SOVIET BLOC AND NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE CSCE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) (CDE-XI & CDE-XII) 10 JUNE - 18 JULY 1986 19 AUGUST - 19 SEPTEMBER 1986 VOL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 271
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Directorate of
Intelligence
-Seeret-
25X1
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-XI & CDE-XII)
10 June ? 18 July 1986
19 August ? 19 September 1986
Volume II
A Reference Aid
eci e
IR 86-10001
November 1986
Copy 3 4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-XI & CDE-XII)
10 June ? 18 July 1986
19 August ? 19 September 1986
Volume II
A Reference Aid
Secret
IR 86-10002
November 1986
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06518
SUBJECT: CDE--NATO BRAINSTORMING MEETING
1. CDE XII - 006.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: NATO CDE HEADS OF DELECATIONS MET AUGUST
16-17 IN THE HAGUE FOR CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO THE
FINAL ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE
IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED ALLIED COHESION AND
COORDINATION WAS STRESSED, AMIDST AN ALLIED
PREOCCUPATION WITH AVOIDING A RESULT SIMILAR TO THAT
AT THE APRIL 1986 BERN HUMAN CONTACTS MEETING, WHERE
THE US WAS ALONE AMONG NATO COUNTRIES IN WITHHOLDING
CONSENSUS. ALTHOUGH GENERALLY A CONGENIAL MEETING,
SOME ALLIED DIVERGENCES WERE REVEALED. THESE
DIFFERENCES WERE PARTICULARLY EVIDENT ON THE ISSUE OF
INSPECTION, WHERE MOST ALLIES SEE THE PRIMARY VALUE OF
INSPECTION IN POLITICAL TERMS. AS A CONSEQUENCE,
THOSE ALLIES ARE EXTREMELY FLEXIBLE REGARDING
MODALITIES. THE US EMPHASIZED THAT SOVIET AGREEMENT
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION MUST BE SUPPORTED BY
AGREEMENT TO AN OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE REGIME. THE
CONFERENCE'S ABILITY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN
EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF INSPECTION MODALITIES WILL MAKE OR
BREAK AN AGREEMENT FOR THE US. END SUMMARY.
4. INFORMATION. IT WAS AGREED THAT NATO'S MEASURE ON
AN EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION WOULD NOT FORMALLY
BE ELIMINATED FROM CONTENTION. THE MAIN THRUST OF
NATO'S NEGOTIATING EFFORTS IN THIS AREA, HOWEVER,
SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS OBTAINING INFORMATION IN
THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AND IN THE ANNUAL
CALENDAR.
5. ANNUAL CALENDAR/CONSTRAINING MEASURES. ALLIES
GENERALLY AGREED THAT NATO SUPPORT FOR A "TIME"
CONSTRAINT SHOULD BE USED AS A BARGAINING LEVER BOTH
TO GET MORE INFORMATION IN THE CALENDAR AND TO ATTRACT
NNA SUPPORT FOR NATO POSITIONS IN OTHER AREAS. THIS
"TIME" CONSTRAINT WILL TAKE THE FORM OF A REQUIREMENT
FOR ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN LEVEL (E.G., 40,000) TO
BE FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE. IN ADDITION, ALLIES
EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR A PROVISION WHICH WOULD PREVENT
ADDITIONS TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES ABOVE 75,000. AS ALERT ACTIVITIES WILL BE
EXCLUDED FROM THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, NATO COULD, OF
COURSE, STILL UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN
LEVEL (E.G., 75,000) WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FORECAST BY
NOTIFYING THEM AS ALERT ACTIVITIES. BEGIN COMMENT:
WE BELIEVE THAT THESE TWO POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO
THE ANNUAL CALENDAR WILL SATISFY NNA DEMANDS IN THE
FIELD OF CONSTRAINTS AS WELL AS GARNER SOME NNA
SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS IN OTHER AREAS. THE EAST,
25X1
204
SECRET
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
WHILE QUITE FLEXIBLE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WE PUT
UNDER THE RUBRIC OF CONSTRAINING MEASURES, IS
CURRENTLY INSISTING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRAINTS,
I.E., LIMITATIONS, RECEIVE ATTENTION IN A FINAL
DOCUMENT INDEPENDENT FROM THE ISSUE OF THE ANNUAL
CALENDAR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DISSUADED THEM FROM
HARBORING ANY ILLUSION ABOUT INCLUDING A PRINCIPLED
REFERENCE TO DEALING WITH CONSTRAINTS IN THE FUTURE
(AS IN A DEFERRAL FORMULA), WE BELIEVE THAT USE OF THE
TITLE IN THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT
(CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN
MILITARY ACTIVITIES) WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
ATTENTION TO THE ISSUE. ALLIES AGREED THAT THE
OCTOBER 14 HEADINGS COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR OUR
APPROACH, BUT WE AND SEVERAL OTHER ALLIES, RECALLING
THAT ANOTHER OF THE HEADINGS IN THE GENTLEMEN'S
AGREEMENT INCLUDES THE WORDS "EXCHANGE OF MILITARY
INFORMATION," BELIEVE THAT THESE HEADINGS GIVE US
SIGNIFICANT BARGAINING LEVERAGE. END COMMENT.
