SA-5 COMPLEXES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES IN SYRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00171R000101000001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP84T00171 R000101000001-0
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NOFORN
SA-5 COMPLEXES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES IN SYRIA (S)
INTRODUCTION
1. This report discusses the deployment of the Soviet SA-5 long-range, medium- to high-altitude
SAM system in Syria; the air warning radar facilities associated with each complex; and the SAM systems
which provide air defense for the two SA-5 complexes. This report contains three maps, four annotated
photographs, and three tables. (S/WN)
2. Prior to the deployment of the SA-5 missile system itself, significant upgrading of the command
and control communications for the air defense network in Syria was noted. New radar and communica-
tions equipment began to arrive in August 1982. This equipment included the TALL KING C long-range
early warning radar; the CROSS SCREEN identification, friend or foe (IFF) radar; the ODD PAIR height
finder radar; the BACK TRAP search radar; the KM-1 computer van set; and the CONE DISH data link
transmission system. (S/WN)
3. The SA-5 e uipment destined for Syria began to arrive at the quay at Nikolayev Port Facilities
South USSR, on After being shi ped from Nikolayev, this equipment
began to arrive in Syria at Tartus Port Facilities on gy SA-5-
associated equipment was at Damascus SAM Support Facility 13. This facility was being converted from an
SA-2/-3/-6 support facility to an SA-5 support facility as early as
SA-5-associated equipment had begun to arrive at Dumayr SA-5 Complex 05, which had been under
construction prior to Hims SA-5 Complex, also under construction by
did not begin receiving SA-5-associated equipment until The sighting of a CLAM SHELL
radar on a transportable electronics tower (TET), along with SQUARE PAIR, ODD GROUP, and TALL
KING C radars in the tracking and guidance area at both the Dumayr and Hims SA-5 complexes, was
significant since this is not a normal deployment practice in the Soviet Union. This combination of
equipment has been seen only once in the Soviet Union-in December 1982, during a training exercise at
Sary-Shagan Missile Complex SAM Training Facility C19-5 USSR. (S/WN)
DESCRIPTION
Hims SA-5 Complex
4. The Hims SA-5 Complex (Figures 1 and 2)
is approximately 6 nautical miles (nm) southeast of
Hims and approximately 72 nm north-northeast of
Damascus. The complex is secured by a double
fence and consists of three functional areas-a
tracking and guidance area, a launch area, and a
support area. (S/WN)
Tracking and Guidance Area
5. Near the center of the tracking and guid-
ance area is a bunker that functions as the tracking
and guidance control center (T&GCC). Five earth-
en radar mounds are in the vicinity of this bunker.
Radar mounds designated Al and A2 have been
seen occupied by the SQUARE PAIR radar and are
believed to be associated with designated launch
site A. Likewise, radar mounds 131 and B2 have
been seen occupied by the SQUARE PAIR radar
and are believed to be associated with launch site
B. Cable trenches connect the T&GCC with the
four SQUARE PAIR-associated radar mounds (Al,
A2, B1, and B2) and with the launch site control
centers (LSCCs) at launch sites A and B. At Al and
131, an exposed linear revetment for a guidance
control van and a generator/converter is beside
each of the mounds. At A2 and B2, an earth-
covered, drive-through bunker adjacent to each
mound provides cover for the guidance-control
van and the generator/converter. The fifth radar
mound, not designated, has been observed occu-
pied by the ODD GROUP radar. Five revetted
support buildings, one radar calibration mast, two
SA-7 firing sites, at least one antiaircraft artillery
(AAA) mound, and numerous revetments are also
in this area. (S/WN)
6. Equipment in the tracking and guidance
area as of included one TALL KING
C long-range early warning radar, draped in net-
ting; one CROSS SCREEN IFF radar, draped in
netting; one ODD GROUP height finder radar and
