NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 19, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

IT At
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S 6712 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection?
Mr. SIMPSON. May I ask the major-
ity leader to ask that the time be
equally divided prior to that time and
that it may be yielded back if there be
remaining time?
Mr. BYRD. Yes; that is a good sug-
gestion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Hear-
ing no objection to the majority lead-
er's request, it will be so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the distin-
guished Senator from Missouri may
proceed for 2 minutes as in morning
business, that he may be permitted to
speak for 2 minutes; that upon the
conclusion thereof the Senate proceed
to executive session for the consider-
ation of the nomination of Mr. Wil-
liam Webster, and that the time be-
tween that moment and the hour of
5:45 p.m. today be equally divided
today between the distinguished Sena-
tor from Oklatioma, Mr. BOREN, the
chairman of the Intelligence Commit-
tee, and the distinguished Senator
from Maine, Mr. CoREN.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, ask
unanimous consent that it be in order,
as in executive session, at this moment
to ask for the yeas and nays on the
Webster nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Without objection, it
is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is suf-
ficient second.
The yeas and nays ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished assistant Republican
leader and all Senators who have con-
tributed in bringing these agreements
Into effect.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, may I
just respond that it is always a tre-
mendous pleasure to work with the
majority leader. He has always been
most courteous and most extraordi-
nary to me even when we were, in spir-
ited moments.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator.
Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. President, may I
inquire, so we might know, if the Web-
ster vote might be the last vote this
evening? Is that appropriate, too?
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the
answer is yes, may I say.
CLOTURE MOTION
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, so that all
Senators will be on notice, I send an-
other cloture motion to the desk while
the Senate is on the motion to pro-
ceed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will report the motion.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
We, the undersigned Senators, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Rule XXII of
the Standing Rules of the Senate, hereby
move to bring to a close debate on the
motion to proceed to the consideration of S.
1174. a bill to authorize appropriations for
fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for military ac-
tivities of the Department of Defense, for
military construction, and for defense activi-
ties of the Department of Energy, to pre-
scribe personnel strengths for such fiscal
years for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.
Senators Robert C. Byrd, John Melcher.
Quentin Burdick. Wendell Ford, Paul
Sarbanes. Jim Sasser, Bill Proxmire,
Brock Adams. Max Baucus. Barbara
Mikulski, John Glenn, Timothy
Wirth. Frank Lautenberg. Patrick
Leahy. Daniel K. Inouye, George
J.J. Exon. Dale Bumpers,
John F. Kerry, and Terry Sanford.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in re-
sponse to the question by the distin-
guished assistant Republican leader,
there will be no more rollcall votes
today following the vote on the nomi-
nation of Mr. Webster.
Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the majority
leader.
Mr. DANFORTH addressed the
Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Missouri.
OPPOSITION TO IMPOSITION OF
CERTAIN TAXES BY THE EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITY
Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, in
late March the Senate passed S. Con.
Res. 21, which expresses the sense of
the Congress that the administration
should vigorously oppose the estab-
lishment of a tax on vegetable and
marine fats and oils by the European
Community, and further states that in
the event that such a tax is imposed,
then our Government should adopt
strong and immediate countermeas-
ures.
? Last week, the European parliament
met on this matter and did recom-
mend the imposition of such a vegeta-
ble oil tax. The effect of that tax
would be a tax, the same as a tariff,
equal to 90 percent of the selling price
of soybeans in the European market.
The European market accounts for
nearly half of our export market for
soybeans.
This week, the agricultural ministers
of the European Community are
taking up the question of the vegeta-
ble oil tax.
I believe, and Senator HEFLIN be-
lieves, that it is exceptionally impor-
tant for us to get the message to the
European Community that this is a
very serious matter. When we talk
about trade wars, this really comes as
close to a real trade war possibility as
anything on the horizon.
Therefore, Senator HEFLIN and I .ate
circulating a letter to Hon. Willy De
Clera, who is a commissioner of the
European Community, to reiterate the
very strong position of the Congress
with respect to the vegetable oil tax
before any action is taken by the agri-
cultural mingters of the European
Community. I hope to have the letter
present during the rollcall vote on the
Webster nomination. I would invite all
interested Senators to sign the letter.
So far we have about a dozen or so
from both parties who have signed the
letter. I would welcome any Senators
who are concerned about this pro-
posed vegetable oil tax to sign on
during the Webster vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's time has expired.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senate will
now go into executive session to con-
sider the nomination of William H.
Webster, which the clerk will report.
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H.
WEBSTER TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The legislative clerk read the nomi-
nation of William H. Webster, of Mis-
souri, to be Director of Central Intelli-
gence.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I am
pleased to speak as chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence in favor of the nomination of
Judge William H. Webster to be the
Director of Central Intelligence.
The Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence reported out this nomina-
tion, by unanimous vote, on May 1.
1987, after an exhaustive review of his
qualifications, character, judgment
and experience. The committee exam-
ined in detail Judge Webster's views
regarding the role of DCI as well as
ways in which, working together, the
executive and legislative branches will
be able to strengthen the congression-
al oversight process.
In our deliberations, the Intelligence
Committee took great care to pursue
at length all issues pertinent to the
confirmation process, including issues
that emerged during the course of the
hearings. These matters involved a
number of topics including Judge
Webster's record during his nine years
as Director of FBI. In particular, the
Committee carefully and painstaking-
ly addressed concerns raised about
FBI links to Lt. Col. Oliver North in
the Iran-Contra matter.
In my judgment, the committee's
findings fully supported its unanimous
vote to submit Judge Webster's nomi-
nation favorably to the U.S. Senate.
Based upon the information available
to the Intelligence Committee and the
sworn testimony of Judge Webster, I
personally, and as chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence. recommend that the Senate
confirm Judge Webster's nomination.
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May 19, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
It is my view that Judge Webster is
fully qualified in all respects to pro-
vide the leadership needed by the In-
telligence Community at this critical
time.
I would add that I hope the Senate
will act promptly on this nomination.
While Robert Gates has done an out-
standing job as Acting Director, the
position of Director of Central Intelli-
gence is an extremely sensitive and im-
portant one to our national security
and requires permanent leadership as
soon as possible. And Judge Webster is
clearly qualified to fill that role.
Mr. President, in addition I will
submit for the record a more complete
summary of the work of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence in a
form of a letter to Senator BYRD and
Senator Doi x from Senator COHEN
and myself as chairman and vice chair-
man of the Committee.
Mr. President, I was particularly im-
pressed during the confirmation proc-
ess with the commitment of Judge
Webster to the oversight process. He
made it clear that he will place trust
In the committee; that oversight is le-
gitimate in his eyes; that we will at-
tempt, working together, to develop
the kind of full and candid relation-
ship that will benefit the country.
Much has been said in the special
committees investigating the Iranian
affairs over the last several days about
the need to rebuild a bipartisan spirit
in this country, particularly when it
comes to national security policy and
foreign policy. We must be able to pull
together so that we have one foreign
policy and one national security policy
that is the American policy. Not a Re-
publican policy or a Democratic policy,
not a White House policy or a congres-
sional policy, but one that will serve
the entire Nation.
I am convinced that working togeth-
er with this candid spirit we can build,
with Judge Webster, through his lead-
ership, the kind of mutual trust that
will benefit this Nation and will bene-
fit our national security interests.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the full text of the letter
which I referred to earlier citing in
detail the considerations of the com-
mittee, the nature of the evidence
which we considered, and the process
which we followed, be printed in the
RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the
REcORD, as follows:
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT CobnarrEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC, May 8, 1987.
Hon. ROBERT C. Bran,
Majority Leader.
Hon, ROBERT DOLE,
Minority Leader,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR BYRD and SENATOR DOLE: In
our capacities as Chairman and Vice Chair-
man of the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence, we would like to submit for the
consideration of the Senate a summary of
the Committee's hearings and other inquir-
ies with respect to the nomination of Judge
William H. Webster to be Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. The nomination Itself was
reported to the Senate on May 1. 1987, pur-
suant to a unanimous vote by the Intelli-
gence Committee.
We have taken great care to examine all
the issues that emerged in the course of the
hearings. and Judge Webster has responded
under oath to all relevant questions. This
letter is designed to give the Senate a de-
scription of the Intelligence Committee's in-
quiry prior to formal debate on the nomina-
tion. We believe that the Committee's find-
ings support its unanimous vote to recom-
mend, based upon the information available
to us, that the Senate confirm Judge Web-
ster's nomination. In particular, based on
the sworn testimony of Judge Webster and
other information made available to the
Committee, concerns raised about FBI links
to Lt. Col. Oliver North and the Iran-contra
matter were carefully considered by the
Committee and were resolved by the Com-
mittee.
We hope the Senate will be able to act
promptly on this nomination. The position
of director of the CIA is an extremely sensi-
tive and important one to our national secu-
rity and needs to be filled by a permanent
director as soon as possible. It was the as-
sessment of the Committee that Judge Web-
ster is qualified to provide the leadership
needed by the intelligence community.
BACKGROUND
On May 1, 1987. the Select Committee on
Intelligence voted 15-0 to report favorably
to the Senate on the nomination of Judge
William H. Webster to be Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. The Committee undertook
an exhaustive review of the qualifications of
Judge Webster to head the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, to manage the U.S. intelli-
gence community, and to advise the Presi-
dent and the National Security Council on
intelligence matters. The Committee fo-
cused on Judge Webster's conception of the
role of the DCI, especially in relation to
congressional oversight, and on his steward-
ship as Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. This letter summarizes the
Committee's inquiry, with particular atten-
tion to issues that arose with respect to mat-
ters that are currently the subject of inves-
tigations by an Independent Counsel and
the Select Committee on Secret Military As-
sistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Resist-
ance.
The Committee received sworn testimony
from Judge Webster at three public hear-
ings on April 8, 9, and 30 and at two closed
hearings on April 9 and May 1. The Com-
mittee also examined documents made avail-
able by the FBI, the Select Committee, and
the Independent Counsel. Committee staff
Interviewed officials of the FBI and other
elements of the Department of Justice.
The closed hearings dealt with classified
documents which suggested the possibility
of improper efforts by staff members of the
National Security Countil to influence the
FBI. Judge Webster testified under oath at
the closed hearings that he was entirely un-
aware of these apparent efforts. Other in-
formation provided to, the Committee indi-
cated that no NSC staff contacts with the
FBI in fact occurred with respect to the
classified matters discussed in the closed
hearings.
The Committee explored FBI relation-
ships generally with Lt. Col. Oliver North
because of the importance of Judge Web-
ster's role in initiating the FBI investigation
of NSC staff involvement in the Iran arms
sales. The FBI investigation began on No-
vember 26, 1986, the day after Attorney
General Edwin Meese announced at a news
conference that he had discovered evidence
of diversion of Iran arms sale proceeds to
S 6713
the Nicaraguan contras. In the days before
the Attorney General's announcement, doc-
uments in NSC files appear to have been de-
stroyed. Moreover, the Attorney General's
interviews of Lt. Col. North and National
Security Adviser John Poindexter, among
others, during the period November 21
through 25. were conducted without the as-
sistance of experienced FBI investigators.
According to testimony received by the
Committee, Attorney General Meese talked
to Judge Webster on November 21. 1986,
about the inquiry Mr. Meese was undertak-
ing for the President. Judge Webster testi-
fied that he offered the FBI's assistance.
but Mr. Meese declined and Judge Webster
did not press the matter. A key issue ad-
dressed by the Committee was whether
Judge Webster's prior knowledge of ques-
tionable activities by IA. Col. North should
have caused him to insist more strongly on
FBI participation in the Attorney General's
inquiry. Such participation might have led
to the securing of NSC files at an earlier
date and to more thorough conduct and re-
porting of the interviews with North and
Poindexter, among others.
This concern was intensified when the In-
dependent Counsel's office called to the
Committee's attention an internal FBI
memorandum dated October 30, 1986, and
initialed by Judge Webster. which cited the
opinion of a senior Justice Department at-
torney that Lt. Col. North might become in-
volved in a criminal investigation by an In-
dependent Counsel. The first two public
hearings covered this matter, as well as a re-
quest by Lt. Col. North through Attorney
General Meese also on October 30. 1986 to
delay an FBI investigation of Southern Air
Transport involvement with private support
to the Nicaraguan contras.
After the initial public hearings were com-
pleted, the FBI reported to the Committee
other instances where Lt. Col. North sought
to influence FBI investigations, and the FBI
provided information in response to press
allegations of additional North-FBI con-
tacts. This information raised the question
whether Judge Webster had ignored or not
responded to warning signs to stop North's
activities. These matters were addressed at
the final public hearing, and we believe that
the record speaks for itself in that regard.
The entire Senate is generally familiar
with Judge Webster's performance as FBI
Director over the past nine years. The Judi-
ciary. Intelligence, and Appropriations Com-
mittees have reviewed many aspects of the
FBI's work under his direction, and the
FBI's conduct in the ABSCAM case and
other undercover operations was examined
in depth during 1982 by the Senate Select
Committee to Study Undercover Activities
of Components of the Department of Jus-
tice. In considering Judge Webster's qualifi-
cations to be Director of Central Intelli-
gence, the Intelligence Committee has
taken this record into account and has ques-
tioned the nominee about certain aspects of
FBI conduct during his nine years as Direc-
tor.
The results of the Committee's hearings
on Judge Webster's nomination may be
summarized as follows:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
The conduct of the Executive branch in
the sale of arms to Iran raised questions of
noncompliance with legal requirements for
intelligence operations. Therefore, the Com-
mittee questioned Judge Webster closely on
his understanding and intentions with
regard to those legal requirements.
Section 501 of the National Security Act
of 1997. as amended in 1980. generally re-
quires the Director of Central Intelligence
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S 6714 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987
and the heads of all departments, agencies.
and other "entities" of the Government to
give We House and Senate Intelligence
Committees prior notice of covert action op-
erations such as the Iran arms sale. A spe-
cial provision allows the President to limit
prior notice to eight Committee and Con-
gressional leaders. The law also recognizes
the possibility that the President may assert
a claim of constitutional authority to with-
hold prior notice in extreme circumstances,
but requires in such cases that the Commit-
tees be notified "in a timely fashion."
Judge Webster pledged to the Committee
that he would recommend to the President
against withholding notification of the
Committees under any except the most ex-
treme circumstances involving life and
death and then only for a few days. Judge
Webster also stated that he would like to
see the Committees notified "in less than 48
hours if it's possible to do so in a rational.
reasonable way."
If he could not support the President's de-
cision regarding covert action notice. Judge
Webster testified, he "would have to advise
the President of my position on that, and if
he would not authorize me to speak to you.
I would have to leave." Asked whether he
would then Inform the Committees, Judge
Webster said he "would do so to the extent
permitted me by law and I know of no rea-
sons why I could not, but only after I had
resigned."
Other legal issues were raised by the ab-
sence of a Presidential Finding, as required
by Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended (the Hughes-Ryan
amendment), for CIA assistance to the
transfer of arms to Iran in November. 1985.
