IRAQ: MAJOR WEAPON DELIVERIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON FORCE CAPABILITIES

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• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2012
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• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

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NOFORN-N
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D C 20505
Directorate of Intelligence
February 1987
Iraq: Major Weapon Deliveries and their Impact
on Force Capabilities (S)
Summa r y
Entering its seventh year of war with Iran, Iraq has
become the largest purchaser of foreign-produced
military hardware in the world. It is the primary
recipient of Soviet arms and the number one client for
arms from a variety of Cornnunist and Free World
nations. The Iraqi appetite for military hardware is
large and broad-based. Since 1983--when Iraq started
to incorporate a large amount of new weapons into its
ground and air forces--Iraq has received 3,500 tanks
and armored personnel carriers and over 300 combat
aircraft, according to our analysis. These arms
shipments have enabled Iraq to acquire and maintain a
significant quantitative advantage in combat equipment
over Iran:
? 4 to 1 in medium tanks.
? 3 to 1 in artillery.
? 5 to 1 in combat aircraft.
But, rather than leading to a quick victory, the Iraqi
advantage has, merely balanced the Iranian superiority
in manpower.
Information available as of 1 January 1987 was used in this
report. (U)
IA M 87-20011C
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Despite Iraq's ability to concentrate an overwhelming
amount of combat equipment against Iranian positions--a
100 to 1 medium tank advantage, for example during the
February 1985 Hawizah Marsh counteroffensive--Iraq has
been unable to do more than blunt Iranian advances, and
even then at a high cost in men and equipment. In our
judgment, the Iraqi penchant for grasping defeat from
the jaws of victory is the result of Iraq's defensive
strategy, and poor leadership, tactics, and training.
Iranian initiative and fervor only magnify the Iraqi
weaknesses.
Continued arms shipments will in all likelihood allow
Iraq to persevere in its defensive strategy and hold
the Iranians at bay, unless Iran also begins to receive
significant arms deliveries. We believe that
regardless of how many or what type of conventional
weapon Iraq obtains, its battlefield performance is
unlikely to improve until changes are made in strategy,
leadership, training, and tactics.
If Iraq is to continue to defend its border against
Iran, it will need a steady supply of tanks, APCs,
artillery, ammunition, and other military-associated
equipment to equip new and existing divisions and to
replace war losses. Even though the Iraqis receive a
large amount of non-Soviet equipment, the USSR will
remain Iraq's number one supplier for weapons and
ammunition.
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Introduction
The Iran-Iraq war is entering its seventh year. Although intense
fighting has been sporadic, Iraq has suffered significant
equipment losses to its over 40-division army and has found that
a quantitative equipment edge over Iran is essential to maintain
military parity. Much of Iraq's military equipment was of Soviet
origin at the start of the war, but a six-month arms embargo
imposed by the Soviets in 1980 prodded Iraq into acquiring
alternative sources of arms from East Europe, China, and the
West. By 1983, Iraq started to incorporate a large amount of
non-Soviet weapons into its rapidly expanding ground and air
forces. As of 1986 other countries such as China, Bulgaria,
Poland, Yugoslavia, Brazil and South Africa had also made Iraq
their number one client for arms, although the Soviet Union
remains Iraq's number one supplier of arms.1
Nearly all military deliveries to Iraq arrive by sea through Ash
Shuaybah, Kuwait; Al, Qadimah, Saudi Arabia; and Aqaba, Jordan
(figure 1) . The Iraqis were forced to use these three Arab
ports when their own ports at Umm Qasr and Al Basrah were closed
early in the war due to the fighting. Although having to use
third party ports complicates Iraq's receipt of arms shipments,
the process appears to function sufficiently well, and we have
detected no bottlenecks which seriously affect Iraq's war-
fighting capability.