four SQUARE PAIR tracking and guidance radars,
each encircled by an environmental screen; one
CLAM SHELL low-level acquisition radar mounted
on a TET, draped in netting; one CONE DISH
communications mast with associated support
vans; and one SA-8 transporter-launcher and radar
(TLAR). (S/WN)
7. The launch area consists of two opera-
tional six-position launch sites (designated A and
B) and two nonoperational three-position launch
sites (designated AA and BB). Launch sites A and B
each consist of a bunkered LSCC and six revetted
launch positions, respectively designated Al
through A6 and 131 through B6. Each LSCC is
connected by cable trenches to the six associated
launch positions and to the T&GCC in the tracking
and guidance area. Concrete pads were poured
around the launcher placement excavation at each
of the 12 launch positions prior to installation of
the launcher. The typical V-rails seen at many of
the SA-5 launch positions in the Soviet Union were
not seen at the Syrian sites. These tracks are used
at SA-5 complexes in the Soviet Union to provide a
rapid reload capability from a resupply dolly to the
launcher. (S/WN)
8. Launch site AA (east of launch site A) and
launch site BB (north of launch site B), each consist
of a dirt mound erected as a dummy LSCC and
three revetted launch positions respectively desig-
nated AA1 through AA3 and 13131 through BB3. No
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FIGURE 1. LOCATIONS OF FACILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH SA-5 DEPLOYMENT IN SYRIA
cable trenches connected the two sites to the
tracking and guidance area, and there was no
evidence of a launcher placement excavation or
concrete pavement in any of the six launch posi-
tions before each position was covered with a
canvas-covered framework. While it is possible
that an SA-5 launcher, with or without a missile,
could be under the canvas at each of the positions
at these two sites, the sites themselves have not
been constructed to function as operational SA-5
launch sites. Therefore, it is postulated that these
two sites, AA and BB, were constructed for decep-
tion/storage, not as operational sites. (S/WN)
9. Also in the launch area are 16 revetted
support buildings, numerous revetments, one SA-7
firing site, a missile checkout tent, and a water
filtration station with two pyramidal tents. Equip-
ment in the launch area as of consisted
of 12 canvas-covered SA-5 launchers, probably
with missiles; eight probable SA-5 missile/canister
transporters in sheds; seven SA-8 TLARs; and two
SA-8 transloaders. It is possible that six more SA-5
launchers, with or without missiles, could be
under the canvas covering the launch positions at
sites AA and BB. (S/WN)
Support Area
10. The support area consists of 40 barracks,
eight support buildings, two guard posts, nine
vehicle storage buildings, one 40-man tent, one
pyramidal tent, and several revetments. Numerous
pieces of support equipment, including trucks,
cranes, and transporters, are in this area. (S/WN)
Hims Radar Facility South
11. Hims Radar Facility South (Figures 1 and
3) is a major air defense center in Syria. This radar
facility, 6 nm south of the city of Hims and 1.6 nm
west-southwest of the Hims SA-5 complex, pro-
vides the complex with significant air warning
capabilities. Radars and electronics equipment op-
erationally deployed there as of 0 in-
cluded two BACK TRAPs, four ODD PAIRs, two
SIDE NETs, one TALL KING C, one CROSS
SCREEN, one SPOON REST D, one CONE DISH,
and two KM-1 computer van sets. Construction of
a large bunker, which had begun prior to
0
NAUTICAL MILES
was continuing. (S/WN)
Dumayr SA-5 Complex 05
12. Dumayr SA-5 Complex 05 (Figures 1 and
4) is approximately 6 nm south of Ad Dumayr and
approximately 18 nm east of Damascus. The com-
plex is double fence secured and consists of three
functional areas-a tracking and guidance area, a
launch area, and a support area. (S/WN)
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Z-12065/83 SECRET
HIMS
IN,
? HIMS SA-5 COMPLEX
DUMAYR
?AW RADAR FACILITY
? ? DUMAYR SA - 5 COMPLEX 05
DAMASCUS
IAR-0046/83
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SECRET
