NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 243
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 8, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER.
HEARINGS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8; THURSDAY, APRIL 9; THURSDAY, APRIL 30; AND
FRIDAY, MAY 1, 1987
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1987
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
HEARINGS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED. STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8; THURSDAY, APRIL 9; THURSDAY, APRIL 30; AND
FRIDAY, MAY 1, 1987
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-691 WASHINGTON : 1987
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DAVID L. BOREN, Oklahoma, Chairman
WILLIAM S. COHEN,Maine, :Vice Chairman
LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas
SAM NUNN, Georgia
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
BILL BRADLEY,'New Jersey
ALAN CRANSTON, California
DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jx., Delaware
ORRIN HATCH, Utah
FRANK MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
CHIC HECHT, Nevada
JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio
ROBERT DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio
SvEN E. HoLMEs, Staff Director and General Counsel
JAMEs H. DYEsTRA,-Minority Staff Director
KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk
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CONTENTS
Hearings held in Washington, DC:
Page
April 8, 1987 ..............................................................................................................
1
April 9, 1987 ........................ ...:.......................................................... ........................
133
April 30, 1987 ............................................................................................................
163
May 1, 1987 ...............................................................................................................
223
Statement of:
Boren, Hon. David L., a U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma and
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence .........................
1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., a U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri.........
56
Cohen, Hon. William S., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maine and Vice
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence .........................
46
Cranston, Hon. Alan, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................
94
Danforth, Hon. John C., a U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri ..............
55
DeConcini, Hon. Dennis, a U.S. Senator from the State of .Arizona ..............
47
Hatch, Hon. Orrin, a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah .............................
49
Hecht, Hon. Chic, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada ...........................
55
Hollings, Hon. Ernest F., a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina
72
Metzenbaum, Hon. Howard M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio .......
108
Moynihan, Hon. Daniel P., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York......
51
Murkowski, Hon. Frank, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska ...............
49
Roth, Hon. William V., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware.......
48
Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ...........
50
Warner, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia .....................
50
Webster, Hon. William H., nominee for Director of Central Intelligence ....
58
Supplemental materials, letters, etc.:
Boren, Hon. David L., Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence
and Hon. William S. Cohen, Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, letter to Judge William Webster, April 1, 1987 ......................
3
Detroit Free Press, newspaper articles concerning FBI inquiries of city
court judges ...........................................................................................................
186
Edwards, Hon. Don, a U.S. Congressman from the State of California,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, a letter to
Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence on
March 30, 1987 with enclosures .........................................................................
16
Financial Disclosure Report ...................................................................................
28
Herst, Esther, Legislative Advisor, National Committee Against Repres-
sive Legislation .....................................................................................................
23
Las Vegas Sun, newspaper articles concerning nomination of William
Webster ...................................................................................................................
89
Meese, Attorney General, excerpts from testimony on December 17, 1986..
41
Memorandum explaining processing of Teletype dated July 18, 1985...........
179
Moynihan, Hon. Daniel P., a letter to Chairman David L. Boren, April 8,
1987 .........................................................................................................................
52
Procedures Governing Reporting to the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence on Covert with Addendum ....................................................................
52
Questionnaire Supplement .....................................................................................
3
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees ................................
7
Ratner, Margaret, Education Director, Center for Constitutional Rights, a
letter to John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
April 1, 1987 ..........................................................................................................
20
Struve, Guy Miller, Associate Counsel, letter to Sven Holmes, Staff Direc-
tor, Select Committee on Intelligence, March 25, 1987 .................................
45
Schroeder, Hon. Pat, a U.S. Congresswoman from the State of Colorado, a
letter to William Webster, March 13, 1987 .....................................................
18
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Supplemental materials, letters, etc.-Continued
Webster, Hon. William H.,, Director FBI:
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Page
Intelligence, in response to letter with Questionnaire Supplement,
April 6, 1987 ...................................................................................................
4
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence with enclosure, April 13, 1987 ..............................................
163
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence with enclosures, April 17, 1987 ............................................
166
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence with enclosure, April 22, 1987 ................... :..........................
173
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence with enclosure, May 6, 1987 .................................................
184
Remarks before the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, De-
cember 8, 1986 ...............................................................................................
225
Speech before the National Security Agency, October 27, 1986 ..............
230
Zogby, Dr. James Jr., Executive Director, Arab American Institute .............
26
Appendix ............................................................................................................................
237
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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1987
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 o'clock
a.m., in room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. David
Boren (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Boren, Nunn, Hollings, Bradley, Cranston,
DeConcini, Metzenbaum, Cohen, Roth, Hatch, Murkowski, Specter,
Hecht, and Warner.
Staff present: Sven E. Holmes, Staff Director and General Coun-
sel; James Dykstra, Minority Staff Director; and Kathleen McGhee,
Chief Clerk.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID L. BOREN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Chairman BOREN. The committee will come to order.
We are here today to consider the nomination of William H.
Webster to be the Director of Central Intelligence. This hearing
itself is a unique occasion. I know of no other Nation where the
selection of the top intelligence official would receive so much scru-
tiny. This process reflects our determination that while a democra-
cy must legitimately protect the secrecy of some information and
operations, the intelligence gathering process must still be ulti-
mately accountable to the people through their elected representa-
tives.
Through this confirmation process, our responsibility as the
members of the Select Committee is to determine whether this
nominee is qualified to serve as the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. Accordingly, it is our responsibility to undertake a careful,
thorough and fair examination of the background of this nominee.
We do this in troubled times, in the midst of the present investiga-
tion by 2 special congressional committees and by an independent
counsel of a covert action program involving allegations of illegal
or improper activities by high government officials, including the
CIA.
This committee and the Senate have a duty to the American
people to ensure that the new Director of Central Intelligence will
conduct a program of effective intelligence gathering within the
framework of our laws and our democratic institutions. It is imper-
(1)
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ative that the Director of Central Intelligence be a person of excep-
tional ability and integrity, capable of exercising the independence
necessary to protect against any possible misuse of the Agency and
its resources.
Judge Webster, I welcome you and feel certain that you recog-
nize the magnitude of the new challenge that you have accepted. I
would add to that challenge by asking that in responding to our
questions today, you keep in mind the pressing need for this
Nation to bring order to the disarray in our foreign policy, and the
need for all of us to go forward together in a bipartisan way to con-
structively address the urgent and important problems which we
face.
As DCI, you would have 3 roles to perform: senior intelligence
advisor to the President of the United States; coordinator of the
entire intelligence community; and Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. I am sure that part of your deliberation concerning
your decision to accept this nomination centered upon the tremen-
dous burdens that you know from your experience in counterintel-
ligence, rests on the shoulders of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence.
You have served as the Chairman of the Interagency Group on
Counterintelligence, a committee of the National Security Council.
The first National Counterintelligence Strategy was developed
under your leadership, improving the coordination between the
FBI, the CIA, and other related agencies.
If confirmed as DCI, you will chair the Senior Interagency Group
on Intelligence of the National Security Council, which greatly in-
creases your responsibilities to further develop the overall National
Intelligence Strategy. We must continue to concentrate on long-
term strategic planning to meet the ever expanding need for timely
and accurate information.
The competing demands upon the budget and the limited re-
sources we have available make this job even more difficult. Great
advances have been made in our intelligence capabilities, but we
must continue to invest in this most important endeavor.
Our entire intelligence effort depends upon dedicated and profes-
sional career personnel, and this requires concentrated attention to
improve career incentives and training in order to recruit the best
possible available talent, and also to retain present valued employ-
ees. And this committee has again and again put emphasis on the
personnel system and the need to continue to upgrade it and im-
prove it.
There appears to be some progress in the ongoing arms control
talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. That makes
it imperative for us to analyze the present methods of verification
and to correct any shortcomings in order to guarantee our national
security. And if you are confirmed to this post as Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, of course those of us who serve on this committee
jointly have a heavy responsibility in the area of assuring the abili-
ty to verify any arms control agreement.
This committee is interested in your activities with respect to the
Iran-Contra matter, and we appreciate your responding to some
written questions that the Vice Chairman and I sent to you to sup-
plement the standard committee questionnaire for nominees. We
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have also received letters regarding your nomination from Repre-
sentative Don Edwards, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee that oversees the FBI, and from Representative Pat Schroe-
der. Both are concerned about recent allegations of improper FBI
activity. In addition, we have received statements from the Center
for Constitutional Rights, the National Committee Against Repres-
sive Legislation, and from the Arab American Institute. Without
objection, these statements and letters will be placed in the record
at this point.
[The documents referred to follow:]
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC, April 1, 1987.
Judge WILLIAM WEBSTER,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
J. Edgar Hoover Building, Washington, DC.
DEAR JUDGE WEBSTER: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has an impor-
tant responsibility to consider your nomination as Director of Central Intelligence
in a comprehensive manner. As you know, we are especially interested in any role
you may have had in matters that are currently under investigation by two special
Congressional committees and an independent counsel.
In the course of preparation for the hearing on your nomination, the Committee
has received information that you were advised as early as July, 1986, of the exist-
ence of the operation to transfer arms to Iran pursuant to a Presidential Finding. A
complete record of your knowledge and involvement would greatly assist the Com-
mittee's consideration of your nomination.
Therefore, we are submitting herewith a supplement to the questionnaire that is
normally completed by nominees considered by this Committee. These additional
questions are intended to provide a comprehensive record with respect to topics of
special concern that are presented by these unique circumstances. We request that
your sworn responses to these supplemental questions be provided to the Committee
as soon as possible in order that they may be available prior to the date of your
confirmation hearing. Of course, if portions of the responses are classified, such re-
sponses should be submitted separately.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
DAVID L. BOREN,
Chairman.
WILLIAM S. COHEN,
Vice Chairman.
QUESTIONNAIRE SUPPLEMENT
1. On what date did you first learn information, either directly or indirectly, from
sources other than public media, regarding the sale of arms to Iran. Describe that
information, and what actions you took, directed or advised upon learning such in-
formation?
2. Since the date set forth in your response to question number 1 above, through
November 26, 1986, state what information that you have subsequently learned,
either directly or indirectly, from sources other than public media, regarding the
sale of arms to Iran. State when you learned such information, describe such infor-
mation and describe what actions you took, directed or advised upon learning such
information.
3. On what date did you first learn information, either directly or indirectly, from
sources other than public media, regarding activities by U.S. officials that had the
purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to the Nicaraguan
resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by law. Describe
that information, and what actions you took, directed, or advised upon learning
such information?
4. After the date set forth in your response to question number 3 above, through
November 26, 1986, state what information you learned, either directly or indirect-
ly, from sources other than public media, regarding activities by U.S. officials that
had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to the Nica-
raguan resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by law. De-
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scribe that information, state when you learned such information and describe what
actions you took, directed or advised upon learning such information. Please include
in your response any information known to you with respect to activities involving
Southern Air Transport.
5. Describe any information that you received or conversations that you had on or
before November 26, 1986, regarding any inquiry by or on behalf of the Attorney
General concerning U.S. arms transfers to Iran, the possible diversion of proceeds
from such transfers to the Nicaraguan resistance and any activities by U.S. officials
that had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to the
Nicaraguan resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by law.
State when and how you learned such information, or describe any such conversa-
tions and state what actions, if any, you took, directed or advised upon learning
such information or upon having such conversations? As part of your response,
please state whether or not you advised the Attorney General as to whether such
inquiry should be treated as a criminal investigation.
6. Describe any information presently known to you, either directly or indirectly,
concerning any intelligence activities that you have reason to believe may be unlaw-
ful or contrary to Executive Order, which have not been reported to the Intelligence
Oversight Board, or any activities by U.S. intelligence officials, including, without
limitation, FBI, CIA, and NSC personnel, which may involve violation of any federal
criminal law which have not been reported to the Attorney General.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington DC, April 6, 1987.
Hon. DAVID L. BOREN,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to the letter from yourself and Vice
Chairman William S. Cohen to me dated April 1, 1987, which enclosed a "Question-
naire Supplement."
I have enclosed an unclassified response which addresses the six additional ques-
tions posed.
Sincerely,
Enclosure.
The following information is supplied in response to United States Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Supplemental Questionnaire provided by letter to me
dated April 1, 1987 signed by David L. Boren, Chairman, and William S. Cohen,
Vice Chairman.
Question 1. On what date did you first learn information, either directly or indi-
rectly, from sources other than public media, regarding the sale of arms to Iran.
Describe that information, and what actions you took, directed or advised upon
learning such information?
Answer. On or around August 5, 1986, following a briefing by the Criminal Inves-
tigative Division, Executive Assistant Director Oliver B. Revell asked to speak pri-
vately with me. Mr. Revell is my representative on the Operations Sub-Group
(OSG), Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) of the National Security Council
(NSC). Mr. Revell advised that he had learned at a regular meeting of the OSG of
an on-going strategic initiative authorized by the President toward an element of
the Iranian Government.
Lt. Colonel Oliver North, the NSC Coordinator for the TIWG, had advised the
OSG members of the President's concern with the strategic importance of Iran and
the need for the United States to have an ability to deal with a post-Khomeini
regime. Lt. Colonel North had advised that the President had authorized a covert
initiative to make contact with an element of the Iranian Government. North had
further advised that in order to show the good faith of the American Emissaries and
their backing by the President, the President authorized a shipment of a small
number of anti-tank missiles and other spare parts. As part of this initiative, the
Iranian group had agreed to use their influence to obtain the release of American
hostages held by radical Shia elements in Lebanon.
Mr. Revell also advised me that Lt. Colonel North had stated that the Attorney
General had reviewed and approved the Presidential finding and that the initiative
had been reviewed by the NSC members. Thus, I became aware that the initiative
was on-going, but I did not know when it had originated. Because the initiative as
described to me represented an apparent departure from the public position of the
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United States with respect to international terrorism, and in order to confirm that
such actions were supported by a Presidential finding, I concluded that I should dis-
cuss this with the Attorney General. I do not recall the exact date that I was able to
discuss this with him personally, but it was shortly following receipt of the informa-
tion from Mr. Revell, possibly the same day. I do recall that following a meeting in
the Attorney General's dining room, I asked to speak to him for a few moments in
his adjacent office. I told him that I had become aware through the OSG meetings
that there was an Iranian initiative involving the shipment of arms and had been
informed that it was supported by a Presidential finding which he had reviewed. I
told him my purpose of inquiring was to be sure of his awareness and approval of
the actions taken. The Attorney General advised me that he was indeed aware of
the initiative and that he had reviewed a finding although it may have been a draft
finding.
Mr. Revell had told me that the FBI had not been asked to take any action to
support the initiative and since the Attorney General had confirmed his awareness
and approval of the initiative, there were no further actions indicated. I informed
Mr. Revell of my conversation with the Attorney General. To my knowledge this
information was not disseminated to any other officials in the FBI, until after the
President's televised speech on November 13, 1986.
Since the 1979 abdication of the Shah of Iran and the establishment of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the FBI has received and investigated several allegations of arms
trafficking to Iran. In addition, some U.S. Customs investigations have also come to
FBI attention and other FBI investigations were ultimately -referred to U.S. Cus-
toms. To my knowledge none of the above investigations surfaced allegations or in-
formation involving U.S. Government sanctioned arms shipments to Iran.
Question 2. Since the date set forth in your response to question number 1 above,
through November 26, 1986, state what information that you have subsequently
learned, either directly or indirectly, from sources other than public media, regard-
ing the sale of arms to Iran. State when you learned such information, describe such
information and describe what actions you took, directed or advised upon learning
such information. -
Answer. On September 18, 1986, I submitted a request to the Attorney General
for authorization to provide assistance within the United States to another U.S.
agency concerning efforts to obtain the release of American hostages held in Leba-
non. There was no indication in the information provided to the FBI concerning this
request that any sale of arms to Iran was involved.
On October 14, 1986, following my return to FBI Headquarters after several days
absence from the city, I was informed by Executive Assistant Director Revell that
he had received a telephone call on October 8_1986, from Lt. Colonel North while
Mr. Revell was attending a convention of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police in Nashville, Tennessee. According to Mr. Revell, North had advised him that
a civilian C-123 aircraft, allegedly of American registry, had crashed in Nicaragua.
North stated that he had learned earlier that day that FBI Agents were reported to
have visited the offices of the Southern Air Transport Company in Miami, Florida,
in connection with the crash. North was concerned that FBI Agents conducting the
investigation might inadvertently' discover that Southern Air Transport Company
was involved in the situation concerning the hostages previously disclosed by North
to Revell. Colonel North wanted to emphasize to Revell and to me that the negotia-
tion process was at a very critical stage and that any inadvertent disclosure could
have serious adverse results. I took no personal action with respect to this informa-
tion. Executive Assistant Director Revell had- already contacted the Miami Field
Office to ascertain the nature of the FBI inquiry and to obtain a teletype report.
After conferring with Floyd Clarke, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Di-
vision, on October 30, 1986, I honored a request by the Attorney General to suspend
for ten days any nonurgent work on a separate preliminary inquiry into a possible
Neutrality Act violation involving Southerh Air Transport, due to pending sensitive
hostage negotiations. Authority 'to resume the inquiry was subsequently obtained
November 20, 1986.
On October 31, 1986, I was informed 'by Mr. Revell that hostage negotiations were
expected to result in the release of hostages in the near future and that an FBI hos-
tage debriefing team was being placed'on immediate standby for deployment if hos-
tages were released: This information required no action on my part.
On or about November 11, 1986, newspaper articles began to appear revealing the
Iranian arms sales. This was followed by a series of statements by various public
officials including a televised report by the President. I -received no additional fac-
tural information- about the arms sales by U.S. officials or U.S. agencies to Iran
until after the press conference by the President and the Attorney General on Tues-
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day, November 25, 1986, which publicly disclosed that funds from the arms sales
may have been diverted to the Nicaraguan Contra organization.
Following the press conference, I met with the Attorney General, and the details
of this meeting on November 25 are discussed in my response to question number 3.
Question 3. On what date did you first learn information, either directly or indi-
rectly, from sources other than public media, regarding activities by U.S. officials
that had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to the
Nicaraguan resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by law.
Describe that information, and what actions you took, directed, or advised upon
learning such information?
Answer. Since the fall of the Somoza regime, the FBI has conducted a number of
investigations in which allegations were made of illegal aid to the Contras-but
none to my knowledge involved U.S. officials providing illegal or unauthorized as-
sistance. The first knowledge I had of any possible activity by U.S. officials provid-
ing illegal or unauthorized assistance came to me during the press conference of the
President and the Attorney General on November 25, 1986, and at the meeting in
the Attorney General's office immediately following. The Attorney General had re-
ported that a document had been located in Lt. Colonel Oliver North's records indi-
cating a proposal to divert Iranian arms funds to the Contras. He advised that Colo-
nel North and Admiral Poindexter had been interviewed over the weekend along
with other members of the National Security Council and the National Security
Council staff. At the meeting, the Attorney General advised that he had given the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice the responsibility for ascertaining
what laws if any may have been violated. He advised me that as soon as that infor-
mation was complete he would determine whether to authorize a criminal investiga-
tion by the FBI. There was a discussion of how best to preserve the records, and the
Attorney General stated that the Department would undertake to advise the appro-
priate offices to preserve and to protect their records.
I returned to my office and met with Executive Assistant Director Revell and As-
sistant Director (Criminal Division) Floyd I. Clarke. I reviewed the discussion with
them, advised them that I anticipated authority to open the investigation shortly
and asked them to prepare to move promptly when so authorized. On Wednesday
morning, November 26, 1986, I received a telephone call from the Attorney General
authorizing the FBI to commence its investigation. I immediately communicated
this information to Assistant Director Floyd Clarke and the investigation began. Mr.
Clarke met later in the day with the Department of Justice officials. The FBI there-
after continued its investigation unabaited by the announcement of the appoint-
ment of an Independent Counsel. Following this assumption of responsibilities, a
team of Special Agents was detailed to assist the Independent Counsel.
Question 4. After the date set forth in your response to question number 3 above,
through November 26, 1986, state what information you learned, either directly or
indirectly, from sources other than public media, regarding activities by U.S. offi-
cials that had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to
the Nicaraguan resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by
law. Describe that information, state when you learned such information and de-
scribe what actions you took, directed or advised upon learning such information.
Please include in your response any information known to you with respect to ac-
tivities involving Southern Air Transport.
Answer. This question is answered by my response to #2 and #3.
Question 5. Describe any information that you received or conversations that you
had on or before November 26, 1986, regarding any inquiry by or on behalf of the
Attorney General concerning U.S. Arms transfers to Iran, the possible diversion of
proceeds from such transfers to the Nicaraguan resistance and any activities by
U.S. officials that had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized as-
sistance to the Nicaraguan resistance during the period that such assistance was
prohibited by law. State when and how you learned such information, or describe
any such conversations and state what actions, if any, you took, directed or advised
upon learning such information or upon having such conversations? As part of your
response, please state whether or not you advised the Attorney as to whether such
inquiry should be treated as a criminal investigation.
Answer. This question is answered in question number 3. I did not specifically
advise the Attorney General whether the inquiry he had been asked to undertake
by the President should be treated as a criminal investigation. On November 21,
1986, when the Attorney General informed me of this productive inquiry, I knew of
no facts suggesting criminal activity, and he stated that he knew of none either. My
offer of assistance at that time was more in terms of providing manpower and sup-
port for his inquiry.
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Question 6. Describe any information presently known to you, either directly or
indirectly, concerning any intelligence activities that you have reason to believe
may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order, which have not been reported to
the Intelligence Oversight Board, or any activities by U.S.. intelligence officials, in-
cluding, without limitation, FBI, CIA, and NSC personnel, which may involve viola-
tion of any federal criminal law which have not been reported to the Attorney Gen-
eral.
Answer. None. No such information is known.
I, William H. Webster, do swear that the answers I have provided to this question-
naire are, to the best of my knowledge, accurate and complete.
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, U.S. SENATE
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES
Part A-Biographical information
1. Name: William Hedgcock Webster.
2. Date and place of birth: March 6, 1924, St. Louis, Missouri.
3. Marital status: Widower.
4. Spouse's name: Drusilla.
5. Spouse's maiden name if applicable: Lane.
6. Names and ages of children: Drusilla Webster Busch, 33; William H. Webster,
Jr., 31; Katherine Webster Roessle, 26.
7. Education since high school:
Amherst College, 1941-43; 1946-47, A.B., 5/47.
Williams College, 1943, V-12 U.S.N.R.
Columbia University, 3/44-6/44, Midshipmen's School.
Washington University Law School, 1947-49, J.D., 5/49.
8. Employment record (list all positions held since college, including military serv-
ice. Indicate name of employer, position title or description, location, and dates of
employment):
U.S. Navy, Lt. Junior Grade, Pacific, 7/43-10/48.
McDonald & Wright, Part-time during law school, St. Louis, MO, 1949.
Cobbs, Armstrong, Teasdale & Roos, Associate, St. Louis, MO, 1949-50.
U.S. Navy, Lt. Senior Grade, Far East, 1950-52.
Armstrong, Teasdale Kramer & Vaughan, Partner, St. Louis, MO, 1952-60; 1961-
70.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorney, St. Louis, MO, 1960-61.
Judiciary, U.S. District Judge, St. Louis, MO, 1971-73.
Judiciary, U.S. Circuit Judge, Eighth Circuit, 1973-78.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FBI Director, Washington, DC, 1978-Present.
9. Government experience (indicate experience in or association with Federal,
State or local governments, including advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-
time service or position. Do not repeat information already provided in answer to
question 8):
Member, Missouri Board of Law Examiners-appointed by Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, Jefferson City, MO (part-time), 1964-1969.
Chairman, St. Louis County Decent Literature Commission, appointed by St.
Louis County Supervisors & confirmed by County Council under Decent Literature
Code (part-time) 1963-1969.
St. Louis County Public Defender Advisory Board. Member designated by Metro-
politan Bar Association (part-time), 1962-1970.
Member of Ad Hoc Committee on Habeas Corpus, Washington, DC, 1975-1978.
Member, Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Washing-
ton, DC, 1971-1978. (Chairman 1977-789).
10. Honors and awards (provide information on scholarships, fellowships. honor-
ary degrees, military decoration,. civilian service citations, or any other special rec-
ognition for outstanding performance or achievement):
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Honorary degrees: I
Amherst College, Amherst, MA.
DePauw University, Greencastle, IN.
William Woods College, Fulton, MO.
Drury College, Springfield, MO.
Washington University, St. Louis, MO.
Columbia College, Columbia, MO.
University of Dayton School of Law, Dayton, OH.
University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN.
Centre College, Danville, KY.
Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA.
University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL.
DePaul University, Chicago, IL.
The American University, Washington, DC.
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York City.
Awards and other citations:
Man of the Year, 1980 by the St. Louis Globe-Democrat.
William Greenleaf Elliott Award from Washington University, 1981.
Riot Relief Fund Award, New York City, 1981.
Fordham Law School Louis Stein Award, 10/82.
International Platform Association Theodore Roosevelt Award for excellence in
public service, 8/83.
American University William Moss Award, 1/83.
Jefferson Award for the Greatest Public Service by an Elected or Appointed Offi-
cial, 6/84.
Freedoms Foundation, Valley Forge, PA, National Service Medal, 5/85.
Patrick V. Murphy Award from Police Foundation, for distinguished service in
law enforcement, 5/85.
Father of the Year for Public Service, by the National Father's Day Committee,
5/86.
Thomas Jefferson Award in Law from the University of Virginia, 1986.
11. Organizational affiliations (list memberships in and offices held within the last
ten years in any professional, civic, fraternal, business, scholarly, cultural, charita-
ble or other similar organizations):
Academy of Missouri Squires, Jefferson City, MO, Nonprofit, 1982-present,
Member.
Alfalfa Club, Washington, DC, Nonprofit, 1/79-present, President, 1/83-1/84
Alibi Club, Washington, DC, Nonprofit, 1982-present, Member.
American Bar Association, Chicago, IL, Law, 1953-present, Member.
American Bar Assoc., Corporation Section, Chicago, IL, Law, 1968-present, Chair-
man, 1977-78.
American Law Institute, Philadelphia, PA, Law Ed., 1978-present, Council
Member.
American University, Washington, DC, University, 1982-present, National Adviso-
ry Bd.
American Bar Foundation Fellow, Chicago, IL, Law, 1968-present, Life Member.
Amherst Alumni Assn., Amherst, MA, College, 1947-present, President, St. Louis,
1966-68, VP 1969-70.
Arlington, "Y", Arlington, VA, Athletic, 1978-present, Member.
Delta Sigma RHO, Amherst, MA, Forensic Fraternity, 1947-present, Member.
District of Columbia Bar, Washington, DC, Law, 1/81-present, Member.
Federal Bar Assn., Washington, DC Law, 1960-, Member.
International Tennis, Tennis Foundation & Hall of Fame, Inc., Newport, RI, Non-
profit, 1980-present, Member, Bd. of Directors Advisory Comm.
International Assn. Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, MD, Law Enforcement 1978-
present, Member.
Institute of Judicial Administration, New York, NY, Law, 1985-present, President.
Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Assn., St. Louis, MO, Nonprofit, 1960's-
present, Trustee.
Metropolitan St. Louis Bar Association, St. Louis, MO, Law, 1949-present,
Member.
Missouri Bar Integrated, Jefferson City, MO, Law, 1949-present, Member.
National Academy of Public Administration, Washington, DC, Nonprofit, 1981-
present, Member.
Order of the COIF, Wash. U. Law School, St. Louis, MO, Nat. Law 1949-present,
Member.
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Noonday Club, St. Louis, MO, Nonprofit, 1950's-present, Non-resident.
PSI Upsilon, Amherst, MA, Fraternity, 1945-present, Member.
PHI Delta PHI, St. Louis, MO, Law Fraternity, Member.
Rotary Club, St. Louis, MO, Nonprofit, 1971-present, Member & Hon. Member.
St. Albans Tennis Club, Washington, DC, Athletic, 1978-present, Member.
St. Louis Country Club, St. Louis, MO, Nonprofit, 1967 to present, Non-resident
Member.
University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL, University, 11/81-9/84, Board of
Visitors.
University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, CO, University, 1983-present,
Board of Visitors.
Washington University, St. Louis, MO, University, 1974-present, Trustee.
Washington University, Alumni Federation, St. Louis, MO, University, 1949-
present, Past President.
Washington University Law Alumni, St. Louis, MO, Universtiy, 1949-present,
President, 1962-63.
Question 12. Published writings and speeches (list the titles, publishers, and publi-
cation dates of any books, articles, reports or other published materials you have
authored. Also list the titles of any public speeches you have made within the last
10 years for which there is a text or transcript. To the extent possible, please pro-
vide a copy of each such publication, text or transcript:
Answer. Submitted separately. Judicial opinions are found in West's Federal Sup-
plement and West Federal Reporter.
Part B-Qualifications and references
Question 13. Qualifications (describe why you believe you are qualified to serve in
the position for which you have been nominated):
I have completed nine years as Director of the FBI.
In addition to administering an organization similar in many respects to the CIA,
I have served as Chairman of the working Group on Counterintelligence (IG-CI) and
as a member of the Special Interagency Group on Intelligence (SIG-I).
My responsibilities have placed me in contact with most of the operational coun-
terparts of the CIA in the free world.
Question 14. References (provide the names and business addresses and telephone
numbers of five individuals whom you believe are in a position to comment on your
qualifications to serve in the position for which you have been nominated. Include
three individuals who have known you for at least five years):
Answer. Hon. Peter B. Bensinger, Bensinger, DuPont & Assoc., 20 North Wacker
Drive, Chicago, IL, 312-726-8620, 9 years.
Walter M. Clarke, Esq., Armstrong, Teasdale, Kramer, & Vaughan, Suite 1950,
611 Olive Street, St. Louis, MO, 314-621-5070, 60 years.
Hon. Lloyd N. Hand, Verner, Liipfert, Bernard, McPherson & Hand, Suite 1000,
1660 L Street, NW, WDC 202-452-7400, 9 years.
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, U.S. Supreme Court Bldg., Washington, DC,
202-479-3362, 16 years.
Hon. James W. Symington, O'Connor & Hannan, Suite 800, 1919 Pa. Ave., Wash-
ington, DC, 202-887-1400, 25 years.
Part C-Political and foreign affiliations
Question 15. Political activities (list any memberships or offices held in or finan-
cial contributions or services rendered to, any political party, election committee,
political action committee, or individual candidate during the last ten years):
None.
Question 16. Candidacy for public office (furnish details of any candidacy for elec-
tive public office):
Answer. None.
Question 17. Foreign affiliations (Note: Questions 17 A and B are not limited to
relationships requiring registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
Questions 17 A, B and C do not call for a positive response if the representation or
transaction was authorized by the United States Government in connection with
you or your spouse's employment in Government service.)
(A) Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, at-
torney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a
foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please
fully describe such relationship.
Answer. No.
(B) If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, account-
ing, public relations firm or other service organization, have any of you or your
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spouse's associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a
foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please
fully describe such relationship.
Answer. No.
(C) During the past ten years have you or your spouse received any compensation
from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign gov-
ernment or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish de-
tails.
Answer. No.
(D) Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act? If so, please furnish details.
Answer. No.
Question 18. Describe any lobbying activity during the past ten years, other than
in an official U.S. Government capacity, in which you or your spouse have engaged
for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modifica-
tion of legislation at the national level of Government, or for the purpose of affect-
ing the administration and execution of national law or public policy.
Answer. None.
Part D-Financial disclosure and conflict of interest
Question 19. Describe any employment, business relationship, financial transac-
tion, investment, association or activity (including, but not limited to, dealings with
the Federal Government on your own behalf or on behalf of a client), which could
create, or appear to create, a conflict of interest in the position to which you have
been nominated.
Answer. None.
Question 20. Do you intend to sever all business connections with your present
employers, firms, business associates and/or partnerships or other organizations in
the event that you are confirmed by the Senate? If not, please explain.
Answer. I intend to retain connections with the charitable, educational and pro-
fessional organizations listed in # 11.
I have no business connections, etc., referred to above.
Question 21. Describe the financial arrangements you have made or plan to make,
if you are confirmed, in connection with severance from your current position.
Please include severance pay, pension rights, stock options, deferred income ar-
rangements, and any and all compensation that will or might be received in the
future as a result of your current business or professional relationships.
Answer. As a Government employee, my government benefits and interests will
not be affected by the new position.
Question 22. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue out-
side employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the Gov-
ernment? If so, please furnish details.
Answer. No.
Question 23. As far as can be foreseen, state your plans after completing Govern-
ment service. Please specifically describe any agreements or understandings, writ-
ten or unwritten, concerning employment after leaving Government service. In par-
ticular, describe any agreements, understandings or options to return to your cur-
rent position.
Answer. As far as can be foreseen, I will most probably return to private law
practice. I have no agreements or understandings, written or unwritten.
Question 24. If you are presently in Government service, during the past five
years of such service, have you received from a person outside of Government an
offer or expression of interest to employ your services after you leave Government
service?
Answer. From time to time law firms and corporations have expressed an interest
in me when I should leave Government service. Some made offers. None were ac-
cepted.
Question 25. Is your spouse employed? If the nature of this employment is related
in any way to the position for which you are seeking confirmation, please indicate
your spouse's employer, the position and the length of time the position has been
held. If your spouse's employment is not related to the position to which you have
been nominated, please so state.
Answer. N.A.
Question 26. List below all corporations, partnerships, foundations, trusts, or other
entities toward which you or your spouse have fiduciary obligations or in which you
or your spouse have held directorships or other positions of trust during the past
five years.
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Answer. See attached list.
Washington University, Trustee, 1974-present, Self.
Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, Trustee, 1960's-present, Self.
American Bar Foundation, Life fellow, 1968-present, Self.
American Law Institute, Council Member,. 1978-present, Self.
Institute of Judicial Administration, President, 1985-present, Self.
Alfalfa Club, Past President, 1/83-1/84, Self.
American University, National Advisory Board, 1982-present, Self.
Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America, Honorary Board Member, 1958-78, Self.
International Tennis Foundation & Hall of Fame, National Board Advisory Com-
mittee, 1978-present, Self.
University of Colorado, Law School Visiting Committee, 1983-present, Self.
Washington Area Tennis Patrons Foundation, Board of Directors, 1981-1984,
Spouse.
Question 27. List all gifts exceeding $500 in value received during the past five
years by you, your spouse, or your dependents. Gifts received from relatives and
gifts given to a spouse or dependent totally independent of their relationship to you
need not be included.
Answer. No, other than as beneficiary of spouse's estate.
Question 28. List all securities, real property, partnership interests, or other in-
vestments or receivables with a current market value (or, if market value is not as-
certainable, estimated current fair value) in excess of $1,000. (Note: the information
provided in response to Schedule A of the disclosure forms of the Office of Govern-
ment Ethics may be incorporated by reference, provided that current valuations are
used.)
Answer. Disclosure form-incorporated by reference.
Question 29. List all loans, mortgages, or other indebtedness (including any contin-
gent liabilities) in excess of $10,000. (Note: The information provided in response to
Schedule D of the disclosure form of the Office of Government Ethics may be incor-
porated by reference, provided that contingent liabilities are also included.)
Answer. None.
Question 30. Are you or your spouse now in default on any loan, debt or other
financial obligation? Have your or your spouse been in default on any loan, debt or
other financial obligation in the past ten years? If the answer to either question is
yes, please provide details.
Answer. No.
Question 31. List'sources and amounts of all income received during the last five
years, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents,
honoraria, and other items exceeding $500. (If you prefer to do so, copies of U.S.
income tax returns for these years may be substituted here, but their submission is
not required.)
Salary ......................................................................................... $60,663 $60,993 $69,800 $72,600 $75,100
Fees, royalties ............................................................................ 4,086 7,476 3,742 1,299 ....................
Dividends .................................................................................... 46,177 44,879 45,835 32,916 23,156
Interest ...................................................................................... 33,026 29,794 28,325 29,495 26,301
Gifts .......................................................................................................................................................................................................
Rents:
Farm ................................................................................. (8,610) (1,968) (4,877) (4,838) (4,227)
Other-exceeding $500 .................................................... 7,731 (965) 7,941 2,100 417
(CG) (CG) (CG) (CG) 1,000.(H)
Total ............................................................................. 151,683 143,142 155,643 138,410 125,974
Question 32. If asked, would you provide the committee with copies of your and
your spouse's Federal income tax returns for the past three years?
Answer. Yes.
Question 33. Have your Federal or State tax returns been the subject of any audit,
investigation or inquiry at any time? If so, please provide details, including the
result of any such proceeding.
Answer. No.
Question 34. Attach a schedule itemizing each individual source of income which
exceeds $500. If you are an attorney, accountant, or other professional, also attach a
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schedule listing all clients and customers whom you billed more than $500 worth of
services during the past five years.
Answer. See Schedule A of Financial Disclosure Form.
Question 35. Do you intend to place your financial holdings and those of your
spouse and dependent members of your immediate household in a blind trust? If
yes, please furnish details.
Answer. My investment holdings other than cash and real property (farm) are
currently in a living trust. I intend to enter into an agreement with corporate trust-
ee to satisfy the purposes of a blind trust except as to shares of Edison Bros. Stores,
Inc., which I do not desire sold without my consent.
Question 36. Explain how you will resolve any actual or potential conflicts of in-
terest that may be indicated by your response to the questions in this part or in
part C (questions 15 thru 35).
Answer. No conflict identified. Should any potential conflict develop, I would
employ recusal and other approaches recommended by CIA counsel.
Part E-Ethical matters
Question 37. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for un-
professional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to, any court, administra-
tive agency, professional association, disciplinary committee or other professional
group? If so, provide details.