6. NOTIFICATION. ALLIES CONTINUE TO SUPPORT A
COMBINED STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL THRESHOLD, ALTHOUGH THE
DISCUSSION REVEALED SIGNIFICANT LACK OF UNDERSTANDING,
EVEN AT THIS LATE DATE, ABOUT THE PRACTICAL
APPLICATION OF THE CURRENT NNA FORMULA. WE BELIEVE
MOST ALLIES NOW UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIP OF
STRUCTURE IN THE PARAMETER, AS A PRECONDITION, TO THE
MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT TRIGGERS IN THE THRESHOLD. IT
WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE MANPOWER PARAMETER
SHOULD BE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY NOT ABOVE
10,000. ALLIES CONTINUED TO EXPRESS PREFERENCE FOR A
SINGLE NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION THRESHOLD, BUT AGAIN
THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF A SPLIT THRESHOLD--SHOULD IT BE
THE ONLY MEANS TO OBTAIN A LOW NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD--WAS MENTIONED.
7. DURING DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF
OUT-OF-GARRISON, SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET PRESSURE ON NATO
TO DROP THE CONCEPT WAS NOTED. ALLIES AGREED,
HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS FOR THE SOVIETS TO PROPOSE ANY
ALTERNATIVES. SOME CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED OVER THE
FACT THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH (TO DEFINE THREE
CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES: MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS,
TRANSFERS) COULD BE USED TO EXCLUDE POTENTIALLY
THREATENING ACTIVITIES SUCH AS LARGE TROOP
CONCENTRATIONS ALONG BORDERS. IT WAS AGREED THAT NATO
SHOULD CONSIDER TWO TACKS FOR RESOLVING THE IMPASSE:
DEVELOPING A CATEGORY OF EXCLUSIONS TO THE 00G CONCEPT
(E.G., CEREMONIAL ACTIVITIES, HARVESTS, ETC.); OR
USING THE SOVIET DEFINITIONAL APPROACH IN SUCH A WAY
AS TO ENSURE THAT IT WOULD BE COMPREHENSIVE.
8. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE THRESHOLD FOR
205
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, ALLIES AGREED THAT IF WE ARE
NOT SUCCESSFUL IN NEGOTIATING A THRESHOLD AT THE THREE
BATTALION/3,000-TROOP LEVEL NATO WILL RECONSIDER ITS
SUPPORT FOR A SEPARATE NOTIFICATION FOR AMPHIBIOUS
ACTIVITIES. SEVERAL ALLIES BELIEVE THAT NO SEPARATE
NOTIFICATION FOR AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES IS BETTER THAN
A THRESHOLD SO HIGH THAT ONLY NATO ACTIVITIES WOULD BE
CAPTURED.
9. VERIFICATION. EASTERN ENDORSEMENT OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AND INDICATIONS THAT THE
SOVIETS ARE NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SC.1 NO RIGHT
OF REFUSAL APPROACH TO INSPECTION AND BEGIN DRAFTING
MODALITIES HAS CREATED SUBSTANTIAL ALLIED OPTIMISM.
THE US ATTEMPTED TO TEMPER THAT OPTIMISM WITH SOBRIETY
BY COMMUNICATING ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE
INSPECTION REGIME. ALTHOUGH ALLIES UNDERSTAND OUR
DEMAND FOR EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE MODALITIES,
INDIVIDUALLY AND NATIONALLY THEY DO NOT HAVE THE SAME
REQUIREMENT. IN FACT, SEVERAL ALLIES ARTICULATED
THEIR BELIEF THAT THE VALUE OF AN INSPECTION REGIME IS
PRIMARILY POLITICAL. THEY ARGUED THAT THE EXISTENCE
OF INSPECTION WILL SERVE AS A DETERRENT TO ABUSE OF A
CDE AGREEMENT AND THAT IN PRACTICE, INSPECTION--AS
SOMETHING WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESCALATION OF
TENSIONS--WOULD ONLY BE USED IN THE MOST SERIOUS OF
CIRCUMSTANCES. THE US EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT A BAD
INSPECTION REGIME IS WORSE THAN NONE AT ALL, THAT THE
PRECEDENTIAL NATURE OF INSPECTIDN AND THE SUBSEQUENT
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORA DEMAND A
RIGOROUS AND COMPREHENSIVE REGIME IN THE CDE AND
ARGUED THAT IT MUST HAVE MORE THAN SYMBOLIC VALUE.
COMMENT: OUR VIEW IS GENERALLY ENDORSED BY THE UK,
PORTUGAL, AND BELGIUM ALTHOUGH THEIR VOICES TEND TO
GET OVERWHELMED BY THE CHORUS OF OPTIMISM. END
COMMENT.
10. REGARDING AERIAL INSPECTION, SEVERAL ALLIES SEE
IT AS A NEGOTIATING NIGHTMARE AND SOME (UK, FRG) WENT
SO FAR AS TO IMPLY WE SHOULD CONSIDER ALLOWING THE
SOVIETS TO FLY AIRCRAFT FOR WESTERN INSPECTIONS OF THE
USSR. THE US MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE LATTER IS
NOT AN OPTION. ALLIES DID NOT RESIST THIS POSITION
AND GAVE GENERAL ENDORSEMENT TO US DEMANDS THAT WE
MUST OBTAIN AGREEMENT TO A WORKABLE AERIAL INSPECTION
REGIME.
11. ON THE ISSUE OF RESTRICTED AREAS, THE TURKS GAVE
A SOBERING BUT SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE ACCOUNT OF THEIR
REQUIREMENTS AND INFORMED ALLIES THAT THEY WOULD HAVE
A POSITION FROM ANKARA IN 10 DAYS. THEY DID SUGGEST
THEY WERE REVIEWING THE US SUGGESTION (FOR DEFINING
WHAT AREAS CAN BE INSPECTED RATHER THAN WHAT AREAS
25X1
206
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
3LUALl
CANNOT) IN A FAVORABLE WAY AND HAVE REINFORCED THIS
POINT TO USDEL MEMBERS PRIVATELY.
12. COMMUNICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL
ALLIES WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A MORE ELABORATE SYSTEM,
ALL ALLIES AGREED THAT DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ARE THE
PREFERRED METHOD FOR COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING CSBMS.
ALLIES ALSO SUPPORTED US SUGGESTION THAT ANY
CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE OF CLARIFICATIONS BE
INCLUDED UNDER A COMMUNICATIONS MEASURE.
13. A SPANISH SUGGESTION FOR A CONSULTATION SYSTEM
WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY FRANCE AND THE US. ALTHOUGH
SOME ALLIES FOUND THE CONCEPT APPEALING, THEY
RECOGNIZE THAT WITH THE LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE WE
CANNOT NEGOTIATE CONSULTATIONS.
14. FORMAT AND IMPLEMENTATION. ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES,
MOST DELEGATIONS INDICATED SIGNIFICANT FLEXIBILITY.
IN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE TITLES FOR A DOCUMENT, IT WAS
GENERALLY AGREED THAT: 1) IT CANNOT SUGGEST A
LEGALLY-BINDING NATURE (I.E., "AGREEMENT" OR "ACCORD"
ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE) AND 2) IT CANNOT INTIMATE THAT THE
FIRST PHASE OF CDE WAS CONCLUDED (I.E., AVOID
ADJECTIVES LIKE "FINAL" AND "CONCLUDING"). SOME
ALLIES ALSO INDICATED CONCERN THAT A TITLE SHOULD NOT
IMPLY THAT THE CDE HAS EQUAL STATUS TO THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT NEGOTIATIONS OR TO CSCE REVIEW MEETINGS.
15. REGARDING THE ORDER OF SUBJECTS IN A DOCUMENT,
ALL AGREED THAT CSBMS MUST BE THE CENTRAL FOCUS. MOST
ALLIES ALSO FELT THAT PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE SHOULD BE
AVOIDED AND THAT, IN ORDER TO DE-EMPHASIZE NUF, IT
SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE.
ALTHOUGH THE US ARGUED TO PLACE THE SECTION ON NUF
AFTER THE CSBMS, WE BELIEVE THAT COMBINING NUF WITH
THE INTRODUCTION AND MAKING CSBMS THE CORE OF THE
DOCUMENT IS ALSO SATISFACTORY. ON IMPLEMENTATION,
MOST AGREED THAT THE FINAL STOCKHOLM PLENARY SHOULD
ADOPT THE DOCUMENT AS WELL AS AGREE TO A DATE FOR
IMPLEMENTATION DURING THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
201
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06484
SUBJECT: US CDE PLENARY STATEMENT: AUGUST 19, 1986
1. CDE XII - 007
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE REMARKS MADE BY
AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF USDEL CDE, AT THE
CDE PLENARY OF AUGUST 19, 1986.
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN:
AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND I SPOKE WITH GUARDED
OPTIMISM. MY THEME TODAY IS URGENCY; ALTHOUGH THE
OUTLINES OF AN AGREEMENT NOW EXIST, SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE
PROBLEMS DUE REMAIN. THE DRAFTING TASK BEFORE US IS
ENORMOUS; AND THE TIME REMAINING TO COMPLETE IT IS
FRIGHTENINGLY SHORT.
TIME IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE WE MUST ACHIEVE EVERYTHING BY
SEPTEMBER 19 IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING. OUR
MANDATE REQUIRES US TO NEGOTIATE AND ADOPT "A SET OF
MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK
OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE." WE MUST COMPLETE
THE REQUIRED TASK: WE CANNOT LEAVE DETAILS, LARGE OR
SMALL, FOR OTHERS TO DECIDE LATER; WE CANNOT LEAVE
BLANKS FOR OTHERS TO FILL IN. SO LET'S NOT BELIEVE
THAT SOME MIRACLE SUCH AS AN EXTENSION OF OUR TIMETABLE
OR A DEFERRAL OF ISSUES UNTIL THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP
MEETING WILL RESCUE US. FOR US, SEPTEMBER 19 IS NOT A
TARGET DATE BUT AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT. WE CAN ONLY
RESCUE OURSELVES BY INTENSIFYING THE PACE OF OUR WORK
AND DEALING HEAD-ON WITH THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
REMAINING.
IN KEEPING WITH THE NEED FOR COMPLETENESS, WE MUST
DEMAND CLARITY OF OURSELVES: WE MUST AVOID A HASTY
PATCHWORK IN WHICH LOOPHOLES OR AMBIGUITIES CREATE
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD PLAGUE OUR RELATIONS IN
THE FUTURE. OUR GOAL IS TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY THROUGH OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE MEASURES WHICH
CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER OPENNESS AND UNDERSTANDING; THEY
MUST NOT THEMSELVES BECOME A SOURCE OF DISAGREEMENT OR
TENSION BECAUSE OF AMBIGUITIES AND DIFFERING
INTERPRETATIONS.
WE THINK WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS IN THE TIME REMAINING
BECAUSE THE CONFERENCE HAS, AT LAST, GATHERED
MOMENTUM. A CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESS OF GIVE-AND-TAKE IS
UNDERWAY. THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES AND THE
COORDINATORS HAVE HELPED TO CREATE THIS MOMENTUM. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE JUNE 13 NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL
ON THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND-FORCE
ACTIVITIES HAS BROUGHT US CLOSER TO THE RESOLUTION OF
THAT MAJOR ISSUE. THE FIVE POINT WESTERN INITIATIVE OF
JUNE 30 HAS CONTRIBUTED TO PROGRESS. AND RESOLVING THE
203-
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS
HAS REMOVED A DIFFICULT OBSTACLE.
