RESISTANCE FACTORS AND SPECIAL FORCES AREAS UKRAINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 219
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
RESISTANCE FACTORS
AND SPECIAL FORCES AREAS
UKRAINE (U)
INFORMATION CUT-OFF
AUGUST 1957
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Pages marked 'NOT RELEASABLE are SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT
RELEAS E TO sr-ITz.pirn.LNATIONA1,4-P-X-C-EPT: NONE, By Authority of
OAC of S 6 May 1958
50X1-HUM
?
THIS STUDY WAS PREPARED BY AN EXTERNAL RESEARCH AGENCY, (THE
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT), UNDER CONTRACT TO
ACSI, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRE-
SENT THE OFFICIAL VIEWS OF ACSI, DA.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
CONTENTS
PART I
RESISTANCE AND POPULATION FACTORS
1. Introduction. 0 0 ? ? 0 ? 0 OOOOOOOO 0
2. Traditional Resistance Background. ?0000?00???00?0
1 1!
a. Separatist Traditions ? . . OOOOOOO 00000 OO
b0 Resistance and Civil War, 1917-1921 0 OOOOOOOO 0 I S 0
c. Resistance to Soviet Rule, 1921-1941 . OOOOOOOOOOOO
d. Resistance During World War II ? ? ? . . ? 0 OOOOOOO
3. Resistance Activity, 1945-1957 0000000?????00?00? 19
a. Participants in Resistance Activities ? 0 ? ? ? 0 ? ? ? 0 0 ? 19
(1) Ukrainian Nationalist Resistance Groups ? . . OO . 1
0
? (a) The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists 0 0 20
(b) The Ukrainian Insurgent Army 23
_
(c) The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Idborition . . 9 W
(2) The "Black uaL.i Organization. 0 26
?000??00??0
b. Characteristics of Resistance Activities in the Ukraine . . . 26
(1) Types of Resistance Activities0.?
00.00??
26
(2) Variations in Resistance Activities by Years ? . 0 : : 31
PART II
GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECTING RESISTANCE AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS
A. General Summary 0 . 0 . 0
O0000000* . 000?0?000 0 35
1. 7EUFEEFErarT-7-0 . . . 0
. 0
0 . 00 . . 0 a ? ? 0 05 . . a . 35
. 0 0
2. Terrain Fearures ? . 36
. .
??0000. ....?.. ..?... . .
a. The Ukrainian Steppelands 0 ??..... . . . . 36
b. Ukrainian Poleslye . 40
?00a? ? ?
O 00000?00
O000
c. Carpathian Ukraine
? 0 .0 ? ?.? 00 ^ 000000?60 0 41
d. The Crimean Mountains.
O00 00000000 0?00?0? ?43
3. Climatic Features? .?.
0.00 0,0000. ....?. . . . 47
a.HITTUM-KM-as 0 .
..... ....?.. .??... . . . 47
(1) Carpathian Mountains . 0 .. . .... ? 0?0? 0 ? a47
(2) Crimean Mountains .
? 0 a . 0 . 0 ? . . ? 0 . . . . . . 48
b. Polesgye . . . .
. . . . ? . . . 0 . ? . . ? ? . ? . ? 0 . . 50
c. The Forest-Steppe and the Steppe 0 .
. . ? . 0 . ? 0 ? . .
: i 555i
4. Vegetation . . . . . .
.... 0000 00000 00?SO?
: 0 ? 54
a. The Zone of Mixed Forests . a
0 ... 0 . 000 ?...
b? The Forest-Steppe Zone . .
. ?0 . . ? e
e r o ? o o o ? 0
c. The Steppe Zone . . . . . . .
. 0 . 0000?0?0000? . 55
d. The Carpathians. . . . . 0 0 ?
. . . . 0 0 0 0 ? ? 0 ? . . 0 56
e. The Crimean Mountains . . . ,0 0
06 0 0000000000 0 57
5. Cross-Country Movement 0000000?00?0000?000?0 . 59
6. Land Urnazation 0 . 0 .. 0 . ? 0 .
.. ? .? 0 0 . . OOOOOOO 61
a. Cultivated Land ..
0.0?00.?0 . . . . 0 ? . . 0 0 0 ? 61
b. Pastureland 0 . .? . . .
. ......00?.... 000 0 64
... Forested Land 0 ..
0 .00.0..0000 OOO 000 ? 66
? d. Non-Agricultural and Unused Land?
? .? ? . . ? . . . . 66
7. Patterns of Rural Settlement . .. . . . 0 0 .
. ?00 OOO O 0 69
a. Types of Rural Settlement 0 00?? ??00?000?0?? 0 69
b. Density of Rural Population 0 . ? . . OOOOOOOOO 0 . .72
8, Rural Roads . 75
0 ?0.???0????0 a
00000000 ?0
R .E-rr-7.1clut on of Partisan Activities, World War II ?..... . . 77
C. Distribution of Resistance Incidents 1945-1957. . . ? ? ? . . . . 83
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05:
flf17 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
PART III
POPULATION FACTORS AFFECTING SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS
1. Total Population
..
.
.
.
?
*
0 0
.
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
2. Ethnic Composition
a.
Ukrainians
?
?
0
0
?
0 0
?
0
0
0
0 0
0
? 0
b.
Russians
*
0 0
?
0
?
0
? 0
0
0 0
c.
Jews 0 ??
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
? 0
d.
Poles *
00
0
?
0
0
??
0
? 0
3. Regional Variations in Population Attitudes
a. The Crimean Peninsula . ? .
b. oThe Donbass 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 ft 0 0 ? 0 0 0
c. The Northeastern Districts ......?.
d. The Ode3skaye Obla-et 7 :CIfet
e. The Black Sea Lowland . ......?..
f. The Dnieper Bend - Krivoy Rog Districts .
g. The Left-Bank and Northern Steppe Districts
h. The Right-Bank Districts ? ??...?.
1. Volynia , . . .,......?.??..
j. Transcarpathia 0000 0000000'??
k. Chernovitskaya Oblast . 8, 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 ?
1. The East Galician Districts 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0
PART IV
SECRET
. . 89
? 0
? ? ? 0
0 ?? 0i
O : ?5 ?? 99941
. 1
..... 0
? 0 . ? ? ? . ? ?
. 0 ? . 95
. .
. .. . . . . 97
99
. .
? .0 0 0 0
O 0. 0 .. 0. .11:0:24
O 0 0 0 0
O 0 101
O 0 ?? 0 0 0
G -C!
0 ? 0 GO.8 G 101
0 ? 0 .
102
. . . .
O 0 . 110035
O 0 0 0 0 0
0
? 0 0 0 0 0
O 0
O 106
O 0
O 0 0 0
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 107
.? 0 05005 . 108
SECURITY FACTORS AFFECTING SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS
1. Security Factors . . . . . ? 0 0 0 0 Go 0 0 0 0 0 ?
a. Border IrroEps ......... 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0
b. Interior Troops..........?....
c. Soviet Army . . . ? ?? 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0
d. Other ? 0 0 0 041 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2. Frontier Security Zones 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a.Tlie-Targr----aFrontier .. a ?.....?...
b. The Czechoslovakian Frontier ,....?..
c. The Hungarian Frontier 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
d. The Rumanian Frontier . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0
1. Introduction .
2. Transportation .
Introduction
a.
b.
Co
PART V
ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY
O 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0
O 0 ? 0
0 ? 0
Railroads 0 0 ? 0 0
Water Transportation
(1) Inland Waterways .
(2) Maritime Transportation .
O 0 0 0 0 0 0,8 0 0
O 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 0
O 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O 0 0 0 ? e o
O0000
0 ? 0 00
0
d. Highways . 0 0 0 ? 0 0??? 0 0 0 0
3. Electric Power . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0
4. Minerals 0 ? 0 0 C 0 0 0 0 ? 0 ?? 0 0 ?
0
a. Coal and Coke . ? 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b. Iron Ore . ........?...??0
ii
SECRET
0 . . . . 109
c . 0
. 109
0 . . . . 0 .
. . . 0 . . . 0 110
.0 0 0 0 . 0 . 110
. . 0 ? .
. . ? 111
. 0 . 0 . 0 0 . 111
.0 0
O 0 0 0 ? 112
.? 0 ? . 0 112
O 0
O a 0 0 ? 0 0 0 113
0
O 0 ? 0 0 ? 0 113
. 117
. 0 , . . 0 . . .
3 0 9
O 0 0 0 . . 119
. .
G . 119
....?0?.
0 . . 0 . 0 . . . . 122
. 0 0 . 0 0 600 0.0: 111422993
O 0 0 006* 0
O0* 0 0
O 0 0 0 0 133
O 0 ?
O 0 139 4,
8 0 0?0 0
? 0 0 0 0 ??? 0
O0
? 00
? 0 ? 0 0 149
O 0 00 149
? 0 ?? 0 0
? 0 0? 0 0 0 0 0 ? 151
I=22N
mita
1
SECRET
c. Manganese
d. Oil and Gas
(1) Oil
(2) Gas
153
155
155
158
e. Other Minerals 160
f. Conclusions 163
5. Telecommunications 165
6. Conclusions 169
PART VI
SPECIAL FORCES ARIAS
Introduction .?.?..?..?...?? a ............. 173
Special Fdrces Area 1 -
175
1. Cover Areas 175
2. Population and,Resistance Factors 181
3. Economic Vulnerabilities . ? 183
Special Forces Area 2 195
1. Cover Areas 195
2. Population and Resistance Factors
3. Economic Vulnerabilities ? ? ? ? ? 198
.
199
Special Forces Area 3 207
1. Cover Areas 207
2. Population and Resistance Factors ? ? . ? 210
3. Economic Vulnerabilities 211
Special Forces Area 4 215
..... o ........ o
1. Cover Areas . . . . . . e . . . . . 5 0 . . . . 0 . 215
2. Population and Resistance Factors . 0 . . . . ....... 217
3. Economic Vulnerabilities 218
Special Forces Area 5, 0 ? . . 0 . ........ ....... 0 223
1. Cover Areas 223
2. Population and Resistance Factors 226
3. Economic Vulnerabilities 227
Excluded Areas . ? . 0 0 ???? 0 ?233
0 ........ 0 ? 0 0 0 ?? ?
APPENDIX
Resistance Activities?....??.. ........ ? 0 ?????? 269
FOOTNOTES
Part I ................................269
Part II . 0 ? 0 ?? 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 ? 0 0 .............. 271
Part III ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 0 ......... 273
Part IV ? ???......??.???.?.?.. . . ...... . . 274
Part V . . . ? ? 0 0 ............. ?0??0?? 0 0 0 0 0 274
MAPS
Following
Page:
A. Administrative Subdivisions (U) 6
B. Terrain Regions (U) 45
C. Temperature (U) 52
D. Precipitation (U) 52
iii
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
E. Snow Cover (U) 52
F. Vegetation Cover (U) 58
G. Density of Forest Cover (U) 58
H. Cross-Country Movement (C) 60
I. Land Utilization (U) 67
J. Variations in Land Use by Oblasts (U) 67
K. Total Population Density (C) 73
L. Distribution of Rural Population by Oblasts (C) 73
M. Partisan. Activity in World War II (C) 82
N. Resistance Activities, 1945-1956 (C) 88
O. Ethnic Composition ,(U) ............ 0 ????00?? 0? 98
P. Regional Variation in Populati=LAttitudes (c) 108
--- Q. Security Factors Affecting Special Frirces Operations (S) 115
R. Railways (U) .. ...................... 9 128
S. Waterways and Drainage Characteristics (U) ? ? a ? ? . 0 137
T. Highways (U) ....... C010 ....... 0 00 ?000? 0 0 141
U. Power Plants and Transmission Lines (U) . . . . . . 0 . 0 147
V. Minerals (U) . . . . . . ??0?0?0,0?0??0?00?0?0 ? 164
W. Telecommunications (C) . . . . ? ? 0 ......... . ? ? ? 0 0 . 167
X. Special Forces Areas Orientation Map (S) .????00??..0 0 a 175
Special Forces Area 1 (S) .?........?.? 0 0 ......... 193
2 (0.0.0.?....0............ 205
3 (S) . . . . . a a a a a a a a .......... 214
4 (S) . 00.0?.?0.0 ..... aa 222
5 (S) ...... 232
TABLES
I: Types of Resistance Activities in the UkSSR--1945-1956 0 ? ? 0 . p. 29
II: Types of Resistance Activities in the UkSSR by Bands-1945-1956 0 33
III: Land Utilization: Ukrainian sSil? 1955 a ? a . ? 0 9 0 0 0 . 62
IV: Population of the Ukrainian SSR, April 1,,1956 ...... . a . a 89
V: Ethnic Composition of the Ukrainian SSR ........ 0 0 0 0 0 90
VI: Ethnic Composition of Principal Ukrainian Cities 93
iv
SECRET
?
?
../.1.11111.1?
PART I
RESISTANCE AND POPULATION FACTORS
SECRET
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release a 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
nP I
? 1 ?
SECRET
' 1. Introduction
The largest of the minority nationalities in the Soviet Union is the
Ukrainian which occupies an important area of 232,600 square miles in-the
southwestern corner of European Russia, as well as smaller areas in southern
Russia, Siberia, and Central Asia. The group totals 37 million people, or
approximately 18 per cent of the population of the Soviet Union,* and con-
sequently rivals in numbers countries such as France, Italy, and West
nermany. Its importance for the Soviet Union lies not only in its size,
but also in the area it occupies which is one of the richest of the USSR
both in agricultural and industrial production and in raw materials. As
a. result, the possibility of national resistance in the Ukraine has more
serious implications for the Soviet Union than the possibility of resis-
tance in other parts of the Soviet Union or in any of its satellites.
Of the factors which have influenced Ukrainians in their attitudes
/"ward Russian rule and the Soviet regime, the long history of union be-
tween Russia and the Ukraine, extending from 1654 to the present in an
aImost unbroken line, ranks first in importance. During this span of .
more than 300 years Russian influence in the Ukraine penetrated deeply
into the life of the country. Russian settlers moved into the pastern
districts of the Ukraine and into its cities, and became the leaders in
Reverment, industry, and intellectual life. Many of the Ukrainians living
1r the cities as well as those drawn there from the countryside adopted
Russian ways, gradually accepting Russian rule and abandoning their -
Ukrainian heritage. To a remarkable degree they identified themselves
with Russians, and the urban areas of the Ukraine became Russian rather
tnan Likrnian centers. Only in the villages and agricultural districts
was the Ukrainian language preserved and a feeling of distinctiveness
from Creat Russians kept alive. As a result, little open opposition to
Russian authority developed, and the Ukrainian national movement remained
unimportant.
???.????????????????????????? ???????.1.4a.m0.????????
.1?1?1?10?11?1111.
* Population firires used throughout the study are estimates for May 1, 1557,,
elceot where otherwise indicate'].
SECRET
ifid in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Gradually, however, Ukrainian nationalism was stimultued by an awareness
of the differences of language, customs, etc. Which separated the Ukrainian
and Russian peoples, and especially by the feeling Which became prevalent among
man/ Ukrainians in the 19th and 20th centuries that Russian rule was synonymous
with Tsarist oppression. The predominant position held by Russians in Ukrain-
ian industry, Commerce, and government and the corresponding discrimination
against Ukrainians encouraged nationalists to oppose Russian rule and to re-
emphasize the distinctive Character of the Ukraihian pea-pie-and their right
to national autonomy or independence. It was this renewed interest in the
Ukraine as a separate national region Which led to the growth after 1850 of a
Ukrainian nationalist literature and the beginnings of Ukrainian political or-
ganizations. By World War I the movement had grown to the point that organized
resistance to Russian authority was possible, and during the civil war years
from 1917 to 1921 Ukrainian nationalists organized a separate Ukrainian govern-
ment and fought with some success against Russian forces.
In the period after World War I Soviet rule was established in the Ukraine
and, in accordance with Bolshevik national policy, the Ukraine was recognized
for the first time as a distinct unit separate from Russia with the right to
use its own language and to develop its own cultural institutions. Under
these conditions numerous Ukrainian nationalists were drawn to support the
Soviet regime, and for a short time it appeared that the wave of anti-Russian
feeling Which had risen in the Ukraine might be absorbed and rendered harmless
by the tolerant conditions of Soviet society. After 1927, however, Russian
leaders embarked on an ambitious program calling for the collectivization of
farms throughout the Soviet Union and a centralization of economic an govern-
mental activities. Russian authority was consequently brought into direct
orfliet with the Ukrainian peasant, as well as with Ukrainian leaders Who
became increasingly aware of their secondary position within the Soviet Union.
A new wave of Ukrainian opposition appeared, expressing itself first in open
resistance to collectivization and secondly in the anti-Russian partisan move-
2SECRET
SECRET
ment which became a strong force in World War II. Although the resistance
was directed against Soviet measures rather than against Russian rule, it
assumed a strong nationalist form, demanding recognition of the right of the
Ukraine to follow its own independent course. After World War II open re-
sistance gradually disappeared, but Soviet sources as well as intelligence
reports indicate that in many districts dissatisfaction with rule by Soviet
Russia remains.
The great influence which Russians have exercised in the Ukraine over
a long period of time and the relative similarity of the Ukrainian and Rus-
sian languages, customs, and backgrounds are distinguishing features which,
in terms of resistance, set the Ukraine apart from the East European satel-
lite countries. As a result, no resistance to Soviet rule on the scale to
be found in the satellites is to be expected. Many influential positions
in Ukrainian life are occupied by Russians or by Ukrainians sympathetic to
Russian rule, and the points of conflict between Ukrainians and Russians
are smaller than in other areas under Russian domination. Some Ukrainians
are apparently only slightly aware of the differences which set them apart
from Russians and feel little national antagonism. Nevertheless, important
grievances exist, and among other Ukrainians there is opposition to Soviet
authority which often has assumed a nationalist form. Under favorable con-
ditions, these people might be expected to assist American Special Forces
in fighting against the regime.
2. Traditional Resistance Background
a. Separatist Traditions
Underlying Ukrainian opposition to Russian rule are a number of
deep roots which have stimulated separatist feeling. The first and most
tangible is the Ukrainian language which, though a division of the East
Slavic language group, differs substantially from its allied tongues,
Russian and Belorussian. Before the 19th century it was unwritten, and
large segments of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and city population used
SERET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
it reluctantly if at all.' Nevertheless, it was the only language understood
readily by the mass of the peasants, and after 1800 writings in Ukrainian began
to appear despite the opposition of the Russian government.2 By 1900 the lang-
uage had developed a grammar, vocabulary, and structure of its own, and was
officially recognized by the Russian imperial Academy of Science.3 The distin-
ctiveness of the Ukrainian language has been important to the nationalist move-
ment: the inability of the Ukrainian peasant to read Russian publications and
to converse with Russians?particularly government officials--has contributed
to his feeling of separation; and the struggle for an official recognition of
the right to use the Ukrainian language has served as a nationalist rallying
point.
A second basis for Ukrainian opposition to Russian rule grew out of the
differences between Russian and Ukrainian customs and folk ways which set the
Ukrainian people apart from the Great Russians. Their costumes were different
as were their traditions and popular songs, their proverbs and folklore. As
early as 1905 an English observer noted:
The city 5ley7 and the surrounding country are, in fact, Little
Russian rather than Great Russian, and between these two sections
of the population there are profound differences--differences of
language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folk-lore,
domestic arrangements, mode of life, and Communal organization.
? Indeed, if I did not fear to ruffle unnecessarily the pat-
riotic susceptibilities of my Great Russian friends who have a
pet theory on this subject, I should say that we have here two ?
distinct nationalities, further apart from each other than the
English and the Scotch.4
During the 19th century Ukrainian customs were abandoned by the upper classes--
government officials, army officers, the nobility, and the higher clergy.5
Many of the-it "Russifiedll families never regained a consciousness of their
separate Ukrainian background. Yet the customs were preserved among the peas-
antry, and after 1880 were gradually extended upward again through the work of
Ukrainian intellectuals.
The third root underlying Ukrainian separatism is the belief held by many
Ukrainians that there was once an independent Ukrainian state which, however,
became divided and enslaved by the Russians and Poles.6 The state, it is
4 SECRET
'Am
?Vr'.
tt,
SECRET
argued) achieved its greatest glory under the Cossack leader, Bohdan Khmelnitsky,
who ruled the Ukraine independently of Russia until 1654.7 The subsequent sub-
ordination of the Ukraine to Russia was a clear violation, nationalists declare,
of the area's historic right to independence--an independence that must be re-
stored. This nationalist call for the re-establishment of an independent
Ukrainian state has become one of the most forceful appeals of the separatist
movement.
The fourth root of Ukrainian nationalism grew out of the sharp cleavage
which existed between the eastern, industrial and urban, parts of the Ukraine
and the western, rural districts. Traditionally the Ukrainian peasant has
regarded merchants and city-dwellers with suspicion, blaming them for his low
income and high prices. Inasmuch as the urban population has been predomi-
nantly Russian or Jewish?8 the Ukrainiants dislike of the city has been trans-
formed into a hostility for Russians or Jews. A Ukrainian writer expressed
the sentiment as follows:
The city rules the village and the city is lalien.t The
city draws to itself almost all the wealth and gives the vil-
lage almost nothing in return. The city extracts taxes which
never return to the Ukrainian village. In the city one must
pay bribes to be freed from scorn and red tape. In the city
are warm fires, schools, theaters and music, plays. The city
is expensively dressed, as for a holiday; it eats and drinks
well; many people promenade. In the village there is nothing
besides hard work, impenetrable darkness, and misery. The
city is aristocratic, it is alien. It is not ours, not Uk-
rainian. It is Great Russian) Jewish, Polish, but not ours,
not Ukra1n1an.9
After 1900 an agrarian movement developed in which the Ukrainian peasant
identified his economic oppressors with his national en-ries. Ukrainian
nationalism was thereby reinforced by the demand for land reform and by the
argument that Ukrainian peasants could obtain land and expropriate alien
landlords and capitalists, if the Ukraine became an autonomous political
unit.10 The argument was equally effective under Tsarist rule with its semi-
feudal system of land-holding and under Soviet rule with its collectivized
and state farms.
Finally, Uktainian nationalism developed out of the experience of
5
? SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Ukrainians living in the western districts of the Ukrainian SSR--in the dis-
tricts incorporated into the Soviet Union during and after World War II.*
Before World War I the most important of these areas--Galicia--was governed
by the Austro-Hungarian Empire which adopted a relatively moderate policy to-
ward its Ukrainian minority and permitted the development of Ukrainian poli-
tical parties and the use of the Ukrainian language.11 After World War I
the area was incorporated chiefly into Poland and2 although a less sympathetic
policy was followed, Ukrainian political consciousness continued to grow; and
political groups, particularly anti-Russian groups, to flourish.12 By 1939,
when the area was acquired by the Soviet Union, its Ukrainian population had
become the most active politically of Ukrainian groups and the most firmly
anti-Russian in its attitudes. Both during and after World War II this wes-
tern group provided the most intense and resolute opposition to the Soviet
regime.
* See Map A.
6 SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @
2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
52?
ubethnoye
_ .rot
? :741
,
^
.)
51?
50?
49"
.?Slayiansk--
Ksamionlr
? oKons
?
R UM A N I A,
UKRAINIAN S. S. R.
MAP A
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS (U)
Oblast boundaries
Oblast center
Acquired from Poland, September 1939
Acquired from Rumania, June 1940
Acquired from Czechoslovakia. June 1945
Transferred from the RSFSR, February 1954
Sumy
r
mmmmm mus
gligeggi
K,snizEv
L.
MOLDAVIA N'
?
S. S R.
Dam)
?Kameda:
Sevastopol'
tialaklaya
0 20 40
60
80
48?
100 Mi
0
HHH
4 60 81) 100 120 140 j0 Km.
Comb*.
29'
30?
3.?
32?
330
34?
350
36?
370
38?
390 .
47?
46?
4
44?
aiss,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
b. Resistance and Civil War, 1917-1921
The first strong indication of unrest in the Ukraine and of opposi-
tion to Russian rule came in World War I after the revolution of March 1917
had destroyed the Tsarist government and opened the way for local uprisings
throughout the Russian Empire. Almost at once a group of Ukrainian intell-
ectuals and students meeting in Kiev formed a Ukrainian council--The Central
Rada--which was gradually broadened in membership until it became a sort of
regional government for the Ukraine.13 Although it refused to declare its
independence of Russia, it displayed its national coloring by demanding
regional autonomy, the right to use the Ukrainian language in the schools,
and in government and public life, and the formation of separate Ukrainian
military nn1ts.14 The government was not widely supported by the mass of
Ukrainians outside of Kiev, but it controlled a number of military regiments,
and with the consent of the Provisional Government, jointly administered the
Ukraine under a rather loose, temporary arrangement.15 The Rada failed,
however, to extend its influence below a relatively thin layer of intellec-
tuals and nationalists, and when Russian Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional
Government and sent troops into the Ukraine, the Rada was quickly defeated
and forced, early in 1918, to flee from Kiev.