Tracking and Guidance Area
13. The tracking and guidance area is sepa-
rated from the launch area by a single fence. At
the heart of the tracking and guidance area is the
T&GCC, which formerly was the central guidance
bunker for a six-position SA-2 site designated Da-
mascus SAM Site B09-3 22 Around
this SAM site are five earthen radar mounds. Radar
mounds Al and A2 are believed to be associated
with launch site A in the launch area. Likewise,
radar mounds B1 and B2 are believed to be associ-
ated with launch site B. Cable trenches connect
the T&GCC with the four SQUARE PAIR-associ-
ated radar mounds (Al, A2, B1, and B2) and with
the LSCCs at launch sites A and B. At Al and 61, an
exposed linear revetment for a guidance control
van and a generator/converter is beside each of
the mounds. At A2 and B2, an earth-covered
bunker adjacent to each mound provides cover
for the guidance-control van and the generator/-
converter. The fifth radar mound, not designated,
is occupied by an ODD GROUP radar. Five re-
vetted buildings, one support building, one per-
sonnel bunker, one single-lane obstacle course, six
AAA mounds, numerous drive-in and drive-
through revetments, and one unidentified instru-
mentation position are also in the tracking and
guidance area. (S/WN)
14. At the center of the unidentified instru-
mentation position, which is on the west edge of
the tracking and guidance area, is a
meter bunkered building with two antenna
mounts/vents on it. Cable trenches extended out-
ward from the bunker to form two
long probable instrumentation legs in a cross
shape along azimuths of 110/290 degrees and
rectangular
concrete bunker is at each end of each leg. On
each rectangular bunker are two dark areas, one
(S/WN)
and the other
15. Also in the tracking and guidance area
are at least 41 scattered groups of very small, dark
objects on the ground in a compact, open-ended
oval shape. Their function is unknown. (S/WN)
16. Equipment in the tracking and guidance
area as of included one TALL KING
C radar, draped in netting; one CROSS SCREEN
radar, draped in netting; one ODD GROUP radar,
encircled by an environmental screen; four
SQUARE PAIR radars, encircled by environmental
screens; two CONE DISH communications masts
with canvas-covered associated vans; one SA-8
TLAR; four probable ZU-23 AAA pieces; two
groups of stick mast antennas; and one possible R-
409 CATS PAW antenna. Additional equipment in
the tracking and guidance area but separated from
the rest of the area by a single security fence
included one CLAM SHELL radar on a TET, draped
in netting; two radar mounds with environmental
screens; and one radar calibration mast. (S/WN)
Launch Area
17. The launch area consists of two opera-
tional launch sites (designated A and B) and three
nonoperational launch sites (designated AA, BB,
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and CC). Launch sites A and B each consist of a
bunkered LSCC and six revetted launch positions,
respectively designated Al through A6 and B1
through B6. Each LSCC is cable connected to its six
associated launch positions and to the T&GCC in
the tracking and guidance area. Concrete pave-
ment was poured around the launcher placement
excavations at all 12 of the launch positions associ-
ated with sites A and B prior to the arrival of the
launchers. Launch sites AA and CC are respec-
tively west and east of site A, and launch site BB is
east of site B. Sites AA and BB each contain three
launch positions respectively designated AA1
through AA3 and BB1 through BB3. Site CC con-
tains six launch positions designated CC1 through
CC6. At each of the three sites, a dirt mound has
been erected as a dummy LSCC. No cable
trenches connected the three sites to the tracking
and guidance area, and there was no evidence of a
launcher placement excavation or concrete pave-
ment at any of these 12 launch positions prior to
the placement of a canvas-covered framework at
each launch position. While it is possible that an
SA-5 launcher, with or without a missile, could be
under the canvas in each of these 12 launch
positions, the sites themselves were not con-
structed to function as operational SA-5 sites.