Answer. Not to my knowledge.
Question 38. Have you ever been investigated, held, arrested, or charged by any
Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any federal,
State, county, or municipal law, regulation, or ordinance, other than a minor traffic
offense, or named either as a defendant or otherwise in any indictment or informa-
tion relating to such violation? If so provide details.
Answer. No.
Question 39. Have you ever been convicted of or entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense? If so, pro-
vide details.
Answer. No.
Question 40. Are you presently or have you ever been a party in interest in any
administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide, details.
Answer. The following instances concern those situations where I was a party in
interest in the proceedings mentioned above which were not connected to my duties
as Director of the FBI.
In 1961, I was erroneously named a defendant as an alleged last member of the
board of directors of a corporation whose charter had lapsed. The suit was a collec-
tion matter. I had resigned in 1959, was not representing the company at the time
and plaintiffs attorney promptly dismissed as to me when this was called to his at-
tention.
In 1964 an action was instituted in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Missouri, Cause No. 64 C 113(2), by Consumers Financial Corporation
against Walter F. Roos and all the partners in my law firm, Armstrong, Teasdale,
Roos, Kramer and Vaughn. I was named as a party defendant although there was
no allegation I was involved in any of the matters alleged. William Erickson, the
principal of Consumers Financial Corp., was competing with another group led by
Burch Williams for control of Associated Fund, Inc. The law firm held 249 shares of
Associated Fund, and Walter Roos held one qualifying share as a director. The law
firm sold its 249 shares to the Burch Williams group, and William Erickson and
Consumers Financial alleged that the firm breached a contract to sell the shares to
Erickson. Plaintiffs sought specific performance of the contract allegedly breached.
The case was dismissed when the Erickson group offered to buy all the stock of As-
sociated Fund and all the shares were purchased. In addition Erickson's group paid
$250,000 to all the shareholders. Walter Roos and the law firm paid no money.
While a Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri (1971-1973), I was informed I had been named as a co-defendant in a civil
rights complaint filed in the United States District Court by three prisoners against
Judge Wangelin, Marshal Link, Warden Lark and Sheriff Edwards. The complaint
as to me seemed to allege that I was an agent for the black power movement in the
city jail. The prayer for relief asked that I be enjoined from hearing another suit in
which some of the plaintiffs were parties. The allegations against me had no founda-
tion in fact. I was never served and the matter was never pursued against me. I
have been advised that the case was dismissed on April 27, 1973.
I was also named in a mandamus action by a petitioner, following my issuance of
a permanent injunction against him which was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. 462
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F.2d 897. The mandamus was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 72-5854, February
20, 1973, 41 U.S.L.W. 3449.
I was named as a defendant in a civil action brought by a prisoner seeking to
enjoin me from sitting as a trial judge in his civil rights case against a Southern
Missouri sheriff. Another District Judge dismissed that case as frivolous. The civil
rights case resulted in a jury verdict for the defendant. My refusal to disqualify
myself was affirmed upon appeal.
In 1977, I was named with other as a co-defendant in a real estate quiet title
action brought to clear title to land once owned by a corporation in which I had an
interest. Since I claimed no interest in this land, and, therefore, was not really a
party in interest, I did not enter an appearance or file a pleading in that case. I was
never aware of the outcome of the suit which, by its very nature, had no effect on
me.
Additionally, during my tenure as Director of the FBI I have been named in nu-
merous lawsuits, both in my official and individual capacities. A description of past
and pending litigation in which I have been named as a defendant, prepared by the
FBI Legal Counsel Division, is attached. I have reviewed this and it is complete and
accurate to the best of my knowledge and recollection.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington, DC, March 25, 1987.
Re civil actions in which Federal Bureau of Investigation Director William H. Web-
ster is named as a defendant.
The following information was compiled March 25, 1987, from the records of the
Legal Counsel Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in conection with Di-
rector Webster's appointment to the Central Intelligence Agency. This document
provides an explanation of the past and pending civil litigation naming Director
Webster as a defendant.
Because of his position as the head of a large Federal bureau, Director Webster is
often named in civil actions which seek damages or equitable relief. These cases run
the gamut from claims arising from autombile accidents of FBI employees, allega-
tions of violations of constitutional rights arising from FBI investigations to Free-
dom of Information Act cases and cases arising from FBI personnel actions. Over
the Director's nine-year tenure with the FBI, there have been literally hundreds of
such cases filed against him but ultimately dismissed. No case has even resulted in
any finding of personal liability against the Director.
Suits presently pending against the Director are categorized according to whether
the Director is named in his official capacity only (i.e., the Director is named only
because he happens to be the head of the Bureau and no personal wrongdoing by
him is alleged), suits naming him in his individual capacity (the Director is named
and relief is sought from him personally), and suits which name him in both capac-
ities. The numbers of cases pending in each category are:
Official capacity .............................................................................................................. 55
Individual capacity ........................................................................................................ 1
Both capacities ................................................................................................................ 18
Total cases March 25, 1987 ............................................................................... 74
The official capacity cases consist of 29 Freedom of Infromation Act/Privacy Act
cases, 23 tort or other miscellaneous actions, and three Equal Employment Opportu-
nity suits.
Of the remaining pending cases, against the Director personally, only three actu-
ally allege in the body of the compliant that the Director himself committed some
wrong for which the plaintiff should be compensated. These cases are synopsized
below:
1. Ebun Adelona, et at v. William Webster, et at (U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y.) Civil Action
No. 81 CIV 0373
Plaintiffs alleged that FBI searches on April 18-19, 1980, at 92 Morningside
Avenue, New York City, in connection with the attempted apprehension of Joanne
Chesimard, a fugitive wanted for escape after conviction for murder of a New Jersey
state trooper, violated various of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Although
wrongdoing by the Director was alleged, the complaint is so vague that the nature
of the allegations against Director Webster could not be ascertained. For this reason
the Director was dismissed from the suit on February 10, 1987, but an appeal may
be filed.
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2. Imari Abubak Obadele v. William French Smith, et al. (U.S.D.C.,. D. D.D.C.)
Civil Action No. 80-1844
Plaintiff alleged that the Director and others conspired to violate constitutional
rights arising from plaintiffs participation in political activities. Director Webster
was dismissed from the suit on June 7, 1984, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his
dismissal on June 11, 1986. The suit is still pending as to other Federal defendants,
but the dismissal is final as to the Director.
3. Edwin Montes v. Edwin Meese, et al. (U.S.D.C., S.D. N.Y.) Civil Action No. 86
CIV 8285
Plaintiff, who alleges that he is a mental patient, alleges that Director Webster
and others have subjected him to illegal electronic surveillance, subjected him to tel-
epathic surveillance of plaintiff's thoughts, raped him, assaulted him by providing
his with adulterated cigarettes, and interfered with his employment by mental te-
lepathy. Plaintiff seeks $50 million in damages plus equitable relief. The suit was
dismissed as frivolous on October 30, 1986, and plaintiff entered notice of appeal on,
November 7, 1986. The appeal is pending in the Second Circuit.
JOSEPH R. DAVIS,
Assistant Director-Legal Counsel.
Question 41. Have you been interviewed or asked to supply any information as a
witness or otherwise in connection with any congressional investigation, Federal or
State agency proceeding, grand jury investigation, or criminal or civil litigation in
the past ten years? If so, provide details.
Answer. In the year prior to beginning my 9-year tenure as Director of the FBI,
while a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, there
was only one instance in which I was subpoenaed to testify in a trial. The trial was
between two oil companies. The circumstances was a motion to disqualify an attor-
ney on grounds of conflict of interest. I was asked to give testimony as to whether
confidential information had been exchanged between attorneys in a prior oil as-
phalt conspiracy case in which I was a lead attorney.
With regard to my providing an affidavit or declaration, being interviewed, and
providing testimony as a witness in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, a
definitive answer cannot be provided from a review of FBI records. Becuase of the
manner in which the FBI's criminal, administrative, and legal matter files are in-
dexed and maintained, it is not possible to. conduct a search that would definitively
establish that all such instances were identified.
However, based on my recollection and the recollections of the only two individ-
uals who have served as Assistant Directors of the FBI's Legal Counsel Division
during my tenure, the only recalled instances are recounted below.
A. DEPOSITIONS
In the course of my tenure as FBI Director, I have not been deposed in any crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative proceeding.
B. INTERVIEWS
1. EEO Complaint.- In one instance recently I did provide to a Department of
Justice investigator a signed statement which was requested in connection with an
Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint by an FBI employee. The EEO
matter is currently being investigated by the Department of Justice EEO Office, and
I have been advised it would not be appropriate for me to provide any details of this
pending matter. .
2. In the Matter of Special Prosecutor's Investigation of Raymond Donovan.-In
August 13, 1982, I was formally interviewed by Leon Silverman, who had been ap-
pointed as a Special Prosecutor in this matter. The interview concerned information
I provided to President Reagan's transition team about Mr. Donovan's organized
crime connections. In addition to this formal interview, I had numerous conversa-
tions and exchanged written correspondence with Mr. Silverman, as well as congres-
sional committees who were investigating this matter. I never testified before the
grand jury investigating this matter. A copy of a summary of the interview obtained
from the Special Prosecutor's Supplemental Report to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is attached. A copy of correspondence to
Special Prosecutor Silverman and to the Congress regarding this matter, which I
signed, is attached.
3. In the Matter of the Independent Counsel's Investigation of the Suspension of
the FBI's Southern Air Transport, Inc. Investigation.- On December 19, 1986, I was
interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning
contact I had on October 30, 1986, with Associate Attorney General Stephen S.
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Trott, United States Department of Justice. Mr. Trott had contacted me regarding
the FBI temporarily suspending its investigation of a Neutrality Act case involving
Southern Air Transport, Inc. That investigation and the substance of my interview
are both within the investigative jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Lawrence E.
Walsh. I have beern advised that Independent Counsel Walsh would object to disclo-
sure of the substance of the interview or to disclosure of any written record or tran-
script of the interview.
C. AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONY
1. United States v. Richard Miller (U.S.D.C., C.D. California) No. CR 84-972A-
Kn.-In this criminal prosecution of a former Special Agent (SA) of the FBI, I fur-
nished a declaration on October 1, 1985 to clarify an aspect of FBI policy and proce-
dure in foreign counterintelligence investigations. SA Miller's attorneys alleged that
I could provide information concerning the FBI's "double agent" programs and ac-
tivities directed against the Intelligence Service of the Soviet Union. A copy of my
declaration is attached.
2. United States v. Edward Tickel (E.D. Va).-This particular case involved a
criminal prosecution of a former SA of the FBI, Edward Tickel. Mr. Tickel alleged
that he had advised me of two situations where he had installed electronic surveil-
lance equipment in facilities prior to the entry of a Court Order authorizing such
installations. I testified on March 11, 1983, as a rebuttal witness for the Government
and also provided a declaration. Copies of my testimony and my declaration are at-
tached. Mr. Tickel was subsequently convicted and sentenced to prison.
3. Testimony in my Private Capacity.-In 1982, I was subpoenaed as a witness in
an action brought in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri,
Docket Number 81-112 C(C), by a former client, Vaughn Morrill, Jr., against Becton
Dickinson and Company, Rutherford, New Jersey. The purpose of my testimony was
in aid of construction of ambiguous clauses in a contract executed and amended
during the period 1961-1970. A transcript of my testimony is attached.
4. Other Instances.- In addition to the above specifically recalled instances, there
have been a few other instances in which I have filed affidavits in civil actions.
These occasionally arise from situations in which I am named as a defendant in my
personal capacity in a civil action, but where I had absolutely no involvement in the
situation which formed the basis for the suit. In order to support a Motion to Dis-
miss or similar pleading I have on occassion filed affidavit(s) and declarations deny-
ing such personal knowledge or action. I have also filed declarations in support of
Motions to Dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction to sue me. I have not, to
the best of my knowledge or recollection, filed any affadavit in a case relating to
any private matter during my tenure as Director of the FBI.
D. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
During my nine-year tenure as Director of the FBI, I have testified before Con-
gressional committees on numerous occasions. This testimony has concerned various
matters, including budget appropriations, oversight, and other matters of Congres-
sional inquiry. All testimony occurred while I was engaged in the normal course of
my duties as Director of the FBI. A copy of all instances when I testified before Con-
gress is attached.
Question 42. Has any business of which you are or were an officer, director or
partner been a party to any administrative agency proceeding or criminal or civil
litigation relevant to the position to which you have been nominated? If so, provide
details. (With respect to a business of which you are or were an officer, you need
only consider proceedings and litigation that occurred while you were an officer of
that business.)
Answer. Not to my knowledge.
Part F-Additional information
Question 43. Describe in your own words the concept of congressional oversight of
U.S. intelligence activities. In particular, characterize what you believe to be the ob-
ligations of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central In-
telligence, and the intelligence committees of the Congress respectively in this proc-
ess.
Answer. National security is a shared responsibility. In order for the Congress to
be certain that the intelligence activities being carried out by the Administration
are lawful, proper and consistent with national security needs, each body has consti-
tuted a Select Committee on Intelligence. It is the responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence, or in his absence, the Deputy Director, to keep the intelligence
committees informed of important information and activities developed within the
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intelligence community on a timely basis. Because such information must not be
publicly or widely disseminated, the committees act as surrogates for the Congress
and the American people. They react to specific issues, at the same time faithfully
preserving the secrets entrusted to them. The key word in the relationship is
trust-and the DCI plays an important role in developing and. preserving this indis-
pensible ingredient between the intelligence community and the intelligence com-
mittees in carrying out their respective responsibilities for the National Security.
Question 44. Define in your own words the duties of the position to which you
have been nominated.
Answer. As the President's primary intelligence advisor, the DCI provides objec-
tive and relevant intelligence to our Government's policy makers. Because this in-
telligence serves as the basis for significant foreign policy and national security de-
cisions, the integrity of the intelligence collection and analysis must be absolute. To
ensure that the President receives the intelligence necessary to carry out policy ob-
jectives, the DCI must encourage the entire intelligence community to exchange all
pertinent information. The DCI must promote a free discussion of ideas and foster
analytical competition within the intelligence community. The DCI must work to
see that the intelligence needs of the respective departments of government are
fully understood and effectively addressed within the community.
The DCI has a special and direct responsibility to the Congress. Each Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence is an overseer of intelligence activities and programs as well
as a partner in ensuring that this intelligence is properly gathered and protected.
The DCI, therefore, must provide the Congress, through these committees, the
timely, accurate and relevant information required to conduct its legislative. and
ovesight duties.
Conducting covert operations is one of the most sensitive responsibilities of the
DCI. The CIA cannot legally undertake covert action without a Presidential finding,
and the American public must have confidence that covert operations will only be
undertaken with the proper authority and after a careful consideration of the risks
and objectives involved. The DCI must be certain the policy makers are presented
with all information necessary for a sound decision. Once the decision is made to
carry out a covert oepration, the DCI has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that
it is effectively managed and aggressively implemented within the limit of the au-
thority granted to CIA.
The intelligence community is a great national resource. Its effectiveness depends
upon the ability of its components to act in concert on issues which transcend indi-
vidual departments of government. In planning, articulating needs, and coordinat-
ing joint efforts, the DCI's leadership role is most significant and national security
of the United States.
Question 45. Please advise the committee of any additional information favorable
or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomi-
nation.
Answer. None.
I, William H. Webster, do swear that the answers I have provided to this question-
naire are, to the best of my knowledge, accurate and complete.
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER.
March 26, 1987.
My Commission Expires 12/14/88.
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, March 30, 1987.
Hon. DAVID L. BOREN,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN BOREN: For some time, the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights has been concerned about the FBI's investigations of domestic oppo-
nents of Administration policy in Central America. We have questioned FBI Direc-
tor Webster on this issue in open hearings and have had several closed briefings.
Some of our concerns focused on an intensive three and a half year investigation by
the FBI of a group known as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Sal-
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vador (CISPES). The investigation was conducted under the Bureau's counter-intelli-
gence and international terrorism guidelines.
Recently an individual named Frank Varelli, of Dallas, Texas, has come forward
to say that he was an informant for the FBI inside CISPES from 1981 to 1984. Var-
elli asserts that:
(1) The CISPES investigation was opened without any suspicion of criminal activi-
ty; it was based just on the fact that CISPES was a left-wing group opposing the
Reagan Administration.
(2) FBI agents said they wanted to "break" CISPES. As the investigation pro-
gressed, Varelli was supposed to create confusion and distress within the group, to
"neutralize" it by "destroying its credibility."
(3) FBI agents carried out break-ins against the CISPES office and the apartment
of a CISPES member to obtain documents about the group.
(4) The Bureau sent Varelli to El Salvador to set up a "back channel" information
exchange with the El Salvador National Guard. Varelli provided the Guard with in-
formation on U.S. opponents of aid to El Salvador and the Guard provided the
Bureau with the names of El Salvadorans coming to the U.S. The Bureau also pro-
vided the Guard with the names of El Salvadorans who were deported from the U.S.
back to El Salvador.
(5) At FBI direction, he compiled a Terrorist Photograph Album, containing pic-
tures and descriptions of, among others, Congressmen and Senators.
Since Varelli's allegations raised serious questions about the FBI's counter-terror-
ism investigations, we invited Mr. Varelli to testify before the Subcommittee. He did
so on February 20th. A copy of his sworn testimony is attached, along with an affi-
davit he has filed in federal court in Dallas where he is suing the FBI.
The FBI has admitted publicly that Varelli was an informant. It has also ac-
knowledged that Varelli's handling Agent resigned from the Bureau in 1985. The
Terrorist Photograph Album is an official FBI form.
Director Webster has promised the Subcommittee a full accounting for Mr. Varel-
li's allegations and has stated that an intensive investigation is being conducted by,
the Bureau's Office of Professional Responsibility. However, this investigation is not
completed and the Bureau has not responded in detail to the Subcommittee. While
the FBI has denied many of Mr. Varelli's allegations, there has been no formal re-
sponse yet.
I believe that these allegations are pertinent to the confirmation of Judge Web-
ster as Director of Central Intelligence. They raise issues of internal controls and
accountability, and have serious implications for the rights of Americans. I would
urge you, therefore, to explore them at your hearings. I would be happy to share
with you any information in the Subcommittee's possession that might be of use to
you.
With kindest regards.
Sincerely,
DON EDWARDS,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, April 3 1987.
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN BOREN: The committee has under consideration the nomination
of William H. Webster for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Department of Justice is currently investigating the activities of a former
FBI informant and several current and former FBI agents.
These individuals were alledgedly involved in a surveillance campaign of groups
and individuals, including members of Congress, critical of administration policies
? in Central America. The campaign allegedly included providing the El Salvador Na-
tional Guard with information about the activities and travel of certain U.S. and
Salvadoran citizens and the preparation of an FBI Terrorist Photo Album. Said
album is alleged to be upwards of 700 pages, some of which depict members of the
House and Senate as terrorists.
The extent to which this operation was approved, coordinated, or condoned by top
FBI officials is not known because the investigation is not finished. Certainly if Mr.
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Webster was even aware of the operation it would raise serious doubts about his
judgment and his suitability to direct the CIA.
I oppose, therefore, Mr. Webster's confirmation until such time as this matter is
resolved.
Please make this letter a part of the hearing record.
Sincerely, ,
PAT SCHROEDER,
Congresswoman.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, March 1, 1987.
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. WEBSTER: A copy of the enclosed document, "Terrorist Photograph
Album, FD-432 (Rev. 2-8-83)" was recently brought to my attention by Douglas R.
Larson, the attorney for Frank Varelli.
According to Mr. Larson, blank copies of this document were provided to Mr. Var-
elli by Daniel Flanagan who was, at the time, an FBI Agent in Dallas. I understand
that Mr. Flanagan is no longer with the FBI. -
Mr. Larson further advised my office that Agent Flanagan. provided Mr. Varelli
with the names of elected officials and clergy and, in the case of the official de-
scribed on the enclosed document, a photograph of said official. Mr. Varelli, using a
variety of John Birch Society and other similar material, then completed the "Ter-
rorist Photograph Album," including the "Narrative of Activities." Said document,
of which I understand there may be upwards of 700 on other individuals, was then
submitted to the FBI.
I understand that Mr. Varelli is currently in litigation with the FBI over, among
other issues, a back pay dispute. Apparently there is a difference of opinion between
Mr. Varelli and the FBI as to whether he was paid a monthly salary or piece rate.
I would appreciate any light you could shed on the following:
(1) Is this an FBI document?
(2) How many other federal, state, and local officials and members of clergy are
the subject of "Terrorist Photo Album" forms? Please provide me with their names.
(3) What were the periods of Mr. Varelli's employment by the FBI and the total
value of his compensation?
(4) Which FBI official was in charge of the investigation that Mr. Varelli was par-
ticipating in? To whom did that official report to?
(5) Was Mr. Varelli provided with internal FBI memoranda, letters, telexes, etc?
If so, please specify.
(6) I understand that the investigation may have, in early 1983, changed from an
intelligence investigation to a terrorism investigation. Is this correct? If so, who
made that decision and why?
(7) What was the reason for Mr. Flanagan's termination from the FBI?
(8) I understand that Mr. Flanagan may be the subject of a current FBI investiga-
tion. Is that true and could you describe the nature of the investigation?
(9) Did Mr. Flanagan provide Mr. Varelli with the names and/or photographs of
individuals to be the subject of a "Terrorist Photo Album" form?
(10) Once completed by Mr. Varelli, what was the disposition within the FBI of
these "Terrorist Photo Album" forms?
(11) Did Mr. Varelli provide, with or without FBI guidance or knowledge, informa-
tion to El Salvador officials, including National Guard officials, the names of private
citizens, elected officials, clergy, nuns, etc., who would be travelling to El Salvador?
If so, please provide me with the names and dates of such communications.
I would appreciate a timely response to this inquiry.
PAT SCHROEDER,
Congresswoman.
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3. Da. V4 P:.4 of aHn
Jul 0th. 1940 Portland Oregon.
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PATRICIA S HROEDER
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Washington, DC.
--------- --............. ....
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Member of The House of Representatives
US Congress.DEMOCRAT - Colorado au Tr.n ------------
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socw se w.y No.
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? 16'T.ana1 .aa41 m..-SANTITNTRTA-Memiot/ en;niston.W P.ean Agent of Influence.
17. NaroweW am.."
Married to James Schroeder. She has two children. Degree from Harvard.
She is openly working on behalf of the Sandinista Goverment in the US.
through the NNSNP and CISPES. The NNSNP is The National Network in -
Solidarity With the Nicaraguan People. It uses at times the name of
Nicaragua Network. Schroeder is actively raising-money for the Sandi-
nistas. Schroeder is involved in operation HAND (Humanitarian. Aid for
Nicaraguan Democracy). She has ties with other pro-Sandinistas member:
of Congress: Tip O'Neill, Christopher Dodd, Michael Barnes, Ed Boland,
Edward Kennedy, Ron Dellums. WARNING. She could be the target of right
wing groups. Strong resentment in right wing circles in the US and El
Salvador against her (Schroeder). Advise if she travels abroad.
SECRET SECRET . SECRET
?
oric. a gem
DALLAS, TEXAS.
F.. No. 6Wa. No.
El Salvadoran Terrorism
EL SALVADOR'S TERRORISM
FBI DALLAS
BY:
Da. ft"..
2-2-191
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CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
New York, NY, April 1, 1987.
Re Webster Confirmation Hearings. _
JOHN ELLIFF,
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. ELLIFF: Enclosed please find a summary of our testimony before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, concerning a suspicious pattern of burglaries and government intelligence
gathering directed at groups and individuals dissenting from administration Central
American policies. Also enclosed is a short piece we did specifically questioning
Webster's role in these activities.
We would very much appreciate your distribution of this material to committee
members and its inclusion in the record of the William Webster confirmation hear-
ings.
Very truly yours,
MARGARET RATNER,
Education Director.
MICHAEL RATNER,
Legal Director.
CONFIRMING A GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW
The rush to lend bi-partisan support to the nomination of William Webster as the
new head of the CIA must not prevent serious pre-confirmation investigations into
the record of FBI abuses which have occurred during Mr. Webster's tenure, and also
into the relationship between the FBI and the National Security Council during
Oliver North's tenure on the NSC staff.
Only two weeks ago, Congressman Don Edwards' Subcommittee on Civil and Con-
stitutional Rights held hearings on the subject of FBI surveillance of groups opposed
to the administration's Central America policies. The hearings showed that the FBI
is currently engaged in a massive spying operation directed against such groups.
For example, documents received under the Freedom of Information Act indicate
that 24 FBI field offices spent over five years in a deep, intrusive investigation of
the Committee In Solidarity With The People Of El Salvador (CISPES). This investi-
gation was initiated without a scintilla of evidence that CISPES was engaged in any
criminal conduct. Moreover, the six years of spying failed to turn up any criminal
activity. Today, as in the time of Hoover, disagreeing with administration policies
may be sufficient to trigger government surveillance.
FBI files are also maintained on other major groups opposing administration poli-
cies in Central America. Intrusive techniques, discredited in the Nixon years, are
freely employed by FBI agents. Informants are paid to join organizations, and ac-
cording to one ex-FBI employee, warrantless burglaries, entrapment, and efforts to
destroy dissenting groups were not only contemplated, but encouraged.
Moreover, Congressman Edwards suspects that some of the FBI investigations
may have been instigated by. North who, as an NSC staff member, was the- head of
an inter-agency counter-terrorism group that included representatives from the FBI.
It is more than likely that North directed aspects of FBI intelligence gathering. Ex-
ecutive Order 12333 on foreign intelligence designates the NSC "as the highest Ex=
ecutive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance of, and direction to the con-
duct of national foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence, and special activities, and
attendant policies and programs." . . -
These revelations are unsettling to those who care about protecting dissent in
America. They raise serious questions about FBI activity that must be answered
before Mr. Webster can be confirmed.
In the 60s and 70s there was much talk about ending FBI spying on groups en-
gaged in lawful dissent, and after revelations of the widespread spying against the
anti-war movement, domestic national security investigations were sharply limited.
Today, however, FBI documents show that similar investigation of similar opposi-
tion groups are carried out under a new, and as yet unfettered, denomination
known as "foreign counter-intelligence." This new category of investigation circum-
vents the limitations placed on domestic spying-the targets and the techniques,
however, remain the same.
In addition to investigations of organizations, individuals who travel to Nicaragua,
visit "unfriendly" embassies or even attend anti-contra meetings, receive visits from
the FBI. Travelers, moreover, are often subjected to harassment at Customs by both
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FBI and Customs officials. Address books and other private material are seized. To
date, the FBI has refused to stop the practice of retaining such materials in its files.
In April 1985, Mr. Webster defended the practice of interviewing travelers, and re-
vealed for the first time that many of the interviews were the result of "specific
taskings" from the National Security Council.
Mr. Webster denies that the FBI has had anything to do with the 58 documented
burglaries directed against groups involved in dissent on Central America which
were also the subject of the House subcommittee hearings. The evidence is substan-
tial, however, that these burglaries are politically motivated and that mailing lists
and private papers were the objects sought. Whether the FBI is involved or not, it
has the legal authority and the obligation to investigate. Mr. Webster has refused to
do so, except in the most cursory fashion.
Spying on groups opposed to the administration's Central America policies is just
one aspect of the FBI s broad intelligence gathering activities. However, these inves-
tigations demonstrate that some hard questions ought to be asked of Mr. Webster.
We ought to find out what domestic intelligence "taskings" were carried out by the
FBI under the direction of North, and what broader relationship, if any, the FBI
had to North's lawlessness? Does Webster believe that the Constitution does not
apply to certain types of investigations, or that incantations of the words "terror-
ism' or "foreign intelligence" override treasured rights? Accordinq. to President
Reagan, Mr. Webster "understands the meaning of the `rule of law,' ' but we don't
know what Mr. Webster's view of the law is. We do know that under Webster, the
FBI operated under an executive order that suspended the warrant requirement for
foreign intelligence investigations. There are many that think that such an execu-
tive order, and activities pursuant to it, run afoul of the Bill of Rights.
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY OF THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Evidence collected by the Center For Constitutional Rights establishes that over
the last six years the FBI has engaged in massive surveillance of organizations and
persons opposed to administration policies in Central America. Files have been
maintained on scores, if not hundreds, of such groups. There are 17 volumes of FBI
files on the Committee In Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) alone.
One FBI document in our possession shows that FBI offices in 23 different cities
were conducting surveillance of CISPES. Each of these offices has its own CISPES
files.
Another document shows how the CISPES investigation was used to provide a
window to spy on other groups, such as the Network in Solidarity with the Guate-
malan People (NISGUA), the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan
People (NNSNP), the Central American Mobilization Coalition (CAMC) (Pittsburgh),
the Thomas Merton Center (Pittsburgh) and the New England Central American
Network (NECAN) (Boston).
All of the extremely intrustive spying techniques-which we thought had been fi-
nally discredited in the wake of the Watergate scandal-continue to be employed
against administration opponents, including the use of informers and infiltrators,
burglaries, interrogations, disruption, wire-tapping, overreaching border searchers
by Customs and the FBI, IRS audits, and mail surveillance.
These techniques are utilized against groups and individuals who are not even
suspected of crimes. In the five-year investigation of CISPES, not a scintilla of evi-
dence was developed to link the organization with criminal activity. CISPES was
simply treated as an "enemy" because of its opposition to U.S. intervention in Cen-
tral America.
We believe that the FBI is functioning as a "thought police." The massive pro-
gram of spying on dissenters, however, comes as no surprise to observers of Presi-
dent Reagan. This administration took office on a platform that promised increased
emphasis on intelligence activities. It should be remebered that one of Reagan's ear-
liest acts upon taking office was to pardon two ex-FBI agents who were convicted of
authorizing illegal burglaries. A Heritage Foundation report, requested by the ad-
ministration, recommended a harder line against domestic opposition groups, and
asserted that the FBI should be permitted to conduct break-ins without warrants. In
1981 President Reagan issued a new executive order governing the intelligence
agencies which authorized surveillance of Americans who are neither suspected of a
crime nor of being foreign agents. The order specifically gives the FBI broad author-
ity to engage in warrantless burglaries against Americans and allows the placement
of undercover agents in domestic groups.
It is against this background that the pattern of break-ins must be evaluated. [See
attached lists.] Our office has documented 58 burglaries directed against individuals
and organizations which oppose administration Central American policies. All in-
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volve a similar modus operandi: nothing of value is taken, although items of value
are readily available; the intruders are familiar with the victims' schedules, and the
locations of offices and files; the files that apparently attract attention contain
membership lists, donor lists, lists of refugees given sanctuary, etc.; and files are ob-
viously rifled and left strewn about. In only one incident was a perpetrator arrested
and convicted.
Frank Varelli, an ex-FBI operative, states that the FBI engaged in burglaries
against Dallas CISPES, giving further confirmation to our view that the govern-
ment may be responsible for some or all of these burglaries. Other factors create a
strong presumption that these burglaries are not carried out by ordinary criminals:
there is no pecuniary motive; they are geographically widespread and follow a defi-
nite pattern; and the targets are a specific category of groups and individuals. More-
over, the FBI claims it has the legal authority to commit burglaries and, coinciden-
tally, it is investigating many of the groups which have been burglarized.
We recommend that the gathering of intelligence about groups and individuals
opposed to adminisrtration Central America policies be stopped: FBI visits should be
authorized only when linked to criminal activities; Customs and the FBI should be
prohibited from using the border search exemption to the Fourth Amendment to
gather intelligence; the IRS and the Postal Service must not be allowed to harass
and gather intelligence about administration "enemies;" infiltration of domestic
groups involved in lawful political activity should not be permitted; unconsented
physical searches must be linked to criminal investigations and should not be per-
mitted without a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate on a finding of probable
cause.
We also recommend congressional investigations and the possible appointment of
a special prosecutor to look into: the infiltration of CISPES; the intelligence activi-
ties being conducted under E.O. 12333, including the possible misused of the coun-
terintelligence classification to avoild legal constraints and congressional oversight;
and the burglaries directed at groups opposed to administration policies.
ORGANIZATIONS BURGLARIZED
Amnesty International .......................................................................... Los Angeles, CA.
Arlington Street Church ........................................................................ Boston, MA.
Casa de la Esperanza .............................................................................. Washington, DC.
Casa del Pueblo ....................................................................................... Washington, DC.
Central American Information Office ................................................. Cambridge, MA.
Central American Solidarity Assoc ..................................................... Cambridge, MA.
Centro Presente ....................................................................................... Cambridge, MA.
Comite de Refugiados Salvadorenos .................................................... Washington, DC.
Comite El Salvador ................................................................................. Washington, DC.
CISPES ...................................................................................................... Dallas, TX.
CISPES ...................................................................................................... Washington, DC.
Educators in Support of ANDES (CAPA) ........................................... Cambridge, MA.
First Congregation Church ................................................................... Cambridge, MA.
Guatemala News and Education Service ........................................... Oakland, CA.
Home for Peace and Justice .................................................................. Saginaw, MI.
International Center for Development Policy ................................... Washington, DC.
New England Central America Network ........................................... Cambridge, MA.
New Institute of Central America ....................................................... Cambridge, MA.
North America Congress on Latin America ...................................... New York, NY.
Old Cambridge Baptist Church ............................................................ Cambridge, MA.
Pico Rivera Methodist Church ............................................................. Pico Rivers, CA.
Reformed Christian Church .................................................................. Washington, DC.
Riverside Church ..................................................................................... New York, NY.
Sojourners ................................................................................................. Washington, DC.
St. Edmunds Episcopal Church ............................................................ Pacifica, CA.
St. Stephens Presbyterian Church ....................................................... Chatsworth, CA.
St. Williams Catholic Church ............................................................... Louisville, KY.
The Church of the Covenant ................................................................. Boston, MA.
Trinity Methodist Church ..................................................................... Berkeley, CA.
United Church of Santa Fe ................................................................... Santa Fe, NM.
United Methodist Church-Calvary ....................................................... Washington, DC.
University Christian Movement .......................................................... Cambridge, MA.
University Baptist Church ................................................................... Seattle, WA.
University Lutheran Church ................................................................ Berkeley, CA.
Wheadon United Church ....................................................................... Evanston, IL.
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AFFILIATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS WHOSE DWELLINGS WERE BURGLARIZED
Bainbridge-Nicaragua Association ....................................................... Kingston, WA.
Casa Nicaraguense .................................................................................. New York, NY.
Central American Refugee Project .................................. :................... Phoenix, AZ.
Central American Solidarity Committee ............................................ Lake Orion, MI.
CISPES ...................................................................................................... Washington, DC.
CISPES ...................................................................................................... New York, NY.
Homes for Peace and Justice ................................................................ Saginaw, MI.
New Institute of Central America ....................................................... Dorchester, MA.
Nicaragua Solidarity Network ............................................................. Washington, DC.
Sacred Heart Church ............................................................................ Nogales, TX.
United Methodist Church-U.N. Office ................................................ New York, NY.
Witness for Peace .................................................................................... New York, NY.
STATEMENT OF ESTHER HERST, LEGISLATIVE ADVISOR, NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST
REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION
Thank you for the opportunity to
present this statement regarding the nomina-
tion of William Webster to be Director of Central Intelligence. The National Com-
mittee Against Repressive Legislation is a civil liberties organization founded in
1960 as the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on UnAmerican
Activities. In 1970, recognizing the changing threats to First Amendment rights, we
became the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation. Throughout our
history, we have worked to protect constitutional rights of political association and
expression from legislative or other governmental restrictions.
Through a Freedom of Information Act request filed in 1975, we learned that
NCARL was the subject of a massive FBI "neutralization" campaign launched even
before our official founding and lasting through the 1960s. The full range of "dirty
tricks" were used against us-poison pen letters, break-ins, wiretaps, infiltrators,
and disruption of public meetings. Thanks to the work of the Church Committee, we
know that NCARL was only one of scores of organizations, engaged in absolutely
lawful, constitutionally protected political activities, which were targeted for harass-
ment and destruction by the FBI.
In response to the Church Committee's recommendations, then Attorney General
Edward Levi promulgated guidelines to control the domestic security investigative
activities of the FBI. These guidelines required, for the first time, a clear nexus be-
tween imminent criminal conduct and FBI investigations. Political spying decreased
markedly and the FBI became subject to meaningful executive and legislative over-
sight.
The role of Judge Webster as Director of the FBI was positive. As a man firmly
committed to the rule of law and conscious of the need to rebuild the FBI as an
effective non-political enforcement agency, he played a critical role in halting the
worst examples of the Hoover-era abuses of constitutional rights. In recent years
however, he has been under increased pressure to ease those controls and he has
bowed to those pressures in ways which cause NCARL serious concern.
The most drastic change in policy has been the revision of the Levi guidelines by
Attorney General William French Smith. The Smith guidelines significantly alter
the criminal standard and allow increased use of intrusive surveillance techniques.
The guidelines permit "preliminary inquires" into the activities of individuals or or-
ganizations, including physical surveillance, collection of newspaper clippings and
other publicly available documents, and recruitment and placement of informants
and infiltrators, where there is merly an allegation of possible future criminal activ-
ity. A fuller investigation, including mail openings and phone taps in addition to
undercover operations, may be initiated whenever there is "reasonable indication"
that persons are "engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or
social goals wholly or in part" through criminal conduct. As the guidelines them-
selves concede, this "reasonable indication" standard is substantially lower than
"probable cause" to believe a crime is about to be committed, the standard set for
searches and arrests under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. This week
standard is particularly troubling because federal statutes punishing speech such as
the Smith Act, though substantially repudiated by the Supreme Court, have not
been repealed by Congress, and hence serve as a convenient springboard for FBI in-
vestigations.
