SOUTHWEST ASIA: TRANSPORTATION AND PROCESSING OF OPIUM PRODUCTS ALONG THE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI BORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01115R000200050002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Pakistani Border
Secret
Southwest Asia: Transportation
and Processing of Opium
Products Along the Afghan-
Secret
IA 85-10005
March 1985
44
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Intelligence 25X1
Pakistani Border
Southwest Asia: Transportation
and Processing of Opium
Products Along the Afghan-
25X1
The authors of this paper are
a
Office of Imagery Analysis, a
25X1
Analytic Support Group. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Economic Resources Division, OIA
25X1
25X1
Secret
1A 85-10005
March 1985
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Summary
lnlurmai,on aiail-
ahlc ai of / Oclohir
nas uwcrl in this
rcporl.
Southwest Asia: Transportation and
Processing of Opium Products Along
the Afghan-Pakistani Border)
The mountain trails crisscrossing the Afghan-Pakistani border are a
key link in the Southwest Asian heroin trade, the leading source
of heroin for the United States and Western Europe. These pack-
animal caravan trails provide traffickers in Pakistan-where opium
production has fallen during the last five years-with ready access to
major opium supplies in Afghanistan, which now account for a sig-
nificant portion of the region's surplus opium.
Current Government of Pakistan interdiction efforts directed against
Afghan opium shipments entering the North-West Frontier Province
are limited and ineffective. The principal Pakistani agency respon-
sible for border trail interdiction, the Customs Service, lacks the
manpower and the transportation and communication resources to
effectively deter opium smuggling. Moreover, the Pakistani gov-
ernment has relied on routine inspections at customs checkpoints
along major North-West Frontier Province roads as its principal
deterrent to narcotics smuggling in the region, and smugglers have
circumvented most checkpoints simply by taking alternate routes.
Afghanistan has made little progress in controlling the production
and trafficking of narcotics: the Soviets have taken only limited
action against Afghan opium smugglers, and Soviet efforts to control
insurgent cross-border movements have only temporarily disrupted
the opium trade.
Secret
/A 85-10005
March 1985
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This study identifies key smuggling routes and trail choke points,
and both maps and provides a rank-order listing of the 164
cross-border routes.
Secret iv
1A 85-10005
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Contents
Page
Summary
Opium Production in the Afghan-Pakistani Border Region
4
Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: The Wholesale Opium Market
4
Opium Smuggling Routes Across the Afghan-Pakistani Border
6
Characteristics of Geographic Border Zones
10
Network Analysis of Border Trails
10
Impact of the Afghan Insurgency on Narcotics Production in the
Golden Crescent
13
Prospects for Interdiction Along the Afghan-Pakistani Border
13
Appendix
Ranking of Narcotics Trafficking Across the Afghan-Pakistani
Border
17
V Secret
/A 85-10005
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Secret
Southwest Asia: Transportation and
Processing of Opium Products Along
the Afghan-Pakistani Border
The Golden Crescent of Southwest Asia, which
includes the opium-growing areas of Iran, Af-
ghanistan, and Pakistan (figure 1), is the world's
largest source of opium. Southwest Asia emerged
as a leading supplier of opium in the late 1970s,
when eradication efforts in Mexico and drought
in Southeast Asia decreased the availability of
opium from those regions
Southwest Asian opium production was estimated
at 560 to 830 metric tons in 1984.1 Most of-this
opium is consumed in Iran, Afghanistan, Paki-
stan, and India by opium smokers and a rising
number of heroin addicts. Less than 15 percent
of the crop-perhaps no more than 100 tons an-
nually-is refined into heroin, producing
approximately 10 tons of injectable heroin
hydrochloride. This 10 tons of injectable heroin
is enough to satisfy almost all of Western
Europe's illicit heroin consumption, and roughly
half of the heroin demand in the United States.
Most Southwest Asian opium destined for US
and European markets is grown in the border
areas of northeastern Afghanistan and northwest-
ern Pakistan. Most of this harvested opium is
shipped along overland routes to wholesalers in
the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). This
raw opium is mostly sold to traffickers in Paki-
stan for processing in nearby laboratories,
predominantly centered in and around the
NWFP villages of Landi Kotal, Bara, and Darra.