Therefore, it is postulated that sites AA, BB, and
CC were constructed for deception/storage, not as
operational sites. (S/WN)
18. Also in the launch area are 11 revetted
buildings, eight AAA positions, one SA-7 firing
site, numerous drive-in and drive-through revet-
ments, and 26 groups of small, dark objects like
those in the tracking and guidance area. Equip-
ment in the launch area as of included
12 canvas-covered SA-5 launchers, probably with
missiles; seven SA-8 TLARs; four probable ZU-23
AAA pieces; and numerous pieces of support
equipment under netting. Additionally, it is possi-
ble that 12 SA-5 launchers (with or without mis-
siles) could be under the canvas over the launch
positions at sites AA, BB, and CC. (S/WN)
Support Area
19. The support area consists of 40 barracks,
19 support buildings (seven under construction),
two guard posts, five vehicle storage buildings
(one under construction), a water filtration station
with two Soviet-type USB-41 tents, and two pyra
midal tents. Numerous pieces of support equip-
ment, including trucks, cranes, and transporters,
are normally seen in the support area. (S/WN)
Dumayr Air Warning Radar Facility
20. Additional air warning for the Dumayr
SA-5 complex is provided by Dumayr Air Warning
Radar Facility. This radar facility is 3 nm northeast
of the Dumayr SA-5 Complex. Upgrading of this
facility began in the fall of 1982. Radar and other
electronics equipment operationally deployed as
of it the facility included two BACK
TRAP, four ODD PAIR, one TALL KING C, one
CROSS SCREEN, one BAR LOCK, one SPOON
REST, and two SIDE NET radars, as well as two
CONE DISH antennas. (S/WN)
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36?30'
2.
NPIC T-6552
FIGURE 6. LOCATIONS OF SAM DEFENSES FOR HIMS SA-5 COMPLEX. Hims Radar Facility South, which provides
significant air warning capabilities for this complex, is also depicted.
Table 2. Active SAM Sites and Related Air Defense Facilities for
Hims SA-5 Complex, Syria (Keyed to Figure 6)
-T
36?45'
1
1 Hims SAM Site A35A-2 14
2 Hims SAM Site 226
3 Hims SAM Site A27-2 214
4 Hims SAM Site 272
5 Hims SAM Site A18-2 217
6 Hims SAM Site 384
7 Hims SAM Site A11-2 17
8 Hims SAM Site 388
9 Hims SAM Site 395
10 Hims SA-5 Complex
11 Hims Radar Facility South
12 Hims SAM Site A20A-2 11
13 Hims SAM Site 393
14 Hims SAM Site 394
15 Hims SAM Site 397
16 Hims SAM Site 399
17 Al Qusayr SAM Site 385
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m8
-10
34-49-57N 036-41-55E
34-47-20N 036-37-10E
34-42-31N 036-33-16E
34-40-55N 036-41-20E
34-40-23N 036-43-25E
34-39-50N 036-48-OOE
34-42-29N
036-47-18E
34-39-10N
036-49-05E
34-36-20N
036-50-20E
34-37-26N
036-46-16E
34-36-55N
036-44-20E
34-36-27N
036-40-37E
34-35-45N
036-43-55E
34-33-50N
036-46-20E
34-37-OON 036-35-50E
34-33-20N 036-38-10E
34-32-15N 036-33-25E
SA-2 SITE
SA.3 SITE
SA-6 SITE
SA-5 COMPLEX
IIIIIIIII AW RADAR FACILITY
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A 14
15>
916
=17
1
36?30'
I
E10
^9
18 .
5 ?
.7
3A
0
NAUTICAL MILES
FIGURE 7. LOCATIONS OF SAM DEFENSES FOR DUMAYR SA-5 COMPLEX 05. Included are the locations of Dumayr
AW Radar Facility, Damascus SAM Support Facility 13, and Damascus Radar Facility TALL KING.
