THE CUBAN TERRITORIAL MILITIA: AN EXPANDED SOURCE OF MANPOWER FOR CUBA'S MILITARY FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Top Secret
Top Secret
Directorate of
I ntelli?ence
The Cuban Territorial
Militia: An Expanded -
Source of Manpower for
Cuba's Military Forces (u)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
NOFORN (N F)
NOCONTRACT(NC)
PROPIN (PR)
ORCON (OC)
Not releasable to foreign nationals
Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
Caution-proprietary information involved
Dissemination and extraction of information
controlled by originator
A microfiche copy of this docu-
ment is available from OCR/
DLB~rinted copies
from CPAS/IMO
Regular receipt of DDI
reports in either microfiche
or printed form can also be
arranged through CPAS/IMC.
WNINTEL-Intelligence sources or methods involved
Declassify: OADR
Derived from multiple sources
Abbreviations for compartmented codewords are:
M -MORAY S -SPOKE U -UMBRA
G -GAMMA
7X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
~~~W`e~r~ Directorate of
_' n '= Intelligence
The Cuban Territorial
Militia: An Expanded
Source of Manpower for
Cuba's Military Forces (u)
Top Secret
25X1
June 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Too Secret
Summary
lnli~rnmtion arailahle
a.c njmid-:1farrh 1985
n~as used in phis report.
~~
The Cuban Territorial
Militia: An Expanded
Source of Manpower for
Cuba's Military Forces (U)
The Territorial Militia Troops (Milicias Tropas Teritoriales, or MTT)
was formed in 1980 as a new Cuban reserve force, and it has since be-
come an integral part of the country's defense structure. With a cur-
rent strength of over 1.2 million, the primary missions of the MTT are
fourfold:
? To defend local areas in the event of an invasion of Cuba.
? To support combat operations by constructing fortifications, em-
placing obstacles, and providing essential rear services such as secu-
rity patrols and traffic control.
? To augment or replace regular Cuban units in last-ditch defense ef-
forts, despite having only rudimentary training and being lightly
armed.
? To conduct guerrilla warfare should Cuba become occupied by for-
eign forces. (s~~ 25X1
In addition to its formal missions, the MTT fulfills two other func-
tions. According to special intelligence, special units of the MTT, or
uniquely trained militia members with "special destinations," arc
helping the Nicaraguans establish their own militia force. These spe-
cially trained MTT personnel are possibly also serving as military ad-
visers to other Nicaraguan para-military organizations. Another im-
portant MTT function is to politically indoctrinate a significant
portion of the Cuban population in accordance with C'astro's ideology.
(TS 25X1
properly organized and equipped to accomplish its missions. (s
There has been no attempt to make the MTT equal in military capa-
bility to the Cuban regular or reserve forces. A training system that in-
cludes schools and military instruction programs different than those
of the regular Cuban military forces has been developed for the MTT.
The militia is equipped with the types of small arms common through-
out Cuba's regular forces, but has no heavy equipment or vehicles. Dc-
spite the limited amounts and types of weapons, enough arc provided
that, with the help of its ambitious training programs, the MTT is
The Militia strengthens Cuba's defense capabilities at limited cost and
without any apparent adverse economic impact. We believe the MTT
Top Secret
!A 85-10046CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
will further mature, refining its training program and improving its
defense capability. Its basic role in Cuba's defense strategy, however,
is not likely to change. The MTT's dependence on the Cuban Defense
Ministry for some of its funding probably will not change either,
though it is supposed to be totally self-supporting. (s
25X1
iv
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Top Secret
Summary iii
Organization 2
Training and Equipment 5
Page
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Tnn CP[`TPt
The Cuban Territorial Militia: An
Expanded Source of Manpower for
Cuba's Military Forces (U)
During the 1960s, the Cuban Armed Forces had
between ?50,000 and 300,000 men and women on
active duty. When the Cuban economy worsened
in the early 1970s the Cubans, with Soviet urging,
reduced their regular forces to 120,000. The Cu-
ban government also instituted athree-year obliga-
tory term of service for most Cuban men and cre-
ated regular reserve forces. This reduced the cost
of maintaining the Armed Forces, which since
then has been a combination of active duty and
regular reserve units. The active duty component
has grown gradually since the early 1970s to its
present strength of about 150,000, and an addi-
tional 1 10,000 to 135,000 ersonnel are in the reg-
ular reserve component. (
Militia units are also assigned combat support
missions, according to Cuban military journals.