Happily for the Ukrainian nationalists, the German government favored
Ukrainian independence from Bolshevik control, and, adopting the Central
Rada as its puppet, cleared the Ukraine of Russian troops and returned the
Rada to Kiev.16 Ukrainian nationalists consequently were given once again
the opportunity to govern the Ukraine. Their freedom of action was limited
by the German occupation and by the tendency of German officials to inter-
fere both in the political life of the country and in its economic affairs,
but much work was done in stimulating the growth of Ukrainian national con-
sciousness. The Ukraine was recognized as an independent country by both
Germany and Russia, and many Ukrainian peasants Who had previously disliked
aspects of Russian rule but had seen no other alternative began now under
SECIZET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
,
SECRET
[the influence of the Ukrainian flag and the Ukrainian language to accept the
possibility of Ukrainian independence.
As a result, when the German occupation and its puppet regime collapsed
late in 1918, a new Ukrainian government, the Directory, was formed, and for
a time established in the capital city, Kiev.17
More than any previous govern-
ment the Directory was supported by Ukrainian peasants. It was defendeda.,
small military units and by peasant bands which were intensely nationalist
and in some cases large and well-organized. At times it claimed the support
of a broad section of the Ukrainian people, and the movement it guided grew
in certain districts Into a mass national uprising. At other times, however,
the Directory was almost alone, as its supporting forces deserted to the enemy
or returned to their homes or engaged in independent, petty raids. In any
case the Directory was opposed by powerful armies it could not cope with, in-
cluding Denikints "White" troops, Polish and Rumanian forces, and the Llshevik
Red Army. By November 1920 it was finally defeated and forced into exile.
Russian Bolshevik troops again occupied the Ukraine and again established a
Soviet government there.
During the same years in which Ukrainian nationalists were working un-
successfully to win control of the Ukraine, Ukrainian Bolsheviks also were
failing to form a stable government. The first Ukrainian Soviet government
was established in December 1917 in the eastern part of the Ukraine at Kharkov.
It received only modest support in the Ukraine, but was aided by Russian Bol-
shevik troops and managed to occupy the area until forced out by the Germans.18
It remained in exile in Russia until the end of 1918 when Germanyls collapse
enabled it once again to enter the Ukraine. With Russian help it seized much
of the area and began to govern it in a centralizing way, refusing to recog-
nize the Ukrainian language or the importance of Ukrainian nationalism)-9
It antagonized peasants and natione.:cts and lost all local support except in
the eastern, Russian districts. By the end of 1919 it had again lost control,
and was severely criticized by Russian Bolsheviks for its failure to accommo-
8
SECRET
"^ ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
,nktrILS,
SECRET
date to local Ukrainian sentiment.20 When it was re-established in the
Ukraine, again with Russian help, it was ordered to adopt a more flexible
policy, to encourage Ukrainian nationalists, and to accept the use of the
Ukrainian language.21
The period of civil war in the Ukraine demonstrated that Ukrainian
nationalism had become an important force in certain districts and that
there was much opposition to Russian and Bolshevik rule. The opposition
-centered in the western and central parts of the Ukraine, while in the
eastern, industrial districts, loyalty to Russia and to the aew Soviet
government remained uppermost. The opposition was poorly organized and
was weakened because its greatest strength lay in the countryside where
peasants were generally indifferent to politics and where equipment and
supplies were not available to match the resources of the city. In ad-
dition, the opposition could command supPort only from the small parts
of the Ukraine it held, while its enemies--the Bolsheviks, Poles, and
forces of Denikin--could draw assistance from Russia, Poland, and other
states. Nevertheless there was considerable sympathy within the Ukraine
for its nationalist leaders, and the period has subsequently been glori-
fied as a time in which the Ukrainian people struggled against numerous
enemies ia the face of overwhelming odds for their independence.
c. Resistance tc ?:viet Rue, 1921-1941
With the establishment of a stable Soviet government in the
Ukraine in November 120, resistance by nationalist bands quickly disap-
Y Tfle last p.r.tisan raid tD17..e. place in October 1921 when a band
of afeu hundred men headed by General Tiutilinnyk was defeated after
22
driving some distance Into the western Ukraine from the Polish border.
Subsequently, resistance disepoeared except for minor, local incidents.
Thrcugh,-;ut the twenties little national opposition to Soviet rule
was expressed. Russian Bolshevik leaders, anxious to win support in the
Ukraine, adopted a surprisingly moderate policy) insisting that the Uk-
rainian language and culture be fostered) that native Ukrainians be drawn
50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R0023on79nnn7_1
9
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
into leadership posts, and that local independence in economic affairs be
granted.23 As a result, Ukrainians lost much of their basis for opposition
to Russian rule, and many nationalist leaders, non-Communists as well as
Communists, took posts in government and public organizations and gave their
support to the new regime.
Gradually, however, conflicts developed between Ukrainian nationalists
and Soviet leaders. The earliest appeared in cultural fields where a group
of Ukrainians including members of the Communist Party began to demand that
the Ukraine turn away from Russia in its literature and art, and toward
Western EUrope.25 The leader of the group was a Bolshevik, Mykola Khvyltovyi,
and the group included the Ukrainian Commissar of Education, Oleksandr
Shumslkyi. Under pressure from Stalin26 and other Russian leaders the group
finally withdrew from its demands, and no open conflict resulted. Neverthe-
less, many Ukrainian writers continued to oppose closer ties between Russian
and Ukrainian literature, and the restrictions imposed by Bolshevik officials
served to increase Ukrainian dissatisfaction with Soviet rule.
In 1927 new limitations on Ukrainian national development were adopted.
In an April resolution of the Ukrainian Communist Party it was emphasized that
the policy of fostering Ukrainian national institutions had led to a disregard
of the rights of the non-Ukrainian minorities and to the development of re-
strictions on the right to use languages other than Ukrainian.27 It ordered
that minority languages be granted an equal status with Ukrainian, and that
Russian specifically be established as a second language in the schools. The
campaign was pushed further in 1929 when a subversive organization, the League
for the Liberation of the Ukraine was uncovered and accused of "pushing its
own people into social, economic and cultural life, into the Party, into the
Komsomol, and into the schools in order to utilize them for grafting national-
ist ideas. 28 Over forty-five Ukrainian scholars including members of the
Ukrainian Academy of Science were tried and convicted and exiled or sentenced
to long prison terms. In 1931 and 1933, two additional organizations, the
10
,SECRET
4.1!
SECRET
Ukrainian National Center and the Ukrainian Military Organization, were un-
covered and additional arrests made. In all the organizations members of
the Communist Party were discovered, some of them holders of important lead-
ership posts. As a result, a complete Party purge was ordered for 1933.
Over a fifth of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party were expelled,
the top leadership was replaced, and nearly a third of the regional (oblast)
secretaries were removed. In addition, most of the officials of the Commis-
sariat of Education and many university professors lost their posts.29
An even more serious opposition to Soviet rule appeared among Ukrain-
ian peasants, who were brought after 1927 under steadily increasing pressure
to surrender their land and join the new collective and state farms. In
1928, discriminatory taxes and forced grain levies were imposed on the
wealthy peasants, restrictions were placed on individual peasant households,
and measures were adopted for the encouragement of state and collective
farms. In 1929, it was decided to eliminate the kulaks (the wealthy peas-
ants) completely as a class: their land was made subject to confiscation;
they were denied the right to join collective or state farms; and the gov-
ernment was empowered to deport them from their districts.30 After 1930,
most vigorous efforts were made to force all peasants to leave their indiv-
idual farms. Peasants throughout the Soviet Union disliked the new measures,
and the period from 1929 to 1933 was a period of sharp conflict in all agri-
cultural regions.
In the Ukraine the greatest peasant resistance to the new farm policy
was encountered--not at first because of any national hostility, but because
the Ukrainian peasant was more seriously affected by collectivization than
the Russian. Ukrainian peasants included traditionally a higher percentage
of kulaks and middle peasants, for the milder climate and richer soil of the
Ukraine made possible a higher farm income. Since the farm changes were
directed primarily at the wealthier peasants, a larger percentage of Ukrain-
ians were harshly affected. Secondly, the traditions of the Ukrainian peasant
made it more difficult for him to accept the communalism of the collective
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
11
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
farm: he had traditionally glorified the Cossack for his freedom and indepen-
dence; he had idealized the institution of private, individual homesteads,
with land passed from father to son; he had not become accustomed, as had
the Russian peasant, to the system of "rppartition" in which the village com-
munity periodically redistributed the land among the peasant families.31 As
a result, he found it even more difficult than did the Russian peasant to
adjust to the new farm system with its reArictions on private ownership of
land and on individual farm management.
Ukrainian opposition to collectivization was largely unorganized. Groups
of peasants occasionally combined to resist grain collection forcibly; small
bands of peasants raided collection points and wealthy farmers alike; but there
was no large-scale, coordinated opposition. The resistance was important,
however, because it involved many more Ukrainians than any previous uprising
or nationalist movement. Few Ukrainian landowners did not make some attempt
to retain their farms, or to hide grain or cattle from the collection team,
or to resist deportation; and almost every Ukrainian was harshly affected by
the famine of 1932-1933.32 As a result, the severity of Bolshevik farm policy
left a sharp impression on a wide section of the Ukrainian people, and that
impression formed a basis for hostility to the regime.
The opposition to collectivization never became a large-scale national
uprising. Ukrainian national sentiment existed, and Bolshevik leaders exag-
gerated its danger, claiming at one point that nine out of ten instances of
"counter-revolutionary" activity were carried out under nationalist slogans.33
The predominant element, however, was econanic? and the Ukrainian peasant who
attacked the grain collector did so to protect his property, not to uphold
Ukrainian autonomy or independence. Yet the struggle did assume an ethnic
character when Soviet leaders discovered they were forced to rely largely on
urban dwellers and on loyal Communists imported into the Ukraine from Russian
cities to enforce the new policy. Over 15,000 such workers were sent to the
rural areas of the Ukraine.34 Since they were almost without exception Rus-
12 SECRET
SECRET
sians or Jews, a measure of national hostility appeared, and the basis was
laid for a distinctly Ukrainian national rebellion directed against economic
and social oppression by alien rulers. Such a rebellion did not materialize
because of the Ukrainian peasant's lack of political consciousness and be-
cause the potential leaders of such a movement--the intellectuals and the
nationalists within the Communist Party--had been removed by 1933 from in-
fluential positions. Yet the harshness of collectivization left the Ukrain-
ian peasant with feelings of bitterness and opposition, and the heavy res-
trictions on private farms aroused his antagonism. His hostility was
apparently directed chiefly against Bolshevik policy; but to a limited but
increasing degree he identified the Russians with Bolshevism and with city
oppression, and thereby became susceptible to anti-Russian, Ukrainian
nationalist and separatist views.
d. Resistance During World War II*
The outbreak of World War II and the subsequent invasion of the
USSR by Germany provided Ukrainian nationalists with a new opportunity to
oppose Soviet Russian rule. As the Red Army was forced back out of the
Ukraine, Soviet controls were removed, and the Ukrainians were enabled,
within the framework of German policy, to express their national feelings.
At the same time the occupation permitted.Gernari observers to assess the
strength and extent of Ukrainian nationalism. As a result, the wartime
period with its lessons about resistance provided a number of concrete
indications of the possibilities for conducting Special Forces operations
in the Ukraine.
Ukrainian resistance during the war period was influenced by two
factors. The first was the attitude of German authorities toward the Ukraine
and specifically toward Ukrainian nationalism. On the whole, the German
government, in keeping with Hitler's policy of maintaining absolute control
over the conquered territories, gave only limited encouragement and support
* See also Part II, Section 2 and Part 111, Section 3.
SECIIIET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
to Ukrainian nationalists. Before the outbreak of the war the Germans had
encouraged Ukrainian emigre groups,35 and the German Army had recruited
Ukrainian translators and police units, and had organized a small Ukrainian
military force; but among the highest German circles there was much opposi-
tion to Ukrainian nationalism, and following the invasion of the USSR many
Ukrainian leaders were imprisoned and a stern policy adopted toward the
national movement. Although the Army in its eagerness to develop Ukrainian
miliLary support continued to tolerate Ukrainian nationalists, allowing them
to carry on political activities in occupied areas and to hold administrative
posts in local government, German policy in general was one of restricting
national enthusiasm.
The second factor influencing Ukrainian resistance was the important
role played by Ukrainian emigres and by Ukrainians in the western, formerly
Polish districts. Among these groups there had developed a nunber of politi-
cal organizations which were extremely nationalist and anti-Soviet in their
views and looked toward Germany for assistance in their fight against the
Soviet Union. The chief emigre group was the Organization of Ukrainian Nation-
alists (OUN) which consisted principally of Ukrainians who had fled from the
USSR following World War I and was now directed by a western Ukrainian, Andrew
Melt nyk. Following the German invasion of Poland in 1939 the OUN had been
given administrative posts in the General government and had developed some
anti-Soviet
weakened by
the Ukraine
enthusiasm in the areas outside the Soviet Union. The group was
the fact that its supporters were primarily emigres who had left
after World War I and hence were conservative and without connec-
tions with Ukrainian nationalists inside the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the
OUN had aroused some hostility by its willingness to cooperate with the Germais.
As a result, on February 10, 19409 a splinter group headed by Stephan Bandera
broke with the parent body and established a separate organization which was
also called the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) and which quickly
became as important as the first. Its membership was considerably younger than
SECRET
-
SECRET
the Melnyk group (OUN-M) and it adopted a more radical position. It insisted
on the most active, forceful measures for the establishment of an independent
Ukrainian state, and it viewed cooperation with Germany with some misgivings.
It was in a stronger position than the OUN-M, for many of its members had
left the Soviet Ukraine only after Russian occupation of Eastern Galicia and
hence had close connections with nationalists in the newly-acquired areas.
Rivalry between the two occasionally became intense, and throughout the war
period the organizations refused to coordinate their nationalist activities.36
As soon as German forces invaded the Soviet Union, the emigre national-
ists attempted to spread their influence into Soviet Ukraine. In the western
zones, especially in the areas acquired by the Soviet Union in 1939) hostility
to the Russians was more intense and better organized than in the eastern
sections. Underground uprisings were ordered, and at Sambor and in several
regions of Eastern Galicia (Podhaitsi and Monastiriska) Ukrainian militia
took over police functions and dissolved the collective farms before the ar-
rival of German troops.37 On June 30, 1941, with the German occupation of
Lvov, a group of Bandera supporters, with the tacit consent of the German
Army, proclaimed the "re-establishment" of the Ukrainian state.38 At the
same time, both the OUN-B and the OUN-M dispatched "task forces" into the
East Ukraine to establish nationalist cells in the principal cities, to
proclaim the independence of the Ukraine, to organize an administrative ser-
vice, and to build a Ukrainian army from former soldiers of the Soviet Red
Army. The groups were tiny and ill-equipped and were successful only in
forming small organizations in Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kiev.39
Meanwhile, the Melnyk organization, by providing translators and advisors
for the German Army, had been permitted to move with it through the Ukraine.
On September 19, 1941, the group reached Kiev, where it established the
administrative apparatus for the city.
The ability of the emigre nationalists to develop their authority in
the eastern parts of the Ukraine was dependent on German military success
in the Ukraine and on the willingness of the Germans to tolerate their ac-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co.y Ap?roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA RDP81 01043R00230027non7_1
15
SECRET
_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
tivities. In contrast to the situation in the west Ukraine, there was in
the east no organized nationalist underground, and the emigre leaders had
few contacts on Which to build such a movement.? Almost immediately after
the German invasion of the Soviet Union,
did not intend to support the activities
the Ukraine. Three days after the Ltvov
it was made clear that the Germans
of the emigre nationalists inside
proclamation of an independent Uk-
rainian state, SS forces arrived in the city, dissolved the embryo government,
and arrested Bandera and his supporters, sending them to Berlin. The OUN-B
"task forces" were disrupted and adherents of Bandera in Zhitomir and the
western Ukraine were executed or forced underground.41 Supporters of Melnyk?
more acceptable to the Germans, were given a longer period of relative free-
dom, but they too, after November 1941, were met by increasing restrictions.
Some of their leaders were shot. Others were forced underground. In December
1941 authority over the Right Bank of the Ukraine was transferred from the
German Army to the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Under the harsh rule of Erich
Koch the role of the emigre groups diminished until only the lower level posts
in local government were left in their hands.
In addition to the work carried on by Ukrainian emigres, underground
and partisan activity developed among groups living inside the Ukraine at the
time of the German invasion. The largest groups appeared near Nikopolt, in
the Dnieper River bend, and in the Poles tyeswamps in the northwestern Ukraine.42
Early in the war, when Ukrainian nationalists still hoped for German coopera-
tion, the bands consisted primarily of Communists afraid of the harsh treat-
ment they might receive at German hands, and of Red Army soldiers who had
been separated from their units and who were fearful of German prison camps.
By spring 1942, all the largest bands had been destroyed except one in the
sheltered forest belt of Polestye northeast of Chermigov. This group, headed
by Sidor Kovpak, was dominated by Communists, and most of its military sup-
plies were provided by the Russian Army by air. Nevertheless it claimed
to be a Ukrainian liberation movement; it published a Ukrainian language
16
SECRET
0.????????? 0??????0-.
(0
SECRET
newspaper; and it received some support and food supplies from the non-
Communist population. In late October 1942, Kovpak embarked upon a con-
siderable raid throughout the northwestern quarter of the Ukraine. Cross-
ing the Dnieper River he moved westward into Galicia, then south to the
Carpathian Mountains, and then back again to the northern swamps.*
Apparently he received little support in the Carpathian Mountains where
the population was strongly nationalist. Throughout most of his raid,
however, he was hampered only slightly by the Ukrainian population or by
Ukrainian partisan bands. At the end of the raid the group dwindled away
except for a small troop in the forest regions.43
The second of the partisan bands was anti-Communist and distinctly
Ukrainian. It was organized by Taras Borovets (Taras Bulba) who, with
the initial permission of German Army officials, gathered together a
group of several thousand Ukrainian partisans and stragglers from the
Soviet Red Army. Its center of operations was the triangle-shaped area
from Pinsk to Olevsk to Mozyrt. Until the end of 1941 it acted principally
against Red partisan bands; but in November, when the Germans ordered the
group disbanded, it withdrew into the woods and carried on activities
against Germans and Communists alike. In July 1942 emissaries of the
Soviet government requested it to join with the Kovpak band in its action
against the Germans; but the demand was rejected.44
The third partisan band, also established in Polestye, consisted
almost exclusively of Ukrainian nationalists. It appeared in the fall
of 1942 when the Germans by their repressive measures had made plain their
hostility to the Ukrainian national movement. It drew its support from
Ukrainians fearful of the Germans and particularly from remnants of the
Bandera group which had been dispersed by the Germans. From October 1942
until February 1944 it carried on open activities against the occupation.
Its strength lay in its isolated location in the forest area north and
* See Map M.
?0.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007 1
17
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
west of Rovno, and in its proximity to Galicia where it could easily draw
support from the emigre groups. Toward the end of 1942, the group adopted
the title Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UP), and in the next year forced the
Borovets partisans and a number of Melnyk supporters to join with it. It
grew in size as repressive German measures affected more and more Ukrainians
until it controlled a large part of Volynia southwest of Rovno and the square
from Kovel' to Vladimerets to Kostopolt to Lutsk. The group remained in con-
trol of the area until the Soviet advance in February 1944 forced it undeJ7-
ground.45
Several conclusions may be drawn from the ekrp:9rience of Ukrainian par-
tisans in World War II. First, it is significant that the only partisan
movements of any size east of the Dnieper River were pro-Russian. Apparently
whatever Ukrainian nationalist sentiment existed in the eastern Ukraine was
?
unorganized and passive, and was unable, without external stimulus, to grow
into an active force. Secondly, it is important to note that the pro-Russian
Kovpak band which was partially dependent on local support was able to con-
duct a successful raid through the center of nationalist activity in north-
western Ukraine. It is true that the band was forced to detour to avoid the
headquarters of the Bandera partisans, and apparently it was greeted with
some hostility in the Carpathian area. Nevertheles;le the Ukrainian partisans
did not challenge it nor did the population oppose it as resolutely as they
did the Germans. Perhaps its use of the Ukrainian language concealed its
pro-Russian bias, or perhaps anti-German feeling had grown so strong that
any group opposing the occupation was supported. Thirdly, it is noteworthy
that the partisan bands developed their greatest strength as a reaction to
the harsh German occupation and not primarily in opposition to the Soviet
Union. Because of the speed of the German invasion it is perhaps natural
that anti-Russian bands did not have an opportunity to organize themselves.
At the same time there is no question that the Borovets and Bandera groups
were consistently anti-Communist as well as anti-German. In general, however,
18
SECRET
a_
SECRET
greatest support for the nationalist partisans came from Ukrainians harmed
by the German occupation, and the principal activities
directed against the Germans.
3. Resistance Activity, 1945-1957
of the bands were
a. Participants in Resistance Activities
With the re-occupation of the Ukraine by Russian troops at the close
of World War II, the nationalist partisans who during the war had fought both
against the German Army and against Soviet forces were incorporated within
the Soviet Union. Many of the partisans wereunwilling to accept Soviet rifle-
and consequently did not return to their homes, but remained in the sheltered
areas they had controlled during the German occupation and continued to op-
pose Russian forces. At the same time, as the Red Army again marched into
?
the former Polish districts of Volynia and Galicia and as the Soviet govern-
ment made clear its intention to incorporate these areas into the Soviet
Union, large numbers of the inhabitants, disturbed by the prospect of Russian
rule, began to support the partisans actively, providing them with food and
supplies and offering them shelter. As a result, a solid base for opposition
to the Soviet Union was established. An active resistance movement appeared,
centered primarily in the Ukraine's western, newly acquired districts, and
dominated by Ukrainian nationalists. It is this movement which has been
responsible for most post-mar resistance activity. Resistance in other
parts of the Ukraine has appeared only sporadically and in a limited way,
and apart from the nationalists, only small and unimportant bands or indiv-
iduals have been involved.
(1) Ukrainian Nationalist Resistance Groups:
The opposition movement established by Ukrainian nationalist
resistance groups has been marked as a highly organized, centrally directed
movement, mc.ivated by long-range objectives which have been outlined care-
fully. The movement has established as its primary aim the defeat of the
* See also Part II, Section 3.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81 01043R002300220007-1
19
rt-
C
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Soviet forces controlling the Ukraine and the formation of an independent
Ukrainian state. The movement has included in its activities not only open
measures against the regime, such as the destruction of bridges and the burn-
ing of police headquarters, but also a program of economic and social resistance
and an educational campaign of nationalist and anti-Bolshevik propaganda.
Three organizations have composed the resistance movement: the Organiza-
tion of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN); the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); and
the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (UHVR). The three groups have
been closely associated with one another and in fact their leadership has taken
the form of an interlocking directorate with the same individuals occupying
the top posts in each organization. For example, until his death in 1950 Roman
Shukevich (General Tares Chuprinka) was the top leader of edch of the three
bodies: head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists; commander-in-
chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; chief of the General Secretariat of
the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation.46 Similarly, Petro Poltava
(pseud.), who was until his death in 1952 the leading ideologist of the Or-
ganization of Ukrainian Nationalists inside the Ukraine, was also .a major in
the Insurgent Army and chief of its propaganda division, as well as deputy
chief of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Libera-
tion.47 The three organizations have been merely separate divisions of the
underground movement: the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation has been
visualized as the official government of the Ukrainian underground; the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists has been the political group dominating
the underground movement; and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army has been the mili-
tary force responsible for active measures of resistance. In recent years
the distinctions between them have become of small importance except in emi-
grant circles, as Soviet counter-measures have almost completely destroyed
the movement inside the Ukraine, transforming the three bodies into paper
organizations.
(a) The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists?This is the
oldest and most firmly established of the three nationalist units. Its
20
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A
e ease
SECRET
membership has consisted since World War II almost exclusively of western
Ukrainians and particularly of Ukrainians from the areas ceded to the Soviet
Union by Poland. The organization is directed by a Provid or Executive
Committee whose members are apparently self-perpetuating and self-selecting.