On the question of whether CIA covert
action could be authorized by a retroactive
Presidential Finding. Judge Webster ex-
pressed his belief that "an 'ex post facto'
finding is contrary to the clear spirit of the
statutory requirement." In his view, a retro-
active Finding would not give legality to the
action and would be merely "damage con-
trol."
Judge Webster testified that a strong legal
case could probably be made for an oral
Fending in an emergency, but he said he be.
lived a written Finding should follow and
he "wouldn't quit." until he had one. The
purpose of a Finding, he explained, is to
state in writing the basis for the action so
that it can be reviewed and understood by
everyone with responsibility, including the
oversight committees.
The fact that the Iran arms sales were con-
ducted by the National Security Council
staff raised the issue of whether covert
action operations by the NSC staff are cov-
ered by the legal requirements for intelli-
gence operations. Judge Webster made clear
his belief that the NSC staff is an "entity"
subject to the requirements to report to the
Intelligence Committees. If the National Se-
curity Advisor failed to notify the Commit-
tees. Judge Webster said, he would do so
himself.
Asked about the desirability of sunset pro-
visions for covert actions, Judge Webster
stated that FBI undercover operations are
already subject to periodic review and that
there should be regular formal review of all
covert actions by the DCI and the oversight
committees.
Judge Webster stressed that his nine
years of testifying as FBI Director on coun-
terintelligence and counterterrorism demon-
strate his support for congressional over-
sight. He stated that he believes he must
have congressional support as DCI and that
he intends to enhance the capabilities of
the intelligence community to serve the na-
tional interest "aggressively, objectively and
professionally . . ,with fidelity to our Con-
stitution. our statutes and all lawful
orders. .
GOALS AS DCI
Apart from oversight issues. Judge Web-
ster discussed his goals as DC1. He ex-
plained that be believes in the traditional
role for the DCI and therefore will not serve
as a member of the Cabinet so as to remove
any possible perception that he has a politi-
cal role in the Administration. He said he
has been promised by the President and the
National Security Adviser that he will have
direct access to the President and that he
will be included in Cabinet and other inner
circle meetings where emerging issues that
depend on accurate intelligence are being
discussed. He will participate with the Na-
tional Security Adviser in making certain
the President is aware of intelligence affect-
ing national security, but will also exercise
the option to impart "his own unvarnished
views" to the President alone.
Judge Webster's primary goal as DCI, as
expressed at the hearings, is to gather intel-
ligence about foreign capabilities and inten-
tions to help-policymakers make sound deci-
sons. He sees the task as not to shape or ma-
nipulate policy, but to provide information
In which policymakers can place maximum
confidence for its integrity. Covert action
should, in his view, be conducted in support
of legitimate national foreign policy goals
controlled by "careful analysis of ideas and
evolution of the plans. a Finding by the Pres-
sident that supports them and oversight by
the Intelligence Committees of the Con-
gress to represent the American people in
terms of what we are doing."
Among other specific objectives, Judge
Webster testified that he places great em-
phasis on human intelligence and recognizes
the need to maintain momentum in recruit-
ment and retention of people with the
"enormous wisdom, talent and selfless dedi-
cation" of the present men and women in
the intelligence community.
Federal law establishes a maximum ten-
year term for the FB1 Director. When ques-
tioned, Judge Webster said he would sup-
port a similar law for the DCI to remove the
office from the political arena. Further, he
will take steps to stand away from political
activity and concerns in making speeches
and attending functions. He does plan to
help gain support from the American people
for proper intelligence gathering activities
by appropriate public statements.
FBI-NORTH CONTACTS
As noted above. the Committee examined
a series of contacts between U. Col. North
and the FBI during 1965 and 1986. Judge
Webster testified that, to the bast of his
knowledge, in no instance did FBI personnel
convey information to North outside offi-
cial, authorized channels. On two occasions
North directly requested the FBI to delay
activity in a criminal investigation. Judge
Webster testified that in neither case was
the request properly reported to him. In ad-
dition to Judge Webster's sworn testimony,
the Committee reviewed key documents and
Committee staff interviewed FBI and Jus-
tice Department officials regarding these
North requests.
DISSEMINATION OF INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS
In a letter dated April 22, 1987, Judge
Webster submitted to the Committee the re-
sults of an internal FBI inquiry into press
reports that the FBI had furnished Neutral-
ity Act investigative reports to North. That
inquiry revealed that in January 1985 North
contacted the FBI office in Los Angeles to
warn that a domestic group's planned inva-
sion of Nicaragua would do extreme damage
to the contra movement. North requested
an update of the Neutrality Act investiga-
tion of these plans initiated by the FBI in
December 1984. The Los Angeles FBI office
reported this contact and request by North
to FBI Headquarters and to the other FBI
field offices investigating the case. When
the Miami and Houston field offices provid-
ed to FBI Headquarters the results of their
Investigations on January 5 and 10. 1985, a
Headquarters supervisor disseminated the
reports to the NSC. It was the supervisor's
judgment that the information could have
been of use to the NSC for foreign policy
considerations.
A summary of the Miami report and the
Report itself, were sent to Judge Webster,
who initialed it to the file. The note indicat-
ed that the report was being disseminated
to several federal agencies including the
NSC without reference to North.
When the FBI's Houston office closed its
Neutrality Act investigation on September
12. 1985, FBI Headquarters again dissemi-
nated its report summarizing the results to
the NSC and several federal agencies. The
Headquarters supervisor did so because it
was consistent with prior handling of com-
munications in this case.
At the confirmation hearings. Judge Web-
ster reported these results of the internal
FBI inquiry and described the matter as
having been properly handled by FBI of
According to Judge Webster, the dis-
semination of reports to the NSC was han-
dled in accordance with established prac-
tices for dissemination to the State Depart-
ment and other federal agencies of FBI in-
formation and intelligence relating to the
conduct of foreign affairs.
INVESTIGATION OF THE "PRINCE"
The two requests to the FBI from North
for delays in criminal investigative activity
occurred in connection with the case of an
alleged bank fraud committed by a self-de-
scribed "Saudi Prince" going by the name of
Ibrahim Al Masoud?in fact, not a Saudi
prince but an Iranian named Mousalreza
Ebrahim Zadeh who was ultimately convict-
ed in 1987. The investigation was conducted
by FBI Field Office in Philadelphia, in con-
junction with the U.S. Attorney',s office in
Philadelphia. In a summary memorandum
volunteered to the Committee after Judge
Webster's initial confirmation hearings, the
FBI advised that North had asked the FBI
to delay attempts to interview the "Prince"
In July. 1985. The new information also in-
dicated that North may have tried in April.
1986, to delay a grand jury appearance in
the case by Richard R. Miller, the President
of International Business Communications.
Inc.. a public relations company and a "con-
sultant" to the National Security Council.
The first North request was made on July
18. 1985, when an FBI Agent in the Wash-
ington Field Office inteviewed North re-
garding the "Prince," following up leads
sent by the Philadelphia FBI office. The
"Prince" had persuaded a Philadelphia
bank to accept a $250,000 check and trans-
fer $210,000 to him before the check
cleared. When the bank discovered that the
check had been written on a closed account,
the matter was referred to the FBI which
opened a bank fraud investigation. Shortly
thereafter, the Philadelphia office reported
a statement by Miller that the "Prince" was
closely associated with the National Securi-
ty Council, and the Washington office de-
termined that Miller's contact on the NSC
staff was North. The FBI Agent assigned to
the case in the Washington office requested
and received approval to interview North
from the White Collar Crimes Section Chief
at FBI Headquarters.
After the interview. the FBI Agent pre-
pared a five-page teletype message reporting
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May 19, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6715
what transpired. According 1,0 this report.
North specifically requested that attempts
by tlie FBI to interview the "Prince" be
held in abeyance so as not to deter the
"Prince" from making a substantial contri-
bution to the Nicaraguan contras. The FBI
Agent told North that his request would be
made known to FBI Headquarters.
The teletype message was addressed to
FBI Headquarters and to the FBI Philadel-
phia office on a "Priority" basis and to the
New York and Sacramento offices on a
"routine- basis. Judge Webster testified
that this teletype message was never re-
ceived by FBI Headquarters officials or by
the Philadelphia or Sacramento offices be-
cause of an "unusual technological failure."
Judge Webster submitted a detailed expla-
nation of how this could have happended
because the FBI was in a period of transi-
tion between two teletype systems. The mes-
sage was received and filed in the New York
office, which did not have principal respons-
biility for the case. It was also filed in the
Washington Field Office, where it originat-
ed. and was discovered there in April 1987,
when the Washington office was asked to
pursue a lead in an investigation by the FBI
Sacramento Field Office of the wife of the
"Prince.- Committee staff interviewed FBI
officials to establish in detail the probable
reasons for the apparent failure of the FBI
telecommunications system in this case, and
Judge Webster submitted a detailed techni-
cal explanation.
The failure of FBI Headquarters officials
to receive the July 18, 1985, North interview
report was especially significant because
North discussed with the FBI Agent his
fundraising efforts for the contras. The
report quoted North as stating that he ad-
vised Kevin Kattke (who had originally told
North about the "Prince") that inasmuch as
public law forbade expenditures of govern-
ment funds to aid Nicaraguan insurgents, it
was inadvisable for a member of the NSC
(North) to meet with the "Prince" directly.
The report said North confidentially ad-
vised the interviewing FBI Agent that the
NSC maintained indirect contact with the
"Prince" through Miller for a lengthy
period of time due to the desperate need for
private 'funds by Nicaraguan freedom fight-
ers since being cut off from 17.S. funding.
The interview report also quoted North as
stating that Miller's work for the NSC con-
cerned the funneling of private funds to
Nicaraguan freedom fighters, that the
"Prince" was offering to provide his oil prof-
its to support the Nicaraguan rebels, and
that North had discussed the "Prince's"
offer personally with President Reagan and
National Security Adviser Robert McPar-
lane as recently as June.
Judge Webster testified that the July 18,
1985. North interview report should have
been referred to him and that, if he had
seen it, he would have recognized the sig-
nificance of the potential violation of law by
North. Judge Webster said there would have
been substantial interest in a request to
delay an interview of the subject of an in-
vestigation based on aid to the contras, be-
cause that would have been "completely im-
proper." Judge Webster also sent the Com-
mittee a memorandum on the internal FBI
inquiry into this incident stating that the
FBI Agent in the Washington office did not
comply with North's request for a delay in
efforts to locate and interview the "Prince."
Committee staff interviews and a contempo-
raneous document corroborate this state-
ment.
The Agent in the Washington office sent
another teletype message to FBI Headquar-
ters on July 31, 1985, referring to the July
18 message and reporting a further discus-
sion with North in which North advised
that Miller and the "Prince" were in Europe
attempting to arrange funds for the contras.
According to the internal FBI inquiry, this
was the first knowledge by the White Collar
Crimes Section at FBI Headquarters of
North's facilitating the channeling of funds
to the contras, and it was not disseminated
outside the Section. Judge Webster testified
that he did not receive this information.
In September, 1985. the Washington
office agent requested and received Head-
quarters approval by telephone to notify
North of information received from another
FBI office establishing that the -Prince"
was an Iranian who had previously engaged
in bank frauds. A subsequent teletype to
FBI headquarters reported that North had
been notified and referred back to the origi-
nal request to interview North (but not to
the July 18 message reporting the inter-
view).
The Committee did not examine in detail
the question of whether supervisory agents
at FBI Headquarters or the agent in the
Washington office should have taken fur-
ther action to bring the information about
North's activities to higher levels in the
FBI. The Committee could find no evidence
that Judge Webster was aware of any of
these FBI contacts with North until April
13, 1987, when he made the information
available to the Committee.
A second North request to the FBI was
made in April 1986, when North contacted
FBI Executive Assistant Director Oliver
"Buck" Revell with respect to the testimony
of Richard Miller before the grand jury in
Philadelphia investigating the "Prince."
The April 13, 1987, summary of the FBI in-
ternal inquiry into this matter stated that
Revell recalled "contacting an Assistant
United States Attorney in Philadelphia on a
secure telephone line and requesting the
postponement of Miller's appearance based
on the NSC's request." On April 17, 1987,
Judge Webster sent the Committee a letter
from Revell in which Revell revised his
recollection significantly. According to this
letter, Revell now recalls that on April 30,
1986, he inquired about the scope of ques-
tioning of Miller but did not request a post-
ponement of Miller's appearance. This revi-
sion was significant because Revell stated
that he had not informed Judge Webster as
he should have done if a postponement was
requested. Revell's revised account is cor-
roborated by a memorandum prepared by
the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia
on May 2. 1986, which recounts the conver-
sation with Revell and makes no mention of
a request for postponement. Revell's letter
of April 17, 1987, states that he did not
bring this matter to the attention of Judge
Webster and did not consult with the De-
partment of Justice because there was no
action requested by him of the Assistant
U.S. Attorney.
In response to Committee questions,
Judge Webster testified that he had been
disturbed to discover In April 1987 the mate-
rial indicating Revell's contact with the As-
sistant U.S. Attorney. He said he had not
previously known of Revell's contacts.
Judge Webster characterized the contact as
"most unusual" and said that Revell should
have consulted him in advance and that
Revell normally was very careful to keep
him informed and had expressed regret to
Judge Webster about his unintentional mis-
take in this case. Judge Webster also stated
that, if he had known of North's request, he
would have referred it to the Justice De-
partment.
KNOWLEDGE OF IRAN ARMS SALES
Judge Webster testified that in early
August 1986, Revell told him that North
had advised members of the Operations
Subgroup of the NSC Terrorist Incident
Working Group (chaired by North) of the
Iran arms sale initiative. North had said
that the Attorney General had reviewed
and approved the Presidential Finding that
authorized the activity. Judge Webster testi-
fied that he raised the matter shortly there-
after with Attorney General Meese, who
confirmed that he was aware of the initia-
tive and had reviewed a Finding although it
may have been a draft Finding. Judge Web-
ster testified that he did not inquire and
was not advised as to whether the Intelli-
gence Committees had been notified.
SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION
The Committee examined the circum-
stances surrounding a delay in the FBI in-
vestigation of the Southern Air Transport
Company in connection with the Nicara-
guan downing of a C-123 aircraft engaged in
delivering arms to the contras in early Octo-
ber 1986. As with the FBI?North contacts
discussed above. the Committee's inquiry in-
cluded examination of key documents and
staff interviews with FBI and Justice De-
partment officials, as well as Judge Web-
ster's sworn testimony. Committee staff de-
veloped the following chronology on the
basis of this information.
On October 8, 1986. the FBI's Miami Field
Office opened a preliminary inquiry into
possible Neutrality Act violations involving
Southern Air Transport, on the basis of
press reports that SAT had serviced the C-
123 aircraft shot down in Nicaragua. That
evening, Lt. Col. North called FBI Executive
Assistant Director Revell and told him that
SAT was involved in "that other initiative,"
meaning U.S. arms shipments to Iran.
Revell replied that the FBI would not inves-
tigate "authorized" activity. Revell also
called the Miami Field Office to determine
the nature of the FBI's efforts on the case.