This role may be their most valuable contribution
to the Cuban military, as it relieves many active
duty and regular reserve units from a support role
and frees them to concentrate on combat. Cuban
military journals show that MTT units receive
training and conduct exercises for building fight-
ing positions and emplacing land mines and obsta-
cles. They also train to provide security for select-
ed facilities, control traffic, and direct military
convoys. Further, the units practice aiding and re-
locating civilians and manufacturing articles such
as ammunition pouches and uniforms (figure 1).
Militia units also prepare and disseminate defense
information and political propaganda to the civil-
ian population. ~s 25X1
An additional reserve force, called the Territorial
Militia Troops (MTT), was formed in 1980 to en-
compass those people not already in the armed
forces. The Castro ideology encourages revolution-
ary zeal and calls for all Cuban citizens to partici-
pate in defense. Militia training, in consonance
with this view, helps keep the population ideologi-
cally aligned and disinclined toward dissent. (S~
Open sources indicate that the primary mission of
the MTT is to help defend the island against for-
eign aggression. Cuba considers the US its princi-
pal threat and has expected invasion several times.
Most of the MTT consists of light infantry forces
whose collective purpose is to protect their home
localities. According to open sources, most defense
scenarios for the MTT involve repelling an enemy
paratroop assault or similar action. MTT units are
probably assigned to defend specific local targets,
such as bridges and radio relay stations, as well as
homes and workplaces. (S ~ ~~
Should Cuba become occupied by invading forces,
MTT members are under standing orders to con-
duct guerrilla warfare to harass and weaken the oc-
cupying forces, according to the Cuban press. Mili-
tia members are encouraged to identify strongly
with this guerrilla role, as it is in keeping with the
revolutiona s grit of the Cuban Communist
Party. IS r 25X1
Our analysis of all available information indicates
that MTT units are decidedly inferior in training,
equipment, and capability to their active duty and
regular reserve counterparts in the Cuban military.
They nonetheless are considered integral to the de-
fense force. The MTT could conceivably augment
or even assume the mission of some of Cuba's reg-
ular forces in island defense, although they would
probably do so only under extraordinary circum-
stances-for example, if a lightly defended area
were attacked unex ectedly, or in an overall final
defensive effort. (~~ 25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Tnn CPrrPf
Figure 1
MTT Member Making Ammunition Pouch, 17 May 1984
The MTT also plays a political role. Political in-
doctrination is a vital aspect of military training in
Cuba, as in most communist societies, and the po-
litical officer holds an important position in the
force structure of all Cuban armed forces-includ-
ing the MTT. The MTT's provincial structure al-
lowsthe Cuban government to reach more people
individually with their intense indoctrination pro-
grams than arc reached through conventional ci-
vilian propaganda methods, such as broadcasts
and posters. ~
With its revolutionary overtones, the MTT is an
excellent propaganda generator for the Cuban
Communist Party. A great deal of Cuban press
coverage praises the country's militiamen, and fea-
tures stories detailing their heroic resolve and nu-
merous sacrifices. Many militia training events are
undoubtedly staged or timed for propaganda pur-
poses. MTT units are often the showpieces of civil
defense exercises in Cuba and frequently are fea-
tured in Cuban military magazines. Well-orches-
irated provincial exercises (recent examples being
Baluarte 84 and Defensa 84) involve civilians in
defense scenarios, but highlight MTT units simu-
lating combat missions. These staged exercises
usually involve repelling an enemy airborne attack
or beach landing. ~s
.Ioining the MTT has apparently become a politi-