The guidelines provide that investigations are permissible when an individual has
merely advocated criminal activity.There need not be an imminent likelihood of
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24
criminal conduct occurring, even though such an immediate danger is necessary
before speech can constitutionally be labeled a crime. Once an organization is under
investigation based on the speech of one of its members, the guidelines allow the
FBI to collect information about all members who participate in its demonstrations,
about the structure of the organization as well as the relationship of the members,
and even about other organizations that cooperate with it. Even after an organiza-
tion has become inactive or no longer presents an "immediate threat of harm," the
FBI may continue surveillance and infiltration.
Separate, secret guidelines set forth standards for FBI foreign counterintelligence
investigations. Such standards have several extraordinary features: the standard for
initiating an investigation is itself classified; warrantless physical searches are per-
mitted; a secret court considers all electronic surveillance requests; special exemp-
tions exist protecting records from disclosure under the FOIA; special access is
available to telephone toll records and financial records. The focus of these investi-
gations is the collection of intelligence and not necessarily the prosecution of
crimes. Yet the definition of foreign intelligence agent is so broad that it can in-
clude peaceful domestic groups.
The practical effect of these new guidelines, including the classified foreign coun-
terintelligence guidelines, has been renewed attacks on political advocacy of contro-
versial positions. FBI agents have interviewed American citizens upon their return
from visits to Nicaragua and El Salvador. Agents have questioned the employers
and landlords of such citizens. The FBI has continued to build files on leading politi-
cal dissenters, such as Milwaukee Auxiliary Bishop Thomas Gumbleton and Seattle
Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen. An FBI agent even questioned an aide to Colora-
do Representative Patricia Schroeder regarding attendees at a church service held
in solidarity with Central American refugees. Most recently, the FBI turned over to
the INS results of an investigation into First Amendment protected activities of Pal-
estinian activists in Los Angeles, leading to attempts to deport those individuals.
Perhaps most ominous is recent testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Civil and Constitutional Rights which revealed a major FBI "neutralization"
effort against CISPES. Former FBI informant Frank Varelli claimed that he and
other agents infiltrated, burlarized, and tried to influence the activities of Texas-
based organizations working in opposition to U.S. policies in El Salvador. This testi-
mony gives support to the suspicions of many political activists that the rash of over
50 break-ins into organizations involved in Central America solidarity sanctuary
work was mastermined by the FBI.
These actions show an alarming disregard for the constitutional protections of po-
litical association and expression and for the rule of law under which the FBI must
operate in a democratic society. Clearly, Judge Webster must be held accountable
for current abuses of rights by the FBI. It is the responsibility of this Committee to
question him and others in order to ascertain the full truth of FBI excesses. Al-
though the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights is in-
vestigating under its oversight authority, the Senate Select Committee should sup-
plement the House investigation to determine if Judge Webster remains sensitive
enough to constitutional limitations on governmental powers to be entrusted with
the directorship of yet another secret agency.
NCARL is equally concerned that this Committee see these hearings as an oppor-
tunity to bring the CIA under meaningful Congressional controls. Clearly, the CIA
has been operating as a "rogue elephant," to see a characterization common to the
Church Committee era. The Administration has abetted the CIA's tendencies to
work in secret and without lawful authority by seeking ways to circumvent congres-
sional restrictions on military spending and on covert operations. Now is the time
for Congress to halt this trend towards unfettered intelligence agency misdeeds.
Plainly, these activities present a serious challenge to American democracy. The
philosophy, tactics, and powers of the intelligence agencies as they operated prior to
1976 and, apparently, during the past three or four years point clearly in the direc-
tion of a police state. The curbs on these practices which were put into effect after
the Church Committee and other revelations have not been adequate to control the
agency permanently. The appointment of a new Director or Central Intelligence
offers to Congress a valuable opportunity to reexamine current "controls" and to
add more meaningful restrictions to prevent future abuses.
The most important control would be a statutory definition of the role and pur-
pose of the CIA. Such a "charter" has proven impossible to pass in previous Con-
gresses and NCARL is under no illusions about the potential for approval at this
time. Still, this Committee can begin a charter process incrementally.
1. Prohibit-covert operations.-The proper function of the intelligence agencies is
to collect information, analyze it, and disseminate it to those who need it. When in-
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telligence agencies go beyond this, they are inevitably operating outside the rule of
law. CIA covert operations are designed to harass and destroy, through illegal meth-
ods that do not stop short of violence, individuals, groups, and even governments
perceived as political opponents. The CIA's covert actions have included bribery, ob-
taining publication of false information, training paramilitary groups, attempted as-
sassination, encouraging terrorism, and organizing plots to overthrow governments.
These operations not only violate international law, they have serious domestic con-
sequences including the spreading of false information and the corruption of aca-
demic, religious, and journalistic institutions.
Under no circumstances do these practices have a place in a civilized community.
If allowed to carry on such activities, intelligence agencies become a state within a
state, totally beyond public control. Nothing could be more dangerous for a demo-
cratic society or for the development of international law.
The fact that these activities have continued and have affected domestic political
opinion, despite Congressional bans on specific covert actions and requirements of
"timely" notice to Congressional committees, is an indication that those very
meager limitations are inadequate. Only a clear prohibition on such actions will
root out practices that are so destructive to the democratic process.
2. Collection of foreign intelligence within the US. and with respect to US. citi-
zens abroad should be subject to the same safeguards as collection of domestic intelli-
gence.-The government has frequently contended that in the area of foreign intelli-
gence the inherent powers of the executive branch are greater, the constitutional
limitations are lesser, and the legislative restrictions required are fewer. This dis-
tinction is unsound and the conclusions drawn from it are dangerous. The position
is based on the assumption that in the area of foreign intelligence the rights of
Americans are less involved than in the area of domestic intelligence. With the ex-
ception of operations conducted abroad not related to American citizens, this as-
sumption is unfounded. The fact that the classified foreign counterintelligence
guidelines have been the basis for ongoing FBI (and perhaps CIA) investigations of
American citizens engaged in lawful political dissent illustrates why it should not be
permissible to make different rules for the conduct of foreign and domestic intelli-
gence. Except for activities in foreign countries which do not affect American citi-
zens, the standards of protection for Americans, not foreigners, should govern.
3. Adequate controls to enforce legislation governing the intelligence agencies re-
quires measures for accountability, internal oversight, and external oversight.-Ac-
countability requires a system of record-keeping and reporting. Significant decisions,
such as the decision to initiate an investigation, should be recorded in writing, with
the facts and reasons given, by the official responsible. Ad-hoc and periodic reports
should be required. The objective is to create a "paper trail" by which individual
responsibility can be assigned and the basis for review made available. Internal
oversight should extend beyond ordinary methods of supervision by superior offi-
cials in the line of authority. The best method of securing an independent check of
performance is probably an inspector-general system. In addition, departmental
heads, or similar officials, should exercise oversight through control of the budget
and other devices. Some method of oversight by persons totally outside the agencies
is essential. While legislative committees have not been very effective in the past, it
may be possible to improve their performance. A board of overseers composed of
prominent persons outside the government, if given adequate staff, could perform
an adequate oversight function. The General Accounting Office, which is independ-
ent of the executive branch and possesses a staff trained in investigating the govern-
ment bureaucracy, might be most effective. Any such oversight agency should, of
course, have full access to all agency operations and complete power to investigate
complaints or institute an inquiry on its own.
This machinery for securing compliance with legislative restrictions can operate
successfully only in a context marked by maximum possible openness, including
publication of budgets, protection for "whistleblowers," encouragement of investiga-
tive reporting, and public concern to know what is going on.
In conclusion, we urge this Committee to use these recommendations as the basis
for questions to Judge Webster in order to learn his views of covert operations, the
relationship between foreign counterintelligence and the rights of American citi-
zens, and appropriate mechanisms for effective oversight and accountability. If his
answers do not reflect adequate understanding of the problems and a sensitivity to
the demands for political freedom within our democratic society, we urge the Com-
mittee to disapprove this nomination.
These recommendations should also become the foundation for legislation, drafted
and ultimately enacted through this Committee. History has shown that only when
there is public attention focused on the misdeeds of intelligence agencies is it possi-
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26 ~.
ble to legislate even cautious limitations. In light of the current Iran-Contra affair
and the renewed press, public, and Congressional interest in the workings of the in-
telligence community, now is the -best ble time to enact positive reforms and
meaningful controls.
NCARL hopes that you will take advantage of the opportunities before you. We
will continue to offer advice and assistance in the passage of legislation to finally
bring the U.S. intelligence community under the rule of law.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES J. ZOGBY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE
The nomination of William Webster as Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency is of great concern to Arabs and Arab Americans.
From the earliest period of his tenure as Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, he has shown little regard for Arab American rights or sensitivities.
The ABSCAM affair, for example, was a great insult to Arabs. However, this fact
was lost on Mr. Webster despite our frequent protests and personal meetings with
him. In addition, he remains unapologetic for the FBI's unconscienable use of an
"Arab" to bait politicians into crime.
Mr. Webster has displayed a cavalier attitude to civil rights as evidenced by the
FBI's repeated assaults on the rights of Arab and Arab American political activists
during the past nine years. In 1982 I met with senior officials of the FBI and pre-
sented them with affidavits from 90 Arab and Arab American political activists in
southern California. They complained of FBI harassment, including late night visi-
tations and interrogations as to their political involvement and activities.
At the same time I presented to these officials over 12 complaints from California
Arab Americans of instances of physical violence or threats of violence against
them. Today, eighteen months after the murder of Alex Odeh, southern California
Arab American and political leader, the case remains unsolved. And, while little or
no progress has been made in the Odeh case, we now learn that the FBI has, for the
last year, been conducting an "intensive investigation" into the political activity of
Palestinians in southern California.
The question I asked of Mr. Webster's FBI then, I ask now: why so much empha-
sis on the infringement of the political rights of Arabs and Arab Americans, and so
little emphasis on protecting their rights?
As CIA Director, Mr. Webster will have greater resources, be further removed
from public scrutiny, and oversee a world-wide operation with direct or indirect con-
tact with 21 Arab nations.
Contrary to what President Reagan has asserted in recent press statements, the
United States' standing in the Arab world is at an all time low. Following the sign-
ing of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Accord, intelligence agencies of a number of friendly
Arab governments, decided to limit contact with the U.S. for fear of security
breaches.
U.S. behavior during and after Israel's 1982 invasion and occupation of Lebanon,
coupled with recent revelations of the Pollard spy case and the U.S.-Israel-Iran scan-
dal all have done little to alleviate Arab fears and growing distrust of the ability of
the U.S. to work with them as a trusted friend and ally.
All this should be of great concern to our government since, while we have exten-
sive interests in the Middle East, we are increasingly becoming more isolated in the
region. As both the 1982 Lebanon War and the U.S.-Israel-Iran scandal show, our
penchant for relying on Israeli intelligence and our attachment to Israeli interests
in the Middle Easts are dangerous both to the peace and stability of the region and
to our own national security interests as well.
It is in this context that I feel we should judge the nomination of William Web-
ster. I know from government and leading non-government sources that our friends
in the Arab world have been deeply disturbed by Mr. Webster's behavior in both the
ABSCAM episode and in the instances of harassment of Arab American political ac-
tivists.
In a period when we desperately need to mend our badly damaged image and re-
lations with the Arab states, I am not certain that an uncritical acceptance of Mr.
Webster's nomination is the correct signal we ought to send to our friends in that
region.
Chairman BOREN. Also, I would like to enter at this point into
the record for consideration by the Committee, the background and
financial disclosure statement filed by Judge Webster with the
committee, pursuant to committee rule 5.6. And I would also men-
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tion that the committee has taken action to authorize the Chair-
man to release unclassified excerpts of the testimony of Attorney
General Meese before the Select Committee on Intelligence during
the preliminary inquiry into the sale of arms to Iran and possible
diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan resistance. And without objec-
tion, this testimony by Attorney General Meese before the commit-
tee will be entered into the record at this point.
[The document referred to follows:]
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ve m.. ,si
IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS #28 and #34
Financial Disclosure Report
~ New Entrant, Nominee, Termination
1 bent IX I or Candidate ~ Filer
Last Name
Posilionlsl Held With the Federal
Government During the Preceding 17
Months ((1 Not Soma ea Above)
Presidential Nominees
Subject to
Senate Confirmation
I ad o - Oil, o,m ahe I ndaall .,,.had
dYe
smchedlesare tree. complete and
to the heel of my knowledge
Other Review
It desired by agency)
The information contained in this
report discloses no conflict of interest
ender applicable laws and regulations.
Office of
Government Ethics
Use Only
Senate Select Committee on
T tell'
William H.
Deparbnem or Agency (//Applicablol
Announced.
119117
Ma tar h
Tenninahon Date ((f Applarab(e)
(Monte, Day. Yearl
Incumbents: Complete Schedules A, B. C. and Part I of D. The
reporting period is the preceding calendar year except for Part
II of Schedule C and Part I of Schedule 0 where you must also
Include any positions held or agreements or arrangements made
from the beginning of the filing year until the dale you file.
Termination Filers: Complete Schedules A, B, C, and Part I
of D. The reporting period begins at the end of the period cov-
ered by your previous filing and ends at the date of termination.
Nominees, New Entrants and Candidates for President and
Vice President: Complete Schedules A, C. and D. (Candidates
1O0) not file Part II of Schedule D.) -
Schedule A-The reporting period for Income (BLOCK C) and
Transactions Test (BLOCK D) is the preceding calendar year
and the current calendar year up to the date of filing. Value
assets in BLOCK Bas of any date you choose that is within
31 days of the date of filing.
? Schedule C, Part I (Liabilities)-The reporting period is the
preceding calendar year and the current calendar year up to.
any date you choose that is within 31 days of the date of filing.
? Schedule C, Part II (Agreements and Arrangements)-Show
any agreements or arrangements as of the date of filing.
? Schedule O-The reporting period is the preceding two
calendar years and the current calendar year up to the date
of filing.
(Chad boo it comm- are contincae on ihr rreerm side) _ El
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nevoning I,,rv,av& s Name
William It. Webster
Page
Number
Schedule
A
All Filers: In BLOCK A report (a) the
Identity of each asset held for the produc
tion of i come at the close of the reporting
All Filers: In BLOCK 8 report
the value of each
set li
t
d i
All Filers: In BLOCK C report the type and amount income exceeding
more
I
e
b
d Ter
tion
i
period d which had fair
market
u
as
s
e
n
sources of income d in You must
received from the assets and other sources of ncome listed n BLOCK A. You must re-
re-
rr
um
an
e
na
m
-ding any
ther
asset
(bl
f i
hi
h
BLOCK A which had a fair mar
Pon the actual amount of any income not of a type specifically noted below. You need
iv
Filers only: In BLOCK D, for
source o
ncome w
c
generated over
$100 in income during the re
orting period
bet value exceeding $1000 at the
not report the actual amount of our spouse's earned income, only the source in BLOCK
y
nds,
od property, stocks, bo
any
p
.
This includes but is not Ilmited to em-
close of the re ortin
p g period.
A. You may not check "qualified trust" unless you have a blind trust which has been
u
m
commodities futures and Cher
plovers, stocks, bonds, tax shelters, bank
t
l
l f
specifically approved by the Office of Government Ethics. If you, our spouse or de n-
securities fisted in BLOCK A,
ou
did
accoun
s, rea
property, mutua
unds,
pensions
IRA sets
assets of certain
dent child are the beneficiary of a trust which no one of you created anhas no know!-
Y
y
chan
e the
ll
e
h
.
,
trusts, commodities sutures, personal bust-
edge of the assets, refer to the instructions to see if it qualifies as an "excepted trust."
g
purc
, or
x
ase, se
item during the reporting period
esses and partnership interests. Exclude
l
'
If "none" for less than $101) is checked under Category of Amount of Income, no other
for a value that exceeds $10007
your persona
rea unles you rent
t ence out
See nstructions for rules on bank
entries need be made in BLOCK C for that item.
.
accounts and complex h holdins.
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
BLOCK C
BLOCK D
Assets & Income Sources
Valuation of Assets
Income
Transactions
Test
Identif
each
ss
d i
t
"a txl
Type of Income 1%1
Category of Amount of Income (xl
II
y
a
e
an
ncome source
of yours, your spouselS) and VOL"
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8
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for
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p
YES NO
s
Eaa % V Z Common
OC
ples Doe Jones a Sm,Ih, 4_.&1own, USA
_
P,nr ,P
$50,000
Chemtech Industries
X
X
X
X
D.O.V.E. Equipment
X
X
X
X
Gould
X
X
X
X
Quick Point Pencil Co.
X
X
X
X
FMC Corp. (New)
X
X
X
X
6
AT&T
_
X
_
X
X
X
American Information
X
X
Tech
X
b
Burlington No.
X
X
X
Bell Atlantic
X
X
X
Ha ton
X
X
X
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William H. Webster
All Filers: In BLOCK A report (a) the
-
identity of each asset held for the produc
f th
e
t
l
All Filers: In BLOCK B report
All Filers: In BLOCK C report the type and amount of income exceeding $100 or more
Incumbents and Termination
g
e r
por
i
ose o
trop of income at the c
period which had a fair market value ex-
the value of each asset listed in
received from the assets and other sources of income listed in BLOCK A. You must re-
only: In BLOCK D, for
Filers
$1000 and Ibl ny other asset
ceeding
BLOCK A which had a fair mar-
port the actual amount of any income not of a type specifically noted below. You need
stocks, bond,,
any real property
or source of income which generated over
ket value exceeding $1000 at the
not report the actual amount of our spouse's earned income, only the source in BLOCK
your
,
futures and the,
$100 in income during the reporting period.
This includes but is not limited to em
dose of the reporting period.
A. You may not check "qualified trust" unless you have a blind trust which has been
securities listed in BLOCK A.
plovers, stocks, bonds, tax shelters, bank
specifically appfoved by the Office of Government Ethics. II you, your spouse or depen-
did you
accounts, real property, mutual funds,
dent child are the beneficiary of a trust which no one of you created and has no knowl-
sell, or exchange the
purchase,
pensions, IRA assets, assets of certain
ersonal husi-
i
f
ures
di
ad a of the assets, refer to the instructions to a" it it qualifies as an "excepted trust."
9
item during the reporting period
es
u
, p
trusts, commo
t
nesses and partnership interests. Ex dude
If "none" (or less than $101) is checked under Category of Amount of Income, no other
for a value that exceeds $1000?
ce
ren if
fnless
r p
ou
oOic r sid n
yo
entries need be made in BLOCK C for that item.
f
n
bank
u
See
ei
i
accounts and complex holdings.
BLOCK D
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
BLOCK C
Transactions
Assets & Income Sources
Valuation of Assets
Income
Test
c?
uao,r
of v.
m. I X
I
Type
of ins
ane I
xl
Cates
nry of
Amou
nt of I
ncome
I X I
Actual
if r?`. LO'^P.-
Identify each asset and income source
ousel$) and
f
our s
r
our
o,ner
Amount
f Date
rr.l
afo
ow
vv ma a rcovxlef
p
o
you
s, y
y
xndent child IDCI
de
_
8
oo
S8
00
.o
?
i
-
Y:
I el
;
Only i(
'
.,
.
Onl 1
y i
nciualn , use cola
f
: o
.
l
$
otR
6 8
n
o r
o
'-
o
1: 2
~
~
T rpe)
-
?o
O ?
^Omer
ifi
d
Honoraria
or
.:.
NONE ^
x
o
-
Ii
Spec
e
YES
NO
S
xv Z
.
C_oni_ reon
Ese
x
-
y
_
_
050.000
Edison Bros.
-
Exxon
Fluor
X
X
X
Handyman Corp.
X
X
X
X
X
Mobil Corp.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
NYNEX Corp.
X
Pacific Gas & Electric
X
X
X
X
e
Pacific Telesis Group
X
X
X
X
Manpower Inc. (formerly
X
X
X
X
Parker Pull
-
-
I
-
--- ----
to
TO
'
X
X
? i I..
SOUL hw,:i I. ~~ Is..I 1?
I ::
,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
Page
Number
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
Page
Number
Schedule
A
All. Filers: In LOCK report (a) the
identity of each asset held for the produc-
Lion of income at the close of the re
orting
All Filers: In BLOCK B report
All Filers: In BLOCK C report g
the type and amount of income exceeding $ or more
t
period with had a fair market a e ex-
the value of each asset listed in
received from the assets and other sources of income listed in BLOCK A
You must re-
In mbents
aIM Termination
ceedieg EI000 and Ibl any other asset
BLOCK A which had a fair mar
.
port the actual amount of any income not of a type
noted below
YOU need
Flee Only:
Filers In BLOCK D, for
ource of Income which generated over
$100 in income during the reportng penod.
kei value exceeding $1000 at the
.
not report the actual amount of earned income, , only
your spouse's earncome, othe source in BLOCK
any real property, stocks, bonds,
This includes but is not Ilmited to -
close of the reporting period.
A. You may not check "qualified trust" unless you have a blind trust which has been
commodities futures and other
plovers, stocks, bonds, tax shelters, bank
specifically approved by the Office of Government Ethics. If you
your spouse or depen-
securities listed in BLOCK A.
accounts, real property, mutual funds,
pensions, IRA assets, assets of certain
,
dent child are the beneficiary of a trust which no one of you created and has no knowl-
Y
did you
purchase
sell
or exchange the
trusts, commodities futures, personal busi-
edge of the assets, refer to the instructions to see if it qualities as an "excepted trust.
,
,
item during the reporting period
nesses and partnership interests. Exclude
unless
ou rent it
u ' perso
si
Ce
II "none" (or less than $101) is checked under Category of Amount of Income, no other
for a value that exceeds $1000?
y
instru
ons
f
ut. See on bank
uses
entries need be made in BLOCK C for that item.
accounts and complex holdings.
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
BLOCK C
BLOCK D
Assets & Income Sources
Valuation of Assets
Income
Transactions
Test
Identif
each asset and income sou
c
C.
..eo,r
of v
.lu. 1
x1
Tyre
of In
ane
I x I
Categ
ory of
Amo
unt of
Inc-
,
y
r
e
Of
yours, your spouse(S) and your
-
c g
?
_
Y
F
Deer
actual
Amount
Dam
(M
Y
D
l
' v.+ complete
srnd. a P.,t I
dependent child WC).
_
o
?
O
i
?
-
-
Ipal
1vp
ct
.1
$ S
.
"
O.,
r.
r.
Only if
n< mO1 `
NONE E]
-
-
ir
o
c
c;
Oee:
s
iti
d
Honoraria
o
e
pec
YES NO
S
a X Y 2 Common
.m
E
x
l
X
a
DC
des' __ -SA -
Doe Jones x Smie, Hometown, U
-
_
x
A
_
-
-
-
-
-
- hp - .
lnco.
omnno
550.000
X
X
U.S. West,Inc.
X
X
X
X
Metropolitan Fed. S&L
X
X
X
X
Boatmen's National Ban
(3)
X
X
X
X
265 Acre farm-Williams
ur
,M
.
X
Farming
$12,300
X
American Security Bank
X
X
X
X
Calloway Bank
X
X
X
X
,
ASB Money Market Fund
X
X
X
X
Proctor 6 Gamble
X
X
X
X
X
I
X
American Brand!;
X
X
Xerox
X
X
-
X
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
a,l
,a?a M.~y.~.
a III.
Page
Number
All Filers: In BLOCK A report la) the
identity of each asset held for the produc
f
h
i
All Filers: In BLOCK 8 report
All Filers: In BLOCK C report the type and amount of income exceeding $100 or more
bents and Termination
I
t
lion of income at the close o
orh.ng
e ra e~ue
lair
market
hick
had a
pen
od
w
the value of each asset listed in
received from the assets and other sources of income listed in BLOCK A. You must re-
ncum
File- only: In BLOCK D, for
and
Ibl a
other asset
ceedi
ng
000
E1
BLOCK A which had a fair mar
port the actual amount of any income not of a type specifically noted below. You need
any real property, stocks, bonds,
or source of income which generated over
hot value exceeding $1000 at the
not report the actual amount of your spouse's earned income, only the source in BLOCK
commodities futures and other
$100 in income during the reporting period.
This includes but is not limited to em
close of the reporting period.
A. You may not check "qualified trust' unless you have a blind trust which has been
Y Y
securities listed BLOCK A,
plovers, stocks, bonds, tan shelters, bank
specifically approved by the Office of Government Ethics. If you, your spouse or depen-
did you
accounts, real property, mutual funds,
dent child are the beneficiary of a trust which no one of you created and has no knowl-
purchase, sell, or exchange the
pensions, IRA assets, assets of certain
l
i
i
di
f
edge of the assets, refer to the instructions to see it it qualifies as an "excepted trust."
item during the reporting period
us
utures, persona
trusts, commo
t
es
muse, and partnership interests. Exclude
If "none" (or less than $101) is checked under Category of Amount of Income, no other
for a value that exceeds $10001
nt it
ess
your p
sg
e a e
It re
r
s
press
entries need be made in BLOCK C for that item.
mi I.
ee
le
ba
nk
on
to
n
Iru
o
accounts and complex holdings.
BLOCK D
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
BLOCK C
Transactions
Assets & Income Sources
Valuation of Assets
Income
Test
Cu
.gory
of v.
lu. Ix
l
Type
of Inc
ase I
xl
Catego
ry o1
Amou
nt of I
ncome
ixl
Actual
u ne 00"0101?
1
Identify each asset and income source
Other
Amount
Oat.
d. B t'err i for
SCI
t^
'
of yours, your spouselS) and your
= o
S $
$
i
-
F
I
.: $
o
o 0
o g
.~?
$
;
only it
lMO., Oar, Yr.l
Onl
1f
o?? ????
?
dependent child (DC).
80
8?
o?
J
B:
dF
T psi
vpal
gn
1
lago
j
? 8
8
on
an
e
s
y
Hpnp-da
NONE D
I
c
e
YES
ru0
S
ExaxYzf-Ton _
--
_
-
x
-x
x
x
Ales. Doe Jmos it Smit^, Hori a inn, USA
merican Home Products
X
X
X
X
Missouri Lincoln
X
X
X
X
a
Colgate Palmolive
X
X
X
X
a
Delta Air Lines
X
X
X
X
rimes Mirror
X
X
X
X
e
i ital E ui . Coro.
X
X
BNB
Institutional Liquid As
et
X
X
X
X
e
ercantile Bancorp Inc.
X
X
X
X
-ontinental Corp.
X
X
X
X
I
-
---
------
-
-cncr~ l Mot ut :,
X
I
X
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
Reporting Individual's Name
William H. Webster
Page
Number
All Filers: In BLOCK A report la) the
identity of each asset held for the produc
of income at the close of the re orting
All Filers: In BLOCK 8 re ort
p
All
All Filers: In BLOCK C report the type and amount of income exceeding $100 or more
period hich had a fair market va ue ex
w
the value of each asset listed in
received from the assets and other sources of income listed in BLOCK A. You must re-
Inambenb and Termination
$1000 and (b) any other asset
ceeding
BLOCK A which had a fair mar-
port the actual amount of any income not of a type specifically noted below. You need
File. only: In BLOCK D. for
source of income which generated over
$100 in income durin
the re
ortin
eriod
let value exceeding $1000 at the
not report the actual amount of your
y spouse's earned income, only the source in BLOCK
any real property, stocks, bonds,
g
p
g p
.
This includes but s not limited to em
close of the reporting period.
A. You may not check "qualified trust" unless you have a blind trust which has been
y y
commodities futures and other
plovers, stocks, bonds, tax shelters, bank
specifically approved by the Office of Government Ethics. If you
your spouse or depen-
securities listed in BLOCK A.
accounts, real assepertymutual fund s,
pensions, IRA ts, assets of certain
,
dent child are the beneficiary of a trust which no one of you created and has no knowl-
did ou
y
purchase, sell, or exchange the
trusts, commodities futurs, personal busi
edge of the assets, refer to the instructions to see if it qualities as an "excepted trust."
item during the reporting period
and partnership interests Exclude
ur
Ifs none" (or less than $101) is checked under Category of Amount of Income, no other
fora value that exceeds $1000?
personal residence unless you rent it
yo
out. See instructions for rules on bank
entries need be made in BLOCK C for that item.
accounts and complex holdings.
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
BLOCK C
BLOCK D
Assets & Income Sources
Valuation of Assets
Income
Transactions
Test
Id
if
h
d i
Ca
te
u.lx
l
Type
vl In
come
1x1
categ
ory of
Amou
nt of
Incom
e IXI
f Ye+ eomp
If
ncome source
ent
y eac
asset an
of yours, your spouselS) and your
dependent child IDCI.
= o
0 0
_
v
? -
P -
Omer
I
1-i
-
?o
Amount
dnw if
Dete
(Me"
OaY.
Yr.l
`afor
5c?rnom.sse
fua;^
nc
P o;
1.
61.
S
..
1
u a
B:
Tpal
TYPe)
c; 8
0 8
"Omer"
onlyi
t
Honor
ria
or ou.
NONE El
Z=
.-
Sw ifiee
o
YES NO
S
E.am. X Y Z Common
x
ples: pge Jones is iiW . Hometown. USA
--
--
-
-
-
_
_
-
-
-
_
-
-
- - - -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Sep ppe _
- - - -
- - -
- -
Dow Chemical
X
X
X
x
x
x
Monsanto
x
General Electric
X
X
X
X
Caterpillar Tractor
x
x
X
Cyprus Minerals
X
X
x
Amoco Corp.
X
____
x
X
X
Avon Products
X
x
e
F.W. Woolworth
X
x
-
X
x
3
California 5.5 Bonds
B/1/H7)
-
_
x
Due
(
American Seed ty link
X
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
neponing Individual's Name
William H. Webster
Page
Number
Schedule
A
All Filers: In BLOCK A report Jai the
Identity of each asset held for the prod-
tion or income at the close of the re orting
All Filers: In BLOCK B report
All Filers: In BLOCK C report the type and amount of income exceedin $100 or more
9
period which had a fair market g re ex
the value of each asset listed in
received from the assets and other sources of income listed in BLOCK A. You must (a
and Termination
Int
'
ceeding $1000 and fbl any other asset
BLOCK A which had a fair mar-
port the actual amount of any income not of a type
y i ype specifically noted below. You need
natty
for
BLOCK D,
only:
or source of income which generated over
$100 in income durin
the re
ortin
eriod
ket value exceeding $1000 at the
not report the actual amount of your spouse's earned income, only the source in BLOCK
r
ad piepety, stocks, bonder
any
g
p
g p
.
This includes but is not limited to em:
close of the reporting period.
A. You may not check "qualified trust" unless you have a blind trust which has been
m
commodities futures and other
A
securities listed in BLOCK
Plovers, stocks, bonds, tax shelters, bank
specifically approved by the Office of Government Ethics. If you, your spouse or depen?
,
,
did you
y
accounts, real property, mutuaf funds,
pensions
IRA asse
ts
assets of certain
dent child are the beneficiary of a trust which no one of you created and has no knowl-
exchange the
purchas
e
.
,
l
trusts, commodities utures, cersona1 busi
edge of the assets, refer to the instructions to see if it qualities as an "excepted trust."
it.. du
it.. during the rperiod
ring reporting
nesses and partnership interests. Exclude
if "none" (or less than $101) is checked under Category of Amount of Income, no other
fora value that exceeds $10007
your personal residence unless you rent it
out. See instructions for lee on bank
entries need be made in BLOCK C for that item.
accounts and complex holdings.
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
BLOCK C
BLOCK D
Assets & Income Sources
Valuation of Assets
Income
Transactions
Test
Id
if
h
d i
? I al
Type of Inane IX)
Gregory of Amount of Insane 1I
Ii rn
complete
ent
y eac
asset an
ncome source
of yours, your spouse(S) and your
_
e
o o
_
-
v
3
Ofner
if
Is
=
e
g
o
Aclval
Amount
Dafe
(Mo., Day, yr.l
,
Sc ;no ::.'.,, or
dependent child (DC).
c
E
2
y
2
pec
v
Type)
$
^
o $
o
0
On,, if
"Otte'
On1V it
nen,am moee Bola
for
toe.
NONE ^
` ;
2
o
o
-
u u
~
'
is
n 8
$
Specified
Non-u
z`.
.
o
YES NO
S
Exam % Y 2 Commo
--
--
-
X
_
-
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
X
_
-
-
-
-
-
- - - -
- - -
pies: .Doe JOlree a Smim, Hometown, USA
nnnp 1?.
550,000
- -
Wells Fargo Bank (forme
rly
froc al_BankL
(Acct. (10-10-500-77351
3)
-
U/A Daniel P.
Lane
William H. Webster con
fist
ing
CIL Bonds M. Co. mon tr
ust
income; reserve income
X
X
X
X
X
I
?? ii~t-ea in 984
i s
re
Ac
t
to
em
nt
as
r
e
t y
of
e
spouse were under proba
te
adm
ini
str
ati
on
of
Es
at
O
nr?S; lla 1.. welsrer
un
98
Th
fiduciary income tax re
tur
n f
it
or
the
a
to
a
of
ec
s
,,.
co
a i
n
he
following bracket:
X
X.
_
.X
X
X
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
esl
Reporting Individual's Name
William H. Webster
Part I
Transactions
Incumbents and Termination Filers only: Report any pur-
, sale or exchange by you, your spouse or dependent
chase
child during the reporting period of any real properly, stocks,
bonds, commodities futures, and other securities when the
amount of the transaction exceeded $1,000. Include trans-
Pegs
Number
a tons vmt ieuunno m a loss. o nor apon a um aow mr
involving property used solely as your personal residence
!
" of
T-
6" Ix)
A
.-
or T,
ensai r
,0n Ix
l
,
or
a transaction between you, your spouse or your depart-
dent child
~ 8
.
NONE Li
o.r.
y
)
0
0
0
-
,
S
E.am fam aicarion of Awls
pie' X Y Z Common
2/1/&1
x
NYNEX Corp
X
2/30/8
X
2
462 Shares Pacific Telesis Group
x
/8/87
X
81 shares SW Hell
x
/8/87
X
4
U.S. West,Inc.
X
2/30/8
X
5
F.W. Woolworth
x
2/30/8
X
6
General Motors
X
2/30/8
X
Part II
Gifts, Reimbursements and Travel Expenses
Incumbents and Termination Filers only:
Report the source, a brie) description and the value of: (1)
to-kind gifts of transportation, lodging, food or entertainment
received from one source totaling $250 or more unless
received as personal hospitality at the donor's personal or
family residence; (2) other gifts received from one source
totaling $100 or more in value; and (3) cash reimbursements
of $250 or more received from one source. Exclude gifts and
reimbursements received by your spouse that were given to-
tally independent of their relationship to you. Exclude trans-
portation, lodging, food and reimbursements from the U.S.
Government. For (1) and (2), exclude gifts from relatives and
exclude gifts of $35 or less when aggregating them for the
total from one source. See instructions for
further exclusions. NONE ^
sou,,. (Name and Add,en)
Brat ooscriplion
V.I..
S
E.am Natl Assn. of Rock Colleel0rs. NY, NY
piesNat 1 Assn. 01 Rock Colleciws, NY. NY
anm,ilameirnnn&morav.ov.dsmn!nnain,alcnot.re0006/tb/B3
Leather briefcase fo, retiring president
$500
$125
Society for the Four Arts,
Pa-l;-, ty-rF'4o*4d
he Society madea contribution of $4,000 to St.Louis Junior League
$4,000
ollowing my appearance before this group. I had previously
-
n this association through a contact with a member of my staff.
--
Committee of One Hundred
Pu-i s e ; -Elk ! e homa
ollowing a speech, the organization made an unsolicited
bt
y appearance. I had no conversation with them prior to their
covid.ing the contributir~>_ .
- $500
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500160001-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12
CIA-RDP90B00017 R000500160001-2
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/12 :
The next that I recall of anything pertaining to the Iranian initiative occurred in
the Summer of 1986, when on one occasion someone brought to me-either the FBI
or someone in our Criminal Division, or our lawyers in the Department of Justice-
brought to me information that persons involved in arms transactions with Iran
were being investigated, or information had come to the attention of the law en-
forcement agencies that there were persons dealing in arms with Iran, and I was
asked whether by any chance this could be authorized. I got the information about
this particular incident, called John Poindexter, related the facts to him, and was
advised by him that there was no such authorization for this activity that had been
reported to me.
The next that I remember--
Senator COHEN. Was that the so-called sting operation?
Mr. MEESE. I think it probably-it may have been, but I am not sure, Senator,
because I don't really know all of the details. I only got a very brief scenario, it was
at an early stage of the investigation. From then on, the investigation went on with-
out any knowledge on my part.
The next thing that I remember was that in late October, I was called by John
Poindexter and told that there was an important element of the Iranian intiative
going forward, and that transportation facilities involving Southern Air Transport
were needed to participate in that part of the operation, and that there was appar-
ently an invesigation being conducted that would have keep people who were sup-
posed to be involved in that operation from participating in it.
I don't remember the exact conversation, but the impression I have was that the
FBI wanted to look at files or other-or interview people, and that if they were-if
this investigation was going to go forward at that particular time, these people
would be unavailable to participate in whatever transportation activity was in-
volved in Iran, or in relation to Iran.
The CHAIRMAN. This was October-
Mr. MEESE. This was the latter part of October.
The CHAIRMAN. Of 1986?
Mr. MEESE. Right. I will connect that up in a moment. I asked the Associate At-
torney General who has responsibility for the criminal enforcement activities of the
Department to check with the FBI and to see whether there was an investigation,
and if it was, whether it could be-whether certain aspects of it could be delayed for
a few days without hurting the investigation. I also contacted the Secretary of the
Treasury, because it was my understanding from Mr. Poindexter that Customs was
also involved in the investigation.