The last Congress of the Organization (the third Extraordinary Great Con-
gress) was held in 1943 inside the Ukraine, and that Congress selected a
bureau of three men to serve as the guiding body of the Executive Committee.
The three men were Stephan Bandera, former chairman of the Executive Commit-
tee; Roman Shukevich, commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Pnly and long-
time associate of Stephan Bandera; and Yaroslav Stetsko, founder in 1940
together with Bandera of the radical wing of the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists.? In 1950 Shukevich was killed by Soviet forces, and his
place taken by Turi Lemish (Colonel Vasil Koval).49 In November 1952,
Stephan Bandera, who had been living outside the Ukraine after 1941, re-
signed from the Executive Bureau with the explanation that only Ukrainians
living inside the Ukraine should direct the work of the Organization.50
Undisputed leadership of the Organization inside the Ukraine then was
centered in the hands of Yuri Lemish, who remained as head of the Organi-
zation at least until March 1954.
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists has emphasized three points
which explain its importance as the most active resistance group inside the
Ukraine. First, it has adopted an extreme nationalist position, glorifying
the nation as an independent entity in terms reminiscent of German National
Socialism. The nation is regarded as "the highest and strongest type of
organic human community," and as a "natural and eternal phenomenon in human-
ity."51 In particular, the Organization has adopted as its motto the phrase,
"The good of the Ukrainian nation is our supreme goal"; and the phrase has
been interpreted to require the unconditional independence of the Ukraine.52
The Organization has consequently become the most uncompromising of the
Ukrainian groups in its demand for Ukrainian independence, and the most ac-
tive in its opposition to Russian Soviet rule.
5 - r 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-1)1n2V1 Prul9qnnoonnn74
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Secondly, the Organization has insisted that Ukrainian independence can
be achieved solely through revolutionary methods, and that consequently the
Organization must remain an illegal, revolutionary group. Attempts to com-
promise with Russian leaders and to accept a gradual evolution of Ukrainian
autonomy have been denounced) and Ukrainians who have cooperated with the
Soviet government have been attacked as-traitors to the Ukrainian nation.
Only a militant and uncompromising battle waged by insurrectionary forces
can, it has been argued, produce Ukrainian independence.?
Finally, the Organization has taken-the position that only resistance
groups actually operating inside the Ukraine can further the Ukrainets nation-
al aims. Although the Organization maintains an emigre division and although
it seeks support from countries hostile to the Soviet Union, emphasis has
been placed most strongly on the internal
years immediately following World War II,
with their policy of internal resistance,
resistance movement.54 In the
Organization leaders, in keeping
committed their partisan units to
open battle with the Soviet Army. The policy was almost ruinous, and nearly
half the bands were destroyed. After 1946 the Organization gradually shifted
to a program of occasional partisan raids and general underground activities.
It has retained, however, its emphasis on the importance of active resistance
groups operating inside the Ukraine rather than abroad among emigre groups.
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists has been an important resis-
tance factor in the Ukraine because it has been an extreme nationalist group
insisting it will not compromise with the Soviet government until Ukrainian
independence is achieved, because it has called for active opposition rather
than passive submission, and because it has been the only political group
maintaining underground forces inside the Ukraine. However, there have been
important limitations on its effectiveness. Since it was organized initially
by western Ukrainians living in Galicia, and since it has been dominated by
western Ukrainians, the Organization has had few ties in the eastern Ukraine,
and some of its representatives have been received by the population there
with apathy or even hostility. In addition, because of its extreme philoso-
22
SECRET
Declassified in Part
aril ized Copy Approved for Release
?
110
SECRET
phy, other Ukrainian groups in the emigration have refused to cooperate with
it. Their supporters inside the Ukraine would probably oppose any resistance
movement dominated by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Finally,
it seems likely that most Ukrainians are unwilling to take as radical a
stand as that adopted by the Organization, or to adopt its extreme national-
ist views. Hence, more moderate Ukrainian groups might find it easier to
develop wide mass support.
(b) The Ukrainian Insurgent Army--The military arm of the
Ukrainian underground movement has been the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The
Army was formed initially during World War II from the merging of a number
of partisan bands which had been operating in the western areas of the Ukraine
against both the German occupation forces and also against pro-Soviet partisan
bands. During the early years of the war the most important of the Ukrainian
partisan bands were controlled by Ukrainian groups hostile to Stephan Bandera
and his Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. However, in 1943 the Bandera
organization began to expand its area of control in the Ukraine, until by
force or persuasion it had absorbed under its authority virtually all the
anti-Russian partisans. The name, Ukrainian Insurgent Army, was adopted and
a Bandera supporter, Roman Shukevich, was appointed head of the Army under
the pseudonym General Taras Chuprinka. By the end of 1943 a central head-
quarters for the underground partisans had been set up, and the Army had es-
tablished itself as a para-military armed force with regular formations
operating in some areas and with a carefully defined organization.55 Through-
out 1944 and the first part of 1945 the Insurgent Army continued to grow in
importance: it operated openly against Soviet forces; it made no attempt
to conceal its major centers; it controlled important areas of the Western
Ukraine. However, in the spring of 1945 the Soviet Army inaugurated ,a major
military offensive against the insurgents, and by the end of 1945 most units
of the Insurgent Army had been defeated and perhaps fifty per cent of its
troops captured. The remainder of the Army broke up into small units which
operated only in inaccessible forested areas, or went completely underground
23
50-Yr2014/03/05:CIA-RnPRi_ninA-Drywn,-- .....
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
and ceased all open activities against the' Soviet regime.56
After 1950 the Insurgent Army apparently disappeared as an effective and
active organization. Although Colonel Koval was appointed to replace General
Chuprinka as commander-in-chief, it appears that his command was only a nominal
one and that there were few units coming even indirectly under his control.
Until 1954 reports continued to indicate that he was in the Ukraine and still
nominally Army- chief, but the reports have said nothing about the scope of his
authority. After 1954 even indirect references to Colonel Koval-disappeared;
and it seems likely that the organization is no longer of importance. There
are perhaps a few isolated bands which remain in bunkers in remote forested
regions, and their numbers may be replenished occasionally by a small stream
of Ukrainians avoiding military service or fearful of Soviet reprisals for
actions they have taken against the regime. Also there are undoubtedly many
western Ukrainians who remain sympathetic to the Insurgent Army and who now
and then render support. Perhaps leaders of the Insurgent Army retain some
contacts with resistance groups and continue to prepare propaganda materials.
In general, however, the Army has virtually disappeared, and it would seem
unlikely that it could increase its activities under present conditions with-
out outside assistance.
(c) The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation--The impetus
for the formation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation came in the
late fall of 1943 when the Bandera nationalists fighting inside the Ukraine
decided that the nationalist movement would be strengthened by the establish-
ment of a semi-governmental body which could easily be broadened into a full-
fledged government in case Ukrainian independence were achieved. In addition,
the Bandera group was anxious to have under its control a political body which
could match the numerous exile governments and "Ukrainian National Councils"
which other Ukrainian groups had formed.57 In November 1943 an Initiating
Commission was established and during the following seven months the Commission
negotiated with various Ukrainian groups in an effort to build broad support
24SECRET
11V
Declassified in Part SanitizedC
py Approved for
ease
?
SECRET
for the new Ukrainian "government." The attempt was not completely success-
ful, for the Hetmanite and Melnyk groups refused to cooperate. Nonetheless,
a Congress of Ukrainian representatives was called to meet in the Carpathian
area of the Ukraine in July 1944, and when twenty delegates arrived, the
Congress declared itself to be a Constituent Assembly. On July 12 a con-
stitution for the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation was adopted and
its principal officers chosen.58
The Supreme Council of Liberation was intended to serve as an under-
ground parliament and government of the Ukraine, and to work for the es-
14
tablishment of an independent Ukrainian state. In theory its principal
organ was to be a Grand Assembly, but the Assembly has not met since its
1944 session. Its only important body has been a General Secretariat or
Cabinet headed by its Chairman, Yuri Lemish. In order to maintain contacts
with Ukrainian emigre groups and to develop support abroad, the Supreme
Council has maintained a foreign mission, the Foreign Representation,
which has established offices in Munich.
In recent years the Foreign Representation has remained as the only
active part of the Ukrainian Supreme COuncil of Liberation. The Council
itself was never more than an adjunct to the other nationalist organizations
in the Ukraine, and after 1950 it became almost completely inactive. It
has played an important role in the resistance movement, however, in two
respects. First, it has devoted much of its energy to the preparation
and distribution of propaganda materials explaining the purposes of the
nationalist movement and the aims of its leaders. It has thereby provided
a more general framework for the nationalists and has helped to give their
resistance activities a more organized form than that of simple bandit
operations. Secondly, by maintaining contact with its emigre division it
?
has provided connections between the resistance groups at home and nation-
alists abroad. Since the Supreme Council has been supported by a wider
group of Ukrainians than has the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,
25
SECRET
50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDPRi_ninaqpnnoQrmoonn,,,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
its contacts with emigres have given the resistance movement a broader basis
of support.
(2) The "Black Cat" Organization:
Apart from the Ukrainian nationalist organizations the only
active resistance group in the Ukraine has been the "Black Cat" movement. It
has never been of any great importance and there have been no indications of
any activity by the group since the end of 1950. As far as is known, there
has been no central organization for the movement, and it has been accused of
being merely a number of separate bands which have adopted the name as a mat-
ter of convenience.59 The group has been active throughout the Soviet Union,
and incidents have been reported in Siberia, Smolensk, and especially in Minsk
and other parts of Belorussia. Inside the Ukraine incidents have been reported
only in Kiev and Odessa. The movement has been distinguished from the Ukrain-
ian nationalist groups because it has been most active in the cities rather
than in the rural and isolated areas. Undoubtedly some of its activities have
been mere bandit operations of no political consequence. However, some reports
have indicated that it has been distinctly anti-Communist and that one of its
missions has been the assassination of Communist Party leaders.60
b. Characteristics of Resistance Activities in the Ukraine
(1) Types of Resistance Activities:
Resistance activities in the Ukraine during the period from
1945 to 1956 are described in Appendix I. Altogether there are listed in the
table 231 incidents varying in intensity from the distribution of anti-Soviet
pamphlets to actual armed engagements between as many as several hundred
Soviet and Ukrainian troops. The incidents fall into three general categories
(see Table I): (1) acts of opposition to specific Soviet measures of control
and regulation; (2) acts of resistance which do not involve violence, but
which are directed against the Soviet regime as a whole rather than against
a single, specific Soviet decree; and (3) violent measures of resistance to
Soviet rule. The first category includes all types of opposition directed
not generally against the regime but specifically against a single measure
26
SECRET
SECRET
such as collectivization, work-norms and food-delivery quotas, deportation,
or military service. In some cases resistance incidents in this category do
not indicate general hostility to the regime, but reflect merely the strong
opposition of the Ukrainian peasant to a specific measure of collectivization
or military service. A Ukrainian who generally supports Soviet rule may feel
that his grain-delivery quota has been set too high, and may consequently try
to avoid meeting the assigned figure. Such opposition does not indicate gen-
eral resistance. In other cases, however, the opposition is an expression of
an underlying, general hostility and may then be classified as a resistance
activity. The incidents listed in Appendix I are considered to be of this
type.
The second category of resistance activities includes incidents directed
clearly against the regime as a whole, but not involving violence. Three
types of incidents are included: (1) carrying on propaganda activities a-
gainst the regime by distributing anti-regime pamphlets and leaflets, flying
Ukrainian nationalist flags, and painting anti-Soviet slogans; (2) assisting
insurgents or partisans by providing them with supplies,
them, or by giving them information about Soviet police;
ing underground bunkers. Although these activities have
or by concealing
and (3) construct-
been directed against
Soviet rule, they represent underground rather than partisan resistance.
The third category of activities includes incidents in which violent
opposition to the regime is expressed. Four types of incidents are included:
(1) plundering stores and supply depots; (2) destroying railroad installations,
kolkhoz property, or government buildings; (3) assassinating supporters of
the regime such as Communist Party members, leaders of local government, or
kolkhoz chairmen;
and (4) attacking Soviet police, security forces, or units
of the Red Army. All four types of incidents represent the most active and
forceful measures of resistance. The incidents have been carried out openly,
and the resistance groups responsible for them have depended either upon
their superior strength in a region which could easily be defended or upon
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50 -Yr 2014/03/05 : IA-
0
27
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
the proximity of forested areas in which underground shelters could be built
to escape destruction by Soviet forces. In the years immediately following
World Mar II the resistance groups were strong enough to defend themselves
openly in some areas against the Soviet army and MVD troops, After 1948 they
were no longer able to do so and were forced to rely on shelter provided by
the local inhabitants or on bunkers built in the remote forested areas. The
individuals who have participated in the incidents have committed themselves
irrevocably to opposition to the regime. They would undoubtedly provide ac-
tive assistance for Special Forces, if modest guarantees against immediate
reprisals could be provided.
As indicated in Table I, the most important single form of resistance in
the Ukraine has been armed attack by insurgent groups against Soviet military
forces (column 10). More than a quarter of the resistance activities listed
have involved such open fighting. Almost all the encounters have been fought
by units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the number of attacks has de-
creased as the size and importance of the Army has declined. In the years
immediately following World War II as many as several hundred men were involved
in each operation, and the Ukrainian units in some oases deliberately attacked
Soviet military groups. After 1948 the number of participants fell to less
than ten or fifteen men, and most encounters were fought to defend the insur-
gents against Soviet troops sent to destroy them rather than to achieve any
particular objective.
The second important form of resistance has been the destruction by par-
tisans of specific military or economic targets (column 8). Nearly a fifth
of the incidents listed in Table I are included in this category. In the
earl period--from 1945 to 1948--military targets such as NVD headquarters
and important railroad installations were most often attacked. Subsequently
the targets most often destroyed were economic or political targets such as
kolkhoz buildings and installations, or government offices and meeting halls
of local Scviets. The shift in targets indicates the general shift in the
28
SECRET
Declassified in Part San iti
"
opy Approvedor Release
Violent Resistance
.4m
0 0
00,44.30
ri M .8-1 p
-POHO
-Pww.T4
-c4
crim0Hmt.--mm.41.r\r-NIA0\
?C11\0?0---cococlo000
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHNNcv
ch-t'OHN-1.?0c-c\ImOHWOm....1.c-
CO
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
Ir\C-INMO?OC.--MNO\M-N
HHC\INMIAIJNIA1AM
?
1
11:14
00(0
n-IM;400
W (PA
0\mt040-PA
d
c g $4
tn ?ri OC. 0
M ??P cl? 0 F4
.4al
NMNIAOHONHCN.-.10NM
ChCNC)C)HOJIANCI\C)
HHHHHHHHHHcv
CM CO CO ON CD ?0 ON r-co r-I CV 1.C\ MO r4
HHM-71.11-MMON
)
Ci
8
Attacking
Communicationsl
Lines & Farm
& Government,
Property
1
H C*1 .40 CM C-- c0 OH c0 crl IA t`- o'.0 0\ L'-* ON
Nmm....10mcocro000
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHNNcvN
IAMHNOGNM-l'Oel?OONIAMO\OMH
HHNNMM----C-C-C-C7
a 0
0 00
.ri t?,ca
$4m1-143
0004o
C---liPtP4P4
0 4288
HW
P-4
H0OHO\MIAOCNO
?0?0coo\0\cm-
HHHH
?
Non-Violent Resistance
'd
WOm
ZoP
.1-1;40
TitokA C
?OH$4
M'S
04?0M111.-)
HHNNIs?....1'.-1?00
HHHCO
bd
ga30
.c-1
4-,m4m
0-Ptiog
poom
In.rtrigto
Prq10
43 p.od H
to E 43 V)
! 4
r-cooNNm\-N-zruNNIs\
000HHNNN
HHHHHHHHHHHHHH
cr"\\O CO ON 0 C\1 CO MIS\ 0 r-i VW\ r"-
HHm.0.1Doc,mmc.o.
CO
cv
mw
1,04,0 ,
gOtr-IPP
.1-101d00
-)3W.1-I -P
.4M;-IP.IdH
.r10000
WW;40
WgP4WW
4H----0
Mr`-.MCNMHIACNIAM00000111
HHN-1-0OHNMM-.1Art
HHHHHH
Opposition to Soviet Control
and. Regulation
2 3
Refusing Resisting
to Meet Deportation
Work Norms & Evading
or Food- Military
Delivery Service
Quotas
MMON-?0
MoON
r-1
?_
---- -
C-- CO Cf? --* --I' t?-?
HMM
1
Opposing
Collectiv-
ization
Is-caONCI\MH111
04.--MHM1A1-11
HHHH
i
ToqmAs dvx
50-Yr 2014/03/05 :
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
resistance movement from a movement Which was primarily military before 1948
to a movement Which was chiefly economic and political. Most recently, the
targets have been transportation and communications lines, probably because
the lines are relatively poorly guarded as they pass through remote areas
most suitable for partisan activities.
The third important category of resistance has been propaganda activities,
(column 5), including. the printing or distribution of anti-Soviet pamphlets
or the display in some form of anti-regime sentiments. Ukrainian nationalist
holidays have been celebrated and nationalist songs sung; the graves of insur-
gents killed by Soviet forces have been decorated and Ukrainian flags flown
openly; slogans attacking the remime have been posted. Unlike other forms
of resistance, nationalist propaganda increased steadily after World War II,
becoming most important in 1949 and 1950. Ukrainian nationalist groups de-
liberately shifted their emphasis from. open resistance to propaganda work
after 1948. After 1950 the number of incidents in this category decreased
sharply as did all other forms of resistance in the Ukraine. However, some
propaganda work continued though on a small scale, and apparently most re-
sistance after 1953 was in this category.
The fourth important form of resistance has been the assassination of
supporters of the regime (column 9). The targets most frequently chosen have
been agents employed by the MVD as informers to observe the movements of the
insurgents or their suspected sympathizers and to report to the security
police. In some cases MND leaders themselves have been ambushed and shot
or killed in raids carried out against MND headquarters. Leaders of collec-
tive farms have also been attacked when considered too conscientious in
their management of the farms or too eager to deliver food-quotas. Other
targets have been collaborators in the church, police, or government, or
occasionally leaders of the army.
Other forms of resistance activity have been reported only on a smaller
,scale. Their importance, however, should not be minimized for in some cases
they indicate an underlying hostility of the population to Soviet rule which
3:tECRET
t'
SECRET
is more significant than the number of reported incidents would suggest.
Open opposition to collectivization, for example, accounts for only a small
part of the resistance activities listed in Table I (column 1). However,
there is much evidence to indicate that in the areas where such opposition
has been noted the population has been almost completely hostile to collec-
tivization although the hostility may not have been openly expressed.
Special Forces units, by supporting a return to a system of independent
farm holdings; could expect a measure of support from many of these people.
(2) Variations in Resistance Activities by Years:
Resistance activities in the Ukraine in the period after
World War II developed in three different phases. In the immediate post-
war period--1945 to 1947--resistance activities were carried out on a
large scale following the pattern of opposition developed by Ukrainian
nationalists during the war. Armed military units including as many as
several hundred men were active in the Carpathian Mountains region and
in the northwestern Ukraine; and parts of these areas were controlled by
the insurgents. The opposition was carried out openly, and a number of
large-scale battles were fought between insurgents and Soviet troops.
The second phase of resistance--1948 to 1951--developed on a much
smaller scale. The largest resistance bands numbered less than fifty
men and were no longer able to maintain control over any areas of the
Ukraine. Most of the bands were nomadic--wandering from one remote
wooded region to another and devoting most of their energy to obtaining
supplies and avoiding Soviet forces. The bands continued to carry out
raids on Soviet installations, but activity was much reduced; large
parts of the year were spent in hiding in underground bunkers. Empha-
sis in the resistance movement was shifted from open measures against
the regime to underground organization and propaganda activities.
The third phase of resistance--1952 to 1956--saw the elimination of
almost all resistance groups. In the early part of the period reports
indicated that active partisan bands were still to be found near Chernovtsy,
31
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
UZhgorod, Kadiyevka, and near other towns, especially in the Carpathian Moun-
tains and in Foleslye. The bands were apparently small--consisting of less
than a dozen men--and carried out few raids, occupying themselves chiefly
with avoiding Soviet forces. By the end of the period reports indicated
that resistance was further diminished, being limited almost exclusively to
propaganda work and underground activities. That a few partisan bands re-
mained, however, was suggested by reports in 1956 and 1957 that trains cross-
ing the CarpathianMountains were still subject to attack, and that on
occasion--most notably during the Hungarian uprising--railroad bridges were
destroyed and trains derailed.
Table II campares the types of resistance activities which took place
in the Ukraine after World War II in eaCh of the three periods--1945 to 1947,
1948 to 1951, and 1952 to 1956. The most striking change indicated by the
table is the steady decrease in the number of open attacks by insurgent
groups against Soviet military forces (column 10). In the first period,
thirty-five such attacks were reported; in the second, the number was cut
approximately in half; in the third, only three open attacks were reported.
The drop in the number of incidents reflects the change in the character o4,
the Ukrainian resistance movement. In the years immediately after World
War II the movement attempted to maintain its character as a military force
by retaining under a regular military organization the partisan units which
had developed during the war. During 1945 and 1946 and into 1947 the mili-
tary units carried on organized operations in which as many as several hun-
dred men were involved. However, in 1945 and 1946 the Soviet Army conducted
a major campaign against the insurgents, and in 1947 the MVD security police
continued the drive.61 As a result, the insurgents were forced to limit
their activity. During 1948 and 1949 the size of the partisan bands fell
to less than twenty to thirty men, and apart from defensive action only
occasional raids were carried out to impress the local population.62 In
December 1949, the Soviet government proclaimed an amnesty for all insur-
32
SECRET
?
43
V
I V ti
0 il I2 4 :
H 4 bi)M E
1 155
t 4
?1 k 4
0 0 I4-1 1
0. 2 U3 0
..4 0 F?4?4
K5:5
\ \
8
Destroying
RR Instal:
lations,Koik-
hoz Property,
& Government
10117-9W
Its. ...474I
I
i ...._
-..
\
l's
kelli)
ri I
I C 04
1*- U3S RA
M
E
gs c
H
?13Via
111 0 to P-1
4)-v 1
44 ..s?L.
. MC21 A
11N N1 I 1
?131 n :9113
A C14 4 V)
.
? ? ?
\
\
gt.' g k T.
1 0 ii o q
r 4) bio-t-1 ???i
-* 474) Tiii
1 al Ilk U3
.4.4 .....
;
1
_
I
E
1 IA I
I 4
1147i1P
Ii m5484 'E
I i A 7143 NI? 0 ct
I
i t111 I
: 4 +.3 01 tbio
0J3Mzp4R4
e-,140-4;4g,
.93gorl
i
V
aj.4r4 SI
so o *4-I
Ha Is
484 0 *1
CO
N
I I I I I I I
11\
0
g .g
squepToui Jo sequin
33
SECRET
SECRET
El
0 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
gents Who left their units,63 and in the spring of 1950 MUD security police
carried out a further intensive campaign against the bands. By 1952 open
military activities were no longer feasible for the partisans.
In the other types of resistance indicated in Table II the pattern was
somewhat different. The number of activities reported in the immediate post-
war period was small; it grew rapidly in the years from 1948 to 1951; it fell
back again sharply after 1952. These changes can best be explained by the
fact that in the period immediately after the war Ukrainians who were resol-
utely opposed to Soviet rule were active in insurgent military units and
did not take part in milder forms of resistance. Also, since the inhabitants
of the western Ukraine had not yet been confronted seriously with the hard-
ships of collectivization and work-norms, many accepted Soviet rule with
little opposition. After 1948, however, most of the active resistance groups
were forced to resort to more indirect and sheltered work such as assassina-
tions and propaganda; the increasing severity of collectivization and deporta-
tions led many of those who had previously accepted the Soviet regime to
oppose the new, objectionable measures. Consequently, the number of resistance
incidents reported in the period from 1948 to 1951 increased. After 1952,
however, the number of incidents dropped again as the same Soviet measures
which had virtiunly eliminated open insurgent attacks also limited the pos-
sibility of other forms of resistance. In the period from 1952 to 1956 only
those most bitterly hostile to the regime were willing to continue their
opposition.
34
SECRET
?