cally astute thing to do for party members and po-
litical climbers. A human source of undetermined
reliability reports that aspiring party members
view MTT membership almost as obligatory, sug-
gesting that some MTT leaders may exert more ef-
fort making good political contacts than in devel-
opingtheir military skills. (s
Organization
The MTT is an organization of Cuban citizen-sol-
diers. It is most aptly described as a Home Guard
and consists of citizens who have received some
military training. The MTT is subordinate to the
Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR), as are
the rest of the Cuban ground, navy, air, and air de-
fense forces and regular reserves. In late 1983,
MINFAR announced that the position of Deputy
Minister for the MTT was created in the MINFAR
and a division general was appointed, his stature
indicating the importance of the position. An
MTT Directorate was established at the same time
within the MINFAR general staff, which the Dep-
uty Minister for the MTT heads. (c')
The MTT's structure, as established by the Direc-
torate, consists of conventionally organized pla-
toons, companies, battalions, regiments, and divi-
sions. Cuban military journals indicate that there
is also one army corps uniquely organized in the
Havana area. An unsubstantiated human source
described the strength of an MTT regiment at just
under 2,000 members. According to this source, a
regiment consists of four infantry battalions, one
sapper company, one communications and recon-
naissance company, one service company, one ar-
tillery battery (most equipped with mortars), one
bazooka company, a medical unit, and a regimen-
tal Headquarters (figure 2). The elements of a sin-
gle regiment may be scattered over several munici-
palities or provinces. (s
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Tnn Cecret
Figure 2
Organization of An MTT Regiment
MTT Regiment
Headquarters
4 Infantry
Battalions
Communications
and Reconnaissance
Company
The organizational structure of MTT units paral-
lels provincial subdivisions within the country.
Each provincial and municipal people's president
(roughly equivalent to a state or county chief exec-
utive) has a FAR officer assigned to him for Mili-
tia matters.' This officer is the Military Adjunct to
the President and frequently is referred to as the
MTT Chief of Staff for that area. A human source
of undetermined reliability reports that command-
ers for MTT regiments and divisions are regular
FAR officers with command experience. Com-
manders of lower-level units are appointed from
within the MTT. ~s
The MTT Corps in Havana City is different from
other MTT units. A Cuban military journal states
that the FAR officers serving as instructors at the
Maximo Gomez Revolutionary Armed Forces
Academy, in Havana city, also command the MTT
units that make up the Corps; the academy direc-
'FAR is the abbrc~iation for Fucrzas Armadas Rcvolucionarias, which
Iranslatcs to Revolutionary Armed Forces. This term refers to all regular
career soldiers, conscripts on active duty, and Cuban reservists. Refer-
ences to hattalions or schools alone denote an active duty or regular co-
scnc unit. Territorial Militia units arc always separately identified as
MIT banalions. M"rT schools, and so nn. (U)
for serves as corps commander. The academy fac-
ulty wrote the MTT regulations and developed the
training courses for MTT units and command
cadres. (u)
Open source references to MTT units show that
they are identified by three-digit military unit
numbers (MUNs), as opposed to four-digit num-
bers for FAR units. The exceptions are MTT train-
ing schools, which also have four-digit MUNs-
perhaps denoting their full-time status (see appen-
dix). The three-digit MUNs for militia units corre-
spond with geographic areas (figure 3). MUNs in 25X1
the 100 sequence are MTT units from Havana
City Province-the MTT Corps there is MUN
163, for example. Militia units with 200 and 300
identifiers are in the central provinces of Sancti
Spiritus, Villa Clara, Cienfuegos, and Matanzas.