I think I perhaps best serve the Committee's interests by reading from a report,
or actually a memorandum from the FBI, which was the memorialization of this
contract. It is dated the 31st of October 1986. It is a memorandum to Floyd Clark,
who is the Assistant Director of the FBI in charge of the Criminal Division. It is in
regard to Southern Air Transport, and it is signed by William H. Webster, the Di-
rector of the FBI, and reads as follows: "This confirms my telephone conversation
with you late yesterday afternoon." That would have been the 30th of October. "As-
sociate Attorney General Stephen Trott called on the secure line at the request of
the Attorney General to ask that we suspend for ten days any non-urgent work in
the Southern Air Transport Neutrality Act investigation. Apparently there are
some sensitive hostage negotiations now under way that could possibly be preju-
diced. He emphasized that the Attorney General did not want to do anything which
would wreck the investigation, but simply to permit a good climate for the negotia-
tions to the extent possible. You informed me that we were just at the preliminary
stages, and this should present no difficulty. I would like to know if these instruc-
tions create problems for us at any time." And if you like, I'll be happy to provide
that to the Committee.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much.
Mr. MEESE. That happened to coincide, for the benefit of the Committee, with the
release of Douglas Jacobsen.
Senator COHEN. Now in October '86 when the Sandinistas captured Mr. Hasenfus,
I think you indicated that you or the FBI was in the process of conducting an inves-
tigation at that time.
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Mr. MEESE. I think actually it was the Hasenfus investigation that the FBI was
conducting.
Senator COHEN. And when you got the request from-who was it, Mr. North?
Mr. MEESE. No, Mr. Poindexter.
Senator COHEN. Mr. Poindexter--
Mr. MEESE. Admiral Poindexter.
Senator COHEN [continuing]. To ask the FBI to delay at that point so that South-
ern Air could carry out its mission, did you still tell the FBI to go forward with its
full investigation on Hasenfus?
Mr. MEESE. Oh, yes.
Senator COHEN. That wasn't interrupted for any period of time?
Mr. MEESE. That was very briefly delayed, and I think it was only those aspects of
the investigation that had to do with the headquarters of Southern Air Transport,
but I know that the investigation was resumed immediately thereafter.
Senator COHEN. What to your knowledge did the Justice Department learn about
the connection between Hasenfus and the Iranian connection?
Mr. MEESE. I know of no connection that was ever learned. The only thing that I
knew at that time for the first time when Admiral Poindexter talked to me was
that the same airline was being used-the same airline that Hasenfus apparently
had been connected with, Southern Air Transport, was also being used in the Irani-
an enterprise.
Senator COHEN. Do you think you should have inquired into the possible involve-
ment of U.S. officials using at that point military support for the Contras by Hasen-
fus and his assistants?
Mr. MEESE. I knew nothing about that. This was entirely being conducted by the
FBI or others, and there was no connection either implied or made apparent or even
hinted at at the time of Mr. Poindexter's call.
EXCERPT NO. 3
Senator BRADLEY. Mr. Attorney General, let's if we could continue on from the
23rd of November, Sunday the 23rd, Monday the 24th.
Monday the 24th you did what? You said you dispensed people to the field.
Mr. MEESE. No, no, on Monday the 24th I asked our attorneys to look at what
possible criminal laws might be applicable or what laws might be applicable to what
we had found out, to these facts.
Senator BRADLEY. And did you do anything else relating to this matter on the
24th?
Mr. MEESE. Yes, I mentioned already that I of course met with our people and
went over what we had found on the morning of Monday the 24th.
Senator BRADLEY. You met with people--
Mr. MEESE. With people that had been working with me-Mr. Reynolds, Mr.
Cooper, and Mr. Richardson. I think at that time we were joined by one other
person, Mr. Cribb. I'm not sure whether I also discussed it with the FBI Director
that day. I had discussed this with the FBI Director on Friday the 20th, and I know
I discussed it with the FBI Director on the 25th, but I'm not sure whether I dis-
cussed it with him on the 24th.
I also talked on the-with the President, as we have heard. I talked with Mr.-
with Admiral Poindexter, as we've heard. I talked with Mr. McFarlane, I believe, on
that day also to find out what he knew about it. I also talked with the Vice Presi-
dent.
Senator BRADLEY. So you talked to Poindexter-this is McFarlane's second inter-
view.
Mr. MEESE. Yes. It was a very short episode.
Senator BRADLEY. And Poindexter's first interview Monday afternoon?
Mr. MEESE. Yes.
Senator BRADLEY. Anyone else that day?
Mr. MEESE. Yes; I talked to the Vice President and I talked with Mr. Regan, Don
Regan, and I may have talked with Mr. Casey during the course of the day. I'm not
sure.
Senator BRADLEY. Now, anyone else you talked to that day on this?
Mr. MEESE. It's possible there may have been something. I may have advised my
deputy, Mr. Burns, I'm not sure.
EXCERPT NO. 4
Senator BRADLEY. Now, on November 25-that was the day you had the press con-
ference.
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Mr. MEESE. The first event that day was that I got a call from Bill Casey about
6:30 in the morning just as I was leaving the House, and he asked me to come by,
and so we talked about the situation there. He had-I can't remember all of the
conversation, but it was generally about the situation and about this development.
I think he told me that-I don't think I talked with Mr. Casey on the 24th, be-
cause I think he told me that Don Regan had told him about this, and that was--
Senator BRADLEY. Don Regan had told him about the memo?
Mr. MEESE. Talked to him about the contra-no, about the contras, the money-to-
the-contras situation.
Senator BRADLEY. But Don Regan found out?
Mr. MEESE. I talked to him on Monday, and I think Don Regan talked to Bill
Casey on Monday night. I met with Mr. Casey on my way from the house to work at
about a quarter to 7:00.
Senator BRADLEY. At the Agency?
Mr. MEESE. No, at his home.
Senator BRADLEY. At his home?
Mr. MEESE. At his home. He just lives about a mile from where I do.
Senator BRADLEY. Is this the second meeting at his home?
Mr. MEESE. Yes; uh-huh.
Senator EAGLETON. Is this with Casey?
Senator BRADLEY. This is with Casey. This is the morning of the 25th?
Mr. MEESE. Morning of the 25th; right. And while I was there I received a call
from Don Regan, who had been trying to get me, and Don advised me that he had
talked-I think he had talked with Poindexter or was going to talk with Poindexter,
and that just verifying that I would be at the White House at 9 o'clock.
Senator BRADLEY. OK. So you got to the White House. You had a series of other
meetings. And then--
Mr. MEESE. We met with the President.
Senator BRADLEY. You told him what you'd found out?
Mr. MEESE. Well, further told him what I found out, and I felt that we would have
to convene a criminal investigation, and that-that we would probably convene a
criminal investigation, I think is the way I said it, but that again it was a matter of
getting this information out.
And then we discussed several things. One, the appointment of a special review
board. Secondly, the meeting with the National Security Council to discuss it with
them and advise them. Third, the meeting with the congressional leadership. And
fourth, a public statement.
Senator BRADLEY. And then, after you had the press conference, the rest of that
day, November 25, what other meetings did you have relating to--
Mr. MEESE. Well, I met with the FBI Director and advised him that we were start-
ing the Criminal Division on it and that we would probably be needing FBI re-
sources. I directed that since we were starting a criminal investigation that we have
the process that has been set up with the White House and the Department of Jus-
tice that the Deputy Attorney General notify the White House Counsel to be sure
that security precautions were taken on any documents. I directed the head of the
Criminal Division, the Assistant Attorney General, to proceed to an examination
and to meet with the Office of Legal Counsel Assistant Attorney General to discuss
the possible laws that might apply, including criminal laws.
Senator BRADLEY. Now did you talk to the President any more that day?
Mr. MEESE. On the 25th I don't think so. I don't think after I left the White House
at noon, I don't think I did.
Well, as a matter of fact I did, because that was the day that the President had
the Supreme Court for lunch, and so after I finished with the press conference, I
went over and joined the lunch. I had been invited previously. And so I talked with
him and I think walked back to the Oval Office with him after the Supreme Court
lunch.
Senator BRADLEY. And did you discuss this subject at all?
Mr. MEESE. I'm sure we did, but it was in general terms, and I told him that I was
going back to the Justice Department because we were pursuing the criminal inves-
tigation at the point.
Senator BOREN. I apologize if I go over ground that has already been covered by
others.
Have you been asked about the delay requesting the FBI in the Hasenfus case?
Mr. MEESE. Yes, I was, and I submitted a document which kind of memorializes
what happened, which is a Committee document now.
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Senator BOREN. What was the specific basis for the request?
Mr. MEESE. Admiral Poindexter called me and said that the Southern Air Trans-
port, which had been involved apparently in the Hasenfus matter, was also involved
in providing transportation in regard to the Iranian initiative, and that there was
some important activities coming up. And my best recollection, my impression is
that people from Southern Air Transport were being asked to be-either meet with
FBI agents in the investigation or were required to be present because the FBI was
coming to the headquarters of Southern Air Transport, something along that line,
and that could that investigation be delayed for a few days while this other activity
took place.
And I said I would find out and if possible we would do that.
Senator BOREN. Was there any inquiry made at that time about any possible in-
volvement of U.S. officials with the military support for the contras by Hasenfus
and his associates?
Mr. MEESE. No; I had no discussion with that nor did that ever occur to me.
Senator BOREN. You had no reason to believe at that time whatsoever there could
have been some connection with Government officials in the funding of these ef-
forts?
Mr. MEESE. No, none at all.
EXCERPT NO. 6
Senator COHEN. Let me ask one final question: Why would the FBI investigation
interrupt the use of that plane to free the hostages?
Mr. MEESE. My understand-my impression was, and I can't remember the exact
conversation, but my impression was that the personnel who would be involved in
this activity were needed on the flights and part of this transportation, or that
somehow that they would be diverted from what they should be doing by the FBI
being there for purposes of looking at records or interviewing people or something
like that. That was the impression that I got.
Senator EAGL.ETON. Mr. Attorney General, you mentioned in the summer of 1986
someone at the Department of Justice informed Meese-that's why I marked it
down-about information about arms in Iran. Meese asked could it be authorized.
Meese called Poindexter. Poindexter said no.
Those are my cryptic notes, to refresh your memory.
Who is this someone in DOJ that informed--
Mr. MEESE. I don't have any recollection, Senator, of who it was. I just remember
the incident happening, and I checked into it, got-back to him, and that was the end
of it. I don't believe I made any record of it at the time.
Senator EAGLETON. It concerned you enough when this person informed you that
you made a subsequent call about it to a high-ranking person.
Mr. MEESE. I was the only one in the Department of Justice that knew about the
Iranian initiative, and I wanted to be sure that there was no possible connection
between these two things.
Senator EAGLETON. Well, if you can't remember the person that informed you, can
you remember the gist of what the person informed you about?
Mr. MEESE. It wasn't information-the best of my recollection is that there was
information that had come to the FBI about certain people, and I think they were
specified by name, who were involved in an arms transaction in regard to Iran. And
I don't know why the question was asked whether this might be authorized or some-
thing like that, but it was asked, or at least I was informed of this, was there any
American connection or anything like that or any U.S. Government connection? It
may be that there have been conversations among the group or something that
would have led to that: I don't know.
In any event I wanted to be sure that there was no connection between that oper-
ation that I was being told about that had come to the attention of either the FBI or
someone in Justice, and this Iranian initiative, which was highly classified, and
that's why I made the check with Admiral Poindexter.
Senator EAGLETON. And Poindexter said no.
Mr. MEESE. He said no, and I think I. either had already said that there was no
connection or-and just wanted to verify it-or else I got back to the people in-
volved.
Senator EAGLETON. Well, if someone tells you this, Poindexter tells you no, and
then you get back to the people involved, can't you remember who that someone
was or who you got back to?
Mr. MEESE, I honestly can't; no. It may have even been brought to me by someone
on my staff as a message from the FBI. I can't be sure. It was kind of a matter of
the fact type of thing that we do all the time.
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EXCERPT NO. 7
The CHAIRMAN. Ed, do you recall the date on which you first talked to Bill Web-
ster about this matter, to initiate the FBI part of the investigation?
Mr. MEESE. Well, it was-I talked to him on-I had talked to him generally, so he
knew what was going on on Friday, and at that time I think we both--
The CHAIRMAN. On Friday, the--
Mr. MEESE. Friday, the 21st.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. 21st.
Mr. MEESE. And at that time we agreed that-he happened to be in the offices; he
is in the office quite frequently, and in the course of the discussion I talked with
him about it, told him what the President had asked me to do, and we agreed that
there was no criminal matter involved and that it would not be appropriate for the
FBI to bring in-to be brought in.
He assured me that any time that they could be of help he would want them to
be. I indicated that whatever time-that if anything developed where they should be
involved, that I would certainly call upon them.
I don't know whether I talked with him on Monday, the 24th. I"know I talked
with him, I am almost positive, on the 25th, and at that time advised him that I was
turning this over to the Criminal Division and we probably would need FBI re-
sources; and, in fact, they were requested the following day after the Criminal Divi-
sion had started.
The CHAIRMAN. On the 26th?
Mr. MEESE. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. So the FBI has then been involved since Wednesday, the 26th?
Mr. MEESE. Since Wednesday, the 26th; right.
OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL,
Washington, DC, March 25, 1987.
Staff Director/General Counsel, U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate
Hart Office Building, Washington, DC
DEAR SVEN: As you know, Senator Boren and Senator Cohen have requested docu-
ments concerning Judge Webster's actions in connection with the delay of an inves-
tigation of Southern Air Transport.
We have identified two documents which relate to Judge Webster's involvement
in the underlying events and which were generated in the course of those events: (1)
a November 12, 1986 letter from John Martin to William Weld, and (2) Judge Web-
ster's October 31, 1986 memo to Floyd Clarke explaining the reasons for the delay.
Both documents are enclosed.
Since our telephone conversation last week, we have located two additional docu-
ments, dated November 24 and 26, 1986, relating to the resumption of the investiga-
tion. Both of these documents are classified "SECRET." Please let me know if you
would like to make arrangements to review these documents.
We are continuing our efforts to identify any other documents which relate to
Judge Webster's role and which were generated in the course of the underlying
events in question.
The letter from Senator Boren and Senator Cohen mentions an investigation by
the Office of Professional Responsibility. The only documents produced by that
office were handwritten notes of preliminary interviews of persons other than Judge
Webster that took place before the Independent Counsel assumed jurisdiction of the
investigation.
I hope that the enclosed documents are responsive to the Committee's request.
Please let me know if we may be of further assistance.
Sincerely yours,
Enclosures.
Guy MILLER STRUVE,
Associate Counsel.
NOVEMBER 12, 1986.
To: William F. Weld, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division.
From: John L. Martin, Chief, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division.
Subject: Investigation of Southern Air Transport.
Attached hereto is a copy of a memorandum, dated October 31, 1986, from Judge
Webster to Assistant Director Floyd Clarke of the Bureau's Criminal Investigative
Division. Briefly, Judge Webster's memorandum advises that in accordance with a
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46
request from Associate Attorney General Steve Trott, the Bureau was to suspend its
ongoing investigation of the captioned. matter for a period of 10 days, because of pos-
sible prejudice to "some sensitive hostage negotiations."
As you know, this matter involves Eugene Hasenfus, the crew member of the
C123 aircraft shot down over Nicaragua on October 7, 1986. The Bureau is anxious
to resume its investigation, but, even though the 10-day period requested by Steve
Trott has expired, it is unwilling to do so without the Department's approval.
Unless you advise to the contrary, I intend to advise the Bureau that it is free to
resume its investigation without further delay.
Attachment.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington, DC, October 31, 1986.
. MEMORANDUM TO MR. CLARKE RE: SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT
This confirms my telephone conversation with you late yesterday afternoon. Asso-
ciate Attorney General Stephen Trott called on the secure line at the request of the
Attorney General to ask that we suspend for ten days any non-urgent work in the
Southern Air Transport Neutrality Act investigation. Apparently there are some
sensitive hostage negotiations now under way that could possibly be prejudiced. He
emphasized that the Attorney General did not want to do anything which would
wreck the investigation but simply to permit a good climate for the negotiations to
the extent possible. You informed me that we were just at the preliminary stages
and that this should present no difficulty.
I would like to know if these instructions create problems for us at any time.
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER,
Director.
Chairman BOREN. At this time I will turn to the other members
of the committee for opening statements and comments which they
might have, beginning with the Vice Chairman, Senator Cohen.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. COHEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MAINE AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, I want to welcome you to the committee this
morning along with the 2 show-me Senators from Missouri. Of
course, we have had a chance to work with you in the past several
years in your capacity as FBI Director, and in that position you
have had primary responsibility for U.S. counterintelligence activi-
ties within this country. And personally, I believe that your will-
ingness to serve as Director of Central Intelligence after those 9
years as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation really does
set an exemplary standard for public service. I think the President
ought to be congratulated for nominating a man of your integrity
and demonstrated ability to this important post.
As I understand it, this represents your fifth confirmation pro-
ceeding. I think by this time you know what to do and we'll see if
we can't make it interesting.
This comes to a time when the CIA and the intelligence commu-
nity as a whole are in a degree of turmoil, when their involvement
in the Iran arms sale and the assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras
is the subject of investigations and of media inquiry, when we have
shrinking budgets that are forcing difficult programmatic deci-
sions, and when it appears that there are serious deficiencies in the
security measures needed to protect intelligence operations.
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So in short, today, perhaps more than at any other time in this
Administration, the job calls for strong leadership, for someone
who can represent the intelligence community's interests effective-
ly and credibly, and who can restore the public's confidence in the
intelligence community and its activities. I believe your appoint-
ment as Director of Central Intelligence would provide that
strength and assurance.
As you know, and as the Chairman has indicated, you wear at
least 2 hats, possibly 3, one as coordinator of the U.S. intelligence
activities, and the other as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
In both capacities, the focus of the DCI's activities is external to
the United States in collecting and analyzing information neces-
sary to support our defense and foreign policy objectives and in un-
dertaking other types of operations, specifically covert operations.
These are areas that have not, for the most part, been an inte-
gral part of your prior professional training and experience, either
as an attorney, a Federal judge, or more recently, as FBI Director.
Accordingly, neither this committee nor the American people
have a very clear perception of your views on a number of funda-
mental questions, views which we ought to know prior to voting on
your confirmation as DCI. These questions would include issues
such as covert action, the strengths and weaknesses of our intelli-
gence community, how you view the responsibilities of the DCI
toward the President and especially toward this Congress.
I am hopeful that we can use the public hearing to explore some
of these topics with you and establish a firmer understanding of
your views in these areas for which you will be responsible if con-
firmed.
According to today's Washington Post, you intend to indicate
that the Attorney General treated you like a "shunned lover" on
the issue of the FBI's interest in investigating the Iran arms sale;
that you offered your services, but the phone call never came. I can
assure you that if you are confirmed as the Director, this commit-
tee will call upon your services. We'll be sure to call you at least
once a day.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Senator DeConcini.
STATEMENT OF DENNIS DeCONCINI, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF ARIZONA
Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, I, too, welcome Judge Web-
ster, and concur with our colleagues as to the outstanding service
you have given to this country, Judge Webster, even before you
were nominated by President Carter to be the Director of -the FBI,
as a Federal jurist. I think as FBI Director you have brought a tre-
mendous amount of credibility to that agency, even though there
are still and probably always will be certain criticisms of some of
its actions, which are necessary to be carried out in at least your
judgment and your subordinates. I welcome your nomination,
Judge Webster.
I feel that the CIA itself, though its budget has increased im-
mensely under former Director Casey, has never, at least in the 10
years I have been.here, has the CIA been in such shambles. Nor
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48
has it had such image problems nationally and internationally of
being an agency which is not tuned in, not under control, and
doesn't know what it is doing. I don't think that is the case, but I
believe that at least from my constituents and my travel, it is cer-
tainly the perception. You will face the problem of how do you
bring credibility that you were able to bring to the FBI.
I want to assure you that I believe, in my short tenure on this
committee, but even before, looking at the quality of people who
serve as Chairman and Vice Chairman and the other members on
this committee, that you have people here who are prepared to
assist you and not be destructive in maintaining and building the
intelligence community capacity to serve this nation. I hope that
you will feel comfortable after you're confirmed, to confide and to
consult with this committee, as often as you can.
I am a firm believer that foreign policy, including covert activi-
ties, is based on a consensus, on a bipartisan basis, and when Presi-
dent Reagan or Carter or anyone else has run into problems, it is
because he has decided not to build a consensus. It is the Director
of the CIA who makes the difference, in my judgment, in building
that consensus. That is one of the reasons I am so pleased and
proud that the President has appointed you, because I think you
have proven you have that capacity. I wish you every success.
I have some questions, Mr. Director, that I will ask later, of
course. I want you to understand these are questions that are not
of a critical nature, but I feel should be laid out in the record. Per-
haps someone else with more seniority may already have touched
on those questions, and if so, I will remain silent.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator DeConcini.
Senator Roth.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Senator ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to welcome you, Judge Webster. I was very pleased
when the President sent your name up for this very, very impor-
tant position.
Judge Webster, I was on the floor this morning introducing a
package of espionage legislation for the 100th Congress. It is a
broad series of measures that I believe will address some of our
most serious problems in what could be called the Decade of the
Spy. Now, my reason for bringing this up at this time is that I do
intend to ask for your views, both as the Director of the FBI and as
the nominee to be the new Director of Central Intelligence. Senator
Dole joined me in this legislation, which will include a number of
separate proposals, and I will advise you what they are so that we
can proceed when it becomes my turn to raise questions. The ques-
tion of restrictions on Soviet bloc personnel, or the satellite na-
tions, whether we should have some restrictions on them in this
country. The question of whether there should be the death penal-
ty for very, very serious spy offenses. The United Nations is propos-
ing a new office for research and collection of domestic information
in each member country as to the political situation, whether or
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not this offers an opportunity for spying. And finally, I will be
asking some questions on the current impasse over the new U.S.
Embassy in Moscow, whether or not we should permit the Soviet
Union to occupy the proposed buildings in the city of Washington.
I think these are pertinent questions, and again, Judge Webster,
I want to welcome you here today.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator Roth. Senator
Hatch.
STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN HATCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF UTAH
Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, I have had a lot of contact with you as a member
of the Judiciary Committee over the last 10 years, and I just want
to compliment you for your selection for this position. And I will be
very interested in the hearings and will pay a great deal of atten-
tion. I have a conflict, because we have the Catastrophic Health
Hearings upstairs in my other committee, but I will be coming in
and out. We just appreciate the service you have given to the coun-
try. We'll look forward to these hearings clearing the air and also
look forward to your confirmation and your work as the Director of
Central Intelligence.
I think you'll find that it will be just as interesting if not more so
than Director of the FBI, and I look forward to working with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, Senator Hatch. Senator Murkow-
ski.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK MURKOWSKI, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF ALASKA
Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, let me join other Members of this Committee and
express my pleasure that the President has selected you as his
nominee for the next Director of Central Intelligence.
There can be no doubt of the importance of this nomination.
Events of recent months and the headlines even as we meet, have
underlined over and over again the critical role played by the DCI
and the agencies which he leads in defending national security.
Your record as Director of the FBI for the past nine years has
demonstrated your intellectual ability, your management and polit-
ical skills, and your integrity. These are all qualities crucial to the
effective performance of a DCI. I believe you also appreciate the
role of Congressional oversight of intelligence and the critical im-
portance of trust and candor in the relationship between the DCI
and this Committee.
Your reputation and experience bode well for the Intelligence
Community and for all of us who have been trying to strengthen
the intelligence capabilities of the United States.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you Senator Murkowski.
Senator Specter.
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STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, I join my colleagues in welcoming you here this
morning. There is no more important job in the Federal govern-
ment, perhaps short of the presidency, than the one that you have
been nominated for, and I think had. there ever been any doubt
about that, it would have been dispelled by the events of the past 6
months with respect to what has happened on the sale of arms to
Iran and the diversion of funds to the Contras.
Certainly the U.S. intelligence gathering operation is one of
enormous importance in may respects. First, on foreign policy, if
we are to have a successful foreign policy the CIA has to do its job
on intelligence gathering. Beyond the function of gathering of in-
telligence itself, then there is the responsibility to advise the Presi-
dent on those Findings. And I think that requires independence
and it requires restraint. And it may require-perhaps does re-
quire-telling the President what he doesn t want to hear on occa-
sion, and perhaps even repeating it when he doesn't want to hear
it. And beyond advising the President, it is the responsibility to tell
the Congressional Oversight Committees what the Congressional
Oversight Committees have a right to know.
There may be some problem perhaps on the longstanding issue of
serving two masters-I don't think so-because every official has
an obligation to follow the law, and if there is a violation of law,
especially ranking officials have an obligation to follow the law on
an independent basis.
If our intelligence operations are to be successful, there is a real
need for covert action, and at this time the covert action has fallen
under disrepute because of the issue of an appropriate finding and
the issue of timely notice to this committee. These questions will
obviously be paramount in these proceedings, because we do not
have to ask you hypothetical questions as to how you would dis-
charge your duties as Director of the CIA because we have a case
in point where we are trying to define standards for the appropri-
ate role of timely notification and appropriate disclosure to the
Congressional Oversight Committees.
As you know from our prior conversations, I have certain ques-
tions that I want to ask you about Abscam. And I do join in the
welcome here and look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, Senator Specter. Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA
Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join others in welcoming this distinguished public servant and,
on behalf of the citizens of this country, thank you for taking on
this assignment rather than returning to the private sector and en-
riching yourself.
I, too, will join in the questions raised by my colleague from
Pennsylvania concerning your relationship with the President. Not
particularly this President, but the CIA Director has a very special
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51
relationship with any President-particularly your ability to look
him straight in the eye and say Mr. President, this is bad advice
you have gotten by someone else, and I caution you and suggest
you change the course of action.
I am sure you have the strength and the conviction to do that. It
is for that reason that you are going to have my whole-hearted sup-
port.
Thank you.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, Senator Warner. We are privileged
this morning to be joined by the former Vice Chairman of this com-
mittee, the Senator from New York, Senator Moynihan, who has
indicated to me he would like to also make a brief opening state-
ment and some remarks on this occasion.
We're very happy to have you with us this morning, Senator
Moynihan, and I recognize you at this time.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW. YORK
Senator MOYNIHAN. You are very generous, Mr. Chairman, and
Judge Webster, I am a bit of a voice from the past here, but I have
something that I would like to put on the record, because it is
something that will be part of the situation you come into. It has to
do with the question of the ways in which the Senate Intelligence
Committee is informed about anticipated covert activities, signifi-
cant ones.
In 1984, the beginning of 1984, the Agency made the decision to
mine harbors in Nicaragua. This committee was not informed. This
caused a great deal of distress with Senator Goldwater and myself
and other members.
We decided to see if we could not make a better arrangement-
have something come out of our misunderstanding, if that was
what it was. On June 6, 1984, Mr. Casey, Senator Goldwater and I
signed an agreement that had been approved by the President and
the National Security Advisor which came to be known as the
Casey Accords.
The Accords had a very simple proposition: how would we define
the word "significant"? What does that word mean. Judges fre-
quently have to do that with statutes. We said, as a working defini-
tion, if the President approves an activity, we will take that to be
significant, because there are only so many things he can get to
and some things that no one would do without his approval.
That simple 3 page agreement had 10 points, and the tenth point
said that within a year we will review this agreement and see how
it is working. And indeed an addendum was reached and signed.
Only it was not done within the year. As things will do, it
stretched on. And so the second agreement was not signed until
June 17, 1986. We have first an 1984 agreement, then 2 years later
an 1986 agreement.
The 1986 agreement states that, "The Committee and the DCI
agree that the Procedures," capital P, "have worked well and that
they have aided the committee and the DCI in the fulfillment of
their respective responsibilities."
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They added a few specific details to be considered as also auto-
matically requiring notification, one of which said that even
though a President doesn't necessarily approve, when "significant
military equipment actually is to be supplied for the first time in
an ongoing operation."
Now, Judge Webster, this agreement, this signed understanding
of June 17, took place 5 months after the Presidential Finding to
ship arms to Iran. I have no more comment than to say that we
have to see it as profoundly deceptive, and in the circumstances
near to heartbreaking. I mean, the effort to produce an under-
standing on notification, made in 'such good faith by this commit-
tee, was greeted in the other direction-I leave it to you to make
your own judgments about it, but that the DCI could sign such a
statement in June 1986, co-signed by the Chairman and Vice Chair-
man of this committee, was ruinous of a relationship which has to
be reestablished. I am confident, sir, that you can do so. But I
would want to bring to your attention what happened and it is
really wrenching to know that it happened.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the full text of the Accords be
included with my testimony at this point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, very much, Senator Moynihan. I
think it is always useful to us to have that perspective and to un-
derstand the context in which we are now operating. Too often we
are not aware enough of events that have taken place in the past
and the procedures that have been put in place. I think it is very
helpful to us to have that information before us, and I appreciate
your entering it into the record this morning..
[The documents referred to follow:]
U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, April 8, 1.987.
Hon. DAVID L. BOREN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC,
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for the opportunity to again appear before your
committee to offer some background on the "Casey Accords." While you are very
aware of the history involved, I thought it important to get the details on record as
you contemplate the nomination of Judge Webster.
With this in mind, could I ask that a copy of the original agreement and subse-
quent addendum be included in the hearing record just after my remarks.. I do
thank you.
Best,
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN.
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPORTING TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
,INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) ON COVERT ACTION
The DCI and the SSCI agree that a planned intelligence activity may constitute a
"significant anticipated intelligence activity" under section 501 of the National Se-
curity Act of 1947 (the "Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980") even if the planned ac-
tivity is part of an ongoing covert action operation within the scope of an existing
Presidential Finding pursuant to the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (22 U.S.C. 2422).
The DCI and the SSCI further agree that they may better discharge their respective
responsibilities under the Oversight Act by reaching a clearer understanding con-
cerning reporting of covert action activity. To this end the DCI and the SSCI make
the following representations and undertakings, subject to the possible exceptional
circumstances contemplated in the Intelligence Oversight Act:
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(1) In addition to providing the SSCI with the text of new Presidential Findings
concerning covert action, the DCI will provide the SSCI with the contents of the ac-
companying scope paper following approval of the Finding. The contents of the
scope paper will be provided in writing unless the SSCI and the DCI agree that an
oral presentation would be preferable. Any subsequent modification to the scope
paper will be provided to the SSCI.
(2) The DCI also will inform the SSCI of any other planned covert action activities
for which higher authority or Presidential approval has been provided, including,
but not limited to, approvals of any activity which would substantially change the
scope of an ongoing covert action operation.
(3) Notification of the above decisions will be provided to the SSCI as soon as prac-
ticable and prior to implementation of the actual activity.
(4) The DCI and the SSCI recognize that an activity planned to be carried out in
connection with an ongoing covert action operation may be of such a nature that
the Committee will desire notification of the activity prior to implementation, even
if the activity does not require separate higher authority or Presidential approval.
The SSCI will, in connection with each ongoing covert action operation, communi-
cate to the DCI the kinds of activities (in addition to those described in Paragraphs
1 and 2) that it would consider to fall in this category. The DCI will independently
take steps to ensure that the SSCI is also advised of activities that the DCI reason-
ably believes fall in this category.
(5) When briefing the SSCI on a new Presidential Finding or on any activity de-
scribed in paragraphs 2 or 4, the presentation should include a discussion of all im-
portant elements of the activity, including operational and political risks, possible
repercussions under treaty obligations or agreements, and any special issues raised
under U.S. law.
(6) To keep the SSCI fully and currently informed on the progress and status of
each covert action operation, the DCI will provide to the SSCI: (A) a comprehensive
annual briefing on all covert action operations; and (B) regular information on im-
plementation of each ongoing operation, with emphasis on aspects in which the
SSCI has indicated particular interest.
(7) The DCI and the SSCI agree that the above procedures reflect the fact that
covert action activities are of particular sensitivity, and it is imperative that every
effort be made to prevent their unauthorized disclosure. The SSCI will protect the
information provided pursuant to these notification procedures in accordance with
the procedures set forth in S. Res. 400, and with special regard for the extreme sen-
sitivity of these activities. It is further recognized that public reference to covert
action activities raises serious problems for the United States abroad, and, there-
fore, such references by either the Executive or Legislative Branches are inappropri-
ate. It is also recognized that the compromise of classified information concerning
covert activities does not automatically declassify such information. The appearance
of references to such activities in the public media does not constitute authorization
to discuss such activities. The DCI and the SSCI recognize that the long established
policy of the U.S. Government is not to comment publicly on classified intelligence
activities.
(8) The DCI will establish mechanisms to assure that the SSCI is informed of
planned activities as provided by paragraphs 1 through 4, and that the Committee is
fully and currently informed as provided by paragraph 6. The DCI will describe
these mechanisms to the SSCI.
(9) The SSCI, in consultation with the DCI when appropriate, will review and, if
necessary, refine the mechanisms which enable it to carry out its responsibilities
under the Intelligence Oversight Act.
(10) The DCI and the SSCI will jointly review these procedures no later than one
year after they become operative, in order to assess their effectiveness and their
impact on the ability of the DCI and the Committee to fulfill their respective re-
sponsibilities.
BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman, SSCI.
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN,
Vice Chairman, SSCI.
WILLIAM J. CASEY,
Director, Central Intelligence.
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(1) In accordance with Paragraph 10 of the Procedures Governing Reporting to
the SSCI on Covert Action, executed on June 6, 1984, the SSCI and the DCI have
jointly reviewed the Procedures in order to assess their effectiveness and their
impact on the ability of the Committee and the DCI to fulfill their respective re-
sponsibilities under section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947.
(2) The Committee and the DCI agree that the Procedures have worked.well and
that they have aided the Committee and the DCI in the fulfillment of their respec-
tive responsibilities. The Committee. and the DCI also agree to add the following
Procedures set forth below:
In accordance with the covert action approval and coordination mechanisms
set forth in NSDD 159, the "advisory" format will be used to convey to the SSCI
the substance of Presidential Findings, scope papers, and memoranda of notifi-
cation.
Advisories will specifically take note of any instance in which substantial
nonioutine support for a covert action operation is to be provided by an agency
or element of the U.S. Government other than the agency tasked with carrying
out the operation, or by a foreign government or element thereof. It is further
agreed that advisories willdescribe the nature and scope of such support.
In any case in which the limited prior notice provisions of section 501(a)(1)(B)
of the National Security Act are invoked, the advisory or oral notification will
affirm that the President has determined that it is essential to limit prior
notice. It is -further agreed that in any section 501(a)(1)(B) situation, substantive
notification will be provided to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI at
the earliest practicable moment, and that the Chairman and Vice Chairman
will assist to-the best of their abilities in facilitating secure notification of the
Majority and Minority leaders of the Senate if they have not already been noti-
fied. It is understood that responsibility for accomplishment of the required no-
tification rests with the Executive Branch.
It is understood that paragraph 6 of the Procedures, which requires that the
SSCI shall be kept fully and currently informed of each covert action operation,
shall include significant developments in or related to covert action operations.
The DCI will make every reasonable effort to inform the Committee of Presi-
dential Findings and significant covert action activities and developments as
soon as practicable.
(3) In accordance with paragraph 4 of the Procedures, the DCI recognizes that sig-
nificant implementing activities in military or paramilitary covert action operations
are matters of special interest and concern to the Committee. It is agreed, therefore,
that notification of the Committee prior to implementation will be accomplished in'
the following situations, even if there is no requirement for separate higher author-
ity or Presidential approval or notification:
Significant military equipment actually is to be supplied for the first time in
an ongoing operation, or there is a significant change in the quantity or quality
of equipment provided;
Equipment of identifiable U.S. Government origin is initially made available
in addition to or in lieu of nonattributable equipment;
There is any significant change involving the participation of U.S. military or
civilian staff, or contractor or agent personnel, in military or paramilitary ac-
tivities.
(4) The DCI understands that when a covert action operation includes the provi-
sion of material assistance or training to a foreign government, element, or entity
that simultaneously is receiving the same kind of U.S. material assistance or train-
ing overtly, the DCI will explain the rationale for the covert component.
(5) The DCI understands that the Committee wishes to be informed if the Presi-
dent ever decides to waive, change, or rescind any Executive Order provision appli-
cable to the conduct of covert action operations.
(6) The Committee and the DCI recognize that the understandings and undertak-
ings set forth in this document are subject to the possible exceptional circumstances
contemplated in section 501 of the National Security Act.
(7) The Procedures Governing Reporting to the SSCI on covert action, as modified
by this agreement, will remain in force until modified by mutual agreement.
DAVE DURENBERGER,
Chairman, SSCI.
PATRICK LEAHY,
Vice Chairman, SSCI.
WILLIAM J. CASEY,
Director, Central Intelligence.
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Chairman BOREN. We have been joined by another member of
the committee this morning, and I believe he has opening com-
ments to make. Senator Hecht, I am pleased to recognize you at
this time.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHIC HECHT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEVADA
Senator HECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Nice to see you this morning, Judge. Nice to welcome a Missouri-
an, since I was a native Missourian before moving to Nevada. I will
have some questions for you after listening to your comments, per-
taining to the local level in Nevada, your tenure-your present po-
sition on the national level and international level.
Nice to have you here today.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, Senator Hecht.
Judge Webster, this morning I notice that you have two very dis-
tinguished members of the Senate here to introduce you. Let me
say you could not be accompanied by two finer individuals to offi-
cially present you to this committee this morning. They are widely
respected by members on both sides of the aisle. It is a privilege to
have them here with you this morning, and to know that those
from your home State think highly of you is a very high recom-
mendation.