1Equipment totals contained in this paper represent estimates
acquired solely from analysis These 25X1
estimates may disagree with other estimates in the Intelligence
Community acquired from all sources of information. In any case,
all estimates show that Iraq has a large and expanding equipment
inventory. 25X1
2The Soviets have airlifted some arms to Iraq over the course of
the war, most notably MIG-25 (Foxbat) aircraft. The three
Chinese B-GD (Badgers) were flown to Iraq. Also, during the
recent Al, Faw offensive, Iraqi IL-76 transport aircraft flew to
India, France, and the Soviet Union for ammunition.
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Figure 1
Location of Receiving Ports and Transshipment Points for Soviet and
Non-Soviet Military Deliveries to Iraq
M~)di(e ian
Sea
AN NAKOD
Caspid+f
Sea
ae} oe?,d;`v People'sDeoroeratit
Y!mien Repufriie of Yemen-
A a{ y R rutilic South Yemepl
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Ethiopia
Soviet union
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Port Facilities Used for Arms Deliveries
The receipt and transport
well documented
of arms shipments from Iraqi
For example, Soviet arms destined for Iraq are delivered to the
Kuwaiti Port of Ash Shuaybah, approximately 50 kilometers (km)
from the city of Kuwait. These arms are then transported
overland by truck to main storage depots in the Baghdad area.
Most non-Soviet arms shipments to Iraq--including Chinese,
Eastern European, and Western arms--arrive at the Saudi Arabian
port of Al Qadimah, although occasionally arms from Europe arrive
at the Jordanian port of Aqaba. From Al Qadimah and Aqaba the
arms are transported on heavy-lift transporters and trucks to
Iraq. Deliveries coming from Al Qadimah stop at the Iraqi town
of Nukhayb, approximately 100 km north of the Saudi-Iraqi border
(figure 2), where the arms are transferred to Iraqi heavy-lift
transporters and trucks and carried to Baghdad.
Figure 2
Minimum Count of Armored Vehicles Delivered to Iraq, 1983-87
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Inventory of New Equipment
the war's beginning.
Armor
The Iraqi Army depends on armored vehicles in its prosecution of
the war and has enjoyed a Quantitative superiority in armor since
Tanks. Before 1983 the Soviet Union was the principal supplier
of medium tanks to Iraq. The 6-month Soviet embargo allowed the
People's Republic of China (PRC) to become a principal supplier.
The PRC provided over 800 Type 59/69 tanks, which is more than 61
percent of the tanks Iraq received from 1983 to 1986 (figure
3). The Chinese-produced tanks are part of a 1981 arms deal for
the delivery of 2,000 Type 59/69 tanks to Iraq. The Soviet T-72
is a more modern tank than the Type 59/69, which in reality is a
modified Soviet T-54 medium tank. The Type 59/69, however, i.s
cheaper and well-suited for the Iraqi tactic of revetting tanks
in defensive positions along the front. Nonetheless, Iraq
received at least 170 T-72 tanks from the Soviet Union in 1986,
according to reliable sources and satellite photography. Besides
the Soviet Union and China, Iraq also has received at least 50 T-
54/55 tanks from Egypt, 100 T- 4 55 tanks from Poland, and 22 T-
72 tanks from Czechoslovakia.
widespread availability of armored vehicles in the world today.
Armored Vehicles. Iraq receives APCs and other armored vehicles
from the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries, the PRC, Brazil, and
France. This diversity of sources demonstrates not only the
complexity of the Iraqi acquisition program, but also the
On the basis of imagery analysis, we believe most of the APCs and
other armored vehicles acquired since 1983 have been used as
follows:
? Some of the 260 BMPs and 70 of the BTR-60 APCs from the Soviet
Union replaced war losses in combat units.
? The remaining BMPs from the Soviet Union, along with 100
Soviet-produced BMD APCs and some of the 250 Czechoslovakian-
produced Bi4Ps probably formed new brigades in the Republican
Guard Forces.3
? At least 400 Chinese Type 63 APCs replaced older Soviet and
Czech APCs in two Iraqi divisions.
? At least 135 MT-LBs from the Soviet Union and Bulgaria replaced
older Soviet APCs in two divisions.