The 400, 500, and 600 identifiers are in the east-
ern provinces of Guantanamo, Granma, Holguin,
Santiago de Cuba, and Camaguey. The 700 identi-
fiers are in Pinar del Rio Province. (c)
The MTT has nearly doubled in size since mid-
1982, and open sources place its current strength
at over 1.2 million, out of a total population of 10
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
million. Membership is open to any Cuban citi-
zens who do not have active or reserve military
obligations. Thus, a large part of some MTT units
arc composed of women, and men too old or
young to be regular soldiers or active reservists.
The main criteria for membership seems to be that
the individual be physically capable of participat-
ing in training. Membership is "voluntary,"
though pressure to volunteer is probably exerted
on individuals in some areas where recruitment
falls short of goals. (s
Militia members fall into three categories:
Figure 3
Location of MTT Training Centers
MUNs 100s
Guines (2) Corralillo
~
Havana (2)? I /
Mari ~ JovellanoS
\'~MUNs700s~'. MUNs'200saad300s
~, Santa Clara
Nueva Gerona
.~i
? /6-to-25-dear-olds who are exempted from active
service (usually university students).
? 25-to-60-tlea~~-olds who are less physicially capa-
ble for combat. They are mainly oriented to-
wards civil defense activities, such as shelter
construction, defense of the workplace, and aid-
ing civilians.
? Special Units who have received unique training
and have "special destinations" (one of which
may recently have been Nicaragua). Their mis-
sion and disposition remain obscure. (s
~Ilaaar Eleuthera
Naw !
Providence "~c~0
Ciego de Avila
/Ceyo Coco
MUNs 4006. S!?OS,
9gQH ,..
Fy~D
F~
4
RE~NA
Lesser Caymans
{KKI ~ `~
Grand Cayman
~;,~~:. rv.Kl
0 b 00 M~laa
~~!
0 IO 801(IlomNere
and 800sHolguin (2) .
Sen
-Salvador
L
Great
e ~ Exuma 4
~_ \\\
~ ~ LOn~ Crooked
Island Island
~ ~, .
u e...a
Santiago de Cuba (2)
~ACklins
" Island
Greaf
Inagua;
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Toa Secret
MTT Special Forces:
The Cuban-Nicaraguan Connection
Spacial intalliganca indicates that special MTT
units have bean %rnned in eastern Cuba. The pra-
cisamission and disposition ~f these units is not
known, but at least one MTT unit underwent spe-
cial h?uining in preparation ron? deplovrnent to Nica-
ragua. Special Intelligence has indicated that indi-
vidual ,~9TT nnemhars ware sent to a rnilitarv school
idantiliad as l:'l Cacho, in western Cuba, before
lauvingfor Nicaragua in September 1984. Signif-
cantly, Nicaragua has started its own territorial rnl-
litia, patterned arta-? the Cuban MTT organisation.
Somc>, il?not all, o~~tha Cohan nnilitiarnen sent to
Nirarugua prohuhly want tq help organise and train
the Nicaraguan militia. (ts
Cuba has sent civilians to Nicaragua since 1979 as
educators, technicians, and adminlsh?ators under
Cuhu's general assistance program to Nicaragua.