At this time I am privileged to recognize the senior Senator from
Missouri, Senator Danforth. Senator Danforth, we are glad to have
you with us this morning.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN C. DANFORTH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Senator DANFORTH. Mr. Chairman, thank you, very much, mem-
bers of the committee. Sitting here listening to the opening state-
ments I am reminded of seeing Judge Webster several weeks before
the President designated him as the next Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and asking him what he would be doing after
his departure from the FBI in a year. I now find out what he will
be doing.
Mr. Chairman, it is often common for Senators from a nominee's
State to appear before a committee to give pro forma remarks
about the reputation of the person who is being considered by the
committee. I want you to understand that in this case my remarks
are not pro forma. In fact, Judge Webser's reputation over the last
9 years since he has served as Director of the FBI has been well
known by every member of Congress. He has brought great luster
to his position at the FBI. He has restored that fine organization
not only to its past heights, but to, I think, an unprecedented posi-
tion in the minds of the Members of Congress and indeed of the
American people.
I think what I have to add to this committee's consideration is
the fact that I haven't just known Judge Webster over the last 9
years; I have known him over many, many years. When I was a
young lawyer just beginning to practice law in my home town of
St. Louis, I can remember at that time asking other lawyers the
question who were really the fine attorneys of our city; who were
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56
the people with the best reputation. And always, Judge Webster's
name would be on that list.
I knew him as a lawyer. I knew him as a United States District
Judge. I knew him as a member of the 8th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Indeed, I believe I have a unique claim for Members of the
Senate, in that I think I am the only person in the Senate ever to
have tried a case in front of Judge Webster. I can say that I did not
agree with his opinion in that case. [General laughter.]
I can also say that unfortunately the United States Supreme
Court did agree with his opinion. [General laughter.]
In addition to my own knowledge of Judge Webster, my family's
knowledge of him even predates my own. He is a contemporary of
my oldest brother. He serves on the Board of Trustees of Washing-
ton University where my brother is the Chancellor. My family has
known him I guess all of his life. And I am well aware of his repu-
tation in his home community in the minds of people who have lit-
erally known him all his life.
Putting it very briefly, Mr. Chairman, Judge Webster is the
pride of St. Louis. He is a person about whom it would be said by
everyone who has known him, not just for 9 years, but for decades
and decades, that he is a person of enormous ability, of very great
character, of fine judgment. He is admired. He is respected by all
of those who have known him over the period of his life. What you
have seen for the past 9 years during his service as Director of the
FBI is exactly what he is and what he has been.
And I guess, Mr. Chairman, this sounds more like a rhapsody
than testimony, and indeed it is; it is exactly that. But it is also a
statement on the part of one Senator and one friend and one con-
stituent, of appreciation that Judge Webster has given so much of
himself and his enormous talent and ability to his country, not just
for the past 9 years, but for several decades now as a public serv-
ant.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator Danforth, for
those fine comments, and Judge, the committee promises we will
not hold against you your incorrect ruling in that one case cited by
Senator Danforth. [General laughter.]
We are also privileged to have with us this morning the junior
Senator from Missouri. I had the privilege of serving with him at
the time that he was Governor of Missouri, and now the pleasure
of serving with him in the Senate. Senator Bond, we are very
happy to have you this morning, and we would welcome any com-
ments from you at this time.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Senator BOND. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman and mem-
bers of the committee.
It gives me a great deal of pleasure to be able to join with our
distinguished senior Senator of Missouri in recommending to you
wholeheartedly and without reservation William Webster for the
position of Director of Central Intelligence. I, too, would associate
myself with the comments that Senator Danforth has made about
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Judge Webster. I would go a step further to say that the entire
state of Missouri takes great pride in the accomplishments, the
record and the high standards which Judge Webster has exempli-
fied.
I have had the privilege of knowing Judge Webster both person-
ally and in a professional manner for about 20 years. It was that
close association and very warm feeling for him that led me, in
1977, when I heard that he was being considered as Director of the
FBI, to communicate to him a real note of caution. I urged him not
to take the position of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation. Two things led to this unsolicited piece of advice. No. 1,
since as you may recall, Mr. Chairman I was returning involuntar-
ily to the practice of law at that time, I had hoped to see the Bench
maintain the highest possible standards. Certainly Judge Webster
exemplified those high standards for all who practiced law in the
State of Missouri and elsewhere in the 8th Circuit.
On a more practical level, I was concerned about the condition of
the FBI. Given its recent past history and the then current state of
affairs, I felt that it was an impossible task for someone to go in
and to restore the .Federal Bureau of Investigation to the high
standards it had once known. However, I should have known that
Judge Webster was one who handles the difficult every day; the im-
possible takes only slightly longer.
His achievements as the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation are obviously very well known to all the members of this
committee and to most concerned citizens throughout this country.
I am confident that should you confirm him, as I trust and hope
that you will, that he will go on to provide the same high levels of
service to the people of this country in his new position as he has
done at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
It is my great pleasure and an honor once again to join with Sen-
ator Danforth recommending wholeheartedly his confirmation.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator Bond. We ap-
preciate both of you being with us this morning.
Judge Webster, at this time I would like to ask that you stand
and be sworn to present the testimony before the committee this
morning. If you would raise your right hand.
Do you, William H. Webster, solemnly swear that the testimony
that you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and noth-
ing but the truth, so help you God?
Judge WEBSTER. I do.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much. You may be seated.
Judge Webster, again I want to welcome you, and say I have
never heard finer and stronger introductory comments by two Sen-
ators from the home State of a nominee. They have been impres-
sive indeed.
I want to ask if you have been provided with a copy of the com-
mittee rules and have had an opportunity to examine those rules?
Judge WEBSTER. I believe I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. At this time we would welcome any opening
remarks that you might have to make to the committee.
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STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, NOMINEE FOR
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -
Judge WEBSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distin-
guished members of the committee. I appreciate very much your
opening remarks, and I am deeply indebted to my friends and
fellow Missourians, Senator Danforth and Senator Bond, for the
generous comments that they made this morning.
I have been looking forward to this moment and I appreciate
very much the opportunity to appear before you today.
As Senator Cohen noted, this is now the fifth time that a com-
mittee of the Senate has considered my fitness to serve in an office
requiring Presidential appointment. I am deeply honored by Presi-
dent Reagan's nomination of me to be Director of Central Intelli-
gence, and if the Senate chooses to confirm me, I will bring to the
office the very best that I have in me.
Mr. Chairman, I realize that past confirmations must stand
apart from the process that you begin today. I know that this com-
mittee will wish to discuss with me my past stewardship in public
offices, and my thoughts and views about the office for which I am
now being considered. Still, I do not exactly come before this com-
mittee as a blank page. For 9 years it has been my privilege to
appear before this committee in its oversight capacity and report to
you on the work of the FBI in counterintelligence and counterter-
rorism matters and to discuss with you my views on the broader
picture of national security. I hope you know by now my unre-
served support for your oversight function, and my deeply held
view that this function can and should provide not only wisdom
and guidance, but also reinforce public support and trust for the
work of the intelligence community. Indeed, as recipients of sensi-
tive intelligence information which cannot be made publicly avail-
able, you serve as surrogates for the American people.
The responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence are
largely defined by statute and by Executive Order. The responsibil-
ities are awesome and no Director of Central Intelligence can suc-
ceed without your full understanding and support. It is a shared
responsibility, and we must succeed.
In my years of association with components of the intelligence
community, I have developed some thoughts, some ideas and views,
principally in counterintelligence, but also in the broader range
and function of intelligence gathering and activities in furtherance
of the national security. I would not, however, want my answers to
your questions today to suggest either that I think I know all the
answers or that there is nothing more for me to learn. Quite the
contrary. But I do have confidence in my own judgment, and even
greater confidence in the enormous wisdom, talent and selfless
dedication of the men and women of the Central Intelligence
Agency and of the other equally competent and dedicated compo-
nents of the intelligence community. I believe I can sustain and en-
hance the collective momentum of the intelligence community to
serve the national interest aggressively, objectively and profession-
ally, and to do so with fidelity to our Constitution, our statutes,
and all lawful orders issued pursuant thereto.
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Mr. Chairman, rather than burden you with a lengthy and po-
tentially presumptuous opening statement, I should like to con-
clude by reading two short paragraphs from a book written some
years ago about a man, now in the twilight of his life, whom I am
privileged to know as a friend. His name is Sir William Stephen-
son, and the book which made him more famous than I suspect he
would like to be is titled "A Man Called Intrepid." Bill Stephenson
wrote a foreword to that book, and in that foreword he said:
Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants can no longer threaten the liberty of any
people, when the function of all nations, however varied their ideologies, will be to
enhance life, not to control it. If such a condition is possible, it is in a future too far
distant to foresee. Until that safer, better day, the democracies will avoid disaster,
and possibly total destruction, only by maintaining their defenses.
Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence is an es-
sential weapon, perhaps the most important. But it is, being secret, the most dan-
gerous. Safeguards to prevent its abuse must be devised, revised, and rigidly applied.
But, as in all enterprise, the character and wisdom of those to whom it is entrusted
will be decisive. In the integrity of that guardianship lies the hope of free people to
endure and prevail.
Mr. Chairman, I wish that I had written those words. I believe
them, I subscribe to them, and if confirmed will do all that I can to
be worthy of your trust.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my formal statement. As you
know, I have completed a number of questions to the Senate and
also some supplemental interrogatories. I should like to make one
addition at this time.
I am aware of a recommendation brought to my attention on or.
about October 30, 1986, to withhold certain information from Lieu-
tenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council. This
recommendation was made by a Department of Justice official who,
based on newspaper articles, concluded that Lieutenant Colonel
North might be involved in a future criminal probe by a special
prosecutor concerning United States activities in Central America.
The official was also of the opinion that this dissemination was not
necessary because it was already available through the media.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that this information was con-
templated in the question previously answered for the record
which specifically excludes public media sources. But further, the
information proposed to be withheld from Lieutenant Colonel
North did not mention Lieutenant Colonel North or any other gov-
ernment official. I did not then nor do I now believe that any of
this information was information, quote, "regarding activities of
U.S. officials that had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or
unauthorized assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance during the
period that such assistance was prohibited by law," close quote.
That was the question.
Nevertheless, on reflection, I have concluded that this informa-
tion should also be provided to you and I wish to supplement my
previous interrogatory with this statement. And I might add that
all pertinent details regarding this matter have been furnished to
the Independent Counsel.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Judge Webster. The
record will reflect that your answer has been so supplemented, and
I appreciate your providing this additional information to the com-
mittee. I also appreciate the comments which you have made in
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your opening statement. You have eloquently described the burden
which we all have to strike that appropriate balance between the
need for an effective intelligence operation, one in which canfiden-
tiality of sensitive information must be maintained, and at the
same time an operation that must be conducted according to law,
and under the appropriate oversight of those that have been elect-
ed by the people to perform that function. I think your statement
is a well taken and an eloquent one.
I also appreciate the fact that you have commented upon the
talent and the dedication of countless numbers of staff people, pro-
fessionals who work at the Central Intelligence Agency and
throughout the intelligence community, because I think all too
often it is only the problems that get the attention. By the very
nature of their work, the successes never become a matter of public
record. Day in and day out, we have an exceptional group of
people, extraordinarily talented, courageous, committed and unself-
ish in many, many ways, who are performing an outstanding task.
I think it is important that all of us reaffirm our appreciation to
them because it is an appreciation that too often goes unstated.
As has been said in the opening comments, and I know from
your own past experiences, you have exercised these kinds of re-
sponsibilities yourself, we all have the responsibility of making
sure today that our inquiry into your qualifications is complete and
thorough. We hope that it will be fair in every way. I know that
you understand that in directing specific questions to you, no hos-
tility is intended, but we are simply meeting our responsibility to
do the job which we are given under the constitutional process.
We will go through a round of questions. I will begin that ques-
tioning, and we will just continue that process with the members of
the committee until all of the members have had. an opportunity to
ask all the questions that they wish to ask. Some members will be
coming and going during the process because of other committees
that are in session this morning.
I notice in your response as you discuss the suspension of the
FBI's preliminary Neutrality Act investigation of Southern Air
Transport on October 30, 1986, you were informed that sensitive
hostage negotiations were going on. Did you have any idea at the
time that Southern Air Transport might be involved in both U.S.
arms shipments to Iran and private arms deliveries to the Contras
in Nicaragua?
Judge WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, I certainly did not associate the
two. We had-we were opening an investigation that had to do
with the crash of a transport plane in Nicaragua which had origi-
nated from El Salvador, but which had possibly some connections
with Southern Air in Florida. That was a preliminary inquiry. I
also had some knowledge relayed to me by a senior FBI official,
Mr. Revell, who sits on the operations subgroup, the group at the
National Security Council, that the same airlines had assisted in
the Iranian initiatives. But that is the extent of the connection be-
tween the two.
Chairman BOREN. If you had known that there existed some con-
nection that might potentially involve the diversion of funds or any
other kind of connection--
Judge WEBSTER. Oh, no.
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Chairman BOREN. Would it have made a difference to you in"
your decision to suspend, whether or not to suspend the FBI inves-
tigation at that point?
Judge WEBSTER. I am sure that it would, but there was no such
indication.
Chairman BOREN. Let me turn your attention now to your con-
versations with Attorney General Meese on November 21, 1986,
when he informed you of his prospective inquiry. I want to go to
the nature of the conversation which you had with Mr. Meese on
November 21st. Did Mr. Meese explain to you in any kind of detail
why he was conducting this inquiry?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, it was a very casual conversation; it. was
not an agenda item. I was just visiting with the Attorney General.
And he indicated to me that he had been given the ticket or had
been asked by the President to straighten out the various confusing
statements that were coming out of various departments of govern-
ment with respect to what 'actually had transpired in relation to
Iran and that he was going to try to get the facts straight.
Did you want me to proceed, Mr. Chairman, or did you have an-
other question?
Senator COHEN. Could you clarify the date on which that conver-
sation took place?
Judge WEBSTER. That was Friday, November 21st, Senator.
Chairman BOREN. How long did that conversation take?
Judge WEBSTER. I suppose I was in the Attorney General's office
for probably maybe 20 minutes, and probably that conversation
itself took about a minute and a half, I guess.
Chairman BOREN. So it was a very brief conversation about this
inquiry. And I understand that at that time you offered assistance.
Looking back, do you think-and we always can look back with
more in our minds in hindsight than we would have understood at
the time-do you think that the Attorney General would have been
better advised to have had someone from the FBI or the Justice De-
partment with extensive criminal law experience take part in that
inquiry?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I first should emphasize, Mr. Chairman,
that neither of us saw this as a criminal inquiry. The purpose was
to try to get the facts straight so that the government could be
speaking with one accurate voice. And when I made that offer of
assistance, I was thinking primarily in terms of manpower re-
sources. Is there anything we can do in that way for you? He was
also thinking in terms of an inquiry, a fact-finding inquiry to
report back to the President. So neither of us were thinking in
criminal terms.
You can always look back and ask in light of what transpired,
could the FBI agents have done a better job of conducting such an
inquiry or looking for materials. I don't think we're in a position
yet to know really the answers to that question. There is also the
downside of sending FBI agents into the White House when there
is no known criminal activity to investigate. So you can say, sure,
maybe we knew better how to ask the questions or maybe we knew
better how to do something else. But it was not a criminal inquiry.
The Attorney General took his own group of experienced attorneys
from the Department of Justice. And I am just not able to say that
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62
in hindsight we could have done a better job than they did. But
that--
Chairman BOREN. Had you known that it was going to indeed
turn into a criminal inquiry, which it did 4 days later, in essence,
when you were asked to bring the Bureau into it, thinking specifi-
cally about the need to protect records and the need to protect po-
tential evidence, had you known on the 21st that this was to
become a criminal inquiry, would you at that time have advised
the Attorney General that either the FBI or those within the Jus-
tice Department who have dealt with a criminal inquiry should
have been brought into it specifically to protect evidence?
Judge WEBSTER. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. If I might go one step
further, I am confident the Attorney General wouldn't have had to
have that; he would have asked for it had he known it would be a
criminal.
Chairman BOREN. Well, I gather then it does not surprise you
that the Attorney General in his testimony before the committee
on December 17th, which we have released today, testified that you
agreed, and I quote from this, you agreed that it would not be ap-
propriate for the FBI to be brought in at that time.
Judge WEBSTER. That is correct.
Chairman BOREN. This morning you have entered into the record
some comments in regard to a memorandum, an internal FBI
memorandum dated October 30th, which bears your initials, which
indicates that an official at the Justice Department had speculated
that Colonel North might someday come under a criminal investi-
gation, and that certain information which was contained in this
memorandum might best be withheld from him at that time. I
wondered if, when you had those discussions with Attorney Gener-
al Meese on November 21st, it must have been known that Colonel
North was one of those involved with the Iranian matter, if you
had in mind or gave any thought to this information passing across
your desk, that there were at least some people in the Justice De-
partment who had suspicion that Colonel North might become the
target of criminal investigation?
Judge WEBSTER. No, I have to tell you in all candor it was not on
my mind. In fact, I don't even recall seeing it until it was called to
my attention recently in connection with preparing the answers to
these questions. It came up with the kinds of informational notes
that come up literally by the dozens, call for no action on my part,
had been reviewed by all of my career subordinates in the criminal
line. I really did not have that in mind.
Chairman BOREN. So there was nothing in your mind at that
time that caused you to have any feeling that this might turn into
a criminal investigation.
Judge WEBSTER. No, Mr. Chairman. It was entirely focused on
Iran and the Iranian situation, the Iranian initiative. I frankly
have entertained some ill ease about the role of the National Secu-
rity Council in those areas, but I had no question about whether
anything illegal was taking place.
Chairman BOREN. Let me go now directly to the point of over-
sight responsibility, and of course as you know, prior notification is
to be given to this committee, or at least in extraordinary circum-
stances to the leadership of this committee in regard to covert ac-
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tions, significant intelligence gathering activities, or any illegal in-
telligence gathering activities that are brought to the attention of
government officials. These are also to be reported.
Can you think of any circumstances in which the President
should withhold prior notice altogether, even of the Chairman and
Vice Chairman of this committee and the four leaders of the two
Houses?
Judge WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, it is difficult for me to conjure
up situations in which I, based on my own experience with this
committee, would want to see information withheld. This is not to
say that the President might take a different view of an extraordi-
narily sensitive, potentially life-threatening initiative that could be
damaged and lives put at risk if there were some kind of prema-
ture exposure. I have difficulty thinking of any such situations. But
the President has a more overriding responsibility.
Chairman BOREN. If for some reason some dire emergency devel-
oped where notice were withheld from this committee, the Presi-
dent, of course, then is required to provide notice after the fact in a
timely fashion. How would you interpret that phase, "in a timely
fashion"?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, of course, I went to the dictionary, having
a name of that kind-Webster's Dictionary-[general laughter.]
I didn't get very much help there nor really in the legislative his-
tory. It speaks about an appropriate time or in reference to some-
thing. In law, if there is a specific number of days you have to do
something, then you would decide whether you did it in a timely
way, that is, within the time prescribed. If there is no time, and it
appears that this issue was wrestled out during the legislation,
then we have to fall back on words like appropriate.
And in trying to articulate to you my view of this, which I knew
that you would ask, it seems to me that notice is timely at the
moment when the compelling circumstances which the President
felt called for deferral ceased to be as compelling as the legitimate
interests of the Congress and its Select Committee in knowing it.
In other words, a deferral is not something you just put off indefi-
nitely. A deferral goes against the tide and it should be continually
revisited. It should be a subject of constant agenda review to deter-
mine whether it is appropriate at that point to let the committee
know.
Chairman BOREN. If you had been Director of Central Intelli-
gence during the period of time in which we have just passed with
the Iranian arms situation and notification had been withheld for
many months as it was, would you have advised the President that
you felt it was inappropriate to withhold notification of this com-
mittee for that period of time?
Judge WEBSTER. I would.
Chairman BOREN. If you were the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and a President took action to withhold notice for
prolonged periods of time over your repeated objections and your
strong feeling that it was wrong in terms of the spirit of the law
and wrong in terms of public policy to continue to withhold notifi-
cation, what course of action would you take?
Judge WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Director of
Central Intelligence clearly has an obligation directly with the
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Senate through this committee, and that is an obligation of trust
which would be breached by my continued acquiescence in some-
thing that I believed to be arbitrary, and for all the reasons that
you have just stated, inappropriate. And I think that I would have
to advise the President of my position on that, and if he would not
authorize me to speak to you, I would have to leave. It is that
simple.
Chairman BOREN. Let me ask one last question related to this
matter. As you know, the law talks about intelligence gathering ac-
tivities, and intelligence operations, and it says that this committee
is to be notified of intelligence gathering activities and operations
conducted by any agency. We have always assumed in the past
that it would be the traditional agencies like the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. We have learned in this instance that other bodies,
including the National Security Council, have undertaken oper-
ations at some point in time that are intelligence activities.
If you learned of what appeared to be legal activities by, let us
say, the National Security Council, agencies that are not consid-
ered traditionally intelligence operative agencies, or if you learned
of illegal activities, either one, about which this committee had not
been notified, would you view it as your responsibility-even
though you are Director of Central Intelligence, you wouldn't be di-
rector of the National Security Council or any other agency that
might be involved-would you view it as your responsibility as the
overseer of intelligence in general, to report such legal or illegal
intelligence activities to this Committee?
Judge WEBSTER. I would consider it my first obligation to insist
that the member of the intelligence community or the National Se-
curity Council make the notification itself, and if it refused to do
so, I would consider it my obligation to inform you.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much. Senator Cohen.
Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Webster, you had some notice of the activities that were
taking place with respect to the sale of arms to Iran, as I recall, in
August of 1986.
Judge WEBSTER. That's correct.
Senator COHEN. The circumstances were such that a deputy of
yours had a conversation with Colonel North, is that correct?
Judge WEBSTER. That is correct, Senator Cohen. It was not a pri-
vate conversation. It was at the operations subgroup committee
meeting at the Executive Office Building.
Senator COHEN. But you were concerned enough about it to con-
tact Mr. Meese directly?
Judge WEBSTER. I was concerned enough about it to contact the
Attorney General directly.
Senator COHEN. Were you concerned, for example, that it might
be in violation of the Export Control Act?
Judge WEBSTER. I wasn't focusing so much on specific statutes so
much as I wanted to be sure that the initiative was supported by a
Presidential Finding as Lieutenant Colonel North had represented
to Mr. Revell, and that the Attorney General had himself reviewed
it and approved it. We've had experiences in the past when the De-
partment of Justice has somehow gotten outside the loop on deci-
sions in which the Attorney General really should have been in-
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volved and really should have passed judgment. And that was what
I wanted to ascertain for myself and to put the Attorney General
on notice, if in fact he was unaware of it.
Senator COHEN. And the Attorney General assured you that a
Presidential Finding that in fact been signed, or rather that a draft
had been considered?
Judge WEBSTER. The Attorney General-I asked the Attorney
General was he aware of the Finding and had he seen it. He said
he was aware of the Finding. He had seen it or a draft of it and
that he had approved it.
Senator COHEN. Was that satisfactory in your judgment, to have
a draft simply looked at by the Attorney General?
Judge WEBSTER. It was satisfactory in my judgment at the time
that the Attorney General was aware of everything I was aware of,
and that he had approved it as Attorney General.
Senator COHEN. Did you inquire as to whether or not Congress
had been notified, or was required to be notified under that Find-
ing?
Judge WEBSTER. No, I didn't.
Senator COHEN. Were you aware at the time of allegations about
Iran's participation in the bombing of the Marine barracks in
Beirut?
Judge WEBSTER. I probably was, Senator Cohen. I am not certain
of the dates, but I probably was. I was informed of everything that
was known at that time with respect to the bombing.
Senator COHEN. Was that. a matter of some concern to you out-
side the legality of whether or not the Attorney General was noti-
fied about a Presidential Finding as to the propriety and wisdom of
engaging in a covert operation of arms transfers to a nation that
was listed as a terrorist nation, who had in fact participated in the
killing, murder of 241 Marines?
Judge WEBSTER. It certainly was of concern to me that if there
was to be a departure from our public policy with respect to State-
sponsored terrorism, that it be done pursuant to an appropriate
Presidential Finding that the Attorney General thought was lawful
and appropriate.
Senator COHEN. Prior to October 30th, were members of your
staff concerned abut Colonel North's alleged activities in Nicara-
gua, the funding of the Contras?
Judge WEBSTER. It seems to me that there was quite a flurry of
publicity in the early weeks of October of 1986, in which various
people including members of Congress, speculated on the activities
of the United States in Central America, and I believe, although I
am not absolutely certain, that Colonel North's name appeared in
some of those news articles.
Senator COHEN. Do you know whether or not members of your
staff, Mr. Revell in particular, contacted Mr. North to inquire as to
whether he was involved in the funding of the Contras?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't know the answer to that.
Senator COHEN. Let me ask you, as of November--
Judge WEBSTER. Pardon me.
[Pause.]
Senator COHEN. That's a pose guaranteed to put you on the front
pages.
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Judge WEBSTER. I can't remember. I can't remember any such
conversation being communicated to me. Perhaps in some other
way. I do know that from time to time Lieutenant Colonel North
stated-made statements in telephone calls to Mr. Revell and at
meetings that whatever he was doing he was doing pursuant to au-
thorization. But whether it related to Central America, I cannot
now recall.
Senator COHEN. If the FBI had been asked to conduct the prelim-
inary inquiry as of November 21st as opposed to Attorney General
Meese, what would you have done?
Judge WEBSTER. First of all, I think I would want to know-have
a clear understanding of what it is we were being asked to do. If we
were being asked to assist in a factual inquiry, such as the Attor-
ney General performed, that would be one thing. If we were asked
to conduct a criminal inquiry, that would be quite another thing.
Senator COHEN. What would you have done, assuming it was
only a preliminary inquiry, to find out what had been done. A
newspaper article had been written revealing the fact that we had
been transferring weapons to Iran at that point. There was a lot of
confusion. You said you were concerned about the NSC being in-
volved in this operation from the beginning in terms of its oper-
ational activities on a covert operation. What would you have done
as Director of the FBI in terms of the initial phase of that investi-
gation? I am talking specifically about securing documents and pre-
venting them from being destroyed. What would you have done
with respect to putting your agents into the White House, contact-
ing officials. What would be the process?
Judge WEBSTER. First, I want you to understand that in 9 years I
have never pretended to be the expert investigator.
Senator COHEN. What would your staff have done?
Judge WEBSTER. My staff, I am confident, would have made ar-
rangements for interviews, would have made arrangements to
review records, would have correlated the public statements that
were out there that we're trying to relate to, either confirm or dis-
prove in terms of factual circumstances. They would have devel-
oped a game plan before we went there, what it is we were trying
to determine, what it is we would be looking for. And I suspect that
probably the Attorney General did pretty much the same thing,
but I don't know that.
Senator COHEN. You indicated on December 4th in an interview
that you were satisfied that documents were not being destroyed,
and that it would not in any way interfere with the investigation.
At that time, what led you to conclude that documents were not
being destroyed?
Judge WEBSTER. Is that interview around the 5th of December
with a group of reporters?
Senator COHEN. The 4th.
Judge WEBSTER. 4th of December. The FBI was fully involved at
that time investigating the alleged illegal activities. My senior staff
officials had reported to me that they had thus far found no evi-
dence of records being missing from the files, that there was a sub-
stantial computer record of what was there--
Senator COHEN. There were reports in the paper that documents
were being destroyed during the course of that weekend.
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Judge WEBSTER. Well, I realize that there were reports in the
paper, but I am telling you what my senior staff officials advised
me. And that at least as of that date-and I was very careful in my
interview on that date to say as of that date-we had not deter-
mined any evidence of record destruction. And that is still the case.
I know of no new information that should have made me alter my
statement.
Senator COHEN. You have not learned of any information since
that time that would cause you to reflect upon whether or not it
was a mistake not to go in and at least secure the records?
Judge WEBSTER. I am having difficulty answering your question
because this relates to the Independent Counsel's inquiry and that
is protected by Rule 6(E) as you know.
Senator COHEN. Fawn Hall has been in every newspaper and
publication in the country, and already admitted publicly that she
destroyed documents.
Judge WEBSTER. But I am not in a position to confirm that or
deny that, Senator, at this point, because of the constraints of the
Independent Counsel's investigation. I think the information that I
had, that is, the information that the state of our investigation was
accurately stated at that time. Fawn Hall was not cooperating at
that time, Senator, and did not cooperate until several weeks later.
Senator COHEN. Well, I have a number of other questions to
pursue. My time is up. Thank you very much.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Nunn.
Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Webster, I want to ask a few questions that are rather
general in nature rather than specific. You mentioned a few min-
utes ago that you were ill at ease about the National Security
Council that you-I don't remember the exact words, but you said
that you didn't sense any illegal activity, but you were ill at ease
about certain things with the National Security Council. Would
you expand on that and tell us what you were ill at ease about,
how that came to your attention and so forth?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I think that a lot of what I was ill at ease
about is very accurately portrayed in the Tower Commission
Report. There was a lot of frustration and impatience in the Execu-
tive Branch over the delay in getting the hostages out, and commit-
tees were formed which met in the National Security Council for
the purpose of coming up with new and innovative ideas about how
the hostages-their release could be obtained.
I guess it starts with the title of this committee, "Operations
Subgroup." I kept asking Mr. Revell to be sure that this committee
was not, in fact, operational, but was simply a think tank for pur-
poses of coming up with new ideas. It has never seemed to me that
the National Security Council was an appropriate vehicle for con-
ducting operational activity. That is, was a place where ideas were
marshaled and policy was developed which could go to the Presi-
dent for his approval, and that people in the National Security
Council, staffers with various types of expertise, largely lacked the
capability and the institutional experience to engage in operational
matters. And that that was better handled by those to whom oper-
ational matters are properly assigned. So I had ill ease when I felt
that the National Security Council had become the focal point for
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operational initiatives. And, I expressed that to Mr. Revell and
asked him to be alert for any indications that the National Securi-
ty Council itself was going operational.
Senator NUNN. Who did you stress that to?
Judge WEBSTER. To Mr. Oliver Revell, Buck Revell, my Executive.
Assistant Director who served as a member of the Operations Sub-
group as my representative.
Senator NUNN. Did he express his own concern to you about
that? What was his view on it?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I think he shared that concern and was
always very alert at those meetings to caution members of the com-
mittee about the limitations of their role and responsibility, and
was very careful to report to me any information that came
through that committee that suggested operational activity.
Senator NUNN. Judge Webster, you have gotten involved to some
extent, I suppose, in Presidential Findings. You are familiar with
the Findings required by law and so forth for intelligence oper-
ations, are you not?
Judge WEBSTER. I am a lot more now than I was then. I was
aware of the principle of Findings because the Attorneys General
in the past have had opportunities to participate, and of course the
present Attorney General sits by invitation as a member of the Na-
tional Security Council. There are some aspects of the Findings
that I am frankly not familiar with, and until the Findings in the
Iranian arms shipments, I don't believe that I had ever seen one.
Nor was I even aware-although the statute certainly makes it
clear-that there was an obligation to inform the Congress in a
particular way about those Findings.
Senator NUNN. Have you had a chance since all this came up to
review the statute requiring Findings?
Judge WEBSTER. I have indeed.
Senator NUNN. You are familiar with that now?
Judge WEBSTER. I hope so.
Senator NUNN. We had testimony from former General Counsel
Sporkin who testified before this committee that he believed that
once the President signed a Finding, that previous activity which
had not been part of a Finding and which could be considered, I
suppose prior to that, unauthorized if not illegal, that that signing
of a Finding made that previous activity legal retroactively. How
do you view that?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I have not done extensive legal research
on it, and I supose that a legal argument can be made for an ex
post facto Finding, but in my opinion an ex post facto Finding is
contrary to the clear spirit of the statutory requirement. It is not
what was intended, and it simply records the President's opinions.
And I doubt very much that it would be satisfactory to this com-
mittee and it would not be satisfactory to me. It was damage con-
trol, nothing less.
Senator NUNN. How do you feel about the statute as far as a
.Finding being in writing or oral? Do you have an opinion on
whether oral Findings are in compliance with the law?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, there again I think that probably a strong
legal case can be made that an oral Finding may meet the require-
timents of the statute. I don't happen to think that it, again, meets
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the spirit of the statute. A Finding has a purpose. A Finding is to
state in writing the basis for the action so that it can be reviewed
and understood, and the specifics of it made available to all those
who have responsibility, including the Oversight Committee. A
Finding that is oral is always subject to modification at some other
time.
We have in our work in the FBI a number of situations in which
emergency authorizations can take place orally, by oral approval of
the Attorney General, when I seek it because of a very tight time-
frame. I am sure there could be situations in which there was such
a time bind that it was not possible at that moment in time to exe-
cute a written Finding. But that would not excuse an immediate
effort to reduce that oral Finding to writing so that the full under-
standing of the President, his full conclusion and desires could be
made available for oversight.
Senator NUNN. I think that is very helpful.
Judge Webster, you have headed up the FBI now how many
years?
Judge WEBSTER. Nine years last February.
Senator NUNN. What do you think of the statute that gives a
lengthy term to the head of the FBI? Do you think that has worked
fairly well?
Judge WEBSTER. The statute is a 10 year term. I have always con-
strued it as a limitation, not as a guarantee. It has had the effect,
and I think with the help of the Congress, in distancing the FBI
from political activity by having a Director who serves without ref-
erence to a Presidential term. But I do serve at the pleasure of the
President. Any President could ask me to leave and I would cer-
tainly do so. The 10 year term also has an advantage of a certain
expectation, that if you do your job well, you will have 10 years in
which to achieve substantial goals. And it tends to relieve-it cer-
tainly did in my case-any sense of urgency that I had to achieve
something within a year to 2 years, and permitted me to insist that
our progress be along established, acceptable guidelines, and not by
any shortcut means.
Senator NUNN. Would you be willing to stay beyond this Presi-
dential term if requested to do so by the next President? Have you
precluded that in your own mind? I am not asking you to give an
unequivocal yes now, but do you have in your own mind a definite
time limit on how long you're willing to serve in this capacity?
Judge WEBSTER. No, I don't Senator Nunn. I have no present
thoughts on it, and I must be entirely honest with you; I have no
thoughts at all about it. I do-the one thought that I have is that I
would like to see, if it is at all possible, the Director of Central In-
telligence be seen, be perceived in the position that I now think the
Director of the FBI is seen, as not a political figure.
Senator NUNN. Well, that was my next question. Is there some
value to making the CIA Director as removed from the political at=
mosphere as possible?
Judge WEBSTER. I think so; absolutely.
Senator NUNN. You do see an anology between the FBI head and
the CIA head in that respect?
Judge WEBSTER. I do, and I think the American people want the
CIA to perform in that way.
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Senator NUNN. Judge Webster, there has been, of course, specu-
lation floating around this town for many, many years about the
relationship between the FBI and the CIA. How would you describe
that relationship now, and is there anything you think you can do
to improve it in your new position, in which I think you will be
confirmed and which I plan to support.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Nunn, we have a very-we being the
FBI-have a very cordial relationship with the Central Intelligence
Agency. We share information. We hand off assets to each other.
We make some joint assessments. We coordinate our work with
each other, having in mind there is a line of responsibility which is
clearly the FBI's and a line on the other side of which is clearly
the CIA. When I first came into office in 1978, the then Director of
Central Intelligence was Admiral Stansfield Turner. We had been
classmates in college and friends for over 40 years. And the first
thing that we decided to do was to demonstrate by our own rela-
tionship to each other, that we wanted the 2 agencies to work to-
gether. It was not something that met massive resistance. It was
something that I believe that the executives on both sides of the
aisle had wanted to see happen but weren't all that sure would be
well received by their respective directors.
When Director Casey came on board we continued that same
warm relationship. And I can say the same about Acting Director
Gates. There may well be areas within the two organizations that
could do a better job of liaison, and I think that both sides can
work towards that. But it represents no mutual distrust, no sense
of rivalry. Simply a matter of making the bureaucracies work
better together.
Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I think my time has expired. I
would say I have had a lot of dealings with Judge Webster over the
years, particularly in the Permanent Subcommitee on Investiga-
tions. I have always found him to be not only skillful and energet-
ic, but also a man of great integrity. I think his nomination at this
critical juncture is hopefully going to be well received by the
United States Senate and the American people. I think it is a good
appointment, and of course, I will listen to the answers of all ques-
tions and reserve final judgment, but I do think he is the kind of
individual and has the kind of sensitivity that we need in a very,
very important and sensitive job.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn. Senator
Roth.
Senator ROTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, last year the Congress directed the President to
make a report on the spy activities of the Soviet Bloc so that Con-
gress could determine whether it is in our interest to apply further
travel restrictions to Bloc personnel, basically equivalent to those
we already have on the Soviets. We have that report, and I think it
bears the mark of heavy FBI input. Based on that report and my
continuing concern about Soviet use of East European agents to
collect sensitive material or for their own purposes, I am introduc-
ing last year's bill to apply such restrictions. Could you give us
your views on this legislation?
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Roth, I have not seen the draft legisla-
tion sufficiently to comment on it specifically, but I know its pur-
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pose and intent, and certainly support it. The expulsions of numer-
ous Soviet spies as a result of Presidential action a few months ago
will undoubtedly increase the tasking responsibilities of Soviet Bloc
hostile intelligence officers operating in this country. I see no
reason why they should not be included within the same restric-
tions that apply to the Soviets.