~r-c-PS
3The Republican Guard
equivalent to a corps and
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consist of 17 brigades.
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? Some of the 45 Urutu and 160 Cascavel Brazilian-produced
armored reconnaissance vehicles have been identified in
brigades of the Republican Guards.
? In 1985 the Iraqis completed testing and evaluation of 33
French VAB APCs at Tikrit Barracks north of Baghdad and have
incorporated them into their ground forces.
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Artillery. Iraq has greatly improved its quantitative and
qualitative advantage in artillery over Iran with the delivery of
French and Soviet self-propelled (SP) howitzers and long-range
artillery like the Austrian 155-mm (GHN-45) gun-howitzer. Since
1983, Iraq has received over 800 artillery pieces--mostly towed
field artillery--from both Soviet and non-Soviet countries
(figure 4) .
Towed Field Artillery. The bulk of the artillery delivered to
Iraq since January 1983 has consisted of towed models supplied by
Austria, China, and Third World countries--over 500 weapons.
Even though Soviet-produced artillery is still the most prevalent
found in the Iraqi ground forces, the Iraqis have acquired only
about 100 towed field artillery pieces from the Soviets since
1983.
? Austria has delivered at least 170 towed 155-mm GHN-45 gun-
howitzers to Iraq through Jordan. The GHN-45, with its
range of nearly 40 km provides Iraq with an excellent corps-
level weapon for counter-battery fire.
? China has delivered over 200 field artillery pieces, from 100-
mm antitank guns to 152-mm gun-howitzers. The most numerous
artillery piece delivered to Iraq is the 152-mm (Type 83) gun-
howitzer, of which Iraq has received 160.
? South Africa has agreed to supply 100 G-5 gun howitzers and
Iraq has already received 72 of them. The gun is similar to
the GHN-45. (S NF WN)
Self-propelled Artillery. Three countries, the Soviet Union,
France, and Bulgaria, have provided Iraq with self-propelled (SP)
guns since 1983. The Soviets shipped Iraq at least 45 122/1,52-mm
SP howitzers; France delivered 56 155-mm GC_T SP howitzers, which
the Iraqis attached to the Republican Guard Forces; and Bulgaria
has supplied six 122/152-mm. SP howitzers.
Other Artillery. Unlike other Arab countries such as Syria,
Egypt, and Libya, Iraq does not have a large number of multiple
rocket launchers (MRLs) in its inventory. Consequently, Iraq has
acquired only a few MRLs since 1983. Only about 60 truck-mounted
MIU,s were received from the Soviet Union and China, and 20 Astros
II MRLs from Brazil, The Astros II has a range of 30 km and
provides Iraq with a long-range saturation weapon.
the Iraqis deployed eight Astros I I MRL, s to the
Hawiza Marsh a ong the Tigris River in 1985. (S NT? WN)
3The Republican Guard Forces are
consist of 17 brigades.
equivalent to a corps and
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Figure 4
Minimum Count of Artillery Pieces Delivered to Iraq, 1983-87
Artillery Pieces
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Air Defense
Iran's dwindling air force no longer poses a major threat to
Iraq, although the Iranian Air Force has had limited success
attacking Iraqi ground forces and rear areas by flying at low
altitude, Apparently to
counter this t reat, Iraq over the last three years has purchased
mobile, low-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and
additional antiaircraft artillery (AAA).
Mobile SAM Systems. Since 1984, the Soviets have provided Iraq
with two new low-altitude SAM systems--the SA-8 and the SA-13.
Satellite imagery shows that the SA-8 is deployed in rear areas
near corps and division headquarters. The SA-13, the follow-on
to the SA-9, will probably be deployed to the Iran-Iraq border
and provide low-altitude air defense for one of the five Iraqi
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armor divisions. Since late 1983, Iraq has purchased at least 20
truck-mounted Roland IT SAM systems (figure 5). The West German-
French produced Roland II is designed to defend against low-
altitude air attacks, and the Iraqis
have deployed it along the border, at airfields anr9 a+- the
chemical production plants at Al Qaim and Samarra.