AS I SAID AT THE END OF THE LAST SESSION, MY DELEGATION
WELCOMED THE STATEMENT OF THE DISTINGUISHED
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AMBASSADOR
GRINEVSKY, ON JULY 18. LET ME RETURN TO SOME OF THE
ISSUES HE RAISED THEN AND, IN THAT PROCESS, SOME OF THE
ISSUES HE RAISED TODAY.
-- FIRST, WE ARE PREPARED TO REACH PROMPT
AGREEMENT ON THE SUB-THRESHOLD FOR PROVIDING
INFORMATION ON THE AIR COMPONENT OF GROUND-FORCE
EXERCISES. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED 200
SORTIES AS THE THRESHOLD; IF OTHERS AGREE, WE ARE
PREPARED TO GO STILL LOWER.
-- SECONDLY, WE, TOO, ARE EAGER TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFYING GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES. TO BE VERIFIABLE, THE NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD MUST CONTAIN STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL AND
EQUIPMENT ELEMENTS. WE WELCOME EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO
CONSIDER COMBINING THESE FACTORS. THE RESULTANT MIX
MUST PRODUCE NOTIFICATIONS OF SUBSTANTIALLY MORE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES THAN DID THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF TROOP AND
TANKS, AS WELL AS THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH
THEY WOULD FIT. BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO APPROACH THIS
DISCUSSION AS LONG AS THE EAST TAKES THE POSITION THAT
TEN TO TWELVE THOUSAND IS "THE STARTING POINT IN THE
SEARCH FOR A COMPROMISE." LET US BE CLEAR -- THIS NOT
OUR STARTING POINT NOR WILL IT BE.
THE SUBJECT OF TRANSFERS CONCERNS THOSE OF US WHO HAVE
TERRITORY OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR THE
MEASURES WE ADOPT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT A
SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND TO THIS PROBLEM WHICH WOULD
PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ARRIVAL OF TROOPS IN
EUROPE TO CONDUCT ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.
A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM MUST NOT, HOWEVER, AFFECT
ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE OUTSIDE THE ZONE.
WE BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL
FORECASTS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE ONE OF THE
MOST IMPORTANT MEASURES WE WILL DECIDE UPON HERE. THIS
WILL MAKE A QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT ON THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AGREED UPON IN HELSINKI.
WE AGREE THAT THESE FORECASTS SHOULD BE EXCHANGED BY
MID-NOVEMBER EACH YEAR. AND WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT, TO
BE MEANINGFUL, THEY MUST CONTAIN DETAILED INFORMATION
ON THE PLANNED ACTIVITY, AS PROPOSED BY THE NEUTRAL AND
NON-ALIGNED STATES AND OURSELVES.
WE HAVE LONG BELIEVED THAT THERE IS A CONNECTION
BETWEEN THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND
CONSTRAINING MEASURES. AS INDICATED IN PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 15, WE HAVE BEEN EXAMINING
209
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
grroor
WAYS OF ELABORATING THE FORECASTING MEASURE SO AS TO
MAKE IT MORE CONSTRAINING. WE AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF
OUR GROUP ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH OTHERS TO SEE HOW
THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO ALL.
AS YOU KNOW, THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION HAS ALWAYS
BEEN CENTRAL TO OUR APPROACH TO THIS CONFERENCE. THIS
IS WHY WE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S
REFERENCES TO INSPECTION ON JULY 18 AND TODAY. AS WE
HAVE INDICATED, WE ARE READY TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF
OTHERS THAT SUCH A REGIME MIGHT BE ABUSED; IT WAS TO
MEET THAT CONCERN THAT, ON JUNE 30, WE INDICATED THAT
WE COULD ACCEPT A QUOTA OF ONE FOR THE NUMBER OF
INSPECTIONS EACH STATE COULD CARRY OUT EACH YEAR. FOR
OUR PART, WE ARE PREPARED TO GO STILL FURTHER AND AGREE
THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF
INSPECTIONS WHICH ANY PARTICIPATING STATE MIGHT BE
REQUIRED TO ACCEPT EACH YEAR. AND WE ARE READY TO TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF ALL OF
OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL.
TODAY, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY MENTIONED THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. WE ARE PREPARED TO LOOK FOR
WAYS TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES ON THIS ISSUE, BUT ANY
SOLUTION MUST BE COMPREHENSIVE AND COVER ALL MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.
WE MUST AGREE ON A COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE INSPECTION
REGIME; NO DETAILS CAN BE LEFT ASIDE FOR LATER
ELABORATION; NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL CAN BE GRANTED OR
IMPLIED. INSPECTION MODALITIES FOR BOTH AIR AND GROUND
INSPECTION MUST BE SPELLED OUT. INSPECTION MUST BE
DISTINGUISHED CLEARLY FROM OBSERVATION; IT MUST BE
CLEAR THAT, WITHIN THE DESIGNATED AREA, INSPECTORS MAY
GO WHERE THEY NEED TO GO TO EVALUATE WHAT IS HAPPENING
IN THE FIELD. BECAUSE SO LITTLE HAS BEEN DRAFTED ON
THIS TOPIC, WE WILL HAVE TO GIVE IT TOP PRIORITY AND
WORK DAY AND NIGHT TO ACCOMPLISH OUR GOALS.