Senator ROTH. To go along, I reintroduced today, along with Sen-
ator Dole, the death penalty legislation. It amends Title 18 of the
U.S. Code, which would allow such a penalty for certain offenses in
time of war, or if the offense concerned nuclear weaponry, military
spacecraft, early warning systems, warplanes or other major intel-
ligence capabilities. As an experienced jurist, as well as the head of
FBI, I wonder if you would give us your views on the usefulness of
such legislation, recognizing of course that it is very controversial
in nature.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Roth, I have given testimony from time
to time and before other committees on my views on the death pen-
alty generally, and in that testimony, in various ways, I have
always said that I thought there was a place for the death penalty
in our system. And when pressed for examples of that, of course I
used the example of the prisoner in prison serving a life term for
whom there is no additional punishment to be given when he kills
a guard. And then I think in most cases I have used another exam-
ple. To me, the saddest word in the English language is betrayal,
and the foulest word is traitor. If we cannot apply the ultimate
punishment to one who is engaged in the kinds of activities that
you have described, I do not think we have a sufficient national
sensitivity to the enormous damage being done to us as citizens
and as a country. So I would support it.
Senator ROTH. Well, I very strongly agree with you and appreci-
ate your frank comment.
Very recently, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary General of the UN
has authorized the creation of a new office-my understanding is,
it is Soviet inspired-in the UN Secretariat. And this new office,
heavily staffed by Soviet intelligence personnel, we fear will effec-
tively create a Soviet controlled UN intelligence collection and
propaganda agency at the UN. Theoretically the idea is that it
would secure information on the domestic situation in each of the
member states. But Senators Boren and Cohen joined me in writ-
ing to the Secretary General, noting our concern and saying that it
was our intention to remove any funding by the Congress. My pro-
posed legislation would do that. I wonder, would the collection of
internal domestic information on domestic politics and other inter-
nal situations give you concern from the standpoint of intelligence?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, if I understand the proposal, and I think
that I do, it would give me the concern that it provides unique op-
portunity for the KGB to engage in manipulative activity at our
expense. I think we should be very careful about it.
Senator ROTH. My final question in this area, Judge Webster, in-
volves the President's comments yesterday about the unacceptable
Soviet penetration of our new embassy complex in Moscow, while
they sit atop Mount Alto here in Washington intercepting our gov-
ernment communications. Again, Senator Dole and I introduced a
bill requiring the Secretary of State to negotiate a new proposal on
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these embassies, and we would provide that if they don't negotiate
such an agreement that is acceptable within 6 months, we would
take a number of actions. Let me ask you this: Do you believe the
new U.S. Embassy in Moscow can ever be made secure without
bulldozing it and starting afresh, based on your knowledge about
such matters?
Judge WEBSTER. Senator, I want to be as open and candid as I
can in an open session, but that is necessarily limiting to me. I
think I can answer your question at least to your satisfaction. I
think the focus has to include, at least, how and by whom our em-
bassy is to be repaired or replaced. As long as we are dependent
upon Soviet workers to do any of that work, it will not succeed.
Senator ROTH. Let me ask you one final question this round be-
cause my time is up. Considering the cost of securing our govern-
ment communications in the Washington area from intercept by
the Soviet Mount Alto site, do you think it would be desirable for
us to require the Soviets to move to some other site in the city? At
least, say, comparable to our location in Moscow?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I suppose that that kind of an initiative
would be wrapped up in our negotiations with respect to our em-
bassy in the swamps in Moscow. I am not in a position to say in an
open meeting, nor am I confident that I have the exact technical
awareness, to say how much damage they are doing. But they are
currently in a position in their present location to capture enor-
mous amounts of microwave transmissions. And in this city, we
seem to be tremendously careless about what we say on our tele-
phones. And we have had a lot of experience with that.
If we moved them, I can't say that would end their collection ef-
forts. It might make it more difficult. I don't know whether that is
enough of a reason, but there are a lot of other reasons why we
have to settle this problem with the Soviets.
Senator ROTH. Thank you, Judge Webster.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator Roth. Senator
Hollings.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Ho1.UNGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, with respect to the present security breaches at
the Moscow Embassy, we know they are investigating the Marines.
But this seems in some sense-the Marines are culpable, obviously,
to me-to be an avoidance of responsibility. We hear you've got to
put older people there, or married people. But Jim Bakker was
married, too. [General laughter.]
And they avoid fixing responsibility. We can't find anybody re-
sponsible for the Challenger disaster, the Marine barracks-I can
go right on down. Even now, with Irangate, the process is flawed.
I am going to ask about your responsibility as Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Title 18 USC 194(E)(1), which
states that wherever someone entrusted with the possession of clas-
sified material-I am paraphrasing it-through gross negligence
allows it to be lost, stolen, destroyed, they shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned more than 10 years. To me there is
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gross negligence involved in the Moscow embassy fracas. I talk as
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce.
We have already had a hearing with Secretary of State Shultz. It
was a closed hearing, but I can at least say this. There is gross neg-
ligence there. The Regional Security Officer and the Ambassador
are the ones in charge and the ones responsible.
Now, what are we doing about that? I know we're giving Marines
polygraph tests, but we've also been promoting the RSO and con-
gratulating the Ambassador. I think if you really want to get secu-
rity at the embassies around this world, you nail an ambassador
and a Regional Security Officer, and you won't have to worry any-
more about the Marines and whether they are married or old or
neuter or what.
So let's get responsibility and accountability. Through gross neg-
ligence, we had a time sharing plan out there with the Soviets in
Moscow. [General laughter.]
That is gross negligence. And what are we doing about it? Are
you giving a polygraph to the RSO?
Judge WEBSTER. We have not been asked to do that yet, Senator.
Senator HOLLINGS. Yeah, but you're the head of the FBI. Who is
going to ask you? You don't think the State Department is going to
ask you. They're promoting people, the Ambassador and otherwise.
I want to nail the responsible individuals. If you nail them, that
will be better than buying all new buildings in the Inman Report
for $4 billion. If you fix responsibility, you 11 change that attitude
that persisted in this particular embassy.
Judge WEBSTER. I certainly agree with you, Senator, that it ap-
pears to be a long standing attitude in the Moscow Embassy, and
one that deserves a very thorough review and change. We have in
our other responsibilities been calling attention for at least 2 years
to some of the vulnerabilities there. So far as criminal investiga-
tions are concerned, I simply have no answer for you. I will under-
take to discuss this with the Department of Justice to see whether
or not there is FBI jurisdiction for activities taking place abroad in
this way.
Senator HoraaNGS. I would appreciate it, because what we're
doing is concentrating on the Marines, and that is fine; we call
them in from all around the world and investigate. But we are
avoiding the responsible individual. We are promoting him, and act
like there is no responsibility. The process is flawed. I am tired of
hearing that in this town. And if you nail a Regional Security Offi-
cer and an ambassador, who's really in charge, all ambassadors
will wake up, and it won't cost us an extra cent. We won't have to
build any more of these turrets that they're building, and pillboxes
all around.
Let me ask another question quickly, because we're voting up-
stairs on the Budget Committee. Please, Judge, take cognizance of
the House report on the counterintelligence and security with re-
spect to the CIA. They made a very thorough study, and I have the
report here and we'll file it for you. But I take pride in the Central
Intelligence Agency. I investigated it for the Hoover Commisssion
back in 1954 and 1955, when we had Allen Dulles, General Cabel
and the others there. But now it seems to have fallen down on dis-
cipline. And the selecting of personnel is a key threat they list
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down here. The same old troubles that we found years ago with re-
spect to ensuring that one particular agency informs the other of
various security breaches. And of course you know the handling of
the Yurchenko case. That was a disgrace. Nobody was responsible.
I bet you they didn't discipline a top fellow at CIA for letting that
fellow wander out of the Washington restaurant down the street
back to the Soviet Embassy. I bet you if they had nailed the top
fellow in charge of that particular program, that would never
happen again. But they didn't. Nobody is responsible.
We've got the Howard Case. Now did he skip surveillance. You
folks, the FBI, had him under surveillance, and he's in Moscow.
What about that one? We've got to get that one. Larry Chin and
others are just part of a general breakdown. Maybe it is because of
our good friend Mr. Casey's health or otherwise, but you've got a
lot of work to do, taking over this particular agency, to bolster it.
And I am confident you are the right man to do it. I support you.
But look at that House report and go over that very thoroughly for
me, please.
Judge WEBSTER. I will, indeed.
Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you a lot, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, Senator Hollings.
Senator Hatch.
Senator HATCH. Judge Webster, you've had some criticism for
the time delay with regard to your first meeting with Attorney
General Meese with regard to the Iran problem. Would you tell the
committee and the public at large how these investigations are
really initiated and what really happened there.
Judge WEBSTER. Are you referring, Senator Hatch, to my meet-
ing on November 21st?
Senator HATCH. Yes. I am referring to the 10 day delay that oc-
curred.
Judge WEBSTER. You're referring to the Southern Air Freight
matter?
Senator HATCH. That, plus the alleged criticism that you failed to
follow up when you knew there was a problem here. Let's start
with Southern Air Transport.
Judge WEBSTER. All right. Your question has to do with the At-
torney General's request through' his Associate Attorney General,
Stephen Trott, that we suspend for 10 days any unnecessary inves-
tigation of Southern Air Freight.
Senator HATCH. That was on October 30th.
Judge WEBSTER. On October 30th.
Senator HATCH. Right.
Judge WEBSTER. I received a telephone call from Mr. Trott relay-
ing a message from the Attorney General. He wanted to know if it
would be possible for us to suspend any unnecessary investiga-
tion-and those were his words-for about 10 days pending some
sensitive hostage negotiations; that he did not want to interfere
with the investigation, but he wanted to create, if possible, a good
climate in which those negotiations could take place.
It is not unusual for the FBI itself to coordinate investigations
that overlap each other where one investigation might get in the
way of another investigation or available resources. I do what I
normally would do. This was unusual in the sense that I do not
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normally get that kind of a request from the Attorney General, but
I called Assistant Director Floyd Clarke, who is in charge of our
criminal investigative division, told him of the request, asked him
about the status of our preliminary inquiry about Southern Air,
and asked him whether the Attorney General's request would
present any problems to us. Mr. Clarke told me it would present no
problems at all. We were barely into this investigation; that there
was not much to do; that we had one more interview, second inter-
view with an informant that would complete this relatively short
inquiry; and he had no problems with accommodating this request.
I made that request a matter of record, and in that formal
memorandum of my conversation, I instructed Mr. Clarke to
inform me immediately if at any time that request became a prob-
lem for him in the investigation.
On-without an exact date, I have it-but about 10 days later
they informed me, as they always do that the 10 days were up and
would it be all right to go ahead with the investigations. And I said
yes, indeed, 10 days are 10 days, and I called for Mr. Trott. Mr.
Trott returned my call the next day. I asked if there were any
problems in our going forward. Mr. Trott, on October 12th said he
wasn't certain, he woud get back and let us know. On October 20th,
Mr. Trott advised Mr. Revell, our Executive Assistant Director,
that it was okay to proceed, and the bureaucratic process started in
the Bureau to draft a Teletype to the field with those instructions.
It took us longer than I was aware of, over a weekend and 4 or 5 or
6 days to get the teletype out, but I think that was indicative of the
fact that a lot was going on at the time and that this investigation
was never considered at that time to be one of major overriding im-
portance.
But that is the process by which the Attorney General made the
request, the process which I honored.
Senator HATCH. As I understand it, the Attorney General did not
ask you to suspend urgent investigations; only non-urgent investi-
gations.
Judge WEBSTER. Absolutely not. And that is included in my
memorandum.
Senator HATCH. Right. I also noticed that in a memorandum,
Subject: Investigation of Southern Air Transport, dated November
12th, 1986, from John L. Martin, Chief of the Internal Security Sec-
tion of the Criminal Division, to William F. Weld, Assistant Attor-
ney General, he attaches your memorandum dated October 31st, to
Assistant Director Floyd Clarke of the Bureau's Criminal Investiga-
tive Division. The memo mentions that this matter involves
Eugene Hasenfus. This memorandum is dated November 12th and
said, "The Bureau is anxious to resume its investigation, but even
though the 10 day period requested by Steve Trott has expired, it is
unwilling to do so without the Department's approval. Unless you
advise to the contrary, I intend to advise the Bureau that it is free
to resume its investigation without further delay." And so that is
another memorandum--
Judge WEBSTER. This is being handled at the level of the oper-
ational level between the Bureau people in charge of that program
and Mr. Martin in the Department. So it was a dual contact with
the Department on getting it going.
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Senator HATCH. As I understand it, the first time you had any
idea that there might have been a diversion of funds to the Contras
from the Iranian arms sales was when Mr. Meese gave his press
conference on November 25th, I believe it was.
Judge WEBSTER. That is correct, Senator Hatch.
Senator HATCH. So you had no tip-off before that time.
Judge WEBSTER. None.
Senator HATCH. Okay. That is all I want to ask at this time, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator COHEN. Senator Bradley.
Senator BRADLEY. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. I see
we have a vote on. I assume we just proceed until the five bells.
Mr. Webster, I have been on the Intelligence Committee for
about 21/2 years now. The last Congress was referred to in some cir-
cles as the Congress of the Spy. We have had already today made
mention of Howard and Whitworth and Walker and Pollard and
Chin, etc. And one of the things that has struck me is how many
Americans have actually sold information for money. I imagine an
American citizen who enjoys the freedom of our country betraying
it for money. When things get tight at home or you think you want
to get rich quick, just sell some information-doesn't matter if it
endangers the national security of your country.
And the thing that occurs to me and I think it occurs to a lot of
people, is what would cause somebody to commit such an act and
what can be done about it. We have heard today from various Sen-
ators who have talked about actions Congress can take and when
that happens you always hear about extended use of polygraphs,
tougher punishment, death penalty, etc., and then you usually hear
Congress saying, "well, we need to revise procedures," and when
the procedures are revised then we will have taken care of the
problem.
But it occurs to me that those are not sufficient answers to what
we have witnessed in the last couple of years. To me, the answer is
probably more basic, more painful, more demanding, and maybe
even more idealistic. And as someone who has had a remarkable
record in 10 years at an institution such as the FBI, I wonder if
you have given any thought to the larger question about what is it
that causes people to sell information for money, to betray their
country for money.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Bradley, I think we have all thought
about this, because you are absolutely right. In my entire time in
the FBI I cannot think of any American citizen who was found and
convicted of selling out to hostile intelligence services who did not
accept money, with one exception. And that was an Air Force em-
ployee who gave away secrets because he was angry at the Air
Force. But he did not have any ideological convictions that caused
him to betray his country.
There is, in a sense, a rough, very rough analogy to the problems
we face in our number one crime problem, drugs. We can do all the
things in law enforcement and in legislation to make conduct ille-
gal, but as long as there is demand for drugs, drugs will continue
to come. And that is an educational process.
The number of people we have found who have betrayed their
country-and I am focusing on those who walked in, not those who
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were undone by various skilled recruiting devices of the Soviets-is
a relatively small number of people to the total numbers of people
in this country who love the country, who honor its freedoms and
would do nothing intentionally to betray it. So whatever I might
say to you in answer to your question is not an indictment of the
American people in whom I have tremendous confidence.
But I think where we do find these incidents and we track them
back, we might-and I am only speculating-we might find in their
education the absence of values. The concept of value neutral that
I am hearing these days in the teaching profession is of concern to
me. It seems to me that we have some traditions and loyalties that
need to be fostered. When I was a child in school, history was very
important to me. I don't think that we're teaching history in the
way that we used to teach it. When I was a child in school, Nathan
Hale was a hero and Benedict Arnold was a traitor, and the dis-
tinction was very, very clear. I am not sure that in today's world
that there is not some numbness about national secrets and the
damage that the selling of those national secrets can mean to us as
a society, as a country, and to us as individuals.
I think that everything I have said probably applies to those indi-
viduals who were found and convicted. I wouldn't want it to be any
kind of indictment of our people as a whole. But we need some
shoring up and we need to be sure that the importance of the work
that individuals have who come into possession of our national se-
crets needs to be made as clear to them, the worthiness of their
work, the trust that is represented by our allowing them to have
these secrets should weigh in their conscience and in their minds
before they knowingly sell out all that is so important to us.
I am not a psychologist. I am not a teacher, but I do believe that
an awareness of our history and our traditions, a sense of worthi-
ness of work, and the importance of preserving trust can be infused
better than we seem to be doing it today with those people to
whom much is entrusted. But I am glad that we only have a hand-
ful of these to deal with. I think the vast numbers of the people in
the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, the NSA, the DIA and all
the other places fully realize the importance of the responsibilities
that have been given to them.
But it is something that I am glad to hear you ask, and I hope
others along the way will ask and find ways to build and reinforce
that sense of responsibility and trust that is so important in our
society.
Senator BRADLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Director. I guess I
have to go vote. Let me just say that I appreciate your statement
and I take it to be a kind of resonance to something de Tocqueville
once said when he said in America the spirit of liberty and the
spirit of religion are in fundamental agreement.
Senator COHEN. The committee is going to stand in recess for 5
minutes. Senator Boren will return.
[A brief recess was taken from 12:05 to 12:14 p.m.]
Chairman BOREN. We will resume the hearing at this point, and
I will recognize Senator Specter. I believe that Senator Bradley had
a small amount of time remaining to him when he had to leave to
go to vote, and if when he comes back he has one last question to
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ask, we'll recognize him after Senator Specter has completed his
round of questioning. Senator Specter, you are recognized.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, when you started your testimony this morning
you had commented about a memorandum dated October 30th re-
lating to certain information which had been withheld from the
National Security Council. Would you care to amplify the circum-
stances surrounding your adding that to your testimony before you
began your prepared statement this morning.
Judge WEBSTER. I think that the facts are that the information
was reported to the Senate staff, and the Chairman and possibly
the Vice Chairman asked for an explanation which was provided to
them last night by members of my staff who had coordinated all of
the records that might bear on this subject. And I concluded that I
should add it even though I did not believe that the question, in
letter or spirit, required it, but in order that you might have a full
record.
Senator SPECTER. Well, the committee's questionnaire had the
question as to your knowledge of any possible illegal activities of
U.S. officials in aid of the Contras. And as you have noted, you had
not put that on your response. As I understand the facts, there was
a memorandum provided by Independent Counsel to the Intelli-
gence Committee which contained your initials and where the FBI
had decided not to make certain information available to the Na-
tional Security Council--
Judge WEBSTER. To Lieutenant North.
Senator SPECTER. Well, it was to the National Security Council,
because Lieutenant Colonel North might have access to it in the
context that there was a possible criminal prosecution which might
be brought or the appointment of Independent Counsel to investi-
gate Lieutenant Colonel North's activities with respect to the Con-
tras. Is that essentially the situation?
Judge WEBSTER. Senator, have you had a chance to read my
statement?
Senator SPECTER. I heard and made notes of the statement that
you gave this morning, Judge Webster.
Judge WEBSTER. I am not sure I understand. your question. I
would like to answer it carefully.
Senator SPECTER. Well, my first question is that the addendum
which you added this morning was due to the fact that Independ-
ent Counsel advised the Intelligence Committee yesterday of a
memorandum dated October 30th which was initialed by you where
the FBI had decided not to make certain information available be-
cause of concern that it might come to the attention of Lieutenant
Colonel North who might be the subject of an investigation by an
Independent Counsel.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, that is substantially correct. The document
said that the Department official had recommended that Lieuten-
ant North not be informed about the information contained in the
memorandum.
Senator SPECTER. According to the information I have, the Coun-
sel for the Intelligence Policy of the FBI was concerned in some-
what direct language about Colonel North potentially being in
trouble, Colonel North potentially being flaky, and concerned that
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the information which the FBI had acquired not be made available
to Lieutenant Colonel North because he might be the subject of an
investigation where Independent Counsel might be involved. Is that
correct?
Judge WEBSTER. The memorandum contained a note from an FBI
employee saying that with respect to that information, the Depart-
mental official had recommended that it not be given to Lieutenant
Colonel North because he might become the subject of an Inde-
pendent Counsel-I want to correct that-that he might be in-
volved in an Independent Counsel probe and besides, it was redun-
dant because that information was already available in the media.
Senator SPECTER. And the recommendation by the FBI official
that Lieutenant Colonel North not have access to this information
because he might be involved in a probe initiated by Independent
Counsel, that recommendation was approved by you and initialed
by you on a memorandum.
Judge WEBSTER. This was not a recommendation-coming to me
in a recommendation form. This was an information note, the kind
that I get dozens of a day, that simply put on there that it had rec-
ommended. I did not participate. I did not sign an approval. My ini-
tials are just scribbled on the botton of the page. It was for my in-
formation.
Senator SPECTER. Well, your initials, though, were scribbled, as
you point out, on the bottom of the page, indicating your agree-
ment with the recommendation not to make the information avail-
able to Lieutenant Colonel North.
Judge WEBSTER. It really didn't indicate anything other than I
had read the memorandum, because I was not the one making that
decision. It was not sent to me for approval; it was sent to me for
information. .
Senator SPECTER. Judge Webster, the issue becomes somewhat
important in the context of the fact that that memo was simply
one day before you wrote this memorandum to Mr. Clarke which
you have already testified about, requesting that there be a delay
in the investigation of Southern Air Transport. This memorandum
asks to suspend the investigation of any non-urgent work that
could-and you used the word-wreck the investigation. Did you
see any connection between the information which had come to the
FBI concerning the Contras and, concerning Hasenfus and the re-
quest which you made the very next day to delay this investiga-
tion.
Judge WEBSTER. Let me make a couple of observations to answer
as candidly and completely as I can. First, I have no independent
recollection of that memorandum at all, other than that my initials
appear on it. It was typical of the kind that came in large batches
of an informational variety in which I was not being asked to act,
but simply being informed.
Senator SPECTER. Well, you say you have no independent recol-
lection of it when you filled. out the Intelligence Committee ques-
tionnaire. But how about--
Judge WEBSTER. That's right. And it was certainly not on my
mind at the time that the Attorney General called through his As-
sociate Attorney General. I do not even know, Senator, that I read
that particular piece-had read it by the time that I had that con-
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80
versation with him. Often those informational notes are taken
home. Sometimes that may be a day or two if I am in travel. These
are not action things; they are informational things. So I can't ex-
plain it. I had no recollection of it. I certainly know that I did not
have it in my mind at the time that Mr. Trott called to inquire
whether I would have any problem.
Further, I have consulted with Mr. Clarke who is the Assistant
Director in charge of the Criminal Investigative Division who is the
one I consulted to determine whether there would be any problem
in suspending it, and he has no recollection of that memorandum,
although he also saw it on an informational basis. I am trying to
suggest that that information was acted on at a very low level.
And as I emphasized in my statement-and then I will take your
next question-but as I emphasized in my statement there is noth-
ing in the memoranda, that is, that contains the information that
the Justice Department official proposed not be given to Mr. North,
Colonel North, there is nothing in that memorandum that refers to
Lieutenant Colonel North or to any other United States govern-
ment official or in any way suggests that any United States govern-
ment official was involved in illegal activity in Central America.
And, therefore, I did not believe and I do not believe now that it
was called for as an answer to your question. But I wanted to put it
in because you had raised it.
Senator SPECTER. Well, I can understand your point that you
may not have remembered it when you filled out the Intelligence
Committee questionnaire. But here we have 2 events, one on Octo-
ber 30th and one on October 31st, and it seems to me that it is not
so inconsequential that confidential information comes to the FBI
which the FBI decides not to transmit to a circle where it may
come to the attention of Lieutenant Colonel North, and that even
as you characterize your scribbling notes, that it is a fairly signifi-
cant matter on your making a notation of any sort in agreement
apparently not to have the disclosure to Lieutenant Colonel North.
This is especially so in the context wherein the very next day you
send a memorandum requesting a delay of 10 days in the investiga-
tion relating to Southern Air Transport.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Specter, it was the same day, if you
want to be precise. I wrote the memorandum the next day.
Senator SPECTER. OK, the same day.
Judge WEBSTER. But I have already told you, I don't even know
whether I read that memorandum on the same day. This is reading
material, the kind of stuff that went home with me.
Senator SPECTER. Well, now, wait a--
Judge WEBSTER. And I don't remember it at all.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Judge Webster, are you saying you scrib-
bled your initials on a piece of paper that you don't even know if
you read?
Judge WEBSTER. No, I didn't say that. I said I don't know-I don't
know when I read it. By putting my initials on it, I meant I had
read it.
Senator SPECTER. Are you saying that you may have read it after
October 31st?
Judge WEBSTER. Yes, I may have.
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1 81
Senator SPECTER. Well, if you read it after October 31st, didn't
you make any connection between some information that the FBI
had decided not to make available to Lieutenant Colonel North
and--
Judge WEBSTER. I did not make the--
Senator SPECTER [continuing]. And a request to have a suspen-
sion for 10 days of an investigation relating to Southern Air Trans-
port which involved the same locale and perhaps overlapping
areas.
Judge WEBSTER. I did not, Senator, and if you look at the-well,
you don't have-I assume that you've had access to the memoran-
dum. It has apparently been provided to you. The memorandum
doesn't talk about Lieutenant Colonel North.
Senator SPECTER. The memorandum has not been provided to us,
Judge Webster. I have a memorandum of the staffer who read the
memorandum, and I think we ought to have the memorandum, and
I intend, speaking for myself, to make an effort to get it.
Judge WEBSTER. You understand, Senator, that memorandum is
in the possession of the Independent Counsel and was provided by
the FBI.
Senator SPECTER. Let me ask you one more question. We have a
vote on and perhaps I can come back to this in a later round. You
have testified that you had no reason to suspect that there was a
criminal investigation or a potentially criminal investigation when
you had the conversation with Attorney General Meese on Novem-
ber 21st. You have testified that the issue of the Iranian arms sale
came to your attention, I believe you said, in the summer of-when
was it, in response to Senator Cohen's question, that you said you
had some information about--
Judge WEBSTER. As nearly as we can determine by tracking it
back to a Criminal Investigative Division briefing, it was on Octo-
ber 5, 1986.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Judge Webster, you have had a number
of indications which surround the issue. Some information comes to
your attention on October 5, 1986, which you consider to be of suffi-
cient importance to call to the attention of the Attorney General to
see if he knows about it and to see if there has been a Finding.
Shortly before that time there is information which comes to the
FBI that you decide ought not to be made available to Lieutenant
Colonel North. At about the same time there is a request which
comes to you, and it is obviously an important matter because you
put it in this memorandum. And then on November 21st you have
? a conversation with the Attorney General about the Iranian arms
sale and there must have been some question about compliance
with the Export Administration Act or the Arms Export Control
Act. Why in that context, given your experience, was there no red
light flashed that perhaps there ought to be some greater concern
about an appropriate role for the FBI.
Judge WEBSTER. It was a judgment call, Senator. I did not see it.
You can fault me for not seeing it, but I didn't see it. And I certain-
ly didn't remember that piece of paper that you're talking about or
have it in my mind.
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82
Senator SPECTER. Had Mr. Meese told you that the issue did in-
volve the sale of arms to Iran when you talked to him on Novem-
ber 21st?
Judge WEBSTER. The conversation was relatively brief. I was the
one who told him what I had been informed, and he confirmed that
yes, he was aware of that, and that yes, he had seen the Finding or
a draft of it and had given his approval to it.
Senator SPECTER. Well, that is the October 5, 1986 conversation
between you and Mr. Meese, where you--
Judge WEBSTER. No, I think that would be shortly after August.
August 5th was the--
Senator SPECTER. About August 5th.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, it would have been within a few days. It
might have been that same day or a few days after that.
Senator SPECTER. Well, all right. You have this conversation with
him on August 5th. Leave out the business as to keeping informa-
tion from Lieutenant Colonel North and the Southern Air Trans-
port matters which occur on October 30th and 31st or thereabouts,
and just pick up the August 5th conversation with Mr. Meese about
the sale of arms to Iran. Also, pick up on your concern about
whether arms are being sold to a state which sponsors terrorism,
and on the information of November 21st where you have a conver-
sation with Mr. Meese about his inquiries relating to the Iranian
arms sale. Wasn't there some concern on your part about possible
violation of the Export Administration Act or the Arms Control
Export Act, that there may be some criminal overtone to this
matter.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I can tell you that there was not. Most of
those acts relate to Customs, and the Attorney General was not-
we were not thinking in terms of or speaking in terms of looking
for what kinds of laws had been violated, but looking for what had
actually happened-trying to get the facts straight.
Senator SPECTER. But, there was the sale of arms to Iran and the
Export Administration Act bars the export of goods and commod-
ities to any nation which the Secretary of State has determined
supports international Communism. And Secretary Shultz had
made that determination. And the Arms Export Control Act regu-
lates transfers of arms generally and specifically bars items on the
munitions list to any nation which the President determines sup-
ports international terrorism.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I could raise the question of whether a
Presidential Finding would have superseded any Finding by the
Secretary of State, but there's really no point in that because we
were not thinking about the Export/Import Arms Control Act
which is not normally an area in which the FBI is active.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Judge Webster. My time has ex-
pired. I'll come back to it the next round.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator Specter. Sena-
tor Bradley has returned, and he has 3 minutes remaining on his
time for questioning, and then we will continue with questions by
Senator DeConcini. So, the Chair will go over to the floor to vote.
And, so, Senator DeConcini if you would take up the questioning
just as soon as Senator Bradley completes his line of questioning,
by then I should be back.
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Senator BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that we will
have Mr. Webster for a closed hearing?
Chairman BOREN. If there are any classified questions that need
to be asked, we will. We had planned to come back in open session
this afternoon at 2 o'clock. There are many more questions that
members have indicated to me they wish to address in the open
session. If members do have matters dealing with classified infor-
mation or questions about which you'd like a ruling as to whether
or not they deal with classified information, if you would inform
the Chair. Then we will decide either later this afternoon or tomor-
row about a closed session. But, we'll resume an open session at 2
o'clock. We'll complete your questions and then Senator DeCon-
cini's and see if there are others that wish to ask questions before
we break. We'll break no later than about 10 minutes to 1.
Senator BRADLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Webster, I'd like to move to another area. I appreciate your re-
sponse to the last one, and I really hope that people read your re-
sponse because I think it was an important response given our cur-
rent environment.
One of the challenges that you will face is how to take the CIA
to a new level of public acceptability and responsibility. In this con-
nection, how you conduct yourself in the position as the head of the
whole Central Intelligence apparatus is very important. To the
extent that you are almost above politics, as you have been, that is
also very important. That leads me to a question relating to the cri-
teria that you would apply to your public speeches and your writ-
ings. The question has arisen in the immediate past as to whether
the Director didn't actually become a part of the policy advocacy
process; didn't actually take a very direct and even quasi-partisan
position on issues before the Congress. And I wonder if you could
share with us the criteria you would have for determining what
you would speak out on and what you would write about.
Judge WEBSTER. I think, Senator Bradley, that first of all I would
probably proceed pretty much as I have done during the past nine
years in the FBI, and that is wherever possible and appropriate to
take advantage of opportunities to explain to the American people
the role of Central Intelligence, the need for it, how intelligence is
gathered in general terms, and, at least in those areas that can be
publicly discussed, made as clear as possible. I have great confi-
dence in the American people to support something that makes
sense and something that they know is necessary. From time to
time over the last 9 years it has been necessary for me to publicly
explain, and often defend, techniques, operations, events that are
understandably confusing to the public. And, I presume I would be
prepared to do that. I do not believe that I would be asked to, nor
would I want to engage, in any advocacy of political policy. I've
tried to stay as far away from that as I can in order not to create
the perception that I am-that either I am politically motivated or
that the quality of intelligence upon which our policymakers are
expected to act is influenced by political or personal bias. I am con-
cerned that on some campuses we are beginning to see signs that
the CIA may not be as welcome as we would like it to be. And that
concerns me because of the enormous pool of tremendously talent-
ed scholars and thinkers and analysts that we have to draw on in
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order to produce the quality analysis that makes the CIA the pre-
mier intelligence agency in the world. And, unless we continue to
have support and understanding on our campuses and in other
places of education and advanced knowledge, we are not going to
have that kind of person to continue to work in the CIA. So I need
to be out talking to those people. If your question was directed,
would I be a partisan advocate for particular causes, the answer is
no. If someone were to ask me while I was making a speech what is
behind a particular policy and I understand it, I think I would try
to answer the question in the same way that I answer similar ques-
tions in the FBI. What was the reason for the President's decision
to punish Libya for the LaBelle discotheque?
I think that needs to be explained. But I think I must be always
careful to do it in ways that would not suggest that the intelligence
is
Senator BRADLEY. Let's say that--
Senator COHEN. The Senator's time has expired. There are two
others waiting. Do you want to yield?
Senator DECONCINI. Not necessarily. But I think it's a unani-
mous consent to let him finish that question. I thought he was in
the middle of something.
Senator BRADLEY. If I could just-very quickly. Let's assume you
got a call from the White House, and there was a big vote coming
up in Congress, and then sometime in the next 3 weeks it would be
very helpful for the head of Central Intelligence to make a state-
ment that could be used in the overall effort to achieve that policy
objective.
Judge WEBSTER. I'd view that with a lot of suspicion. I've had re-
quests from time to time to state views on such things as the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and I think that in the sense
that it effects anything-any legislation that effects the CIA-I
would be entitled to make a statement. But just simply to roll
drum beats to make room for high level speeches is not the role of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
Senator BRADLEY. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator COHEN. Senator DeConcini.
Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Judge Webster, I want to go back in time because I've never
quite understood the problem in the Donovan confirmation and the
FBI's involvement in that hearing. At the time of that confirma-
tion hearing for the Secretary of Labor, before the Senate Commit-
tee on Labor and Human Resources, the FBI told the committee
that its investigation of Mr. Donovan had been "thorough and com-
plete." Those are quotes. And, "had surfaced no information which
would reflect unfavorable upon Mr. Donovan." Yet, according to a
teletype sent from the New York field office to the FBI Headquar-
ters, dated January 10, 1981, with which I presume you're familiar.
The Tumcon cases Masselli tapes revealed conversations in
which schemes to defraud the New York Transit Authority,
through the use of a phony minority business enterprise, JOPEL
Construction Company, and other misdeeds of overcharging and
what have you, were discussed by William Masselli and the execu-
tives at Shiavone Construction Company. Mr. Donovan and his
fellow Schiavone executives are now standing trial, as you know, in
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New York on evidence taken from these tapes and other evidence.
I want to know, Judge Webster, can you tell the committee why
these serious allegations about Ray Donovan's social and business
ties to organized crime and his possible involvement in fraudulent
contracts were not revealed to the Senate Labor Committee during
the confirmation proceedings.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator DeConcini, there was a lot that was
wrong with that investigation. And in extensive hearings chaired
by Senator Hatch those facts came out fully.
Senator DECONCINI. In the confirmation hearings? Excuse me?
Judge WEBSTER. In confirmation hearings and even in separate
hearings before that. The FBI executive who made that statement I
really believe thought it was true at the time, but the investigation
was not as thorough and complete as we would expect in any
present day confirmation. It was done in a manner consistent with
past Presidential nominations, but in reviewing it I have to say
very candidly that the summaries that we provided the White
House, which was consistent with past practice, were inadequate-
inadequate to alert the President's counsel that there were serious
and specific problems that he might want to address and, in fact,
inform the Congress about. When we gathered up what informa-
tion that we had-and we really did try in that one to reach fur-
ther than we had in the other Cabinet offices. We didn't capture it
all. Very substantial changes have taken place since that time and
the systems-the automation systems, the rules, the practices.
Even the form in which we supply information to the White House
with respect to Presidential nominations has been substantially
changed so that nothing we say will mislead.
Senator DECONCINI. Judge Webster, when the confirmation hear-
ings and report was sent up did you have already in your posses-
sion the January 10, 1981, teletype from the New York FBI office?
Or do you know?
Judge WEBSTER. I just don't know the answer to that, Senator.
Senator DECONCINI. Could you find out for me? I'm concerned
that this type of information--
Judge WEBSTER. We'll certainly answer it promptly for the
record.
Senator DECONCINI. I'm concerned that this type of information,
a copy of which was provided to me by the District Attorney's
office, may not have been given to the Labor Committee. Do you
know what happened to it? Maybe it wasn't sent to the headquar-
ters as they say it was. But if it was sent to headquarters, how
would it not wind up in the file for either your review or your chief
deputy's review?
Judge WEBSTER. I'm confident today that would not happen.
Senator DECONCINI. It would not because of procedural changes?
Judge WEBSTER. Yes.
Senator DECONCINI. Did anyone from the White House, or par-
ticularly Fred Fielding, request that these allegations, or this type
of information, not be sent to the committee?
Judge WEBSTER. There was one time when there was some ques-
tion about further interviews and whether further interviews were
necessary, and I think Mr. Fielding said that he didn't believe that
they were. And I believe that our agent working the case didn't
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86
think so either. But I know of no situation in which White House
counsel intentionally withheld any information the White House
counsel had. I think the problem was that we gave some of that
information in such summarized form and then those working with
it really believed that that information was all incorporated in
some very general summaries. Now we provide all derogatory in-
formation in the form in which it is received, so there can be no
doubt about what the counsel was actually told.
Senator DECONCINI. Judge Webster, my question is did the White
House, particularly Fielding or anybody else, request that these
particular allegations or any other allegations not be forwarded to
the committee?
Judge WEBSTER. Senator DeConcini, I can recall no such request
by the White House.
Senator DECONCINI. Can you also provide us-perhaps you don't
have this at your fingertips-when you did learn of these allega-
tions and the information which was not available to the commit-
tee during Mr. Donovan's confirmation process, and then how
much time elapsed before you transmitted it. If that period of time
was longer than a reasonable time of 30 or 60 days, why was it not
transmitted?