Towed Antiaircraft Artillery. Iraq has received most of its
towed AAA since 1983 from China--over 1,100 57-mm (Type 59) and
14.5 millimeter (mm) (ZPU-4) AAA guns. The AAA has been used to
form units for new Iraqi ground force divisions and to provide
air defense for major economic and military facilities. other
countries providing Iraq with AAA include the Soviet Union with
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79 -mm (ZU-23) uns and Hungary with 118 57-mm guns. 25X1
the Iraqis frequently use the 7,U-2 3 AAA guns at 25X1
defensive strongpoints and near brigade and hattal' r 25X1
ters in a direct-fire role against ground targets.
Aircraft
The Soviet Union is the major supplier of combat aircraft--over
200 total since 1983--to Iraq (figure 6). France, Egypt, and
China also supply combat aircraft, and the Soviet Union and four
western nations have supplied Iraq with helicopters.
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Figure 6
Minimum Count of Aircraft Delivered to Iraq, 1983.87
Fighters and Fighter-bombers. In 1995, Iraq became the first
country outside the Soviet Union and ^zechoslovakia to receive
the SU-25 (?rogfoot) ground attack aircraft, and in 1'186 it
became the first country outside the Soviet Union to receive the
MIG-29 (Fulcrum) fighter aircraft (figure 7). Analysis
indicates that Iraq received 35 SU-25 ground 2bA1
attack aircraft in 1985 and 1985. The Ira is first used the SU-
25 in the Al Faw area in 1986, 25X1
In late 1986, Iraq received 21 MIG-29 fighters. 25X1
Soviet Union,
the pilots for these planes were trained in the 25X1
and the aircraft could be available for operations
by mid-1987. Since 1983, Iraq has also received at least 70 MIG-
23 (Flogger) --with 20 or more of these being the improved Flogger
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G fighter variant--and over 60 SU-17/20/32 (Fitter) f_ighter-
bembers. The delivery of the Frogfoots, Fulcrums, Floggers, and
Fitters has allowed Iraq to deploy new fighter/bomber squadrons
and maintain a numerical aircraft superiority over Iran.
we believe Iraq has received over
40 French F-1 (Mirage) fighter-bombers since 1983; at least 20
are capable of carrying the Exocet air-to-surface missile.
According to defense attache reporting, in early 19865 the Iraqis
completed training on an F-]EQ variant capable of carrying the
AS-30L laser-guided missile--which has a more powerful warhead
than the Exocet.
China and Egypt are the only other countries to provide Iraq with
a significant number of fighter aircraft since 1983. In 1984
Egypt sold Iraq 40 F-7--the Chinese version of the MIG-21
Fishbed--that were originally purchased from China. Between
1983-1985, the Chinese delivered
Iraq at lea
Bombers. The Chinese also shipped three of four contracted for
B-6D/Badger bombers (a Chinese-built version of the Soviet-
designed aircraft) in 1986. The 13-60 can carry two Chinese-
produced C-601 air-to-surface missiles. Its unrefueled combat
radius of 1,200 nautical miles gives the Iraqis the capability to
attack any target in the Persian Gulf without having to refuel in
neighboring states.
Helicopters. The Soviet Union has provided Iraq with 42 combat
capable helicopters since 1983. Besides the Soviet Union; West
Germany, Spain, France, and Italy are involved in the sale and
supply of helicopters to Iraq, as Iraq continues to broaden its
search for Western equipment. West Germany and Spain supplied
Iraq with over 40 BO-105 helicopters, at least 10 of which the
Iraqis have modified for ground attack purposes. France supplied
at least 12 Gazelle heli5copters, and Italy is negotiating for
4At least 78 Fitters have been shipped to Iraq, but Iraq sent at
least 17 of these to the Soviet Union for refurbishment.