On October 10, Revell met with the FBI
Terrorism Section Chief and Deputy Assist-
ant Attorney General Mark Richard from
the Justice Department's Criminal Division.
They agreed that the PSI should continue
Its preliminary inquiry, while the CIA
should be asked about any authorized activi-
ty by Southern Air Transport,
On October 14, Revell briefed Judge Web-
ster, who had just returned from an out-of-
town trip, on North's concern.
On October 30, Associate Attorney Gener-
al Stephen Trott called Judge Webster on a
secure line and asked, at the request of the
Attorney General, that "any non-urgent
work" on the SAT investigation be suspend-
ed for 10 days. Trott said that there were
sensitive hostage negotiations going on and
that the Attorney General, while not want-
ing to "wreck the investigation," was trying
to "permit a good climate for the negotia-
tions to the extent possible." Judge Webster
called the Assistant Director in charge of
the FBI Criminal Investigative Division,
Floyd Clarke, who said the investigation
was "just at the preliminary stages" and
could readily be suspended. Judge Webster
added that Clarke should tell him if the sus-
pension caused problems. Those calls were
described in a memorandum from Judge
Webster to Clarke the next day.
On November 10, FBI officials began to
ask Justice Department officials whether
they could resume the SAT investigation.
Further contacts were made on November
12, 13, and 18.
On November 11, FBI Assistant Director
Clarke told Judge Webster that the 10 days
were up; Judge Webster agreed to call Asso-
ciate Attorney General Trott.
On November 12, a memorandum from .
the Internal Security Section Chief in the
Justice Department's Criminal Division in
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S 6716 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987
formed Assistant Attorney General William
F. Weld that, "[Witless you advise to the
contrary. I intend to advise the Bureau that
It is free to resume its investigation without
further delay."
On November 20. Associate Attorney Gen-
eral Trott informed FBI Executive Assistant
Director Revell that the suspension was
lifted.
On November 26. FBI Headquarters told
the field to resume its preliminary inquiry.
The Committee also learned that. on No-
vember 6 and 14, 1986, Lt. Col. North called
Revell to ask his assistance in stopping a
Customs Service investigation of Southern
Air Transport. Revell referred North to As-
sociate Attorney General Trott and, on both
occasions, asked whether North knew about
SAT involvement in arms shipments to the
contras. According to Revell. North replied
in the negative.
At the public hearings, questioning of
Judge Webster focused on his reasons for
complying with the Attorney General's re-
quest to suspend the investigation. Judge
Webster stated that he was already aware of
Southern Air Transport's role in arms ship-
ments to Iran, from his briefing by Revell
on October 14. so he understood and accept-
ed the sensitivity of the matter. Assistant
Director Clarke told him that a follow-up
interview with an informant was all that re-
mained in the inquiry and that this could
easily be postponed. Once he had been as-
sured by Clarke that the suspension would
not hurt the FBI investigation. Judge Web-
ster saw no need to question the Attorney
General's judgment.
Judge Webster was also asked why he had
not reacted. on October 30 or later, to an
FBI memorandum which he initiated, dated
October 30, that included a recommenda-
tion by the Justice Department's Counsel
for Intelligence Policy that North be ex-
cluded from receiving confidential FBI in-
telligence because "North may soon be in-
volved in a criminal probe concerning U.S.
activities in Central America by a special
prosecutor. . . ." This recommendation also
noted that "it would not be possible to
advise other persons on the National Securi-
ty Council to be assured the technically de-
rived information would not be made avail-
able to Lt. Col. N orth.-
Judge Webster explained that he did not
read this memorandum until after suspend-
ing the SAT investigation and that, in any
case, the memorandum did not make an im-
pression on him because it was part of a
typically large stack of informational
memos and did not require him to take any
action.
MEESE INQUIRY
On November 21, 1986. Attorney General
Meese was asked by the President to con-
duct an inquiry to determine an accurate
chronology of the Iran arms sales. Accord-
ing to the Attorney General's testimony
before the Committee on December 17.
1986, he met with Judge Webster on the day
that he began his inquiry. Meese testified
that when he informed Judge Webster of
the inquiry. "we agreed that there was no
criminal matter involved and that it would
not be appropriate for the FBI to be
brought in." He added that Judge Webster
had offered the FBI's help whenever the
Attorney General might wish it.
At the confirmation hearings, the Com-
mittee questioned Judge Webster regarding
his November 21 meeting with Attorney
General Meese. Judge Webster agreed with
the Attorney General's description of the
meeting, saying that the conversation re-
garding the Iran inquiry was a short, casual
one and that Judge Webster. like the Attor-
ney General, had not seen the Iran arms
sales as a criminal matter on November 21.
Judge Webster also noted that he had previ-
ously asked the Attorney General whether
a Presidential Finding for the arms sales
had been cleared with Meese. and had been
told that it had. In light of these facts,
Judge Webster testified that he did not
know of any material ways in which FBI in-
volvement at that point would have
changed the manner in which the inquiry
was conducted.
Judge Webster was asked why the Octo-
ber 30 memorandum expressing a senior
Justice Department official's concern about
North did not lead him to entertain the pos-
sibility that the Iran inquiry could get into
criminal matters. He replied that although
he had read that memorandum, it had not
stuck in his mind and had no impact upon
his thinking on November 21. Judge Web-
ster similarly stated that he had not
thought about the possibility that the arms
sales to Iran would violate the Arms Export
Control Act, because the Act was not some-
thing that the FBI commonly handled and
because he knew there had been a Presiden-
tial Finding. He also stated that, although
he knew that Southern Air Transport was
involved in the Iran arms sales and might be
involved in the supply of arms to the con-
tras. neither that fact nor the White House
interest in suspending the SAT investiga-
tion had prompted any concern about possi-
ble criminality in the Iran arms sales.
A major line of questioning concerned re-
ported document destruction by members of
the National Security Council staff between
November 21 and the initiation of the FBI
investigation on November 26, Judge Web-
ster testified that he met with Attorney
General Meese on November 25. after the
public announcement of discovery of possi-
ble diversion of funds to the contras. At
that meeting Judge Webster learned that
the Justice Department was going to ask all
agencies to preserve relevant records. When
the FBI entered the case on the 26th. they
were informed by a White House official
that documents had been secured on the
night of the 25th. Assistant Director Clarke
testified that FBI Agents went to the NSC
offices and confirmed that the documents
were under seal on the 26th.
Judge Webster said that on December 4,
when he stated publicly that the FBI had
no knowledge of any document destruction,
that was an accurate statement. He declined
to discuss what knowledge the FBI might
now have, bemuse of constraints placed by
the Independent Counsel's investigation.
Judge Webster did note, however, in re-
sponse to questions that North's secretary,
Ms. Fawn Hall. had not yet begun to cooper-
ate with the FBI as of December 4, 1986.
OTHER TBI INVESTIGATIONS
Committee Members questioned Judge
Webster about the FBI's conduct in several
other specific investigations.
(1) Nevada Cases. In ?the course of im-
peachment proceedings brought against
U.S. District Judge Harry Claiborne, allega-
tions were made of a "vendetta" against
Judge Claiborne by the Special Agent in
Charge of the Las Vegas Nevada. FBI Field
Office, Joseph Yablonsky. Senator Hecht
cited specific instances of alleged miscon-
duct by Agent Yablonsky during the course
of the investigation. In response. Judge
Webster noted that the FBI's Office of Pro-
fessional Responsibility investigated allega-
tions and that Agent Yablonsky was official-
ly censored and placed on probation.
(2) FBI "Targeting." In connection with
the FBI's ABSCAM and Claiborne cases,
Members questioned whether the FBI had
"targeted" individuals for investigation.
Judge Webster stressed that it is not FBI
practice to target individuals for investiga-
tion. While it is appropriate to target prob-
lems (e.g.. organized crime, labor racketeer-
ing). Judge Webster emphasized that it is
not appropriate to target individuals. Before
the FBI opens a criminal investigation of an
individual, the Bureau must have reason to
believe a person has been or will be engaged
in criminal activity.
Judge Webster recognized shortcomings in
the FBI's handling of the ABSCAM case.
He stated that the FBI had incorporated
recommendations made by the Senate
Select Committee to Study Undercover Ac-
tivities into its undercover practices and
procedures which had improved the FBI's
operations.
(3) PFLP Case. Earlier this year, acting on
the basis of FBI information. the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service arrested sev-
eral aliens who were members of the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP. At issue was what authority the
FBI had used to originate the investigation
of PFLP members who had not committed
terrorist acts in this country. Judge Webster
explained that the FBI had acted under
classified Attorney General's Guidelines
which permit investigations of organizations
that the FBI has reason to believe might be
engaged in terrorist activities. He main-
tained that the PFLP is a recognized world-
wide terrorist organization and that the FBI
was concerned an infrastructure in the
United States could develop and become the
basis for support of terrorist activities.
(4) Warrantless Searches. Members ques-
tioned Judge Webster about the FBI's use
of warrantless searches for intelligence pur-
poses. He replied that the FBI operated
under the authority of the classified Attor-
ney General's Guidelines for Foreign Coun-
terintelligence Investigations and that FBI
Agents made full affidavits of facts support-
ing the authorization of any warrantless
search. Judge Webster stressed the very lim-
ited use of warrantless searches in the FBI's
work and maintained that current proce-
dures were satisfactory, although he said
the FBI would be willing to work with Con-
gress on legislation requiring a court order
comparable to the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act procedures for wiretapping. He
agreed to provide the Committee with addi-
tional classified information concerning the
use of such authority in specific instances.
Varelli Allegations. Representative Pa-
tricia Schroeder has been the subject of al-
legations by a former FBI informant named
Frank Varelli that she was listed in an FBI
Terrorist Photo Album. Judge Webster
stated that Rep. Schroeder had never been
in the FI31 album, that she was not the sub-
ject of any FBI investigation, and that he
had responded to her concerns personally.
Judge Webster was questioned about elle-
gation.s that certain domestic groups active-
ly opposing U.S. foreign policy in Central
America were improperly investigated by
the FBI and that the FBI's handling of in-
formants in such investigations was inad-
equate, especially in light of the FBI's
recent experience with former informant
Varelli. Members asked what mechanisms
were in place to ensure that investigations
of domestic political groups are handled
properly and lawfully.
According to Judge Webster, the primary
authority for initiating such investigations
Is the Attorney General's Guidelines for Do-
mestic Security Investigations which specify
the conditions under which an investigation
can be launched. With respect to the han-
dling of informants. Webster emphasized
that there are substantial FBI Manual pro-
visions dealing with informants which re-
quire strict accountability and record-keep-
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May .79, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
ins. Alleptions of impropriety are subject
to investigation by the Office of Profession-
al Responsibility. Judge Webster subse-
quently advised the Comittee in a response
for the record that the investigation in
which Varelli was used as an informant was
conducted under the classified Attorney
General's Guidelines for Foreign Counterin-
telligence Investigation&
(6) Donovan Investigation. In 1981, the
FBI conducted a background field investiga-
tion of former Labor Secretary Raymond
Donovan, who was undergoing Senate con-
firmation. The background check apparent-
ly failed to report information in FBI files
that had a direct bearing on the nomina-
tion. Judge Webster was asked how this had
occurred and what had been done to pre-
vent such problems in the future. He con-
firmed that the investigation was not as
thorough and complete as it should have
been. He also advised that substantial
changes in procedure and practice had been
made since this incident and that he felt
those changes would make recurrence un-
(7) Files on Bishops. Press reports have al-
leged that the FBI has maintained informa-
tion in its files for a number of years on two
Catholic bishops who have worked with
peace and civil rights groups. Members
asked about the FBI's criteria for collecting
and filing information on particular individ-
uals. Judge Webster stated that the FBI did
not have criminal investigative files on the
two bishops. Instead, their names had been
cross-referenced and appeared in other files
for which the FBI had legitimate investiga-
tive interests. Judge Webster also said that
he was concerned that FBI cross-referenc-
ing guidelines were not adequately clear. He
noted that the FBI had recently completed
a planning and evaluation study of this
process and was implementing changes to
tighten up procedures to ensure that there
was sufficient reason for names to be includ-
ed and cross-referenced in files.
(8) Cases Involving the Attorney General.
Judge Webster was asked how he and the
FBI handled cases in which allegations of
wrongdoing reached the level of the Attor-
ney General or his friends and associates, in
light of the Attorney General's ability to
protect those people by keeping Independ-
ent Counsels from investigating them. The
?Wedtech" case was cited as a prime exam-
ple of the Attorney General's possible in-
volvement in wrongdoing, and the Olsen
case (involving former Justice Department
executives Edward Schnaults and Carol Din-
kins) was cited as an example of the Attor-
ney General preventing an Independent
Counsel from broadening an investigation to
include high officials.
Judge Webster stated that the FBI's role
was to conduct a preliminary inquiry under
the direction of career Justice Department
attorneys and then to assist any Independ-
ent Counsel. Judge Webster saw the ques-
tion of the limits of an Independent Coun-
sel's powers as a matter for the courts and
Congress to determine. With regard to the
"Wedtech" case. Judge Webster stated that
the Independent Counsel was investigating
the case with whatever FB/ assistance he
desired and that there was a separate FBI
investigation that did pot involve a person
covered under the Ethics in Government
Act. Judge Webster added that, if a case in-
volved the Attorney General himself, he
would expect the Attorney General to
recuse himself and "would take the neces-
sary steps to be sure that he did recuse him-
self."
Of course, the above is only a brief sum-
mary of the information developed by the
Intelligence Committee in Its deliberations
with respect to the nomination of Judge
Webster to be Director of Central Intelli-
gence. The full transcript of the hearings
regarding Judge Webster's nomination, both
open and closed, as well as all pertinent doc-
uments, are available for review by Mem-
bers of the Senate. The classified docu-
ments are available in our secure committee
space for examination under the rules and
procedures of the Committee.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely.
DAVID L BOREN,
Chairman.
WILI110.1 S. Coxes,
Vice Chairman,
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President. I reserve
the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the unanimous-consent agreement,
time is to be shared between the Sena-
tor from Oklahoma and the Senator
from Maine. The Chair assumes that
the Senator from Pennsylvania is the
designee of the Senator from Maine at
this time and will recognize him.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am
on the Intelligence Committee and in
the absence of any other Senator on
this side of the aisle, I seek recognition
in my own right.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator will be assuming control of
the time. Under the time agreement.
the time between the moment we took
the nomination up to 5:45 must be di-
vided equally between the majority
and the minority. Under those circum-
stances, the time allotted will be
counted as part of the time designated
to the Senator from Maine.
Mr. SPECTER. I understand and I
thank the Chair.
I voted in favor of Judge Webster to
be the Director of Central Intelligence
at the conclusion of hearings conduct-
ed by the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, and I intend to vote for his con-
firmation before the full Senate be-
cause his overall record establishes his
qualifications for this most important
position.