Judge WEBSTER. I am trying to relate your question to what I
knew. I did not know the substance of Mr. Mullins testimony until
later that summer when I-as I recall, I received a letter from Sen-
ator Hatch referring to the testimony, and suggesting that perhaps
it was incomplete. It had to do with information that was on
lengthy wiretaps, some 1500 hours of wiretaps in New Jersey.
One-as I recall one, possibly two references to Mr. Donovan's com-
pany had been made on those tapes that had been reported to me
before the confirmation began, with the information that those ref-
erences did not refer to anything criminal, any criminal activity.
Senator DECONCINI. You mean as to the information that was re-
ferred to you.
Judge WEBSTER. That was referred to me.
Senator DECONCINI. Not as to the whole tapes.
Judge WEBSTER. No. No. The full tape was not actually tran-
scribed until the Independent Counsel was appointed, and it took
some 6 or 8 of his people several weeks to listen to those tapes, and
I think that they found 5 or 6 additional references to the company
and possibly even to Mr. Donovan in doing that.
That information was really not available to us in the form in
which it was held. We did know that there were references in the
tape to Mr. Donovan-rather, to his company, at least-and that
information was not given to the Senate during his confirmation. I
did not know that--
Senator DECONCINI. That it was not given.
Judge WEBSTER. That is was not given, and I did not know that it
had been asked for.
Senator DECONCINI. Judge Webster, can you tell us what is the
procedure that you have implemented to prevent this from happen-
ing today? If we had a nominee for another Cabinet position, what
guarantees do we have that, in fact, the Director or your chief sub-
ordinate would have all the information that you know of within
the Federal Bureau, and that all available information would be
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87
sent up to the appropriate committee and its Chairman and rank-
ing member.
Judge WEBSTER. I missed the first part. You say--
Senator DECONCINI. What procedures have been implemented
now so that this won't happen again and doesn't happen now.
What is the change in procedures?
Judge WEBSTER. We now have procedures for calling in field in-
formation and for automating the information that is available to
us, both from the field and at headquarters. We have procedures
for identifying derogatory information and giving it in the form in
which it is received to the White House so that it is not incorporat-
ed in some sort of gross summary of the facts. I think the review-
ing procedures have been tightened up, and I could supply for the
record, if you wish, a list of those changes.
Senator DECONCINI. I would like to see them-Judge-if you
could provide them. My time is up.
But let me say that I think this is very candid of you and very
typical of the way you operate. Indeed, it appears from the little bit
that I know, and I am not on the Labor Committee, that indeed
something was left out in that confirmation hearing-a very impor-
tant something as to Mr. Donovan. I ended up voting against him,
and I can't even remember exactly why now, but in retrospect I am
very glad I did. But it might have been my concern that all the
information wasn't there. Still, I can appreciate that errors happen
or procedures change. I think it would be helpful to this Senator
and perhaps the record, if you would supply what those changes
are and what the process is now, by providing a summary position
paper which could be put in the record.
Judge WEBSTER. I would be happy to do that. (See p. 237.)
Senator DECONCINI. Thank you, Judge Webster. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator DeConcini.
Let me explain to the members of the committee the situation in
which we find ourselves. We have some members of the committee
who have been waiting to ask their questions who cannot return
this afternoon. As I understand it, they have other conflicts. What
I would like to do is give them an opportunity, Judge Webster, if
we could go on maybe another 20 minutes or so this morning.
Judge WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, I am at your service, as long as
you would like.
Chairman BOREN. We will return about 2:10 after that. If I could
ask my colleagues, since we've had the Judge here now for almost
3 hours, if there is any way you can constrain the length of. the
questions. We want to give you every opportunity and we'll have
more rounds of questioning this afternoon. But we want to give you
a chance, because I know some have scheduling problems.
Senator Hecht.
Senator HECHT. Good afternoon Judge, how are you?
Judge WEBSTER. Good afternoon Senator.
Senator HECHT. Judge, in my particular State of Nevada, there's
been a lot of question about how you have handled some FBI
agents and I'm bringing this up because this is very relative to
your confirmation, how you hope to handle CIA agents.
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Maybe the questions I'd like to submit have been raised by news-
papers, the Las Vegas Sun, with your permission I'm going to have
a lot of these articles included in the record.
[The newspaper, articles referred to follow:]
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89
-?' " it
I !~i !,:I[,
alwal
LL Ir
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Webster
-faces quiz
about FBI
'ven 0ett:a'.:-
By Chris ChrysfIT 8
United Press International
WASHINGTON - A Senate In-
telligence Committee member
said Wednesday he will question
FBI Director William Webster
during confirmation hearings on
his nomination to head the Central
Intelligence Agency about aUega?
tions a federal judge was hounded
in an FBI "vendetta" that led to
his impeachment.
Sen. Chic Hecht, R-Nev., said
he. will ask Webster about - the
mission of Joseph Yablonaky, who
headed.the Las Vegas, Nev., FBI;
-office-from 19801983 while Harry
Claiborne was a federal Judge,
and was. known as the "King of
Sting."
"Why did the head of the FBI
send him (Yabloneky) to, Not:
vada?" Hecht said. "Webster *M:
be questioned on these i4sues. I
will do it. We'll ask and find oilt:'.
Webster has been nominated t&
succeed William Casey, wbp'',ia
suffering from brain cancer,. as
CIA chief, but no date has been ' et
for the confirmation hearings' '
Claiborne and others, Includig$
former Sen. Paul Laxalt,.R-Nev.
said Yablonsky came to Nevada
bent on "getting" the judge,
Laxalt, who left public office iq
January and is considering a pre.
idential bid, said he also was op RR
FBI "hit list" promoted:"bY:
Yabloneky, which he considet
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Senator HECHT. As you are aware, last year the Senate voted to
impeach Judge Claiborne and remove him from office. At the same
time, the Senate approved an investigation into the way Judge
Claiborne was targeted by the FBI and the conduct of those who
conducted the investigation. Are you satisfied with that investiga-
tion, headed by then FBI Las Vegas Chief Joseph Yablonsky, was
conducted properly by the book?
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Hecht, I am satisfied that with respect
to the investigation of Judge Claiborne, the head of our office in
Las Vegas carried out his responsibilities in the manner appropri-
ate and in a lawful manner. I guess that's your question, did he
break any laws or break any rules. There were other things that
occurred out there that I'm not so proud of, but in terms of the in-
vestigation, I am satisfied that there was a proper predicate to ini-
tiate the investigation. That evidence came forward that formed
the basis for a Grand Jury investigation and an indictment. There
was a hung jury, and the case was retried. Senator Claiborne was
convicted. He has exhausted his appeals before he came before this
Senate on impeachment charges. In no where in any of that did I
find anything that would require a disciplinary action or adminis-
trative action of my officials out there. That investigation was
under the supervision of the public integrity section of the Depart-
ment of Justice. I was a participant in passing on and carefully re-
viewing various proposals to deal with Senator Claiborne during
that investigation.
Senator WARNER. Judge Claiborne.
Judge WEBSTER. I beg your pardon. What did I say?
Senator WARNER. He was here for only a short time.
Chairman BOREN. I think you referred to him as Senator Clai-
borne.
Judge WEBSTER. I would withdraw and apologize for that. But I
won't say that I agreed with everything that was proposed to be
done, because I didn't, and I exercised my responsibility to modify
various proposals. But I am not aware that the special agent in
charge went beyond his authority when I gave it to him.
Senator HECHT. Why was Judge Claiborne targeted by Mr. Yab-
lonsky?
Judge WEBSTER. I would, Senator, very respectfully disagree with
the term targeting: He was not targeted. Information came to the
FBI through a fugitive in, at that time, another country, that he
wanted in exchange for favorable consideration of his situation to
give evidence to the government of a bribe paid by him to then Mr.
Claiborne, and I think-I'm not sure of the exact time-of a bribe
to Judge Claiborne. We interviewed the prospective witness, got
further information. Other collaborative information came from
other individuals including a former Assistant United State Attor-
ney. We went forward with that investigation. And in the course of
that investigation, evidence of income tax evasion came forward
and that formed the basis for an additional charge, in fact, for the
charge for which he was finally convicted. That was handled with
the Internal Revenue Service and of course the United States At-
torneys out there were in charge of the investigation locally.
Senator HECHT. For the record I want to point out that the indi-
vidual which was from another country was an American citizen,
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and a man of questionable integrity, the owner of a licensed broth-
el, and on this particular type of an individual you relied on his
testimony.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator, we didn't rely on his testimony, we
took his testimony, and reached out for other collaborating facts to
determine whether or not he was telling the truth. We get informa-
tion from the worst kind of people. [General laughter.]
And it doesn't mean their evidence is untrue. It means we have
to be careful about it.
Senator HECHT. Why did you send Mr. Yablonsky to Las Vegas?
Judge WEBSTER. I sent, I chose Mr. Yablonsky for Las Vegas, and
I take responsibility for having done so. He was doing a very good
job in the Cincinnati office. He was, he had developed a significant
reputation in undercover activity. I was concerned that while we
had substantial indications of organized crime involvement in Las
Vegas and the casinos with tentacles reaching from Chicago and
Kansas City, we had not been successful in dealing with organized
crime out there, and I thought he was the one to go out and do
something about it.
Senator HECHT. How do you feel about the situation now?
Judge WEBSTER. I think he did a very good job. Las Vegas is a
difficult climate in which to live, and I think he made some mis-
takes, some personal mistakes, for which he was accountable and
was held to account. But in terms of his investigative efforts, when
I look at the indictments that came down during his tenure there, I
am very pleased that I sent him.
Senator HECHT. How often were you briefed by Mr. Yablonsky
during the course of the Claiborne investigation?
Judge WEBSTER. The normal course of events is that the special
agents in charge do their reporting to the Criminal Investigative
Division, and then I receive informational notes from that division
which manages the programs. And that is the way this generally
occurred. From time to time, Mr. Yablonsky would request author-
ity to do certain things of a sensitive nature, and those would be
elevated to senior officials and often to me for determination. If I
thought it were necessary to talk to him personally, I would do so,
and on at least one trip, to Las Vegas, I had an extensive confer-
ence with him and with the people out there with respect to their
work.
Senator HECHT. Did you ever caution him to stay within the
bounds of the law during the investigation?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't know that I ever used those terms, be-
cause he never proposed to do anything outside the law. But from
time to time, I exercised my responsibility in limiting certain ac-
tivities in order to protect-what I considered to be-to protect the
investigation from possible compromise by a very wily subject.
Senator HECHT. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I wish to have
time to continue this pursuit of questions at a later time.
Chairman BOREN. Certainly Senator Hecht. We'll have more
rounds of questions this afternoon and every member of the com-
mittee will have a chance to ask every question they wish to ask.
Senator HECHT. Thank you very much.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Cranston.
I
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STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN CRANSTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome you to
this committee.
Judge WEBSTER. Thank you, Senator.
Senator CRANSTON. You come before us at a time of strain and
stress for the Intelligence Community in the wake of the Iran/
Contra matters. It is very important to have someone of experience
and integrity and very good judgment assuming the role of leading
the Intelligence Community. From all that I've gathered this far,
you're highly qualified for this nomination, and subject to what-
ever may come up in the scope of these hearings, I expect you're
going to be confirmed, and I will be one of those very happy to join
in that confirmation.
I do want to ask you some questions that relate to something
that happened in California a while ago. This hearing gives me the
opportunity to do that. According to press reports the FBI started
an investigation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine some three years ago. Some of my questions you may not want
to answer in open session, some you may want to go back to look at
the files, but let me ask you what prompted your investigation at
that time of the PFLP?
Judge WEBSTER. Senator, I appreciate your understanding the
constraints that I am under in responding to that question. The
PFLP is a world-wide organization which has been extremely vio-
lent in its activities. It has claimed credit and been involved in
such incidents as the shootings in Munich and the hi-jacking of the
famous plane that went to Entebbe. A number of Americans have
been victims of the PFLP terrorist activity. There was a substantial
basis under the Attorney General guidelines to conduct investiga-
tions of this organization and the individuals in that organization
who might-who we had reason to believe might be engaged in ter-
rorist activity. That was the basis for opening the investigation.
Senator CRANSTON. Did you have any reason to believe that the
group was actually engaged in or planning to engage in terrorist
activities in this country?
Judge WEBSTER. Taken as a whole, I think we had reason to be-
lieve that there were plans in operation of a terrorist nature. With
all that is going on in the Middle East we have an awareness of
infrastructures in the United States which could form the basis for
support mechanisms if individual groups chose to retaliate or to
engage in terrorist activities here in this country, and that goes
across a number of such organizations. The individuals who were
arrested in California had not been found to have engaged them-
selves in terrorist activity.
Senator CRANSTON. I understand that the Immigration Service
actually carried out the arrest of the PFLP members for deporta-
tion purposes. But the arrests were based on information provided
by the FBI concerning the organization and activities of the indi-
viduals, is that correct?
Judge WEBSTER. I believe that is correct, Senator.
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95
Senator CRANSTON. Press reports allege there was mistreatment
of the arrested people by the Immigration Service agents, not by
the FBI agents. Were FBI agents present during the arrest?
Judge WEBSTER. FBI agents were present at the arrest for the
purpose of being in a position to interview any of those arrested
who wished to cooperate. We did not make the arrest.
Senator CRANSTON. Are you looking into the charges of mistreat-
ment of the people during the arrest by the Immigration officials,
or do you have any information on that?
Judge WEBSTER. Of course I have spoken to Mr. Allen Nelson,
the head of the Immigration Service, and he has ordered an Office
of Professional Responsibility investigation into the allegations. We
had originally started a civil right investigation but were advised
by the Department that we did not have a basis for that and that
we should close our investigation and rely upon what should be de-
veloped by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which was
looking into it. We've also conducted some internal inquiries as a
result of some of the news reports, particularly an article by Mr.
Anthony Lewis, that referred to mistreatment of a woman. I think
her name is Vitar; it's close to that, Vitar. We do not believe-we
know that no agent of the FBI participated in it. We do not have
any evidence of any others. Mr. Nelson is looking for any that he
can find, and the attorney for the woman has not made her avail-
able for us to interview, so that we can do anything further about
it. But if there is any way for us to put that to rest, I certainly
want to do so.
Senator CRANSTON. What was the reason for the arrests being
made for deportation purposes of the alleged members? Was that a
technical, legal reason, were they apprehended for deportation be-
cause they were "members of a Communist" organization.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Cranston, I believe that some of them
were out of status and that would be information, I believe, devel-
oped by the INS. But all of them were arrested because they are
alleged to be members of a world-wide Communist organization
which under the McCarran Act makes them eligible for deporta-
tion tion as foreign nationals.
Senator CRANSTON. So in a way, it was like arresting a gangster
for parking by a fire hydrant? Do you think that we need to revise
the laws that are available for this purpose? Are we using the
wrong tools to address a legitimate concern about terrorism and
terrorist operatives in the United States?
Judge WEBSTER. That's entirely up to Congress, because in this
particular case if these individuals had been United States citizens,
there would not have been a basis for their arrest.
Senator CRANSTON. Is there any law that would enable you to
focus more narrowly on aliens who are actively involved in clandes-
tine terrorist activities, rather than needing this broader law about
membership in a Communist apparatus? In your opinion, would it
be helpful to have a law that would be more precise?
Judge WEBSTER. I think it would be helpful to have a law that
was more precise and was treated as a more serious incident than
just civil deportation.
Senator CRANSTON. Under what circumstances does the FBI con-
duct warrantless searches for intelligence purposes? Is the PFLP
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96
the kind of group that might fit the criteria for a warrantless
search based on inherent executive powers?
Judge WEBSTER. Our warrantless searches are based upon, first
they are based upon the inherent authority of the President to pro-
tect the national security and his ability to delegate that authority
to the Attorney General, who has in turn, formulated foreign coun-
terintelligence guidelines which include international terrorist ac-
tivity. I'm not able to respond to the question specifically because
the guidelines themselves are classified. I simply can give you the
basis upon which, if a search were conducted, it would be under
that line of authority that I described to you.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Cranston, we could either pursue that
further in a closed session or if you wish to have the Director
answer a classified question in writing, that could also be done and
made a part of the classified part of our record.
Senator CRANSTON. If you could respond in writing, that would
be helpful.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Cranston will direct the question in
writing and there could be a response in writing which would be a
classified portion of the record.
Senator CRANSTON. My time is about up, so I, thank you very
much.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Warner.
Senator WARNER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Again, Judge Web-
ster, I'm speaking as a citizen. I'm very pleased that you are will-
ing to take on this challenge and put in an additional period of
public service.
I want to return to the discussions that I think my colleagues,
Senator Nunn and Senator Cohen probed about the role of the
President's chief advisor on intelligence matters and the relation-
ship with a President. And your reference to the thought as to
what role politics plays in this. Would you care to sort of set the
foundation here of your views as to how you hope to relate to your
President and particularly what role, if any, politics plays. Now I
notice that you've never sought political office; you've apparently
have not been a member of a political party; and with your nomi-
nation, we've come full circle from your predecessor who was one
of the campaign managers for the President, to a person, yourself,
who has not been affiliated in any way. I think it would be helpful
to me if you would clarify your views with respect to what if any
role politics plays in your discharge of your responsibilities in the
office and with your relationship with the President.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Warner, I have to make a confession
that for the first 30 years of my life I harbored the idea that I
wanted to be a United States Senator. [General laughter.]
Chairman BOREN. Fortunately, that may be the most damaging
admission so far. [General laughter.]
Judge WEBSTER. Fortunately, as you see from the gentleman
who-distinguished gentleman who introduced me this morning, I
didn't have to pursue that arduous task. But I do believe that there
are certain jobs in which you, if you're going to hold them proper-
ly, you have to stand away from political activity and political con-
cerns even to the point of missing some fund-raising dinners from
time to time, which hasn't been all that arduous.
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Senator WARNER. I clearly agree with you in terms of partisan
political activities. But the CIA, particularly now that we're going
to strip from the National Security Council the responsibility,
which I doubt they ever really had, for covert operations.
You're going to be the Chief Operator for this President and per-
haps the next President. Of covert operations, and indeed the very
essence of a covert operation, it is a political judgment by a Presi-
dent that certain assets of this nation shall be employed in a for-
eign land to further the interest of our country, primarily our na-
tional security. Now that's a political decision. Let's suppose that
you were called into the Oval Office by a President, and he indicat-
ed that he has made a finding, that it is his judgment that we
should pursue a certain covert action. Having had some knowledge
of this beforehand, you did your own independent research and you
wish to disagree with the President. I m sure, because I have
known you personally and professionally, you would in the strong-
est of terms necessary, take him by the collar, say Mr. President,
you've received bad advice and I caution you in the interest of our
country. But then after receiving your advice and all the other
advice, he makes a decision, we will, the United States, follow this
covert course of action. It seems to me that you have one of two
choices and they are very clear. You either salute, march off and
implement that covert action. Or you submit your resignation. Now
have I succinctly stated that case as you understand it?
Judge WEBSTER. I think that's correct Senator, and I think the
choice would depend upon whether I thought that my disagree-
ment was so fundamental and that the President's decision was so
arbitrary that I could not remain a part of it. I don't expect that in
positions like Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the
FBI that in relation to the Attorney General, that you have the
right to thumb your nose at the authority that has been placed
there by the American people in the President, just because you
disagree. But if your disagreement is fundamental, and you know
that the action is arbitrary and wrong, you can't stay, and you
cannot in conscience support it, you've got to leave. There isn't any
option.
Senator WARNER. I'm most reassured by that response and it
clarifies that area. Now I bring you to an example on the 30th of
October which we reviewed in the hearing this morning. Attorney
General Meese asked the FBI to suspend its investigation. Did you,
at that time, try to make any independent inquiry into why that
was being asked and to whether or not you should exercise your
judgment to say to the Attorney General, I disagree with the pro-
priety of that course of action or did you just accept his request
and act accordingly?
Judge WEBSTER. No, Senator. The first thing that I did was to
ask my own executive subordinates who are in charge of those pro-
grams whether suspension would adversely infect the investigation.
In other words, I sought a professional opinion on the impact of the
request. From what I already knew, that there were sensitive arms
initiatives going on in Iran and efforts to release the hostages, and
that the hostage activity was getting sensitive, that was in my view
a reasonable request with which I did not disagree because my own
people had told me that it would not get in the way of our oper-
1
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U8
ation. I was careful, I thought, to include in my confirming memo-
randum making it a matter of record, that I wanted to know if at
any time, it became a problem. And I think that this is one of the
important aspects of my responsibility if I'm selected for DCI-that
in these findings, or these decisions, that we make sure that they
be revisited, that they be reviewed and that they be tested in the
light of new circumstances. And I wanted to be sure that in that
particular case that I knew if something changed-why we should
be back in to this rather low-level investigation if it became impor-
tant. They were to tell me, and they would have.
Senator WARNER. You've had an extensive record of distin-
guished public service and now you take on this new post following
the confirmation of the Senate of which I am certain. Do you bring
to this office your own agenda, a set of goals that you would like to
see accomplished and would those goals in any way vary from
those of your immediate predecessor? Or from, should we say, the
traditional role of the Director of Central Intelligence?
Judge WEBSTER. I hesitate to answer that question, because natu-
rally, I don't know all of the goals of my predecessor. I know the
many great things he achieved for the CIA in terms of morale and
resources and momentum. I think it would perhaps be a mistake
for me to speak as to his goals when he is not able to speak for
them himself.
I tend to a traditional view of the role of the Director of Central
Intelligence. I believe that the most important thing that that
agency does, that the CIA does, and the coordinate elements of the
intelligence community is to gather intelligence-intelligence
about capabilities abroad, intelligence about intentions abroad-
that will help the policymakers make sound decisions. Not to make
them for them, but to provide them with information upon which
they can give the maximum amount of confidence in making their
decision. I think it's my responsibility to say in the councils of
which I am a member what I think that intelligence means. But
not to shape it or manipulate it but to give it all the integrity that
I know how.
I believe that that intelligence must come from a variety of tech-
niques including human intelligence, especially in the area of in-
tentions. If we had better human intelligence in Iran, we might
have anticipated what was going on there. Intelligence in the
street, rather than in the embassy, that's just a private opinion.
And I'm not faulting anyone, any other predecessor, I just simply
think human intelligence is very, very important because there is
really no other agency in government which can carry out that
function. There will from time to time be calls on the agency to
engage in certain kinds of covert activity-activity in furtherance
of a legitimate national foreign policy goal that would not succeed
if third countries had to face the fact that our government was
openly and militarily involved in that effort. Those efforts are con-
trolled by a careful analysis of the ideas and evolution of the plans,
a Finding by the President that supports them and authorizes
them and oversight by the Intelligence Committees of the Congress
to represent the American people in terms of what we are doing.
All of those things, I think are important responsibilities of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence and I believe, too, that it is very im-
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portant that he exercise his role as the President's principal intelli-
gence advisor.
Now if I may without pressing your time too far, I'd like to say
in that respect that I have had a conversation with the President
in the company of his chief of staff and principal advisors from the
National Security Council.
Senator WARNER. That would be Howard Baker and Frank Car-
lucci?
Judge WEBSTER. Yes, Frank was not there, but General Powell
was there in his place and memorandized the conversation. In that
conversation, I suggested that I would think it best for me to
return to the traditional role of the Director of Central Intelligence
and not be a member of the President's cabinet. The President told
me that he agreed and had come to the same conclusion. That I
think will help to minimize the perception that the Director of
Central Intelligence is a political officer of the President's, in the
President's immediate political staffing. But I felt that it was very
important that in making that move, it be very clear that I would
continue to ` have direct one on one access to the President. Both
Mr. Baker and I know Mr. Carlucci from direct conversations with
him and his deputy subscribe to that principle, as does the Presi-
dent. And I will exercise that one on one access as well as other
opportunities. I also asked for and promptly was given assurances
of what I call the awareness principle, that I be made aware of
emerging issues and be invited to attend meetings of the cabinet
and other inner circle functions in which issues that would depend
upon accurate intelligence would come to me at an early enough
date to be of assistance in guiding the President to a correct opin-
ion. So if I have access and awareness I do not need, nor want to be
involved, in a cabinet level function and I think we're all straight
on that and all in agreement on it.
Senator WARNER. Judge Webster, I thank you for those re-
sponses. I think they are among the more important ones for the
Senate to consider as we pass on your nomination. You have my
support. Good Luck.
Judge WEBSTER. Thank you.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much Senator Warner.
Judge Webster, we've kept you far past the time that I indicated
we would this morning before breaking. I think, therefore, it would
be more appropriate for the committee to wait to resume until 2:30
this afternoon. So we'll stand in recess until the hour of 2:30 this
afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 1:22 o'clock p.m., the committee was recessed, to
reconvene at 2:30 o'clock p.m., the same day.]
Chairman BOREN. We'll resume our questioning at this point. We
will continue having rounds of questions in the order that we did
this morning until the members of the committee have had an op-
portunity to complete the questions which they wish to ask. Judge
Webster, I will remind you that you are still under oath from this
morning's testimony.
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luo
Let me begin the questioning this afternoon. In regard to the
question you were asked by Senator Cohen this morning, I believe
that he quoted a newspaper article, I believe it was in early Decem-
ber, "quoting you as stating that as of that time, you felt there had
been no destruction of records in the course of the investigation
conducted by the Attorney General.
Judge WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, because I know these are impor-
tant questions, I believe I said that nothing had been called to my
attention. I didn't have a feeling about it.
Chairman BOREN. Well, I just wonder on what basis you felt that
there had been a destruction. Was it merely that nothing had been
called to your attention?
Judge WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, that's why I interrupted you be-
cause I didn't say I felt that there had not been a destruction; I just
said that we hadn't found any yet.
Chairman BOREN. You had not found any evidence of destruction
of records. Did you make any attempt on your own to check as this
matter began to unfold during that 4 day period.
Did you make any attempt to discuss the possible destruction of
records with anyone or did you endeavor to have the FBI check in
any way independently to determine whether records had been de-
stroyed?
Judge WEBSTER. Now, are we back-we're on December 5th--
Chairman BOREN. Between November the 21st and November
the 25th.
Judge WEBSTER. When I met with the Attorney General follow-
ing his and the President's announcement at the White House and
I met with-I was waiting for them when he returned to his office
in the Department of Justice. We convened a meeting there to dis-
cuss the implications of what had been announced. And during
that discussion, a question of preserving the records came up. And
it was my understanding that the Department was taking steps to
ask the appropriate officials to preserve their records.
Chairman BOREN. Did you do anything to assure-or what did
you do yourself with FBI resources to determine whether or not
any records had been destroyed?
Judge WEBSTER. The Attorney General stated that he had turned
the question of responsible criminal involvement over to the crimi-
nal division of the Department of Justice, which was considering
what, if any, statutes may have been violated. And so there-at
that point-the FBI was not authorized to conduct an investigation.
Chairman BOREN. Did you simply take the word of the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice that there had been no de-
struction of records, or did you endeavor independently to assure
that there was no destruction of records?
Judge WEBSTER. The Attorney General did not make that repre-
sentation. We discussed as a group-and I considered myself a part
of that senior management-what should be done. One of the
things that we decided that should be done was that the records
should be preserved and the Department undertook to make-to
notify those-the appropriate officials.
Now, as it happens--
Chairman BOREN. You mean, they just simply-this seems to me
to be a very naive approach in all honesty and all candor-to
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1 101
simply say, here we're dealing with people that have records in
their custody that are suspected of criminal wrongdoing. I assume
that in most cases you would simply not notify someone that you
suspect of a criminal act; we don't want you to destroy your
records now that might implicate you in any wrongdoing.
I mean, are we simply relying upon the good offices of the people
under suspicion not to destroy the records?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, we're talking about the National Security
Council. We do not have an opinion from the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice as to what criminal statutes, if any,
form the basis for a criminal investigation as of this conference
that I'm discussing and that form of notification is not unlike the
forms of notification that the Senate sends out to agencies in the
Executive branch not to destroy records.
Chairman BOREN. Well, now we go back to November 25th when
the press conference was held and it became clear that we were
into a criminal investigation.
Judge WEBSTER. That's the afternoon I'm talking about.
Chairman BOREN. The afternoon of November 25th.
On that afternoon, at that point the FBI was asked to step in, I
believe.
Judge WEBSTER. No, Mr. Chairman, the FBI was not asked to
step in until Wednesday morning. The Criminal Division was still
considering what criminal laws were implicated by what the Attor-
ney General and his staff had developed over the weekend.
Chairman BOREN. Now, Wednesday morning was what date?
Judge WEBSTER. The 26th.
Chairman BOREN. The 26th?
On the 25th, what action did you take or what assertions did you
make in terms of preserving the records?
Judge WEBSTER. Only what I have related to you, that there was
a discussion in the Attorney General's office about preserving the
records and the Attorney General undertook, through the Depart-
ment, to notify the appropriate heads to preserve the records.
Chairman BOREN. On November 26th when the FBI was called
in, what actions did you take at that point to assure the preserva-
tion of records?
Judge WEBSTER. The FBI checked to determine whether or not
the NSC records had been secured and were informed that they
had been secured the night before, on Tuesday.
Chairman BOREN. Who informed you that they had been se-
cured?
Judge WEBSTER. I'm informed that the individual who reported
this to us was Mr. Jay Stevens of the President's Counsel's office.
Chairman BOREN. The President's Counsel's office informed you
that they had been secured?
What action did you take to independently verify whether or not
they had been secured other than just taking the word of the
White House Counsel who might well have been not an unbiased
source in this matter.
Judge WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, I was in Chicago at that point.
But the agents who were involved were investigating, conducting
interviews, and I am sure they did whatever was appropriate.
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Chairman BOREN. What action have you taken to make sure they
did whatever was appropriate? What check have you made of their
actions?
We've had this report which was alluded to by the Vice Chair-
man this morning. It's been in the press that Fawn Hall, among
others, have indicated that there were large amounts of records
shredded and destroyed during this period of time.
Judge WEBSTER. Which period of time, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman BOREN. Well, from November 21st on.
And, therefore, I'm wondering what independent check you made
or what personal attention you gave to the protection and preser-
vation of those records at the time when it would be somewhat, I
think, negligent to simply rely upon the assurances of say, the
President's Counsel's office.
Judge WEBSTER. Well-that was the first check that was made. I
can't answer because I said I was in Chicago. But the-I received
reports from time to time from my officials on the investigative
steps that were taking place. And when the Independent Counsel
was appointed, he, of course, assumed responsibility on December
19th.
Chairman BOREN. On December 19th?
Judge WEBSTER. He was appointed on December 19th. He asked
us to continue our investigations until he actually took over.
Chairman BOREN. Who took physical custody of those records?
In other words, were they put under lock and key, under guard?
Who took physical custody? Do you know? Of those documents in
the period-Say if we start with November 21st, when the Attor-
ney General began his inquiry on through the morning of Novem-
ber 26th when the FBI was officially called in up to the date in De-
cember when the Special Counsel was appointed-who assumed re-
sponsibility for physical control and custody of the documents in
the period from November 21st through the date in December
when the Independent Prosecutor was appointed?
Judge WEBSTER. I'm informed by Mr. Clarke, who is in direct
charge of that investigation who is present here this morning, the
Assistant Director, that agents were sent promptly to the National
Security Council to verify that they were in fact sealed and to
make arrangements to have access to the sealed documents for in-
spection and investigation.
Chairman BOREN. So, an agent, you may feel free to turn to Mr.
Clarke, on what date were agents sent to verify that the documents
were sealed in a manner in which they could not be tampered
with?
Mr. CLARKE. On the 26th.
Chairman BOREN. That was on the 26th.
Let me go back to the question of your colleagues and associates
bringing to you concerns. Senator Cohen asked you this morning
about colleagues, I believe the Deputy Director Mr. Revell and
others had mentioned to you concerns about the activities of Colo-
nel North.
I want to recall your answers as to what kinds of concerns your
colleagues brought to you about Colonel North?
Judge WEBSTER. Well these concerns which we discussed at vari-
ous times had to do with a free-wheeling kind of atmosphere. I
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want to be careful of what I'm saying about someone who is not
charged here. I think we worried about this influence in the Na-
tional Security Council. He was a very gung ho person, a very
tunnel visioned, outgoing-rather result oriented without what I
could only term a broader gauge approach to the implications of
what he was doing.
That may or may not be true. That was the kind of concern that
we had-that these think tanks might turn into action tanks, and
that we might not know about it.
Chairman BOREN. ' Did you have any question as to whether or
not he was acting within the bounds of instructions or powers or
authority given to him by those above him?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I think there was some anxiety on our
part to be sure that that was the case, but we were never-we were
never-I know that Mr. Revell was checking-we were never
tasked that I can remember to do anything so it didn't come into
an issue of his authority. But there was just some general concern
that something foolhardy might take place without the proper
scrutiny by others who might have a more balanced judgment.
Chairman BOREN. Roughly, during what period of time did you
and Mr. Revell and perhaps others in the Bureau have discussions
among yourselves regarding concern about Colonel North?
Judge WEBSTER. It was going on for a long time. I don't want to
suggest that we were panicked by it or that we were-we had high
anxieties pains. We just regarded him as a different kind of person
than we normally associate with the National Security Council and
its proper function. And we tried to be a little more watchful about
the activities in which he took a role.
Chairman BOREN. To whom did you or Mr. Revell express these
concerns that you felt over this period of time?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, it was more of a matter of opinion expres-
sion rather than asking anybody to do anything about it. I dis-
cussed this with the Attorney General. He was aware-he was
aware of Ollie North as the kind of personality that he was and my
concern that we stay on top of what was going on in the National
Security Council to be sure that things were not getting out of
hand.
Chairman BOREN. Now we know that on October 30th, there was
this memorandum we have referred to where this person in the
Justice Department was quoted as expressing concern about the
possible criminal prosecution of Colonel North. You've said that
over a period of time, you, Mr. Revell and perhaps others had dis-
cussions among yourselves about concern as to the judgment of
Colonel North.
Judge WEBSTER. I think that's it, in judgment. I don't think any
of us questioned his regard for the law and certainly he was a lika-
ble kind of person, but he--
Chairman BOREN. You had some discussions at least with the At-
torney General about it. You had--
Judge WEBSTER. In general-in general terms, yes.
Chairman BOREN. In general terms.
You had the investigation of Southern Air commencing earlier
which was suspended on October the 3rd. I presume the investiga-
tion was of whether or not appropriate or inappropriate activities
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were being undertaken to aid the resistance in Nicaragua. I pre-
sume that those investigations might have also touched upon con-
cern about Colonel North as well. I'm sure Colonel North's name
would have popped up in that he was very much involved in the
recruitment and raising of funds for these various operations.
My question is did you ever express this concern to the President
as to whether or not the President was fully aware of activities of
Colonel North?
Judge WEBSTER. No, I did not. I didn't have any solid information
in that area at all that would have warranted my expressing that
kind of opinion even to the Attorney General.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Cohen?
Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, the question about the memo
should not be seen as raising exaggerated concerns on the part of
the committee, Judge Webster. Part of the difficulty is, as Senator
Moynihan pointed out earlier, there have been several occasions in
the past several years, including the mining of the harbors in Nica-
ragua and several other cases in which the committee was not noti-
fied of certain items, and then we had an Assistant Secretary of
State come up and publicly acknowledge that he thought he had
successfully circumvented the -nature of this specific question
asked.
And I think the question that was posed to you was perhaps in-
artfully asked. I don't know why, in question No. 3, that we said on
what date did you learn, either directly or indirectly, from sources
other than public media. I don't know why we excluded the public
media, but we did. And, for that reason, you concluded that it was
not necessary to inform the committee about this memo.
It really comes down to how specific do we have to be? Do we
always have to ask the right question or be precluded from getting
at least the spirit of the answer we are looking for. I think that is
the context in which many of the questions are now being asked of
you. Had it not been for the Special Prosecutor-Independent
Counsel-we would not have known about this and we didn't learn
about it until last evening. And so it raises an issue as to how spe-
cific we have to be in the future in terms- of getting information.
With respect to that--
Judge WEBSTER. May I say something about that, Senator? I cer-
tainly agree with what you are saying. As I pointed out in my
statement to you that the public source thing was only part of the
equation. The other equation was that there was just simply noth-
ing in that memorandum that pointed towards the illegal activities
of U.S. government officials, which is what the question asked for.
And I don't think any of us felt that it was included in that equa-
tion. And not that we were trying to hide anything from you. I
didn't even remember that memorandum.
Senator COHEN. For the benefit of the press who has been inquir-
ing-it has nothing to do with Iran. Colonel North himself is not
mentioned in the memo. But it does, according to your answer, in-
clude that a Justice Department official, based on her reading of
newspaper articles concluded that Colonel North might be involved
in a future criminal probe by a Special Prosecutor concerning U.S.
activities in Central America.
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So, there was at least some concern at a certain level that he
might be prosecuted at some future time.
I guess the question I have is that if, in fact, you were worried
about the influence of Colonel North within NSC as you have just
stated to Senator Boren, if in fact you were concerned about NSC
being involved in a covert operation as far as actually carrying out
the covert operation, why weren't you also concerned about the
possible destruction of records once the matter started to come to
public light and there was going to be an investigation?