5Scme modifications to Iraqi helicopters have been done by Spain.
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US Arms Deals with Iraq
The official US position has
conflict between Iran and Iraq.
other countries, including its
been to remain neutral in the
The United States has encouraged
NATO allies, not to sell arms to
either Iran or Iraq. L o o ~I 25X1
however, within the last three years Baghdad has successfully
negotiated for the delivery of the civilian versions of the US
Bell 214ST helicopter and the C-130/L-100 transport aircraft.
The contracts call for Iraq to receive 45 of the multi-purpose
US-made 214ST helicopters and 10 L-100 transport aircraft.
Despite the civilian nature of these aircraft, we believe the
Iraqis are likely to use them for military purposes, because the
Iraqis have converted all 30 Hughes 500 helicopters received fr
the US in 1983 to gunships, 25X1;1
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Naval Vessels
Because the ports of A1.Basrah and Al.Faw are closed and the port
of Umm Qasr is vulnerable to Iranian attack, Ira has done little
to improve its navy. Iraq 25X1
received two Osa II patrol boats from the Soviet Union in 1984
has also taken receipt of ten Italian-produced ships,
The contract calls for Iraq 25X1
to receive four frigates, six corvettes and one replenishment
oiler. Because of the closure of Iraqi ports, the ships are
currently still at the Italian shipyards. 25X1
Use of Modern Arms
Iraq has considerably more military equipment than Iran, an
advantage particularly evident in ground and air forces. Our
analysis shows that Iraq enjoys:
? A 4 to 1 advantage in medium tanks.
? A 3 to 1 advantage in artillery.
? A 5 to 1 advantage in combat aircraft.
In spite of favorable weapon ratios, Iraq's military, albeit with
Iranian help, has found ways to enable Iran to remain even. F-
Considering Iraq's current quantitative equipment edge and its
continuing acquisition of new and often more sophisticated
equipment, the failure of its military to decisively defeat Iran
directs attention to Iraqi leadership and battlefield tactics.
From our analysis
we have gained an understanding of how Iraq uses
many modern weapons at its disposal,
Tactics
For the past five years of the war, Iraq has pursued a strategy
of strategic defense to minimize its own casualties and wage a
war of attrition with Iran. Based on the historical record, such
a strategy should have led to a lessening of Iraqi casualties
with a corresponding increase in Iranian casualties. Iraqi
forces fighting on their own soil, with equipment superiority, in
prepared defensives, and with strong interior lines of supply
would seem to be in an enviable position. Ideally, they could
punish Iranian forces without exposing themselves to the serious
losses sometimes realized in offensive operations. But, the
fervor of the Iranian attacks and Iran's seeming disregard for
heavy casualties have put severe strains on the Iraqi strategy.
One Iraqi response to the Iranian tactics has been to purchase
increasing amounts of military hardware. But, as our evidence
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clearly shows, the addition of new weapon systems, for the most
part, has not changed Iraq's conduct of the war or its success on
the battlefield.
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we know that the Iraqi Army provides very 2bAl
little infantry support to its armor. This tactic probably led
to the large armor losses in past battles. In the March 1985
Iranian offensive west of the H awi zah Marsh, over 300 Iraqi
medium tanks were lost or damaged--including as many as 120 of
the modern T-72s. This despite the fact that 25X1
the Iraqis had at least a 100 to 1 advantage over 25X1
the Iranians in tanks. Again in the February 1986 Al, Faw
offensive, over 250 Iraqi medium tanks and APCs were lost or
damaged. We believe that in both instances Iraq lost most of its
armor to hand-held RPG-7 antitank weapons, because Iran had very
few tanks involved in either battle. The lack of adequate Iraqi
infantry support to counter Iranian infantrymen spelled disaster
for Iraq's armor columns. 25X1
we know that Iraq acquired an 25X1
assortment of new towed and self-propelled artillery since
1983. This artillery has been spread among Iraqi combat
divisions and combat support units. During the past four years,
Iraq used this artillery in counteroffensives and to blunt
Iranian offensives on the Majnun Islands and at Al, Faw. 25X1
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Despite the Iraqi quantitative advantage in artillery, in our
judgment Iraq's artillery tactics are, for the most part, poor.