Nonetheless, I am concerned by the
evidence produced during the confir-
mation hearings that the FBI, and to
some extent Judge Webster himself,
did not respond to clear danger signals
of seriously improper, if not illegal, ac-
tivities by LTCOL North. The totality
of the evidence suggests that LTCOL
North's key position in the National
Security Council and the President's
strong personal support for the Con-
tras created a climate wherein the FBI
may have winked at possible violations
of law involving the Contras. At his
confirmation hearings, Judge Webster
referred to his concern about White
House influence, stating:
From time to time I have made It clear to
my executives that I wanted to be closely in-
formed about any kind of White House in-
fluence, and as recently as September 1986
before all of this broke, I addressed a memo-
randum to my executive conference remind-
ing them that I wished to be informed of
any committee meetings at the White
House at which they were invited as my rep-
resentative or for any other purpose.
Starting in January 1985, LTCOL
North established direct contact with
S 6717
FBI field offices on their investigation
of Neutrality Act violations. He re-
quested that he be kept informed of
those matters. At his hearings, Judge
Webster stated that since the matter
was a national security concern, he
therefore provided the information to
the NSC and other Government agen-
cies.
On July 18. 1985, the FBI's Wash-
ington, DC field office cabled FBI
headquarters a most important piece
of information which, if properly pur-
sued, could have short-circuited
LTCOL North's activities as early as
1985. But, the cable to FBI headquar-
ters was never received because, in the
words of Judge Webster, of "an unusu-
al technological failure." The cable
points out that the FBI?if not its Di-
rector?was well aware that LTCOL
North:
Personally discussed private aid to
the Contras with President Reagan in
mid 1985.
Asked the FBI to delay an interview
with a fraud suspect.
Was dealing with an alleged Saudi
Prince through an intermediary be-
cause it was not advisable for North,
as a member of the National Security
Council, to deal directly in view of a
legal prohibition against aiding the
Contras.
Although that cable was referenced
in subsequent FBI cables, no attempts
were ever made to retrieve it. Those
facts could have irrunediately spot-
lighted and possibly stopped LTCOL
North's operations through early FBI
Investigations. At a minimum, it would
have alerted President Reagan to the
serious implications of North's activi-
ties.
On the record, this key FBI docu-
ment and several subsequent ones did
not reach Judge Webster. so he cannot
be held personally responsible for pur-
poses of these confirmation hearings.
Nonetheless, FBI agents knew about it
and did nothing.
Again. in April 1986, LTCOL North
contacted one of Judge Webster's
three deputies, Oliver Revell. to re-
quest that Revell intercede with an
Assistant U.S. Attorney in Philadel-
phia to delay the questioning of Rich-
ard Miller, a "consultant" to North
and a witness in the Saudi Prince case.
In April 1987, Richard Miller was
named as a co-conspirator along with
LTCOL North in a tax fraud case in-
volving aid to the Contras and entered
a guilty plea. Mr. Revell originally told
the Intelligence Committee by letter
on April 13, 1987 that he did intercede,
but 4 days later, recanted his story. He
admits that he never advised Judge
Webster of this White House request
because he never interceded, although
until April 13, 1987, he thought he
had. It is Judge Webster's view that
Revell erred in judgment by failing to
inform him in April 1986 of this re-
quest and for not dealing with the As-
sistant U.S. Attorney through the Jus-
tice Department.
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S 6718 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987
On October 30, 1986, a memorandum
was prepared by the Attorney Gener-
al's, Counsel for Intelligence Policy
stating that "North may be involved in
a criminal probe concerning U.S. ac-
tivities in Central America by a special
prosecutor." The memorandum con-
tained an even more important danger
signal that "it would not be possible to
advise other persons in the National
Security Council and he assured the
technically derived information would
not be made available to LTCOL
North." Judge Webster testified that
he did not remember having read the
memorandum, although he concedes
that he initialed it.
Questions arise on Judge Webster's
and the FBI's failure to focus and act
on this memorandum in light of the
fact that Judge Webster, and certainly
the FBI, knew of LTCOL North's ex-
tensive involvement in Contra aid and
his involvement, as early as August
1986, with the arms-for-hostage effort.
Judge Webster stated in testimony
that he was concerned by that August
5, 1986 revelation. At about the same
time the October 30 memorandum
crossed his desk, Judge Webster wrote
a memorandum dated October 31, 1986
concerning a request of Admiral Poin-
dexter relayed by Attorney General
Meese to hold up on an investigation
of Southern Air Transport because of
the hostage negotiations.
Perhaps it is 20-20 hindsight to say
that Judge Webster and senior FBI of-
ficials should have been alerted to pos-
sible violations of Federal law such as
the Arms Export Control Act and the
Boland amendment. But, there was no
focus, there were no questions asked.
In the context of the information
which had come to Judge Webster's
personal attention, a further question
arises as to the adequacy of Judge
Webster's reaction when Attorney
General Meese told him on November
21, 1986 that he, Meese, had been
asked by the President to pull the
facts together on the Iran arms trans-
action. Judge Webster and Attorney
General Meese concurred in their tes-
timony that there was no reason for
FBI involvement because there was no
indication of a criminal investigation.
In retrospect again, perhaps more
should have been expected of Judge
Webster in light of:
The information which had crossed
his desk on the possibility of criminal
allegations including the October 30
memorandum that North might be in-
volved in a criminal probe concerning
activities in Central America.
The Iran arms transaction which
was laden with questions on compli-
ance with the Arms Export Control
Act; and
The Attorney General's obvious
closeness to White House involvement
on such matters which would profit
from the more-detached participation
of Judge Webster.
In evaluating the events of Novem-
ber 21, 1986, questions have been
raised about the propriety of Attorney
General Meese's conduct and handling
of the inquiry. Judge Webster might
have been in an even better position to
objectively evaluate those problems
and direct an inquiry which would
have preserved the records which
LTCOL North was able to shred.
Experience has demonstrated the
dual conflicting functions of the U.S.
Attorney General. He is the senior
lawyer of the executive branch, and he
Is also the Nation's chief law enforce-
ment officer. That duality is com-
pounded when the Attorney General
Is also a President's confidant. At
about this time, Attorney General
Meese was making public statements
about marching "shoulder-to-shoul-
der" with the President in response to
some high level executive officials who
were raising questions about the Presi-
dent's Iranian policies. The relation-
ship between President Nixon and At-
torney General John Mitchell is closer
to current events than ancient history
as a danger signal to possible analo-
gous relationships.
Perhaps even perfect hindsight
would not have brought this potential
problem into focus, but it raises the
problem for the future. Based on the
Watergate experience, the time is long
overdue that we give serious consider-
ation to separating the roles of the
Nation's chief law enforcement officer
from the senior executive branch
lawyer or Presidential confidant.
It may be that some of these danger
signals available to Judge Webster and
the FBI are apparent only through
20-20 hindsight. But it may be that
more should have been expected from
the highly touted Federal Bureau of
Investigation and its Director who
enjoys a reputation for integrity and
competency unsurpassed by anyone in
office in Washington today. In any
event, there are lessons here which
should not be lost. Such issues should
be identified and analyzed so that we
may benefit in the future.,
Although not directly relevant here, it Is worth
noting that the FBI is now being called upon to
serve as the investigative arm for the Independent
Counsel, formerly known as Special Prosecutor,
who will be investigating Attorney General Edwin
Meese in the WedTech matter. That role for the
FM. as well as the Bureau's investigative functions
on matters where others in the Executive Branch
may be under investigation or have a different in-
terest, should be scrutinized and evaluated in an-
other proceeding.
It may be that it is too much to ask a Federal
agency, like the FBI, to be indifferent to the Presi-
dent's stated position when they are investigating
allegations of violations of law regarding U.S. as-
sistance to the Contras. It is a very difficult situa-
tion to have FBI personnel investigate the Attor-
ney General of the United States, even when they
are for the moment under the direction of Inde-
pendent Counsel, because the Attorney General,
after all, was their boss and probably soon again
will be their boss.
The adage that no man can serve two masters is
firmly established.
Congress. perhaps through the Judiciary Com-
mittees, should review the FBI's roles in such situa-
tions which have inherent conflict-of-interest impli-
cations.
Needless to say, no one is perfect,
and we must be careful not to impose
standards so rigorous that good men
and women fall by the wayside or that
other good men and women will be dis-
couraged from seeking important Fed-
eral positions. Judge Webster's record
as a practicing lawyer, Federal judge
and Director of the FBI is excellent.
Judge Webster's record outweighs my
reservations so I shall vote to confirm
him as the new Director of CIA.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Maine has 5 minutes 20
seconds remaining: the Senator from
Oklahoma has 10 minutes 4 seconds
remaining.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield 2
minutes to the Senator from Missouri.
Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator from Maine.
Mr. President, I have known Judge
Webster for a number of years. He is a
very good family friend and has been
for, I guess, most of his life. When I
was admitted to the Missouri bar, he
was a member of the board of law ex-
aminers. I believe I am the only
Member of the Senate ever to have
tried a lawsuit in front of Judge Web-
ster. I have known him in many capac-
ities for many years. He is the pride of
our State. I do not know of anyone in
the State of Missouri who is more
highly thought of than Bill Webster
by people who have known him all of
his life, people who have known him
In every conceivable setting. And so it
is with considerable pride that I rise
once again to support the nomination
of Bill Webster for this latest example
of his support and contribution to his
country.
The PRESIDING OFFICkat. Who
yields time?
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President. I yield 4
minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Nevada (Mr. Run].
The PRESIDING OFFICER,. The
Senator from Nevada is recognized for
4 minutes.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are
asked today to confirm as Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency Judge
William Webster, Judge Webster is an
honorable and decent man, and if
these were ordinary times, I would
probably vote to confirm his nomina-
tion, although with some reservations.
These are not, however, ordinary
times. Once again the CIA has been
betrayed by those in the highest corri-
dors of power who are charged with
maintaining its health. Each week re-
veals some new action taken by the
former director in direct or implicit
contravention of the law and ex-
pressed will of Congress.
Judge Webster has been presented
to us as the physician to cure these
Ills. I do not believe he is the man for
the job.
As things now stand, I do not believe
an adequate explanation has been of-
fered for the conduct of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation while it has
sat under Judge Webster's steward-
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ship. I do not speak lightly in this vein
as one example of this lack of adminis-
tratioon is how the FBI has run amok
In Nevada, and it did so under the di-
rection of William Webster.
There remain too many unanswered,
unjustified, and =acceptable actions
during the tenure of William Webster,
and while Joseph Yablonsky served as
the FBI agent in charge in Nevada.
Use of the Bureau to investigate politi-
cal opponents such as Nevada's Repub-
lican attorney general is simply im-
proper. Use of the Bureau to intimi-
date those with whom the agent in
charge disagrees, such as former De-
tective Chuck Lee. is simply improper.
Lee questioned Yablonsky's approach
to law enforcement. Yablonsky even
placed stakeouts on the movement of
respected veteran homicide Detective
Robert Hilyard. He even attempted an
aborted investigation without founda-
tion or substance of former U.S. Sena-
tor, Paul Laxalt. He and his lieuten-
ants were not above the intimidation
and use of IRS agents?one of whom
lost a high ranking position with the
IRS because of these actions. He even
planned and/or condoned the use of a
convicted felon and brothel owner to
get tainted evidence against others.
I want to make it clear that my dis-
approval has nothing to do with the
guilt or innocence of Harry Claiborne,
the Federal judge who claimed he was
the victim of FBI persecution in
Nevada. Rather. it deals with the still
unanswered questions surrounding
conduct by Judge Webster's subordi-
nates which was nothing short of rep-
rehensible: conduct in which they un-
questionably harassed decent, law-
abiding, and upstanding citizens: con-
duct in which they violated the very
laws they and Judge Webster had
sworn to enforce.
Even this past week the story in the
Nevada press is that FBI agents have
offered to drop dope charges against a
private detective if he v ould implicate
Clark County Sheriff John Moran and
Clark County Public Defender Morgan
Harris.
William Webster may be a decent
and honorable man. But an adminis-
trator he is not. William Webster per-
mitted the FBI to be used for indecent
and dishonorable purposes. He is not
the man to cure the CIA of its ills.
Rather. I would urge my colleagues to
leave him at the FBI, and give him an
opportunity to deal with the sickness
the Bureau has shown during his
tenure. "Physician.- we should say to
him, "Go from this house and cure
thyself."
Only when that sickness has been
purged from the FB1 should we permit
Judge Webster to accept another pa-
tient.
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER /CIA DIRECTOR
(By request of Mr. Snitesox the fol-
lowing statement was ordered to be
printed in the RECORD:1
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am very
pleased that the Senate is voting
today to confirm William H.. Webster
as Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
This is a critical position, and a criti-
cal period for the Agency. When Judge
Webster was nominated to fill this va-
cancy, there was an outpouring of
praise and approval. Why? Because
throughout his many years in public
service, as Director of the FBI, as a
Federal appeals court judge, a Federal
district judge, and U.S. attorney, Wil-
liam Webster has established a record
of integrity and competence.
Today's FBI is a testament to the in-
telligent, forward-looking leadership
of William Webster, Since 1978. when
President Jimmy Carter appointed
him, he has guided the Bureau with a
steady, sure hand and developed it
Into a stable, aggressive, and effective
law enforcement agency.
Judge Webster is a real professional,
who understands the ins and outs of
the intelligence community. He has a
proven record of dedication and
achievement in Government service.
And I have no doubt that he will con-
tinue that course in his new rule as Di-
rector of the CIA. I urge my col-
leagues to follow the pattern of the
Intelligence Committee, which unani-
mously approved this nomination.
WILLIAM WEBSTER-A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I
know I speak for all Americans when I
express my gratitude to Judge William
Webster for devoting so much of his
career to the judicial system of this
country. All of us are indebted to this
extraordinary public servant, and all
of us have benefited from his service
to his country.
At a time when its need was great-
est, Judge Webster took the helm at
the Federal Bureau of Investigation
where his leadership made possible
the replacement of chaos with stabili-
ty; of shattered effectiveness with sig-
nificant accomplishment. His keen
vision identified weakness and his pre-
cision of purpose restored vigor to a
beleaguered agency.
Under his guidance, the FBI has
emerged fully capable of discharging
its responsibilities as the Nation's pri-
mary criminal investigative agency,
one of which all America can be
proud.
As a member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, I have had many occasions
during the past decade to become fa-
miliar with Judge Webster's high
standards, both for himself and for
others: with his unassailable personal
integrity and with his strength of
character as he directed the FBI on a
steady course.
Once again, I was privileged to sit on
the committee charged with consider-
ation of Judge Webster's nomination.
The Intelligence Committee conducted
comprehensive and exhaustive confir-
mation hearings which scrutinzed
Judge Webster's fitness for the posi-
tion of Director of Central Intelli-
gence. Throughout this thorough and
sometimes grueling review of his
record at the FBI, Judge Webster dis-
played, with unflappable patience, his
solid qualifications for the job. In an
expression of its support for his nomi-
nation, the Intelligence Committee
unanimously voted to confirm Judge
Webster as Director of Central Intelli-
gence.