FOR US, INFORMATION REMAINS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF A
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME. FOR A DECADE, THE UNITED
STATES, LIKE OTHERS IN OUR GROUP, HAS BEEN PROVIDING
DETAILED INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE DESIGNATION OF
PARTICIPATING UNITS, IN ALL OF THE NOTIFICATIONS OF ITS
ACTIVITIES PROVIDED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IF
THIS CONFERENCE IS UNABLE TO AGREE TO DO WHAT SOME
PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE BEEN DOING FOR YEARS, THE
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WILL BE REDUCED, NOT INCREASED,
ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY; THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR
SETBACK FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. AT LEAST FOR COMBAT
UNITS ON THE DIVISIONAL LEVEL, LET US AGREE TO EXCHANGE
INFORMATION, INCLUDING DESIGNATION AND NORMAL PEACETIME
LOCATIONS, ESSENTIAL TO UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE.
FINALLY, AGREEMENT ON NON-USE OF FORCE WITH A PROVISION
210
SECRET
25X1
in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
5Elatta
25X1
ON HUMAN RIGHTS SEEMS TO BE EASILY WITHIN REACH, BASED
ON THE PROPOSALS ALREADY ON THE TABLE. WE SUPPORT
REAFFIRMATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
ADOPTION OF CONCRETE CSBMS.
OUR BELIEF THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE CAN SUCCEED
COMES FROM THE VIEW THAT ALL OF OUR DELEGATIONS ARE NOW
ENGAGED IN A COMMON EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL RESULT. MY DELEGATION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO
THIS PROCESS, ALWAYS BEARING IN MIND THAT THE OUTCOME
CAN ONLY RESULT FROM THE COMMON EFFORT OF ALL
THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPANTS AND MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL
THIRTY-FIVE. BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS CAN AND DO
FACILITATE OUR WORK; THEY CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS AND OTHER INFORMAL
GROUPS. AS PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON SAID NEARLY
SEVENTY YEARS AGO, THE UNITED STATES SEEKS "OPEN
COVENANTS, OPENLY ARRIVED AT." ALL THIRTY-FIVE STATES
WILL BE BOUND POLITICALLY BY THE OBLIGATIONS WE
UNDERTAKE; CLEARLY, ALL MUST PARTICIPATE IN THEIR
FORMULATION.
MR. CHAIRMAN, AS WE WORK THROUGH THIS FINAL SESSION --
SHORT WEEKS WHICH PROMISE TO BE HECTIC AND INTENSE --
WE SHOULD ALSO KEEP IN MIND WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT
THE SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
WE ADOPT HERE BE COMPLETE AND SUBSTANTIVE. IN A
STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY, PRESIDENT
REAGAN HAS SAID, "SUCCESS IN CDE WOULD CONTRIBUTE
DIRECTLY TO A CLEARER AND MORE PREDICTABLE MILITARY
SITUATION IN EUROPE. MORE BROADLY, IT WOULD GIVE AN
IMPORTANT IMPULSE TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS OF WHICH CDE
IS AN INTEGRAL PART, AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO THE
PROMOTION OF ALL THE AIMS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT."
I WOULD ALSO RECALL PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT
MARKING THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE FINAL ACT, WHEN HE NOTED
THAT "THE SIGNATORIES (OF THE FINAL ACT) UNDERTOOK TO
OBSERVE IMPORTANT STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT
AND TO PURSUE PRACTICAL STEPS TO REDUCE THE BARRIERS
DIVIDING EUROPE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. . . . THE UNITED
STATES REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE FULL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT IN ALL ITS PROVISIONS
AND TO THE INDIVISIBILITY OF ITS HUMAN, SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS."
MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SPOKEN TODAY TO REAFFIRM THE
COMMITMENT OF MY DELEGATION AND THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN THIS CONFERENCE.
I HOPE THAT THE NEXT TIME I HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO
ADDRESS A PLENARY IT WILL BE TO EXPRESS SATISFACTION
THAT THAT IMPORTANT GOAL, WHICH WE HAVE PURSUED
CONSISTENTLY AND ENERGETICALLY FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS,
HAS BEEN MET.
THANK YOU. END TEXT
211 ,
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
222
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06506
SUBJECT: USSR CDE PLENARY STATEMENT: AUGUST 19, 1986
1. CDE XII - 008
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE REMARKS MADE BY
AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD OF USSRDEL CDE, AT
THE CDE PLENARY OF AUGUST 19, 1986.
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN:
FIRST OF ALL I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE
PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE TO THE STATEMENT BY
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV MADE YESTERDAY ON SOVIET
TV. IT CONTAINS AN IMPORTANT ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, GIVES IN A
CONCENTRATED FORM PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO SAVE MANKIND
FROM SLIDING TO THE ABYSS OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE, TO
BREAK THE DANGEROUS COURSE OF EVENTS AND PUT IT ON THE
TRACK OF DETENTE.
THE PEACE INITIATIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
ALLIED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES GO PRECISELY IN THIS
DIRECTION. THEY INCLUDE THE PROGRAM OF ELIMINATING
NUCLEAR AND OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
THE SET OF MEASURES TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS
AND ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE
URALS, NEW PROPOSALS ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS, ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
REGIME OF NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, COOPERATION IN
PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF SPACE, AND ON VERIFICATION OF
COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS, ETC.
GUIDED BY THE AWARENESS OF THE HIGH RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE DESTINY OF MANKIND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO
EXTEND ITS MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TILL
JANUARY 1, 1987. THUS A POSITIVE RESPONSE WAS GIVEN TO
ALL STATES, POLITICAL AND PUBLIC FORCES WORKING FOR
PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. ACCOUNT WAS ALSO
TAKEN OF THE RECENT ADDRESS BY THE SIX AMONG WHICH
SWEDEN IS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT.
