REQUEST FOR EVALUATION OF(SANITIZED)GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE RESOLUTION STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00873A001600040060-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: May 3, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP79B00873A001600040060-8
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S.ARMY IMAGERY INTERPRETATION CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219
ICIIC
MEMORANDUM THRU: Chief, Technical Services Group, NPIC
FOR: Chief, Research and Engineering Division, TSG/NPIC
SUBJECT: Request for Evaluation of
Ground Order of Battle Resolution Study
3 MAY sr
1. Reference is made to NPIC Memorandum NPIC/TSG/RED-45/71 dated
6 April 1971 (SpAD Project 011256).
2. SpAD's evaluation of the technical performance aspects of the
subject study is given below.
3. Test Objectives
a. The introduction to the report does not make clear whether
the phrasing of the questions to be answered is that of the briefing
authority, or whether it is the company's own interpretation of a
general requirement. In any case, more pertinent would have been
the following questions:
(1) What is the minimum ground resolution.required for:
(a) Classification of targets?
(b) Identification of targets?
(c) Detailed analysis of equipment?
(2) What is the effect of stereo viewing on ground
resolution requirements?
4. Target Material
a. By choosing as one of the target areas the Aberdeen Proving
Ground the company somewhat limited the scope.of the study. This
facility had been Visited previously by some of the PIs who took part
in the study while they were attending the Army PI school. Their
ground knowledge of the targets and their familiarity with other
imagery of the same targets undoubtedly led to false conclusions in
the report.
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CS-031-71
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SUBJECT: Request for Evaluation of
Ground Order of Battle Resolution Study
b. The report does not make clear whether Eastman Kodak injected
a haze factor into the simulated small scale photography. Any simu-
lation factor should have been taken into account.
c. Some difficulty was experienced by PIs in orienting the re-
sponse sheets to the various scenes. In some instances the 45-inch
resolution targets were not recognizable, even for orientation pur-
poses. The effort required for orienting the targets with the re-
sponse sheets was a time consuming and an irritating process which
did not help to motivate the PIs concerned.
d. The keys provided by the company consisted entirely of ground
or oblique views. No vertical cover was provided. Such photography
in the case of the Aberdeen Proving Ground presumably would have been.
similar to that provided in the study,
5. Preparation and Briefing
? a. Not all the PI subjects were given the full briefing shown
on pages 5-7 of the report. Most of the PIs in the stereo group were
unaware that it was necessary for them to view entirely in stereo.
Some, finding themselves short of time, used monoviewing to speed
their progress. This factor obviously must have led to false conclu-
sions in the final analysis. Additionally, PIs were not given the '
opportunity to view their response sheets as promised.
6. The Report
a. The report is considered unnecessarily lengthy and, in
places, overly sophisticated. Some of-the referenced technical
material is not readily available to the average reader and there-
fore has little meaning, e,g.,,page 8 of the report refers .to "The
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test." This office has no
knowledge of this document.
b. Most of the information contained in the many line graphs
could have been condensed into a single paragraph of text, and it
.does not take a technician to appreciate the fact that identifying
tanks is more difficult than classifying them (page 9-13).
c. Some of the line graphs do not add up correctly, e.g., in
Figure 2 under GR=7", the stereo group subjects given as 20 add up
only to 18.
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ICIIC
SUBJECT: Request for Evaluation of
Ground Order of Battle Resolution Study
d. A considerable portion of the report deals with individual
PI performances. Apart from.being.outside the scope of the study,
this portion of the report probably has set forth false conclusions
which have led to recommendations for refresher training. The remarks
on page 42 concerning "specialty (GWS versus,electronics/missile)" are
also false, because by virtue of their actual task there is no reason
why Ground Weapons Systems personnel should do better on OB. What is
obvious, however, is that PIs who recently had attended the Army PI
school did better than other PIs probably because they had had training
in ground order of battle targets. Some of the civilian PIs who had
training at an Air Force or a Navy PI school did not have this advantage,
Rather than there being a.relationship between the performance of a .
PI and the last time he attended a formal School of instruction, there
more probably is a relationship hetween his performance and the type
of instruction he received at the school. The conclusions regarding
refresher training for PIs therefore should be disregarded at this
stage.
7. General Comments
a. The main outcome of the study was that figures were obtained
for resolutions needed to classify and to identify ground order of
battle targets. In this perspective the study may be regarded as at
least partially successful. The conclusions and the recommendations
regarding stereo photography, however, are suspect for the reasons
given in paragraph 5 above.
b. The need for the ?very best possible ground resolution for
detailed analysis of weapons systems should not be overlooked. There
also is possibly a need to examine the effect of obliquity on identi-
fication capability at a given' resolution.
c. SpAD recommends that in any future test of this nature every
effort should be made to select PIs of the same background and experi-
ence to prevent striking variations in PI performances.
d. In conclusion we believe that the contractor should receive an
'award fee not greater. than the target fee of 87g. -
FOR THE COMMANDER:
Chief, Special Activities Division
3
CS-031-71
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP79B00873A001600040060-8