PART II
SECRET
GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECTING RESISTANCE AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
A. General Summaryl
1. Introduction
The Ukrainian SSR occupies 222,600 square miles in the southwesternmost
corner of the USSR. It extends approximately 850 miles from west to east
and 550 miles from north to south, including the Crimea. In the west and
southwest, where the Republic borders on the four satellite states of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, significant territorial gains were
realized at the expense of these states as a result of World War II. The
Moldavian SSR, in the southwest, represents a lengthy interposition between
the Ukraine and much of the Rumanian frontier. The Belorussian SSR defines
about half of the northern limits of the Ukraine; the remaining portion and
all of the east is enclosed by the'RSFSR. A limited section of the south-
ern frontier is shared with Rumania and the remainder extends along the
Black Sea, the KerchtStrait, and the Sea of Azov.
It is impossible to depict the Ukrainian SSR as a natural geographic
unit, submitting to easy definition. The broad and sweeping steppes of
the uplands and lowlands are not uniquely Ukrainian, but actually are part
of the greater East European Plain, or Great Russian Plain, spreading in
many directions beyond Ukrainian borders. In the north, a wide band of
marshland, typically a Belorussian terrain feature, covers thousands of
square miles, while widely separated highland areas rise steeply over a
limited part of the periphery in the west and south. Again in the south,
an extensive coastline borders on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
Vegetation likewise fails to provide a basis for describing the Ukraine
as a natural unit inasmuch as there are three broad landscape zones which
spread latitudinally across the Republic. Climatically the greater part
of the Ukraine partakes of the continentality characteristic of most of
European Russia, although manifested less severely than in many areas.
However, even though the Ukraine is not 4 distinct natural unit based on
physiography or vegetation, it is clearly a distinct political unit, the
limits of which have been justified on the basis of community of language
and history.
SECVET
De I
ied in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
50-Yr 2014/03/05 C:IA_Pnoszi
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
2. Terrain Features (See Map B)
a. The Ukrainian Steppelands
The dominant terrain feature of the Ukrainian SSR is the wide, level
to gently rolling, fertile steppeland which stretches from the Carpathian
Mountains on the western frontier into the RSFSR on the east, and in the
north from the inhospitable swamplands of Poleslye southward to the Black
Sea, the Sea of Azov, and into the Crimea. Throughout this vast area, ac-
counting for about seventy-five per cent of the Ukraine, he basic pattern
of land formation is one to discourage the operations of Special Forces.
Like the Great Plains of the United States the Ukrainian steppes gently
rise and fall with monotonous regularity, seldom varying in elevation by
more than 500 feet; in most areas the limit of visibility is the horizon.
Regional variations exist within the limits of the Ukrainian steppe-
land, but in most cases these differences do not involve significant areas
suited to refuge and evasion. On the periphery of the steppelands, however,
there are several areas in which the terrain differs radically from that of
the plains, offering excellent opportunities for long-term refuge and eva-
sion. These areas are: Ukrainian Poleslye? the Carpathian Ukraine, and
the Crimean Mountains. They will be considered in more detail following a
briefer description of the regional elements of the generally unsuited
steppelands.
From the standpoint of Special Forces operations the most promising
part of the steppeland is found in the upland areas west of the Dnieper
River. This extensive upland, generally over 100 miles in width, trends
northwest-southeast for about 500 miles from the Carpathian foreland and
the Polish frontier to the great eastward bend of the Dnieper River. In
the north and northeast it is defined by an escarpment facing the lowland
of Poles 'ye, and in the south and southeast it follows the line of the
Dnestr River, finally merging with the Black Sea Lowland roughly along a
line connecting the cities of Ealta and Zaporozhtye. The uplands region,
36
SECRET
SECRET
or plateau as it is sometimes called, is composed of loess, underlain by
various sediments on a crystalline base; there are places where river val-
leys are incised deeply enough to expose this base. The Yuzhnyy Bug divides
the area into two parts: the Volyno-Podollskaya Upland, which occupies all
of the north, and the area between the Dnestr River and the Yuzhnyy Bug; and
the smaller and lower Pre-Dnieper Upland which is largely confined to the
area between the Yuzhnyy Bug and the Dnieper River.
The Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland ranges from about 600 to 1300 feet above
sea level. Elevations are highest in the northwest, the upland sloping-
gradually toward the east and southeast. The erosive action of water has
had a considerable effect on the upland surfaces. The valleys of the larger
streams draining southward to the Dnestr are deeply cut, frequently having
the appearance of canyons 300 feet or more in depth; the western valley
slopes are steeper than the eastern. There is also drainage northward to
the Bug and Pripet Rivers. Removal of forest cover and other agricultural
abuses have led to gullying elsewhere on the upland; steep-sided, branching
ravines are common and sometimes attain a length of several miles and a
depth of 100 feet. The broad interstream areas are plateau-shaped and con-
tain a great number of round, various-sized, shallow depressions sometimes
occupied by bogs or temporary ponds. The winding valley of the Dnestr,
which strikes between the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland and the Bessarabian
Upland of the Moldavian SSR, is deeply incised, much of the valley floor
being 300 to 450 feet below the surrounding heights. The valley ranges
from under one mile up to five miles in width and has many marshy sectors.
The other upland area west of the Dnieper, the Pre-Dnieper Upland,
has lower elevations than the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland. The highest
elevations, about 1,000 feet, are in the northwestern part; the average
elevation is about 700 feet above sea level. Occupying the area between
the Yuzhnyy Bug and the Dnieper River, the upland slopes gently toward
the northeast, where it merges with the Dnieper Lowland, and toward the
southeast, terminating in an escarpment along the right bank of the Dnieper.
37
SECRET
Declassified in Part Sanitized
op Ap.roved for Release
50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RnPfkl_ni
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Its southernmost extension merges gradually with the Black Sea Lowland. The
upland surface is cut by streams and gullies, but not as deeply as on the
Volyno-Podoliskaya Upland. Many river valleys are broad and troughlike,
with occasional small areas of poor drainage.
Upland areas are not as extensive to the east beyond the Dnieper. Only
the southernmost part of the highly dissected, although nearly level, Central
Russian Upland penetrates the Ukraine in the vicinity of Kharkov, rapidly
losing its character as an upland north of the Donets River valley. Another
upland area, the Donets Ridge, rises steeply to the south of the Donets
valley, in many places being as much as 300 to 500 feet above the surface
of the river, and occupies much of the area between the river and the Sea
of Azov. In general the ridge has the characteristics of a gently rolling
plateau with steppelike interstream areas. Orientation is WNW-ESE, for
a distance of over 200 miles, and in places the upland is about 100 miles
in width. The maximum elevations, attained south of Voroshilovgrad, are
about 1,200 feet; most of the upland is in the 328 to 656 foot range (100 -
200 meters), but there are significant sections which fall in the 656 to 984
foot range (200 to 300 meters). As in other upland areas of the Ukraine
the surface is penetrated by steep-sloped stream valleys and marked by
gullying. A southweStm extension of the ridge, called the Pre-Azov Up-
land, closely approaches the shores of the Sea of Azov before merging with
the Black Sea Lowland.
TWO large lowland areas occupying the central and southern sectors of
the Ukraine constitute thepremainder of the steppelands. The northernmost
of these, the Dnieper Lowland, adjoins the left bank of the Dnieper River
and gradually merges into the Central Russian Upland on the east. In ex-
tension it is about 250 miles from northwest to southeast and 150 miles in
width; this lowland continues northward beyond the Ukrainian border. Eleva-
tions rise from about 300 feet above sea level at the Dnieper River to over
500 feet upon merging with the uplands in the east. The terrain throughout
38SECRET
S
SECRET
is predominantly level with average slopes less than 2 per cent. Numerous
left-bank tributaries of the Dnieper cross the region. Their right banks
are generally higher than the left, and in spring floods inundations spread
far and wide over the left bank areas contributing to the development of ex-
tensive meadowlands. These tributary streams generally have a slow current
and become shallow in the summer. Part of the Dnieper Lowland immediately
adjoining the left bank of the Dnieper is described as the zone of the
Dnieper Terraces, a band of terrain stretching from Chernigov in the north
to Dnepropetrovsk in the south; in places this zone reaches a width of over
75 miles. Subdivision of this terrace zone are largely defined in, terms of
altitude, soil, and vegetation. Thus they pass from the flood plain meadows,
through dunes overgrown with pine groves, to the relatively higher elevations
of the fertile steppe. A very small part of the Dnieper Lowland lies on the
right bank of the river in an area west of Kiev. It merges in the north
with the swamplands of Poles 'ye, and in the south and west gradually ascends
to the Pre-Dnieper Upland.
The other extensive lowland area in the Ukraine is the Black Sea Low-
land. It extends for almost 500 miles from the western to the eastern limits
of the Ukraine along the northern shores of the Black Sea and the Sea of
Azov, and then continues eastward to the rolling plain of the Don. River.
Its extension inland ranges from 20 miles, in the eastern part, to over
100 miles in the area north of the Crimea. The Crimean Lowland steppe,
constituting three-fourths of the entire peninsula, is a part of the Black
Sea Lowland.
The outstanding relief characteristic of the Black Sea Lowland is
the vast expanse of nearly level to gently rolling terrain. Elevations
range between 100 and 300 feet above sea level and the monotony of the flat,
treeless horizons is broken only by the shallow valleys of streams, local
gullies, and occasional low hills. Granite outcrops of the underlying
crystalline base and numerous ancient burial mounds provide relatively
prominent breaks in the prevailingly level plains. The lower courses of the
SEdET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50 -Yr 2014/03 05 : - - 1 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Dnieper, Yuzhnyy Bug, and Dnestr, and many smaller, partly intermittent
streams provide the drainage of the area. The steep right banks of the
streams are commonly marked by gullies and ravines. Where the larger streams
empty along the coast, long and narrow bays and estuaries (called limans) have
been formed. These estuaries are the drowned valleys of lower river courses;
some of them have become completely separated from the sea by spits. Through-
out a great part of the coastal are including the Crimea, short beaches are
backed by low cliffs. The Crimean Peninsula is connected to the continental
lowland by a five-mile wide isthmus. The greater part of the peninsula is
level to gently rolling, ascending in the south, however, to the ridges of
the Crimean Mountains. The Kercht Peninsula, an eastward elongation of the
Crimea between the Tea of Azov and the Black Sea, is also predominantly flat,
but rises into a series of low ridges and hills around and about Kerchtat
the eastern tip.
b. Ukrainian Polestye
Of the areas in the Ukraine which show marked differences from the
upland or lowland steppes, Polestye is the most extensive and inaccessible.
Polestye is the name given to the vast, level, poorly drained lowland area
that is roughly defined as occupying the basin of the Pripet River. The area
is more commonly known as the Pripet Marshes and is famous as a major mili-
tary obstacle, having served many times to divert invasions and counter-
invasions to the easier ground lying to the north and south. The southern
third of this marshland lies within the borders of the Ukraine and extends
about 300 miles from the Polish frontier eastward to beyond the Dnieper
River. It extend southward from the Ukrainian-Belorussian border to the
Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland, a distance of about 80 miles in some places.
Differences in elevation over the broad reaches of Polestye are not at all
significant, there being only a difference of 180 to 262 feet between the
center and the edges of the marshland. There are many sandy areas, often
with westward-facing parabolic dunes, the whole characteristically bearing
4?SECRET
MUM
SECRET
a growth of pine. On the Whole, however, Polestye is one great flood plain
with a few, predominantly sandy, dry valleys. Absolute elevation is in the
328- to 656-foot range (100 to 200 meters); there are a few small "islands"
of terrain foreign to the area, the most remarkable being the Ovruch Ridge
which attains an elevation of about 1,050 feet. The typical landscape is
cheerless, being monotonously flat, wooded, and wet. Marshes and swamps
cover most of there a Which abounds in small sluggish streams and drainage
ditches and canals. Interstream areas are low and almost completely given
over to marshes and swamps. Soils are dominantly peat and muck with some
sand and gravel on the low ridges. Spring thaws render any movement through-
out the area almost impossible because of widespread flooding. Winter is
the season most favorable to movement, depending on the depth to which the
ground freezes. Late summer also offers somewhat better opportunities for
travel. Despite its generally forbidding aspect, Polestye supports a mod-
erate population and, in addition, has proved its worth as an excellent
refuge and evasion area by supporting large-scale guerilla activities in
the past.
c. Carpathian Ukraine
The Carpathian Ukraine is a second area differing radically from
the level plains and gently rolling uplands which cause po much of the Uk-
raine to be held unsuitable for the operations of Special Forces, In the
Ukraine the Carpathians form a slight arc, trending northwest-southeast
for about 150 miles. During their course from the Polish frontier across
the westernmost sector of the Ukraine to the Rumanian frontier, the Car-
pathians reach the lowest and narrowest points of any section of the whole
system. The total width of the parallel component ridges varies from about
60 miles in the northwest and central portions to over 80 miles in the
southeast. Elevations increase gradually from northwest to southeast with
most of the summits rising to between 3,000 and 6,700 feet; a maximum ele-
vation of 6,752 feet is attained on the peak of Gore Goverla in the south-
east. Longitudinal and transverse valleys provide an easy means of access
SECRET
: ( ,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop A
d for R
e ease
5 - r 03/05 . CIA-RDP81-0104f1Pnn0qnn00(1(1(17
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
and penetration over wide areas of the Carpathian Ukraine. A number of
relatively low passes are availabe.
Three parallel ridges are distinguishable throughout much of the length
of the mountains, although in the higher southeastern section longitudinal
valleys are not as clearly defined. The central ridge, the highest and most
extensive, has summits ranging from 3,000 to 6,000 feet and over, and varies
in width from 12 to 24 miles; most of the summits of this range are dame-
__
shaped although sharply defined peaks are encountered in the southeast.
Large, nearly level alpine meadows are a common feature of the broad crests
and are used as summer pastures as well as avenues of relatively unhindered
movement. The northeastern slopes are short and frequently precipitous,
whereas the southwestern slopes are longer. A longitudinal depression av-
eraging 15 to 18 miles in width separates the central from the eastern ridge.
In its southern part this eastern ridge becomes increasingly rugged and dis-
organized, local relief* often exceeding 1,000 feet. The northern part is
also ill-defined and resolves itself into a group of separate mountains.
The westernmost ridge, divided from the central by a narrow depression,
averages about seven miles in width. It is the lowest of the three ridges,
varying between 2,500 and 3,300 feet above sea level. Summits are fairly
level and the southwestern slopes decline gradually to merge with the foot-
hills facing the Trans-Carpathian plain; the northeastern slopes are short
and steep.
On the whole, the southeastern section of the Ukrainian Carpathians is
the area best suited for refuge and evasion, although sections which are
almost as rugged are found in the central portion. Even though elevations
are not particularly high in the northwest, this section is still a signif-
icant barrier area. Gorge-like valley approaches, forests, and broken ter-
rain greatly hinder traversability. The southeastern section, however, is
* Local relief is defined as the difference between highest and lowest
elevations within a horizontal distance of one mile.
42SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Rel
? 50-Yr 2
SECRET
the highest, most isolated and inaccessible of all. Traversability, and
therefore organized pursuit, would be most difficult here. The lack of
natural approaches has resulted in sparse settlement. Relative relief is
considerable in the western part of this section; differences of 1,000 feet
per mile are not unusual. The valleys are narrow and steep, frequently
having gradients of over 50 per cent.
The foreland areas to the northeast and southwest are occupied by
foothills.- On the northea5t-the fOriaa-rid Vries- -inth?fr-c.:_tl- a- few_roile.s _
to a maximum of about 30 miles. The slopes generally have gradients of less
than 10 per cent, except Where there are steep valley wells. The general
elevation ranges from 760 to 1,000 feet, but there are places where eleva-
tions are greater, the maximum being 2,500 feet. The belt of foothills in
the southwest is not as wide, ranging from six to nine miles, and there are
places where the transition is abrupt and striking, the -elevation between
plains and mountains differing by as much as about 3,000 feet in ten miles.
Southwest of the Carpathian Mountains, the Soviet Union has acquired
a strategic western gateway in the form of the Trans-Carpathian Plain.
This narrow rectangular plain, about 20 miles in width, is oriented north-
west-southeast along the strike of the mountains. It is a monotonously
flat area, gradually sloping toward the frontier Where it opens onto the
Great Hungarian Plain, of Which it is actually a part. The area is crossed
by numerous braided streams bordered by swamps and marshes; drainage
ditches, canals, and dikes present further restrictions on movement. The
largest river, the Tisza, is a considerable barrier and is subject to .
widespread flooding. Vegetation on the plain offers few opportunities
for concealment. A line of Soviet cities and towns marks the abrupt break
between the Carpathian ridges and the plain.
d. The Crimean Mountains
The mountains aligned southwest-northeast along the southern coast
of the Crimea provide one of the most striking departures from the monotonous
3/0 5. ClA-RDP81Q1Q43p7rn79nnn7
43
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
terrain of the upland and lowland steppes of the Ukraine. The Crimean
Mountains are strung out for about 100 miles along the Black Sea coast and
extend inland approximately 30 miles. A narrow coastal strip, only a few
miles wide, divides the mountains from the sea, except where occasional high,
steep cliffs plunge directly into the water. In the north the boundary be-
tween mountains and steppe is somewhat north of a line defined by the cities
of Sevastopol-BakhchisaryrSimferopol-Karasubazar-Feodosiya.
---The mountain system -consists of three parallel ridges in the e tern
sector, contracting to two in the eastern. Valley depressions of varying
width divide the ridges latitudinally and steep transverse valleys and gorges,
carrying most of the mountain drainage, tend to cut the individual ridges
into a number of mountain blocks. Elevations are greatest on the southern
ridge, decreasing on the central and northern ridges until the mountains
merge with the steppe on the north.
The southernmost and highest ridge is called the Yaila. Elevations
reach their highest point, 5,062 feet, on the Roman-Kosh? northeast of Yalta.
The summit of the range is not a crest, but a rolling plain only a few miles
in width, partly covered by meadows, and partly rocky. These "flats" are
generally at elevations of between 3,000 and 4,500 feet above sea level and
are strongly marked NT ntlaler9Ue depressions, furrows, caves, and deep cavelike
abysses. The southern, sea-facing slopes are extremely steep. On the western
and eastern ends of the range they descend into the sea in the form of nearly
vertical precipices which in places are a thousand feet high. In the central
section the range recedes somewhat from the coastline, but remains noteworthy
for its high precipices. Terraces and gullies are common, and deep divides,
which resolve the Yaila into a series of individual plateaus and blocks, are
also met with on the southern slopes. The extensive fissuring of the Yaila
leads to damaging landslides and the entire mountain Crimea is subject to
earthquakes. Northern slopes are much more gradual, descending to a depres-
sion about ten miles in width separating the Yaila from the foothill ranges
104SECRET
SECRET
to the north. A few low, rounded hills are found in this valley.
The second or central range is not nearly as impressive as the Yaila,
either in terms of height or ruggedne3s. Actually this ridge is not a true
mountain form, being rather the product of
six miles in width and ranges in elevation
its summits. As in the case of the Yana,
erosion. It varies from two to
from 1,300 to 2,400 feet along
southern slopes are steep and
craggy While those on the north are much more gradual. Zn its-eastern----
part, toward Feodosiya, this range is broken up into detached hills and
basins. Water action has led to considerable erosion, cutting narrow
gorges and dissecting the range into a number of separate plateau blocks.
The northernmost range is the lowest and least extensive, spreading
eastward only as far as.Stary Krym. Elevations range from about 400 feet
above sea level at the northern base to a maximum of 1,000 to 1,200 feet
on summits. South slopes are steep and in places terminate in cliffs; nor-
thern slopes descending to the Crimean steppe are gradual. Considerable
erosion has taken place. A narrow depression, about two miles in width,
divides this range from the central range to the south.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SEAET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
eChuguyev
?Sleviinsk ?
Kramitorsk?
s-
-0Artemork-z,
\-1-111ova
.2 Min *Oita
6?Cr s
- Go lo ka- -Deba
???6.7.. effikre
evka. oChistyakovo
r."
??.
'
vAl-? .74 tiVra,r,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
52
48
22
L.t
24
26
26
30
32
BELORUSSIAN SSR
\?
,N\\
\X ?
N\NN
Ns? .
? \\ \\.?
? I
c
\ ? \ ? \kNx
\
34
36
38
40
UKRAINIAN S.S.R.
MAP D
PRECIPITATION (U)
Annual precipitation (inches)
under 12
12-16
16-20
20-24
24-28
28-32
32-36
over 36
Dibrova, 0. T. Geografiya Ukrains'koi RSR
Kiev, 1954 (U)
Dobrynin, B. F. Fizicheskaya geografiya SSSR
Moscow, 1948 (U)
0
30
60
90
120 MI.
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT
a=f1=1=32G
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Number of days per year
with snow cover
Dibrova, 0. T Geografiya Ukrains'koi RSR,
Kiev, 1954 (U).
Dobrynin, B. F. Fizicheskaya geografiya SSSR,
Moscow, 1948 (U).
30 60 90 120M1.
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co. Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
4. Vegetation (Vela F and G)
Within the borders of the Ukrainian SSR there are three broad latitu-
dinal landscape zones which can be defined largely on the basis of their
vegetation. From north to south they are: (1) the zone of nixed forests,
(2) the forest-steppe zone, and (3) the steppe zone. In addition, there
are two well-forested highland areas, (4) the Carpathians and (5) the
Crinean Muntains, which are but little influenced by the latitudinal
zones in which they lie.
a. The Zone of Mixed Forests
The zone of mixed forests (actually a subzone of the vast forest
zone of the USSR) is one in 'which broad-leaved species appear in company
with conifers. In the Ukraine this zone closely approximates the southern-
most extension of Poles lye. Oak is the characteristic tree of this zone,
intermixed with spruce and pine. However, the sane deciduous species which
grow in the taiga, such as birch, aspen, alder, and linden, are found in
company with elm, maple, ash, and hornbeam. North of the Ukraine, and par-
ticularly north of the Pripet River, the distribution of spruce is continuous.
In the Ukraine, however, the nixed forest is a much more general feature and
spruce is generally found in isolated islands on the outskirts of bogs, or
on valley slopes.
In terse of cover, the zone of nixed forests far exceeds in suitability
for Special Forces operations the forest-steppe and steppe zones. It covers
a wide area in the northern Ukraine, spreading eastward for about 300 miles
from the Polish frontier to beyond the Dnieper River, and extending south-
ward from the border with the Belorussian SSR for over 80 miles in nallY
places. Over a quarter of the total surface is covered with forest, and
there are broad sectors where the density of the forest cover ranges from
25 to 40 per cent and more (see yap F). In sone places there are patches
of open, grass-covered land that provide fodder for cattle. On the whole,
however, the region is covered. by heavy forests of deciduous and evergreen
trees with a dense undercover of tall grass reeds and underbrush. The
53
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
thick growth provides excellent cover for unconventional warfare operations
and the extensive swamps form a major obstacle to military activities directed
against such units. The ability of partisan bands in this region during
World War II to survive and the effectiveness of their operations underscore
this evaluation. - The sparse road and rail networks have had little effect
on the natural isolation of the region.
b. The Forest-Steppe Zone
The forest-steppe zone is one of transition between the forest zone
of the north and the steppe zone on the south. The typical forest-steppe
landscape is one in which forest complexes alternate with vast stretches of
steppeland, or in which coppices are scattered in patches over a background
of steppe. In areal extensions this zone proceeds southward from poles 'ye
over most of the Volyno-PodarskaYa Upland.. East of the Dnieper the south-
ward extension follows a varied course roughly between the parallels of 49?
and 50? North latitude. South of this line the relief on the Donets Ridge
has led to tae establishnent of a large island of forest-steppe.
Oak is the characteristic species of this zone, but ash, linden, aspen,
elm, naple, and hornbeam are common. Beech groves are found in the western
part where the climate is mild and noist; pine, practicFoly the only conifer
. growing on the forest-steppe, is encountered in sandy areas on the Dnieper
terraces. The steppe areas of this zone are much greater than the forest areas.
The entire area was once steppeland, but gradual climatic changes have led to
the encroachment of forests which would in tine be dordmInt but for the inter-
ference of man. As it is, the demand for agricultural land. has nore than kept
pace with the slow advance of the forest, and the fact that the region is
termed a "forest-steppe" is mare for purposes of geographical classification
than to indicate that forests at present vie with the open steppes for the
dominance of the landscape.
There are a few areas of limited size within the forest-steppe zone of
the Okraine where small resistance bands or Special Forces units night find
shelter for short periods of tine. Along many of the river valleys wooded
514
SECRET
?
SECRET
areas are found extending from the river banks for distances of as mach as
eight miles on each side. In many cases the banks are lined with villages
so that even the presence of woods would not guarantee that unconventional
warfare units would escape detection. However, in certain areas around
the Dnieper and Donets Rivers and in the San Dnestr River 'Valley there
are larger wooded sections whidh are sparsely populated. Southwest of
aterkassy on the west bank of the Dnieper River there is a wooded marsh-
land of approximately 180 square miles which is covered with oaks and birch
thickets and which has only a scattered population. Along the bsrikg of the
Donets River west of Izyum, and in the western Ukraine northwest of L'vov
other wooded areas are found.