No less a challenge awaits the next
Director of Central Intelligence than
that which greeted William Webster
at the FBI 10 years ago. In order to re-
store stability and effectiveness to the
intelligence community the new Direc-
tor of the CIA will have to blend judi-
ciously the four components of intelli-
gence, analysis, counterintelligence,
espionage, and covert action, to create
a combination best suited to form the
structure on which this country's for-
eign policy can be forged and its de-
fenses built to deflect threats from
outside forces. In these times of dimin-
ished resources hard choices must be
made. I am confident that as Director
William Webster will make those
choices which will accurately reflect
our national priorities.
At a time when it is imperative to
remove politics from decision making
in the intelligence community, mem-
bers of the Intelligence Committee
were reassured by Judge Webster that
he would continue to maintain his
apolitical posture, but would make cer-
tain he met with the President often
so that he could give him his unvar-
nished views.
He also pledged to the committee
that he would inform Congress of
covert activities in a timely manner,
adding. "Any project that cannot sur-
vive congressional notification is sus-
pect from the beginning." Judge Web-
ster buttressed that statement with
his declaration that "I believe the Di-
rector of the CIA clearly has an obli-
gation of trust- to the Senate and to
this committee."
Mutual trust and cooperation be-
tween the CIA and the Congress arc-
the ingredients required to reinforce
the structure on which sound intelli-
gence policy is constructed. Judge
Webster in his guarantee that he
would resign if the President withheld
notification of a covert operation to
the Congress told the committee, '1
would have to advise the President of
my position on this and if he would
not offer to speak to you, I would have
to leave."
As the country recovers from some
of the most serious foreign policy
blunders in its history, carried out by
those without respect for the law or
the will of the American people, it is
important to know that in William
Webster we have a man who has dedi-
cated most of his life to the law and
can be counted on to continue that
commitment and to serve the Ameri-
can people to the best of his uncom-
mon ability.
Just as Judge Webster responded to
his country's call 10 years ago to re-
store order to an organization stand-
ing in tarnished disarray, his country
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S 6720 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987
is again asking him to fill another
leadership role. This time at the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, where, I am
certain. he will answer this call by fin-
parting his own high standards to that
organization.
Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, Wil-
liam H. Webster has had a long and
distinguished career of service as a
U.S. attorney in St. Louis, as a U.S.
district judge, and as judge on the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
He has served 9 years as Director of
the FBI.
He is not a stranger to us here in the
Senate; we have confirmed him three
times for positions requiring the high-
est degree of integrity and ability.
He has appeared before the Select
Committee on Intelligence many
times, and we know him well.
As FBI Director he has been inti-
mately involved inthe intelligence ac-
tivities of the U.S. Government, and
has served as Chairman of the Work-
ing Group on Counterintelligence and
as a member of the Special Interagen-
cy Group on Intelligence.
In the course of its hearings on this
nomination, the Select Committee on
Intelligence conducted three open
hearings totaling almost 11 hours over
3 days, plus two closed sessions on
matters that were deemed too sensi-
tive for public discussion.
Judge Webster has answered ques-
tions on every conceivable subject re-
lating to his conduct as FBI Director,
to the activities of the FBI while he
has served as Director, and on the
manner in which he would conduct
himself as Director of Central Intelli-
gence.
Following these hearings the Com-
mittee voted unanimously, 15 to 0 to
recommend that Judge Webster be
confirmed by the Senate.
The position of DCI is one of the
most sensitive and important positions
In Federal Government.
This country has been without a per-
manent DCI since William Casey was
hospitalized some months ago.
It is vital that we fill this position,
and I am pleased that someone of
Judge Webster's stature?someone
who had certainly earned the right to
retire with honors if he had chosen to
do so?has agreed to accept the nomi-
nation.
CONTIRMATION OT WILLIAM WEBSTER AS
DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, I am pleased to rise today to sup-
port the confirmation of William H.
Webster to be the 14th Director of
Central Intelligence. Judge Webster
faces formidable tasks in this position.
Perhaps most important is to renew
leadership of the intelligence commu-
nity that the Congress and the Ameri-
can people can trust.
I spent 8 years on the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, the last 2
as chairman. I saw first hand how the
responsibilities of the intelligence
community have changed in the
1980's. The threats we expect our in-
telligence agencies to deal with include
state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics
Interdiction, and technology security.
As our expectations for the intelli-
gence community increased, it was in-
evitable that new lines of authority
and accountability would have to be
established.
Congressional oversight has played
an integral role in the development of
new lines of accountability. The Intel-
ligence Oversight Act of 1980 estab-
lished precise notification procedures
In order that Congress could properly
exercise its constitutional oversight
role. Oversight of sensitive intelligence
operations involves the intelligence
community, which must operate in
secret if it is to be effective, and the
Congress, which is accustomed to open
debate and public dialog.
Congressional Oversight of Intelli-
gence has evolved considerably since it
was formalized in the 1970's?and it
will continue to evolve to meet the
new intelligence challenges of the late
20th century. But oversight is a proc-
ess that depends on people to make it
work. It involves trust among the par-
ties. Congressional oversight is a form
of a social contract which must have
commitment from both parties if it is
to work effectively.
We have witnessed what can happen
when the process breaks down. The
select committee hearings have heard
detailed testimony, amplifying the tes-
timony heard by the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee last fall, which lays
out how a private covert action network
was established to circumvent the re-
quirements of the 1980 Intelligence
Oversight Act.
Many have been quick to proclaim
that oversight failed in the wake of
the Iran-Contra affair. But this view
reveals a lack of understanding about
what oversight can and cannot do.
Oversight can impart the wisdom of
the Senate into the intelligence proc-
ess. Oversight can argue for larger in-
telligence budgets to meet the new
threats of the 1980's. And oversights
can help to improve the quality of in-
telligence when it focuses on the intel-
ligence process.
Oversight cannot, however, prevent
determined people from evading or cir-
cumventing the law of our Nation.
Oversight did not fail in the Iran-
Contra affair?certain individuals in
the administration failed to live up to
their responsibilities to keep Congress
adequately and fully informed of all
significant intelligence activities. This
was a failure of people not of the proc-
ess.
Some have tried to argue that Con-
gress could not be trusted to keep such
Important secrets as the Iran initia-
tive. I have never understood why Ira-
nian mullahs and middlemen like Gor-
banifar were more trustworthy than
the elected representatives of the
American people. As the hearings in-
vestigating the Iran-Contra affair pro-
ceed, it is becoming increasingly clear
that Congress was not informed be-
cause Congress disagreed with trading
arms for hostages, disagreed with ne-
gotiations with a terrorist state, and
disagreed with the administration's
approach to Nicaragua.
In fact, the track record of the intel-
ligence committees keeping secrets is
very good. Under my direction. the
Senate Intelligence Committee under-
took a study of published media ac-
counts which revealed secret informa-
tion and relied on leaks for such infor-
mation. The result of our study were
informative: 147 stories were found in
a period of 151 days. Of the 147 stories
only 13, or 9 percent, cited congres-
sional sources and none were attrib-
uted to the Intelligence Committee.
Over 90 percent of the leaks came
from the executive branch. I think
these results show far better than any-
thing else just how specious the argu-
ment that "Congress cannot be trust-
ed because it leaks" is.
The problem is simply a lack of trust
on the part of officials that were de-
termined to pursue their goals irre-
gardless of the will of Congress. The
answer is not to pass further restric-
tive legislation?the answer is to re-
build the trust relationship that is so
necessary for oversight to work.
I have long argued that the proce-
dures governing oversight of the intel-
ligence community are sound and not
in need of revision. Judge Webster has
a tremendous opportunity to revitalize
relations between the intelligence
community and Congress. I believe
that he will do just that. Throughout
his long and distinguished career,
Judge Webster has shown himself to
be a dedicated and honest public serv-
ant. I look forward to his confirma-
tion.
Mr. President, I ask uiiathous con-
sent that an article by former Director
of Central Intelligence, Stansfield
Turner, be entered into the RECORD.
Admiral Turner's article, in the form
of an open letter to Judge Webster,
offers much that all future DCI's
should take to heart.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[Prom the New York Times, Mar. 13, 1987)
A LETTER TO WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
(By Stansfield Turner)
WASHINGTON.?Dear Bill. Thanks for being
willing to take the job at the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. The nation needs you there
badly. There will likely be months of diffi-
cult investigations ahead, but I would like to
suggest that there can be opportunity in the
adversity.
So many mistakes have been made in the
past few years in and around the White
House and the C.I.A. that the President has
agreed to make radical changes in the way
he uses the C.I.A. That will help you im-
measurably. Witness two excerpts from his
talk to the nation March 1:
"I am also determined to make the Con-
gressional oversight process work. Proper
procedures for consultation with the Con-
gress will be followed, not only in the letter
but in the spirit.
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ay 19, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
"I've also direeted that any covert activity
be in suprkrt of clear policy objectives and
in compliance with American values. I
expect a covert policy that if Americans saw
It on the front page of their newpaper.
they'd say. "That makes sense."
The Administration has previosuly resist-
ed these policies strongly. The C.I.A. has re-
sisted them from time to time. External
forces, though, have made such policies in-
evitable. Congressional oversight, for in-
stance. is the result of the greater and
greater democratization of American life
since you and I entered Amherst College in
1941. We are much less willing today to
yield to authority just because it is author-
ity. You and I have come to see the tradi-
tional power of committee chairmen in Con-
gress watered down, junior officers in the
military daring to ask why they are doing
what they are doing and factory workers ad-
vising management.
From the 1940's to the 60s, almost no one
outside the C.I.A. sought a say in what was
going on inside that secret organization.
The public accepted that as a necessary
price of the cold war, and the Congress
obliged by providing money with few ques-
tions asked. By the late 60's, the Congress
began to worry about the C.I.A.'s secret ac-
tivities. In 1974, it passed the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment requiring that Congress be in-
formed when the C.I.A. undertook covert
actions. A year later, it ordered a halt to a
covert action in Angola.
That same year brought the Church com-
mittee, whose investigations revealed that
unaccountable power can lead to mistakes.
The Congress decided that we could not
have any unaccoutable agency of Govern-
ment, not even our most secret intelligence
organization.
From 1977 to 1981, we worked to make
Congressional oversight compatible with se-
crecy. It quickly became clear that you must
have good will and trust on both sides to do
that. Without trust, the Congress may insist
on knowing details that could endanger the
lives of agents or other secrets, and without
good will the C.I.A. cannot win the support
from Congress that it needs.
In their concern for secrecy, Pregident
Reagan and former Director William J.
Casey told the intelligence committees as
little as possible. The most obvious damage
was that the Administration had neither
the advice of the Congress on the Iran hos-
tage swap nor its support. What you now
face is the possibility of new laws requiring
such full disclosure that you might feel in-
hibited from conducting some sensitive op-
erations.
Building on Mr. Reagan's pledge to make
oversight work, however, you can restore
confidence and trust. The Congress would
prefer this, I believe, but you will have to
persuade Congress that secrecy is not being
abused. There will always be some resist-
ance from C.I.A. professionals to sharing in-
formation with the Congress. Espionage and
covert action have traditionally been viewed
in the C.I.A. as unique undertakings that
demand extraordinary secrecy. There is
probably nowhere in our Government
where so much secrecy in justifiable. We
have just seen, though, where excess secre-
cy can have disastrous results.
The paranoia with which Vice Adm. John
M. Poindexter and Lt. Col. Oliver L. North
divided up information and limited its distri-
bution on the grounds of secrecy is just
what did them in.
President Reagan's pledge on covert ac-
tions should also help. His conversion here
comes from having been burned four times
by covert actions that the public rejected:
the mining of Nicaragua's harbors, publica-
tion of a manual for the contras that ap-
peared to Condone assassination, support Of
antiterrorist actions by Lebanese intelle-
gence that got out of the C.I.A.'s control
and resulted in some 80 innocent deaths,
and the anus deliveries to Iran. None of
these passed the verdict of "makes sense."
It is also very difficult to keep a covert
action covert if it does not make sense.
Under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, you
must obtain Presidential approval and
notify the Congress of all covert actions.
There are bound to be leaks. This means
that we have forsaken the ability to under-
take covert actions that would not be ac-
cepted by the public. The President, in
effect, acknowledged that he is now willing
to accept that.
It is not a high price to pay, because it
would be contrary to the spirit of our consti-
tutional process to carry out foreign policies
in secret that the public and Congress
would not accept if known and also because
the scope for covert action has narrowed re-
markably in the past 20 years, especially ac-
tions to change the political complexion of
other countries.
For instance, in 1954 Dwight D. Eisenhow-
er decided that he did not like the Guate-
malan Government. The C.I.A. with not
much more than radios broadcasting reports
of the movements of nonexistent troops.
helped "our man" into office. That policy
would probably not work today because
communications are too good in most coun-
tries for such deception to deceive. Tomor-
row, when commercial photographic satel-
lites are more broadly available, it will be
even more difficult. Convert action has an
important niche, but it is a more narrow one
than we previously thought.
Finally. what I found perhaps most dis-
turbing in the Tower commission report was
the evidence that some C.I.A. people were
out of control: responding to Colonel
North's request for covert help without
proper authorization; treading close to, if
not over, the law in assisting the contras,
and submitting statements that have proved
to be false.
The people in the C.I.A. are among the
very best in our Government, but the pres-
sures to which we subject them are unique.
A few of them may go wrong from time to
time. Given the present environment, you
have a marvelous opportunity to establish a
more careful management system.
In short, this time of trouble is also a time
of opportunity to cement the President's
pledges and to assert a greater degree of
control at the C.I.A. Both are overdue?and
both are essential.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I have
known Bill Webster personally for a
long time. Since our days together at
law school at Washington University, I
have never doubted my friend's hones-
ty, his integrity, or his unswerving
commitment to what is right and fair
in Government.
William Webster is committed to
good government. He cares deeply
about what this Nation stands for, and
I sincerely believe this commitment
will be reflected as he serves the
American people in his capacity as Di-
rector of Central Intelligence.
Mr. President, this country needs a
man of William Webster's character to
lead its intelligence apparatus, a vital
tool of U.S. foreign policy. It is unfor-
tunate that this crucially important
Government agency has suffered a
loss of credibility. Its role in American
foreign policy is too vital.
S 6721
For these reasons, I believe the
Senate should unanimously advise and
consent to the nomination of William
Webster to be Director of Centra/ In-
telligence. This agency deserves a com-
mitment to professionalism and excel-
lence from its Director. Judge Webster
offers this commitment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I yield 4
minutes to the Senator from Montana
(Mr. MELcHE111.
Mr. MELCHER. Mr. President, when
people of my generation first became
aware of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation it was during the bank rob-
bery days in the early thirties and the
apprehension and disposal of Dil-
linger.
And in the later time the FBI inves-
tigation of organized crime drew the
attention of the public, and perhaps
many of the public are aware of the
FBI's work on income tax evasion, but
there are also some duties that the
FBI has in connection with Indian res-
ervations and the major crimes that
are committed on Indian reservations.