The primary products of these labs are heroin
base and injectable heroin (heroin hydrochloride)
(figure 2). Most processed heroin is shipped from
the NWFP by car or truck to major traffickers
in Karachi and Lahore. From there it is sent-
primarily via commercial airlines and ocean
freighters-to markets in the Middle East,
Europe, and North America. Traditional smug-
gling routes through Iran, Turkey, and the Medi-
terranean littoral are still used, but increased sur-
veillance at ports and the search for new
markets are causing traffickers to shift to other
routes through India and Africa.
During the last five years, low opium prices and
government crop control measures have caused
a decline in Pakistani opium production, and
NWFP wholesalers have become increasingly
dependent on opium grown in the neighboring
Afghan provinces of Nangarhar and Konarha.
Raw opium from these provinces-as well as
significant amounts of heroin base-is easily
smuggled into Pakistan by pack-animal caravans,
along trails crossing the Afghan-Pakistani border.
This report, usin network
modeling, identifies the key border trails and
passes most heavily used for smuggling Afghani-
stan's 1984 export opium crop to the NWFP. It
also discusses opium wholesaling and heroin
processing in the region, evaluates current border
trail interdiction measures, examines the impact
of the Afghan insurgency on narcotics production
in the Golden Crescent, and assesses the pros-
pects for future interdiction efforts along
the Afghan-Pakistani border
Secret
IA 85-10005
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Figure 1
The Golden Crescent: Poppy Cultivation Areas and Smuggling Routes
Soviet
Union
to Europe
by air
Sri
-kgopka
OLOMBB
Heroin-smuggling route
Heroin laboratories
o-. Opium- smuggling route
Opium -growing area
to Africa
MOGADISHU
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Figure 2
Opium Refining Process and Products
Intermediate
Products
Finished
Products
Crude Morphine Base
(Number 1 Heroin)
Dry or Prepared
Opium
Consumed in Iran,
Pakistan, Afghanistan
and exported to other
Middle Eastern and
South Asian countries
Morphine
Sulfate
Crude Heroin Base
(Number 2 Heroin)
Pure Heroin or Heroin
Hydrochloride;
Injectable Heroin
(Number 4 Heroin)
To Europe
and North America
Smoking Heroin
(Number 3 Heroin)
To Iran, India,
and Europe
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Opium Production in the Afghan-Pakistani
Border Region
Opium has been grown for centuries in the Gold-
en Crescent, primarily to satisfy regional opium
demand. For many tribesmen, it is their only
cash crop. Production is concentrated in those
areas where government control is weak. In both
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pathans, or
Pushtuns, are the major tribal group involved in
opium cultivation, smuggling, wholesaling, and
refining. Independent Pathan farmers typically
grow opium poppies in small fields, averaging
only 0. 1 hectare in size (figure 3); the crop
is planted from October through December, and
the opium gum is harvested in April and May.
Most of the opium gum produced by Pathan
farmers is sold to local opium merchants, who in
turn sell it to major regional wholesalers
Opium production in Pakistan peaked in 1979,
when a record 700 to 800 tons of opium gum
was harvested. Pakistani production has declined
significantly in the 1980s, the result. of a glutted
opium market and a 1979 ban by the govern-
ment on opium poppy cultivation. Almost all of
Pakistan's opium is grown in the NWFP, and the
threat of eradication appears to be forcing opium
farmers to move to more remote areas.
1984 opium pro-
duction in the NWFP is estimated at only 40 to
50 tons, with most cultivation occurring in Dir
and Gadoon Districts and in Mohmand, Bajaur,
and Malakand Agencies.
Afghanistan is a leading surplus opium producer
in Southwest Asia. Field sources reported that be-
tween 1977 and 1982 production ranged between
200 and 300 tons, and that it declined only
slightly after the Soviet invasion in December
1979. According to limited Drug Enforcement
Admininstration (DEA) human source reporting,
a record 400 to 575 tons of opium was produced
Afghanistan's principal poppy-growing areas are
in Nangarhar and Konarha Provinces, directly
across the border from Pakistan's NWFP. These
two provinces were responsible for approximately
50 percent of Afghanistan's total opium produc-
tion in 1984.
Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: The
Wholesale Opium Market
Opium bound for the NWFP from Afghanistan is
usually transported, in vehicles or on pack ani-
mals, from the growing areas to villages near
the Pakistani border. These villages-nota-
bly Towr Kham, Kama Daka, and Cob], near the
Khyber Pass-serve as staging areas where the
opium is transferred to pack-animal cara-
vans. From the villages, these caravans transport
the raw opium by long-established and well-
protected smuggling routes across the border into
Pakistan (figure 4). Once inside Pakistan, the
opium is transferred to another pack-animal
caravan or to small trucks for delivery to major
NWFP wholesalers. Small amounts of opium
are also smuggled across the border at
Towr Kham by vehicle, along the only paved
highway linking northeastern Afghanistan with
Pakistan's NWFP
Most raw opium produced in the NWFP, and
most of the opium shipped to the NWFP
from Afghanistan's Nangarhar and Konarha
Provinces, is purchased by Pakistani opium
wholesalers, who operate principally from small
business establishments located in bazaars
throughout the NWFP. These bazaars have long
been the centers of commerce for the region,
promoting trading of food and clothing as well as
contraband items such as arms, ammunition, and
currency. Although there are hundreds of bazaars
throughout the NWFP, raw opium is sold chiefly
at bazaars in the villages of Landi Kotal, Bara,
and Darra.
Most opium wholesalers in the NWFP operate
independently of major trafficking organizations.
According to DEA reporting, there may be more
than 50 major wholesalers in Land] Kotal alone.
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Figure 4
Opium Caravan in Dry Streambed Near the Afghan-Pakistani Border, April 1982
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Opium supplies arriving from the growing areas
are typically stockpiled in small warehouses
near the bazaars. DEA sources report that whole-
salers.often have at least 4 tons of opium on
hand and normally deal in quantities of 1 ton or
more. The NWFP's wholesalers sell most of their
supplies to local heroin refining laboratory
operators, who convert the raw opium to mor-
phine base, heroin base, or injectable heroin
hydrochloride. Frequently wholesalers in the
NWFP also operate refining labs
Heroin Production in the North-West Frontier
Province
Heroin refining began on a large scale in the
NWFP in the early 1980s, in response to a
decline in prices for raw opium and the 1979
Government of Pakistan (GOP) ban on opium
poppy cultivation.' Despite efforts by the GOP
to halt the operations of laboratories, which
resulted in the surrender of processing equipment
from some 41 laboratories in 1982 and 1983,
heroin processing continues in the NWFP, espe-
cially in and around the villages of Landi Kotal,
Bara, and Darra. Although there are no reliable
estimates of the number of these labs, recent
US Embassy reporting indicates that Pakistani
heroin labs produced a total of some 6 tons
of morphine base, heroin base, and injectable
heroin in 1983. Approximately 4 tons of heroin
was consumed in the United States in 1983;
Western Europe's 1983 consumption is estimated
at roughly 6 tons.
Most heroin labs in the NWFP process raw
opium to crude heroin base, but because the
profit potential of refined heroin is so much
greater, we believe the number of labs converting
opium to injectable heroin has increased steadily
in the 1980s. Heroin labs in Pakistan are usually
small and crudely constructed, and are often set
up in existing buildings in outlying farm com-
pounds (figure 5) and villages.' These labs
are typically run by one owner with five to six
helpers. Most such labs are capable of producing
6 to 10 kilograms of heroin base daily.
During the last few years, as government enforce-
ment in Pakistan has been stepped up, heroin
labs have also been established in the Afghan
countryside, where neither the government nor
the Soviets exercise effective narcotics control or
enforcement activities. According to long-time
reliable DEA sources, at least 40 heroin labs were
operating in Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province
in 1983. These labs are reportedly similar in
appearance and operation to Pakistani labs, and
most of them produce heroin base rather than
injectable heroin. We believe that heroin labs are
probably also operating in Konarha Province, the
other major source of Afghan opium in the bor-
der region. Most Afghan-produced heroin base is
exported to the NWFP for final processing to
injectable heroin; some is shipped to Iranian
markets. DEA and other reports indicate that
some Afghan heroin base is also sold to both
Afghan insurgents and Soviet troops.
Opium Smuggling Routes Across the Afghan-
Pakistani Border
The Afghan-Pakistani border is long, mountain-
ous, and relatively easy to cross undetected.