Table 3. Active SAM Sites and Related Air Defense Facilities for
Dumayr SA-5 Complex 05, Syria (Keyed to Figure 7)
Item
Facility
1
Dumayr SAM Site 396
33-38-48N 036-47-24E
2
Damascus SAM Site C08-3 23
33-36-07N 036-48-40E
3
Damascus SAM Site C09B-3 33
33-33-25N 036-46-20E
4
Dumayr Air Warning Radar Facility
33-33-40N 036-44-1OE
5
Dumayr SA-5 Complex 05
33-32-OON 036-41 -OOE
6
Dumayr SAM Site 387
33-29-50N 036-42-25E
7
Dumayr SA/6 SAM Site 391
33-28-35N 036-40-25E
8
Damascus SAM Site B10-2 19
33-30-OON 036-37-05E
9
Dumayr SA/6 SAM Site 390
33-32-35N 036-35-42E
10
Dumayr SAM Site 389
33-35-30N 036-34-30E
11
Damascus SAM Site A08-2 47
33-32-24N 036-27-12E
12
Damascus SAM Support Facility 13
33-30-55N 036-24-35E
13
Damascus SAM Site Al 1A-3 54
33-29-32N 036-24-59E
14
Damascus SAM Site A12-2 2
33-26-57N 036-24-54E
15
Damascus SAM Site B12-3 46
33-26-11N 036-30-54E
16
Damascus SAM Site B13-3 37
33-21-15N 036-32-54E
17
Damascus Radar Fac TALL KING
33-19-55N 036-17-34E
18
Dumayr SA-6 Site 400
33-40-14N 036-41-40E
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? SAM SUPPORT FACILITY 13
SA-2 SITE
0 SA-3 SITE
SA-4 SITE
? SA-5 COMPLEX
AW RADAR FACILITY
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN SYRIA*
No SA-5 complex construction was noted in the Hims or Dumayr areas of Syria.
BACK TRAP radar was active near Dumayr.1
BACK TRAP radar was active at Hims.2
Initial TALL KING radar signals were emanating from near Dumayr SA-5 Complex.3
Damascus SAM Support Facility 13 was an SA-2/-3/-6 support facility.
Initial TALL KING radar signals were emanating from near Hims SA-5 Complex.3
The SA-2/-3/-6 equipment had been removed from Damascus SAM Support Facility 13.
Construction was underway.
The Hims and Dumayr SA-5 complexes, both in the late stages of construction, were
imaged for the first time. Dumayr consisted of 24 launch positions; Hims consisted of
18 launch positions. Hims Radar Facility South was under construction. Equipment
there included one CONE DISH and two KM-1 computer van sets. However, this
equipment could not be confirmed on that date.
The revetment for the bunker at the unidentified instrumentation position in the
tracking and guidance area of Dumayr SA-5 Complex had been started.
Major construction was complete at Damascus SAM Support Facility 13. Elements of a
mechanized infantry company, consisting of 7 BMPs, were defensively deployed
around the perimeter of the facility. At the Dumayr SA-5 Complex, the cable trenches
for the cross-shaped legs in the unidentified instrumentation area had been dug.
Four of the seven BMPs seen on at Damascus SAM Support Facility 13
remained.
SA-5 equipment was seen for the first time at Damascus SAM Support Facility 13. Ten
SA-5 missile/canister transporters were present. Four BMPs continued to provide
perimeter defense.
An increase in SA-5 equipment was seen at Damascus SAM Support Facility 13. At least
34 SA-5 canisters with fin crates and numerous booster crates were observed draped
with netting. Other types of support equipment, such as canister transporters, truck-
mounted cranes, and trucks, were also observed. Only two BMPs remained for
perimeter defense.
The amount of SA-5 equipment at Damscus SAM Support Facility 13 continued to
increase; 68 to 80 camouflage net-covered SA-5 canisters with fin crates, numerous
booster crates, 23 SA-5 missile/canister transporters, one truck-mounted crane, and
other support equipment were observed. Two BMPs remained. At the Hims SA-5
Complex, the roads were being oiled. Although Dumayr SA-5 Complex was almost
completely cloud covered, two trucks each were seen at launch positions CC4 and
CC5.
Fifteen of the 23 canister transporters had departed Damascus SAM Support Facility 13.
A missile checkout tent had been erected between two drive-through buildings in the
center of the facility.
Two KM-1 computer vans remained at Hims Radar Facility South, where they were first
observed on this was the first confirmed sighting of this equipment
deployed in Syria. At Hims SA-5 Complex, the roads throughout the facility continued
to be oiled.