In other words, if you have a man who, according to one official,
may be subject to criminal prosecution sometime in the future, you
have concerns about an 'individual who is gung ho and perhaps a
bit too aggressive or whatever, are generally concerned about his
activities in terms of judgment, and then a matter of this magni-
tude erupts suddenly-now got a major investigation or inquiry
going-undergoing the process, why wouldn't you also have a con-
cern about what would be taking place over that week-in that 4
or 5 day period-about who's in charge of the NSC? What's hap-
pening in that office? I didn't detect that in your response.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, if you're asking me to inquire into my
state of mind, which I think you are, you have to get rid of that
memorandum that supplied some information about-that had had
attached to it a note that the government official-Bob, maybe that
ought to be shown to-I just had no recollection-that was not in
my mind. It was-and not considered to be important. I. really still
don't consider it to be important.
Be it the substance of the memorandum or the comment of the
United States Attorney. So what I had, I think it--
Senator COHEN. Does it adopt any importance in your mind now
after the fact, looking back saying that here's a man who may be
under possible indictment by a Special Prosecutor for perhaps ob-
struction of justice?
Judge WEBSTER. No, because the department official was just ob-
serving what was in the newspaper. With no extra information at
all on that subject. But I think your question is a legitimate one
about preservation of records.
I was not-I was frankly not concerned over the weekend, be-
cause at that time, I did not believe that there was concern about a
criminal violation touching on the Iranian arms shipment. I had
been informed that there was a Finding, that it had been reviewed
by the Attorney General, and that the action was lawful. I had no
reason to believe that either the National Security Advisor or Colo-
nel North had any reason to conceal information about a lawful ac-
tivity.
If that was naivete, I confess to it. But sometimes in 20-20 hind-
sight, things seem a lot clearer than they did at the time. That's
the way it was. That was the way we were looking.
When we became aware of the new issue-that is the diversion
of funds to the Contras-it may be that I and indeed the other
members of the senior management of the Department should have
been more aggressive in more rapidly freezing information. I be-
lieve, and I can't comment on this without getting into the Inde-
pendent Counsel's business, that any damage that was done was
done prior to that Tuesday afternoon meeting. And, as I said, the
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FBI, who was given jurisdiction, moved in promptly on its own to
make sure those areas were taken care of.
Now, you can say yes we should have done it a day earlier. And I
won't quarrel with that. I'm certainly willing to be second-guessed,
and I try to second guess myself on that. But I can only tell you
the way it was and how it appeared to me.
Senator COHEN. On Southern Air Transport, what was the
nature of the FBI's investigation into Southern Air Transport that
began in late October after a plane was shot down in Nicaragua?
Judge WEBSTER. The plane was shot down in mid-October or
early October. It did not involve-it was not a Southern Air air-
plane. But reports circulated quickly in the newspapers that the
plane that had started in El Salvador and it landed-it crashed in
Nicaragua, had been maintained in some way at the Florida facili-
ty of Southern Air Transport. And so we opened a preliminary in-
quiry--
Senator COHEN. What was the nature of the inquiry?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, the nature of the inquiry was to ask for
records which were not readily destructible. That is records from
official agencies about the tail number, registration--
Senator COHEN. What was the purpose of it-to find whether
there was a violation on Congressional ban on assistance to Nicara-
gua? What was its purpose?
Judge WEBSTER. I think it was a Neutrality Act predicate, that
is, whether or not we were furnishing arms or anything of that
kind that was specifically banned by statute, and to a neutral
nation-I mean to enemies of a nation with whom we are not at
war. And we were looking to see if there was a connection. We
wanted some records. We had an informant. We had interviewed
the informant. All that we needed to do at that point was to have a
second interview with the informant.
Senator COHEN. Now, when you were contacted by the Attorney
General's office-the Attorney General or Oliver North had con-
tacted your office?
Judge WEBSTER. Mr. Trott, the Associate Attorney General,
called me.
Senator COHEN. On behalf of the Attorney General?
Judge WEBSTER. On behalf of the Attorney General.
Senator COHEN. OK. And he said that he would ask that you
would delay for 10 days so that you wouldn't jeopardize the sensi-
tive negotiations?
Judge WEBSTER. I want to emphasize that he said if we would
suspend for 10 days any non-urgent investigative business.
Senator COHEN. Were there any urgent aspects to your investiga-
tive--
Judge WEBSTER. Not that I am aware of. I asked Mr. Clarke that
specific question, and he said absolutely not.
Senator COHEN. Were you curious as'to how your investigation
into the relationship between Southern Air Transport and the
plane that was down in Nicaragua could somehow jeopardize these
delicate negotiations?
Weren't you curious to say well how in the world is that possi-
ble?
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Judge WEBSTER. No, Senator Cohen. I was not. I was not as curi-
ous as you might think because in early October, Colonel North
had called-after the crash-Colonel North had called Mr. Revell,
who was then at a meeting in Nashville. I had attended the same
meeting but had left the city. And he called to let him know that
the same place-he was aware that we were investigating some-
thing at Southern Air and that he wanted us to know that that
was the airplane company that had helped them on the other oper-
ation, I think was the way he described it. Which he-over in the
other place and--
Senator COHEN. Assuming that to be the case, that this airline
was operating in Iran and in Central America, again, wouldn't you
be curious as to why your investigation as to its operations in Cen-
tral America would somehow jeopardize the release of hostages
over in Iran?
I mean I don't understand the connection.
Judge WEBSTER. The question that the-the way the Attorney
General put it through Mr. Trott was that they were trying to pre-
serve a safe environment for hostage negotiations that were going
on at that time. And the concern was that any public awareness of
Southern Air's involvement in Iran would-now this is not coming
from the Attorney General, this is what I'm deriving from my con-
versation with Mr. Revell-might expose the hostage negotiations.
Senator COHEN. But at that point your investigation was con-
fined really to seeing what the relationship was of Southern Air
Transport to Nicaragua? It had nothing to do with Iran?
Judge WEBSTER. That's right.
Senator COHEN. I guess the question is how do you make the leap
to get into Iran that the Iranians somehow might be upset to see
that the FBI was investigating the nature of Mr. Hasenfus's activi-
ties in Central America that somehow might jeopardize the negoti-
ations currently underway in Iran?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, there was great sensitivity over there as
evidenced by the fact that the Congress was not-that you were not
told of what was going on about having any information about
what was going on or who was supporting that activity get out in
the public domain in any way.
Senator COHEN. So that it really was not a question of directly
jeopardizing the negotiations, but rather that if Congress got any
wind of your investigation into Southern Air, we might start in-
quiring further, and that might unravel the negotiations.
Judge WEBSTER. I didn't tie Congress into it. I tried to use that as
an illustration that-for the same reason--
Senator COHEN. That's a pretty good illustration. I mean I don't
disagree with what you've said. That probably was the rationale,
wasn't it?
Judge Webster. Well, I didn't ask what the rationale was. It did
not seem unreasonable to me since the-Mr. Clarke said there was
no problem with that investigation, that it was not that kind of an
urgent investigation and it could wait for 10 days.
When you are talking about very sensitive hostage negotiations,
we were all aware that the efforts were being made to get the hos-
tages out. That there is a lot of sensitivity at that time and no one
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wants to rock the boat. And, as long as it did not interfere with an
ongoing investigation, I had no problems with it.
Senator COHEN. Time has expired. Thank you.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Metzenbaum was not able to ask his
questions this morning so I'm going to turn to him next.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, A. U.S.
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, I
had a bill on the floor and was not able to be here at that time.
Chairman BOREN. Correct.
Senator METZENBAUM. I'm concerned, Judge Webster, about the
question of maybe who is watching the chicken coop and whether
the fox is in the coop. I'm concerned about instances when the
press reports a case of possible wrongdoing by an administration of-
ficial, such as in the Wedtech case, involving Mr. Nofziger and Mr.,
Wallach and now, perhaps, Mr. Meese. The question is what does
the FBI do? In the Wedtech case, we have in Mr. Wallach a man
who prides himself on his close relationship, in fact says that he
had been approached by Wedtech, quote, "because of my notoriety
as a good friend of Ed Meese," unquote.
And in that case, the Attorney General causes to be set up at
their instance a meeting in the White House-and thereafter Wed-
tech gets a $32 million no-bid military contract. The Army had
been opposed to it. The Army dropped its objections. Now we know
about Mr. Nofziger's involvement and we know about the involve-
ment of another individual-Jenkins. But Mr. Wallach comes in
from out of nowhere an is hired by this company because he is very
close to Mr. Meese.
My question is what does the FBI do when they read stories of
this kind? What is your role as Director? There may or may not
have been law violations here, but the person involved may be the
Attorney General of the United States. And he's the one who calls
for the appointment of an Independent Counsel. What are you
doing or what do you intend to do with reference to this kind of
matter?
Judge WEBSTER. I think that the procedure, Senator Metz-
enbaum, is pretty well set out in the ethics in government-rather
the Independent Counsel statute which sets out that we will
promptly consult with the officials in the Department of Justice-
not the Attorney General, but the people in the public integrity
section, the career people-and advise them of any allegations or
information that has come to our attention. Then under the statute
there is a period of time during which we attempt through means
other than grand jury process to obtain any additional information
that will help the Attorney General decide whether or not to ap-
point an Independent Counsel. He must make a finding to the
court designated for the appointment of Independent Counsel
within a stated period of time. While I don't have all those proce-
dures firmly in my head, it is a self-driving procedure under the
statute.
Senator METZENBAUM. But you missed my point. He may be the
one who ought to be investigated. There may have to be a special
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Independent Counsel appointed in connection with his activities. I
don't know that, but I think the people of this country are entitled
to have a satisfactory answer. And the only one who can make the
investigation and to go forward with the matter is your arm of gov-
ernment. And my question to you is not alone with revolving
around Mr. Wallach and Wedtech. We know that in the Whittles-
ley case-
Judge WEBSTER. Which case, sir?
Senator METZENBAUM. Whittlesley. Ambassador Whittlesley.
W-H-I-T-T-L-E-S-L-E-Y, where the Attorney General was involved,
where he decided not to-there was no need of Independent Coun-
sel. We also know that in the Schmults case there was an Inde-
pendent Counsel in connection with one other person in that
matter.
Senator NUNN. Mr. Olsen.`
Senator METZENBAUM. In that case that there was the withhold-
ing from the Congress in an executive privilege dispute, of certain
papers that were in the EPA. And Deputy Attorney General
Schmults reportedly took it upon himself to withhold from Con-
gress hundreds of pages of handwritten notes without telling the
committee he was doing that, and finally Attorney General Meese
was forced to ask for an Independent Counsel. But he has refused
to let that Counsel investigate Mr. Schmults or Miss Dinkins.
Now as a matter of fact, the Independent Counsel even went to
court asking for the right to investigate Mr. Schmults. Mr.
Schmults is also a friend of Mr. Meese's. Miss Whittlesley is a
friend of Mr. Meese's.
There is also another matter. We know of Mr. Meese's involve-
ment. As we read in the paper yesterday, Meese learned about sale
of arms-and a probe 'that was being done having to do with arms
sales-to the Contras. And Mr. Meese sticks his nose into a pend-
ing investigation that is being conducted by the Justice Depart-
ment. And Mr. Meese is asked why he is sticking his nose in. He
says I wanted to see if he had such an investigation going on be-
cause I had seen it in the newspaper.
Well, all of these things involved special interests of Mr. Meese.
And my question is, how can the American people rely upon the
investigative arm of the United States Government to do some-
thing, to find out whether there is and has indeed been a law viola-
tion, if everything that you do stops with the man who himself
may be the investigated?
Judge WEBSTER. There have been a lot of problems with the stat-
ute over the last several years. And interpreting all the way to the
questions going to the constitutionality of the statute. The statute,
in some respects, is confining on the investigative arm because if a
protected person, rather not a protected person-excuse me-a cov-
ered person, that is a person who is subject to the provisions of the
Independent Counsel Act, is under investigation, then we must nec-
essarily confine the scope of our investigation in order not to step
on the shoes of the Independent Counsel if one is appointed. These
all follow a statutory scheme and if there is a problem with the Act
of the kind you suggest, Senator, then I think the Congress ought
to look at the Act and see if it needs improvement--
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Senator METZENBAUM. But I don't think that's the end of it. I
don't think it's enough to say that we ought to look at the Act to
change it.
The question I'm really asking you is, has the FBI in the past, or
do they intend to, investigate these four separate issues that have
to do with the Attorney General himself and his conduct? And if
you don't investigate them. If you investigate them and then you
say to the Attorney General, we believe an Independent Counsel
ought to be appointed to investigate the Attorney General, that
would be one thing. Or you could say, we believe that there is
enough involved in this matter to submit it to a grand jury without
going through the Independent Counsel.
But absent that, here you have four separate instances, and I
think I can dig up another four without too much difficulty, re-
garding the Attorney General's conduct itself, and there is no
action-and even one case where the Independent Counsel is
saying, I want to investigate. And the Attorney General is standing
there protecting his friend.
Wallach was his friend. Schmults was his friend. Whittlesley was
his friend. And in the Contra arms sale, there was a question of
friendship, but a question of ostensibly attempting to advance ad-
ministration policy.
Judge WEBSTER. I believe the courts have passed some judgment
on what an Independent Counsel can do and what the scope of the
Independent Counsel's authority is when it comes to a question of
appointing or not appointing an Independent Counsel. The Attor-
ney General has to give his report to the Congress. I would expect
that an Attorney General would always consider whether or not
the matter requires his recusal. And I am sure that that has been
done, but I really don't know how to answer your question. We will
investigate just-as vigorously as possible any matter within our ju-
risdiction. If it happens to come within the provisions of the Inde-
pendent Counsel statute, then we are required to coordinate our
work through the career department officials who will determine
the timing and the scope of our investigation.
Senator METZENBAUM. Will you investigate the Wedtech matter
and the Attorney General's personal involvement in that matter?
Judge WEBSTER. It's my understanding that we did participate in
the preliminary inquiry.
We are, and that is a pending investigation, I'm just not at liber-
ty to comment on what we are doing.
Senator METZENBAUM. I'm sorry.
Judge WEBSTER. I say, there has been and there is a pending in-
vestigation. I'm just not at liberty to comment on the details of it
because it is a pending investigation.
Senator METZENBAUM. I think that this goes to the integrity of
the process, because it is the Attorney General who is involved-to
the extent that he is involved, and I don't know whether he violat-
ed any laws or not, but I think the American people are entitled to
know. And I would hope that there will be some report or some in-
dication at the conclusion of your investigation.
Judge WEBSTER. There will be a report which will go to the court
and whether it's signed by the Attorney General, or, if he should
recuse himself by the person who stands in his shoes, I'm not in a
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111
position to say at this time. But it is a report that is required of the
senior official in the department acting at that time in that capac-
ity.
Senator METZENBAUM. Director Webster, my time has expired
and I'm not sure whether I will be able to have another round of
questioning, but either today or tomorrow I do want to get into the
entire Varelli matter.
Judge WEBSTER. Certainly.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, Senator Metzenbaum.
Senator Murkowski, I know you were otherwise tied up this
morning. You may wish us to go on to Senator Specter before we
come back to you. Are you prepared to ask your questions now, or
would you like to defer to Senator Specter.
Senator MURKOWSKI. No, I think I'll wait a little further. I think
there will be time.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, since this morning's round of questioning, I have
had an opportunity to review the memorandum of October 30,
1986, that you had addressed as an addendum in your opening re-
marks. And there are two portions of this memorandum which
seem important to me. One portion of the memorandum which con-
tains a notation that Lieutenant Colonel North may soon be in-
volved in a criminal probe concerning United States activities in
Central America by a special prosecutor. And a second notation in
the memorandum that it would not be possible to advise other per-
sons in the NSC-National Security Council-and be assured that
the information would not be made available to Lieutenant Colonel
North.
Your initials appear on the face of the memo. My question to you
is are those two matters of sufficient importance that had you read
this memo you would have recollected?
Judge WEBSTER. I have already told you, Senator, that I did not
in fact recollect it. And those are my initials, so I did read it.
Senator SPECTER. Well, I ask you specifically, Judge Webster, in
the context of those two comments; I had not asked you about
those comments before because I'd only had a summary memo
from Intelligence Committee staff. Now I have seen the memo
itself. I focus on the language about Lieutenant Colonel North and
that he may soon be involved in a criminal probe concerning U.S.
activities in Central America by a Special Prosecutor. And I come
back to the questions which were asked by Senator Boren earlier
about your taking this up with higher officials in the Executive
branch and you testified that you had with Attorney General
Meese, in a general way, you used expressions that North was gung
ho and had tunnel vision. That's substantially different from the
statement in a FBI memo on an evaluation that he might be in-
volved in a criminal prosecution.
And my question is-and I don't know if it's useful to pursue it if
you don't remember having read this-but isn't this the kind of se-
rious matter relating to somebody in the White House, and the Na-
tional Security Council's key position where the Director of the FBI
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ought to take that up with the Attorney General or even the Presi-
dent.
Judge WEBSTER. I don't think so. But you can fault my judgment
on it. It was an informational memorandum. It was a speculative
comment by a Department official, not official advice. It was a
speculative comment. It was not taken seriously by anyone else
who was actually working those investigations. I received no fur-
ther communications from my own people about it. And so I simply
have to put it in the context at the time. And it probably explains
why I don't remember it. I'm sure I read it, but I didn't remember
it because there are a lot of things that I have read that I don't
now remember that are just informational.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Judge Webster, I don't know that it is
speculative. And on the face of this memo, I candidly don't agree
with that.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, the official says it was speculative. And
the official says that it was based upon newspaper reports exclu-
sively.
We've talked to the official about it.
Senator SPECTER. Well, this memo says that the information
would be redundant with that publicly available. But the memo
itself does not say that the information is based on newspaper
sources.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, the information contained in the main
memorandum which was not about Lieutenant Colonel North was
redundant.
Senator SPECTER. Well, what is your basis for saying that it was
speculative that Lieutenant Colonel North might be the subject of
criminal investigation involving a Special Prosecutor?
Judge WEBSTER. "Might" or "may' is speculative.
Senator SPECTER. Well, if it is speculative, is it not serious? Is it
not something to be pursued with substantial concern?
Judge WEBSTER. If there is an investigation in fact, Senator Spec-
ter, I hope it would come to me by some other means than by an
officer not involved in that speculating about the newspapers. That
was just informational. That is the way it must have been taken by
me. But as I have testified, I regret that I have to tell you I don t
remember that memorandum.
Senator SPECTER. Well the memo doesn't say that it's either spec-
ulative or based upon newspapers. You may conclude that it's spec-
ulative. I don't read it that way. My judgment is that if their read-
ing is not that, but even if it were, it's pretty serious.
If you add to it, Judge Webster, that the conclusion is reached
not to advise other purposes in the NSC because there is no assur-
ance that the information would not be made available to Lieuten-
ant Colonel North, isn't that a serious matter? If you have informa-
tion which comes to the FBI and that matter is such that it ought
to be referred to the NSC, pretty important material, and you can't
do so because North will see it, isn't that a serious matter?
Judge WEBSTER. I won't argue with you, Senator. If you want to
call it a serious matter and say that I was negligent in failing to
view it as a serious matter, I'll accept your verdict on that.
But if you were to ask the person who made that report, that
person would tell you it was based. entirely on newspaper reading.
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Senator SPECTER. Well, I don't have a judgment on it, Judge
Webster. I'm just asking questions. I'm trying to figure out-I'm
trying to figure out your role in. it. But it seems to me that if the
FBI is not going to pass information on to the National Security
Council because North may have access to it and if North even
speculatively may be the subject of a criminal probe by a Special
Prosecutor, that's serious business. And that when the FBI Direc-
tor reads it, he ought to note it. And he ought to tell the Attorney
General about it. And maybe he ought to tell the President about
it.
This language just can't be blown away. And now we have, a few
months later, North, under investigation by a Special Prosecutor.
And we have North being involved in calling up the FBI and
saying this is the same outfit which is taking care of our business
in Iran. This is the same man who is handling a great many mat-
ters. This is a man who you say is flawed with tunnel vision, he's
gung ho, that he's result oriented, that he has no broad gauged
concern.
Now those aren't the characterizations of a criminal. But those
are red flags. Those are danger signals.
Well, I have asked the questions and I think I've gotten your an-
swers.
Let me come on to the subject of the information you had about
the sale of arms to Iran where you had been informed, as you said,
about August 6, 1986, that there was a sale of arms to Iran and you
had taken it up with the Attorney General. And I had touched on
this briefly in the opening round of questions and really didn't get
finished with it. And had asked you in the albeit brief conversation
which you had with Attorney General Meese on November 21,
1986, what was said, if anything, specifically about the sale of arms
to Iran?
Judge WEBSTER. I believe my response, Senator Specter, was that
I was the one who outlined what I knew, or what I, rather, what I
had been told and asked him whether that was correct.
Senator SPECTER. Which conversation are you talking about?
Judge WEBSTER. We're talking about the only one we had about
this thing, November 21, on Friday.
Senator SPECTER. And what did you say specifically to Attorney
General Meese, if anything, about the sale of arms to Iran?
Judge WEBSTER. All right, it went something like this, as best I
can recall. It was following a luncheon or breakfast meeting in his
dining room. I followed him into his office and I said that I had
been advised by Buck Revell that at an OSG meeting, Oliver North
had said that there was a-that they were working on a new Irani-
an initiative which involved some backwater or back channel nego-
tiations to reopen relations with certain parts of the Iranian
people, that it might involve a shipment of-or would involve a
shipment of arms and possibly some hostage negotiation-some as-
sistance with the hostages, that I understood that there has been a
Presidential Finding supporting this and that he had seen it and
approved it. And I just wanted to be sure that he had seen and that
he had approved it. That's the substance of the conversation.
Senator SPECTER. That's November 21, 1986?
Judge WEBSTER. That's correct.
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Senator SPECTER. And at what point did Mr. Meese say to you
that he was going to conduct some inquiry and where you agreed
to?
Judge WEBSTER. I beg your pardon. I've been focusing on the
wrong date. This information came to me--
Senator SPECTER. Well, I thought you might have. That's why I
came back to August--
Judge WEBSTER. Yes, I'm sorry. I apologize for that.
Everything that I said is correct, but it occurred shortly after
August 5th, which was the day that I received the information
from Mr. Revell. I beg your pardon.
Senator SPECTER. All right. So on that day there had been--
May I have about 3 minutes, Mr. Chairman, until I can come
back to another round?
Chairman BOREN. Please go ahead and complete your line of
thought.
Senator SPECTER. All right, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
So on August the 5th you had the conversation with Attorney
General Meese about the backchannel negotiations and the ship-
ment of arms to Iran and some hostages being involved.
Now, what conversation did you have with Mr. Meese on Novem-
ber 21, 1986?
Judge WEBSTER. Yes, that was a-following some other reason for
my. being there, I think we were-we had been working on a Na-
tional-on our department resources board meeting as I best recall.
I'm not certain. The Attorney General mentioned to me as I was
getting ready to leave-I think it probably was prompted by some
comment of mine about the confusion of statements in the press
about what was going on, what happened in Iran-that the Presi-
dent had asked him to determine the facts. And that he was going
over and was going to talk to the various people involved and was
going to try to get the facts straight. Get them accurate.
Senator SPECTER. Was it at, that point that you made an offer of
personnel?
Judge WEBSTER. At that point, I said, "Can we be of any help?"
Senator SPECTER. And he said what?
Judge WEBSTER. As best I can recall, he said, "No I don't think
so. I don't think there's any need for it, there's nothing criminal
about this that I can see, do you?" And I said, "Well no, not on the
basis of what I know now.
And we agreed, and that was the end of the conversation. Senator SPECTER. Well, the question which comes to my mind,
Judge Webster, was the one which I had started to pursue with you
this morning. And that was that in the context of the conversation
you had shortly after August 5, 1986, about the backchannel nego-
tiations and the hostages, and the sale of arms to Iran, and the fed-
eral laws, the Export Administration Act which bars exports of
goods to nations which support terrorism and Iran had been so
classified in the Export Arms Control Act which regulates trans-
fers of munitions and requires Congressional approval. The Presi-
dent can't handle it on his own Finding. You have to have Congres-
sional notification and be overruled. In the totality of that context,
why did you not consider that there might be some criminality in-
volved or allegation of criminality or possibility of it?
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If I can supplement it as the final comment I have, you said ear-
lier, Judge Webster, that when Senator Cohen asked you what you
would have done differently and then he said what would you have
done. You responded that you are not an expert investigator and I
can understand that. You're the Administrator of the FBI. The At-
torney General is not an investigator either. When you start to ask
questions, you have to give Miranda warnings, and you have custo-
dial interrogations, you have investigative techniques, preservation
of documents, sealings, a tremendous number of very complex mat-
ters people only know when they're in it day in and day out.
Where you had the information about the sale of arms, why was
there not a danger signal at all that this was something that the
FBI really ought to be involved in?
Judge WEBSTER. I didn't see any danger signals at the time. On
the basis of the facts as I knew them, my confidence that the Attor-
ney General had reviewed the legal predicate for the actions that
were being taken over there. He wasn't going over there to find out
if a crime had been committed. He was going over to find out ex-
actly what had happened. Who had authorized this. Who had au-
thorized that. He was going to talk to the people. They were all
making statements that seemed at times to be inconsistent. And in-
accurate.
Certainly, I would not have felt that it was necessary to take the
FBI in there on the basis of a customs management export-import
control violation. My assumptions were that if the Attorney Gener-
al was a part of the National Security Council, had reviewed the
Findings, had been brought into it, given an opportunity to consid-
er the legal aspects of what was taking place over there, that that
was what was important.
I just wanted to be sure they weren't off running around without
legal advice.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Judge Webster. Thank
you.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Hecht.
Senator HECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's been a hot after-
noon, and before we get on with the security questions, I'll go back
to the X-rated questions we were on before, about brothel owner
Joe Conforti and the Judge Claiborne case and your handling of
agents in the FBI.
Brothel owner Joe Conforti was offered millions in tax breaks to
testify against Judge Claiborne. Was that your call, Judge?
Judge WEBSTER. That was not my call and I don't believe it to be
true. But it was not my call.
Senator HECHT. That was not your call and you do not believe it
to be true?
Judge WEBSTER. And I am unaware of it today.
Senator HECHT. What do you know about allegations that Mr.
Yablonsky directed--
Judge WEBSTER. Let me, if I may, correct the record a little.
Senator HECHT. Yes.
Judge WEBSTER. I think there might have been some suggestions
of that kind of a basis for a plea bargain. But it was not my call.
Senator HECHT. I will have to research that out. And I will give
you a prepared question on that.
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My recollection at the time was in the newspaper that he was
given tax breaks.
Judge WEBSTER. He may very well have been. I was listening to
the amounts you were talking about and I don't really know that
to be true but it may be part of the plea agreement. But it was not
my call.
Senator HECHT. It was not your call. That's the main point. OK.
What do you know about allegations that Mr. Yablonsky directed
a break-in at Judge Claiborne's home? Did the FBI or Justice De-
partment ever investigate those allegations?
Judge WEBSTER. I believe those allegations were investigated as
part of an overall Office of Professional Responsibility investigation
following various allegations of that kind that were made. We did
not authorize such a break-in. I do not, in fact, know that such a
break-in occurred.
Senator HECHT. What resulted from the investigation of allega-
tions Yablonsky's wife was intimidating local casinos into buying
fresh shrimp from a company she was associated with?
Judge WEBSTER. That investigation was-there was an investiga-
tion of that and it was concluded that it was unfounded.
Senator HECHT. Was it not true though that Mr. Yablonsky's
wife was in that business and did sell shrimp to the hotels?
Judge WEBSTER. Yes, indeed. It was true. And that's why we con-
ducted the investigation.
Senator HECHT. But there was no implication that she was using
her husband's influence to do-to get this contract?
Judge WEBSTER. That was the result of the investigation, Sena-
tor.
Senator HECHT. Were you aware that while Joseph Yablonsky
was heading the Las Vegas field office, he kept a $40,000 bank
error in his favor until the bank found the mistake on its own 3
years later, after the FBI official had left office?
Were you aware of that?
Judge WEBSTER. I was aware of it after he had left office. I
became aware of it after the matter surfaced, but he was already
retired at that time.
There was an investigation conducted. And, again, no action was
deemed indicated by the Department of Justice.
Senator HECHT. Do you condone any of your FBI field agents or
future CIA agents engaging in these types of activities?
Judge WEBSTER. Which types, Senator?
Senator HECHT. Keeping quiet of a $40,000 bank error.
Judge WEBSTER. No, I don't condone that.
His explanation was he was. not aware of it, that his wife was
entirely in charge of the finances. If he had knowingly kept it
secret, I would not have condoned it.
Senator HECHT. If that was by any other citizen, would he have
been prosecuted for that?
Jude WEBSTER. I don't know the answer to that. That's a pros-
ecutor s discretion, and I can't answer the question. It would
depend on the intent.
Senator HECHT. In October 1982, the head of the Las Vegas FBI
Office, Joseph Yablonsky, apparently attempted to derail Brian
McKay's bid for Attorney General. According to news media ac-
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1 117
counts, Mr. Yablonsky solicited the help of an intelligence investi-
gator at Nellis Air Force Base in an apparent attempt to dig up the
reported inflammatory information. -
He also had someone check McKay's military central files in St.
Louis. I should. like to point out that no derogatory information
was found and Brian McKay won the election.
Judge Webster, would Mr. Yablonsky's activities not constitute a
violation of the Hatch Act which bars federal officials from inter-
fering in political races?
Judge WEBSTER. That matter was investigated by our Office of
Professional Responsibility. It was not found that he was engaging
in political activities. His explanation was that he wanted to know
more about Mr. McKay who was about to come in to see him
during the election.
Since there was no evidence that he was engaging in political ac-
tivities, that matter stood as I have described it. Mr. Yablonsky
was, however, disciplined by me for what I consider to be extreme-
ly bad judgment in utilizing the files of another agency to inquire
about Mr. McKay for a reason that I did not consider adequate or
sufficient.
Senator HECHT. So you would classify this as bad judgment, not
any type of a crime?
Judge WEBSTER. That's correct.
Senator HECHT. Were you aware of other prominent Nevadans
who were targeted for investigation by the FBI?
Judge WEBSTER. Again, I would like to say that-it would be very
sensitive to use that word targeting because we target programs.
We target organized crime. We target scheme scams. We should
not be targeting individuals.
There were at various times individuals under investigation in
Las Vegas as there are all over the United States. But they are
based upon something we believe they've done and not because we
have some interest in getting something on them.
Senator HECHT. There were newspaper reports, and I just use the
term newspaper reports, that certain heads-pictures were on Mr.
Yablonsky s walls and he would throw darts at them and-you
know anything about anything like that?
Judge WEBSTER. I really don't.
Senator HECHT. In your opinion, why has the Las Vegas Sun
been on such a vendetta-and I'll just show you a couple of head-
lines. "Hecht to Grill Webster on Yablonsky Vendetta," "Will
Hecht Give Webster Indigestion?" And one thing after another like
this for the last 2 years.
Why, in your opinion does the Las Vegas Sun take this on in
such a manner?
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I don't want to impugn the motives of its
editor. He was deeply involved in the Conforti-rather the Clai-
borne investigation. He had strong views about it. He even tried to
arrange a meeting with a Senator at the White House to protest
the investigation.
Things get pretty heated out in Las Vegas as you know, Senator.
And it took a pretty strong SAC to stand up to that.
So I'm not at all surprised that the feuding continued as it did.
Senator HECHT. SAC? Give us the--
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118
Judge WEBSTER. Special Agent in Charge.
Senator HECHT. I see.
So you have nothing in your mind that would have triggered
this?
Judge WEBSTER. Well I have something in my mind, but I don't
think I ought to say it. [General laughter.]
Senator HECHT. Well, why not?
Senator COHEN. And that's why he's a judge and you're a Sena-
tor. [General laughter.]
Senator HECHT. I nearly had him talking. Now shut up. [General
laughter.]
Would you care to proceed on that or would you not?
Judge WEBSTER. I'd really rather not. I will if you insist. But I'd
really rather not.
Senator HECHT. Well, if it has any bearing on this hearing I
would ask you to. If you don't think it does have any bearing, I
cannot force you to.
Judge WEBSTER. I don't think it does, Senator. Newspaper people
form opinions, particularly if they own the newspaper. And it's-
and you can have your article on the front page. I really believe
the editor believes what he is writing, but he is out of line.
Senator HECHT. Thank you.
You have mentioned that Mr. Yablonsky was guilty of bad judg-
ment numerous times. However, when he retired, you gave him a
glowing recommendation. Is that not correct?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't remember a glowing recommendation. I
remember writing him a letter of appreciation for all that he had
done for the Bureau.
Senator HECHT. I got 1 minute left and let me ask you a ques-
tion. I'll lead into the intelligence area:
You chair the Government's highest level of counterintelligence
coordination group, and you are a member of the Government's
key defensive security planning coordinating group. You were a re-
spected jurist. Based/on your perspective from all three of these
areas, what is yourzanalysis of our ability to build an effective de-
fensive security system? Is there something wrong in government
management or is there something inherent in our national politi-
cal philosophies and way of life which makes it impossible for us to
prevent these previous losses? Does our tendency in the Congress
to politicize these matters have a bad impact?
Judge WEBSTER. I believe that we can develop within the Intelli-
gence Community a better system of what we call countermeas-
ures. That is not counterintelligence, we can do better there too,
but countermeasures are systems for protecting our national se-
crets which exist within the community itself and within those
public contractors with whom-private, contractors with whom the
government must share its secrets.
That is only half the equation. The other half of the equation has
to do with how we in government publicly act about such things as
leaking. Official leaking is bound to reduce the level of concern
about private leaking and create a numbness among other govern-
ment employees about the importance of protecting classified infor-
mation.
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So it starts at the top, in my opinion, if we are going to ever
change an attitude about protecting secrets in government.
Senator HECHT. I thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, will we
have a chance at another time to question Judge Webster on classi-
fied matters?
Chairman BOREN. Yes we will. We will definitely if there are
Members that have classified items-and I'll be happy to consult
with you about that-schedule a time to do that. I anticipate that
we will continue public hearings as well tomorrow. We might con-
clude our public hearing tomorrow afternoon with a closed session
at that time if there are any classified matters.
Senator HECHT. I will have some of those questions for you in a
classified context. Thank you very much, Judge Webster.
Chairman BOREN. Let me ask, Judge Webster, what you would
do if you were faced with a situation-a hypothetical situation in
which your own values were violated either in terms of the covert
action that was undertaken or in terms of failure to notify Con-
gress.
Looking back at the concrete situation, our most recent experi-
ence, a very damaging situation that developed with the Iranian
arms transfer and the failure to notify Congress for a period of
some 10 or 11 months.
If you had been the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
at the time that the Finding was issued by the President for Janu-
ary, bearing in mind consent to notify Congress was not given for
several months, what would you have done?
Judge WEBSTER. I would have to ask the Chairman to understand
that I am not possessed of all of the facts. I only know--
Chairman BOREN. Just knowing what you have read in the news-
paper.
Judge WEBSTER. And in the Tower Commission Report.
Chairman BOREN. What would you have done?
Judge WEBSTER. I would have insisted on revisiting the decision
not to tell the Congress on a regular and frequent basis. And at the
first opportunity when I felt that those reasons that were impor-
tant to the President at the time that he made the original order
were no longer as important as the need. to preserve the trust and
confidence I would be coming down as hard as I knew how to get
the President to change his mind.
Chairman BOREN. Well in this specific situation, Qf course, the
President did not give authority for notificatior.ot t'`?C Sad i
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District judge alleges'
entrapment by FBI
By JOE SWICKARD / J z
Free Frets 5iee wrier
Detroit 36th District Judge Leon
Jenkins, saying he "wouldn't be
surprised" to be Indicted as the
result of a federal Investigation of
alleged court corruption, contend-
ed Monday that FBI agents or infor-
mants tried I I times "to entrap me
Into some type of wrongdoing."
Jenkins also said at a morning
news conference that he was
pushed to the brink- of nervous
breakdown by federal harassment,
i
tntimdation and threats. He said
a he was forced off the road by
two men he believes to be FBI
agents, and that they fled when he
drew a gun on them.
Jenkins said FBI agents "act
worse than hoodlums on the street
... (and like) communist hoodlums
with government badges."
Although U.S Attorney Roy
Hayes declined to comment, Jen-
kins' allegations were disputed by
Kenneth Walton, special egeut in
charge of the Michigan FBI office.
"Judge Leon Jenkins' allega.
tions are untrue. Beyond that, we
have no further comment," he said.
Jenkins, 33, who has been on the
bench four years, has been named
frequently by court personnel and
attorneys as one of the judges be-
lieved to be a target of a three-year
teoerat tnvesugeuon into ancge-
tions of corruption, ticket-fixing
and payoffs in 38th District and
Detroit Recorder's courts.
Ju&,e alleges FBI entrapment effort
Attorneys familiar with the case
have said the probe focuses on other
judges, court em-
ployes, police of fi.
cers, an assistant
Wayne County
prosecutor, de-
tense lawyers and
others.
FBI agents
swept through
pth Diskrict's
Ison enter
and Recorder's Jenkins
Court's Frank
Murphy Hall of Justice two weeks ago,
interviewing court personnel; examin-
ing records and serving subpoenas.
Jenkins was on vacation at the time.
He said he will be available if agents
want to interview him.
Denying any criminal or improper
tivities, Jenkins said he believed he
vas targeted "because of my involve'
, . 1
[lien[-ik the Buddy Battle case.
stood by film as family member and'et
as a judge."
Jenkins said he looked upon Battle,
a UAW official acquitted of embezzle-
ment charges last year in federal court,
as a father figure and a man who
befriended him as a poor child.
Saying "no, no, absolutely not,"
when discussing whether he had ever
taken improper payments, Jenkins
joked that he has trouble spending his
$82,000 annual salary.
HE SAID attempts at entrapment
..pito au,y o. n,.a"o. oe teo