For centuries tribal groups have routinely crossed
the border between Afghanistan's Nangarhar
and Konarha Provinces and Pakistan's NWFP,
using a multiplicity of mountain trails. They
cross the border to trade, look for work, visit
relatives, and move their herd animals to winter
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grazing areas--and opium smugglers, as well as
Afghan refugees and insurgents, travel across the
border along the same routes. Cross-border
movements in this region are difficult to monitor
because of the border's great length, the large
number of trails, and the rugged terrain (figures 6
and 7). The trails are typically steep and narrow,
and often follow deep ravines, ridgelines, and
streambeds. Trail passes are frequently blocked
by snow during the winter months
Afghan narcotics smugglers can choose from a
multitude of routes to move their supplies to the
NWFP. A 1983 study identified about 85 major
border trails connecting Afghanistan's Nangarhar
and Konarha Provinces with Pakistan's NWFP.a
Figure 6
Trail Across Afghan-Pakistani Border, Hindu Kush Mountains, April 1982
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Characteristics of Geographic Border Zones
Border trails in this region of Southwest Asia
traverse four distinct geographic zones, compris-
ing two mountain ranges-the Hindu Kush
and the Safed Koh-and two hill environments,
the Khyber Hills and the open barren hills
north of the Kabul River (figure 9). Border trails
in each of these zones are distinguished by sev-
eral geographic characteristics (see table):
? Hindu Kush Mountains. Trails traversing the
Hindu Kush have moderate slopes, and
trail passes average 2,500 meters in altitude.
The northernmost trails are often impass-
able between November and April due to snow
cover. This zone has the most trails-73-
and the most trails in relatively good con-
dition5-30-of the four geographic zones in
the border region.
? Hills North of the Kabul River. Trails in this
geographic zone have gentler slopes and lower
passes than trails in other zones. Most trails are
open year-round, but are in poor condition.
? Khyber Hills. Khyber Hills trails are steeply
sloped, and many wind through hills
along deep ravines. This geographic zone has
the most trails per kilometer-25 trails over a
52-kilometer stretch of the border.
? Safed Koh Range. Travel along the steeply
sloped Safed Koh trails is often difficult and
hazardous. Passes average 3,400 meters in alti-
tude, and the westernmost trail passes are often
blocked by snow between January and June.
This geographic zone has the fewest trails_ and
most trails are in poor condition.
Network Analysis of Border Trails
To identify the routes most likely used to trans-
port opium from major growing areas in Afghani-
stan to the distribution centers in Pakistan's
NWFP, we developed a network model to assess
trails in each of the four geographic border
zones.6 This model is designed to identify the
routes most likely used by opium smugglers, and
to estimate the relative quantities of opium
crossing the border in the four different zones.
Using this network model, we examined the 164
trails identified in this study to determine the
major routes probably used to transport the 1984
opium harvest to Pakistan.
For each of these 164 trails, we considered three
factors: the total distance of travel from Afghan
growing areas to Pakistani distribution centers;
the difficulty of the trails, in terms of slope
and condition; and snow coverage in the trail
passes from April through September, when most
opium is transported across the border
Several assumptions are inherent in our network
analysis. First, the opium-growing areas consid-
ered in this study are located in Nangarhar
and Konarha Provinces; these areas are believed
to account for most of the opium cultivated in
eastern Afghanistan and exported to Pakistan's
NWFP. Second, the villages of Landi Kotal,
Bara, and Darra are assumed to be the major
centers for opium distribution in the NWFP.
Third, the model assumes that traffickers prefer
the shortest, most easily traversed routes from
the growing areas to the major opium markets.
The factors of distance to distribution centers
and trail difficulty are equally weighted in our
analysis. In some instances a trafficker may have
to choose between an easy but longer route and a
shorter but more difficult one. The relative im-
portance attached to distance versus difficulty is
likely to -vary among traffickers, but the model
suggests that the set of preferred routes is not ap-
preciably altered by changing the relative
weights of these two factors
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Figure 9
Geographic Zones and Flow of Opium Across the Afghan-Pakistani Border
Golden Crescent
Opium-growing area
o 5yo
`KABUL
NORTH-
WEST
FRONTIER.