The first identification of SA-5-associated equipment at an SA-5 complex in Syria
occurred when two sets of SQUARE PAIR antenna trailers were observed at Dumayr
SA-5 Complex. One TALL KING C radar with its associated CROSS SCREEN was
deployed in the tracking and guidance area. Eighteen of the 24 launch positions
contained a canvas-covered framework large enough to house an SA-5 launcher. The
trucks in launch positions CC4 and CC5 could no longer be observed. One Soviet-type
USB-41 tent and numerous trucks were in the support area. A building was under
construction at the unidentified instrumentation position in the tracking and guidance
area. A berm surrounded the revetted building, the cross-shaped probable instrumen-
tation legs emanating from it, and the road out of the facility. Two SA-8 batteries were
deployed in the complex. SA-8 LAND ROLL reflections were acquired from Dumayr.4
Initial reflections were acquired of the SA-8-associated LAND ROLL radar near Hims.s
A CONE DISH antenna was deployed along with its computer van and two support
vans on the northwest edge of Damascus SAM Support Facility 13. At Dumayr SA-5
Complex, a second USB-41 tent had been erected in the support area. Numerous
trucks were also present.
*Activity at Tartus is not included.
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Four SQUARE PAIR radars and one ODD GROUP radar were newly deployed at
Dumayr SA-5 Complex. Two of the SQUARE PAIRs were encircled by an environmental
screen. Each of the 24 launch positions was occupied by a canvas-covered framework.
One group of five stick masts and one probable CONE DISH were deployed in the
tracking and guidance area. Twelve SA-5 transporters were in the support area, and
one large tent and one pyramidal tent had been erected in the area. The two USB-41
tents also remained. AAA pieces were deployed on mounds throughout the facility.
Initial SQUARE PAIR radar reflections were noted in Syria.6
The CONE DISH deployment at Dumayr SA-5 Complex was confirmed.
A second group of five stick masts was observed in the tracking and guidance area at
Dumayr SA-5 Complex.
One TALL KING C, one CROSS SCREEN, and one CLAM SHELL with support
equipment were observed at Hims SA-5 Complex. Environmental screens were being
erected on radar mounds, and two SA-8 batteries were deployed within the complex.
Additional SA-8 LAND ROLL reflections were acquired from the Hims SA-5 Complex.?
One TET and elements of an SA-9 battery were observed at Hims SA-5 Complex. Two
probable CONE DISH computer vans were observed at the Complex, but the CONE
DISH system was not deployed there.
SQUARE PAIR signals were first isolated at Dumayr SA-5 Complex.8
Initial CLAM SHELL target acquisition radar reflections were noted in Syria.9
The TET-mounted CLAM SHELL radar was erected at Dumayr SA-5 Complex. Netting
was first observed on the T&GCC bunker. Elements of a water filtration station were in
the support area next to the USB-41 tent.
Launch position A3 at Hims SA-5 Complex contained a canvas-covered framework
large enough to house an SA-5 launcher. One FLAT FACE B was deployed in the launch
area. Two SA-5 canisters (one with fin crates) were in the support area. This was the first
identification of any SA-5 components at either SA-5 complex in Syria. Also, one 40-
man tent and one pyramidal tent had been erected in the support area.
Thirteen launch positions at the Hims SA-5 Complex contained canvas-covered
frameworks. The SA-5 canisters had been removed from the support area. One
SQUARE PAIR and one ODD GROUP had been enclosed by an environmental screen.
The CLAM SHELL and TET were attached but not erected. Post holes for a security
fence surrounded Hims Radar Facility South.
Six possible missiles were on launchers at Dumayr SA-5 Complex. A second CONE
DISH antenna was deployed in the tracking and guidance area. Two pyramidal tents
had been erected next to the USB-41 tents and water filtration station in the support
area. At Hims SA-5 Complex, the canvas had been pulled back on launch position B4,
exposing an SA-5 launcher. Three SQUARE PAIRs were deployed in the tracking and
guidance area. One of the SQUARE PAIRs was ground mounted, while the other two
were enclosed by screens on radar mounds.
An SA-5 launcher and missile without canvas was observed at launch position A5 at
Dumayr SA-5 Complex. At Hims SA-5 Complex, seven SA-5 launchers with missiles
were observed. One CONE DISH was deployed in the tracking and guidance area, and
the CLAM SHELL on the TET had been erected. Four of the six launch positions at sites
AA and BB contained canvas-covered frameworks. Three BRDM-2 armored cars were
first observed at this facility at the entrance to the support area.