None of them are larger than 200 square
miles and in sone cases the woods are not thick. However, all provide
limited possibilities for concea2nent.
Forest density in the forest-steppe zone is generally less than 10
per cent, but in sone of the areas nentioned above it rises well above this
figure. Conditions are best in the westernnost part of the Volyno-Podoll-
skaya 'Upland near the polish frontier where the density of cover ranges
between 15 and 25 per cent although there are wooded expanses near D'vov
where forest density goes as high as 40 per cent (see Nap G). This region
sustained considerable partisan activity during World War U.
c. The Steppe Zone
The final and southernnost landscape zone is that of the steppe,
Characterized by an almost total lack of forest cover. The southern boun-
dary of the zone neets the shores of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and,
In the Crimea, the southern mountains. The typical landscape consists of
grassy steppes and broad cultivated fields. The little forest cover that
is available is confined to floodplains of rivers, slopes of river valleys,
or narrow sandy terraces which lie above the river floodplains. Although
trees are scarce, their variety is great. Elm, oak, ash, poplar, willow,
maple, alder, aspen, birch, and sone pine are found here and there.
55
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
The steppe zone is the least favorable of any part of the Ukraine for
the operations of Special Forces. The greater part of the zone is classified
as having less than two per cent of its area under forest. The remainder is
hardly more favorable, ranging only from two to five per cent under forest.
The only sizeable area of forest cover in the entire region lies east of
Dnepropetrovsk in a bend of the Samara River where a sandy terrace encourages
forest growth in a 150 squate mile section.
' A.. The Carpathians
The mountainous regions of the Ukraine are confined to a compara-
tively small section of the Western Ukraine--Carpathian Ukraine?and to the
southern edge of the Crinean Peninsula. These two areas, although limited
in extent, possess sone of the most suitable vegetation cover in the Ukraine.
That part of the Carpathian Mountain chain which lies within the borders
of the USSR stands out as the most thoroughly forested section of the Ukraine.
The mountains lie at the western end of the forest-steppe zone, but are not a
part of it, more accurately constituting an island of true forest. In the lower-
lying parts the forests have been considerably cut over to make way for agricul-
ture, but in the more rugged and inaccessible sections (central and southeastern),
mountain slopes are still covered with excellent forest stands. The lowest
altitudinal zone--that of the foothills--has suffered most from clearing; where
forests still remain, they are composed of oak, hornbeam, and beech. Higher--
at about 1,000 to 2,000 fe4tlerthe broaaleaf forests of oak; hornbeam, beech,
linden, maple, and elm begin to receive an admixture of the conifers--fir and
spruce. At higher elevat4.ens the admixture tends to be limited to conifers
and beech until at about 4l000 feet spruce forests prevail. The upper limit of
the forest zone is reached at a little over 5,250 feet. Subalpine meadows and
scrub thickets dominate the summits above the timberline.
Possibilities for concealment in the forest belt of the Ukrainian Car-
pathians are excellent. Many individual forests offer continuous cover over
hundreds of square miles. Although the deciduous forests on the lower reaches
of the mountains have largely a seasonal value as cover, the thick evergreen
56SECRET
SECRET
stands on the upper slopes provide excellent year-14ound coneealweint, and
forest density here frequently exceeds Ito per cent. Forest density, in
general, decreases with altitude. The forests of the Carpathian Ukraine
were the site of uudh partisan activity during World War II and have
continued to be the chief focal point of post-war resistance to the
regine.
e. The
Crimean Mountains
The Crimean NOunteies and the southern littoral constitute a
narrow geographical band lying between the Crinean steppe to the north
and the Black Sea to the south. The most characteristic feature of the
littoral strip is its subtropical vegetation, supported by a Mediterranean
climate which also encourages orchards, vineyards, and tobacco plantations.
The rich Yediterranean vegetation, however, does not extend very far up
the mountains and soon gives way to juniper and oak forests, which, in
turn, are dominated at higher levels by beech forests admixed with
Scotch pine, maple, and hornbeam. Juniper thickets form an upper fringe
to the beech forests and extend up to the Yaila summits. The sunnit
itself is largely unforested, but there are sone thickets and even occa-
sional small beech forests. Descending the northern slopes of the yaila,
beech and hornbeam forests with stands of Scotch and Crinean pine are
encountered, graaing into oak and hornbeam at lover elevations. Below,
the characteristics of the forest-steppe zone re-assert themselves, with
oak, pear, and hornbeam predominating, continuing northward to the lowest
and northernmost ridge of the Crimean Mountains Where the treeless steppes
are net.
Concealnent possibilities on the sumnit of the Yaila are limited,
but the thick forests
of the Crinean ranges
The two northern, and
forest cover and less
on the northern and southern slopes of this highest
offer nany opportunities for refuge and evasion.
lower ridges of the Crimean Mountains have a thinner
rugged topography than the Yaila. In fact, both
ridges have large areas 'which are unforested or 'which have been cut over
57
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
-
SECRET
and cleared. There are, however, many stretches, particularly in the valleys,
where good forest cover is available in company with thick underbrush. On
the whole, the undergrowth throughout the forests of the Crimean Muntains
is not heavy, reducing somewhat the value of these forests for concealment
from ground observation. However, the unbroken extension of forests over
many square miles of difficult terrain compensates in a large measure for
the lack of undergrowth.
-441111.
58SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
--. _
? -7-62:0:. - Z?
+.
.77-1-- - -
........1:k4.
'et'?"1/, -. ,S,'"S''':?,. . '::
10..40A44
. . Ak, itelio?
cl'Ax_
40
T( );v1
Atr*
A
AV
???>,....,,,,, .('--..
0 .... --.?-?,71
X
V
49?
bezhnoye
-Slayyansk?
Kramliord-
?radials,?
Druzhkov
Mins Cinerria
?
Dnepropetrovsk\
46?
.?
?mmIe
? Porvomaysk
R UM A N I A,
UKRAINIAN S. S. R.
MAP F
470
VEGETATION COVER (U)
AREAS WHERE VEGETATION HAS LITTLE OR NO CONCEALMENT VALUE--DOES NOT RESTRICT
MOVEMENT
Uncultivated steppe dry grasses, desert shurbs and salt plants
Cultivated steppe crops provide limited concealment for short
periods, trees found only in occasional, narrow
shelter-belts.
AREAS WHERE VEGETATION HAS SOME CONCEALMENT VALUE FOR SMALL GROUPS--DOES
NOT RESTRICT MOVEMENT
Forest-steppe area cleared for cultivation except for scattered trees
and occasional small groves
River-valley and mountain meadows with grasses, reeds shrubs and
scattered trees.
- I
AREAS WHERE VEGETATION HAS CONCEALMENT VALUE?RESTRICTS MOVEMENT LOCALLY
????ei Y.
,ese-14f.r,t,p;,
rtZfiv-.
kt5r4ti
?
rI. : ? 4. ?
Deciduous forests, chiefly oak, hornbeam, and beech
Mixed forests chiefly pine, oak, and beech
SOURCES:
Akademiya nauk soyuza SSR. Karta Rastitel'nosti Evropeyskoy Chasti SSSR (1:2, 500,000).
Moscow, 1948.
J. Kleopow and E. Lavrenko. Vegetationskarte Der Ukraine (1-1,000,000). Kiev, 1942.
"Die Naturlichen Vegetationszonen Der Ukraine" (1:3,000,000), in Petermanns Geographische
Mitteilungen, 90 Jahrg., 1944, Tafel 8, Gotha.
4tzr
MOLDAVIAL.
t?-11
S. S. R.
?
46?
IN/
Belgrod.DnestrovSkiy
? ;
11
6L.
?Krasnodar
Dan
51
A
20 40
60
Baiaklay&
4
60
80 '
100 .120 140 160 Km
Ii
44'
?
4t?Iffy
14,
tte,12%
':1,1?Zt%
VVV'
.44
i%
Constanta?
30?
32'
330
34?
35?
36'
37?
380
39?
???
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
717..
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
? ?
'
22?
23? 24?
25? 26? 270 280 29? 300 31? 32? 33? 340 35'
36? 37' 38? 33?
`.7??????:
iI
51?
50?
48?
LAND
r.........---#!-? .... '"--Z,...1.F
fflagg''"igi""'
r'tlIPAra-,Ijr0
? -0,Aiia hi, ifit
9,1, ' .'"4.iiir' ./L?1 elynt
.,0,..-
. TriA ;Rt.
; '3 ii, -rat-A:Iumitti
?=.,
...
..
4 ?,,V,
-
w
A
..
,
..?,..?,-
....ill--'4?4*,T.c
- -..
.,.
gio...;.,tx.,-
-
...-T.-
=a
_-..
.:.:?,.
.1?-?,...my
?-?-?-????et
_
. "
52?
- Ct .??? , ej
. to. i .A.....r....t
. / ????
/
? ---,---
%:-...--=:'-- _ ??
.. ' ??^21
' .7-k? - - ?:1
-.---.......
? ?
'51?
Slivisnsk?
Kramilorsi
RUMANIA,
UKRAINIAN S. S. R.
MAP G
DENSITY OF FOREST COVER (U)
Percent of total area under forests
Less than 2
- 5
5 - 10
10 - 15
15 - 25
25 40
Over 40
SOURCE. PLOSHCHA LISIV URSR (1 7, 500,000) in 01 T Dibrava,
GEOGRAFIYA UKRALNIS'KOI RSR, (Kiev, 1954), p 31
1.4"
--r4 7?
50?
49^
48?
???
MOL DAV IAN
S. S. R.
"
%ft.. ?
_ ?
rBel#rod?Dnestrovskiy
r?
.J A
Constintao
29
30?
3110
32?
BaiodiT,
Sevast000r
A
0 20 40 -
60
80
100 Mi
0 4
1414
100 120 140 160 Km
33?
34?
330
36? 37?
38?
390
46?
4??V
.?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
?
SECRET
5. Cross-Country MOvenent (Alps H and S)
Conditions of terrain and climate are generally favorable to cross-
country movement on foot throughout the Ukraine. Aside from the larger
streams Which are everywhere a barrier to movement except When frozen,
the major areas in which novenent would be sharply restricted, and at
times prohibited, are Poles'ye, Carpathian Ukraine, and the Crimean MOun-
tains.
The vast marshes of Poles'ye are pereniRlly wet. Movement in any
direction encounters very difficult conditions, although sone local move-
ment is more easily accomplished in a north-south direction on long,
narrow strips of dry land along the slightly higher left banks of the
major streams. Spring is the least favorable season in Poles'ye; at that
time, thaws lead to widespread flooding. Winter is the most favorable
season after the moist ground and open water has had sufficient oppor-
tunity to freeze. low water level is reached in August and its arrival
expands to a limited degree the possibilities for movenent. A second
6
high-water period cones in autumn but does not usually create conditions
as severe as those in spring. Despite its forbidding aspect the marshes,
swamps, and forests of Poles'ye have demonstrated their value as refuge
and evasion areas in the past. During World War II large bands of
guerillas were able to sustain themselves for long periods of time in
this area.
The highland areas of the Carpathian Ukraine and Crimean MOuntains
also present marked obstacles to movement on foot. Steep or precipitous
slopes, rough surfaces, and deep, narrow gorges would severely hamper
or dhannelize movement. The summit regions, however, are frequently broad
and rather level and would Provide avenues of relatively easy movement.
1110 The most difficult season 14 the highland areas occurs in winter When
;
deep snows and strong winds result in the formation of high drifts.
Mountaineering experience and special equipment would be particularly
useful in this season but would also prove valuable throughout the year.
59
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
?
SECRET
5. Cross-Country Movement (!41psH and S)
Conditions of terrain and climate are generally favorable to cross-
country novement on foot throughout the Ukraine. Aside from the larger
streams which are everywhere a barrier to novement except when frozen,
the major areas in which novement would be sharply restricted, and at
?
times prohibited, are Poles 'ye, Carpathian Ukraine, and the Crimean MOun-
tains.
The vast marshes of Poles ye are perenially wet. TOvement in any
direction encounters very difficult conditions, although sone local move-
ment is more easily accomplished in a north-south direction on long,
narrow strips of dry land along the slightly higher left banks of the
major streams. Spring is the least favorable season in Poles'ye; at that
time, thaws lead to widespread flooding. Winter is the most favorable
season after the moist ground and open water has had sufficient oppor-
tunity to freeze. Low water level is reached in August and its arrival
expands to a limited degree the possibilities for movement. A second
high-water period cones in autumn but does not usually create conditions
as severe as those in spring. Despite its forbidding aspect the marshes,
swamps, and forests of Poles'ye have demonstrated their value as refuge
and evasion areas in the past. During World War II large bands of
guerillas were able to sustain thenselves for long periods of tine in
this area.
The highland areas of the Carpathian Ukraine and Crimean MOuntains
also present marked obstacles to movenent on foot. Steep or precipitous
slopes, rough surfaces, and deep, narrow gorges would severely hamper
or channelize novenent. The sunnit regions, however, are frequently broad
and rather level and would Provide avenues of relatively easy novement.
The most difficult season in the highland areas occurs in winter when
1110
deep snows and strong winds result in the formation of high drifts.
Muntaineering experience and special equipnent would be particularly
useful in this season but would also prove valuable throughout the year.
59
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2
RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
AA in the case of Poles 'ye, these two highland areas were the refuge of
large guerilla bands in the past.
The remaining areas of the Ukraine are xaade up of upland or lowland
steppes. In these areas are found. broad, unfordable streams, frequently
margined by swamps and ne.rshes. primary dissection in the plains areas is
due to the sometimes deeply incised valleys along which the streams flow.
High banks would hinder movement locally. For details on some of the 1319?jor
Ukrainian rivers see Idtp S. Elsewhere on -the plains erosion has led to the
formation of long, deep ravines and gullies. Spring thaws have a far-reaching
effect on the traversability of the plains, creating serious mud conditions
and flooding vide areas adjacent to streams. Winter snows are not deep and
next to the dry, dusty summers this season is the one most favorable to
movement. Autumn witnesses a second mud period, not as serious as that of
spring.
60
SECRET
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2
RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
52?
?oesai.100
7Z7Por
=
510
?
51?
LAND
S.
/
..?..../.../ .. ,,,,,,
?
Ot.'"'
50?
A__?-:-.? -.72... . T=
? - -s, ..., ';;"'''::
? '-iz47-4'.-,?-2:S, : ::
?
-.CI--
,..,;,,,,,,43,4,:le ,,,,, era.e0,4?::::?:4,,, .....,_77.4k:!..j''
,fe24.';rt I 0314 eeeif_ .1%
L.
.s-*\ 15 al`
?-\
c
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
22.
23..
24.
25.
26.
Odess aya
Polta skaya
Rove skaya
Stali kaya
Stanis avskaya
Sumska a
Ternopo skaya
Vinnits
Volynskaya
Voroshilovgra
Zakarpatskaya
Zaporozhskaya
Zhitomirskaya
aya
UKRAINIAN S.S.R.
MAP J
VARIATIONS IN LAND USE BY OBLASTS (U)
Type of land use (Percentage of total area)
Other and unused
Hayfields and
pasture land
Forested land
10
Identifies Oblasts
Grain
Technical crops
Potatoes and
vegetables
Fodder crops
SOURCE:
Data on cultivated land taken from Statystychne
Upravlinnya Ukrainskoi RSR, Narodne
Gospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSR (Kiev, 1957), pp.
110, 123-125. Other figures are estimates.
0 30 60 90 120M1.
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT
C"?- ?
I- ? Dneprodzerzhinsk
Dnepropetrovsk
VotosHovitad
7
c.
4.,
?Mahn?
45e River
28
BLACK
EA
CONFIDENTIAL
34
36
38
.c.e)
48
46
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
7. Patterns of Rural Settlement (See Maps K and L)
a. Types of Rural Settlement
The types of population settlement in different sections of the
Ukraine vary widely from one another. In the fiat steppes in the southern
Ukraine there are large villages extending for many miles along river
valleys. In the mouhtains there are small settlehents or clu6ters of
several households dotted here and there on the sheltered slopes of
mountain basins or along mountain streerla- In Poles 'ye the villages
are small and crude and are stretched along the relatively dry banks of
the area's sluggish streams or on islands of dry ground surrounded by
swamps, and marshes:,
The most prevalent form of settlement is found in the steppe and
forest-steppe districts, and especially in the broad, middle belt of
the Ukraine which extends from the eastern to the western borders
between Poles'ye in the north and the Black Sea Lowland to the south.
To a greater degree than in other areas of the Ukraine, settlement is
concentrated in moderately large rural villages varying in size from 500
to 3,000 inhabitants. Villages are found most often along rivers, where
they extend in thin lines for distances of several miles along one or
both river banks. where settlezent is heaviest as in the Volyno-
Podol'skaya Upland and the northeast Ukraine, the villages form almost
continuous ribbons of settlement along the valleys. Away from the rivers,
villages have grown lip also wherever natural or artificial ponds are found.
/h contrast to the Ti,ver settlements, the pond villages are nucleated. In
both types of villages houses and farm buildings are constructed usually
of sun,dried brick or clay mixed with straw, and are frequently white-
washed. Traditionally roofs have been thatched and steeply pitched.
Newly,-built homes are sometimPs of frame construction with tile roofs.
A large part of the farming in this area is intensive, and principal
crops are sugar beets, potatoes, and fodder-crops. As a result, villages
are relatively closeiy-spaced, and farmers travel only short distances to
their fields.
SEeRET
Darf qnniti7Pd Coov Aooroved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
In the southern steppes, especially in the Black Sea Lowland and the
northern sections of the Crimea, the pattern of population settlement is
somewhat different. The principal crops here are wheat, barley, and corn,
and cultivation is extensive rather than intensive. The climate is dry,
and there are few rivers or streams; as a result the problem of later
supply is a difficult one and villages are consequently concentrated almost
exclusively along the bigger rivers and streams. The water divide stretches
are covered with fertile loess soils 65 to 100 feet deep, and water is avail-
able only at considerable distances below the surface. Only in those few
places where artesian wells can be dug have suitable sites for villages
been found. In general, the water divide areas are without settlement.
Agriculture in the southern steppes is nore heavily mechanized than in any
other part of the Soviet Union. It was here that the first machine tractor
station was formed and there is now almost no farming which is unmeehanized.
In parts of the steppes the machinery is electrified, drawing its power from
the great hydroelectric projects on the Dnieper River. Because villages are
concentrated along river valleys they frequently adjoin one another closely
and contain as many as 3,000 to 5,000 inhabitants. Houses are typically of
brick or clay with tile roofs.
A third type of settlement is found to the north in Toles'ye, where the
land is distinguished by its nunerous swamps and forests. Population in
Poles 'ye is generally sparse and is settled principally in farm villages
located on the higher lands surrounding the swamps. In some cases the
villages are built along river banks -which are raised above the swampland
and hence are relatively dry. In most cases the villages consist of 20 to 100
farmhouses strung along both sides of a single street. In centrast to the
steppe villages, houses and farm buildings are principally of wood mounted
by thatched roofs. Frequently the houses together with their stables and
outlying btildings are grouped to form a courtyard. The land cultivated
from the villages consists of small separate plots which are seldom far away.
The plots are intensively farmed, with vegetables and cereal grains predomina-
ting. The villages are the most backward in the Ukraine, and sanitary and
7?SECRET
?
?
? ip
SECRET
water-supply facilities are primitive. In the deepest parts of the swamps,
occasional separate dwellings are found, used by trappers and fishermen
or by farmers grazing livestock or cultivating tiny patches of dry land.
In the mountain districts of the Ukraine?the Crimean and Carpathian
NOuntains?the settlement patterns are diverse. In the foothills and in
the lover reaches of stream valleys communities similar to those of the
tenpe are to be found. A typical community consists of 800 to 1,000
inhatan-cs engaged in agriculture and lumbering. In addition to crops
suel. az: ..hear and potatoes, orchards, gardens and, in the Crimea, vine-
yards ctri7 cultivated, and Livestock are grazed on the steeper slopes.
Houses art- ce-lefly of brick with tile roofs.
In the Carpathian NOuntains above the foothills, settlements are
generally found only in valley basins, along gentle mountain slopes, or
along the larger river valleys. Settlements consist usually of a few
houses widely separated from one another. The houses are made of wood
with high thatched roofs. In the Eastern Carpathians the number of such
small villages is very great: in one district in the Zakarpatskaya oblast
there are over 5,CO3 indicat:ae, can average density of nearly six villages
per square mile.
cr [)/' 01,31,tiC was brought to bear to indu.:c the
farmers to join coJittyes, and in the following years a number of the
smaller villages wcn7 Alibined into larger towns with schools, hofspitals,
libraries, etc. Hoaevcr, many older villages remain, particularly in the
higher mountain reg2ons where lumbering is the principal activity.
In the Crimean KounLains the settlement pattern is marked by the
numerous resort and he7,Ith facilities which dot the hills above the
Black Sea. In the vaiter7. and mountain basins gardens, vineyards, and
tobacco plantations are found, adjoining closely to small villages con-
structed along mountain st-2eams. At higher elevations there are virtually
no permanently inhabited points, although shelters used in the summer
months by herdsmen, huntrs and lumbermen are to be found.
71
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
b. Density of Rural Population
Total population density in the Ukraine is indicated on Map K,
and rural population density by oblate on Nap L. The most densely popu-
lated sections are those in the forest-steppe belt, including the Volyno-
.
PodolTskaya Upland, the Dnieper River districts between Kiev and Krenenchug,
and the Poltavskaya and Sumakaya oblasts in the northeastern Ukraine. This
is the belt which'enconpasses the traditionally Ukrainian lands and in which
cultivation is of an intensive type= Consequently rural 'Population is dense,
varying from 112 to 181 per square mile., Within the belt the most densely
settled points are found in the Ternapollskaya and Vinnitskaya ?blasts,
where the land is fertile and heavily cultivated.
A second densely populated section is the chernovitskaya oblast, which
occupies a part of the southern valley of the Dniester River, the upper
valley of the Prut River, and the eastern section of the Ukrainian Car-
pathian Mountains. Rural population density is 188 per square mile.
Settlements are found not only along the principal rivers, but also in
mountain valleys and on mountain slopes extending upward to elevations of
2,000 feet. The dense rural population is engaged in the cultivation of
grains, potatoes, and sugar beets, and in the grazing of livestock. At
elevations above 2,000 feet settlements gradually disappear, although herds-
nen and woodsmen are to be found at heights of 5,000 feet and more.
A third densely populated region is the Trans-Carpathian Plain. The
most densely settled places are l'ound in the foothills above the plain,
especially in the Tisa valJey near.Tyachev and near the towns of nikaohevol
Vinogradov, Beregovo, and Uthgorod. Rural population densities in excess
of 500 per square mile are recorded at some points. Further into the moun-
tains the population becomes sparse, and settlement is confined almost
exclusively to the basins of a few larger rivers. In the mountain meadows
and in the forest districts only occasional herdsmen and woodsmen are found.
72SECRET ?
?
?
SECRET
The sections of the Ukraine with lowest rural population densities
are found in the Black Sea Lowland, the Crimean Steppe, and the Donbass.
Densities vary from 46 per square mile in the Crimea to 88 per square
mile in the Odesskgya oblast. Farming in these sections is extensive,
farm madhinery is heavily used, and there is a consequent low ratio of
farm workers per square mile of cultivated land. In the Donbass the popu-
lation is predominantly urban, and rural inhabitants are found only in
clusters of farm villages producing chiefly vegetables and dairy products
for the industrial centers.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
73
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SOURCE: MVD SSSR, Plotnost' naseleniya SSSR
Asmussmasziwa
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
o 0? o o
o 0
00 0 -0
0 060 00?0: :6-4 0::
? 0
O ? 0 - ?
0 0 0 ?
? ? 0 ?0
O a a 0 0 0
O 0? 0 ? 0
0 0 0 0
0 4:0 4 10 0 6?0 :0 1.1 io Vt? 6
.0 ? 0 ? 0
:0?0? 0'3 : o ? 0 0 ?
0 0 o
: A
-000o0 0 0 0 '
? 0 "Oo 00o 0 ?
s:
0 0 0
o o
o * o ?? 0 42000 _o00 ?of ?: 20 0 ..0" :0Ce? 0
000? ?
e 0
0 00?00.'00?0
0
? e ? A 0 %coo 0 0 o o o ?