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TOO HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN
REDUCING THE LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN
EUROPE. AS THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE STATED, "AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THE
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BY COOPERATING CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH
ITS OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAVE DONE A LOT TO FIND
SOLUTIONS TO SUCH KEY ISSUES AS NON-USE OF FORCE,
NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS AND TRANSFERS OF
FORCES. EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, AND
VERIFICATION". AS A RESULT, MOVEMENT FORWARD BECAME
DISCERNIBLE BY THE END OF THE LAST SESSION IN
STOCKHOLM. THE CLIMATE AT THE CONFERENCE BEGAN TO
CHANGE FOR THE BETTER AND PROSPECTS OPENED FOR
2/3 .
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
COMPLETING THE CONFERENCE WITH SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS.
TODAY THE CONFERENCE ENTERS THE MOST SERIOUS PERIOD OF
ITS WORK. IT MUST COMPLETE ITS WORK ON SEPTEMBER 19
WITH THE ADOPTION OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLIMENTARY
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. OBVIOUSLY, THIS IS
NOT A SIMPLE TASK, BUT IT IS QUITE RESOLVABLE.
THE TIME FACTOR CANNOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO SUCCESS
PROVIDED THERE IS A FIRM DESIRE AND THE POLITICAL WILL
TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS. THEREFORE TODAY IT IS NECESSARY TO
EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND ALL OUR VIGOUR, TO DEMONSTRATE
MAXIMAL RESPONSIBILITY, FLEXIBILITY AND A BUSINESS-LIKE
APPROACH IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE THE STOCKHOLM FORUM BY
THE ADOPTION OF A MEANINGFUL DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD
INCLUDE BOTH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION
AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE.
AS THE STATE OF AFFAIRS DEMONSTRATES THE ISSUE OF
VERIFICATION HAS BECOME ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS
OBSTACLES TO THE NEGOTIATION OF A FINAL DOCUMENT
ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES ATTACH PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO VERIFICATION.
WE WANT THAT AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED IN STOCKHOLM WOULD
BE PROVIDED WITH DEPENDABLE AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION
SO THAT STATES COULD HAVE ASSURANCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH
THE AGREED CSBMS IN EUROPE.
FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW WE ARE GIVING CAREFUL STUDY TO
ALL THE PROPOSALS TABLED AT THE CONFERENCE. WE ARE
IMPRESSED, IN PARTICULAR, BY THE PROPOSALS OF THE
NEUTRAL AND NON-ALLIGNED COUNTRIES ON OBSERVATION ON
REQUEST OF THE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE SEE
QUITE A LOT OF MERIT IN THIS IDEA AND ARE PREPARED TO
ACCEPT THE ELABORATION OF A CORRESPONDING AGREEMENT ON
THIS BASIS, PROVIDED, OBVIOUSLY, OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ALSO PREPARED TO DO SO.
WE HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED THE VIEWS MADE AT THE
CONFERENCE REGARDIG A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE
INSPECTION ISSUE ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE
BASIS THROUGH A STRICKLY LIMITED ANNUAL QUOTA. WELL,
WE ARE READY TO MOVE ALONG THIS ROAD AS WELL. WE
COULD, IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VERIFICATION CONCEPT
LAID DOWN IN THE BADAPEST APPEAL OF THE WARSAW TREATY
MEMBER STATES, AGREE TO THE CONDUCT OF ON-SITE
INSPECTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ON THE BASIS
OF A LIMITED QUOTA - 1-2 INSPECTION PER YEAR ON THE
TERRITORY OF EACH STATE.
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE READY
TO START IMMEDIATELY AND IN A BUSINESS-LIKE FASHION
NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE ISSUES IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO
A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THIS POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST
214
SECRET
25X1
npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
COUNTRIES PROVIDES VIVID PROOF OF THEIR READINESS TO
PURSUE A LARGE-SCALE PROGRAM OF REDUCING THE ARMED
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL
AS SET FORTH AT THE BUDAPEST MEETING OF THE POLITICAL
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW TREATY
ORGANIZATION.
DEMONSTRATING GOOD WILL WE, NATURALLY, EXPECT THAT OUR
CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES WILL BE MATCHED BY STEPS OF
THE NATO STATES. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO BELIEVE THAT
THE SOLUTION OF THE VERIFICATION ISSUE AUTOMATICALLY
PAVES THE WAY TO AN AGREEMENT. IN THIS AREA OF THE
UNEXPLORED WE FACE HARD WORK IN THE COURSE OF WHICH IT
IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SENSITIVE
SECURITY INTERESTS OF STATES.
IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT, IT IS NECESSARY, IN THE
FIRST PLACE, TO IDENTIFY PRECISELY SPECIFICALLY WHAT
MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.
THE NOTIFICATION CONCEPT OF "OUT-OF-GARRISON
ACTIVITIES" OR ITS MODIFICATION - "OUTSIDE PERMANENT
LOCATIONS OF FORCES" - DO NOT PROVIDE A SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM. THEY ARE TOO VAGUE AND OBSCURE, CONTAIN MANY
LEEWAYS FOR MISUSE AND INTERFERENCE INTO THE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OF STATES AND THUS CANNOT SERVE AS A CRITERION
FOR NOTIFICATION. WE CAN SAY ON THE SAME GROUNDS THAT
THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH
INSPECTION. IT MAKES INSPECTION DEVOID OF SUBSTANCE
AND UNACCOMPLISHABLE.
THE TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE
PROVEN THAT IT IS THIS CONCEPT THAT BLOCKS THE
ELABORATION OF THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION
SYSTEM. THIS FACT SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS GROUNDS FOR
CONCERN WHEN WE ADDRESS THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM.
HOWEVER THERE ARE NO INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES HERE.
BY ALL THE LOGIC, INSPECTION SHOULD COVER SUCH CONCRETE
TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS MANEUVERS,
MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES.