It is a requirement of law that the FBI
investigate on Indian reservations.
The special duties of the FBI on
Indian reservations in Montana caused
me to write late in 1985, in November
specifically, to the special agent in
charge in Butte, MT, about crime on
Montana reservations. I received a re-
sponse from the FBI, in fact from the
Director, Judge Webster, in February
1986, and it was a resume of what was
occurring.
Might I point out that part of that
response was that on the Blackfeet
Indian Reservation in Montana, just
?one -of our reservations, there were 99
major crimes with three convictions.
This was during a period between
June 30, 1983, until August 1, 1985.
And those crimes involved death or se-
rious bodily injury or other personal
crimes of violence like kidnapping or
assault, rape, or robbery, and so forth.
Ninety-nine investigations to three
convictions seemed to demonstrate the
point that the investigations of these
major crimes were not resulting in sig-
nificant amounts of convictions. I had
not been informed of significant im-
provement since that date in 1985. Not
much happened that I was aware of
during my recent discussions with
Judge Webster over the past several
weeks. I have emphasized my concerns
that crime on many Indian reserva-
tions in Montana was not under con-
trol.
He has brought me up to date on
some improvement, and I am pleased
to say that. But there is still lack of at-
tention. Judge Webster, in a letter to
me today outlined the steps that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation will
take in trying to get better control
over crime on Indian reservations.
At the heart of this was a discussion
of the reorganization of the FBI in the
Montana and Idaho division. Judge
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6722 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
Webster has also. in light ed all this se-
rious concern, reennunented that
?there be a reassessment cof the studies
that have gone on since 1984 about
FBI reorganization.
I am pleased that Judge Webster has
set the course for the FBI over 'the
next several months in looking Into
these problems in depth and attempt-
ing to get better coordination between
the various agencies that are responsi-
ble for law enforcement on Indian res-
ervations. He will also recommend
that during the reassessment period,
that the FBI will consult with Mon-
tana and Idaho Senators and Con-
gressmen. State, local, and Indian offi-
cials, and civic leaders. This approach
Is needed and the coordination of all
law enforcement offices is essentiaL
Butte has been the location of the
special agent in charge for the divi-
sion. It is a proper geographic location
and the essential work of adequate in-
vestigation and preparation of cases
has been successfully carried out in
the past in the two States. Coordinat-
ing the work of FBI and other law en-
forcement agencies can be greatly im-
proved, but it depends more an the
work on the ground where the crimes
are committed, than where the invi-
sion headquarters are located. The
problem is not Butte. It is the lack of
-coordination. Today's letter from
Judge Webster commits the necessary
effort to get on top of the problems.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the Haeolle my
letter to the special agent in charge,
dated November 1985, and the re-
sponse by Judge Webster in February
1986, with attached documents, as well
as Judge Webster's letter of today and
documents that are attached to it.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RecORD, as follows:
VS. DEPARTwarn or Jcsascs.
FEDERAL BUREAU or lintermation.
Washington, DC. February 4. 1988.
BOR.-MAWR ANDREWS,
Chairman, Select Committee on /iodide df
-
faits, ELS comet% Washington, DC.
Darn Ma. Cadman, I sin writing in re-
ationse to the November 22, 1985, letter
from Senator John Meicher to Special
Agent in Charge William Fallin of our Butte
Office regarding the Senator's concerns
about the effectiveness of law enforcement
of Indian reservations in Montana. The fol-
lowing comments concerning the FBI's rote
In Federal law enforcement on Indian reser-
vations in Montana -relate directly to Sena-
tor Melchees six questions:
L The Butte FBI Office has overall re-
sponsibility for the investigation of Crimes
on Indian Reservations (CIR) in Montana.
The office consists of a complement of
seven Special Agents, a Special Agent in
Charge and an Assistant Special Agent in
Charge. The Butte Office is responsible for
the administration of +debt satellite offices
in Montana known as Resident Agencies
(HA). five of which are responsible for CIR
matters. Theme RAs are located in Cut Bank
(2 Agents). Great Falls (3 Agents). Glasgow
(2 Agents), Missoula (3 Agents) and Billings
(5 Agents). The three additional RAs are lo-
cated in Helena (2 Agents), Bozeman (2
Agents) and Kalispell (2 Agents).
& lindlostare I sets Tenth inornell ItAs
that serve Indian teservattons in Montana
and The distance between eaeli RA and his-
wanton. Drielosure 2 Dots the disitance be-
tween our butte Office and each res-
ervation adtliln Its resporisnAllty.
At the present time, my associates are
cad/a/rang a proposal submitted by Special
Agent In Charge Falba to ander* the three-
Agent complement in Great Palls to two
Agents, said to reestablish the RA at Havre
with one Agent. Under this prepense the
Havre RA would handle Investigative mat-
ters In Liberty County, Hill County, Blaine
County and at the Fort Belknap and Rocky
Boy Indian Reservations. This new change
would afford our assigned Agent immediate
access to Fort Belknap (50 miles) and Rocky
Boy (25 miles).
3-5. Refer to enclosure & which is a two-
year statistical analysis of CHL cases opened
by our Butte Office from June 80, 1983,
through October 8, 1985. Listed declinations
are based upon U.S. Attorney guidelines.
6. The FBI's working relationship with
Montana tribal and Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (BIA) offices is projected toward the
eventual nationwide shifting of the FBI's
primary investigative responsibiBties for law
eriforeesnient on Indian reservations to the
HU. Department of the Interior (DOI), and
the tribal police. during the past five years,
extensive efforts have been implemented to
accomplish this goal, which has been the
policy of the Department of Justice since
1980. This policy encourages U.S. Attorneys
having jutisdiction over Indian triatters to
utilize the investigative services of tribal
and DIA police as a means toward Indian
self-determinaiton. It is currently published
in the United States Attorneys Manual, and
reads as follows:
9-20.145 INVESTIGATIVE JURISDIC-
TION.
'The fin has investigative jurisdiction
over Uolatiors of 18 U.S.C. 1152 and 1153.
Frequently by the time the MU wives an
the reservation some investigation will have
been undertaken by tribal or Bureau of
Incline Affairs (BIA) police. it is recogaized
that the ability of the tribal mid Bee police
can wary from naservatiow to tn.-serve/ion,
and United States Attorneys are free to ask
far FBI investigation in all eases Where It is
telt that such is requried. However, United
States Attorneys are ericoaraged and au-
thorized to accept investigative reports di-
rectly from trent' or BIA police and prepare
a case for prosecution without FBI investi-
gation to all eases where you feel a suff -
dent investigation can be undertaken by
BIA or tribal law enforcement officers."
In spite of the implementation of this De-
partmental policy, the .F131 continues to
-conduct the majority of the investigations
of major criminal offenses that occur on
Indian reservations. In various conferences,
meetings and seminars with U.S. Attorneys
and -FBI officials, it has been determined
that a variety of concerns have been ex-
pressed in regard to transferring investiga-
tive responsibilities in all major felonies to
the Bill and tribal police. Among the con-
cerns voiced is the importance of uniformity
In delivering law enforcement services to
The Indian people, the timeliness and thor-
oughness of investigation, the reporting of
investigation for prosecutive consideration,
and the ability to Provide coverage of out-
trfetate tends when the BIA =munes the in-
vestigative responsiblities. Some U.S. Attor-
neys have indicated that they had net been
satisfied with BIA's investigative response
on cases currently within WA's jurisdiction
and did not favor a blanket transfer of re-
sponsibilities. The US. Attorneys also ques-
tioned the sufficiency of the manpower pool
May 19, 198'
-available to DIA to handle e Isig.h volume of
tirvestigatiore.
Consideration is presently being even to
exploring the possibility of extending to the
WA and other tribal police departments ju-
risdiction for negligent homicide Investiga-
thms. Should such extensions take place,
the FBI will follow each of those investiga-
tions with the respective agencies.
ft should be noted that there will be no
transition of law enforcement from the FBI
to the Indian police until the Indian police
develop a career-type law enforcement serv-
ice with officers who can practice the law
enforcement skills that they are taught and
become expert in them. The rapid turnover
of officers in the Indian police ranks is a
detriment to the effectiveness of Indian
police organizations and must be addressed
as a number one priority prior to placing
undue emphasis on removing the FBI horn
Its law enforcement responsibilities on
Indian land.
The FBI has attended various meetings
with Department of Interior (DOI) officials
in efforts to expedite the shifting of the
FBI's role on reservations to the BIA. The
DOI has a Division of Law Enforcement
Services (DLES) BLit, which does not have
line authority or control of BIA Investiga-
tors on reservations. The B1A Investigators
are directed by nonlaw enforcementerained
personnel. At the present time, if the Chief
of the DLES desires any action to be taken
on a reservation. he mast request this action
through the BIA area Superintendent (not
law enforcement trained), who then passes
this request on to the Reservation Superin-
tendent (not 1RW enforcement trained) to
determine if he desires this action to take
place. Due to this type of arrangement, the
BIA DLES has been hampered at times in
executing its responsibilities.
The BIA is assigned one FBI National
Academy (NA) student position M each of
the four classes trained annually at the FBI
Academy at Quantico, Virginia. During
1962, three student positions viere filled; in
1963, lour student positions were filled: in
1984, four positions were filled; and km 1985,
three positions were filled by BIA students.
It should be noted that Indian tribal police
officers are allowed to attend the Treasury
Department's consolidated Federal Law En-
forcement Training Center, IBYRCO, Geor-
gia. Coordination for this training Is han-
dled by the BIA.
The FBI has conducted numerous local
Indian Training Schools for BIA and tribal
police in the areas of report writing, investi-
gative techniques, crime-scene search and
'evidence preservation. The total Fiscal Year
BIA and Indian training statistics sponsored
by the FBI for 1982 there were 29 schools
'with 516 attendees; Fiscal Year 1983 there
were 33 schools with 693 attendees; Fiscal
Year 1984 there were 33 schools with '752 at-
tendees; and Fiscal Year 1985 there were 18
schools with 442 attendees. In December,
1985. our Butte Office conducted a three-
day Basic Law Enforcement Techniques
Training Session in Browning, Montana, for
20 WA and tribal police.
This type of training continues to en-
hance the professional capabilities of BIA
and tribal officers. As their professional
qualifications are enhanced, the quality of
work that they produce will also improve,
and we would expect subsequently the U.S.
Attorneys will come to rely more and more
on their invesigative efforts.
In addition to the training given to the
BIA and the Indian law enforcement com-
munity, the FBI has also conducted two sep-
arate cross-cultural Indian seminars for FBI
Special Agents working primarily Indian
matters. Instructors and guest speakers tn-
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of
10
he
IU-
ra-
ce,
DO
BI
ee
kw
rid
PT
a
an
rag
al
Dn
gs
its
tie
nt
're
,'a-
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,sC1
ref
4.1
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to
Si
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I.
ci
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May 19, 1987
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE S 6723
eluded prominent Individuals from the
Indian community and the BIA.
TheiFBI presently supports the Montana
MA and tribal police through training and
during their investigations offers guidance
and counseling. as well as the services of the
7131 Laboratory and Identification Divi-
sions. The FBI will continue in this regard
In the event these agencies assume full re-
sponsibility for all investigations on Indian
reservations.
Continued coordination by the FBI with
leaders of the Indian community on matters
of mutual interest is a priority matter to
me. In this regard, as recently as October
28, 1985, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
Allan E. Meyer, Unit Chief. General Crimes
Section, Criminal Investigative Division,
FBI Headquarters, attended and participat-
ed in the ninth Inter-American Indian Con-
ference held in Santa Fe, New Mexico. This
forum presented an excellent opportunity
for SSA Meyer to discuss several of the pre-
viously mentioned matters, and by so doing,
open additional lines of communication
With other attendees.
I trust that the above information will be
of assistance to you and the Committee
members.
Sincerely yours.
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER,
Director.
RESERVATION/RA COVERING RESERVATION
Blackfeet/Cut Bank.
Rocky Boy/Great Falls.
Fort Belitna.p/Glasgow.
Fort Peck/Glasgow.
Flathead/Missoula,
Crow/Billings.
Northern Cheyenne/Billings.
DISTANCE BETWEEN RA AND RESERVATION
Blackfeet/Cut Bank:
Browning-35 miles.
East Glacier-48 miles.
St. Mary-57 (appx).
Heart Butte-55 (appx).
Rocky Boy/Great Falls:
Rocky Boy-93(aPPk).
Iiavre-113 miles.
Box Elder-91 (appa).
--Fort Belknap/Glasgow: ?
Fort Belknap?I 22 miles.
Hays?I52 (appa).
Lodge Pole-142 (appx).
Harlem-135 (appx).
Port Peck/Glasgow:
Fort Peck-22 (appal.
Poplar-70 miles.
Wolf Point-49 miles.
-Flathead/Missoula:
Polson-66 miles.
Crow/Billings:
Crow Agency-57 (appx).
Lodge Grass-79 (appa).
Pr3'or-25 (appa).
Hardin-46 miles.
Northern Cheyenne/Billings:
Lame Deer-103 (appx).
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, November 22, 1985.
Mr. W. D. FALL'S,
Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Butte, MT.
DF.AR MR. FALUN, I have longstanding con-
cerns about the effectiveness of law enforce-
ment on Indian reservations in Montana. I
am contacted frequently by Indian and non-
Indian constituents who feel that the atten-
tion and services provided by Federal law
enforcement officers and prosecutors on
Indian reservations in Montana are inad-
equate.
In order to better understand the Federal
law enforcement situation on Indian reser-
vations in Montana. I would like you to pro-
vide me with the following information:
1. the location of the FBI field offices in
Montana and the number of agents in each
field office;
2. which field offices serve Indian reserva-
tions in Montana and the distance between
each field office and the reservation it
serves:
S. for each of the last five years. how
many cases did the FBI investigate on each
reservation in Montana (please break out by
year. by reservation, and by the type of
crime):
4. For each of the last five years, provide
the number and type of cases, broken out by
reservation. investigated by the FBI which
were (a) submitted to the U.S. Attorney for
prosecution: and (b) prosecuted in Federal
Court. For those cases prosecuted, please in-
dicate the final disposition:
5. for each of the last five years, provide
the number and type of cases, broken out by
reservation, which were submitted to the
U.S. Attorney for prosecution and declined.
Please indicate the reason for declination by
the Attorney;
6. please describe the nature of the FBI's
working relationship with the Tribal and
Bureau of Indian Affairs enforcement offi-
cers on each Indian reservation in Montana..
Include in this description any informal or
formal arrangements between the FBI and
reservation law enforcement that facilitates
the investigation of federal crimes on the
reservations in Montana.
I appreciate a prompt response to this re-
quest.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
JoHle MELcaER,
DISTANCE BETWEEN ROM CENTRAL orrica AND
RESERVATION
Blackfeet:
Browning-238 miles.
East Glacier-251 miles.
St. Mary-260 (appx).
Heart Butte-218 (appal.
Rocky BOY:
Havre-266 miles.