11 ?a currently estimate that there are between 3, 775
and 4, 7?S Cohan civilians in Nicaragua.? Since the
CAS arliort in Granada in October 1983, all civilians
stint hi? Cuba to Nicaragua have had soma military
training, and it is highly likely that some are Terri-
torial .t9ilitia nnamhars. (s
7'ha ntnnher and distribution of the Cubans in Nic-
crru,~~uu ara sorb shat in the major population cen-
ters tharaara probably enough to corm all-Cuban
rnilitiu traits. Open press sources have stated that
Ctrhuns in Nicaragua ~ti~ill fight alongside their San-
dinista countarpan7s if necessary, and that "no
nrora Granudas" ~a~ill occur. A source oTtrndeter-
nrinad raliahilit y said that Cubans in Nicaragua
/cacti been told wham to raport?for military duty in
Iha avant o/~a US im?asion of Nicaragua. (s~
11 'bather Cohan militia rnernhers stint to Nicaragua
as civilian specialists ara parTonning those jobs, or
whether thew ara using their titles as covers /or mili-
tun~y colas, is cwt kno~a~n. By using civilian positions
us a scn?aant, however, Cuba and Nicaragua could
nrora easily conceal the true nunnber of Cuban mili-
lur.y persomtal in Nicaragzra. (s
aFor further information on the Cuban resence in Nicaragua, sec OIA
Research Napo IA AS-100390, (TS~May 1985. (7~hans
in :~'iru~z~,~i~u: (?u.riro's (bnlinuirr,e (?ommiNnnn( In the Sandfni.rlas. (S
Training and Equipment
The MTT has a training program distinct from
that of the rest of Cuba's military forces. Most mi-
litia members receive basic training at one of ap-
proximately 22 MTT military training centers or
MTT schools located throughout Cuba (figure 3),
according to Cuban military journals. Each of Cu-
ba's 15 provinces has at least one center to train
militia command cadres, either exclusively or in
conjunction with courses for non-cadre militiamen
(figure 4).~ Satellite imagery confirms open source
reporting that several abandoned military facilities
have been reopened and refurbished to become
MTT training centers. Also, many new centers
have been built-often under short deadlines,
which underscores the importance placed on these 25X1
schools. The schools are the only facilities associ-
ated with the MTT that can be seen on overhead
photography. Individual MTT units may have
only an equipment room and perhaps asmall-arms
range at their disposal in their own locale. ~s~ ~ 25X1
25X1
Several Cuban sources of undetermined reliability
have described militia training programs for both
militia officers and enlisted personnel. The train- 25X1
ing centers, staffed mainly by regular FAR officers
and instructors, give a variety of courses devel-
oped by the faculty at Cuba's military academy.
New militia officers first receive a 45-day course at
an MTT school, and eventually attend either a
5 1 /2- or 1 1-month course for command cadres.
Whether the brief or longer version is attended
may depend on the time that can be devoted to
such training with respect to one's civilian occupa-
tion, or the specific skills required for the position.
For example, a course qualifying a political or ar- 25X1
tillery officer for the MTT would probably require
1 1 months of training, compared to a 5 1/2-month
session for an infantry officer. (.' 25X1
All militia members are required to participate in
a concentrated 10-day training program at the bat-
talion level every 5 years (figure 5). These pro-
grams, conducted at the MTT training centers, 25X1
'C'uba has 13 provinces. but the Isle of Youth and Havana City are also25X1
counted as provinces in the MTT organization. (S) 25X1
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
consist of daily military classes and field exercises,
as well as political study, sports, and physical
training. The training centers hold a 5-day cadre
course for each battalion command group prior to
each I 0-day course for the entire unit, so that com-
mand groups can help train their units. Special
courses for political officers and regimental and
battalion staffs arc also part of the MTT school
curriculum. ~s
Most of an enlisted militiaman's training takes