OBVIOUSLY, INFORMATION SHOULD ALSO APPLY TO THESE SAME
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IT WOULD BE SENSELESS TO RAISE
AGAIN THE QUESTION OF SO CALLED "STATIC INFORMATION" AS
IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES.
OF COURSE, WE STILL HAVE TO SOLVE QUITE A FEW IMPORTANT
PROBLEMS TO SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDE THE CONFERENCE. ONE
OF THEM CONCERNS NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF FORCES
INTO EUROPE FROM OTHER AREAS AND CONTINENTS. ITS
RESOLVED STATUS MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLETE
NEGOTIATION OF THE ENTIRE LIST OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. IN OBJECTIVE TERMS, WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR
NOT, IT IMPEDES THE ELABORATION OF OTHER CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, FOR EXAMPLE ANNUAL
PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THE INVITATION
215
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
OF OBSERVERS, ETC. IT IS ALSO HIGH TIME TO AGREE ON
PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS OF GROUND AND
AIR FORCES, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIR-BORNE TROOPS AS WELL.
ONE CAN HARDLY IMAGINE THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS
NOT ABLE TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS ON THE
ISSUE OF THE LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY
MANEUVERS AS WELL, WHICH LITERALLY KNOCKS ON THE DOOR.
AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE WOULD MAKE OUR CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT MORE SUBSTANTIVE AND ACCOMPLISHED.
FINALLY, WE HAVE TO COMPLETE THE ELABORATION OF AN
AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND
EFFECT TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
AT THE END OF THE PREVIOUS SESSION WE PUT FORTH A
NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO
PURSUE SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS
AT THE CONFERENCE. IN MANY RESPECTS THEY MEET THE
WISHES OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALLIGNED COUNTRIES AND
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IDEAS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES PUT FORTH
ON JUNE 30 IN THE STATEMENT BY DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR
DELWORTH. TODAY WE HAVE PROPOSED A WAY TO A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OF THE VERIFICATION ISSUE. THE
BALL IS IN NATO'S COURT. WE HAVE GONE OUR PART TO AN
AGREEMENT.
I WOULD ONLY STRESS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE ENTERING
A PHASE OF CRITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DESTINY OF
THE BUSINESS ENTRUSTED TO US. IF SOMEONE IS GOING TO
CONTINUE TO BET ON HARDENING AND LINKAGES, ON RAISING
STAKES AND FUTILE RHETORICS HE SERIOUSLY PUTS THE
CONFERENCE BEFORE THE THREAT OF A FAILURE.
TODAY AS NEVER BEFORE WE NEED A STRICT ACCOUNT OF
MUTUAL INTERESTS, ABANDONMENT OF MAXIMALIST DEMANDS,
ABILITY TO MEASURE ONE'S OWN CLAIMS AGAINST REAL
POSSIBILITIES, AND AN UNDERSTANDING THAT EVERY PARTNER
HAS A BOTTOM LINE FOR CONCESSIONS DELINEATED BY THE
SUPREME INTERESTS OF ITS SECURITY. WE NEED CANDID AND
HONEST NEGOTIATIONS FOR IT IS HARDLY IMAGINABLE THAT A
SIDE WILL ALLOW TO OUTSMART OR OUTWIT IT INSOFAR AS ITS
NATIONAL SECURITY IS CONCERNED. A CLEAR STATEMENT OF
POSITIONS, EXCLUSION OF AMBIGUITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES,
MUTUAL READINESS TO CLARIFY QUESTIONS THAT RAISE DOUBTS
WILL PERMIT TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS.
A POSITIVE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE CAN MAKE A
SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY
BUILDING IN EUROPE AND TO PROMOTION OF THE MULTILATERAL
PROCESS INITIATED IN HELSINKI. AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM
WOULD CREATE FAVOURABLE PREREQUISITS FOR THE CSCE
FOLLOW-0? MEETING TO TAKE PLACE THIS FALL IS VIENNA AND
HENCE FOR THE SECOND STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
WHICH COULD PRODUCTIVELY ADDRESS DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS.
BARRY
2/6 -
SECRET
25X1
nna-Inecifiarl in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 06590
SUBJECT: PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CDE: INSPECTION
AND INFORMATION
REF: STOCKHOLM 6506
1. CDE XII - 010
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC
EXCHANGES, US SHOULD KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS
TO DELIVER ON THEIR PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION IN
CDE. WE SHOULD ALSO STRESS INSPECTION, ALONG WITH
ANNUAL FORECASTS AND AN INTENSIFIED
NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION REGIME, AS THE MAIN FEATURE OF
A POSSIBLE CDE REGIME; WE SHOULD DOWNPLAY THE EXCHANGE
OF MILITARY INFORMATION. END SUMMARY.
L. AS CDE APPROACHES ITS SEPTEMBER 19 DEADLINE, SOVIET
PROPAGANDA EFFORTS AND OTHER PRESSURES TEND TO DISTORT
THE PUBLIC VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONFERENCE AND
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME. US AND
ALLIES NEED TO MAINTAIN ACTIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS
TO KEEP THE RECORD STRAIGHT.
5. THE SOVIETS ARE PLAYING THEIR AUGUST 19 ACCEPTANCE
OF "ON-SITE INSPECTION" AS PART OF A CDE REGIME (REF)
AS A MAJOR CONCESSION WHICH PREPARES THE WAY FOR FINAL
AGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE. THE US WELCOMES SOVIET
ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION IN CDE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE
MUST REJECT THE SOVIET IMPLICATION THAT THEY HAVE NOW
DONE THEIR PART AND IT IS UP TO THE WEST TO MAKE
FURTHER MOVES NEEDED FOR FINAL SUCCESS. THE EAST STILL
HAS TO AGREE TO PRACTICAL MODALITIES TO CREATE AN
INSPECTION REGIME WHICH IS OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE. WE
WILL NOT AGREE TO SYMBOLIC INSPECTION; IF WE ARE TO GET
THE SOVIETS TO PUT SOME REAL CONTENT INTO INSPECTION WE
MUST KEEP THE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THEM.