O ? 0
0o00. 0 0",0 A 0Ao0000 o 00 e
0 0 0* o 0 ? 0 0
0 e ? ? 0 0 * 0 ?
O ? 0 00 0 A 0 o ? o o 00000 00 0* ?O? ? ? 00000, 0
? 0 0 e eo0 0 .0 ? 0 0 o? 0 ? 0
0 0? 00 ooe 0 0 A o 0
o ? _ 0 0_0 0 0? ,. ea 0 ?
o. 0 00. ? o ? '2? .0 ??0I 12 .0. .0......?
O 0
a . a . ? . . -
. . ? 0 ? . ........e.o_
0 ? a
0 0 a oe ? : :..... ?00
,0,:, ? ,... 00 . 0 . t, ? . a . ? . ? ? 6. ? ? e 0_ 0 . 0 ? 0 0 ?
o 0
o 0 o 0
? ? 0 ? 00 000
? ? 00 o?
o 0 0 000, 0 0 0
O 0 ? 0
0
DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL
POPULATION BY OBLASTS (C)
156--Average density of rural population in each oblast
Note: Figures are Soviet estimates for April 1, 1956
SOURCE: Statystychne upravlirmya Ukrains'koi RSR.
Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrains 'koi RSR.
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT
/
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
8. Rural Roads
Current information on the density of rural roads in the Ukraine is
not available. Rural roads known to have been in use in recent years
are plotted on the AY6 N501 1141) Series. The naps covering the Special
Forces suitability areas included in this study present a general picture
of the rural road ne'Pwork in these areas.
The most dense:network of roads is found in the forest-steppe belt
where rural populaqOn density is also greatest. Roads are most nunerous
in the western and eastern sections of the belt and somewhat more sparse
in the central distActs. Equily numerous roads are to be found in some
sections of Poles'Ye 'to the north, and in certain districts of both the
Carpathian and Crimean Mountains. Rural roads are relatively Sparse in
the broad steppe regions in the Black Sea lowland, in sone parts of the
Donbass, and in the dry steppes of northern Crimea.
Rural roads everywhere are poor by U.S. standards. In nost cases)
they do not have a consolidated roadbed and are simply natural roadways
connecting one village with another. In the steppe regions where the
terrain is level and unbroken the roads are very wide, and during dry
weather in the summer and when frozen in the winter are capable of
bearing heavy traffic. In wet seasons and particularly during spring
thaws the roads become so muddy that they are impassable even for
moderate traffic. Light carts and trucks which must travel during
these seasons avoid the roads, traieling across the dryer and nore
passable fields on ther side.
In the area of'Foles'ye roads are narrow, commonly following thin
belts of dry ground between swampy' depressions on either side. Possi-
bilities for movement along the swam roads are excellent only in mid-
winter When the ground is frozen. 'At other seasons the roads are at
tines locally impassable and in the spring are everywhere closed to all
but foot traffic.
75
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap ? roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R00230027non7_1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
In the mountain regions the standards of rural roads are generally
higher and although they are often winding and narrow are open to traffic
for larger parts of the year. Both the Carpathian and Crimean Mountains
are crossed by numerous trails and tourist routes
suitable for light vehicles. In mid-winter roads
by snow at elevations of 5,000 feet and above.
as well as by roads
are frequently closed
76
SECRET
SECRET
B. Distribution of Partisan Activities, World War II (See Map M)
An important criterion in the selection of suitability areas for Special
Forces operations in the Ukraine must be seen in the locational factors de-
fining the operations of the partisan bands which controlled sections of
the Ukraine for varying periods in World War II. These factors are of in-
terest to Special Forces planning first because they point to those areas
where geographic conditions--terrain, vegetation cover, settlement patterns,
etc.--are most favorable for operations by opposition bands, and secondly
because they throw light on certain problems Special -Forces units operating
in the same areas would encounter.
Two principal groups conducted partisan operations in the Ukraine during
World War II. The larger group was composed of pro-Soviet partisans organ-
ized in most oases by Russian military leaders, led by dedicated members of
the Communist Party or by Army or MND leaders parachuted into the Ukraine,
and supplied in part at least by stores of equipment left hidden by the re-
treating Soviet Army or by material parachuted from Soviet planes.2 Members
of the pro-Soviet partisan groups were recruited in some instances from the
local population generally; but apparently the majority of the partisans
were Communist Party members, membefi-of partisan battalions specially
trained in the rear of the Red Army and sent to favorable areas as the
Germans advanced into them, or soldiers of the Red Army who had been sur-
rounded by German forces and had joined partisan bands rather than surren-
der. Undoubtedly the harshness of the German occupation encouraged some
Ukrainians to resist, but it would be misleading to assume that large numbers
of the partisans were local inhabitants who had fled to the woods to escape
repressive measures.
The second important group of partisans consisted of anti-Soviet bands.
These partisans were Ukrainian nationalists who initially viewed the Germans
as liberators from the Soviet yoke and were given tacit permission by the
German Army to occupy parts of the northwestern Ukraine. During the early
months of the war much of their energy was devoted to fighting the Poles in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
77
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
the area who were their bitterest enemy.3 Later the groups were alienated
by the harshness of the German occupation, and when ordered by German Army
leaders to disband in 1943, they refused, continuing their operations against
Soviet and German forces alike. Initially, many members of these bands were
emigres who had come into the Ukraine on the heels of the German Army from
the eastern districts of Poland. During the later years of the occupation,
however, as German repressive measures increased, many local inhabitants
fled to the wooded areas of Polestye? joining the nationalist groups there.
In contrast to the Soviet partisans, the nationalists could rely on no out-
side group to provide them with supplies. In numerous instances, however,
the local population provided them with food and shelter; for equipment
and weapons they were forced to depend on whatever they could seize from
the Germans or occasionnlly from pro-Soviet partisan groups.
There were five regions of the Ukraine in which the partisans were
strong enough to disrupt German control for long periods of time in at least
the outlying areas. In addition, there were seven smaller centers in which
partisan groups operated for short periods although they were eventually
destroyed by German forces. These general centers of partisan activity
have been plotted on Map M. Throughout the rest of the Ukraine there were
occasional acts of sabotage which the Germans sometimes labeled as partisan
activity, as well as occasional raids by partisan bands. None of these in-
cidents were important in comparison with the activity of the partisan-
infested areas.
Polestye: -- The largest and most important area of partisan activity
was Polestye--the wide swamp-forest belt stretching along the northern bound-
ary of the Ukraine (area A on Map M). The area was the most favorable section
of the Ukraine for partisan operations. It offered excellent sanctuary for
partisan groups because of its moderately heavy forest cover and extensive
swamps and marshes, and because its sparse communications network limited
Tossibilities for German counter-measures. The bands operating in the area
78
SECRET
4
SECRET
were pro-Soviet bands and were consequently strengthened by their proximity
to the marshland in Belorussia to the north where the largest and most im-
portant of the partisan groups in the Soviet Union were to be found. In
the parts of Polestye east of the Dnieper River the people were apparently
sympathetic to the Soviet partisans or at least benevolently neutral, and
consequently provided them with supplies. In the districts west of the
river the people were less sympathetic and provided less support; but be-
cause population density was moderately low, the partisans could carry on
operations with little fear of detection.
Because of the favorable conditions in Poles:ye partisan groups were
both more numerous and more strongly entrenched than in any other region
of the Ukraine. Altogether there were perhaps 20,000 men included in the
bands, contrblling not only the areas outside the cities, but occasion-
ally raiding German centers such as Chernigov and Glukhov.4 Initially,
the partisans were strongest in the region east of the Dnieper River,
but early in 1943 a large group commanded by Sidor Kovpak crossed into
western Polestye;5 in the following months many other bands developed
until almost the entire northern border of the Ukraine came under partisan
control. German forces were never able to challenge seriously these
forces.
Southern Volynia: -- A second area in which partisans were entrenched
during an important part of the war was the area immediately to the south
and west of Polestye (area B on Map M). Included in the area were parts
of the Poles tyeLowland with its forests and marshlands and also the
northwestern sections of the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland. Before World
War II the area had belonged to Poland, and anti-Soviet, Ukrainian nation-
alist organizations had developed within it. With the German occupation
of the region, these organizations had established active, military units
which fought at first against the Soviet partisans to the northeast and
later also against the German Army. The partisans were strongly supported
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co.y Ap.roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA RDP81 01043R00230027onn7_1
SEeliET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
by the sparse population of the area, and remained in control until 1944 and
1945 when the Soviet Army forced them to disband or withdraw further west,6
Although the geography of the area is not as favorable for Special Forces as
are the more northern parts of Poles lye, there is sufficient cover to provide
concealment for large groups,
to anti-Soviet forces than in
Carpathian Mountains: --
and the population is apparently more sympathetic
Polestye itself.
The third important partisan area was the Car-
pathian Mountain region and especially its western, formerly Polish sections
(area C on Map M). Since this area was the furthest west of the partisan
areas and had not been a part of the Ukraine before World War II, it was the
last area in which partisan groups were organized.7 Like the partisan area
immediately to the northeast, it had been a center of anti-Russian, Ukrainian
nationalists before World War II, and consequently the bands which appeared
were anti-Soviet. In some cases they were composed of Ukrainian partisans
who had been forced out of Polestye by Soviet partisans and Soviet troops and
had taken shelter in the more protected and remote regions of the Carpathians.
Toward the end of 1943 Sidor Kovpak led his band of Soviet partisans into the
area, but the population was apparently strongly anti-Soviet and the band
could not obtain supplies and equipment. The group quickly disintegrated and
although other Soviet groups occasionally raided the area, they too were un-
able to establish bases there, and the area remained into the post-war period
a center of Ukrainian nationalist partisans. Possibilities for concealment
in the mountains are good, although there are places which are not heavily
forested and which are moderately densely settled with numerous access roads
and communications lines. On the basis of World War II experience it would be
expected that Special Forces would be more strongly supported in the Carpath-
ian Mountains than in any other section of the Ukraine.
Crimean Mountains: -- The fourth partisan center was the Crimean Moun-
tain region on the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula (area D on Map N).
Numerous pro-Russian, anti-German encampments were established in the forested
soSECRET
?
`oda,
?
Ora
SECRET
parts of the mountains and perhaps as many as 10,000 partisans were active
at various times,8 The partisans were under the same form of organization
as were those in Poles tye, and came under the close control and guidance
of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement of the Red Army. The groups
were strongest at the end of 1942, and although the Germans were later able
to make extensive raids against them, they were never completely eliminated
?ss
before German troops were forced to withdraw in 1944. The area is less iso-
lated than the Carpathian Mountains or Polestye, being crossed by a number
of paved roads and dotted with tourist centers and trails. Its population
would probably be unsympathetic to American Special Forces, for the only
group which opposed the Russian partisans in World War II--the Crimean
Tatars--were subsequently deported to Central Asia,
Dnieper River between Cherkassy and Kiev: -- The last important cen-
ter-of partisan activity was the area between Cherkassy and Kiev along the
Dnieper River (area E on Map M). The partisans operating in the area were
pro-Russian partisans numbering approximately 2,000 at their greatest
strength.9 Except for the Black Forest, southwest of Cherkassy? tree
cover is limited, being confined to the shores of the Dnieper River and
its tributaries. Apparently the ability of the World War II partisans
to maintain themselves rested more on their proximity to the stronger
partisan groups in the northern Ukraine and on German reluctance to cam-
mit the troops necessary to destroy them rather than on the geographic
features of the area. Only small Special Forces groups could find shel-
ter in the Black Forest, and the area as a whole does not compare in
suitability for unconventional warfare operations with the other four
areas of heavy partisan activity.
The seven smaller centers in which partisan groups operated for
short periods of time were of less importance. None were controlled by
partisans for more than four months, and the bands were able to remain
as long as they did only because German forces were not immediately
available and organized to operate against themc The band of 350 men in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007 1
81
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
the swamps near Nikopolt was dispersed within a month of the time it was
organized;-0 the groups located along the Donets River and east of Sumy were
quickly destroyed; many of the Kharkov partisans were dispersed by local in-
habitants hostile to the Soviet regime even before the German Army took steps
against them. The only area in which the partisans were not easily uprooted
was the forested section lying in the bend of the Samara River between Novo -
moskovsk and Favlograd. Here approximately 350 partisans were able to main-
tain themselves from October 1941 to January 1942. As in the case of the
partisans around Cherkassy? however, they were not immediately destroyed
chiefly because the situation on the front lines prevented the Germans from
assigning the necessary troops to the area to oppose them. In January, a
German Infantry Regiment arrived in Novomoskovsk and in a brief engagement
completely wiped them out.11
On the basis of the experience of the partisans in the seven smaller
areas of activity in the Ukraine, it is apparent that the areas provide
suitable shelter only for small Special Forces operations and only for short
periods before Soviet forces are directed against them. The forest zones
are small in area--less than 200 square miles--and are separated from one
another and from the larger wooded regions by broad stretches of coverless
steppe. Communications facilities near the areas are good, and Soviet troops
could be moved quickly to surround the woods. Unconventional warfare opera-
tions, limited in size and scope and particularly in the time needed to
accomplish their missions, could be carried out in the areas; but no large-
scale operations as in the north and west Ukraine and the Crimean Mountains
are feasible.
1
82
SECRET
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
30?
310 SECRET
? ?
32?
330
34?
35?
51?
51 ?
50?
LAND
-
U
_ .
r ?
? 1:
? .7.1
_7e
? a-
50?
- of
? II-
?- -
?
111 -
? ?
? ? ? ,?
a /1 ? ?
4:11
:) 0 ?
1U .1
Khaf tar
?Chuguyev
Kupyansk?
L,1/4
-
49?
- \
,
-
4 ti
1,
1: t
e?
Oarnenla, Pori?I'skl
s: a j1
e ? ,
??e
-6=7
y
If.
? , ?
491 ?
Kblienyya
?????, /
480
(t- ?
?
f ? !.?
%,(%??
? ecoromr--, , I
? ?b?1?. *Av. era ?
?Z' 0?
-?1?:;?;? or. ? ? "I?
?
Kirovograd
48?
???
R U ,AA
vi A N
IA
UKRAINIAN S. S. R.
MAP M
PARTISAN ACTIVITY --WORLD WAR II(C)
0 IN ?
? II
? ? ?
--
Areas in which Red partisan activity was so extensive
as to constitute a disruption of German control.
A Poles'ye and the northeastern Ukraine
D . . . . Crimean Mountains
Dnieper River between Cherkassy and
Kiev
Areas in which Ukrainian nationalist partisan activity
was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German
control.
Southwestern Poles'ye
Carpathian Mountains
Points at which Red partisan groups were noted.
Points at which Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups
were noted.
Route followed by the Red partisan band commanded by
Sidor Kovpak.
47?
MOLDAV IAN
S.S R.
?^.
6^.
46?
iL
45?
Dana e
?Krasnodar .
Sevastopol'
KBalaklava
Canton/a0
0 20 ao - 60 90 9OMi
80 100 120 140 160 Km
OF444 ,4 a-IL...L(41 60
?
.. ?
290
30?
3' ? SECRET
32?
33?
34?
35?
36 )
3 7 0
38?
390
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
C. Distribution of Resistance Incidents, 1945-1957 (See Map N)
The resistance incidents reported
Appendix I have been plotted on Map N
bution of the incidents is their heavy
formerly Polish parts of the Ukraine.
since World War II and described in
The striking feature of the distri-
concentration in the westernmost,
Of the 212 recorded incidents, 163--
nearly 77 per cent--have taken place in the six oblasts (Rovenskaya, Volyn,
skaya, Livovskaya, Ternopolskaya, Stanislavskaya, and Drogobychskaya)
transferred from Poland to the Soviet Union during World War II. Twenty-
one of the remaining 49 incidents have occurred also in the westernmost
parts of the Ukraine, but in the areas ceded to the Soviet Union by
Czechoslovakia and Rumania (the Zakarpatskaya and Chernovitskaya oblasts).
In the other sections of the Ukraine--tho districts belonging to the
Soviet Union before World War II--only 28 incidents, approximately 13
per cent of the total, have been reported in the post-war years. The
predaninance of the formerly Polish areas as centers of resistance has
not been quite as prominent as the tabulation in Appendix I indicates
because the insurgents operating in these sections have had close con-
nections with emigre nationalists in the Western world and hence have
reported more completely and directly on their activities than have re-
sistance groups in other sections of the Ukraine. Undoubtedly many
acts of resistance carried out in the eastern Ukraine have never been
reported outside the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, with due allowance
for the more complete reporting of resistance in the western Ukraine,
there is little question that a preponderant part of opposition to the
regime has been expressed here, and that it has been expressed in a
more active form than elsewhere.
The concentration of resistance may be explained in two ways.
First, the Ukrainian population in the six western oblasts has been
consistently the most strongly opposed of Ukrainian groups to Soviet
rule. In the period between the first and second world wars the area,
83
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05.
81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
as a part of Poland, became a center for anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists.
Many Ukrainians inside the Soviet Union unwilling to accept the Soviet re-
gime fled to the area, joining there in the organization of strongly anti-
Russian, Ukrainian groups. The Polish government provided some encouragement
for their efforts. As a result, when the Soviet Union seized the area at the
beginning of World Nar II, it incorporated within the Ukraine an organized
and strongly anti-Russian group. Following the war, the hostility of the
local population was intensified because the process of Sovietization of the
new districts was carried out at a pace which far exceeded that by which the
Soviet Union itself had been initially socialized as well as the pace being
followed by the satellites in their program of socialization. Industries
were immediately taken over by the. state; farm collectivization was deedily
pressed; severe quotas for food deliveries and work-norms were established
and enforced. As a result, Ukrainian opposition to Soviet rule in the wes-
tern districts, and especially among the farmers, increased rapidly.
The second explanation for the concentration of resistance lies in the
geography of the western parts of the Ukraine. Included within the area
are parts of three physiographic regions, all of which provide at least mod-
erately favorable conditions for the survival of resistance groups. In the
north, the Volynskaya and Rovenskaya oblasts are covered by the Poles tye
swamps where evasion possibilities are excellent: forests in the oblasts
are relatively dense, providing suitable concealment for resistance bands;
population density is not high, enabling bands to escape detection; the
ground is marshy in most places, providing an important obstacle to Soviet
security forces moving against the insurgents. In the center of the wes-
tern sections of the Ukraine, the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland extends into
the two oblasts of Ltvovskaya and Ternopolskaya: the upland offers less
favorable conditions for evasion, but wooded sections and numerous deep
valleys with wooded slopes provide possibilities for concealment in places.
In the south, the Carpathian Mountains and the Carpathian Hills cover large
84
SECRET
SECRET
parts of the Stanislavskaya and Drogobychskaya oblasts: the heavy forests
and mountainous terrain found at many points interfere with movement and
assist evasion and concealment. These physical factors conspire to render
conditions for resistance more favorable than is the case in any other re-
gion of the Ukraine.
Within the newly acquired western districts of the Ukraine are seven
points at which resistance has been concentrated. The most important has
been the triangle identified by the three towns of Stanislav, Slavsko, and
Stryy. Within the triangle 61 incidents have been reported- -29 per cent
of all incidents in the Ukraine. The triangle is centered on the northeast
foothills of the central section of the Ukrainian Carpathian Mountains on
the border between the Drogobych and Stanislav oblasts. Its terrain is
dissected, although not as sharply as in the more mountainous regions fur-
ther to the south. Forest cover is not continuous throughout the triangle,
but heavy woods are found especially east of Slavsko and in a line west of
Stanislay. The triangle lies on the edge of the line of settlement of the
two oblasts; to the south only a few, small and scattered communities are
to be found. Access to the triangle is difficult inasmuch as only one
highway and rail line are to be found--between Stryy and Stanislav--plus
a few secondary roads. The people living in and near the triangle have
been strongly anti-Soviet, and although many have been deported to the
east and replaced by Ukrainians from more settled and pro-Soviet districts,
some anti-Russian nationalists apparently remain.
The second important center of resistance has been the heavily eroded
sector of the Volyno-Podoltskaya Upland extending southeastward from Lvov
to the Dnestr River. Twenty-nine incidents or 14 per cent of the total
for the Ukraine have taken place in the area. Although maximum elevations
in the upland are less than 1,400 feet, numerous rivers and streams have
cut sharply into its surface forming deep valleys with steep slopes. The
valleys themselves are flat and swampy, and the woods which once covered
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SEC El
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
them have been cut-over and the land planted to crops. Population density
in the valleys is high. On the hills and ridges separating the valleys for-
ests are to be found and there is little settlement. It is here that possi-
bilities for evasion and concealment are good. According to numerous reports
the people living in the sector have been strongly opposed to Soviet rule
and especially to collectivization. They have provided considerable assist-
ance to the insurgents in the Area,.
A third important center of resistance has been the western section of
the Drogobychskaya oblast between the town of Drogobych and the western
frontier of the Ukraine south of the Dnestr River. Seventeen incidents or
eight per cent of the total in the Ukraine have been reported here. The
terrain is mountainous with elevations of 3,000 feet or more in some places.
Southeast of Turka is a heavily forested area, unpopulated except for scat-
tered woodsmen and herdsmen; possibilities for concealment are excellent.
Elsewhere heavy woods are found here and there, although they are not con-
tinuous. The only communications link is a single-track rail line and a
paved highway running from Sambor to Turka and beyond.
Two other important centers of resistance have been reported in the
general area of the Carpathian Mountains. In the Eastern Carpathians along
the upper reaches of the Prut River ten Incidents have been noted. The in-
cidents have been concentrated near the towns of Delyatin and Nadvornaya
and along the rail line leading to Kolomyya and southward across the Car-
pathians toward Rumania. The mountains are rugged and high in this sector
and there are no settlements or communications facilities away from the
valleys. The second area is centered on the southwestern slopes of the
mountains above Uzhgorod in the Zakarpatskaya oblast. Partisans have appar-
ently operated from the Ungdarok Forest--a heavily wooded section to the
northeast of Uzhgorod. The partisans have attacked kolkhozes in the vicin-
ity, as well as the highway and rail line between Perechin and Uzhgorod and
between Uzhgorod and the Hungarian border.
8ECRET
SECRET
Outside
Outside the Carpathian Mountain region there have been two additional
centers of resistance in the western Ukraine. The first lies in the Polestye
swamp district east of Rovno where six incidents of resistance have been re-
ported. During and after World War II the area was a center for the Ukrain-
ian Insurgent Army, and throughout the post-war period the local population
opposed collectivization and supported groups unfriendly to the regime. The
combination of swamps and forests in the vicinity was favorable for insur-
gents; and numerous underground bunkers were built. After 1950 many of the
original inhabitants were deported and replaced by eastern Ukrainians whose
loyalty to the regime was more certain. Hence Special Forces could no longer
anticipate local support with as great assurance. The second center of
resistance has been the area near Ternopolt where five incidents have been
reported. Although the terrain is moderately dissected, conditions are
generally unfavorable for resistance groups. No incidents have been reported
after 1950, suggesting that opposition elements in the local population have
been largely eliminated.
Outside the western districts of the Ukraine the only reported resis-
tance activities have been located in the cities. In Kiev nine incidents
have been reported, the only important number anywhere in the eastern Ukraine.
In Stalin?, Kadiyevka, Kharkov, Zaporozhtye, and Odessa other incidents have
been noted, but they have been isolated and have indicated little basic,
underlying hostility to the regime. The lack of resistance activities in
the populated areas of the Ukraine confirms the suggestion that the cities
have been Russified. It is only in the rural western regions where terrain
conditions are favorable and the population dissatisfied that resistance
has been important.
In most recent years resistance has been much less widely distributed
than in the immediate post-war period. Incidents have been reported in the
cities of Kiev, Stalin?, and Kadiyevka, and in the western Ukraine in Ltvov,
Stanislav, Chernovtsy, and Uzhgorod. Many of the reports have referred to
student unrest which was not subversive in itself or to isolated raids which
87
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50 -Yr 2014/03/05: - - 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
may have been carriei out by bandits rather than resistance groups. The
only areas in which distinctly partisan attacks have been located are in
the mountainous areas near Drogobych, south of Stanislav, immediately west
of Chernowtsy, and north of Uzhgorod; in the Polesiye swamps north of Lutsk
and east of Kovell; in the woods near LI vov and Magerov; and in the cities
of Kadiyevka and Stalino. Only in the Carpathian Mountains have partisan
activities been reported after 1955.
88
SECRET
41P10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R007?Ann99nnn7_1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
220
23?
24?
25?
26?
27?
28?
29^
30?
31` SECRET 32?
33?
34?
35?
.36?
37?