The SQUARE PAIR on the ground at Hims SA-5 Complex was encircled by a sceen. All
six launch positions in sites AA and BB were covered by a canvas-covered framework.
One of the four SQUARE PAIRs at Dumayr SA-5 Complex had been removed from
mound Al and was positioned on the ground between the TALL KING and ODD
GROUP. The building at the center of the unidentified instrumentation position in the
tracking and guidance area was earth covered, and its drive-through openings were
obscured by canvas. Two antenna mounts/vents were observed on the bunker. A
small-arms firing range had been constructed in the launch area.
At Hims SA-5 Complex, the canvas-covered frameworks had been removed from the
launch positions at sites A and B, revealing 12 SA-5 launchers, 11 with missiles. A missile
checkout tent had been erected in the launch area. Two pyramidal tents had been
erected with a water filtration station in the launch area next to the support area. The
environmental screens had been removed from the SQUARE PAIR and ODD GROUP
radars. One probable SQUARE PAIR had been added for a total of four in the tracking
and guidance area. Two SA-7 firing sites and the LSCC at site B had been draped with
netting. At Hims Radar Facility South, no further fence construction was evident. Post
holes surrounded the facility.
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At Hims SA-5 Complex, the canvas-covered frameworks had once again been erected
over the launch positions at sites A and B except launch position A2, where an SA-5
launcher with a missile remained. The water filtration station remained next to the
support area, and seven large revetments near it had been occupied by 13 tank trucks
with trailers. One occupied revetment was also canvas covered. Netting had been
draped over the missile checkout tent. Canvas covered the entrances to both LSCCs.
An SA-5 transporter was carrying an SA-5 missile out of launch site B, and another SA-5
transporter was entering launch site A. The environmental screens had once again
been erected around the four SQUARE PAIR radars. At Hims Radar Facility South,
cable trenches connected the KM-1 computer van sets to the CONE DISH.
At Dumayr SA-5 Complex, one radio van truck (possibly an R-405) with netting over it
was deployed on the T&GCC. The CLAM SHELL position had been revetted, and an
environmental screen was around the ground-mounted SQUARE PAIR. The water
filtration station next to the two USB-41s and the two pyramidal tents in the support
area appeared to be complete. The support vans for the CONE DISH had been canvas
covered. Numerous pieces of equipment in revetments next to the support area were
canvas covered.
All applicable satellite imagery acquired through Iwas used in the preparation of this report.
1. NSA. Syria/Military Activity: AP Noted Active Near Dumayr, 23 October,
291914Z Oct 82 ~ 7
2. NSA. OSyria/Air Defense: BACK TRAP Radar Active at Horns, 20 November, 251919Z Nov 82
(SECRET)
3. NSA.O Syria/Air Defense: New TALL KING Early Warning Radars Near the Horns and Dumayr SA-5
230433Z Jan 83
Syria/Air Defense: Reactivation of the SA-8 Associated LAND ROLL Radar at Dumayr,
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5. NSA. L__ Syria/Air Defense: Initial Reflection of the SA-8 Associated LAND ROLL Radar Near Horns,
6. NSA. Syria/Air Defense: Initial Reflections of the SQUARE PAIR SA-5 Associated Radar in Syria,
272134Z Jan 83
7. NSA.
Syria/Air Defense: Additional LAND ROLL SA-8 Associated Radar Active Near the Horns
SA-5 Complex, 1 February, 022031Z Feb 83
8. NSA Syria/Air Defense: SA-5 Associated SQUARE PAIR Radar Signals Isolated at the Dumayr SA-
5 Complex 6 February, 071928Z Feb 83
9. NSA.O Syria/Air Defense: Initial Reflections of the CLAM SHELL Target Acquisition Radar in Syria,
Comments and queri
World Forces Division, Im
report were provided by
es regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed to
Third
o this
a er Exploitation Group, NPIC
Warsaw Pact Forces Division; and
Guerette, Soviet Strategic Forces Division. (S)
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