place in his own home locality with his unit, not at
a training center. The local training is conducted
by both militia cadre and FAR advisers to the
MTT. New MTT recruits receive 22 hours of pre-
liminary training, including target practice, before
taking their military oath. Militia unit training is
usually for four hours one Sunday per month, 10
months per year. This 40-hour training require-
ment is halved every fifth year, when the 10-day
training event occurs. Is
Most of the available information on militia train-
ing comes from Cuban open press sources. Given
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Top Secret
Figure 5
MTT Member Undergoing Training, 17 May 1984
their obvious propaganda viewpoint, it is difficult
to say how effective the militia training program
is-for example, there is no reporting on how seri-
ously it is taken. Some special intelligence reports
have made reference to periodic breakdowns in
supply and transportation support for some MTT
schools, but this is unlikely to seriously degrade
training operations. Most of the exercises reported
in the open press appear to be relatively simple,
but nonetheless they strongly support the militia's
primary mission of defending and securing their
home locales. (~~
The MTT is equipped with an assortment of stan-
dard Soviet-manufactured light arms typically
found throughout the Cuban forces: light machine-
guns, antitank weapons, and 82-mm mortars, as
well as rifles and pistols. There is no evidence of
heavier weapons and equipment or vehicles being
assigned to MTT units, although civilian vehicles
may be routinely used. In an emergency MTT
units arc probably to use readily available civilian
transportation, tools, and materials, and to draw
on local areas for medical supplies. They undoubt-
edly receive ammunition allotments, first aid sup-
plies, and civil defense equipment from the FAR
each year, though probably in small quantities. (Ts
The MTT was designed to be aself-supporting or-
ganization, according to a former Cuban govern-
ment official Members, who receive no pay, pur-
chase their own uniforms and equipment, but
weapons arc provided by the Soviet Union. Other
expenses are defrayed by contributions from labor
organizations and fund drives. Despite these mea-
sures, the Cuban Ministry of Armed Forces (MIN-
FAR) still has to help support the MTT, especially
by funding training programs. According to a Cu-
ban government official quoted in an open source,
the MTT cost $66 million from l May 1980 to 15
March 1982. Of this amount, the Cuban national
and local governments had to provide $25 million,
the rest being covered by fund drives. ~c>
Although the MTT has not been totally self-sup-
porting, the cost is much less than that necessary
to maintain a large standing army. Although it is
of lesser quality than other Cuban military forces,
the MTT has moderately increased Cuba's defense
posture, while permitting most militia members to
hold full-time civilian jobs. (s~~ 25X1
We believe the MTT is firmly entrenched as part
of the Cuban military structure, and the Cuban
government will continue to commit the necessary
resources for the MTT's training and develop-
ment. ~s 25X1
The MTT has grown very rapidly during the last
three years, but the rate will inevitably slow as the
majority of those eligible for membership become
recruited. Cuban officials have projected an even-
tual militia strength of 2.5 million. This figure
probably will not be reached for several years, if at
all, as it most likely hinges unrealistically on re-
taining most members from the original recruiting
drive and adding new members as they reach eligi-
ble age or finish other military obligations. (s~25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
The training programs will probably improve. The
force and its training program are barely five years
old, and consequently it is reasonable to expect
that as militia members gain experience, the quali-
ty and thoroughness of the training will be en-
hanccd.ts~~
The MTT is not likely to take on new missions or
