng Fac Fengxian SSM RTP Fusong SSM Fld Tng Pos 01 Fusong SSM Fld Tng Pos 02 Fusong SSM Fld Tng Pos 03 Fusong SSM Interim Gar Haiyan SSM Fld Tng Fac Jianshui Missile Lch Cplx SSM Jianshui Rail Transfer Point Jianshui SSM Army HQ CP Jianshui SSM Army Altn HQ CP Jianshui IRBM Spt Radcom Sta/Bnk/Hd Jianshui SSM Army Spt Area A Jianshui SSM Army Spt Area B Jianshui SSM Poss RIM Fac Jianshui SSM Regt HQ Jianshui IRBM Regt HQ 1 Radcom/Bnk/Hd Jianshui SSM Regt 1 Spt Area A Jianshui SSM Regt 1 Spt Area B Jianshui SSM Propl Stor Area 1 Jianshui SSM Regt HC! 2 Jianshui SSM Regt 2 Spt Area A Jianshui SSM Regt 2 Spt Area B Jianshui SSM Propl Stor Area 02 Jianshui SSM Lch Cplx Gar 01 Jianshui SSM Lch Cplx Gar 02 Jianshui SSM Lch Site Gar 01 Jianshui SSM Lch Site Gar 02 Jianshui SSM Lch Site Gar 03 Jianshui SSM Lch Site Gar 04 Jianshui SSM Lch Site Gar 05 Jianshui SSM Lch Site Gar 06 Jianshui SSM Lch Site Gar 07 Jianshui SSM Lch Site Gar 09 Jingshan SSM Fld Tng Position Jingxian SSM Fld Tng Pos Jingxian SSM Lch Site 1 Jingxian Prob SSM Lch Site 2 Jingxian SSM Possible Tunnel Construction Jingxian SSM Related Construction 1 Jingxian SSM Related Construction 2 Jiumengjin SSM Tec Tng Fac Kunming SSM Fld Gar Kunming SSM Fld Tng Fac Kunming SSM RTP Lianxiwang Missile Lch Cplx SSM Lianxiwang SSM Army HQ CP Lianxiwang SSM Army Altn HQ CP WNINTEL -iii - Z-12122/83 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 ac~,rsc i Lianxiwang SSM Army Spt Area A Lianxiwang SSM Army Spt Area B Lianxiwang SSM Army Spt Area C Lianxiwang SSM Army Spt Area D Lianxiwang SSM Army Spt Area E Lianxiwang SSM Army Spt Area F Lianxiwang SSM Army Spt Area G Lianxiwang SSM RTP Lianxiwang SSM RTP Spt Fac Lianxiwang SSM RIM Fac Lianxiwang SSM Fld Tng Fac Lianxiwang Regt 2 SSM Cave Stor Area Lianxiwang Poss SSM Spt Fac Lianxiwang SSM Regt 1 HQ CP Lianxiwang SSM Regt 1 Spt Area A Lianxiwang SSM Regt 1 Spt Area B Lianxiwang SSM Propl Stor Area 01 Lianxiwang SSM Regt 2 HQ CP Lianxiwang SSM Regt 2 Spt Area A Lianxiwang SSM Regt 2 Spt Area B Lianxiwang SSM Propl Stor Area 02 Lianxiwang SSM Regt 3 HQ CP Lianxiwang SSM Regt 3 Radcom Sta/Bnk/Hd Lianxiwang SSM Regt 3 Spt Area A Lianxiwang SSM Regt 3 Spt Area B Lianxiwang SSM Regt 3 Spt Area C Lianxiwang SSM Regt 3 Spt Area D Lianxiwang SSM Propl Stor Area 03 Lianxiwang SSM Regt 4 HQ CP Lianxiwang SSM Propl Stor Area 04 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Cmplx Gar 01 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Cmplx Gar 01 A Lianxiwang SSM Lch Cmplx Gar 02 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Cmplx Gar 03 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 01 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 02 - Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 03 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 04 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 05 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar O6 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 07 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar OS Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 10 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 12 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 13 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 14 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 1 7 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 18 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 21 Lianxiwang SSM Lch Site Gar 22 Lianxiwang Poss SSM Lch Site 25 Lianxiwang Poss SSM Lch Site 26 Lianxiwang Poss SSM Lch Site 27 Lianxiwang Poss SSM Lch Site 28 Liuqingkou SSM Lch Cmplx Liuqingkou SSM Regt HQ Cp Liuqingkou SSM Regt Radcom Sta/Bnk/Hd N Liuqingkou SSM Regt Radcom Sta/Bnk/Hd S Liuqingkou SSM Lch Cmplx Gar Liuqingkou SSM RTP Liuqingkou SSM Propl Stor Area Liuqingkou SSM Fld Tng Pos 01 Liuqingkou SSM Fld Tng Pos 02 Liuqingkou SSM Fld Lch Site Gar 01 Liuqingkou SSM Fld Lch Site Gar 02 Liuqingkou SSM Fld Lch Site Gar 03 Liuqingkou SSM Fld Lch Site Gar 04 Luanchuan SSM RIM Fac Luanchuan SSM Army HQ CP Luoning SSM Rgt Housing/Spt Area C Luoning SSM Rgt Housing/Spt Area E Luoning SSM Regt Spt Area A Luoning SSM Construction Spt Area Luoning SSM Lch Site 01 Luoning SSM Lch Site 02 Louyang SSM RTP Lushi SSM Prob Cave/Tunnel Support Facility East Lushi SSM Cave/Tunnel Support Facility West Lushi SSM Lch Site 01 WNINTEL Z-12122/83 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 SECRET Lushi SSM Lch Site 03 Lushi SSM Related Construction Area 1 Lushi SSM Related Construction Area 3 Minluo SSM Fld Tng Pos Shandan SSM RTP Shuangta SSM Fld Tng Pos 1 Shuangta SSM Fld Tng Pos 2 Shuangta SSM Fld Tng Pos 3 Shuangta SSM Fld Tng Pos 4 Sundian Msl Lch Cmplx SSM Sundian ICBM LS1 Radcom Sta/Bnk/Hd Sundian SSM Regt Spt Area A Sundian SSM Cave Stor Spt Fac N Sundian SSM Cave Stor Spt Fac S Sundian SSM Propl Stor Area Sundian SSM Lch Site 02 Sundian SSM Lch Site 03 Sundian SSM Lch Site 04 Tongdao Msl Lch Cmplx SSM Tongdao SSM Army HQ CP Tongdao Poss SSM RIM Fac Tongdao Prob SSM RTP Tongdao SSM Prob Regt HQ Tongdao SSM Regt Spt Area A Tongdao SSM Regt Spt Area B Tongdao SSM Cave/Tnl Constr S Tongdao SSM Lch Site 1 Tongdao SSM Lch Site 2 Tongdao SSM Lch Site 4 Tonghua Lch Cmplx SSM Tonghua SSM Army HQ CP Tonghua SSM Army Altn HQ CP Tonghua SSM Army Radcom Sta/Bnk/Hd 01 Tonghua SSM Army Spt Area A Tonghua SSM Army Spt Area B Tonghua SSM Army Spt Area C Tonghua SSM Army Spt Area D Tonghua SSM Army Propl Stor Area Tonghua SSM RTP 1 Tonghua SSM RTP 2 Tonghua SSM RTP 3 Tonghua SSM Regt 1 HQ CP Tonghua SSM Regt 1 Spt Area A Tonghua SSM Regt 1 Spt Area B Tonghua SSM Regt 2 HQ CP Tonghua SSM Regt 2 Altn HQ CP Tonghua SSM Regt 2 Radcom Sta/Bnk/Hd Tonghua SSM Regt 2 Spt Area A Tonghua SSM Regt 2 Spt Area B Tonghua SSM Regt 3 HQ CP Tonghua SSM Regt 3 Altn HQ CP Tonghua SSM Regt 3 Spt Area A Tonghua SSM Propl Stor Area 01 Tonghua SSM Propl Stor Area 01 B Tonghua SSM Propl Stor Area 02 Tonghua SSM Lch Cmplx Gar 01 Tonghua SSM Lch Cmplx Gar 1A Tonghua SSM Lch Cmplx Gar 02 Tonghua SSM Lch Cmplx Gar 02A Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 01 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 02 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 04 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 05 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 06 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar OS Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 09 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 10 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 1 1 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 12 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 13 Tonghua SSM Lch Site Gar 14 Wuwei Prob SSM RTP Xian SSM Tech Tng Fac Xian RTP Xixia SSM Fld Gar Xuanhua SSM Depot Yidu SSM Tec Tng Fac Xuanhua SSM Fld Gar WNINTEL - ~ - Z-12122/83 SECRET Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 1 Top Secret RUFF NOFORN MEMORANDUM FOR Holders of Z-14662/82, RCA-01/0015/82, Chinese Deployed Strategic Rocket Forces Facilities Encyclopedia (S) SUBJECT Addition of Section II (Introduction) and Subsection IIA Section II: Missile and Missile Equipment Storage and Handling Facilities-Introduction Section Ila: Missile Handling and Storage Facilities. Please note the classification of this material; it must be stored separately from the material already in your hands and handled in the appropriate channels. You will soon receive Subsection IE of Section I, which is expected to carry the same classification as the material attached here. New covers for the encyclopedia reflecting the higher classification of this more recent material will be distributed at that time. (S) Encyclopedia (S)" for your retention: Attached are the following additions RCA-01/0009/83) to the "Chinese Missile 25X1 East Asian Forces Division Imagery Exploitation Group National Photographic Interpretation Center Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 SECTION II MISSILE AND MISSILE EQUIPMENT STORAGE AND HANDLING FACILITIES (S) Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF SECTION 11: MISSILE AND MISSILE EQUIPMENT STORAGE AND HANDLING FACILITIES INTRODUCTION 1. Section II is a compilation of reports on strategic missile support facilities grouped according to our assessment of each facility's principal function: Subsection IIA: Missile Storage and Handling Subsection IIB: Missile Propellant Storage Subsection IIC: Missile Warhead Storage and Handling Subsection IID: Ground-Support Equipment (GSE) Storage. Each report describes all activities at the facility, but its principal activity is the basis for the grouping of reports under common headings. All of these facilities differ from those described in Section I in that they have no launch sites and do not store together all the equipment needed to launch a missile. (S/WN)) 2. A list of all targets to be covered in this encyclopedia, in alphabetical order by BE name and number, is included in the preface to the encyclopedia (pages iii-v). It is the intention to keep this list current. Changes are made frequently as existing facilities are modified and new facilities are identified. Occasionally, changes in the categories and targeting methodologies in the DIA "Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS)" result in a new name for an old installation or a separate name for a part of an installation. This section uses the current BE name and number as of each report's latest date of informa- tion. Other, previously used names may be included in the introduction of each report. (S/WN)) 3. The same definitions and methodologies used in Section I will be used in Section II and through- out subsequent sections of the encyclopedia. Any new term or abbreviation will be defined when it is first used. A list of abbreviations common to the entire report has been published as part of the preface to the encyclopedia (page ii). (U) I I-1 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 SUBSECTION IIA MISSILE STORAGE AND HANDLING FACILITIES (S) Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F NOFORN TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .................................................................................................................................................IIA-1 SSM Road-to-Rail Transfer Points and Facilities (RTP/RTF) Baoji SSM RTP .......................................................................................................................................IIA-6 Datong SSM RTP ...................................................................................................................................IIA-8 Delingha Possible SSM RTP ................................................................................................................IIA-10 Dengshahe SSM RTP 1 ........................................................................................................................IIA-12 Dengshahe SSM RTP 2 ........................................................................................................................IIA-14 Kunming SSM RTP ..............................................................................................................................IIA-16 Lianxiwang SSM RTP ...........................................................................................................................IIA-18 Liuqingkou SSM RTP ..........................................................................................................................IIA-20 Luoyang SSM RTP ...............................................................................................................................I IA-22 Shandan SSM RTP ...............................................................................................................................IIA-24 Tongdao Probable SSM RTP ...............................................................................................................IIA-26 Tonghua SSM RTP 1 ............................................................................................................................IIA-28 Tonghua SSM RTP 2 ............................................................................................................................IIA-30 Tonghua SSM RTP 3 ............................................................................................................................IIA-32 Wuwei Probable SSM RTP ..................................................................................................................IIA-34 Xian RTP ..............................................................................................................................................I IA-36 SSM Depots Xuanhua SSM Depot ...........................................................................................................................IIA-38 SSM Receiving, Inspection, and Maintenance Facilities )ianshui SSM Possible RIM Fac ..........................................................................................................IIA-40 Lianxiwang SSM RIM Fac ...................................................................................................................IIA-42 Luanchuan SSM RIM Fac ....................................................................................................................IIA-44 Tongdao SSM RIM Fac .......................................................................................................................IIA-46 SSM Cave and/or Tunnel Support Facilities Delingha SSM Regt Tunnel Support Facility East ..............................................................................IIA-48 Delingha SSM Tunnel Support Facility West .....................................................................................IIA-50 Sundian SSM Cave Storage Support Facility North ..........................................................................IIA-52 Sundian SSM Cave Storage Support Facility South ...........................................................................IIA-54 Jingxian SSM Possible Tunnel Construction ......................................................................................IIA-56 Jingxian SSM Related Construction 1 ................................................................................................IIA-58 Jingxian SSM Related Construction 2 ................................................................................................IIA-60 Lushi SSM Probable Cave/Tunnel Support Facility East ...................................................................IIA-62 Lushi SSM Cave/Tunnel Support Facility West .................................................................................IIA-64 Lushi SSM Related Construction Area 1 ............................................................................................IIA-66 Lushi SSM Related Construction Area 3 ............................................................................................IIA-68 Tongdao SSM Cave/Tunnel Construction South ..............................................................................IIA-70 Reverse side blank -i- Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF NOFORN SUBSECTION IIA: MISSILE STORAGE AND HANDLING FACILITIES INTRODUCTION 1. This subsection presents basic reports on support facilities where missile storage or handling is the principal function. These studies, when combined with the reports in Section I, complete the reports on the types of deployed facilities in China that store or handle strategic missile airframes, except those at training areas. (S/WN) DEFINITIONS SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point or Facility (RTP or RTF) 2. An SSM rail-to-road transfer point or facility in China is any location served by both rail and road where missiles and missile ground support equipment (GSE) for deployment have been transferred from one transportation network to the other. (S/WN) SSM Depot 3. An SSM depot is a facility for the long-term storage of missiles that have not been assigned to a deployed unit. Storage can be in either caves or buildings. (S/WN) SSM Receiving, Inspection, and Maintenance (RIM) Facility 4. An SSM receiving, inspection, and maintenance (RIM) facility in China is a facility at a deployed SSM complex that contains a specialized building where a missile may be inspected and maintenance performed. (S/WN) SSM Cave/Tunnel Storage Facility ~ ~ 5. An SSM cave/tunnel storage facility is a hardened, underground facility at a deployed SSM ~ complex where missiles are stored separate from a launcher or launch unit. Single-entrance (cave) and multiple-entrance, drive-through (tunnel) facilities have been found. (S/WN) DISCUSSION 6. The primary function of each of the types of facilities defined above is the storage or handling of missile airframes. However, some GSE is also present where missiles are stored, even if that equipment is limited to the GSE needed to lift and transport the missiles. Some installations apparently store large amounts of GSE alon with missiles. 25X1 25X1 7. Following is a discussion of the operations at each of the types of facilities defined above and how each is identified. This discussion is preceded by a description of specialized equipment and the rail transport of missiles and launch units. (S/WN) Rail Transport of Missiles and Launch Units 8. China's strategic missiles, except for the CSS-4 ICBM, are transported in converted passenger and baggage rail cars and occasionally in boxcars. The specialized attar must eat east as ong as t e missi a so t at t e entire missile airframe clears the end of the transporter car before it is turned or lifted. (TSR) Otherwise, a missile launch unit traveling y rai uses or inary attars, oxcars, an passenger cars. (TSR) 10. There is considerable evidence that two separate trains are used to transport a launch unit. One train, composed mostly of flatcars, carries all vehicles and wheeled GSE; a few boxcars and passenger cars apparently carry personnel and their supplies. This train uses an ordinary end-loading dock or inclined ramp to load and unload. Transloading operations can take place virtually anywhere along a rail line; at one location a temporary ramp was erected across an ordinary rail siding and was removed after the train was unloaded. (S/WN) IIA-1 Top Secret R CA-01/0009/83 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F 11. The second train probably carries the rest of the launch unit. Separate trains carrying only missiles (and probably their RVs) have been identified. These trains usually contain missile railcars, a missile transfer flatcar, one to four additional passenger-type railcars for guards, the rest of the launch unit personnel, and possibly the unit commanders. Propellant railcars have been seen attached to both types of trains. Transporting the launch unit in two parts may be a form of security and control. This precaution has been observed elsewhere in the missile forces, particularly when launch units are based in remote locations: there is no evidence that propellants are stored at type A missile bases, for example, and there is some evidence that missiles and warheads also are not routinely stored at these garrisons. (S/WN) Missile Transloading Operations 12. No direct observation of a missile being transferred from its railcar transporter to road trans- porter has yet been made. Nevertheless, the procedure can be inferred from the equipment and facilities present and also from recent photographs released by the Chinese (Figures 2 and 3). Once a missile has been rolled out onto the flatcar from the transporter car, via the rail guides, a crane lifts it from its dolly and places it onto a road transporter. Normally this operation is performed from the side of the train, so a side-loading dock or a stable support area for the crane is necessary for this operation (Figure 4). Specialized transloading buildings, with an overhead crane and rail and road entrances, have been constructed at some RTPs to handle missile transloading more smoothly and under shelter. These special- ized transloading buildings have been identified at deployed complexes, at the separate, large SSM depots, and at missile test ranges. However, almost any passenger station or isolated rail siding could be used, particularly during wartime. (S/WN) I I A-2 Top Secret J 25X1 RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F C Identification of and Operations at SSM RTPs China at storage yards and manufacturing areas. The types of buildings at missile RTPs, including high-bay rail- and road-served buildings, are common in 14. 