PAKISTAN
NANGAHAR KamaOhlka
Selected opium-growing
area in Afghanistan
Opium wholesale center
Major border regions
Hindu Kush Mountains
Hills North of Kabul River
Khyber Hills
Sated Koh Range
Province-level boundary
(first-level admin.)
District/agency boundary
(third-level admin.)
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Characteristics of Trails Across the Afghan-Pakistani Border
of Border Trails
(kilometers)
Hindu Kush 163 73
Mountains
Open Barren 52 28
Hills North of
the Kabul River
Sated Koh
Range
Snow coverage is a major hindrance on border
trails traversing mountain passes, and it is
assumed that traffickers will not cross a snow-
covered pass if an alternate route is available.
This assumption has little appreciable effect on
our final assessment, however, because passes
that are frequently closed by snow are usually on
trails judged undesirable because of their length
or difficulty
To determine which of the 164 cross-border
routes are most likely preferred by opium smug-
glers, we used our network model to assess all
possible routes from the growing areas in Afgan-
istan to the major distribution centers in
Pakistan's NWFP. The paths from each growing
area are weighted according to the amount of
opium produced in that area,
pro uc ton weights and applying these weights to
the assessment of the 164 paths-by distance to
distribution centers, difficulty, and pass condi-
tions-we established a network-model ranking
of border trails, indicating which trails are most
likely to carry the greatest amounts of opium
from Afghanistan into the NWFP. The appendix
to this report provides a rank-order listing of
the 164 cross-border trails examined.
Number of Number of Percentage of
Trails Trails Trails
(per kilometer) in Good in Good
Condition Condition
The ranking established in this network analysis
reveals that most opium entering Pakistan's
NWFP probably moves along trails crossing the
Khyber Hills and the Safed Koh Range, both
on the borders of Afghanistan's Nangarhar Prov-
ince, where opium poppy cultivation is heaviest.
Trails in both of these geographic border zones
represent the shortest and most direct routes to
the major distribution centers in the NWFP. The
Khyber Hills zone has more trails per kilometer
than any other border zone, and while Safed Koh
trails are steep, their proximity to both growing
areas and distribution centers overrides this
disadvantage.
Based on our network model, approximately 50
percent of eastern Afghanistan's 1984 export opi-
um production probably crossed the border into
Pakistan along Khyber Hills trails, while 40
percent was most likely carried on the steeper
Sated Koh Range trails. The most heavily used
trails are those leading from the Afghan border
settlements of Towr Kham, Kama Daka, and
Cobi, suggesting that these settlements are major
caravan staging areas.
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Some 10 percent of opium exported to the
NWFP from eastern Afghanistan probably flowed
from northern Konarha Province across the
Hindu Kush Mountains into Dir District in the
northern NWFP. The difficulty of trails cross-
ing the border in this area and the distance from
Dir to the major distribution centers makes this
region far less desirable to smugglers moving opi-
um across the Afghan-Pakistani border. Probably
less than 1 percent of eastern Afghanistan's ex-
port opium crossed the border into Pakistan
along trails through the open barren hills north
of the Kabul River. Although these trails are
relatively easy to traverse, we believe that opium
smugglers use them infrequently-as the model
reveals-because they involve additional river
crossings and because they are not the most
direct routes from the growing areas to the opium
distribution centers in the NWFP.
Impact of the Afghan Insurgency on Narcotics
Production in the Golden Crescent
We estimate that Afghan opium production de-
clined slightly immediately after the Soviet inva-
sion in 1979. The invasion reduced the supply of
local labor available for opium cultivation: a
large portion of the population fled to Pakistan,
and many of those who remained diverted their
attention to the conflict with government forces.
During the past few years, however, Afghan
opium production has returned to former levels.
The labor supply available for opium cultivation
has stabilized as the flow of Afghan farmers
from traditio areas to Pakistan
has slackened7L'
refugees also cross back into Afghanistan
temporarily to help plant and harvest the opium
crop.
Although the Soviets and the Afghan government
are concerned about growing drug abuse among
their troops, lack of manpower and preoccu-
pation with the. insurgency have limited their
actions against opium cultivation and processing.
Moreover, farmers and heroin lab operators are
relatively immune to government enforcement
actions, because most opium cultivation and
processing occurs in areas of eastern Afghanistan
that are controlled by the insurgent forces (figure
10). Opium cultivation continues even in areas
occupied by the Afghan and Soviet armies, and
we have observed opium poppy fields left undis-
turbed near Soviet military installations.