Since the start of the war, Iraq has had a tendency to position
its artillery too far to the rear, thus protecting it from the
shorter-ranged Iranian artillery, but negating its long-range
effectiveness. This was quite evident at Al, Faw in 1986 when the
majority of Iraqi artillery was originally positioned and
repositioned so it could only reach the Iranian frontlines and
not staging areas in the rear, thus allowing the Iranians to
continue their resupply effort west of the Shatt Al. Arab.
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In another instance in the Al, Faw campaign, Iraq employed the
accurate, long-range GHN-45 gun-howitzer at close range against
dispersed Iranian infantry positions instead of 6suppressing
Iranian artillery located east of the Shatt Al Arab. This in-
efficient use of artillery, in our opinion, has negated Iraq's
quantitative and qualitative advantage in artillery.
Nonetheless, the Iranian
attack on the South Majnun Island in September 1986 was hampered
by effective artillery fire from the Iraqi artillery forces in
III Corps.
Air
Iraqi employment of combat aircraft has been poor. Despite
overwhelming advantage in combat aircraft, Iraq has failed
exploit this situation to the fullest.
Headquarters in Baghdad rigidly controls
reduces pilot initiative.
Iraqi
aircraft which,
an
to
in turn,
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Iraqi pilots fly bombing missions at altitudes of 10,000 to
20,000 meters, in an attempt to avoid Iranian defense, when
Soviet doctrine calls for ordnance to be dropped from a height of
1,000 to 3,000 meters. The SU-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft
is flown at altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 meters rather than the
recommended 200 to 2,500 meters. The flight profiles are part of
the government's policy to minimize aircraft losses, but poor
training and ineffective leadership undoubtedly play a part. In
and, high altitude attacks decrease targeting success. 25X1
In 1986, the Iraqi Air Force became more proficient. The
combination of modern aircraft and weapons, a weak Iranian Air
Force and air defense network, and more aggressive tactics have
led to better Iraqi Air Force performance. By using the Mirage
-1 aircraft equipped with the AS-30L laser-guided missile, the
Iraqi Air Force has inflicted heavy damage on Iranian oil
facilities and powerplants. The Iraqis have also used the AS-30L
against bridges spanning the Shatt Al, Arab waterway to Al. Faw,
indicating that an abundant supply of the guided missiles are
available for use in tactical operations. In our analysis, the
6For further information on the Iraqi use of the GHN-45, see CIA,
Typescript Memorandum IA M 86-20071J, December 1986 25X1
(Top Secret Codeword Noforn Nocontract), The GHN-45 155-mm Gun
Howitzer in Iran and Iraq: A Case Study of Modern Arms
Acquisition, Assimilation, and Use in the Third World. 25X1
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Iran-Iraq war will not be won in the air, but the increased
aggressiveness of the Iraqi Air Force has reduced Iranian oil
revenues and hampered the Iranian preparations for major
attacks.
Training
Ground
Throughout the war, the Iraqis have offered training courses on
armor and field artillery tactics, and on joint combat helicopter
and ground forces operations. Also, training exercises and
battle simulations are conducted at the battalion, brigade, and
division level at the front.
air e ements providing tacti.ca
support for the ground forces, this cooperation has not led to
success at the front, indicating that joint training is
ineffective or insufficient. Indeed, despite specialized
training, Iraqi ground forces have performed poorly in battle,
probably because of the low level of training and the quality of
leadership in the Iraqi ground forces.
The initial training for infantry, armor, and artillery personnel
occurs at three different garrisons:
? Infantry at Rasheed Barracks.
? Armor at Tikrit Barracks.
? Artillery at Khan Al.Mahawil,Barracks.
Conscripts receive small arms training, driver training, and
weapons familiarization.