38?
31)0
40?
.., a _
_
-
_
onr.zh
51?
51?
LAND
- ?Sumy
-
141
5
44
_T5-5.13-?::-.10-";77-1!.:?6.1761*::?9 115
? 27208
201-202
rTI1T
VIII4-9.1154 1
80 IIITI101111 14216-1211:1-13 10 !I?2,82
32 -
S.
?
49?
1
1 1 6-5k
110 t1 1 C183t185 b
111 II
148
-43'7111:
41111111r t,
13....-
"--
?1;-1 4
.,
r -----12tr,, i ) l',-431-133::::: 7-.1._,,,__L22z-4,24
? ? '''.-...--?-?.,---7.0. ''.77' ---7,'
? ? "-;--?- V%--C?....).....?...y. 19 )
...? ...'.... _or ,..." \
II ? N .......,,, , .. ,..._ ... ,.?7.....
N-7''".;1"7''',.y.,,-? ,7----,t, ss??:'__. --1---
Tr
%? . ..
102
Ly-
r'?( _ f?
j
oChuguyev
KhEneln11.1kly ?
40
,1!111
Kupyansk0
so
49"
ubezhnoye
".?
emenchug
Lozpaya
ih_stelhuovg
4.!? ? . p.
,
Novomoskovsk?///
Pinto rad?
? ??44N 6 'A
?
?
S.
RUMANIA
'
' entomaysk
Dnep ortzerzhInsk-?--???
Dnepropetrovsk
oKrasn
oChistyaltovo
_ _
i:oo, ?
48?
0Kryoy Rog
UKRAINIAN S. S. R.
MAP N
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES, 1945 1956 (U)
(See Appendix I)
1945 - 1947
1948 - 1951
1952 - 1956
47?
Zhdanov
KISHI EV
1111111111111111111111
MOL DAV IAN
SS R
? n
e-
?.)
(
1.0
\\ti
flt -
? ? ? -
timber
Mehtepor
79
'than;
dessa
34-135
46?
BeVotod.Dnestrovskiy?,
1 ii
,S k
Dzhankoi
t".
FLF.
4:1'v
Oanu
?
patonya r,M1,84,
r
???? I
I
?
? 140ft
2903 ;4,4
.........
..
- .
4.2?307.4.? 2 _
P??"P" Mcol,,
............
? ?;'?
\_
1)???"?'&'
?
v.:
L.11. o Podd.
p44,07.
000
*.*:"P???
? e_
..vd?
rod co
' ..-..e.... - ,.
mow,. Few)", erj 4-"i-."7.14"G.,,,ijd I."- t.o.,.....:.????;::*? . ? ;$,.),..tch; 2,_., ,
''"*".??Y?thi'4th''''""?:" ''. 'Boa' '17yor????31?37. 9.:. :15'6:c..,,:???'.?'.. Nficryo:0?40,"
: 0 b ?
.kotT.'14 A' * lor01.7.1.1..Alue? ___s_____tonion..TM.'..141.--:-.--1
. - - ...
?C ..--? ? :IA,: _ ???? ,I
Poo:world*
I .
.;????_, raio loth;
S;;;-/ ? C---./s.`-se.`-'2*
?:i? 447-1
Apr Miarkff;*?' - ? ??
' ? 'VT-.
j".
hclO -
otliyo
p t3P9/4"
?-? ???-^
Kohin
?
? .--???;.1171,4733oito
rr;ft,r,e-'
Spenalkoya Toprodo
? 4 .-- Zor
P'?.?
1.
..?
_ Sot
orlto
0.
?War*
-
00.
r:*
..-7-?? 930' `????
g5 65
66,6
'7 '7
30'
,4*rr-"Yro,
go; ,
liT"*0
?ver.
4-4
114'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
?
?
SECRET
Special Forces Area 5
The importance of the Crimea to the Soviet Union is based on its mineral
resources?particularly iron ore--and on its location on the Black Sea and
the consequent development of the port of Sevastopolt?located in the area--
as the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet and the main naval ship-repair
center on the Black Sea. While nearly all the main mineral resources now
being exploited in the Crimea lie outside the Special Forces Area proper,
the railroads connecting these resources to the manufacturing centers of the
Ukraine and of central Russia do pass through the area and constitute there-
fore the most significant target system.
The Crimean Mountains, extending along the southern coast of the penin-
sula, offer excellent possibilities for concealment and evasion. In places
the mountains are alpine in character with escarpments, steep slopes, and
many deep ravines. Troops operating in these sectors could do so only if
specially trained and equipped. Forest cover is nat continuous, but there
are extensive dense woods especially in the southwest.
The population in the area is predominantly Russian with important
Ukrainian elements in the northern half of the mountains and continuing into
the Crimean steppes. Neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians have shown
themselves in the past to be particularly hostile to the Soviet regime. Rem-
nants of the Tatar population which so vigorously opposed the Russians during
World War II may be found in remote mountain regions and would probably be
willing to assist Special Forces.
l. Cover Areas
Area 52 which includes the southern portion of the Crimean Peninsula,
possesses some of the most striking landforms to be found in the Ukrainian
SSR. Along the southern coast steep mountain walls rise from a narrow
coastal plain or directly from the Black Sea; in some places the mountains
attain elevations of over 52000 feet within a distance of only a few miles
from the shoreline. Northward, these mountains decline more gently to a
225
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
lower series of ranges which in turn aeon give way to the sharply contrasting
flat and featureless prospects of the Black Sea steppe which constitutes the
remainder of the Crimea. In many places the slopes of the Crimean Mountains
are covered with forests that wouldafford good opportunities for concealment.
Forest cover is not available elsewhere in the Crimeae
The mountains of the southern coast are orientated southwest-northeast from
,Sevastopolq443511-3334E) to a little beyond Feodosiya (4502Ne3,524E), a distance
of about 100 miles. They are most prominently developed in the southwest, where
three parallel ranges reach a maximum width of about 30 miles; toward the north-
east the mountains grow narrower and lower and finally disappear altogether be-
yond Feodosiya. Throughout the greater part of the mountains the terrain is
. typified by steep valley slopes, deeply dissected terraces, large plateau sur-
facesa and other stretches of relatively level terrain eeparated by deer transverse
valleys and narrow gorges. The southern slopeso particularly on the main ridge,
form high cliffs andabrupt escarpments in many plume. Elsewhere there are
terraces, gullies and narrow coastal strips. Although the northern slopes are
more gentle, they are also extensively dissected in places.
Opportunities for concealment are best in the youthweetem sector of the
mountains. Here there is a rectangular-shaped area ?approximately 40 miles long
by 20 miles wide in which the density of forest cover frequently exceeds 40 per
cent. The area is roughly defined by the highway from Sesaetopolt to Simferopol'
(4458N-3405E) on the north on the east by the highway from Simferopo17 to
Alushta Oddilne3425E), and on the south and west by the Black Sea. Contained
in the area are the highest elevations of the Crimean Mountains and consequently
some of the Itost rugged terrain. The Yaila Mats" assume 30M8 of their most
characteristic features here at a distance of only about five miles from the
Black Sea shoreline in the vicinity of Yalta. The forests do not offer contin-
uous and unbroken concealment throughout this south stern areaa, but are inter-
rupted here and there, as on the summit of the !alias, by patches of open terrain
which are sometimes quite broad. The possibility of moving undetected from one
2L SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release
50-Yr
SECRET
point to another in this areas however, is good. Slopes are thickly wooded
and mountain defiles as well as broader valleys have a screen of trees.
Broadleafs predominate, but year-around concealment is available in ever-
green stands at higher elevations, particularly on the southern slopes of
the Yaila. Undergrowth is not particularly dense, but scrubby growth is
common near the summits. The area is completely encircled by all-weather
roads and several of this type make their way across the mountain ranges to
the southern coast. Approaches to passes are frequently steep and winding.
Other roads of an inferior type will also be encountered in this
travel on them in subject to the vagaries of .clii..eate end season0
towns- and small fishing settlements are numerous on the southern
area, but
Resort
coast and
a number of small settlements are scattered at the lower elevations along
mountain valleys) particularly in the western part of the area. Tourist
trails will be encountered throughout the area.
Forest
extensive,
However, a
northeast,
cover throughout the remainder of the Crimean Mountains is less
and the mountains are lower and narrower than in the southwest.
forested area of about 600 square miles is to be found in the
and there is much rugged and precipitous terrain. Forest cover
does not approach closely to the coast and is more fragmented in the moun-
tains. It is possible, however, to move from one part of the area to
another with benefit of forest cover, and contact is easily made with the
forests of the southwest. Coastal and mountain valley settlements are
less numerous, but the network of seasonal roads is quite dense. Thera
are fewer alleweather roads.
The nature of the terrain in the Crimean Mountains poses great dif-
ficulties to movement on foot. The seaefacing slopes of the southernmost
range present the most serious and extensive obstacle because of the many
precipices and high escarpments occurring there. The southern slopes of
the lesser ranges are also frequently precipitous. Movement is much more
easily accomplished along the line of the summits and on the northern
slopes, Local dostacles? in the form of gorges, deep and narrow valleys,
225
SECRET
2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
and rough surfaces, are encountered everywhere, but can generally be circum-
vented. In the winter, deep snows sometime block passes and greatly restrict
or even prevent movement on foot. Mountain streams can be hazardous in spring
when swollen by melting snows? As in the Carpathian Mountains, mountaineering
experience would be invaluable in the Crimean Mountains*
Settlement patterns vary in the area from place to place. Densest popu-
lations are to be found along the southern coast where numerous rest hares and
recreation areas are scattered on the wooded slopes. Along the valleys extend..
ing into the mountains are gardens, vineyards, and tobacco plantations. The
villages whose inhabitants cultivate the fields are closely spaced and thickly
settled. At higher elevations, population becomes sparse except in mountain
basins and on the most gentle slopes whore orchards and gardens are cultivated.
Villages are small and generally isolated from one another. Near the summits
of the mountains only occasional shepherds cottages are to be found, many of
which were formerly used by Tatar herdsmen and may now be deserted. On the
northern slopes of the mountains a second belt of relatively dense settlement
occupies lower elevations. In addition to gardens* vineyards, and tobacco
plantations, there are grain fields which extend northward into the steppes.
These are relatively sparsely populated.
Nowhere are the Crimean Mountains as isolated as other mountainous dis-
tricts of the Soviet Union. Many paved, allsweather roads cross the mountains
and are supplemented by secondary roads and by numeroue tourist trails and
livestock tracks. Security forces and ground fonces of the Soviet Amy also are
present in the area, particularly at Simferopol1 and at Feodosiya.
2. Populations and Resistance Factors.
The predominant populations in Area 5 are Russian and Ukrainian. The
Russian are concentrated most heavily along the southern coast, on the southern
elopes of the Crimean Mountains, and in the cities of Sevastopol? and Simferopol's
including their outlying areas. In these sections Russians comprise more than
80 percent of.. the population. The Russians are largely an urban group, although
a number of Russian farmers have been brought to collectives in the mountain
226
SECRET
4-6
SECRET
valleys and in the steppes to the north. Largely due to the fact that the
southern slopes of the Crimean Mountains overlooking the Black Sea are one
of the principal tourist centers of the Soviet Union, their populations are
undoubtedly loyal to the regime.
Ukrainians nowhere form a majority of the population, although they
occupy numerous settlements in the steppes to the north of the Crimean Moun-
tains. Most of them have exhibited no opposition in the past to Soviet rule,
although some of the recent settlers are repatriates from Poland and may hold
some nationalist convictions. A few Tatars may have escaped deportation
after World War II and may be found in the remote, more densely wooded parts
of the mountains and could be useful to Special Forces.
During World War II partisan groups were active in the area. The pre-
dominant group consisted of 'Russian partisans who controlled the more remote
mountain districts of the Crimea during the entire German occupation. The
partisans were not necessarily recruited locally, but were apparently sup-
plied at least in part by the local population. In opposition to the 'Rus-
sians were the Tatars, who also inhabited the mountain districts as well as
the plains to the north, and who strongly supported the Germans. Although
they destroyed numerous Russian troops and settlers, the Tatars were never
able to challenge Russian control of the mountains.
3. Economic Vulnerabilities
The only important urban center in the Area is Sevastopol% It is the
headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, with extensive supply depots and the
largest naval ship.repair facilities in the Black Sea area. The Sevastopol'
shipyards are also capable of constructing naval vessels including sub-
marines, torpedo boats, and destroyers. Some fishing vessels and other
small commercial boats are also constructed here. The small port of
Balaklava also has some shipbuilding facilities and serves as an auxiliary
naval base. Sevastopolt also has a small electro-technical industry, manuis
facturing switchboards and munition plants. The other towns in this
SEdfiT
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA RDP81 01043 02 n9 n7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Special Forces Area excepting Simferopol! are all fairly small and most of
them are located around the coastline. They are either resort centers or small
agricultural centers, Their only industries are food processing and production
of consumer goods for local consumption.
There are two railroads in the Crimea which cross each other at Dzhankoy
(454214.,3424E) north of Special Forces Area 5. One of these railroads, terminat-
ing at Sevastopol!, goes northward to the Dnieper Bend Area, Kharkov and Moscow.
It is by far the most important of the two in terms of providing the Crimea
with the naval supplies for the Vieet.ind 14.1th-the-wide range-e-manufaetured_
goods not locally available, and also for shipping the fish and sub-tropical
agricultural products of the Crimea to the main urban centers. The second rail
line originates at Kerch! (4523N-3626E) and proceeds along the southern and
western shores of the Sea of Azov through Perekop Strait to Kherson (4640N-3235E),
where it connects with rail lines servicing the central and western portions of
the Ukraine. This rail line could be used for land shipments of Kerch2 iron ore
to the East European satellites (if land shipments. are currently being made) and
may also be used for obtaining some supplies, particularly lumber, from the
wooded areas of Belorussia and the Carpathian Mountains. Most of the rail traf-
fic between Kerchl and the rest of Russia follows this line only as far as the
junction at Dzhankoy and then goes north via the Sevastopol!-Kharkov-Moscow
_ .
route, Both of these rail lines are single-tracked and steam-operated. Fuel
is mainly coal from the Donbass although some diesel locomotives are used. The
physical vulnerabilities of the sector of the Kerch2 line is law inasmuch as it
passes -through. al dry and level coastal plain. The rail line to Sevastopol!, on
the other hand, cuts through the northwestern portion of the Crimean Mountains,
?
encountering numerous fairly steep grades and passing through a number of cuts
at which the right-of.may is vulnerable to interdiction. There are quite a few
bridges on this mountain sector, including two long ones, and reportedly six
tunnels on the approaches to Sevastopol!, four of which have been located on
the accompanying map.
22%ECRET
SECRET
The peninsular nature of this Special Forces Area greatly reduces the
vulnerability of rail transportation. Most of the mineral products of the
Kerchl Peninsula go north by way of the Azov Sea to Zhdanov (4705N .-3736E).
Much of the agricultural produce of this area and also most of the fish
catch go by water to various ports along the Black Sea and along the northern
shores of the Sea of Azov. The bulk of the freight received by the Crimea
is also believed to come by sea, including coal from the Donbass-and oil
from the Caucasus. Because of the limited industrial importance of the
Crimea the volume of freight required! for the proper functioning of its
economy can readily De moved by seats." circumstances warrant.
The Crimea has awell -developed highway network, largely geared to the
needs of thesesort centers. In addition to the principal paved highway which
runs from Yalta (4430N-3410E) to Moscow in this area largely paralleling the
railroad north of Simferopol!, good highways skirt the coast from Sevastopol!
through Yalta past Feodosiyaa and connect Simferopol! to 7evpatoriya (4512N-
3324E) and the northwestern coast of the Crimean Peninsula. A second high-
way link between Sevastopol! and Feodosiya runs to the north of the main
mountain mass through Simferopol!. These highways and the fairly well-
developed network of secondary roads serve mainly to collect the limited
agricultural products of this region. Highways cannot be considered to be
strategic targets-from a economic standpoint partly because of the limited
economic contribution which the areas served by these roads make to the
Soviet economy and partly because the agricultural produce of this r egion
is raised so close to thesea that it could be loaded aboard ships without
reliance on the highway network. The only value which highways in this
Special Forces Area might have would be militaryand therolonl'y in case of
Military operations in the Crimea proper.
The maincenter of power generation in this area is Sevastopol!. The
Inkerman power plant which is located at the eastern end of North Bay pro-
vides power for Sevastopolt and an extensive area in the southern part of
SECT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
the Crimea. Its capacity is reported my most sources to be about 24,000 kw.,
although one source states that it is at least 50,000 kw. The plant burns coal
which is presumably shipped by water from the Donbass. An oilf4ourning plant
of 9,000-10,000 kw
principal sources
these two plants;
capacity which is
Sevastopoll.i
. capacity is located on the south shore of North Bay. (All
are inagreement on the identity and approximate size of
however, one source mentions a third power plant of 12,000 kw.
a hydroelectric plant located somewhere in the vicinity of
Another source, which does not list power plants, reports a
1Z4000-1.- Seriestepolt,2_ Cnumber of other
power plants are undoubtedly in operation in various industrial concerns in
Sevastopolt including one at the main naval shipyard. They are all believed
to be small and their joint capacity is certainly not sufficient to explain the
large gap in estimates of total capacity between the 33,000 kw, given by most
sources and 1060000 kw.) The only other power plant in this area known to be
larger than 5,000 kw. is located at Yevpatoriya. The old Simferopol! power
plant has only 3,000 kw. capacity0 but another power plant0 reportedly much
larger, is under corutruction. A reservoir covering an area estimated at 1 km.
by 2 km. and backed up by a dam 400 meters long is located two kilometers south
of Simferopol, on the road to Alushta. Its functions are unknawn. Also under
construction is a reservoir near Yalta which will contain the waters of a small
river flowing into the Black Sea. It is probable that a hydroelectric power
plant is being constructed at the reservoir but its capacity cannot be very
large because of the limited water flaw and its highly seasonal nature. The
oi/i-burning power plant at Feodosiya may possibly be as large as 5,000 kw. It
consists of diesel generators and a power train located just vest of the rail,.
road station. Other planta are in operation at the torpedo test station and
in the harbor area. k 110.4cv. network is centered on the two power plants of
Sevastopol?, with one line going north to Yevpatoriya? the second northeast to
Simferopol?, and a third around the coast to Yalta. A 110-kv0 line runs be,-
tween Simferopol? and Yalta, but no information on construction is available.
230
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
t.
50-Yr
SECRET
Other power transmission lines in this area are 35.-kv. At present current
flows from Sevastopol, to the various other cities in the high-tension net-
work and the interdiction of the three 110-kv. lines would deprive much of
this area of its power. The consequences, however, would not be serious
because of the lack of significant production or of large urban populations
outside of Sevastopol!. Although there are reports that with the completion
of the Kakhovkal power plant on the Lower Dnieper the Crimean power network
will be connected with the Dnieper-Donbass network by a 110-kv. line, there
re. no _reports of .aufficiently_large_ industrial __expansion. ontside
Kerch t Peninsula which would require considerable increments in power sup-
ply. Nearly all the small power plants in the Crimeas with the exception of
the sizeable plant at Sevastopol!, use oil as fuel and probably depend
mainly on water transportation for their fuel supplies. Since the oilfields
of the Kercht Peninsula have no local refining facilities it seems likely
that fuel comes from the Caucasus or from the Odessa refining plants.
The only significant mineral production in this areat are the salts of
the Lake Sakstkoyd (45?7N-3336E). In pre-war years 75,000 tons of sodium
chloride were obtained yearly by solar evaporation. Lake Sakstkoye also
provides magnesium salts, its pre-war capacity being 1,250 tons of magnesium
chloride and 66 tons of magnesia. It was the main source of raw materials
for the production of metallic magnesium at Zaporozh!ye, which had an output
of 400 tons. in 1937. Its present importance as a source of magnesium salts
is unknown. The salt works near the lake are also reported to extract bro-
rine and possibly iodine from Saksikoye brines. Lake Sasyk (4512-3331) and
other nearby lakes also contain large supplies but are not known to be ex-
ploited. There are ample supplies both of sodium chloride and magnesium
salts in the parts of the Crimea lying outside this Special Forces Area.
The USSR has many other larger deposits of salt, so that deprivation of the
Sakstkoye supply, which although railroad-connected is mainly shipped out
by sea, would have little effect on the economy of the Ukraine or of the
USSR.
2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
231
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Because of the peripheral location of Area 5 and its limited economic
importances the telecommunications network is not a particularly valuable tar-
get. The main line from Moscow follows the railroad-and terminates at Sevas-
topol'. The main center for wire communications is the capitals, Simferopoll.
The most powerful radio communications stations are at Simferopol' and Sevas-
topol', with other stations at Feodosiya, Yevpatoriyal, Yalta, and Sevastopol'
Turgovyi Port (4436N-3333E). A powerful broadcasting station is located at
Simferopol'. Maritime communications include Yevpatoriya? Yalta, Feodosiya,
Arabat (4518N-35321,. and SevAstopolt. 1).erhaps of greater interest to Siaecial
Forces than the radio or telegraph network is the chaim of radar stations
skirting the coast of the Crimea. Presumably these radar stations stretch all
the way from the eastern tip of the Kerchl Peninsula to the western tip of the
Crimea and include early-warning radar stations as well as aerial navigation
and maritime navigational control stations.
Nearly all the significant targets in this area, with the exception of
the rail lines, are along the seacoast or very close to it. The feasibility
of seaborne attack should be considered.
232SECRET
?
?
SECRET
SPECIAL FORCES AREAS (S)
LEGEND
r-% Rail bridges
)( Highway bridges
Tunnel
Steep grade
Electric Power Plants
Hydroelectric
5,000 - 10,000
11 10,000 - 50,000
over 50,000
o under construction
Thermal
? 5,000 - 10,000
41 10,000 - 50,000
111 over 50,000
C) under construction
? Transformer station
Power Transmission Lines
60 KV Existing
60KV _ Under construction
Pipelines
Existing
--?-- ??? --0- Under construction
/t* Mines
Oil and/or gas field
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
?
?
15
5: OweMWCk
a3L . A'
YEVPATOP.,
Boyuk Ak.act.
??
54
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
? , ?
? . .
? sp ?J
essis..so.
? ; k s?
56
hdt:
.SECRET_T
? ?
Nawyp? 1?1??00.1
Th
chell?
p? - ? . -.Ads/bk.).* ?
:Kaftan/4.4k/
59 *. ? ea.
e.tAnd ?yevka ?
,:"..C?oroposSnk
7
11.4.6t0. 0101i. '
Kt .
i L 1.147,- f(
? X? P
?
i
.0'., hobe..ior
?
Allugan Tatartki:1,
?
65
V
^ ?
S.
L..
P
) 412
- :: I
??*'l
reit
ziSoS tia
.T.
'44
? ',s-Y ?;?'./
\ ? 5 "-??''
1
C I
14J
?4"1Pro104:4 ? ???
? '
U4.41,-
// ,
K.ALAMITSAIY
(4,ro S44 54550
va
Kama.* 10554.1
-
Rad, Key.***
And .
',al, St.
? --bek29
151,1 Ia.
47 c,7
: , .? 6,..o...
X f k.
* .'r??.....
,Kodovitc;?.. lir .?....0
.0.. 1 ..;', : ....f.
.I., ?k,
It
.... - 93
2.4551y.B.nondwk
?
. .?
mak /
kaY
$d .Z,. Kee&
b.141sid?444d.
67
h..- I. r?
,e$
44:.
Kiaro..basy E
?
?? L.:1......:5.,6:7:7?:.:N ??
ata.:\ ? I.-
"
? . 4...faus,"
L. 1, ?
? ,
'TT
?
5cio
Ad
Katny...
5.Ory90 1.2055134
7
shpts.,. ?{JO,
-et
Na.1 Swab..
:at .
/Slang UiWys,..
141":1
?
Ah?no,kok
g
/ft'
r.a,.,or ?
091571 lie( 084
?
F E
FEODOSIYA
? ? ?
',11:"Te ?:4fiS.--"s:?-? I
-4 ,?ba
? !..421IK_uk Ada..
Kkoiasevio
* 4 ?
44,4 ??????....
, SEVASTOPOL'
?Ss cals ono
la
50.50
kvandrytd,
? r
...nue EL
.
forniaitg
111
"Ad.
?
?Z.. "e-N
?-?
,./.2L24.C/.6
? J
laSenad?or 5.
?