roles. Its organization and training now support its
assigned missions, but the force cannot do more
without considerably upgrading its equipment,
training, and support. The MTT was obviously
creatrd to perform specific roles within Cuba.
MTT units will probably not deploy outside of
Cuba-or even outside of their own localities
within the country-except for limited numbers of
militiamen nn special missions, as in Nicaragua's
casc.(s
Top Secret g
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Appendix
('alumna Imasora Ciro Rcdon
Granma
U/I` MTT Rapid Deployment
Baraco
a
Comnumdante Camilo Cienfuegos
Unknown
(Guantanamo) Force
Conunandantc Pinares MTT School
Guillcn (Pinar Dcl
U/1 MTT Unit
Imias (
Guantanamo)
Rio)
U/I MTT Unit
San An
tonio Del Sur
(Guan
tanamo)
Conunandantc Gust Macil Bcchc
Vuelta .Abajo (Pinar
Dcl Rio)
U/I MTT School
Nueva
Gerona (Isle of
Corallilu MTT School
Villa Clara
Youth
)
ka Cacho MTT School (MUN 1790
Los Palacios (Pinar
U/I MTT School
Bueyci
to
and 3~~7)
Dcl Rio)
Yatcritas MTT School
San A
ntonio Del Sur
~nwnio Macro Far
Gen
Havana Province
(Guan
tanamo)
:
Gen Jose Macro MTT School
Santiago De Cuba
101 MTT Regiment
Havan
a City
I I? MTT Regiment
Dicz. D
e Octubre
Havana City Province MTT
Colinas De Villareal
(Hava
na City)
School
(Havana City)
113 MTT Regiment
Diez D
e Octubre
La Coronclla MTT Schoolh
Havana City (Reparto
(Hava
na City)
Alamar)
'
115 MTT Battalion
Guana
bacoas (Havana
La l
uca MTT School
Cienfuegos
City)
Los Cocos School
Holguin
117 MTT Regiment
Dicz D
e Octubre
Maricl MTT Ofticcrs School
Maricl (Havana)
(Hava
na City)
(MIiN X881)
118 MTT Regiment
Cerro
(Havana City)
Micas Military School
Mayari
I?i MTT Battalion
Guana
bacoa
MTT Cadrr Formation School
Corallilo (Villo
Elguca
,
I ~3 MTT Regiment
Rcgla
District
Clara)
_
(Hava
na City)
MTT center in Marti
Marti (Matanzas)
144 MTT Regiment
Dicz D
e Octubre
MTT Training Center Central
Santa Rosa, Remedios
(Hava
na City)
~rmv
__
(Villa (Clara)
_
147 MTT Division
Havan
a City
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Locations of 1~ITT Units and Schoolsa (continued)
~I I"I t nits and Schools
Ig3 M~I~"f Regiment
?(ll Ml~~h I)iv ision
'0_' M~h~I Regiment
_'tl-I Ml~l~ Battalion
Santa Cruz Dcl Sur
(Camaguc}')
Matanzas (Possible
Bucc Jaca)
Juan Francisco,
Yaguaja~~. Sancti
Spiritus
SOU MT~I Regiment Ciego De Avila
Province
Palma Soriano
(Santiago
Dc Cuba)
~ 18-1 MTT School
Fomcnto Sancti
Spiritus
(EI Pcdrero)
i73 MTT Battalion
El Salvador
(Guantanamo)
Placctas (Villa Clara) -
_ __ X79 MTT Battalion
31U MTT Uicision Villa Clara, Santa
(.Tara
Abel Santia Maria
Plaza
(Santa Clara)
EI Sah-actor
(Guantanamo)
J91 MTT Battalion EI Salvador
(Guantanamo)
Sangua la Grande _- _ --
(Villa Clara) 6461 MTT School
33'_ M~I~~h Regiment Manicaragua (Villa 6~~1 MTT Regiment
Clara) --
- --- ---- - - -_ _ _ 661 MT"h Regiment
361) MT"I Regiment Cienfuegos (~itv
-- - -- - - _--- -- 69(1 MTT Regiment
363 MTT Regiment Encrucijada (Villa ?~,,, , -.
373 MTT Regiment Santa Clara (Villa
7aR MTT Regiment
Clara)
Segundo Frcntc
(S. Dc Cuba)
Minas Dc Matahambrc
(Pinar Dcl Rio)
Sumidcro (Minas Dc
Matahambrc)
379 l i/I M I~~h l~nit Caibarien (Villa Clara)
--- -- - - __ - 779 MTT Regiment Vinales (Pinar Dcl
?3~0 MTT I~isision Holguin City Rio)
a31 M'h~i~ Regiment Cnice De Los Banos, Pros~incc MTT School Jovcllanos (Matanzas)
Tcrccr Frcntc
''This list was compiled irom open sources. and is not necessarily com- ~'Probabh two names for the same school.
pletc. Some schools or units may be listed twice under different names. `l'/I Unidcnlilicd.
or once by name and once by MUN. Because sources refer to these This school in Holguin province is named either Los Cocos or Camilo
schools varioush by names or MUNs, some confusion results. In some Cienfuegos. both of which arc listed by name in the appendix as well.
rases two Ml~~f Schools. one for cadres and one for troops. arc colo-
caicd. Some units have been referenced in sources, but remain
unloaucd.
Top Secret 10
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/30 :CIA-RDP91T01115R000200280001-3