The Soviet and Afghan armies have had only an
indirect impact on opium caravans traveling
across the border, through their efforts to control
cross-border movements by insurgents. These
actions-including frequent helicopter strafing
operations and the mining of border trails-have
disrupted cross-border travel only temporarily.
Because there are so many border trails, helicop-
ter strafing is a hit-and-run operation, and
normal travel resumes as soon as the strafing
stops. Mined trails have also presented few prob-
lems for traffickers, as the insurgents have
quickly learned to disarm mines, and travelers-
warned by area residents-have often avoided
mined trails simply by taking alternate routes.
Afghan insurgent leaders have denied that the
Mujahideen are involved in the production and
trafficking of opium.
The insurgents have not, however, inter-
fered with opium poppy cultivation in the north-
eastern provinces. They have also permitted
heroin labs to operate in their areas of control,
and lab operators do contribute some funds
to the Mujahideen cause.
Prospects for Interdiction Along the Afghan-
Pakistani Border
In Pakistan, the GOP has made little effort to in-
terdict Afghan opium entering the NWFP
along its northwestern border. Moreover, the
principal GOP agency responsible for patrolling
the border region-the Customs Service-has
only 30 mobile units operating in the area, and
most of these units lack the transportation
and communications equinment needed
for effective interdiction.
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Figure 10
Afghan Insurgent and Soviet Forces in Opium-Producing Areas of Afghanistan
Secret 14
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Hampered by inadequate resources, the GOP has
relied on routine inspections at customs check-
points-one on the border, but most along major
roads leaving the NWFP-as the principal means
for narcotics interdiction in the region. However,
traffickers have avoided most checkpoints simply
by moving off the main roads to the mangy
small roads and trails in the border area.
Prospects for improvement in Pakistan's inter-
diction effort are not good. The identification of
key smuggling routes and trail choke points, as
presented in this study, could aid in targeting
interdiction efforts to the most heavily used
smuggling routes, but we believe that the GOP
is unlikely to initiate a large-scale border
interdiction program in the NWFP. Such a
program would require the long-term presence of
a significant GOP force, and we do not believe
the GOP has sufficient resources to make such a
commitment. Moreover, an increase in troop
presence could lead to hostilities between govern-
ment forces and the autonomous tribal groups
that inhabit most of the border region. The GOP
is likely to avoid such a confrontation, espe-
cially given the instability of the region.
Even if the GOP were to conduct a vigorous bor-
der trail interdiction campaign, we believe its
chances for stemming the flow of Afghan opium
into the NFWP would be slight. As this study
indicates, the sheer number of trails along the
Afghan-Pakistani border represents the greatest
obstacle to successful enforcement. This factor
has already thwarted concerted Soviet military
efforts to restrict cross-border movements by
Afghan insurgents. Moreover, smuggling has
been a way of life in the Golden Crescent for
centuries; tolerance for smuggling is high, and
traffickers are extremely adept at eluding govern-
ment authorities.