15. Some operating missile RTPs have not yet been found. Six missile bases and complexes have no identified RTP. Examples are: Fengrun SSM Field Garrison, Liuqingkou SSM Launch Complex Garrison, Datong SSM Field Garrison, Tongdao Missile Launch Complex SSM prior to 1980, and the Sundian Missile Launch Complex SSM prior to 1979. Candidate RTPs have been found for each base or complex, and all are included in the basic reports in this subsection; however, these RTPs cannot be confirmed as related to the missile force until missile railcars or GSE are observed. (TSR) 16. A few confirmed missile RTPs serve unconfirmed missile facilities or deployed launch sites. They are Baoji SSM RTP, Fengxian SSM RTP, and possibly Xixiang SSM RTP. All are in central China, south or west of Xian. (S/WN) 17. Operations at the SSM RTPs are limited for the most part to transloading of missiles and other GSE. Most do not have buildings or caves for long-term storage of missile equipment. RTPs that serve large deployment complexes also handle or store building supplies and general equipment in support of construction or the large military population in the area. Only a few RTPs are within a missile complex or base. Two of them, at Tonghua, have been joined with a RIM facility and do have some equipment storage areas. For the most part, however, missile equipment handling activity is transitory and conducted at night or in buildings. Light-standards have been observed at all the frequently used RTPs. Also, these RTPs are the ones most likely to contain a transloading building to provide cover for transloading missiles and GSE at all times of the day or in bad weather. (S/WN) At Tonghua, the 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 functions of the RIM facility, once concentrated at SSM RTP 1, have been dispersed to areas closer to each launch regiment-at Tonghua Launch Complex Garrison 1, Launch Complex Garrison 2A, and possi- bly at SSM RTP 3. At Liuqingkou, the Launch Complex Garrison is the RIM facility for that small complex (see subsection IB). (S/WN) the last ten years. Identification of and Operations at SSM RIM Facilities 18. The maintenance needs for China's missile systems are not known. At each missile base and complex, certain buildings or parts of buildings, usually with ahigh-bay or raised roof section containing an overhead traveling crane, appear to be for missile maintenance. However, these same buildings, since they are often the only ones in missile complexes or bases containing either heavy-lifting equipment or a metal-working shop, are often used for general vehicle repair and for all types of fabrication and repair work in the complex where metal-heating and shaping is necessary. The small, separate maintenance buildings or bays at each field garrison and at some launch complex garrisons were reported in subsec- tions IA and IB. The large, drive-through RIM building, found separately at most launch site complexes, and the facility surrounding it are reported in this subsection. (S/WN) 19. The association of these buildings with missile maintenance is based upon the wide-radius turns on the roads leading to the buildings. Few sightings of missile GSE and fewer still of missile transporters have been made. It appears that these facilities are for emergency or temporary repairs to missiles and at most other times operate as the major maintenance center for many types of equipment at the complex or base. (S/WN) 20. The four RIM facilities reported in this subsection have all been expanded and improved over CPYRG I IA-3 Top Secret RCA-01/0009i~83' 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF 21. The level of activity observed at the RIM facilities appears to correspond to the extent of missile deployment in the complex it serves. At smaller complexes, like Luanchuan, activity levels have been very low until recently. Observations of vehicles or GSE and other signs of work in progress are most frequent at Lianxiwang, Jianshui, and Tonghua complexes. The Tongdao RIM facility has been doubled in size in the past two years, but little activity has been detected. Lack of imagery of this facility, however, hinders assessment. (S/WN) 22. Considering the lack of activity observed at these RIM facilities, and the other types of missile maintenance facilities in the deployed missile force, it appears that missile maintenance is carried out mostly in the deployment area by launch crews and by specialized personnel in each launch regiment. Missiles are not routinely sent out of the launch regiment to the large separate RIM facilities either for periodic maintenance or routine initial inspections. Thus, it appears that the RIM facilities are used for major breakdowns or accidents that cannot be repaired by personnel in the launch regiment. If the work cannot be done in the RIM facility, the missile is probably returned to the factory for rework or replace- ment. (S/WN) Identification of and Operations at SSM Depots 23. Only one missile depot has been identified in China, at Xuanhua. It is approximately 185 km west-northwest of Beijing, the location of the factory where virtually all China's deployed missiles have been produced. The depot appears to be an intermediary between the factory and the deployed forces. It was identified by the presence of specialized missile railcars and flatcars at the transloading area. Xuanhua is apparently used for long-term storage of missile airframes and possibly nuclear weapons. No other types of railcars or GSE, except those needed to handle and transload missiles, have ever been seen there. (TSR) 24. China probably has other missile depots. There are indications that one has been operating within the Tonghua Missile Launch Complex, at Launch Complex Garrison 2 and RTP 2 (see subsection IB and this subsection for basic reports on those installations). If this depot and the one at Xuanhua are accepted as supporting their respective regions of the country, then another depot should be located in south China. Increasing deployment in central and west China in the next few years suggests another depot should be serving that area of the country. A candidate depot has been found, at Taibai Strategic Storage Facility near Baoji, but no missile GSE has been detected within the facility. (S/WN) 25. The one confirmed and two probable missile depots suggest that a regional supply, storage, and transfer system exists for strategic missiles and probably the nuclear weapons for them. The postulated regional depot system would be similar, in concept, to the systems of regional and local depots in China for both the surface-to-air missile forces and cruise missile forces. (S/WN) Identification of and Operations at SSM Cave/Tunnel Storage Facilities 26. Virtually all SSM cave or tunnel facilities identified in this subsection are associated with the ICBM forces-either the CSS-3 or CSS-4-because similar underground storage installations in the MRBM or IRBM complexes are classified as types of missile bases. These facilities are the subject of previously CPYRGHT Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF issued reports in Section I. Caves and tunnels with rail guides at the entrances have been identified near the two operating CSS-3 silos and are presumed therefore to be storing at least some missile airframes, and some GSE. Similar tunnels and caves with rail guides are in the Delingha 25X1 CSS-3 deployment area. Reports on each of these facilities are included in this subsection on facilities that are not missile bases and where missile storage and handling are the principal or most important func- tions. (TSR) 27. In 1982 new CSS-4 deployment areas were identified near Lushi in east-central China and )ingxian in south-central China. The facilities at these new deployment areas are under construction and will not be completed until 1985 or 1986. Two CSS-4 silos were found in each new deployment area, and three or four separate areas of cave and/or tunnel excavations were also observed. The function of the caves and/or tunnels is not known, but the size of many of the caves indicates strongly that they will be used at least for GSE storage, if not for missile airframe storage. Each of these new but unfinished facilities is also included in this subsection. As the facilities are finished and their functions become better known, updated reports will be issued. (S/WN) I I A-5 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01!11:CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Baoji SSM Rail-to DMAAC, USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0384-14, scale 1;200,000 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Baoji SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point (RTP) is a confirmed SSM RTP. This is based on the nd occasional sighting of SSM GSE at this installation. The RTP is 9.0 km east of Baoji, Shaanxi Province, Lanzhou Military Region, in central China, The RTP consists of a high-bay missile and GSE transloading building, 19 warehouses, a small shop area, a vehicle maintenance area, a vehicle storage area, three open storage areas, a barracks area, and two rail spurs, all enclosed by a wall with gates for road and rail entry (Figure 1). (S/WN Associated Facilities 2, This facilit ma serve Taibai Probable Strategic Storage Facility a suspected missile facility approximately 60 km south and connected to this RTP by an improved, intermittently paved road. The nearest known missile facility is Xian SSM Technical Training Facility, over 140 km away, No other strategic missile facility, either launch site or field garrison, has been identified in this area. The national-level buried cable network passes within 400 meters to the south of this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The high-bay missile and GSE transloading building measures A rail spur goes through the building and terminates at an end-loading dock, The building has two en- trances at each end for rail and road access. It could accommodate two to six missile airframes simultane- ously. Side-loading docks parallel both sides of the two spurs. There is no discernible underground missile storage. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. Two nine-bay garages, face each other; access to them is through a gate. Missile-related GSE has been seen at the RTP, but none has been seen near these garages or in the vehicle yard connected to them. There is no underground GSE storage at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5, There are 19 warehouses within the facility, 13 of which are large enough to house missile GSE; however, the warehouses have been associated so far only with nonmissile-related materials and equip- ment, There are eight support buildings/sheds in the RTP and three open storage areas, in the eastern, the northern, and the southern sections of the RTP, The vehicle maintenance yard is in the northwest corner of the facility and consists of a grease rack, three sheds, and a hoist for lifting engines. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6, The barracks area contains seven probable barracks with floorspace of 1,800 square meters, providing housing for an estimated 390 personnel. The barracks area also has three possible BOQ/sup- port buildings, three messhalls, a lighted basketball court, four sets of animal pens, and several sheds, There are four shop buildings just east of the barracks area. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is November 1966, The RTP was seen under construction initially in mid-1968. The rail spurs into the RTP were constructed between 1969 and 1970, Most of the facility was completed by 1970, The missile and GSE transloading building was constructed between December 1970 and July 1972, The national-level buried cable network, which passes 400 meters to the south of the RTP, was also completed in 1972. Only minor construction and maintenance activity has been observed since. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has not been associated with any specific SSM missile system. (S/WN) 9. The RTP has been observed infre uentl and only on poor quality imagery, Missile railcars were not observed at the RTP until when a probable type Amissile-associated railcar was seen halfway into the transloading building. OnOtype Amissile-associated railcars were observed at each end of the building, On one type A missile railcar and one type B4 missile transfer flatcar were on the rail spurs in the RTP. There was also a probable warhead van parked near the vehicle maintenance area on this date. This may have indicated a warhead transfer operation. No missile railcars have been observed since October 1982, On two warhead vans were in the vehicle maintenance area. A truck chassis that measured close to the size of a warhead van chassis was also present. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. Baoji RTP may serve Taibai Strategic Storage facility. The Taibai facility has some characteristics that indicate it could be used for storing missile GSE It contains five drive-in caves with clamshell blast doors and rail guides extending from their entrances, The blast doors, although similar in appearance to those seen at deployed SSM facilities, are smaller than the doors on missile hold bunkers and larger than the doors on GSE storage bunkers, This facility is still under construction. No missile-related equipment has been sighted at Taibai, Until a definite function is established for Taibai a tenuous connection between the two facilities will continue to exist, The type 64 missile transfer flatcars observed at the RTP have been associated with the CSS-NX-3 SLBM, CSA-1, and CSS-N-1 missile systems. Type A missile railcars have been associated with all liquid SSM systems except the CSS-4, Therefore, no specific missile system association can be assigned to Baoji RTP, Taibai may be associated with any one or more of China's missile systems, (S/WN) 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 L~/1 I IIA6 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01!11:CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F Datong SSM Rail- to-Road Transfer Point ~ CH SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0332-20, scale 1:200,000 May 83 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Datong SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is a confirmed SSM RTP. This is based on the facilities present and its location near a known SSM facility. The RTP is 60 km northwest of Datong, Qinghai Province, Lanzhou Military Region, in western China. It consists of two rail spurs leading to concrete off- loading docks and a movable overhead crane (Figure 2). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility may serve the Datong SSM Field Garrison located approximately 33 km west of the RTP. The national-level buried cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. There is no missile storage at the facility. The west rail spur leads to aside-loading dock; the east rail spur leads to an end-loading dock and is served by a movable overhead crane. The crane could be used not only to handle a missile airframe but could also handle missile support equipment and vehicles. No underground missile storage is discernible. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. No surface or underground GSE storage is at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. Two small support buildings provide the only additional storage and support at this facility. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. There are no barracks or housing at this facility. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is October 1976. This facility was completed by and there have been no additions since that time. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. If this facility is used by CSRF forces, it would be associated with the CSS-2 IRBM, based on its proximity to the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. Infrequent coverage, approximately once a year, prevents an accurate assessment of activity levels. The presence of the loading docks, overhead crane, and its location 33 km from Datong Field Garrison provide some evidence that this facility could be SSM associated. (S/WN) I IA-8 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F Delingha Possible SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point ~ CH DMATC. JOG (Ground), Series 1501, Sheet NJ47-9, scale 1:250,000 7 Jul 78 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Delingha Possible SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is now a confirmed SSM RTP. This confirma- tion is based on the October 1983 sighting of CSS-3-related SSM GSE at this installation. It is located on the east side of the city of Delingha, Qinghai Province, Lanzhou Military Region, in western China. The RTP (Figure 3) is wall secured, contains three rail sidings, and a passenger station. (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 1.0 km east of Delingha Regiment Support Area A and 30 km 25X1 southeast of four CSS-3 ICBM launch sites. The RTP is served by the national-level buried cable commu- nications system. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The RTP, which is wall secured, contains three rail sidings, one of which has both an end-loading dock and aside-loading dock. Each siding is approximately 300 meters long. There are no missile storage or handling buildings because of the proximity of the regiment support area, which has storage buildings for missile airframes. There is no underground missile storage at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. There are no surface or underground GSE storage or handling buildings, again because of the proximity of the regiment support area. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. A small passenger terminal is within the facility. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. There are no barracks or housing at this facility. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility isOThe rail line was constructed to Delingha in early 25X1 1978. The RTP was constructed between No additional construction has been 25X1 observed since that date. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with the CSS-3 SSM missile system because of equipment sight- ings and this facility's location in relationship to the associated facilities listed. The RTP serves the CSS-3 ICBM launch groups at Delingha and Da Qaidam. (S/WN) 9. A possible CSS-2/-3 missile train was observed in June 1982. In August 1983, a confirmed CSS-2/-3 missile train was identified. In October 1983, aCSS-3 missile and GSE transfer was observed. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. This RTP is used primarily for general cargo and construction material transfer. It is used by the CSRF when necessary. (S/WN) IIA-10 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Dengshahe SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point 1 ~ CH DMAAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0381-5, scale 1:200,000 Location and Identification Sep 64 BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Dengshahe SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point 1 is the RTP for Luda/Chengshahe Airfield ~~ 25X1 and is not associated with SSM equipment. It is 300 meters south of the airfield and 4.0 km 25X1 northeast of Dengshahe, Liaoning Province, Shenyang Military Region, in northeastern China. The facility consists of four or five separately walled storage areas for POL and aircraft fuel, bulk cargo, lumber and building materials; and a motor pool. It is served by a single-track rail spur that branches into two tracks within the RTP (Figure 4). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. In addition to its association with the airfield, this RTP has supported an air warning radar site (Luda/Chengshahe Airfield Air Warning Radar Facility, and anti-aircraft defense forces at 25X1 the airfield, including a CSA-1 launch site (Luda SAM Site C04A-21, ~ (S/WN) 25X1 Missile Storage and Handling 3. There are no facilities at this RTP for handling or storing SSMs. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. There are no missile GSE handling or storage facilities. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. The RTP contains warehouses for bulk cargo and earth-covered tanks for POL and aircraft fuel. (S/W N) Barracks and Housing 6. Each walled area contains one or two barracks for 15 to 30 security personnel and for personnel to man the storage areas. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The RTP and airfield were present on the earliest available imagery, on Few changes were observed until the mid-1970s. Since then, the amount of warehouse space has been doubled, housing improved, and the motor pool constructed. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. SSM-associated railcars have been observed on both the rail spur leading to and the rail spur within the facility. These railcars appear to have been shunted onto these tracks in order to get them out of the way of the main line traffic for the town of Dengshahe. (See Dengshahe SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point 2, in this report, for a description of SSM transloading associated witti the SSM field garrisons and training facilities in the area.) (S/WN) IIA-12 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF IIA-13 - Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 9. The presence of these SSM-associated railcars at this RTP was heaviest in May, August, and November 1978. Types A and B missile railcars were observed on each occasion. Type B propellant cars were also seen. Missile railcars were also present in September and October 1979. On these two occa- sions, the railcars were on the rail spur near its junction with the main rail line (not on figure). A flat area of packed earth at that location makes that area suitable for transloading. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. This RTP has no side-loading or end-loading docks suitable for transloading missiles or GSE. The only side-loading dock is more thanOfrom the rail spur. General and bulk cargo are loaded via 25X1 conveyors and ramps out to the railcars. POL and aircraft fuel is off-loaded via overhead racks between the rail spurs. The discovery of missile railcars next to a flat, packed-earth area 250 meters south of this facility indicates that transloading of missile GSE probably has occurred at that area. Most equipment for the Dengshahe SSM garrisons is apparently transloaded at RTP 2. (S/WN) Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Dengshahe SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point 2 DMAAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0381-5, scale 1:200,000 Location and Identification Sep 64 BASIC DESCRIPTIOfd 1. Dengshahe SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point 2 is a confirmed SSM RTP. This is based on the sighting of SSM GSE at this installation. The RTP is in the railyard of Dengshahe City, Liaoning Province, Shenyang Military Region, in northeast China. It consists of one rail siding, an end- loading dock with a vehicle ramp, and an overhead traveling crane (Figure 5). (S/WN) Associated facilities 2. The RTP is approximately 1.0 km south of Dengshahe SSM Field Garrison, 8 km south of Deng- shahe SSM Field Garrison North, and approximately 16 km north of Dengshahe SSM Field Training Launch Site 1, which has been used by both CSS-1 and CSS-2 units. The national-level buried cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility but is within 1.0 km to the north, running generally east to west. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The rail siding is parallel to the main rail line, along a grain storage and shipment area, and can be switched to run trains back onto the main line or to an end-loading dock. An overhead traveling crane is parallel to the south side of the rail siding, the end-loading dock, and the vehicle ramp. There are no buildings or caves for missile storage. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. The end-loading dock and the vehicle ramp are large enough to handle missile GSE, but there is no surface or underground GSE storage at this facility. GSE storage is provided by Dengshahe SSM Field Garrison and SSM Field Garrison North. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No other significant storage is available at this facility. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. No barracks or housing are at this facility. Barracks and housing are probably provided by Dengshahe SSM Field Garrison. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. Dengshahe City Railyards were seen on the earliest available coverage, on September 1964. As early as October 1977, the beginning of support to the CSRF was observable by the presence of a dirt ramp at the rail siding. In August 1979, a rail siding was laid from the rail yard onto the ramp and to its end. In September 1979, the tracks were installed for the overhead crane. The overhead crane was installed and the vehicle ramp was started in December 1979. The end-loading dock was started in June 1980 and was complete, together with the vehicle ramp, by September 1980. No further construction has been observed. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with the CSS-1 and CSS-2 SSMs because of railcar sightings and its location in relationship to the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) IIA-14 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 25X1 J Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF 9. The first identification of missile railcars occurred on ~ when one possible type 25X1 A missile railcar and one type B missile transfer flatcar were seen at the RTP. That date was near the end of the 1981 summer training cycle. Missile railcars were again present during the next two annual training cycles in 1982 and 1983 at Dengshahe SSM Field Training Launch Site 1. Also, at the beginning of the 1983 training cycle, one type A missile railcar, one possible type A and one type B missile transfer flatcar, and three type Amissile-associated railcars were in the RTP on (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. There appears to be little chance of observing vehicular GSE at the RTP because of its proximity to the field garrison. (S/WN) Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F Kunming SSM Ra DMAAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0496-17, scale 1:200,000 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Kunming SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is a confirmed SSM RTP. This confirmation is based on the March 1973 and continued sighting of SSM GSE at this installation. The RTP is 16 km southeast of Kunming, Yunnan Province, Kunming Military Region, in south China. It contains a missile and GSE transloading building served by three rail spurs, an end-loading dock, aside-loading dock, and a small support area (Figure 6). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 6.2 km east-northeast of Kunming SSM Field Garrison and 9.5 km north-northwest of Kunming SSM Field Training Facility. It serves lianshui SSM Missile Launch Complex, approximately 122 km to the south, and is the closest identified RTP to the Jianshui Complex. The national-level buried cable network passes within 2 km of this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The missile and GSE transloading building is It has four entrances, two rail-served (one standard-gauge and one narrow-gauge), and two road-served. The standard-gauge rail entrance is approximately The narrow-gauge rail and both road entrances are No other buildings in the RTP are large enough to handle missiles. There is a lightning arrester tower at the northwest corner of the transloader building. Three light standards are alongside the loading docks, one at the entrance to the RTP, and one west and one east of the rail spurs. There is no underground missile storage at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. There is no surface or underground GSE storage at this facility. GSE is handled through the transloading building, which is large enough to handle such equipment, or on the loading docks.(S/WN) Other Storage 5. No other significant storage is available at this facility. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. One messhall, one newly constructed probable support building, one barracks, and three small building/sheds are in the support area. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. Excavation for the foundation of the transloading building had begun by January 1972, the earliest available imagery. The building appeared externally complete in May 1972. The RTP, including the transloading building, the docks, the railspurs, and one support building/shed, appeared complete in August 1972, although there were construction materials still on the loading docks in October 1972. The messhall and the probable barracks were constructed between May 1973 and December 1973. The probable support building was completed in October 1982. No obvious construction has been observed since then. (S/WN) 25X1 25X1 I IA-16 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with the SRBM and with SSMs CSS-1, -2, -3, and -4 because of equipment sightings and this facility's location in relationship to the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9. Missile railcars were first observed here in March 1973, when one possible type A missile railcar, one possible type B missile transfer flatcar, and a flatcar were present. Since then, missile railcars, includ- ing type C1, C2, and type A propellant railcars, have been seen numerous times, particularly during field training exercise periods at Kunming SSM Training Launch Site 1. Vehicular GSE has been seen on three occasions in the RTP. The first was in May 1973, when four CSS-2 IRBM fuel trucks were on the side- loading dock off-loading propellants from a propellant railcar. The second sighting was in September 1981, when a transfer operation involving a probable CSS-2 missile regiment-level unit was observed in progress: four probable CSS-2 missile transporters were next to the rail spurs, and 22 missile and missile- associated railcars were on the spurs. The third sighting of GSE occurred on when one 25X1 possible SRBM transporter, one possible SRBM T/E, six missile-related railcars, and several pieces of GSE were alongside the rail spur at the RTP. By~only six of the 12 previously reported missile railcars 25X1 were present, and the SRBM equipment was gone. No SRBM GSE or training was observed at the Kunming Field Training Launch Facility Site 1. The SRBM GSE was removed from an unknown location and moved to an unknown location. (S/WN) 10. On ~ 12 canvas-covered CSA-1 missiles on transporters, six canvas-covered canister 25X1 transporters, and 13 other vehicles were at the RTP. Three type A missile railcars and one type B missile transfer flatcar were on the rail spur. It is unusual for surface-to-air missile equipment to be at an RTP, which is normally associated only with surface to surface missiles. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 11. Since 1973, missile and missile-associated railcars have been present nearly continously at the RTP. Several non-missile-associated RTPs in the area handle the transfer of civilian goods and other military equipment from the standard-guage rails of the central region of China to the narrow-guage rail running through the southern border region of China and into North Vietnam. Therefore, the railcars at this RTP can be presumed to be SSM-related, or at least to be carrying sensitive military equipment, as in the case of the CSA-1 equipment observed in May 1979. (S/WN) Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Lianxiwang SSM SAC. USATC Series 200, Sheet 0493-09, scale 1:200,000 Aug 83 Sep 65 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Lianxiwang SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is a confirmed SSM RTP. This is based on the August 1972 and continued sighting of SSM GSE at this installation. The facility is 111 km north-northeast of the city of Lianxiwang, Anhui Province, Guangzhou Military Region, in east-central China. The RTP consists of a rail yard with three sidings, one rail spur, an end-loading and side-loading dock, and associated housing and storage areas (Figure 7). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 97 km north-northeast of the Lianxiwang Missile Launch Complex SSM and is the RTP for this complex. The associated support area (formerly the Lianxiwang SSM Support Facility, BE is just to the west of the rail yard. The national-level buried cable network serves this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. Two two-bay missile storage and checkout buildings in the support area provide missile storage. Missiles may also be stored temporarily in missile railcars on the rail spur; missiles are probably moved to more secure launch sites shortly after their arrival at the RTP. There is no underground missile storage at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. The support facility on the west side of the rail yard contains one four-bay vehicle storage building. There is no underground GSE storage at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. Five warehouses for general cargo and areceiving/shipping office, located on the loading dock, are available at this facility. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. The barracks have a fioorspace of 920 square meters, providing housing for an estimated 200 personnel. Some housing may be available for transients. (S/V~/N) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is September 1965. Initial construction was observed in Septem- ber 1965 and was completed by January 1967. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with the CSS-1 and CSS-2 and probably with the SRBM. This association is based on equipment sightings and this facility's location and relationship to the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9. The CSS-1 and CSS-2 missile systems have been associated with the Lianxiwang Complex. Railcars were first observed at the RTP in September 1967, but low image quality precluded identification of railcar types until August 1972. In August, one Type A missile railcar and one type B missile transfer flatcar were present. Type A missile railcars, type B missile transfer flatcars, and several types of propellant railcars have been observed at this RTP on a regular basis. In August 1982, a propellant transfer operation IIA-18 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F was in progress: either new propellant was being brought in or old propellant was being purged from the deployed sites. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. This RTP apparently was in operation by the missile forces in 1966-67, considering the presence of railcars and the completion of the missile checkout and storage buildings between September 1965 and September 1967. Some missile bases within Lianxiwang complex were also completed during 1966-67. Only the lack of coverage and the low quality of the imagery acquired throughout the 1960s and early 1970s prevented confirmation of missile GSE. Some missile bases within the Lianxiwang complex were completed during the 1966-67 period. (S/WN) ~~ I IA-19 Top Secret R CA-01/0009/83 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Liuqingkou SSM SAC. USATC Series 200, Sheet 0332-19, scale 1:200,000 May 82 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Liuqingkou SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is considered a possible SSM RTP because of its proximity to known SSM facilities, even though no missile GSE has ever been seen here. It is 150 km northwest of Xining, Qinghai Province, Lanzhou Military Region, in north China. The RTP (Figure 8, top) is in an excavation approximately 100 by 60 meters, sloping to a depth of 20 meters at the south end. The wall-secured RTP contains one standard-gauge rail siding, aside-loading area, and an end-loading dock. (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 66 km south-southeast of the Liuqingkou SSM Launch Complex and is connected to it by an improved dirt road. A connection between the national-level buried cable network and this facility has not been observed. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. In the center of the RTP is an earthen transloading area with a concrete retaining wall on two sides. The rail spur lies parallel to the west side of the transloading area and terminates at a concrete end- loading dock. There is no surface or underground missile storage at this facility. Aside-loading area at the north terminus of the rail spur serving the RTP (Figure 8, bottom) was previous reported as being associated with the RTP. A concrete retaining wall prohibits access to the rail spur, however, and the area now serves as a coal transfer area. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. No surface or underground GSE storage is at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. A warehouse is adjacent to the side-loading area in the center of the RTP. Two other small storage buildings are located within the security wall. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. One building at the RTP appears capable of providing housing. It has 67 square meters of floorspace for an estimated 15 personnel. (S/WN) J Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is The RTP was observed under construction in 25X1 January 1972 but was not capable of receiving rail traffic until September 1973. At that time the RTP ~,~ appeared complete, with the main rail line terminating just north of the RTP. No further construction or extension of the rail line has been observed. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. If this facility is used by CSRF forces, it would be associated with the CSS-2 IRBM, a conclusion based on this RTP's proximity to the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. (S/WN) I I A-20 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. The RTP currently serves the industrial facilities in the area and, although capable of receiving missile-related rail traffic, is an unlikely candidate for an SSM RTP. Limited manuvering space within the RTP, an access road with a 20 percent slope, and aright-angle turn onto the main road would make missile and GSE transshipment difficult. (S/WN) C I IA-21 Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F Luoyang SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-8, scale 1:200,000 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Luoyang SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is a confirmed SSM RTP. This is based on the and continued sighting of SSM GSE. The RTP is approximately 7.0 km south of Luoyang, Henan Province, Wuhan Military Region, in east-central China. This wall-secured facility contains two rail spurs, one missile transloading building, 13 warehouses, three multistory barracks/housing buildings, two messhalls, an auditorium, nine support buildings, one administration building, three open storage areas, one water tower, and one swimming pool (Figure 9). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is approximately 80 km by road southwest of Jiumengjin SSM Technical Training Facility. Other SSM facilities in the area include the Luoning CSS-4 launch group, approximately 75 km by road southwest; the Lushi CSS-4 launch group currently under construction, approximately 160 km by road southwest; and the Sundian CSS-3 launch group, approximately 130 km south-southwest. This facility may also serve aCSS-2 launch unit at an unidentified location in this area. A railyard approxi- mately 0.8 km southwest of the RTP has been used as a parking area for missile railcars and flatcars carrying missile GSE. The national-level buried cable network runs within 1.0 km of this facility, but no connection has been identified. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The southern rail spur has side-loading docks on both sides and a small, general-purpose, end- loading dock. The northern rail spur has avail- and road-served transloading building, meters, a large end-loading dock, and open concrete transloading aprons on both sides. The transloading building probably has an overhead crane that could lift missiles directly onto or from flatcars. Missiles would normally be stored in this facility only temporarily while awaiting delivery to a launch site. There are no dedicated missile storage buildings at this facility and no underground missile storage. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. A ramp at the end of the northernmost rail spur, serving the transloading building, would enable GSE to be driven directly on or off flatcars. GSE, including missile transporters, erectors, and other GSE for various systems, has been regularly observed in the open storage areas. There are no dedicated GSE storage buildings nor any underground GSE storage at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. The facility contains 13 large warehouses, three open storage areas, and a vehicle refueling area. Propellant storage tanks, cable spools, lumber, concrete reinforcing bar, and other construction materials are stored in the warehouses and open storage areas. A large crawler crane and several truck-mounted cranes are usually observed near the storage areas. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. Two multistory barracks, with 1,630 square meters of floorspace for an estimated 354 personnel, and one multistory family quarters building, with space for an estimated 16 families, are located in the northwest corner of the facility. Two smaller single-story probable barracks and a probable barracks/ messhall with 360 square meters of floorspace-sufficient to house 78 personnel-are directly behind the multistory barracks, and atwo-story, 16-unit, family quarters building is across the courtyard. Two large messhalls and an auditorium/messhall with two kitchens support the barracks. (S/WN) 25X1 25X1 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is October 1972. Construction was apparently started Burin 1974. A construction workers' housing support area was observed within the facility on 25X1 The permanent barracks, messhalls, and several warehouses were externally complete by ~ 25X1 the two rail spurs were under construction. Both rail spurs appeared ~~~ ~ complete, and construction had begun on the missile transloading building and the largest warehouse by This facility was externally complete by (S/WN) 25X1 ~~ Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with all SSMs. Luoyang serves as the transshipment facility for the Sundian CSS-3 launch group, the Luoyang CSS-4 launch group, and the Lushi CSS-4 launch group, which is currently under construction. It also serves Jiumengjin SSM Technical Training Facility, which has been associated with training for all Chinese SSMs. In chronological order, SRBM GSE was seen first, followed by CSS-4, CSS-1, and CSS-2/-3 GSE. (S/WN) 9. This facility was first associated with Chinese missile forces on when two SRBM 25X1 transporter/erectors (T/E) and two SRBM gantry cranes were resent. An SRBM missile on its transporter was observed near the transloading building on One SRBM T/E and one gantry crane have 25X1 been present in the open storage area through the latest imagery. (S/WN) 10. Two type CCSS-4 missile railcars and one type B missile transfer flatcar were arked on the rail spurs on A probable CSS-4 launch stand was also observed on ~ Probable CSS-4 25X1 silo door components were observed on and CSS-4 missile transporters were first 25X1 identified at this facilty on (S/WN) 25X1 11. CSS-1 GSE was first observed on when acanvas-covered CSS-1 T/E was seen on 25X1 a flatcar near the transloading building. This GSE departed the RTP by (S/WN) 25X1 12. CSS-3 GSE, including first- and second-stage transporters, was first observed during a missile delivery on The first CSS-3 erector ever observed outside the Jingyu Missile Test Complex 25X1 SSM was parked next to the RTP transloading building on The erector remained in the same 25X1 position through and had departed the RTP by (S/WN) 25X1 Imagery Analyst's Comments 13. An auditorium and large swimming pool indicate that this is aregiment-echelon facility. No specific regiment headquarters administration building has been constructed; the headquarters may be in one of the barracks. This would reduce the available floorspace for quarters. (S/WN) 14. There was, and may still be, another RTP in this area that remains unidentified, because the Sundian launch group, the Jiumengjin training facility, and two SRBM garrisons were active before the Luoyang RTP was constructed. (S/WN) I IA-23 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F I-to-Road Transfer Point ~ CH SAC. USATC Series 200, Sheet 0332-10, scale 1:200,000 May 82 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Shandan SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is a possible SSM RTP. This is based on the single sighting of SSM GSE immediately outside this installation on The RTP is 2.7 km north- west of Shandan, Gansu Province, Lanzhou Military Region, in northern China. The wall-secured RTP consists of two loading docks, each served by a standard-gauge rail spur, a warehouse, storage buildings, and one barracks or housing building (Figure 10). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is connected by road to the Liuqingkou SSM Launch Complex approximately 100 km southwest. A possibly associated facility is Shandan SAM Training Area A 2.0 km south- southwest, which is China's largest SAM training installation. The national-level buried cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. One end-loading dock, 22 by 6 meters, and one side-loading dock, which is partly covered by the roof of the warehouse, are each served by separate standard-gauge rail spurs. A single crawler crane, capable of transloading missiles, has been observed near the end-loading dock. There is no surface or underground missile storage at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. No surface or underground GSE storage is at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. A warehouse, 33 meters by 12 meters, is located adjacent to the side-loading dock in the center of the RTP. Six other small storage buildings are within the walled area. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. One building at the RTP appears capable of providing housing. It has 108 square meters of floorspace possibly for an estimated 23 personnel. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The RTP was present on the earliest available imagery of Since then, the RTP has changed only slightly, with the addition and removal of various small support buildings and repositioning of the security wall. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. If this facility is used by CSRF forces, it would be associated with the CSS-2 IRBM because of its proximity to the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9. Two type C2 propellant railcars were present on the siding outside of the RTP on ~No other missiles or related GSE have been observed. (S/WN) I IA-24 Top Secret RCA-01 /0009/83 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. Shandan has the necessary components to be a SSM RTP candidate. However, the single 1976 sighting of propellant railcars may have been in support of China's largest SAM training facility 2.0 km away. (S/WN) Top Secret 25X1 RCA-01 /0009/83 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F Tongdao Probable SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point UTM COORDINATES GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES CATEGORY NA 26-42-20N 109-41-45E MAP REFERENCE SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0497-08, scale 1:200,000 May 83 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Tongdao Probable SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is probably SSM related because of the facilities at this transfer point and its location near known SSM facilities. It is 40 km north of Tongdao, Hunan Province, Guangzhou Military Region, in south China. The RTP is secured by a perimeter wall and contains a barracks area, a storage area, and a transloading area. Separate wall-secured areas are at the eastern and western ends of the facility access road. At the west area is a secured 6-bay garage, and at the east area end there are two possible storage caves with transfer buildings (Figure 11). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 20 km north of the Tongdao Possible SSM RIM Facility and within 70 km of type IIIA, type IIIB, and type IV ICBM launch groups. It is served by the Luoyang/Lizhou rail line, which was completed in 1978. The national-level buried cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility, but the expected right-of-way for a buried cable would be along the railroad tracks. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling _~ 3. The transloading area contains two separate docks. The northernmost has an end-loading dock with some side-loading capabilities. The second dock, in the center of the facility, is larger, concrete surfaced, and has both side-loading and end-loading docks. There is no surface or underground missile storage at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. The separately secured 6-bay garage at the eastern end of the access road is the only vehicle storage in the facility. No underground GSE storage is at this RTP. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. The storage area provides open storage and contains 13 large warehouses and four support buildings. The separately secured underground storage area has two possible storage caves with transfer buildings-one drive-through and one drive-in-in front of the entrances. This area may serve as warhead storage. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. The barracks have a floorspace of 1,660 square meters, providing housing for an estimated 361 personnel. A small barracks area at the western part of the RTP contains five barracks, one administra- tion/support building, two support buildings, and one messhall. Three additional barracks and one messhall are in the center of the RTP. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is November 1974..There are major gaps in the construction chronology of the RTP as a consequence of only limited photo coverage. By September 1975, all the buildings had been constructed and were externally complete. The transloading aprons were completed by December 1975, and the RTP was operational when construction on the main rail line was completed in mid-1978. (S/WN) I I A-26 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF issi a ssoaation an Actwity 8. This facility is probably associated with the CSS-3 and CSS-4 SSMs, given its proximity to the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. On three probable propellant tanks of the type and size observed at type IIIB and type IV launch sites were at the facility. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. More frequent coverage of this RTP will be needed to determine the level of activity and operational status of the nearby associated CSS-3 and CSS-4 launch groups. (S/WN) 11. It is clear that another, as yet unidentified, SSM RTP has served this deployment area. SSM- related construction in Tongdao complex began in the late 1960s, and first operational deployment was detected in 1975. This RTP was not usable until 1978. (S/WN) I IA-27 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Tonghua SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point 1 SAC, USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0290-18, scale 1;200,000 May 83 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Tonghua SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point 1 is a confirmed SSM RTP because of the si hting of SSM GSE at this installation o and additional sightings through The 25X1 RTP now appears abandoned. It is 38 km southeast of Tonghua, Jilin Province, Shenyang Military Region, near the end of a standard-gauge railspur in northern China. The RTP contains avail-served missile and GSE transloading building and two rail spurs, separated by a third spur that serves an adjacent, aban- doned iron mine (Figure 12). A separate, possible associated area is 3.0 km southeast of the RTP (not on the figure). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is part of the Tonghua Missile Launch Complex SSM. The national-level buried cable network has not been observed to connect with the RTP but does connect with the associated area 3 km southeast. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. When the RTP was still receiving missile-related rail traffic, the north rail spur was covered by a 207-meter-long, gable-roofed shelter, capable of covering as many as nine Type A missile railcars. The shelter was dismantled by mid-1977. Agable-roofed missile and GSE transloading building, capable of missile storage, is served by a standard-gauge rail line that enters at the west end. This missile and GSE transloading building is 110 meters long by 17 meters wide, with a narrow open-sided shed attached to the north side. Open storage of missile-associated railcars was also observed on the south rail spur. There is no underground missile storage at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. Surface storage of GSE is provided by a six-bay garage and by the missile and GSE transloading building. There is no underground GSE storage at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No additional support buildings can be associated with the RTP, though numerous support buildings are located in the immediate vicinity. These include a sawmill and an ore concentration plant, which probably supported an iron and coal mine east of the RTP. The mine and RTP were both active at the same time. A possible associated area is in a stream valley approximately 3.0 km southeast of the RTP. This area contains two revetted buildings, a cave with blast doors, and three other buildings. The present function of the area is undetermined; however, a buried communications cable connects the area with Tonghua Missile Launch Complex SSM and indicates amissile-force association for this area. Two addi- tional large, revetted buildings, which once provided explosives storage for the mine, are between the cave and the RTP. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. The barracks have a floorspace of 2,859 square meters, providing housing for an estimated 615 personnel. One barracks, with an attached kitchen area, and a U-shaped barracks compound, served by a separate messhall, are located north of the missile and GSE transloading building. When the RTP was active, a family housing area containing seven four-family units was located about 500 meters north of the missile and GSE transloading building. The same area now contains four four-family units and one two- family unit. (S/WN) I I A-28 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Construction Chronology 7, The negation date for this facility is March 1966, Improvement of the former mining support facilities, which eventually became this RTP, coincided with construction of the Tonghua Missile Launch Complex SSM. Some existing support buildings from the adjacent iron mine were used to form the RTP. The gable-roofed rail shelter was built specifically to support the RTP, On it did not yet appear that the facility had been modified for missile-related use. By the roof of a large foundry had been removed, and by 0 a new light-toned roof had been installed, probably indicating that the building had been renovated for use as a transloading building. The rail shelter was completed by The rail shelter was dismantled between October 1976 and Jul 1977, Construction o Tong ua RTP 2 was started in January 1972, and it became operational by~ at the same time as this RTP was abandoned. No other changes to the RTP have been observed since then. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8, This facility has been associated with the CSS-1 and CSS-2 SSMs. This association is based on equipment sightings and on its proximity to the associated facilities listed, (S/WN) 9, Missile-associated railcars were first seen at the RTP on Average levels of between 10 and 15 missile and propellant railcars were observed consistently through The highest number of railcars observed at one time was 37 in 1972. Abandonment of the RTP occurred sometime between when sections of the rail shed were observed dismantled. Nofurther missile-related railcar activity has been seen since October 1976, (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. It appears that RTP 1 was intended to meet SSM rail transloading needs for the Tonghua SSM Complex only until a better RTP, with underground storage, could be constructed, (S/WN) I I A~29 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0290-18, scale 1:200,000 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Tonghua SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point 2 is a confirmed SSM RTP, This is based on the and continued sighting of SSM GSE at this installation, The RTP is 30.7 km southeast of Tonghua, Tulin Province, Shenyang Military Region, in northeast China. The RTP consists of a three-track holding yard, three railcar storage caves, three drive-in propellant/POL storage caves, warehouses, and a barracks area (Figure 13). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is part of the Tonghua Missile Launch Complex SSM and serves the CSS-1 and CSS-2 launch units in launch groups A and B. The RTP is connected by buried communications cable to facilities in the Tonghua complex, (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. Three rail-served caves provide storage for missile and propellant railcars. The north and south caves have clamshell blast doors; the center cave does not, The cave entrances are large enough to admit all known missile-associated railcars. Aside-loading and an end-loading dock are at the south end of the rail holding yard. Propellant railcars are seen most frequently on the spur serving the southernmost cave. No railcars have been seen on the spur serving the northernmost cave. There are no missile storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4, No buildings appear capable of GSE storage. The three drive-in, propellant/POL storage caves are capable of GSE storage, but their storage capacity is unknown, A railyard to the north of the RTP, containing an end-loading dock, appears to serve as the GSE transshipment point for the RTP, Numerous flatcars have been seen frequently at the railyard, although no transshipment activity has been observed. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. Awall-secured warehouse area, at the north end of the RTP, contains six warehouse buildings each 37 meters byOOne buried propellant transfer building, one buried personnel bunker, one probable office, and two storage buildings provide additional support to the RTP. Propellant is transferred at this RTP from the railcars to the north drive-in propellant storage cave via an underground line. The earth-mounded building probably houses pumps to move the propellants from track level up to 25X1 the level of the storage caves. An underground POL transfer line extends from the central drive-in cave to a retaining wall directly in front of the cave, The southernmost cave is also believed to be used for POL storage, Forty tanks in the vicinity of the caves provide open POL storage, (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. Eight barracks and three messhalls provide 986 square meters of floorspace for an estimated 212 personnel, One administration building is also located in the housing area. (S/WN1 Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is~~lnitial construction was observed on _and continued through early 1977, On ~~ the presence of missile-associated railcars indicated that the RTP was operational, All tracks had been laid by that time, and the RTP ap- peared complete, Construction of probable transfer pipeline trenches in the south end of the RTP was first seen on Two of the three drive-in caves had an open, concrete-lined trench extending from them. One trench was traced from the northernmost cave to the arch-roofed propellent transfer building adjacent to the rail terminus at the south end of the RTP. The second trench leads from the central drive-in cave to a POL transfer area directly in front of the cave, Both trenches and the OConstruction on a new barracks and omplete on the ~ construction of propellant transfer building were earth covered b probable office building was observed on barracks by Dand on the office b wilding by another barracks building was complete, and an unidentified structure was observed under construction in the POL storage area, (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with the CSS-1 and CSS-2 SSMs, based on equipment sightings and its proximity to the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9. Initial observation of missile-related railcars at this RTP was made onOMissi1e-related rail activity has been observed on nearly all coverages since that date, As many as 26 missile-associated and propellant railcars have been seen at one time; normal levels range from 5 to 15 railcars. No SSM- related equipment has been reported at the RTP, (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. The RTP and Tonghua SSM Launch Complex Garrison 2 probably serve as the missile, prop- ellant,and POL depot for the entire launch complex. RTP 2 became active at the same time that Tonghua SSM RTP 1 was abandoned. RTP 1 was apparently serving as a contingency facility until a more suitable RTP could be constructed, (S/WN) IIA 30 Top Secret Construction was externally c 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Tonghua SSM Ra I-to-Road Transfer Point 3 ~ CH SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0290-12, scale 1:200,000 Apr 83 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Tonghua SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point 3 is a confirmed SSM RTP. This is based on the January 1976 and continued sighting of SSM GSE at this installation. It is 24 km northwest of Tonghua, Jilin Province, Shenyang Military Region, in a narrow, southwest/northeast-oriented valley in northeast China. The RTP consists of grail-served missile and GSE transloading building, GSE storage areas, numerous shops and fabrication buildings, and barracks and housing areas. Astandard-gauge rail spur off the main rail line branches into two spurs after entering the RTP. One spur serves the transloading building, the other terminates at a hillside excavation. Two short sidings also branch off the main spur (Figure 14). (S/W N) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is part of the Tonghua Missile Launch Complex SSM and serves the CSS-1 and CSS-2 launch units. A rail siding with an end-loading dock is outside the RTP in Guangzhou village and is similar to those used at other missile RTPs. No missile GSE loading or unloading activity has been seen at this dock, however. Awall-secured area, consisting of one warehouse and three other buildings, is just south of the RTP. The security wall was added in December 1982. The area previously contained grain bins. It is believed that the warehouse is now used for storing military supplies, possible small arms and munitions. The national communications buried cable passes within 15.0 km of the RTP, but no connection to the RTP has been observed. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The transloading building is the only buildin ca able of handling and storing missiles and is centrally located in the facility. It is 48 meters by~with a high-bay central section measuring 11 25X1 meters from the floor to the roof peak. Two small shop areas flank the building. No cave storage has been identified at this facility, although an excavation at the end of one of two rail spurs in the facility has recently been enlarged. The excavation was thought originally to be an abortive attempt to construct a rail-served, cave storage area. The recent enlargement of the excavation, however, appeared to be only surface activity; no tunneling activity was discernible. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. In addition to the transloading building, two buildings appear capable of GSE storage and han- dling. One is a four-bay garage, the other is a drive-in vehicle repair facility with a raised central section. There is no underground GSE storage at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. This facility contains an additional 16 buildings, including aheat/steamplant, one administration building, and 14 shops or fabrication buildings. Other small, unidentified buildings as well as one guard- post are also present. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. Three single-story and two two-story barracks, with a floorspace of 4,342 square meters, provide housing for an estimated 935 troops. Each barracks has an attached kitchen area. At the mouth of the valley, outside the security fence, is a dependents' housing area consisting of nine housing units and one support building. (S/WN) I I A-32 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Tap Secret RUFF Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is June 1971, Construction of the RTP was first observed in July 1972, and it appeared complete, with rail service to the transloading building, in ~ti'ovember 1974, By V'o~~ember 1918, three buildings, which form a compound at the west end of the RTP, were constructed, Since that time, only minor construction has taken place. (5%W~~) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with the CSS-1 and CSS-2 SSMs, a conclusion based on equip- mentsightings and its prozimlty to the associated facilities listed, (S/WN) 9, CSS-1-related GSE was first seen at the facility in January 1976, CSS-1 T%Es, cryogen trailers, and non-system-specific, missile-related GSE have been seen periodically since that date, In October 1976 one type A and one type B missile railcar were observed in the RTP. CSS-2-associated GSE was first seen in April 1981, when CSS-2 fuel transporters were observed, (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10, It is undetermined which of the launch groups this RTP serves. Launch Group C is the closest and would seem a likely candidate, but it does not appear to be occupied. The RTP is currently serving also. as a vehicle maintenance facility, Both Launch Groups A and B are occupied, but each contains vehicle maintenance facilities and is remote from the RTP. The GSE present at the RTP may be receiving specialized repairs not available in the launch groups or possibly may come from an unidentified missile unit in the area, (5%4tii\) I IA~33 Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF DMAAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0383-11, scale 1;200,000 location and Identification May 67 BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Wuwei Probable SSM Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is a probable SSM RTP because of the Octo- ber/ November 1970 sighting of SSM GSE at this installation. It is 1.8 km south of Wuwei, Gansu Province, Lanzhou Military Region, in north-central China, It consists of two rail spurs, loading docks, and two or three storage buildings (Figure 15). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 8J km by road from Wuwei Army Barracks ~~ which was formerly the Wuwei SSM Field Garrison, The nearest SSM launch positions to the RTP are the four field training positions at Shuangta 55 to 66 km southeast by road. The national-level buried cable network has never been observed to connect with this facility, but it probably runs parallel to the main rail line. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. One rail spur extends north from the main rail line past aside-loading dock and warehouse area, through a coal yard, and terminates in a factory. The second rail spur extends east from the main rail line past another side-loading dock, several warehouses, and terminates at an end-loading dock. Both rail spurs have ready access to good roads, There is no surface or underground missile storage at this facility, (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4, This RTP contains two to three buildings that could serve as GSE storage but no underground GSE storage. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. This facility has been enlarged over the years, with additional warehouses added near the coal yard and a storage building erected along an extension of the side-loading dock. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. No barracks or housing are at this facility, Barracks and housing may have been provided by the nearby Wuwei SSM Field Garrison/Army Barracks, (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. Both rail spurs were present in 1967, the earliest coverage available, and were probably part of the main rail yard. The north rail spur served a coal storage yard. In 1972 the east rail spur was extended to terminate at an end-loading dock and the RTP walls were extended to enclose this new area, Also in 1972, several small fuel tanks and a small support building were added to the area. In late 1981 and early 1982, the wall separating the end-loading dock area from the other warehouses and dock areas was taken down, the warehouse with the side-loading dock extension was built, and the small tanks were removed. Minor support buildings, probably not associated with the RTP, were built throughout the 1912 to 1983 period. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8, This facility has been associated with the SRBM, CSS-1, and CSS-2 SSMs, based on equipment sightings at Wuwei SSM Field Garrison and the facility's proximity to the associated facilities listed. The Wuwei Garrison was converted from missile forces' use to ground forces' use inmid-1976. Since October 1978, no missile forces have been detected exercising at Shuangta. This RTP probably no longer serves as a missile transfer point, as indicated by the continuing lack of missile activity in the area and the removal of part of the security wall separating the end-loading dock from the rest of the east rail spur area, (S/WN) 9, Missile railcars were first confirmed in the RTP when a type A missile railcar and a type B missile transfer flatcar were seen in October and November 1970 near the coal yard on the north rail spur, In November 1977, one type A missile railcar and one type B missile transfer flatcar were on the east rail spur, near the end-loading dock, During that same period, CSS-1 launches took place from the Shuangta SSM Field Training Positions. These railcars probably supported the launches from Shuangta. Since November 1977, no missile-associated railcars have been observed on either of the rail spurs in the RTP, (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10, The missile and GSE storage facilities at Wuwei Army Barracks are still serviceable, and the field positions at Shuangta are still intact, although in need of some repair, This RTP could function as a missile-related RTP if needed in the future. (S/WN) Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01111 :CIA-RDP84T001718000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01111 :CIA-RDP84T001718000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01111 :CIA-RDP84T001718000301550001-8 lop Secret RUFF DMAAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-11, scale 1:200,000 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1, Xian Rail-to-Road Transfer Point is confirmed as an SSM RTP because of the November 1968 and continued sighting of SSM GSE at this installation. It is in the southwest corner of Xian SSM Technical Training Facility (TTF), in the eastern suburbs of Xian city, Shaanxi Province, Lanzhou Military Region, in north-central China, The RTP consists of a rail spur, which divides into three rail spurs inside the TTF, an end-loading dock, aside-loading dock, and a long, open-sided railcar shelter covering two of the rail spurs (Figure 16). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. The RTP is located in the southwest corner of Xian SSM Technical Trainin Fanlit and is an integral part of the TTF, It also served the Muxiayan SSM Field Training Position ~ 70 km by road to the east-southeast, until that training facility was deactivated in 1975. The national-level buried cable network was connected with the Xian TTF between February and April 1982. The TTF was probably also connected to the original buried communications cable network constructed through the area in 1969, (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. This RTP has no missile-handling or storage buildings. Missiles could be left on their railcar transporters and stored under the railcar shelter. Missiles are transloaded at the side-loading dock, The collocated TTF has storage and handling facilities for both missiles and GSE, There is no underground missile storage at this facility, (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. No surface or underground GSE storage buildings are within the RTP, GSE is offloaded at the side- and end-loading docks. GSE and propellants could be stored on their railcars and the railcars parked under the shelter, (S/WN) Other Storage 5. Seven warehouses and two storage sheds, all apparently for general or bulk materials storage, are within the RTP area, Several miscellaneous small buildings are next to the RTP. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. This facility has no barracks or other housing, The support facilities for the RTP are within the TTF. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The TTF was substantially complete when first imaged in March 1959. At that time it was a PLA barracks and school, but sometime before December 1962 it was converted to CSRF use, A rail spur into the facility was probably present as early as 1962. In June 1963, the walls around the side-loading and end- loading docks were built, Asix-car rail siding was added to the rail spur in 1967. Between 1971 and 1973 the siding was removed and a second and third rail spur were added. The two new rail spurs are 300 meters long and are used for storing or holding railcars; there are no loading docks beside or at the end of them, An open-sided railcar shelter measuring 191 meters by 13 meters was built over part of the two new rail spurs during the same period, From 1978 to the present, only small warehouses or sheds were built or expanded near the rail spurs and rail shelter. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with the SRBM, CSS-1, -2, -3, -4, and CSS-NX-3 (or its land-based variant) missile systems. This association is based on equipment sightings and this facility's proximity to the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9, Possible railcars were seen on the spur as early as 1965. Missile-associated railcars were first confirmed at the RTP in November 1968, when a probable type A missile railcar, a probable type B missile transfer flatcar, and two to four propellant railcars were on the rail spur that terminates at the end- loading dock. All the known Chinese SSM systems have been associated with training at this TTF, and a wide variety of the railcars associated with these systems have been seen at the RTP. Railcars are seen occasionally on the end-loading dock rail spur and partially seen more frequently under the rail shelter or on one of the two rail spurs that terminates under the shelter, (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. The railcar shelter was constructed primarily to prevent detection of missile-related railcars, Such railcars are typically left in the open at almost all missile facilities in the country, The Xian railcar shelter is open-sided and offers no control of temperature and humidity, Its size allows the out-of-sight storage of up to 25 railcars and also prevents assessment of rail traffic changes. (S/WN) 11. A basic report on the associated Xian SSM TTF, including a more detailed summary of missile GSE sightings, has been published in the following report: NPIC. Z-14569/82, RCA-01/0007/82, Chinese Missile Encyclopedia, Subsection 1A (S), Jan 82 (SECRET/WNINTEL), (S/WN) I IA 36 Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01111 :CIA-RDP84T001718000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF 40-38-59N 115-02-31 E SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0289-21, scale 1:200,000 Sep 65 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Xuanhua SSM Depot is confirmed as an SSM facility because of the presence of SSM GSE there since September 1967. It is in a mountain valley 3.7 km north of the walled city of Xuanhua, in the Hebei Province, Beijing MR, northeast China. The facility is rail served and consists of a transloading area, a missile storage and checkout area, and a support area (Figure 17). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. Xuanhua SSM Field Garrison, 3.8 km to the south-southeast, is probably associated with the missile depot. The national-level cable network connects with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. Missile storage is provided in four caves of unknown size and configuration. However, a conser- vative estimate of the .volume of spoil removed indicates each cave is 100 to 200 meters long. The caves could therefore accommodate four to eight airframes. Also, 11 buildings containing 29 parking bays at least 17 meters long are in the depot. However, most of these buildings appear to be used for storing large cranes such as the gantry crane and A-frame cranes used in the missile forces or missile road transporters and the prime movers needed to pull them. Other buildings appear to be used for checkout and maintenance rather than storage of GSE. Four buildings, all served by a narrow-gauge rail system, appear to be used at least partly for airframe storage. They contain six to ten bays for airframe storage. (S/W N) 4. Missile airframes arrive and depart through the transloading building which is It probably contains an overhead traveling crane. Astandard-gauge rail spur serves one end of the transloading building. The probable overhead crane can transfer a missile from the standard-gauge rail line either to a road transporter or to the narrow-gauge rail system. Another rail spur terminates next to the transloading building, at aside-loading and end-loading dock. A third rail spur in the depot is used for holding railcars. Missiles are moved within the depot either on probable dollies traveling on the narrow-gauge rail system or on road transporters. Missiles destined for the eastern pair of storage caves must be transported first by road and then transfered to the separate narrow-gauge rail system in that area of the depot. Two concrete hardstands for that transfer operation are in that part of the depot. (S/W N) GSE Storage and Handling 5. There are 11 buildings containing a total of 29 parking bays in the depot used for GSE storage. Nine of these buildings are large enough to hold missile airframes but, as previously indicated, appear to to be used for storage of large items of GSE and for maintenance and checkout. (S/WN) Other Storage 6. There are nine small sheds, offices, and shops providing additional support for this depot. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 7. The barracks have floorspace of 1,078 square meters, providing housing for an estimated 187 personnel. Three barracks and one messhall are in the center of the depot, and one barracks is near the vehicle gate and guardpost at the eastern edge of the facility. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 8. The negation date for this facility is June 1965. Xuanhua SSM Depot was first observed under construction in September 1965. One year later the central and western portions of the facility were 25X1 25X1 I I A-38 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF compete an pro a y operating, Construction continued on the eastern pair of caves through Septem- ber 1967 when that storage area was completed. No significant new construction was observed until 1916 when, for the first time, a road suitable for heavy vehicles was completed into the facility and another barracks was erected, All the roads in the facility were improved and paved, In 1979 a fourth barracks was constructed, No significant changes have been observed since 1979. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 9. Xuanhua Depot should be associated with all of China's land-based, liquid-propellant strategic SSM systems because of the type of railcars observed there and its period of operation. Types A, B, and C missile railcars have been observed. ~'o missile propellant railcars or specialized railcars for China's solid- propellant missile system have been observed. Types A and B railcars were first confirmed in 1967 and may have been present in September 1966, A type C railcar was first observed in the depot in February 1981, NPIC reports of type C railcar sightings prior to that date can now be negated. (TSR) 10. Little vehicular GSE has been observed in the depot. Most transfer of equipment apparently occurs at night or when clouds obscure activity. However, on nets were raised over both hardstands in the eastern storage area indicating transfer activity was underway, On ~18 vehicles, mostly cargo trucks and cranes, were in the facility, On Da gantry crane was on the easternmost hardstand. Checkout van trucks were observed once in the depot, on imagery of On imagery of a type A missile transporter was observed on the easternmost hardstand. This is the only observation of a missile transporter in the facility, The highest number of railcars observed has been 12, which is the capacity for all the rail spurs. Two to six railcars are usually present. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 11. Xuanhua SSM Depot has the facilities to perform minor maintenance associated with preparing missiles for long-term storage and checkout of missiles prior to their dispatch, The depot lacks the personnel strength and major maintenance building with crane and metal-working shops necessary for major repair on missiles or other equipment. (S/W~~) 12. The possibility that Xuanhua also stores missile RVs cannot be ruled out, particularly when it appears that each missile's RV is carried in the same railcar as the missile when a launch unit is being deployed. There are no facilities at the depot, however, to indicate assembly and handling of nuclear weapons; and if RVs are present, they are there for storage only. (S/WN) 13, Though the road improvement in 1976 made it possible for the first time to dispatch a missile from the depot by road, it does not appear that this contingency is planned. The service road ends at an intersection containing both a rail crossing and 90-degree turns. (S/WN) I IA-39 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Jianshui SSM Pos ible RIM Facility DIA. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0616-2, scale 1;200,000 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1, Jianshui SSM Possible RIM Facility is confirmed as an SSM installation because of the communica- tions cable connection between it and the Jianshui SSM Complex and observation of missile GSE at the facility. This is the RIM facility for the Jianshui SSM Complex and is 12 km north-northeast of the city of Jianshui, in the Yunnan Province, Kunming MR, southern China, at a point approximately equidistant between Launch Groups A and B of the Jianshui SSM Launch Complex. The RIM facility consists of a RIM building, a cave storage area, vehicle maintenance shops, and barracks and housing areas (Figure 18). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. Kunming, 120 km to the north, is the nearest RTP capable of handling missiles for the Jianshui area, A buried communications cable connects the RIM facility to the hardened CP at Jianshui SSM Division/Army Headquarters, 18,5 km to the west. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. One high-bay, drive-through RIM building is in the center of the facility. The high-bay section is 45 meters long and from the floor to the overhead crane, which traverses the length of the building. Shop bays high flank each side of the drive-through area, One single-bay, drive-in missile checkout/storage building is at the entrance to the cave storage area. It is A drive-in cave storage area is southeast of the RIM building. The cave entrance is large enough to admit missiles and missile transporters, and the cave size is probably large, because of the extensive spoil piles along both edges of an adjacent stream, Other natural caverns are present in this area of karst-type geology, possibly providing additional storage capability. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. Surface GSE storage is provided by nine buildings with a total of 21 vehicle bays, in addition to the RIh1 and missile checkout/storage buildings. Underground GSE storage is provided by the cave storage area, (S/WN) Other Storage 5, Two buried cylindrical POL storage tanks are in the southeast corner of the facility. An arch- roofed building has been built over the buried POL tanks, Fifteen additional shops/storage buildings are in the facility. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. The 19 barracks have a total floorspace of 2,806 square meters, providing housing for an esti- mated 605 personnel. Five messhalls serve the barracks which are primarily in the northwest corner of the facility, Two of the five messhalls and six of the barracks are in the area of the regimental administration building and the auditiorium on the east side of the facility, Housing for 23 family units (not on figure) is outside of the RIM facility, to the southeast, (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is March 1970. Construction of the RIM facility was first observed in January 1972. The RIM facility appeared operational by late 1974; however, construction of barracks and support buildings continued through September 1982, The majority of construction was complete by November 1977, with only small shop or storage buildings added since then. Two-thirds of the barracks area in the northwest corner of the facility was complete by January 1975. The cave storage area was complete by March 1976, and the remaining third of the barracks area, as well as the regimental administration building and auditorium, were complete by October 1976, The missile checkout/storage building was constructed between October 1976 and November 1977. All construction workers' housing has been razed, indicating no further construction is planned. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with CSS-2 SSMs because of equipment observations and its location near the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9, CSS-2-related GSE has been seen consistently at this facility. However, no missiles have been observed, (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10, The RIM facility serves a vehicle maintenance function for the Jianshui SSM Missile Launch Complex, Although the necessary missile receiving and storage facilities are present, there have been few indications that the facility has ever peformed a missile RIM function, The facility appears to support a maintenance regiment, as indicated by the regimental administration building and auditorium. A proba- ble CP is in the storage cave, as indicated by the buried communication cable connection. (S/WN) I I A 40 Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Lianxiwang SSM RIM Facility ~ CH SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0493-14, scale 1:200,000 Aug 83 Location and Identification May 69 BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Lianxiwang SSM RIM Facility is a confirmed SSM facility because of the presence of SSM GSE there since August 1975. It is the RIM facility for the Lianxiwang SSM Complex. It is 10 km west-northwest of Qimen, in Anhui Province, Guangzhou MR, southeastern China. The RIM facility consists of a head- quarters/barracks area; two barracks areas, one of which is along the installation access road; and a RIM/vehicle maintenance area (Figure 19). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. Lianxiwang SSM RTP is 200 km north-northeast by road from the RIM facility. A new rail line is under construction from the south which will serve the town of Qimen, 10 km away, and possibly the Lianxiwang Missile Launch Complex SSM. The Lianxiwang LSGs are from 40 to 90 km by road from the RIM facility. Lianxiwang SSM Headquarters General is 2.0 km to the west and is connected by buried communications cable to the RIM facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. A clerestor drive-through RIM building, provides missile storage and 25X1 handling. The clerestory center section probably has an overhead crane. The building is 25X1 similar in size to the RIM building at the Jianshui RIM Facility, but shorter (approximately 10 meters) than the Luanchuan and Tongdao RIM buildings. This RIM building is of sufficient size to accomodate up to a CSS-4 SSM, There is no underground missile storage at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. Five garages with 24 bays and the two large vehicle maintenance buildings provide the GSE storage for the RIM facility. There is no underground GSE storage at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. A weather station, aheat-/steamplant and 24 su ort buildings provide additional su Barracks and Housing 6. The 24 barracks have a total floorspace of 3,739 square meters, providing housing for an esti- mated 813 personnel. A large headquarters/administration building, three administration/barracks build- ings, an auditorium, and four messhalls are within the facility. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for the facility is May 1969. Construction was initially observed on imagery of October 1969. The RIM building was observed under construction on imagery of February 1972. By July 1972, all buildings appeared externally complete and the buried communications cable was being laid. The auditorium was constructed in 1975. No additional construction has been observed. (S/WN) 25X1 25X1 I IA-42 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01111 :CIA-RDP84T001718000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Missile Association and Activity 8. This laciliry has been associated with CSS?1 and CSS-2 SSMs because of observations of GSE and its location within a known SSM complex. (S/WN) 9. CSS-1 GSE was first observed on imagery of August 1975 when nine probable CSS-1 fuel trucks were within the RIM/vehicle maintenance area. Subsequent observations of CSS-1 GSE, in 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1979, consisted of approximately one CSS-1 launch unit's complement of fuel trucks with occasional sightings of oxidizer trailers and various support vehicles. (S/WN1 10, CSS-2 GSE was first observed on imagery of March 1977 when three probable CSS-2 propellant trucks and two probable CSS-2 control/alignment van trucks were in the RIM/vehicle maintence area, Additional observations of CSS-2 GSE, in 1979, 1980, and 1983, have consisted of from three to six CSS-2 propellant trucks and support equipment, The support equipment typically consisted of a water wash- down truck, atruck-mounted crane, and van trucks. (S/WN) Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01111 :CIA-RDP84T001718000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01111 :CIA-RDP84T001718000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF acility SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-12, scale 1,200,000 May 83 location and Identification Aug 70 BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Luanchuan RIM Facility is confirmed as an SSM-related facility because of its facilities, construc- tion chronology, and location near known SSM installations, It is 12.0 km northwest of the city of Luanchuan, in the Henan Province, Wuhan MR, east-central China, The RIM facility consists of general and specialized maintenance buildings, barracks, and single-family housing indicative of a regiment- echelon facility (Figure 20), (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 10,0 km west of the Luanchuan Army/Division-level Headquarters, 130 km south- west of the SSM RTP at Luoyang, within 40 km west of the CSS-3 ICBM Launch Group at Sundian, 60 km south of the CSS-4 Launch Group at Luoing, and 50 km east of the CSS-4 Launch Group at Lushi. It is connected to the Luanchuan Headquarters and the CSS-3 SSM Launch Group buried communications cable. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3, A clerestory RIM building is in the center of th e facility, It is wide at its greatest width, The clerestory center section is building is similar to buildings found at other SSM installations and as imensions Simi ar to the cleres- tory RIM building at Tongdao SSM Complex, This RIM building is of sufficient size to service any operational SSM in the Chinese inventory, There is no underground missile storage at this facility, (5/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4, The facility contains one 8-bay and two 4-bay garages for 16 bays of storage, (S/WN) Other Storage 5, The facility contains one high-bay maintenance building with attached shops/offices, one proba- ble compressor/generator building, one probable metal-working building, four general maintenance buildings/shops, and eight support buildings, A small drive-in cave is near the center of the facility, Its function is not known, but it may serve as a CP or possibly store warheads. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6, The barracks have a floorspace of 3,372 square meters, providing housing for an estimated 733 personnel, The facility contains asingle-family housing area for senior personnel, a probable BOQ, and barracks sufficient to accommodate five company-sized units, The barracks are in two locations. The grouping closest to the access road entrance contains four company-sized units along both sides of the access road. One company-sized unit is at the end of the access road, It also contains two administration buildings, an auditorium, and six support buildings, The single-family area contains one two-family unit, one three-family unit, and three four-family units, (S/WN) Construction Chronology 1, The negation date for this facility is August 1970, Initial construction was begun by June 1971 when construction support housing and the cave excavation were observed, The first barracks con- structed were sufficient to house three company-sized units and were built between February and July 1972, By March 1973, three of the four senior personnel housing structures were complete, By August, a fourth company-sized barracks area and the last senior personnel structure were complete. Construction of the high-bay maintenance building and two shops was begun between April and May 1974, By October, all the maintenance and shop buildings were complete; construction of the RIM building had begun and was nearly complete; the last of the barracks and the final messhall were complete; and two garages had been constructed. The RIM building was externally complete by January 1975. When the facility was next imaged in December 1975, the auditorium and the eight-bay vehicle garage had been constructed. The administration building had been constructed by June 1979 and the BOQ area had been constructed by September 1980, (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8, This facility has been associated with the CSS-3 and CSS-4 SSM systems because of its location near the associated facilities listed. (S/WN) 9. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility, (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. The lack of observed GSE may be a result of very infrequent imagery collection and of the facility having few operational LSs to support, Through the 1970s, only one ICBM LS was operational, and it contained sufficient onsite facilities to perform most checkout and maintenance functions. Greater use of this facility is expected with the activation of the five ICBM LSs now under construction. (S/WN) Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!01111 :CIA-RDP84T001718000301550001-8 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Delingha SSM Regt Tunnel Support Facility East DMATC. 10G (Ground), Series 1501, Sheet NJ47-9, scale 1:250,000 Apr 83 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Delingha SSM Regiment Tunnel Support Facility East is confirmed as an SSM facility under construction. This is based on its location near known SSM facilities and its connection to them by buried communications cable. It is 15 km north of the city of Delingha, Qinghai Province, Lanzhou MR, in western China. This facility is a regiment-level support facility serving two CSS-3 ICBM rollout, erect-to- launch sites. It consists of a probable drive-through tunnel and one barracks/messhall (Figure 22). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 6.0 km northeast of the regiment CP. It is also between Delingha SSM LS 2 and Delingha SSM LS 3, approximately 5.0 km from each. The tunnel is connected to the launch group buried communications cable. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The drive-through tunnel is in the side of a mountain. The tunnel entrances, 315 meters apart, are above the valley floor and protected by concrete/steel blast doors. Imagery of sufficient quality for accurate mensuration is not available to determine the door dimensions. Packed earth aprons, created from excavated spoil at each of the tunnel entrances, provide sufficient area to maneuver large pieces of GSE. Narrow-gauge rail guides extend 25 meters from the tunnel entrances on concrete aprons. There are no missile storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4, This facility has no separate surface or underground GSE storage. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No other storage is available at this facility. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. The single-story barracks/messhall has a floorspace of 164 square meters, providing housing for an estimated 35 personnel. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is December 1969. In the early phase of construction the drive- through tunnel was to be the missile hold and GSE storage structure for a type C IRBM missile base. Construction was begun by 1970 and had been discontinued at the Delingha LSs by 1976. The construc- tion worker support camp at this tunnel was dismantled between October 1976 and September 1977. Although conversion from IRBM to ICBM LSs in this portion of the Delingha Launch Group began in 1978, construction did not resume at the drive-through tunnel until 1980. Between January and June 1980, a construction support camp composed of tents was erected near the ruins of the former construction support camp. A large tent-like structure and construction materials were on the western entrance apron and the blast doors were open. The necessary excavation apparently had been accomplished during the IRBM construction phase as no further spoil extraction was seen. A permanent barracks was constructed and the primary water line was refurbished between May and October 1981. By November 1981, the construction support camp had been dismantled. In June 1982, a buried communications cable was installed which entered the eastern tunnel entrance and connected with the intragroup buried cable that had been installed two months earlier. The first evidence that the barracks was occupied was observed in Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U FF July 1982, when a basketball court was constructed and a secondary water line was refurbished. By September 1982, a small, square support building, possibly an administration office, had been con- structed. Asmall tent encampment was erected near the western tunnel entrance during April 1983. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with CSS-3 SSMs because of its buried communications cable connection with and its location near the associated facilities listed. (S/W'N) 9. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. (S/W'N) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. The two-year lag in construction resumption, separate barracks from the LS barracks, and the similarity to facilities under construction at new ICBM launch groups suggest that this facility is a separate support facility rather than an extension to the existing LS construction. The tunnel was originally con- structed to store and maintain SSM airframes and GSE. Because the rail guides were left in place, some activity, relating to airframes could be expected in the future, probably storage and general maintenance of missiles for resupply of LSs 2 and 3. (S/WN) Top Secret RCA-01 /0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R l! F F Delingha SSM Tu nnel Support Facility West ~ CH DMATC. JOG (Ground), Series 1501, Sheet NJ47-9, scale 1:250,000 Apr 83 location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Delingha SSM Tunnel Support facility West is confirmed as an SSM facility under construction because of the observation of SSM GSE. It is 50 km northwest of the city of Delingha, Qinghai Province, Lanzhou MR, in western China. Delingha SSM Tunnel Support Facility West is a regiment-level support facility that probably serves two CSS-3 rollout, erect-to-launch sites. It consists of a probable drive- through tunnel and one barracks (Figure 23). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 35 km west of the regiment CP. It is adjacent to Delingha SSM LS 1 and 22 km west of Delingha SSM LS 4. The tunnel has no discernible connection to the launch group buried communica- tions cable. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The drive-through tunnel is in the side of a mountain. The tunnel entrances, approximately 350 meters apart, are above the valley floor and protected by blast doors of concrete/steel Narrow-gauge rail guides on concrete aprons extend 30 meters from one tunnel entrance and 36 meters from the other tunnel entrance. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. This facility has no separate surface or underground GSE storage. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No other storage is available at this facility. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. The barracks has a floorspace of 164 square meters, providing housing for an estimated 35 personnel. Living quarters are provided by one single-story barracks. The barracks is slightly separated from two other barracks which are associated with the nearby LS. A temporary messhall serves the barracks of the tunnel facility. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is December 1969. In the early phase of construction the drive- through tunnel was to be the missile hold structure for a type C IRBM missile base. Construction had begun when the facility was imaged in 1970 and had been discontinued at the Delingha LSs by 1976. Unlike the other construction camps in the Delingha area, the construction camp that supported LS 1 and this facility was not dismantled. Conversion of LS 1 to an ICBM LS had begun by early 1976, and construction at the tunnel appears to have continued without an identifiable pause during this conver- sion process. Although activity continued at the tunnel through 1980, construction of the tunnel may have been completed earlier and the activity observed at the tunnel could have been in support of construction at the nearby LS. Construction of the tunnel is complete. (S/WN) 25X1 25X1 I IA-50 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Missile Association and Activity B, This facility has been associated with the CSS-3 SSM missile system because of its location near the associated facilities listed, (S/WN) 9. During late 1977 and early 1978, one CSS-3 first- and one second-stage missile transporter were observed parked in the ruins of nearby construction workers' housing, They may have been subsequently stored in the tunnel facility, In July 1982, a possible warhead van was identified on the access road, This was concurrent with a deployment exercise from the headquarters support area in Delingha to the Da Qaidam deployment area. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10, Similarities between this facility, Delingha Tunnel facility East, and tunnel facilities being con- structed in other new ICBM launch groups suggest that this is a separate support facility rather than an extension to the LS construction, The tunnel was on inall constructed to store and main in airframes and GSE. I IA-51 Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF e Storage Support Facility North I CH SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-13, scale 1:200,000 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Sundian Cave Storage Support Facility North was confirmed as a SSM facility because of the facilities present, construction chronology, and its location near known SSM facilities. It is 9.0 km east of the city of Sundian, in Henan Province, Wuhan MR, east-central China. It consists of the storage cham- bers of an abandoned type IIIA CSS-3 ICBM LS. This cave storage support facility was part of the CSS-3 ICBM Launch Group at Sundian. The facility has been annexed by and is now part of a new type IIIB ICBM LS constructed nearby, Sundian SSM LS 4. This report describes the installation as a support facility, before the type IIIB LS construction, for historical purposes (Figure 24). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 17 km east-southeast of Sundian SSM LS 1, a type IIIA CSS-3 ICBM LS. The launch group buried communications cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. Underground stora e is rovided b the missile storage cave of the abandoned silo. The entrance is approximately with rail guides that extend approximately 35 meters on a concrete apron. If the chamber was completed, and not extensively modified from original specif- ications, it could store up to four CSS-3 ICBM airframes. There are no missile storage buildings at this facility, (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. Underground GSE storage may have been provided by the chamber originally constructed to house the propellant storage tanks. No surface GSE storage has been constructed. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. A few construction support structures were retained. They may have been used for general purpose storage. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. The barracks have a floorspace of 344 square meters, providing housing for an estimated 74 personnel. The facility contains a large messhall, two barracks, and abarracks/administration building. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is December 1967. Initial construction of the type IIIA silo had begun by 1968. The barracks were complete and construction of the silo shaft had begun by June 1971. The silo construction may have been discontinued by February 1972, Construction of the storage cham- bers continued throughout 1972 and had probably been completed by luly 1973. Additional barracks were constructed between April and July 1978. New construction support housing to support the type IIIB rollout LS construction had been built by October 1980. (S/WN) I IA-52 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Missile Association and Activity B, This facllity has been associated with the CSS-3 SSM because of its location near to the associated facilities listed, (S/WN) 9. Although no missile GSE was observed, it is Ilkely that this site was used between 1974 and 1980 as a storage and possibly a local maintenance facility serving the Sundian Launch Group, (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. This facility has been annexed by Sundian SSM LS 4. The former missile storage cave is a propellant storage cave for the LS. The former propellant/GSE storage cave may serve as the communica- tionsand command center for the LS, (S/WN) 11. The completion of the rail guides in 1973 and the maintenance of the barracks indicate the facility was active in launch group operations during the mid- and late 1970s. (S/WN) IIA~53 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U FF e Storage Support Facility South SAC, USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-13, scale 1,200,000 Apr 83 location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Sundian Cave Storage Support Facility South is confirmed as an SSM facility because of the facilities present, its construction chronology, and its location near known SSM facilities. This installation is a regiment-level support facility serving the two easternmost LSs in the Sundian Launch Group, It is 13 km east of the city of Sundian, in the Henan Province, Wuhan MR, ineast-central China. It is road served and consists of two cave entrances on opposite sides of a mountain and three barracks (Figure 25), (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 13 km east of the city of Sundian, in the same valley and approximately 0,4 km from Sundian SSM LS 3, and 4,0 km east of Sundian SSM LS 4. The facility is not connected to the launch group buried communications cable line. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The two cave entrances, approximately 350 meters apart, are in the side of a mountain above the valley floor and protected by concrete/steel blast doors, Packed earth aprons at each of the entrances, created from excavated spoil, provide sufficient area to allow maneuvering of airframes or large pieces of GSE. Narrow-gauge rail guides on concrete aprons extend approximately 25 meters from the northern entrance and 42 meters from the southern cave entrance. The southern cave entrance is secured by a fence with a single gate, The caves may be connected but, because of elevation differences, do not appear to bedrive-through. There are no missile storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN} GSE Storage and Handling 4. There is no surface GSE storage at this facility. The two caves could provide underground GSE storage. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. Some of the construction support structures were retained and may be used as general stor- age/utility buildings. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6, Three single-story barracks provide approximately 334 square meters of floorspace, sufficient to house 72 personnel, One large messhall serves the three barracks. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is December 1967, Initial construction had begun by November 19b8. Excavation of the caves was in progress by June 1971, Construction paralleled that at the nearby type II IA silo. Permanent barracks had been constructed by June 1972, Construction was probably complete by late 1978 and much of the construction workers' housing had been razed by late 1979. By October 1980, a type IIIB rollout LS was under construction in the same valley, approximately 400 meters south of the tunnel/caves. The facility is complete. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with the CSS-3 SSM system because of its location near the associated facilities listed, (S/WN) 9. It may also have been used by portions of an SRBM unit. During 1978, one prime mover, one possible crane, and six camouflaged trucks were parked along the main access road near the intersection of the road leading to the northernmost storage cave. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. Since this installation predated the nearby rollout LS, it is probably not part of that LS but a separate facility, This installation was constructed in the same timeframe as the silo and was probably intended to support a larger ICBM silo deployment than actually occurred, With the reduction in planned ICBM deployment, the storage capacity provided by this facility was in excess of operational requirements, It may, therefore, have been used in some function different from that originally intended. While no system-specific GSE has been observed, the permanent barracks, well-maintained roads, and security fencing indicate that this facility did have an active part in the operation of the launch group, The expansion of the complex, with the construction of the rollout LSs, will probably require this facility to be used, either to store additional airframes or possibly warheads. (S/WN) 11. The vehicles observed in 1978 are believed to have been remnants of SRBM units. SRBM garrisons in the region were deactivated at that time, and portions of the GSE complements were moved to several storage facilities in the Sundian Launch Group, (5/WN) I I A-54 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 . Top Secret RUFF Jingxian SSM Possible Tunnel Construction SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0497-8, scale 1:200,000 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION is in hilly terrain, approximately 7.4 km northeast of the city of Jingxian, in Hunan Province, Guangzhou MR, in southern China. Figure 26 . (S WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is approximately 22 km by road northeast of Jingxian SSM LS 1 and approximately 37 km by road northwest of Jingxian SSM LS 2. Other SSM facilities in the area include the Tongdao SSM RIM Facility, approximately 20 km by road southwest; and the Tongdao CSS-3 Launch Group, approxi- mately 74 km by road southeast. The national-level cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The position and number of cave excavations indicate that this facility will have some type of storage and handling function. It is still in an early stage of construction, and there are no missile storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. The number and position of cave excavations indicate that this facility will have some type of storage and handling function. This facility is still in an early stage of construction. No GSE storage buildings are at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No permanent storage and support areas have yet been constructed. Construction equipment storage is collocated with the construction workers' housing and support areas. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. There are no permanent barracks or housing at this facility. Four areas of construction workers' housing and support structures are on the site access roads. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is Construction was apparently started during 1981. cave excavations and four construction workers' housing and support areas were observe on imagery of Spoil from the excavations was being removed and dumped nearby with hand-pushed mining carts. The positions of the widely separated cave excavations, 1,500 meters apart, indicate that adrive-through tunnel could be constructed although the construction of two separate cave facilities cannot be eliminated. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility is associated with the CSS-4 missile system because of its location near and construc- tion period similar to the CSS-4 silos at Jingxian SSM LS 1 and Jingxian SSM LS 2. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 9. The function of this facility cannot be firmly established until construction has progressed fur- ther. (S/WN) 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 I I A-56 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF )ingxian SSM Rel SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0497-8, scale 1:200,000 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. )ingxian SSM Related Construction 1 is confirmed as an SSM facility under construction because It is in hilly terrain, approximately 16 km north of the cit of Jin xian, Hunan Province, Guan zhou MR, in southern China. This facility consists of four areas of construction workers' housing and support camps (Figure 27). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is approximately 28 km by road north of Jingxian SSM LS 1 and approximately 44 km by road northwest of Jingxian SSM LS 2. Other SSM facilities in the area include the Tongdao SSM RIM Facility, approximately 28 km by road southwest; and the Tongdao CSS-3 Launch Group, approximately 83 km by road southeast. The national-level cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The number and size of cave excavations indicate that this facility will have some type of storage and handling function. This facility is still in an early stage of construction. There are no missile storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. The number and size of cave excavations indicate that this facility will have some type of storage and handling function. But, as noted above, this facility is still in an early stage of construction, and there are no GSE storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No permanent storage and support areas have yet been constructed. Construction equipment storage is collocated with the construction workers' housing and support areas. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. There are no permanent barracks or housing at this facility. Four areas of construction workers' housing and support camps are along the site access road. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The during 1981. negation date for this facility is ers' housing and support camps were observed on imagery being removed and dumped nearby with hand-pushed mining carts. excavations are drive-through tunnels under construction. (S/WN) struction was apparently started four areas of construction work- Spoil from the caves was It is possible that some of the cave Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility is associated with the CSS-4 missile system because of its location and construction period similar to the CSS-4 silos at Jingxian SSM LSs 1 and 2. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 9. The function of this facility cannot be firmly established until construction has advanced further. (S/WN) I IA-58 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 i ,~ 25X1 25X1. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Jingxian SSM Rel SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0497-8, scale 1:200,000 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Jingxian SSM Related Construction 2 is confirmed as an SSM facility under construction because of construction techniques and its location near known SSM facilities. It is in hilly terrain, approximately 15 km east of the city of )ingxian, Hunan Province, Guangzhou MR, in southern China. This facility consists of an improved road leading into a ravine, a concrete bridge over a stream, and five areas of construction workers' housing and support camps (Figure 28). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is approximately 30 km by road northeast of Jingxian SSM LS 1 and approximately 34 km by road northwest of Jingxian SSM LS 2. Other SSM facilities in the area include the Tongdao SSM RIM Facility, approximately 37 km by road southwest; and the Tongdao CSS-3 Launch Group, approxi- mately 50 km by road southeast. The national-level cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. No missile storage and handling buildings or areas have been identified. However, this facility is still in an early stage of construction. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. No GSE storage and handling areas have been identified. However, this facility is still in an early stage of construction. No GSE storage buildings are at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No permanent storage and support areas have yet been constructed. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. There are no permanent barracks or housing at this facility. Five areas of construction workers' housing and support camps, including 25 barracks, 7 messhalls, and 10 support buildings, are near this facility. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is Construction apparently was started 25X1 during 1981. In September 1981, an improved road leading into a ravine, a concrete bridge over a stream, and five areas of construction workers' housing and support camps were observed. The latest imagery revealed additional road improvements, but no cave excavations were apparent. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with CSS-4 SSMs because of its location near the associated facilities listed and a construction period similar to the CSS-4 silos at Jingxian SSM LS 1 and Jingxian SSM LS 2. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 9. This facility's function cannot be determined until construction has progressed further. (S/WN) I I A-60 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF le Cave/Tunnel Support Facility East ~ CH SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-12, scale 1:200,000 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and- Identification 1. Lushi SSM Probable Cave/Tunnel Support Facility East It is on both sides of a steep mountain ridge, approximately 12 km southeast of the city of Lushi, in Henan Province, Wuhan MR, east-central China. This facility consists of housing/support area (Figure 29). (S WN) support buildings, and one construction wor ers' Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 30 km by road northeast of Lushi SSM LS 3 and approximately 32 km by road northwest of Lushi SSM LS 1. Other SSM facilities in the area include the Luoning CSS-4 Launch Group, approximately 142 km by road northeast; the Sundian CSS-3 Launch Group, approximately 130 km by road southeast; and Luoyang SSM RTP, approximately 222 km by road northeast. The national-level cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The size and position of cave excavations indicate that this facility will have some type of storage and handling function. The cave entrances are approximately 865 meters apart. This facility is still in an early stage of construction. No missile storage buildings are at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. The size and position of cave excavations indicate that this facility will have some type of storage and handling function. This facility is still in an early stage of construction. There are no GSE storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No permanent storage and support areas have yet been constructed. Construction equipment storage is collocated with the construction workers' housing and support area. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. There are no permanent barracks or housing at this facility. A construction workers' housing and support area, including 21 barracks, 5 messhalls, and 9 support buildings, is at the north end of the facility. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 25X1 25X1 ~~x1 25X1 25X1 7. The negati on date for this facility is Construction was apparently started during 1981. 25X1 buildings, and one 25X1 construction work ers' housing support area were observe d on imagery of Spoil from all four 25X1 caves was being re of cave excavation moved and dumped nearby with han s indicates that a probable drive-thr d-pushed mining carts. The position and number ough tunnel is being constructed, although the construction of tw o separate cave facilities cannot be eli minated. Also on 25X1 (S/WN) Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Missile Association and Activity 8, This facility is associated with the CSS-4 missile system because of its location near and construc- tion period similar to the CSS-4 silos at Lushi SSM LS 1 and Lushi SSM LS 3. (S/WN) 9. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility, (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. The function of this support area cannot be firmly established until construction has advanced further, (S/4VN) I1A 63 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF unnel Support Facility West ~ CH SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-12, scale 1:200,000 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Lushi SSM Cave/Tunnel Support Facility West is confirmed as an SSM facility under construction. it 25X1 occupies both sides of a steep mountain ridge, approximately 19.4 km north-northwest of the city of Lushi, in Henan Province, Wuhan MR, east-central China. This facility consists of 25X1 (Figure 30). (S WN) Associated Facilities four construction workers' ousing support areas 25X1 2. This facility is 1.6 km by road southwest of Lushi SSM Related Construction 3. This facility is also approximately 43 km by road northwest of Lushi SSM LS 3 and approximately 63 km by road northwest of Lushi SSM LS 1. Other SSM facilities in the area include the Luoning CSS-4 Launch Group, approximately 100 km by road northeast; the Sundian CSS-3 Launch Group, approximately 166 km by road southeast; and Luoyang SSM RTP, approximately 185 km by road northeast. The national-level cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. The number and position of cave excavations indicate that this facility will have some type of storage and handling function. This facility is still in an early stage of construction. There are no missile storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. The number and position of the cave excavations indicates that this facility will have some type of storage and handling function. This facility is still in an early stage of construction. No surface GSE storage buildings are at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No permanent storage and support areas have yet been constructed. Construction equipment storage is collocated with the construction workers' housing and support areas. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. There are no permanent barracks or housing at this facility. Four areas of construction workers' housing and support structures are along the site access road. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is (Construction was apparently started during 1981. four construction workers' housing support areas were observed on imagery of excavation of a third cave was underway (Spoil from all three caves was being removed and dumped nearby with hand-pushed mining carts. The position of the cave excavations indicated that a probable drive-through tunnel, possibly with large connecting chambers, was being constructed. (S/WN) Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 2X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Missile Association and Activity 8, This facility is associated with the CSS-4 missile system because of its location and a construction period similar to the C5S-4 silos at Lushi SSM LS 1 and Lushi SSM LS 3. (S/WN} 9. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. The function of this support facility cannot be firmly established until construction has advanced further. (S/W'v) Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 iop secret tsurr SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-12, scale 1:200,000 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification 1. Lushi SSM Related Construction Area 1 is confirmed as an SSM facility under construction. This is It is on both sides of a steep mountain ridge, approximately 6.5 km north-northwest of the city of Lushi, in the Henan Province, Wuhan MR, east-central China. This facility consists of 31). (S/WN) Associated Facilities three construction workers' housing support areas (Figure 2. This facility is 24 km by road north-northwest of Lushi SSM LS 3 and 48 km by road northwest of Lushi SSM LS 1. Other SSM facilities in the area include the Luoning CSS-4 Launch Group, approximately 120 km by road northeast; the Sundian CSS-3 Launch Group, approximately 150 km by road southeast; and Luoyang SSM RTP, approximately 200 km by road northeast. The national-level cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. No missile storage and handling areas have been identified. However, the size and position of cave excavations indicate that this facility will have some type of storage and handling function. This facility is still in an early stage of construction. There are no missile storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. No GSE storage and handling areas have been identified. There are no surface GSE storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No permanent storage and support areas have yet been constructed. Construction equipment storage is collocated with the construction workers' housing and support areas. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. There are no permanent barracks or housing at this facility. Three construction workers' housing/ support areas are along the site access road. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is Construction was apparently started during construction workers' housing/support areas were observed on imagery of Spoil 1981. three from both cave excavations was being removed and dumped nearby with hand-pushe mining carts. The position and number of cave excavations indicate that a probable drive-through tunnel is being con- structed. (S/W N) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility is associated with the CSS-4 missile system because of its location and a construction period similar to the CSS-4 silos at Lushi SSM LS 1 and Lushi SSM LS 3. (S/WN) I I A-66 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F 9. No missiles or related GSE haves been observed at this facility. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. The function of this facility cannot be firmly established until construction has advanced further. (S/WN) I I A-67 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/125X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret R U F F SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-12, scale 1:200,000 BASIC DESCRIPTION Location and Identification Lushi SSM Related Construction Area 3 is confirmed as an SSM facility under construction. This is It is along the southeast base of a steep mountain ridge, approximately 20.3 km north-northwest of the city of Lushi, in the Henan Province, Wuhan MR, east-central China. This facility consists of (Figure 32). (S WN) Associated Facilities one construction workers' housing/support area 2. This facility is 1.8 km by road northeast of Lushi SSM Cave/Tunnel Support Facility West. It is also approximately 41 km by road northwest of Lushi SSM LS 3 and approximately 61 km by road northwest of Lushi SSM LS 1. Other SSM facilities in the area include the Luoning CSS-4 Launch Group, approximately 100 km by road northeast; the Sundian CSS-3 Launch Group, approximately 165 km by road southeast; and Luoyang SSM RTP, approximately 180 km by road northeast. The national-level cable network has not been observed to connect with this facility. (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3. No missile storage and handling buildings or areas have been identified. This facility is still in an early stage of construction. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4. No GSE storage and handling areas have been identified. There are no surface GSE storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. No permanent storage and support areas have yet been constructed. Construction equipment storage is collocated with the construction workers' housing/support area. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing 6. There are no permanent barracks or housing at this facility. One area of construction workers' housing/support structures is along the site access road. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is OConstruction apparently was started during 1981. observed on imagery of ne construction workers' housing/support area were an excavation for a third possible cave had been started near the northernmost cave. Spoil from the cave excavations was being removed and dumped nearby, probably by use of hand-pushed mining carts. (S/W N) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility is associated with the CSS-4 missile system because of its location near and construc- tion period similar to the CSS-4 silos at Lushi SSM LS 1 and Lushi SSM LS 3. (S/WN) 9. No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. The function of this facility cannot be firmly established until construction has advanced further. (S/W N) 25X1 25X1 25X1 ~~X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 ,~~ I I A-68 Top Secret RCA-01/0009/83 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret RUFF Tongdao SSM Ca SAC. USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0385-12, scale 1:200,000 Location and Identification BASIC DESCRIPTION 1. Tongdao SSM Cave/Tunnel Construction South is confirmed as an SSM facility under construc- tion because of its location near and buried communications cable connection to known SSM facilities. This facility is part of a CSS-3 launch Group, It is 10 km northeast of the town of Tongdao, in the Hunan Province, Guangzhou MR, southern China. The facility is road served and consists of two drive-in caves, possibly tunnel entrances, a construction support camp, and permanent barracks (Figure 33). (S/WN) Associated Facilities 2. This facility is 5.0 km south of Tongdao SSM LS 1 and 5,0 km east of Tongdao SSM LS 2. IC is connected to the launch group's buried communications cable, A second buried communications cable had been installed by 1982, (S/WN) Missile Storage and Handling 3, The cave entrances are on opposite sides of a steep ridge, 310 meters apart. Narrow-gauge rail guides extend from the cave entrances, approximately 25 to 35 meters The cave adits have not been clearly imaged, therefore blast doors have not been discerned. Atwo-bay shed was constructed near the northwestern cave entrance after November 1974 and remained through 1980. This shed was similar to the CSS-3 transporter storage shed near the airframe storage alit at both active CSS-3 ICBM silos. There are no missile storage buildings at this facility. (S/WN) GSE Storage and Handling 4, There is no surface and no separate underground GSE storage at this facility. (S/WN) Other Storage 5. Between December 1977 and July 1978, a security post with lift gates was established at the facility entrance. The security post remains but the lift gates were removed in late 1979 or early 1980. (S/WN) Barracks and Housing b, Living quarters are provided in two single-story barracks, These barracks contain 462 square meters of total floorspace, sufficient to house 100 personnel. Two messhalls serve the facility. Most of the construction workers' housing remains. (S/WN) Construction Chronology 7. The negation date for this facility is October 1968. By February 1969, the access roads, a few support buildings, and spoil extraction from the cave northwest of the support camp were present. September 1969 coverage revealed no discernible change, By July 1972, spoil extraction from the second cave was dicernible and the buried cable had been installed. Atwo-bay shed was built at the northwest- ern cave entrance between November 1974 and September 1975, Excavation of the caves/tunnels ap- peared complete by late 1975, Rail guides had been constructed at both entrances by October 1976, One long barracks and two messhalls were constructed between February 1979 and May 1980. Another buried communications cable was installed and the two-bay storage shed was dismantled between October 1978 and May 1981, By 1982, a smaller barracks had been constructed, The continued presence of construction workers' housing suggests construction activity is continuing. (S/WN) Missile Association and Activity 8. This facility has been associated with the CSS-3 ICBM missile system because of its location near the associated facilities listed, (S/WN) 9. The exact function of this facility is unknown, however construction began at the same time as that for the nearby type IIIA CSS-3 silo, and the presence of rail guides suggests airframe storage, It is likely that the CSS-3 silo deployment in this area was not as large as had been originally planned, No missiles or related GSE have been observed at this facility. (S/WN) Imagery Analyst's Comments 10. Another facility in this launch group, Tongdao Cave/Tunnel Construction North, was converted to a type I IIB LS. It is unlikely, although possible, that this facility will undergo similar conversion. (S/WN) 11, The higher level of security during 1978 and probably into 1979 is evidence that the facility actively supported the silo in some manner, The removal of the security lift gates in early 1980 indicated a change in facility status, probably renewed construction, (S/WN) IIA~70 Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8 Top Secret Top Secret Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11 :CIA-RDP84T00171 8000301550001-8