Box Elder-244 (appx).
Fort Belknap-315 miles:
Hays-348 (appx),
Harlem-310 miles.
Lodge Pole-355 (appx).
Fort Peck:
Poplar-494 miles.
Wolf Point-473 miles.
Flathead:
Poison-185 miles
Crow:
Crow Agency-367 (appx).
Lodge Grass-389 (appx).
Pryor-335 (appa).
Hardin-269 miles
Northern Cheyenne:
Lame Deer-413 (appa)..
JUNE 30, 1983 TO AUGUST 1, 1985
Iteservabor
a a rases r.,,,,,,r4m/1" cases,. Total rases/
by offense convictions
ofteme
thecae,/ '1981-99 3 181/9
C-I? 6
1911-21 '2 61/2
B-1 0
C-2I
0-5 0
Fort Belknap 1984-19 1 45/2
C-25
0-1 1..._.................
Fon Peck 1984-54 16 i9
C-50
Rathead 198C-5 0 6/1
0-1 1 ........._
Crow 1981-21 3 . 51/3
B-1
JUNE 30, 1983 TO AUGUST 1, 1985?Continued
leseratim
No al coos "II (I/ ma Towr
oftw omacted convicurs'
C-27 0
0-1 0
Where Demme. 1984-39 I 53/8
C-13 3
0-1 1 .
49/ 74 491/74
? Carat Descriphoe
Crime on Mat Ilesavave heath a wan oratty Mon and
other primal cram al mance, it. 0?g. gout rapt nthin"Y. etc ?
198A
Crow N Indan Besenabas?Olher persoral arves-1988
Came o4 Indian Reservation?At property ernes-198C
Crime on India tesavalta?Embeniement aft!, trawl amivtag tribal
Iona-198D
I One ovaietheanor.
Cases closed by declination
Blackfoot 54
Rocky Boy 18
Fort Belknap 20
Fort Peck 25
Flathead
Crow 12
Northern Cheyenne 25
Total 154
U.S. DEPARTMENT or JusTicx,
FEDERAL BITRILAT/ OF INVESTIGATION.
Washington, DC, May 19, 1987.
Hon. Joifs MELCHER,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR MELCHER: I appreciate very
much the opportunity to discuss the law en-
forcement situation in Montana and espe-
cially the management of our Butte Divi-
sion, which encompasses both Montana and
Idaho. This is. of course, a continuation of
our previous discussions and correspondence
and of the briefing provided to you by Exec-
utive Assistant Director John Glover,
First, I understand your deeply felt con-
cern that there be more effective law en-
forcement on the Indian Reservations and I
agree that greater effort should be made to
Improve the combined effectiveness of the
law enforcement agencies involved in this
effort. I believe that significant progress has
been made, as reflected in our current sta-
tistics, but recognize that other agencies are
also involved and other statistics may vary
from ours. The FBI will undertake to see
what additional means are available within
the law enforcement community, including
the FBI, to improve coordination on the res-
ervations and will fully support your efforts
in this regard.
Second, I know that you understand my
desire to improve the management of our
field offices, especially those offices with
significant numbers of resident agencies
scattered throughout large territories. The
Attorney General has been furnished with a
number of studies and recommendations
that have been made dating back to 1984.
None of these studies or recommendations
suggest any diminution in the investigative
strength of the FBI currently assigned to
our Butte Division. In fact, in recent years
there has been a significant increase in the
division's target staffing level. I have previ-
ously assured you that I would not under-
take to dictate a decision during the time I
remained in office should the Senate con-
firm my nomination as Director of Central
Intelligence. That has been, and will contin-
ue to be the case.
Because of your deep concern, and in def-
erence also to Senator Baucus, I will recom-
mend that a reassessment of the accumulat-
ed studies be made under the direction of
our Inspection Division and that the new
Director and the Attorney General take no
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S 6724 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
action on this matter until a more current
assessakeit los 'been amailleted. I loll also
recommend that all of the Senators and
Congressmen .from Montana and Idaho, as
well as other Mate, local and tribal officials
and civic leaders be consulted and their
views incorporated in the assessment. Final-
ly, I'm certain that the Attorney General
and/or the new Director will discuss their
final conclusions with you at the appropri-
ate time.
I believe all of the above is in accordance
with our discussions and I trust will be sans-
factory to you. With best wishes,
Sincerely.
Wttutst B. WEBSTER,
Director
CV* ON INDIAN RESERVATION 198 CLASSIFICATION
AICOMPLISHMENTS
Set
Um-
sibents
mem
aid
-inform
toss
Renal
skews
Aunt
Says
fiscal sex
1987 (10 OD)
13
16
65
1412
21
1
45
21
BUTTE'S PECENTAGE OF TOTAL litIREAti
PTDs
Commit iSrs frets somietla
2621 pa,
24 (55) 23(781) 16 (123P(
1986 _ 16 (105) 21(398) 12 (178)
1167 (le
69) 6 43/ 3 (36)
i12 rift
M461)
Fguies P purstheses aselareau lot*,
IMES
DO
qentfmg DO cars tzses
lesimmt noir OM
d
ao
ePestif
fer
Es*
1987 (1st
102
137
JIB
303
142
269
719
SO
131
100
BUTTES PERCENT OF =Ai 13UREAD OD CARS
*ening tecoet Dosed
of year
Pad
Se (564) 26 (1160) 96 (751) 14 173)
291119811.1-0 f, is t9131 17 (1076) r (13n) 16 4672)
15 (677) 21 4284) 17 (1118) 166223)
CRIME ON INDIAN RESERVATION DEATH OR SERIOUS
1300ILY INJURY
Com-
*its
Warw.
Ion and toravi:-
*rests
Isms
romig
1986.
8987 4201418)?__
31
45
4
.17
10e18
UI
9898
.844log
fly
00 uses 431oses
wind done
1147
19I6 _
1W (131 00)
049
.1.14
30
132
227
29
316
Si
51
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I am
pleased that 'FBI =recta: WMIszo
Webster has assured Senator Marcum
and myself that the Bureau's Butte.
'MT division office will r?ri
Butte, pending a study of FBI oper-
ations on the division's Indian reserva-
tions.
The Butte FBI office has a distin-
guished record of effectiveness. This
effectiveness is enhanced by Butte's
central location, conveniPtit to Mon-
tana's and Idaho's Indian reservations,
where many of the Bureau's investiga-
tions are conducted
The Butte -office also contributes
substantially to the local eonununity,
esnploying approximately RV People.
These jobs are important to Butte, a
community rich in history, but more
recently hit hard by the downturn 'in
the natural resource industry.
I am confident that when the FBI
completes Its study of Bureau -oper-
ations on Indian reservations, it will
become clear that Butte Is the be !ro-
tation for coordinating investigations
on these reservations.
I thank Mr. Webster lor bls
thoughtfulness In calling Icw this
study and I anxiously await its recom-
mendations.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, bow
much time remains to this side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two
minutes and fifteen seconds.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, at this
time, in case other members of the
committee appear, I reserve the re-
mainder of my time.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, hew
much time remains on this aide?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four
minutes and seventeen seconds.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, ca Kay
1, 1987, the Senate Intelligence 'Com-
mittee voted 15-0 to report 4favnra'b1y
to the Senate on the nomin' atkm of
Judge William H. Webster be Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence. This unan-
imous vote came after extensive delib-
erations on his qualifications for the
position.
The committee's inquiry focused on
questions regarding Judge Webster's
conception of the role of the DCI, his
views on the congressional oversight
process, and his record as Director of
the Federal Bureau of investigation.
We paid particular attention?both in
open and closed hearings?to several
issues which relate to matters current-
ly being investigated by the select con-
gressional committees and the inde-
pendent counsel. Judge Webster has
responded under oath, both orally and
In written form, to all of the terseons
submitted to him by the committee
relevant to these issues. Based on our
inquiry and those responses, I feel it
imperative that the Senate confirm
him as expeditiously as possible.
The Central Intelligence Agency and
the intelligence community at large
have been without a permanent Direc-
tor since William Casey was hospital-
ized last December. While Robert
Gates, his former deputy. has served
May 14 1.987
admirably as Acting Director through
these difficult times, a position as crit-
ical to the Nation as the Directorship
of Central Intelligente carmot be al-
lowed to languish unoccupied.
The chaos which has characterized
some elements of this country's na-
tional security apparatus has been
chronicled almost daily since last No-
vember in the press, ;n the proceed-
ings of select congrestional vornroit-
tees and through the wort of the inde-
pendent counsel. The Senate Intelli-
gence Committee undertook the initial
Inquiry into the Iran-Contra affair in
full knowledge of the contributions in-
belligence activities make to the for-
mation and implementation of United
States, foreign, and defense policies.
The importance of maintaining a con-
gruence between the foreign policy
goals of the country, as articulated by
the administration and in laws passed
by Congress, and the execution of
those policies by the iritelligence com-
munity lies at the heart of intelligence
oversight.
It is for precisely this reason that we
conducted exhaustive interrogation of
candidates for the position of DCL It
was clear that a complete and public
disclosure of all matters which might
be relevant to the tenure of the Office
was in order. Investigating committees
of the past have been criticized for
putting too much information relating
to the conduct of covert operations
before the public, and in so doing,
causing irreparable damage to the
process by which the Nation safe-
guards its security. It is a criticism
which expresses a fundamental insen-
sitivity to the needs of a democracy
and underestimates the wisdom of the
people, in whose hands the strength of
the Nation ultimately rests.
Secrecy can find Us proper function
in a democracy only to the extent that
It is used to accomplish goals and poll
cies expressed through democratic
legal processes and is limited by the
bounds of the constitutional frame-
work. In many ways, entrusting the
leadership of an agency whose man-
date is to support policy through
secret means is the most delicate of all
Executive appointments. for any abuse
of the position carries catastrophic po-
tential for our sometimes precarious
system of checks and balances.
It is for this reason that the commit-
tee had to seek Judge Webster's firm
pledge to abide by the legislation gov-
erning the oversight of intelligence,
and for this reason that his reactions
to a seemingly endless stream of docu-
ments and press reports detailing alle-
gations of impropriety by the Bureau
or ether Government entities had to
be examined in full view of the public.
If the CIA and other agencies of the
Intelligence community are to retain
support for their activities in the
aftermath of the investigative process-
es which are currently underway, they
must be visibly occupied with the busi-
ness of correcting past excesses. The
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bile7grlianted eda4Skitt Un-
derage, bo -le -engagediiejtiallies
vesicle isiislet it 'import open swan-
ny have been addremed, and that the
prelerences of the leadership of the
intelligence community lie in the sup-
port of foreign policy rather than in
Its conduct.
Judge Webster has cinacenstrated his
annadtment to these challenges, and
he has evidenced his own predisposi-
tions by requesting from the start to
sit on the President's Cabinet in an &d-
eism"' capacity only, without the pre-
rogatives of membership. His state-
ments regarding retroactive and oral
readings indicate his commitment to a
policymaking process which can boast
both demonstrated authorization and
prior policy consideration His 9-year
tenure as Director of the KU has in-
vested him with an appreciation of the
side of law, a general knowledge of the
role a Intelligence in support of
policy. and specific expertise in the
areas of counterintelligence and corm-
torterrorism?areas which are current-
ly In sore need of his stewardship.
-I believe we are fortunate to have
before the Senate the nomination or a
man 'with such demonstrably appropri-
ate qualifications for the position. I
trtge Senutors to vote to confirm
Judge Webster with the same enthusi-
asm which our committee has report-
ed his nomination.
Mr. Preddent, I think we are seeing
right now the importance of this par-
ticular -nomination.
I think everyone recognizes that we
have a Central Intelligence Agency
that necessarily has to function in the
dark Of reeeessfty, ft also met operate
within the law, and therein lies the
Particular rob we face How do we in-
tegrate intelligence ad:irides into the
formulation of Jocelyn policy? Hoe
can inieliigence operations be oanduct-
ed, most of them in private and secret,
and occasionally even In the dark. and
at the same thee 'within the ride of
law?
That is what we are spending a lot of
time on in the Iran-Contra hearing, io-
dising on the words "rule of law."
The rule of law is important to this
_democracy. It is the very CeMeillt that
lutds conflicting and competing inter-
ests together in our melted Nation.
When that tement either cracks or
loses its adhesive power, then we can
find those conflicting interests and
opinions left floating almost on the
debris of democracy.
I think ft is -terribly impottant that
we establish the meaning of the rule
of kw in the minds of our elected *M-
etals.
I think we gourd 16 years ago, and
again recently, that secrecy can lead
to unaccountability; and if you have
unaccountabilfty, that In turn can lead
-to* sense Of arrogance, and that arro-
gance Inevitably leads to abuse. When
the abuse is &natty exposed. that can
lewd to public emisinassinent at the
least and political :paralysis at the
wend. ant Mile have witnessed a certain
disrdsaitlie. - ? _
lie Weeniest take egt!Inioiary care
in how we Oversee the CoMtral betelli-
settee -AMMO. Them Is :perhaps 'no
more kapoitant function than to take
an equal amount of care in the selec-
tion of people nominated to head the
agency.
Bill Webster, I believe, is a man of
extraordinary capability, dedication,
Idealism, and kitelligence. I am satis-
fied, as vice chairman of the commit-
tee, that he mearnres up to all the
qualities we need and seek in the di-
rector of this Agency.
We understand that we need to have
covert operations as an option to be
employed by the President from time
to time. That option must be exercised
very selectively and must be employed
with great care.
There mo no longer be covert ac-
tions which seek in exclude notifica-
tion to Congress, because that will
lead to destruction of our Intelligente
agencies.
We are satisfied. I think that Bin
Webster anderstands his role as Direc-
tor of the Agency and the role of the
Agency within our system. and I be-
lieve he w make a fine contribution
to ow country.
Mr. President, I yield back the re-
mainder of my time.
Mr. BOREN, Mr. President. I yield
the remainder of the time on this side
to the distinguished majority leader..
Mr. BYRD. I thank the able chair-
man and manager Of lite neunkation.
Mr. President, in legislative session
today, I will introduce ingislation to
set fixed Imam for the Director and
the Deputy Director of the Central ka-
tefligence Agency.
The CIA's involvement in the Iran
arms-for-hostagies deal, evidence that
has emerged in the Iran-Contra hear-
ings that former CIA Director Casey
was far snore deeply involved than
originally thought in helping the Con-
tras get mllibery supplies, and the con-
troversial nomination of Robert Gates
as CIA Director earlier this year sug-
gest that ft would be wise to provide a
degree of independence to the two Lop
people at the CIA.
The legislation I will introduce sets
fixed terms of 7 years for the Director
and Deputy Director of Central Intel-
ligence.
Members might not agree to a 7-year
term. They may think it ought to be
10 years or some such term. In any
event, the legislation would set the
fixed term of? years for the Director
and Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency..
The Director may not serve more
than one "7-year term. The legislation
also would stipulate that the two posi-
tions shall not be occupied simulta-
neously by individuals who were em-
ployed by the CIA at any time in the 7
years prior to their nomination.