Tv% Lembo/
Kaeobakh
54
dylto?\*
010.1.3
Mustorn'yo,
?44
55
\ Gt4rsvf
.411(
foti
ir?70-44er
VI/ a doya
A?reanda
4405-ArTccf5r
AJOpbO
Mys Ir enn-Bumu
???? Sa?reA
56
.hotio
vs ?er,
57
MOSKVA
mINSK
PYATIGORSK
Khyalynsk
? ?????
./. 4 ?
? ?
* 15-
55
45
56
57
NArton
My, AyviDeg
- r ?
--1-
'11
- _
xi':
9
II
Mys
4--
_
4..
My s 11'4
a Mot dids
'411118.6.?.?
Th
1_
x.?
A
-- 45
? IS
5
4.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
4.10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Excluded Areas
Several marginal areas have been excluded as unsuitable for extended
Special Forces operations, although they have some concealment which might
be adequate for short periods. Some of these areas have features other than
concealment possibilities which are favorable to Special Forces operations.
One of the areas excluded) although in some respects it is favorable, is an
area with Kharkov at its northwestern corner and extending south almost to
the Donbass and east to the Upper Donets River. It offers extremely impor-
tant. target -cysteras, TartieUlaA7 the rail Ines from the Donbass through -
-
Kharkov to Moscow which carry a substantial proportion of the freight from
the Donbass north and are essential in supplying raw materials for the
very important engineering industry of Kharkov. Also in this area are the
newly developed Shobelinka natural gas deposits and the large-diameter pipe-
line conveying gas to Kharkov. Eventually this pipe line will be extended,
possibly as far as Moscow, and its value will be accordingly enhanced.
Another areat extremely important from an economic standpoint extends
east and north from Dnepropetrovsk. In this area are the main railroad
connections between the Donbass and its sources of iron ore and manganese,
between the metallurgical industry of the Dnieper Bend and its sources of
coal and pig iron and steel in the Donbass, and also the main connections
between the eastern and western Ukraine. The Dnieper River itself, of con-
siderable importance for navigation, power generation and irrigation, is a
significant target at vulnerable structures. Finally, some of the high-
tension lines passing through the Dnepropetrovsk area and supplying it at
present with current from the south at Zaporozhtye and eventually from the
northwest at Kremenchug are vital to the heavy industry in this region.
Three other areas in the Ukraine also offer some opportunity for con-
cealment but not of sufficient density to justify their selection as
Special Forces Areas. These remaining three regions, although not entirely
lacking in target systems of interest to Special Forces, do not have any-
where near the economic significance of the Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk
233
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
???
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
regions. One of these lies east of Cherrrtgov and e xtends from the Desna
Myer north to the border of the Ukraine. This area has no large cities
or important industries. The railroads passing through are important for
connecting Kiev and Moscow: but of only secondary purpose to other inter-
regional trade. A water connection between the Dnieper and the Volga Rivers
follows the Desna River in this area but the present level of its utiliza-
tion is low. A second region of marginal cover and only moderate interest
from the target standpoint is located on the Middle Dnieper around Cherkassy.
The most significant target system here is the rail line from Kiev to the
Dnieper Bend and the Donbass. This rail line, however, can be by-passed
both to the south and to the north. The third area is located north of the
Dnestr Myer and is bordered on the west by Areas 1 and 2. It is an ex-
clusively agricultural region with only local industry and no significant
mineral production. The main rail lines between the Ukraine and the East
European satellites pass further north, although some rail connections with
the Moldavian SSR and Rumania lie within this region.
234
SECRET
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
50-Yr
APPENDIX
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES
2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
SECRET
-4501r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
R
50X1 -HUM
Next 16 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
E
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
1
0
SECRET
PART I
1. Ralph Butler, The New Eastern Europe (London, 1919), p. 132 (U).
2. Michael Hrushevsky, The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian
Problem (London, 1915), pp. 40-41 (U).
3. john S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917:1920 (Princeton,
1952), PP- 33-34 (U).
4. Donald Wallace, Russia New York, 1905), p. 347 (U).
5. Reshetar, op. cit., pp. 11?. 12; Butler, 2p.l_sa.? p. 132 (U).
6. Michael Hrushevsky, AJILII2asiLa52ILTI (New Haven, 1941), pp. 39-
123 (U).
7. George Vernedsky, Bohdan.:Betman of Ukraine New Raver,
pp. 131 if (U),
8. The Russian census of 1897 noted that 94.4 per cent of the Ukrainians
lived in the country, while the cities were composed of 32.4 per cent
Ukrainians, 32.5 per.centyussiahel and 28.4 per cent Jews. (H.H.
Weinstein, "Land Hunger in' the Ukraine, 1905-1917," Journal of
Economic History, May 194) p. 25 (U).)
9. Peter Skorevetanski?.Revoliuteiia ha Ukraine (Saratov, 1919), pp. 7-8,
quoted in.yeinstein? op. cit., p. 26 (U).
10. Weinstein, p. 34 Ca.
0
11. Henri Grappin, Thlonais et Ruthenes la uestioh de Galicii (Paris,
1919) (U).
12. john A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism 19391911.5 (New 1955),
pp. 18-25, 30-32 (U). .
13. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine, pp. 521-22, 524-25 (U).
14. Paul Khristiuk, Zand:tki:i,materiali do istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii
1917-1920
15. Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, 1954) (U).
16. Reshetar, op. cit., pp. 117=20 (U).
17. Ibid., p. 216 (U).
18. Pipes, 222_211., pp. 123-26 (U).
19. Ivan Majstrenko, Borot'bism a Chaster in the 1134/92.121.21291
p pp. 119-
Nationalism (New York, 19
20. Vsesoyuzlaa a kommunistiches a arti a u rezo
(5th ed.; Moscow, 1935 Vol. I pp. 32 -2 U).
ir'
21. Ibid., pp. 325=26 (U).
22. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 14, 106-107 (U).
269
SECRET
akh I reshen akh
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
23. J. V. Stalin, Sochineniia (13 vols.; Moscow, 1946-1952), Vol. V,
pp. 181-94, 2364d0, 291-341 (U).
24. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 15-16; Walter Kblarz, Russia dad Her Colonies
(New York, 1952), p. 129 (U).
25. George S. N. Iuckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934
(New York, 1956), pp. 65.66, 92.102 (U).
26. Stalin, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 149-54 (U).
27. Visti vseukrains'kogo tsentralinogo vykonavdhogo komitetu, April 19,
1927 /U).
28. MYkola Sciborsky, "The De-Ukrainianization of Ukraine by Soviet Russia,"
Trident/ Vol. IV, p. 15 (U).
29. (U).- -
30. Alexander Baykov, The Development of the Soviet Economic System (New York,
1947), pp. 192, 194 (U).
31.
W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine, a Submerged Nation (New York, 1944), p. 57 (U).
32.
Ibid., pp. 57-62 (U).
33.
P. P. Pbstyshev and
pp. 71..73 (U).
S. V. Kosior, Soviet Ukraine Today (Moscow, 1934),
34.
Ibid., pp. 11-12 (U).
35.
Joachim joesten, "Hitler's
Fiasco in the Ukraine," Foreign Affairs, Vol. MCI,
No. 2 (January 1943),
p. 334; German Foreign Office, Nazi-Soviet Relations,
1 '-i 'i (Washington,
1948), pp. 145-98; Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 23-29,
3 35) 43 (U).
36.
Armstrong, op. cit.,
pp. 53.63 (U).
37.
Ibid., pp. 76.77 (U).
38
Peter Mirchuk, Akt violnovlennia ukrainskoi derzhavnosti (New York, 1952) (U).
39.
Armstrong, op. cit.,
pp. 84.86, 90.92 (U).
40.
There are sone indications
that the emigre nationalists were distrusted by
the natives for their excessive Ukrainization, their superior attitude, and
their emPhasis on the western Ukraine and on cooperation with the Germans.
41.
Armstrong, op. cit.,
pp. 97.98 (U).
42.
Ibid., pp. 131-38 (U).
43.
Ibid., pp. 133-421
146-47, 151-53 (U).
44.
Ibid., pp. 145-46 (u).
1
45.
46.
47.
270
SECRET
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
She New York Tires, November 3, 1953 (U).
SECRET
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
55. Oleg Martovych, Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Tires (Edin-
burgh, 1951), p. 107; Ukrainian Congress Committee of Anerica,
Ukrainian Resistance (New York, 1949), pp. 72.73; CIA/SODB (S);
_50X1-HUM
56.
57.
53.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
Ukrainian Resistance, op. cit., p. 107 (U).
Martovych, op. cit., pp. 116-18 (U).
50X1-HUM
Anerican Legation, Vienna, Desp. No. 407, September 14, 1951 (U).
50X1-HUM
PART II
1. Principal sources used in preparation of "General Sunnary":
AFOIN-1 Al., IR-1114-55 (DOI 1957), Uneval., AF 698011 (u).
Anuchin, V. A. Geografiya sovetsko o z at' a (Geography of
Soviet Transcarpathia). Mbscow, 1956. U
Axtenenko, A. K. "Lesnyye po1osy--nade7hrmya zashchita pole"
(Forest Belts--Reliable Defense of the Fields), Iesnoye
khozyaistvo, Vol. 7, No. 12 (December 1954), pp. 59-61 (U).
Baranskiy, N. N. Ekonomicheskaya geografiya SSSR (Economic
Geography of the USSR). Nbscow, 1952. (U)
Berg. L. S. Natural Regions of the USSR. (O. A. Titelbaum, transl.)
New York, 1950. (U)
Bubnovskiy, N. "Sellskoye khozyaystvo Ukrainy na podlleme" (Expansion
of Agriculture in the Ukraine), Sotsialisticheskoye dx -HUM
khozyzysvto, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1956), pp. 18-30 (U).
Camnbell Prolect, Terrain Study, Poland (ID 674500) (U).,
-%
De Nhrtonne, Emmanual, The Carpathians: kflysLograpZfl_C .ie u-u kAdu
trolling Human Geography," The Geographical Review, June 1917
(U).
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
271
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
Dept. of the Any Pamphlet No. 30-50-1, Handbook on the Soviet and
Satellite Arnie March 1953 (R).
Dibrova, O. T. Georafiya Ukrains'koi RSR (Geography of the Ukrainian
SSR). Kiev, 1954. (U)
Debrynin, B. F. Fizichesksya geografiy. SSSR (Physical Geography of
the USSR). scow, 1948.
G-2 Project #6550, Ukraine, Country U-1 thru U-7 (ID 950050)
(S/SpH/NOFORN).
Gavrilav, A. M. and Popov, I. V. Dnepr idet v step' (The Dnieper is
Brought into the Steppe). Ieningrad? 1951. cffy
Germany. Generalstab des Heeres? Abteilung ffir Kriegskarten mid.
Verressungswesen (IV. Mil.-Geo.). Militargeographische Angaben
fiber das Euro gische Russland, Ukraine (Military-Geographic Data
on European Russia, Ukraine). Berlin, 1941. (U)
Kutaflyev, S. A. EUkalall_WILISE (Ukrainian SSR). scow, 1951. (U)
Library of Congress, Studies of Migration and Settlerent, "Pripet Marshes:
Ponulation and land Settlemmtr NO. R-108, January 1945 (ID 113405)(C).
Iubyaw? I. Ya. nowt ogyoxegiya kolkhoaaml osushennyth zeger vpoynakh
r. Supoya i Dritokav r. Trubezha--Karani i Ne&y71"RalagEtior-Vort
of the Kolkhozes on the Drained Lands in the Floodplain of the River
Supay and the Tributaries of the TrUbesh River?the Karani and Nedry"),
Gidzotekbnikai nelioratsi Vol. 7, NO. 7 (July 1955), pp. 38-41 (U).
Maslov, S. P. Krym Crinea Moscow, 1954 (u)
Rinisterstvo prosveshcheniya RSFSR. Ekononiches o SSSR
("Economic Geography of the USSR). "scow, 1
Mirav, N. T. 222Enkl*.y_9f Russia. New York, 1951. (U)
Vbscow. Vsesayuznaya sellskokhosysystvennaya yystavka. Pavil'yon
.114rg4POP.Ya SSR. Kiev, 1955. (u)
NIS 26TUX717.777-Chap. VI, Sec. 61, "Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry"
(s).
NIS 260 Supplement I, U.S.S.R.-I, European U.S.S.R., Chap. II, Sec. 20,
"Introduction" (S).
NIS 26, Supplenent I. European U.S.S.R. Chap. II, Sec. 21,
"gIlitary Geograph cRegions'
NIS 26, Supplement I, U.S.S.R.-IL Euroan U.S.S.R., Chap. II, Sec. 23,
"Weather and ClimaTe" (SiSpH/NOFORN).
NIS 26, Supplenent I, U.S.S.R.-I, European U.S.S.R., Chap. II, Sec. 24,
"Topography" (C). ---------
Ozhevskiy? P. G. 0 razvit narodnogo khosy stva Ukrainskay SSR (On the
Lvelopment of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR scow,
1954. (U)
Seletskaya, N. A. "Konkretnyi plan poyysheniya produktivnosti lesov
Gnivanskogo lesnidhestva" (Concrete Plan for Raising the Productivity
of Forests of the Gnivanskiy Forestry District), Lesnoye khozyaistvo,
Vol. 8, No. 9 (September 1955), pp. 23-28 (U).
Shabad, T. Geography of the USSR: A Regional Survey. New York, 1954. (U)
Shackleton, M. R. Europe: A Regional Geography. Iondon, 1951. (U)
Shdherbina, A. A. "Parki zapadnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi SSR" (Parks of the
West Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR), Biulleten' glavnogo botanidheskogo
sada, Vol. 18 (1954), pp. 32-41. (U)
Sada:toy, A. G. "Kurtury dUba v Chernom lesu, sozdannyye shpigovkoi"
(She Culture of Oak in the Black Forest), Iesnoye khozyaistvo, Vol.
8, No. 1 (January 1955), pp. 33-36. (U)
Statystychne upravlingya Ukrainstkoi RSF. Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrainekoi
RSR (National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR). Kiev, 1957. (U)
Tyulaffir? M. O. "Perspektyvy ta stan osvoyengya zaplavnykh zerel' v
kolgospakh URSR" (Perspectives and Status of Utilization of the
Reclaimed Lands in the Kolkhozes of the Ukrainian SSR), Visgyk akadegii
nauk UkRSR, Vol. 27, No. 6 (June 1956), pp. 30-38 (U).
USAF, Eq., DI. Political and Demo ra ic Co osition of the Sino-Soviet
B1siThaa.951Avaufaj.a4taiL. 1 May 1957. S .
272
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
???????I??
????????
SECRET
2. Dept. of the Army, Office Chief of Military History, Supply of Partisan'
Units during the War, 1941-1945, MS 0-125 (ID 1144619) (U); Dept. of
the Army, G-2, Det. 5562nd AAU, Partisan Warfare in the Soviet
Union, 20 June 1953 (S); Air Research and Developnent Connand, BRRI
Project, The Role of the Partisans in Soviet Intelligence, .January
1954 (C); G. A. Dixon and O. Helibrunn, Communist Guerilla Warfare
(New York, 1954) (U).
3. Vladimir Studnicki, Das ostliche Fblen (Kitzingen-Main, 1953), pp4,
101-109 (U).
4, 213 Sich. Div., "Tatigkeitsberichte der Abt. Ic worn 1.4.42.-31.12.42"
(GEES 35307/4); Div., "Feindlagekarten vom 16.5.43-3.7-43" (GME6
uncatalogued); "Bandenlage Oat" 15.12.43 (GME G H3/1439) (C).,
Sloloy_XOvnak, Vld-netivlia do karnat (Kiev?.1940 (U).
"Bandentatigkeit in den Ost-Wahrkreisen" 15.12.43-15.7.44 (GNDS
uncatalogued) (C).
7. Ibid.
?5.
6.
8. A.O.K. 17, "Anlage 12 zwr&T.B. Ni'. 8 Bandenneldungen worn 10.10.
bis 31.12.43" (GMDS 40935/14) (C); A.O.K. 17, "Anlage 12 zum &Tab
Ni'. 8 Bandenneldungen worn 1.1. his 31.3.44" (GVE0 52947/18) (C);
A.O.K. 11/Abw. Offs. "Banden 16.8,.1941-20.11.1942" (GMDS 35774/16) (C)
9. Ibid.; 213. Sich. Div., "Feindlageharten worn 16.5.1943-3.7.1943"
TUR56 35307/4).
10. Air Research and Development Command, HRRI Project, Partisan Warfare
in the Dnepr Bend. Area of the Ukraine, January 1954 (C).
11. Ibid., pp. 4-8.
PART III
1. Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945 (New
York, 1943), pp. 150, 184, 208-210 (u).
2. According to the most recent account (me.y 1957) the Tatars are not to
be returned to their homeland, as. are most of the deported minorities.
(New York Times, Illy 5, 1957.)
3. The last complete record of regional variations in ethnic composition
of the pre-war Ukraine vas the census of 1926. elsentrarnoye statis-
ticheskoye upravleniye SSSR, Otdel perepis, Vsesoyuznaya perepie
naseleniya 1926 goda (Moscow, 1927), Vol. XI, pp. 8-26 (U).) The
last record for the territories acquired from Poland was the 1931 ,
census. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,' Th:e
Pisod'Po.u.12.tiozoldan (Washington, 1954), pp. 147-55 (U).) For the
Trans carpathian oblast infornation dated. April 1, 1956 is available
in V. A. Anuchin, Geceratiya aovetskogo zakarpat'ya (Moscol./0 1956),
pp. 130-34 (u). The following account of regional differences
ethnic composition is based on projections' of this information, with
allowance made for major population dislocations Where known.
50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
2;t3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
4. After World War II about 483,000 Ukrainians were repatriated from
Poland to the Black Sea area around Eherson, Nikolayev and Zhdanov.
(Joseph B. Schechtman, "The Polish-Soviet Exchange of Population,"
Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. IX, NO. 3 (October 1949),
p. 306 Cu).) The Ukrainian percentages mgy therefore be somewhat
higher than the figures given.
5. Tsentral'noye statisticheskoye upravleniye SSSR, op. cit., pp. 8-26.
6. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
7. Solomon M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union (Syracuse, 1951), p. 15.
(U)
8. Ibid., pp. 229-30.
- ?
?_
9. Ibid., p. 16.
10. Gregor Aronson, Soviet Russia and the Jews
(New York, 1949), p. 26 (U).
U. Schechtman, Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 3, op. cit.,
p. 306 (U).
12. Eugene M. Kulischer? Europe on the Move (New York, 1948), pp. 291-92 (U).
The balance were apparently killed during the war.
13. New York Tines, March 28, 1957 (u).
14. Ibid., April 1, 1957.
PART IV'
1. Center for International Studies, NKVD Labor Carps, Final Report on
Project Mango, Cl/B/55-3 (Carbridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
June 1955) (S).
2.
3,
5. Dept. of the Army Pamphlet No. 30-50-1, Handbook on the Soviet and Satellite
Armies, March 1953 (R).
6. G-2 Project #65501 Ukraine, Country Books, U-1 thru U-7 (ID 950050)
(S/SpH/NOFORN).
7. USAREUR, 580-qq-13891 55-0496 (ID 2281741) (C).
PART V
1. Principal sources on railroad transportation are:
NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 31, "Railroad," November 1950 (ID 935103) (C);
Germany, Generalstab des Heeres, Ukraine: Schema der Eisenbahnen, Map
1:1,500,000, April 1941, CIA 20630-G-220-25 (U);
Statystychne upravlinAya Ukrains'koi RSF, Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrains'koi
RSF (National Econory of the Ukrainian SSR) (Kiev, 1957) (U).
274
SECRET
2.
3.
5.
6.
7. NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Part DI Supplerent I, "Ports and Naval Facilities,"
March 1951 (ID 935103)(C).
50X1-HUM
al
cce-DcT
'-'50X1-HUM
? 8.
? 50X1-HUM
9. On shipbuilding facilities and their recent activities, see:
CD
0
10. Main sources on highways are:
NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 32, "Highways" (ID 935103) (C);
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
U. Main sources on electric power plants and transmission networks are:
U.S. Federal Power Commission, .Btameau of Power, Electric Power Require-
ments in the USSR, 1950; "Sixteen Cities in Economic Region III,"
1950 (D);
Ibid., "Electric Power Requirements Dnepr-Donets Grid" (D);
NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 621 'Fuels and Power," March 1951 (ID 935103)(C);
USAF Project Rand R-194, Electric Enerr Resources of the USSR,
26 April 1950 (ID 1095353(5);) (
Ibid., R-4311 The Electric Power Systems of the USSR--AMendum to
R-194, 15 May 1950 (ID 1095353) (S);
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
' 27
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
SECRET
JIB (London), 3/149, Electric Power in the USSR, Vols. I, II, June 1952
(ID 1093875) (S);
SALOPIBI Bet. "Q", London, The Distribution of Electric Power in South
Russia, Parts I, II, III, 12 February 1954 (ID 1224681) (S).
12. NIS 26-I, U.S.S.R.-I, Sec. 251 "Urban Areas," June 1954 (ID 935103) (S).
13. Ibid.
14. Principal sources follow. Additional sources of mare limited scope
be nentioned in the appropriate subsections.
D. B. Shimktn, Minerals: A Key to Soviet Power (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1953) (U);
NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 62, "Fuels and Power," March 1951 (ID 935103) (C);
Theodore Shabad, Geography of the USSR: A Regional Survey (Net" York:
Columbia Univeroity Press, 1951) (U);
Statystychne upravlinnya Ukrainsikoi RSF, op. cit. (U).
15. NIS 26, Sec. 62, op. cit. (C); Mykheylo Pavlyak, "The Sixth Soviet Five-
Year Plan and the Eloitatjon of Ukrainian Iron and Fuel," The Ukrainian
Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 2, June 1957 (u).
16.
17.
18. On oil and gas, see:
NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Supplerent V, "Petroleum," (ID 935103) (TpH/NOFORN);
NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 34, "Pipelines,: May 1951 (ID 935103 (C);
N/A Moscaur, R-151-56, 31 Eby 1956 (DOI: Eby 1956), A-1 (ID 2019457 (u);
AIIR IR-1387-55 (DOI: August 1955), AF 692194, 25 August 1955 (c);
7050 AISW, AF 749141, 7 May 1956 (C);
AIIR IR-416-56, AF 732245, 7 Februali 1956 (q);
19. NIS 14, Poland, Sec. 62, "Fuels and POwer," Septenber 1952 (ID 935103) (S);
20. Principal sources on teleconnunications are:
NIS 261 U.S.S.R. Sec. 38, "Teleconnunications" (ID 935103) (S);
Ibid., Supplenent III, "Teleconnunications" (S);
Signal Corps Intelligence Agency, S-117-57, Selected Soviet Radio Network
Facilities, Septerber 1956 (ID 2041228) (S);
Ibid., S-62-551 Soviet Radio Network Facilities, January 1955 (ID 1282407)(S).
21. NIS 26-I, U.S.S.R.-, Sec. 25, "Urban Areas," June 1954 (ID 935103) (S).
276
SECRET
PART VI
Special Forces Area 1
SECRET
1. NIS 26, U.S.S.R., Sec. 34, "Pipelines," }&y 1951 (ID 935l0) 56X1-HUM
ibid., Supplenent V1 "Petroleum" (ID 935103) (S/SpH/NOFORN
2.
3.
Special Forces Area 2
1. 50X1-HUM
2. NIS 14,,Ita.and-, Seq.-6Z "Fuels rand Power," September 1952 (ID 935103)
(S); CIA/00-14-826) 12 Odtolier 1955 (D0I: 1955) (MO).
3. G-2. Project #6550,Akrainef:Countr7 Book (ID 950050) (S/SpH/NOFORN).
. . 50X1-HUM
Special Forces Area 3
1. "d-2 Pro.ject #6550, op:-cit;i1 Book U-1 (S/SpH/NOFORN).
2. Akadetiyalleuk fiRkl, Kiev.- Rada po vyvehennyu produktyvnykh syl.
a .roz tk?.pd.ukty'cmkhsyl za.khidnrkh oblastei Ukrainalkoi RSR.
.( uest ons.o . Yelopme.n...:_of the Produc ive Forces of the West
Miasts of the Ukrainian SSR). Kiev, 1954. (U)
Special Forces Area.:4*
1.
2.
Special Forces Area 5..
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
1. NIS 26, U.S.S.R!., Part DI Supplement I, "Porto and Naval Fac 11.,
4,
Narch 1951 0:-JD 955103) (C).
2. U.S. Federal Power Commission, Bureau of Power, Electric Power Revire-
mentos in the USSR, 1950, "Sixteen Cities in Economic Region III," 1950 (U).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/05 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007 1
277
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/05: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300220007-1