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we believe combined arms training 25X1
is not taught at these facilities. In our judgment, the Iraqis
rely on the combat schools established in some of the infantry,
mechanized infantr and armored divisions to teach combined arms
training. 25X1
At the front, most training
is at the battalion level in tank and artillery units. We see
little evidence that mechanized infantry training or combined
arms exercises with tanks and mechanized infantry. The lack of
such training could help explain why the Iraqis suffer such heavy
armor losses to the Iranians.
7For further information on the Iraqi Air Force, see CIA Near
East and South Asia Review, NESA NESAR 86-028C, 5000453/86, 19
December 1986 (Top Secret Codeword Noforn), Why the Iraqi Air
Force Has Been More Effective.
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the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) training
programs begin with the selection of applicants. Qualified
cadets report to a three-year training course at the IAF Academy
at Al,Sahra Airfield near Ti.krit. The course is broken down into
six months of basic military training and one year of basic pilot
training on L-29/Maya and L-39 jet trainers. Actual combat
training is done at squadron level at the assigned air bases.
Selection of which type of plane a pilot will fly has more to do
with Ba'ath party membership than individual qualifications. F
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The air campaign in 1986 against Iranian economic targets
indicates to us that Iraqi pilots are competent. In our opinion,
the IAF's problems cannot be totally attributed to poor pilot
training. Indeed, for each 25X1
operation the IAF headquarters specifies the number of aircraft
to use, which pilots will fly, the target, ordnance to be used,
and the altitude to fly for the entire mission. IAF headquarters
also provides the exact coordinates where the pilots will turn.
The centralized control of all aspects of the air operation is
contrary to US Air Force doctrine which espouses centralized
control of assi ned air resources but decentralized execution of
operations. 25X1
We do not know why the IAF headquarters places such stringent
controls on air operations. This policy places undue stress on
pilot capabilities, however, and we have detected problems in
Iraqi pilot training. Iraqi F-1 25X1
Mirage pilots, who are trained by the French, are not instrument-
qualified and only fly when the weather is good. '?-1, pilots also
do not train to bomb in close formation which results in wide
dispersal of ordnance. however, 25X1
the French-trained F-1 pilots are better trained than their
Soviet-trained counterparts on the MI1-23. 25X1
Implications and Outlook
Iraqi training, tactical use of military equipment, and
leadership have all contributed to Iraq's lack of significant
success. Iraq enjoys an overwhelming advantage in numbers of
mechanized formations. But, poor training and poor weapons
employment, in combination with the Iraqi pursuit of a static
defensive posture based on prepared strongpoints, gives the
initiative on the ground to the Iranians. Joint training between
Iraqi air and ground elements has been insufficient to insure
close cooperation and success at the front line. Artillery
employment has had mixed success, although Iraq has an
unqualified superiority in number of artillery weapons at the
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Top Secret 25X1
front. Centralized control of air force operations has minimized
Iraqi air losses, but, at the same time, reduced the air force's
Nevertheless, the addition of new weapons and the continued
delivery of weapons systems already in the Iraqi inventory should
allow Iraq to maintain its defensive strategy in the war with
Iran, if it so chooses. In our opinion, if Iraq is to continue
to defend its border against Iran using its present strategy, a
steady supply of tanks, APCs, artillery, ammunition, and other
military-associated equipment will be needed to maintain its
quantitative edge over Iran and to replace war losses.
Iraq will probably continue to import arms from its new
suppliers, but the Soviet Union, in our analysis, will remain its
main supplier. If the Soviet Union and China do not meet Iraqi
armor needs, then Iraq may turn to Eastern Europe for Soviet-
designed tanks and APCs or risk further complicating their
logistics and training by purchasing tanks from Brazil or another
Western country. We believe that Iraq--with this large infusion
of non-Soviet equipment--may eventually or may already suffer
from maintenance and logistics problems because of the large
variety of weapons. The Iraqis are pleased with the aircraft and
training from France, according to a western military attache,
and consequently they will probably seek additional combat
aircraft from France, especially if the F-1 has continued success
attacking Iranian economic targets.