In the mid-1970's, las part In response
to revelations about CIA excesses,
there were a number of bills and ree-
the Director 'Central leteiligetiee,
big-,01 -them became law. Con-
gress 3thi continued to struggle with
the issue of the CIA's accountability
On covert ?Pertinent I do not take
Issue with the need of any administra-
tion?Republican or Democratic?to
collate intelligence and conduct eovert
operations when necessary.
The CIA's role in this administra-
tion's assistance to the Contra rebels
In Nicaragua. however, suggests that
Perhaps ft would be wise to insure that
the Director of Central Intelligence,
and his Deputy, have a degree of inde-
pendence that would make it possible
for the Agency to resist pressure to
engage is questionable or illegal activi-
ties, As well, reports that intelligence
studies were tailored to support de-
sired administration conclude gas on
Soviet designs on Iran, which appar-
ently provided intellectual justifica-
tion dor the Iran anns-for-ionetages
deals suggest that the CIA needs pro-
tection from political pressure to
home that its intelligence analysis Is
unbiased.
A munber of Important executive
branch officials serve fixed terms: the
FBI Director serves a single 10-year
tens; the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management serves for 4
years; the Chairman of the ~end
Reserve Board serves for 4 years. It is
time for the Director and Deputy Di-
rector of Central Intelligence to be
added to this list.
I thank the 'Senator from Oklahoma
for yielding.
Mr. WREN. Mr. President, does any
thne remote? -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All
time has expired.
Mr. DOREN. Mr. President, I-ask
unanimous -consent to proceed for 30
The PRESIDING PRESIDING 'OFFICER. With-
out objection it is so ordered.
- Mr. COHEN. Mr. President. I want
to take a moment to express my
thanks to the chairman of the Intelli-
gence Committee. Be conducted two
sets of hearings?one on Mr. Gates
and one on Mr. Webster?and conduct-
ed them with intensity and great in-
togrity. It was because of his patience
end perseverance that every Member
of the minority had a full opportunity
to develop, explore, and exchange
views on this important nomination. I
thank him for his patience and courte-
a?
Mr. BOftEN_ Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 1 minute.
'The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, ft is so ordered.
Mr. BOREN. Mr.. President, I thank
my colleague from Maine for the very
generous comments he has just made.
It is a great privilege and pleasure to
be able to serve with him in the lead-
ership -of that committee. He serves
ably as vice chairman and has made an
immense contribution to the spirit of
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S 6726 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987
bipartisanship which appropriately
reigns in that committee.
That committee spans the entire po-
liticall spectrum of the Senate. The
members of the committee put in long
hours, and because of the nature of
the work, the amount of time they
spend is often unrecognized.
Under the leadership of the Senator
from Maine and the spirit he exempli-
fies, the members of the committee
are developing the kind of spirit that I
think the country needs and will serve
our Nation's security interests as well.
I thank him for the very gracious com-
ments he made.
I urge my colleagues to join in the
unanimous recommendation of the
Committee on Intelligence that Judge
Webster's nomination be confirmed, so
that he can get on with the important
work at hand in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I
am delighted to rise in support of the
nomination of William Webster as Di-
rector of Central Intelligence.
There is probably no more demand-
ing job for an unelected official than
that of DCI. The Director must have
an intellectual grasp of an increasingly
complex array of programs ranging
from traditional espionage, to some of
the world's most advanced technical
systems, to the analysis of political
and economic developments in virtual-
ly every country in the world. He must
have impressive administrative skills
to lead a diverse set of agencies, both
civilian and military, that make up the
intelligence community. The degree of
direct authority varies from one
agency to the next, making the man-
agement challenge that much more
difficult.
The DCI must have political skills of
a high order if he is to successfully
defend the interests of Intelligence
against the competing demands of
other government programs. And
those same political abilities will, of
course, be repeatedly tested in his reg-
ular dealings with the Congress.
There can be no doubt about the im-
portance of this vote. The headlines of
the last few months have underlined
over and over again the critical role
played by the DCI and the agencies he
leads in defending national security.
Intelligence agencies are the eyes and
ears?the tripwire?of national de-
fense. For instance, we are on the
brink of a breakthrough in arms con-
trol negotiations with the Soviet
Union. The ultimate success of that
effort will depend heavily on the mon-
itoring capabilities of U.S. intelligence.
These are demanding times for the
Intelligence community. While the
tasks and demands grow in scope and
complexity, the budgetary resources
are increasingly constrained.
With all these considerations in
mind, the Intelligence Committee con-
ducted protracted hearings, in open
and closed session, over several days.
The result, I am happy to say, is a su-
perbly qualified nominee. William
Webster has the required ability and
experience and proven integrity for
this position. His nine year record as
Director of the FBI confirms this. His
candor and patience in responding to
the committee's painstaking confirma-
tion process demonstrates his readi-
ness to work constructively with the
oversight committees of the Congress.
In several instances Judge Webster
volunteered information that had re-
cently come to his attention, but
which was not then known to the In-
telligence Committee.
Mr. President, I am pleased to say
that we are entrusting the intelligence
community to excellent hands.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is, Will the Senate advise and
consent to the nomination of William
H. Webster, of Missouri, to be Director
of Central Intelligence? On this ques-
tion the yeas and nays have been or-
dered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from Illinois [Mr. &sum]
is necessarily absent.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the
Senator from Kansas (Mr. Dori), the
Senator from Delaware [Mr. Rom],
the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Snows),
and the Senator from Connecticut
(Mr. Wzroura) are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting the Senator from Kansas
(Mr. Dour) and the Senator from
Idaho [Mr. Symms) would each vote
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber desiring to vote?
The result was announced?yeas 94,
nays 1, as follows:
tRollca11 Vote No. 115 Ex.)
YEAS-94
Adams Own Mikulski
Armstrong Glenn Mitchell
Baucus Gore Moynihan
Bentsen Graham Murkowski
Biden Granun Nickles
Bingarnan Grassley Nunn
Bond Harkin Packwood
Boren Hatch Pell
Boschwitz Hatfield Pressler
Bradley Hecht Proxmire
Breaux Heflin Pryor
Bumpers Heinz Quayle
Burdick Helms Riegle
Byrd Hollings Rockefeller
Chaf ee Humphrey Rudman
Chiles Inouye Sanford
Cochran Johnston Sarbanes
Cohen Karnes Sasser
Conrad Kassebaum Shelby
Cranston Kasten - Simpson
D'Amato Kennedy Specter
Dan! orth Kerry Stafford
Daschle Lau tenberg Stennis
DeConcini Leahy Stevens
Dixon Levin Thurmond
Dodd Lugar Trible
Domenici Mateunaga Wallop
Durenberger McCain Warner
Evans McClure Wilson
Ex on McConnell Wirth
Ford Melcher
Fowler Metzenbaum
NAYS-1
Reid
NOT VOTING-5
Dole Simon Weicker
Roth ? Symms
So the nomination was confirmed.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to
reconsider the vote by which the nom-
ination was confirmed.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, /
move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask that
the President be immediately notified
of the confirmation of the nominee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have
eight nominations which were submit-
ted by the Committee on the Judiciary
earlier today. These eight nominations
have been cleared on both sides of the
aisle.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Senate proceed to the
consideration of the eight nominations
en bloc, that they might be confirmed
en bloc, that a motion to reconsider en
bloc be laid on the table, that the
President be immediately notified of
the confirmation of the nominees, and
that the nominations be spread sever-
ally and independently on the record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection?
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, we
have no objection to this procedure. I
would say that this is acting extraordi-
narily swiftly. I think it is an accom-
modation to the majority leader. We
acted on these today at 2 o'clock. They
have now come forward. We appreci-
ate the excellent efforts of the Judici-
ary Committee and we thank the ma-
jority leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The nominations considered and
confirmed en bloc are as follows:
THE JUDICIARY
Michael S. Kanne. of Indiana, to be US.
circuit judge for the seventh circuit;
Roger B. Andwelt, of the District of Co-
lumbia, to be a Judge of the U.S. Claims
Court;
James H. Alesia, of Illinois, to be U.S. dis-
trict judge for the northern district of Illi-
nois;
Joseph P. Stadmueller, of Wisconsin, to be
U.S. district judge for the eastern district of
Wisconsin:
Charles W. Larson, of Iowa, to be US. at-
torney for the northern district of Iowa;
K. Michael Moore, of Florida, to be US.
attorney for the northern district of Flori-
da;
George J. Terwilliger III, of Vermont, to
be U.S. attorney;
Michael W. Carey, of West Virginia, to be
U.S. attorney for the southern district of
West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am
pleased to support the confirmation of
Mr. Michael W. Carey as the US. at-
torney for the southern district of
West Virginia.
Mr. Carey is a native of Charleston,
and is a fine public servant. He has
served as an assistant U.S. attorney
for the past 7 years, following his
graduation from the West Virginia
University College of Law, where he
was first in his class, Order of the
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May /9, /987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Coin and editor-In-chief Of the law
review.
Be is well respected by Ith peers, and
earlier today, his nomination Was
unanimously reported out of the Judi-
ciary Comrafttee, 'where I was happy
to have voted for him.
I am very pleased that the Presklent
has made this exceptional appoint-
ment. and I know that Mr. Carey will
continue to serve the citizens of West
Virginia in an exemplary way.
In these times of skepticism in the
confidence of ear patine servants, it is
heartening and reassuring that a
person of Mr. Carey's ability arid in-
tegray holds this office, requiring the
laighest degree of public trust.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate
return to legislative session.
The PRESIDING OPTIC:tat. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
MORNING BUSINESS
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there be a
brief period for the transaction of
morning business, not to extend
beyond 10 minutes, and that Senators
may speak therein for not to exceed 6
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
"FOLLOW THROUGH" PROGRAM
Mr. GRAS,SLEY. Mr. President, the
Follow Through Program is a popular
program that helps disadvantaged
children. It maintains, or follows
through, the developmental support
that is available to children enrolled in
Head Start, or similar preschool pro-
grams. once they enter elementary
school.
For more than 15 years recipients of
grants under this program have been
awarded noncompeting continuation
grants. The Department of Education
is now proposing to make this a cam-
petittve grant program as a result of
legislative language in the Human
Services Reauthorization Act of 1986.
We think that the program should be
competitive. That would allow addi-
tional schools the opportunity Lo com-
pete for the benefits of this program.
Proposed regulations implementing
the competitive grant process -were
published on April 30, just a few weeks
age. Final regulations are expected on
July 31. Initially, applicants were ex-
pected AO return implications for the
Fonow Through grants by June 30,
before the regulations would have
been finalized. The Department hoped
that it would be able to review and ap-
prove the applications ia just 3
months, so that they could eamence
awards by September 1. That would
have pushed the start up date for new
progriuns to October 1, after school
has started.
Even if the Department of Educa-
tion had been able to adhere to this
optimistic schedule, such timelines
would not have allowed existing or
new programs sufficient time to devel-
op plans and complete applications.
Existing programs would have had
trouble maintaining their teaching
staff or making plans for the next
year if ftmcning would have been un-
certain. New applicants would not
have had adequate time to prepare
India developed Follow Through pro-
posals for initial start-up programs.
Moreover, since this is a school based
program, most local school districts
would have had difficulty completing
proposals during the final weeks of
their school year.
When these concerns were brought
to my attention, I proposed to intro-
duce an amendment to the Supple-
mental Appropriathea Bill. That
amendment would have simply de-
layed the Implementation of the De-
partment's rules for 1 year. Senator
Kreiteren chairman of the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, was
Seining me as a to-sponsor.
Mr. President, I am pleased to say
that the Department of Education re-
sponded quickly and responsibly to
the eoncerns which I and my col-
leagues from Massachusetts brought
to their attention. When we relayed to
the Department our concern about the
timing of the competitive process for
Follow Through grants, the Depart-
ment agreed to delay the competition
mail the next year. The Department
has notified current grantees that
awards for the 1987-88 school year will
be distributed according to the regula-
tions that are currently in place. They
will receive their awards on June 30.
While this step means that competi-
tion will, in effect, be delayed a year,
we believe such a delay is fully justi-
fied. The delay will enable existing
programs to plan for the forthcoming
year, thereby preventing unanticipat-
ed staff displacement and program dis-
location. Additionally, the extended
application time will ensure better
competition among more applicants
with better proposals.
Mr. President, there is going to be a
Follow Through Program and next
pear it will be conducted, as we intend-
ed, on a fully competitive basis. Delay-
ing the effective date of the new regu-
lations ensures that, ferr this year, the
method and the tinting for the grant
award process will be both reasonable
and practicable.
We have a precedent for such a
delay. In 1964 the Department of Edu-
cation proposed that funding for its
research and laboratory centers be
changed to a competitive process. At
that time, Senator PACKWOOD was con-
cerned that the process would be dis-
ruptive to the existing programs. Be
was suceessful in having an amend-
ment adopted which delayed the com-
petition for 1 year.
I should like to add, Mr. President.
that staff members from my office
6727
.
and Senator Siotiiirilf ontIce have
discussed this problem with staff rep-
resenting Senator Psats chairman of
the Subcommittee on Education, Arts
and Humanities and Senator Seer-
rosin ranking member of that subcom-
mittee. They share our concern and
also believe that a single year delay in
the competition for Follow Through
grants is a reasonable and desirable
step in these circumstances.
am pleased that the Department of
Education acted as it Aid. It thereby
obviated the need for to take legisla-
tive action this year.
The regulation the Department has
proposed is a good one, Mr. President.
It not only introduces competition
Into the program, but it redirects it in
fundamental way by focusing on the
demonstrations and dissemination of
promising approaches for educating
young children from poor families.
I am delighted that the Department
of Education has responded so quickly
and responsibly to our concerns.
TRI FOLLOW/I:URN/GM PROGRAM
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I
should like to add my strong support
to the statement offered by the Sena-
tor from Iowa.
What we are proposing is a single
year delay in the grants competition
for followthrongh projects. The key
word is delay. We want the competi-
tion to take place., but at such time
and under such circumstances as to be
in everyone's best interest. That is pre-
cisely what this I-year delay will ac-
complish.
I am pleased that the Department. of
Education recognkied our concerns
and was willing to work out an accom-
modation on this matter. I believe that
this delay will rtsuit In a better com-
petition with better quality proposals
than would otherwise beth* case.
I commend the Senator from Iowa
for his efforts on this matter.
THE nreisow mammas PROGRAM
Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. President, 1
Join my colleague from Iowa, Senator
GRASSLrY, in his support for the De-
partment of Educsaioa proposal to
delay implementation of recently pub-
lished regulations regarding changes
In the Pollowthrough Program. The
substance of these regulations win
provide needed revision of the Follow-
through Program. Current recipients
of grants ander this act have received
continuation funds for many years.
Competition for grant swards will revi-
talize this program and encourage new
districts to participate. 'The Depart-
ment of Education's decision to wait
until the next fiscal year to implement
these regulations Is an appropriate
step to take at this time. It will give
local districts the time aecessary to
properly prepare for a grant competi-
tion.
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