Given the difficulty of border trail interdiction,
the GOP may initiate indirect measures to
combat the Afghan opium traffic across its
borders. These measures could include arrests of
known major NWFP traffickers and large-scale
closings of NWFP heroin labs. However, only the
sustained application of such measures over a
long period of time could significantly curtail the
Afghan opium trade. In the near term, South-
west Asia will probably increase its regional
output of heroin, because the production of
surplus opium in Afghanistan is expected to
offset gains made in reducing Pakistani produc-
tion. For the foreseeable future, Pakistan's
NWFP will remain the center of the Southwest
Asian heroin trade
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/08: CIA-RDP91TO1115R000200050002-7
Secret
Appendix
Ranking of Narcotics Trafficking Routes Across
the Afghan-Pakistani Border
Rank
Route Pass Pass
Number" Number' Name`
Geographic
Zone
Rank
Route Pass Pass
Number' Number' Name`
Geographic
Zone
I
38
30
23
28
24
Musatal
Kandao
Safed Koh Range
2
39
31
Khyber Hills
24
29
24
Musatal
Sated Koh Range
3
62
53
Khyber Hills
Kandao
4
33
Safcd Koh Range
25
40
32
Khyber Hills
5
34
Safed Koh Range
26
57
48
Khyber Hills
6
43
Khyber Hills
27
70
61
Hills north of
7
45
35
Khyber Hills
Kabul River
8
36
29
Safed Koh Range
28
72
63
Hills north of
35
28
Cobi
Safed Koh Range
Kabul River
Kandao
29
40
32
Khyber Hills
10
37
28
Cobi
Kandao
30
61
52
Khyber Hills
31
21
17
Nang Stara
Safcd Koh Range
Khyber Hills
Kandao
12
30
25
Bazar
Kandao
32
24
20
Salemai
Kandao
Safcd Koh Range
13
31
25
Bazar
Kandao
21
Darmu
Drah
Safed Koh Range
14
68
Hills north of
Kabul River
Kh}ber Hills
Hills north of
15
27
23
Khandwala
Kandao
Kabul River
16
73
Hills north of
Kabul River
36
68
59
Hills north of
Kabul River
17
74
Hills north of
Kabul River
37
77
68
Hills north of
Kabul River
18
75
Hills north of
Kabul River
38
78
69
Hills north of
Kabul River
Hindu Kush
Mountains
39
93
84
Hindu Kush
Mountains
20
94
85
Hindu Kush
Mountains
40
101
92
Hindu Kush
Mountains
-'1
95
86
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Hindu Kush
Mountains
32
26
Tabi
Safed Koh Range
42
124
115
Hindu Kush
Mountains
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/08: CIA-RDP91TO1115ROO0200050002-7
Ranking of Narcotics Trafficking Routes Across
the Afghan-Pakistani Border (continued)
Rank
Route
Pass Pass
Geographic
Rank
Route Pass Pass
Geographic
Number'
Number' Nance`
Zone
Number" Number'' Name`
Zone
Hindu Kush
64
123
114
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
44
91
8'
Hindu Kush
65
144
135
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
45
49
40
Khyber Hills
66
1 16
107
Hindu Kush
46
135
126
Ghakhai
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Pass
Mountains
67
119
110
Hindu Kush
47
148
139
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Hindu Kush
48
147
138
Kaga Pass
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
Hindu Kush
49
159
150
Tripaman
Kandao
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
Hindu Kush
5))
3
2
Gawai
Safed Koh Range
Mountains
Tangai
71
110
101
Hindu Kush
51
I
I
Kirka
Safcd Koh Range
Mountains
Tangai
71
5
4
Safcd Koh Range
5-1
4
3
Zarai
Safed Koh Range
73
6
5
Spinkaii
Khande
Kandao
Raghai
Tangai
74
7
6
Rishak
Kandao
Safed Koh Range
75
8
7
Safcd Koh Range
54
19
15
Safed Koh Range
76
9
8
Shah
Safed Koh Range
55
71
62
Hills north of
Kabul River
Hussaini
Kandao
56
120
III
Hindu Kush
Mountains
77
10
9
Safcd Koh Range
78
II
10
Safcd Koh Range
57
108
99
Chartana
Hindu Kush
Pass
Mountains
79
1?
I I
Agam Pass
Safcd Koh Range
80
13
11
A am Pass
Safed Koh Ran
e
58
146
137
Mukha Pass
Hindu Kush
'
g
"
Mountains
81
14
1?
Oghaz
Kandao
Safed Koh Range
59
18
14
Cora Tigga
Safed Koh Range
8?
15
1 ?
Oghaz
Safcd Koh Range
60
157
148
Hindu Kush
Kandao
Mountains
83
16
12
Oghar
Safcd Koh Range
61
155
146
Hindu Kush
Kandao
Mountains
84
17
13
Kot
Safcd Koh Range
6_1
158
149
Loegram
Hindu Kush
Mohniand
Pass
Mountains
Kandao
63
160
151
Binshai
Hindu Kush
85
20
16
Pekhe
Safed Koh Range
Kandao
Mountains
Kandao
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/08: CIA-RDP91TO1115R000200050002-7
(continued)
Rank
Route Pass Pass
Geographic
Rank
Route Pass Pass
Geographic
Number' Number' Name`
Zone
Number' Number' Name`
Zone
86
22
18
Bajur
Safed Koh Range
112
79
70
Hills north of
Kandao
Kabul River
87
23
19
Brekh
Safed Koh Range
1 13
80
71
Hills north of
Muhammed
Kabul River
Kandao
1 14
81
72
Hills north of
88
16
22
Chawatkhai
Safed Koh Range
Kabul River
Kandao
1 15
8?