I n our opinion, Iraq will face some problems with creditors
because the recent fall in oil prices reduces revenues. As a
consequence, the Iraqi populace may be forced to accept severe
austerity measures so Iraq can continue to finance the war. On
the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Iraq's principal
benefactors, probably see no alternative except to continue to
support Iraq, dewer oil prices, because they fear an
Iranian victory.
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Appendix
Minimum Count of Major Weapon Deliveries to Iraq
January 1983 through 31 December 1986a
Equipment
Tanksb
T-72
Type 59/59
T-54/55
Unidentified Tanks
Armored Personnel Carriers
3MJ
3NP
rc-L3
3TR-60 PB
3TR-60 PU
ACRV
French 4x4 VA3
AMX-10
Type 701A/750 Canmand
Vehicle Ambulance
Type 63/531
Unidentified Armored Personnel
Carriers
Other or South Soviet West
Unknown Austria 9razil Bulgaria China Czechoslovakia Egypt France Hungary Poland Africa Union Germany Total
Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles
BRDM-2 1
LE-11 (Urutu) 45
ai-9 (Cascavel) 160
Fiat 35
Unidentified Armored 32
Reconnaissance vehicles
Artillery
122-mry 152-mm SP howitzer
155-mn OCT SP howitzer
155-mm GI-N-45 howitzer
155-mi G-5 howitzer
152-mm M-1984 howitzer
152-mm D-20 howitzer
152-nun L-20 12
130-ran '1--46 field gun 19
122-ran D-30 howitzer
105-mn howitzer 36
85/100-ran anti tank gun 25
Astros II multipll
rocket launcher
122-tm (3M-21) multiple
rocket launcher
Unidentified artillerye 38
6 45
52
106
2 62
59
97
8
15
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Appendix
Minimum Count of Major Weapon Deliveries to Iraq
January 1983 through 31 December 1986a (continued)
Other or South Soviet West
Equipment Unknown Austria 9razil Bulgaria China Czechoslovakia Egypt France Hungary Poland Africa Union Germany Total
Antiaircraft artillery
1,342
57-mm AAA
37-mm AAA
23-sin (ZU-23) AAA
14.5-mm (ZPU-2/4) AAA
Unidentified Antiaircraft
Artillery
SAM Equipment
SA-13 Transporter-erector
24
3
683
192
235
118
launchers (TEL)
SA-8 TEL
12
SA-8 Resupply Vehicle
6
SA--6 TEL
6
SA-6 Missiles
240
SA-3 Launcher
17
59-3 Canister Transporter
6
SA-2 Launcher
26
SA-2 Missile Transporter
42
SA -2 Missiles
76
Roland I Launcher
1
Roland II Launcher
22
SSM Equipnent
Scud Missile Airframe
Frog-7 Rocket
Aircraft
Mig-29 (Fulcrum)
Mig-25 (Foxbat)
Mig-23 (Flogger)
Mig-21 (Fishbed)
IMig (Trainer)
SU-25 (Frogfoot)
SU-17/20/22 (Fitter)
F-7
Mirage F-19
B-6D (Badger-China)
NU-17 (Hip-H) helicopter
MI-24/25 (Hind) helicopter
MBB BK-ll7 helicopter
MBB BO-105 helicopter'
S. 341/342 (Gazelle) helicopter
6
UNK
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kcontinued)
blraq may have also received 50 to 60 TR-77 tanks-the Romanian version of the T-55 tank.
Iraq could have received as many as 38 Astros II `4RLs.
eAntitank gin of unknown caliber-
flncludes 34 Fitter J. 0
9Includes 20 Mirage F-1EQ5 fighter-barbers-the Exocet carrying variant.
hlraq has received at least 40 3D-Lp5 helicopters from Spain and West Germany, and nine to 13 have converted to gunships.
This appendix is Secret Noforn.
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