73
Hills north of
90
44
36
Khyber Hills
116
83
74
Hills north of
91
46
37
Khyber Hills
Kabul River
91
47
38
Khyber Hills
1 17
84
75
Hills north of
Kabul River
93
50
41
Khyber Hills
118
85
76
Hills north of
94
51
42
Khyber Hills
Kabul River
95
5?
43
Khyber Hills
1 19
86
77
Hills north of
96
53
44
Khyber Hills
Kabul River
97
54
45
Khyber Hills
120
87
78
Hindu Kush
Mountains
98
55
46
Khyber Hills
99
56
47
Khyber Hills
121
88
79
Hindu Kush
Mountains
100
58
49
Khyber Hills
122
89
80
Hindu Kush
I01
59
50
Khyber Hills
Mountains
102
60
51
Khyber Hills
123
92
83
Hindu Kush
103
63
54
Hills north of
Mountains
Kabul River
124
96
87
Hindu Kush
104
64
55
Hills north of
Mountains
Kabul River
125
97
88
Hindu Kush
105
66
57
Hills north of
Mountains
Kabul River
116
98
89
Shaunkrai
Hindu Kush
106
67
58
Hills north of
I'ass
Mountains
Kabul River
127
10?
93
Hindu Kush
107
69
60
Hills north of
Mountains
Kabul River
1-18
103
94
Goraprai
Hindu Kush
108
70
61
Hills north of
Pass
Mountains
Kabul River
119
104
95
Hindu Kush
109
71
62
Hills north of
Mountains
Kabul River
1 i0
105
96
Spina Tsuka
Hindu Kush
110
72
63
Hills north of
Pass
Mountains
Kabul River
131
106
97
Hindu Kush
III
76
67
Hills north of
Kabul River
Mountains
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/08: CIA-RDP91TO1115R000200050002-7
Ranking of Narcotics Trafficking Routes Across
the Afghan-Pakistani Border (continued)
Rank
Route Pass Pass
Geographic
Rank
Route Pass Pass
Geographic
Number' Number" Name`
Zone
Number' Number" Nance`
Zone
1
107
98
Pishio
Hindu Kush
149
133
124
Hindu Kush
Kandao
Mountains
Mountains
133
109
100
Hindu Kush
150
134
125
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
134
III
102
Hindu Kush
151
136
127
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
135
113
104
Hindu Kush
152
137
128
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
136
114
105
Nawa Pass
Hindu Kush
153
138
129
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
137
115
106
Hindu Kush
154
139
130
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
138
117
108
Hindu Kush
155
140
131
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
139
118
109
Hindu Kush
156
141
132
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
140
121
112
Hindu Kush
157
142
133
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
141
125
116
Hindu Kush
158
143
134
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
142
126
117
Hindu Kush
159
153
144
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
143
127
118
Hindu Kush
160
154
145
Latwatai
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Pass
Mountains
144
128
119
Hindu Kush
161
155
146
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
145
129
1_'0
Hindu Kush
162
156
147
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
146
130
121
Hindu Kush
163
157
148
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Mountains
147
131
112
Hindu Kush
164
158
149
Loegram
Hindu Kush
Mountains
Pass
Mountains
148
132
123
Hindu Kush
Mountains
"A route number was assigned to each of the 164 trails exam- Most passes along the Afghan-Pakistani border do not have
fined in our network analysis. Route numbers are keyed to recorded names, and many are actually long ridges, deep
trails shown in figure 8. ravines, or dry streambeds. Some major routes are known b\
The 164 cross-border trails traverse a total of 151 mountain the names of the rivers whose beds they follow across the
and hill passes. Sonic of these passes are crossed by more border.
than one trail. Pass numbers are keyed to figure 8.
Secret 20
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 Figure 8
Trails and Passes Along the Afghan-Pakistani Border
i
,~iaEh.,, ? r
? Major opium bazaars.
Opium poppy growing areas.
Note: Red numbers denote passes.
Black numbers denote trail routes.
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Secret
Secret
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