6. ON A SECOND POINT, THE OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF ANY
CDE REGIME COMING OUT OF STOCKHOLM ARE LIKELY TO BE:
. - ANNUAL FORECAST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES: THIS IS
NEW KIND OF MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE AND
WOULD PROVIDE ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WITH A
COMPREHENSIVE SCHEDULE OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR AHEAD;
. - A MORE COMPREHENSIVE NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION
REGIME COMPARED WITH THE CBM'S OF THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT. THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE NOTIFICATIONS,
PLUS MANDATORY OBSERVATION OF NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES;
. - INSPECTION TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE.
THE CDE REGIME WILL PROBABLY NOT REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF
MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE, I.E., IT WILL NOT PROVIDE A
MBFR-TYPE DATA BASE. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ANNUAL
FORECAST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE NOTIFICATION
REGIME, SOME INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCES WILL BE
217
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
RFCRPT
PROVIDED. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
2/8 .
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 06635
REF: CURTIN/ROMANSKI TELCONS
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SPEECH IN FRG ON CDE
1. CDE XII - 012
2. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. USDEL APPRECIATES ASSISTANCE OF USIS BONN IN TRYING
TO ARRANGE SITE FOR AMBASSADOR BARRY'S SPEECH ON CDE.
OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO PRESENT THE AUTHORITATIVE US VIEW
OF CDE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE, RIGHT AFTER THE CONFERENCE
ADJOURNS SPETEMBER 19.
4. AUDIENCE: WE SEEK A HIGH PROFILE PUBLIC FORUM, FOR
EXAMPLE, THE FRG EQUIVALENT TO THE NEW YORK COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS OR LONDON'S CHATHAM HOUSE. IT NEED
NOT CONCENTRATE ON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ALTHOUGH THEY
WOULD, OF COURSE, BE WELCOME. WE WOULD LIKE A GERMAN
CO-SPONSOR, IN THE THOUGHT THAT A GERMAN AFFILIATION
SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE IMPACT OF THE SPEECH WITH
EUROPEAN AUDIENCES. WE WILL SEEK TO PUBLISH THE SPEECH
AFTERWARDS.
5. PRESS/MEDIA: THE SPEECH WILL BE ON THE RECORD, AND
AMBASSADOR BARRY WOULD WELCOME QUESTIONS FROM THE
AUDIENCE AFTERWARDS. WE WOULD WELCOME MEDIA COVERAGE,
BUT THAT IS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE TO US. IF USIS
BONN WANTED TO ARRANGE A SEPARATE PRESS CONFERENCE,
THAT WOULD BE FINE, SCHEDULE PERMITTING.
6. TIMING: THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 22-26 WOULD BE
BEST. AMBASSADOR BARRY WILL DO A EURONET INTERACTIVE
SEPTEMBER 23. WE UNDERSTAND BONN MAY PREFER SEPTEMBER
22 POR THE SPEECH, BUT THERE ARE NO FLIGHTS EARLY THAN
THE 23RD TO ENSURE ARRIVAL IN TIME FOR EURONET AND
RETURNING ON THE 22ND WOULD MEAN LEAVING BONN IN EARLY
AFTERNOON. IF BONN STILL PREFERS SEPTEMBER 22 GIVEN
THOSE CONSTRAINTS, THE 22ND WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO AMB.
BARRY. WE WOULD ALSO BE OPEN TO PROGRAM LATER IN THE
WEEK AND ALSO TO A SITE IN HAMBURG OR ELSEWHERE OTHER
THAN BONN.
7. IF A FULL PROGRAM SEPTEMBER 22 IN BONN SEEMS
STRONGLY PREFERABLE TO OTHER OPTIONS, WE COULD RUN THE
EURONET ON THE 23RD FROM BONN. THAT, OF COURSE, WOULD
PLACE THE BURDEN ON YOU. WE HAVE UNTIL SEPTEMBER 3 TO
CONFIRM ARRANGEMENTS FOR EURONET HERE. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
219
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06627
SUBJECT: CDE CHRONOLOGY
REF: STOCKHOLM 6552
1. CDE XII - 013
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. PLEASE NOTE FOLLOWING CORRECTION TO CHRONOLOGY IN
REF.
DATE FOR ITEM: "IN PARIS, CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV ... VERIFICATION PROBLEMS" IS OCTOBER 3,
1985, NOT JULY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
220
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 06634
SUBJECT: AKHROMEYEV VISIT TO CDE 8/29/86
1. CDE XII - 014
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF AKHROMEYEV'S
PLANNED SPEECH TO CDE SEPTEMBER 29 UNDERLINES
INTENSIFYING SOVIET EFFORT TO SEIZE THE PUBLIC OPINION
INITITATIVE AS CDE ENDS. WE CAN EXPECT A REGULAR
STREAM OF EASTERN PUBLIC MOVES, LARGE AND SMALL,
BETWEEN NOW AND ADJOURNMENT SEPTEMBER 19. END SUMMARY.
4. PLANNED VISIT TO CDE 8/29/86 OF THE CHIEF OF THE
SOVIET GENERAL STAFF, S. F. AKHROMEYEV, IS PART OF AN
INTENSIFYING SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO TAKE CREDIT
FOR ANY POSITIVE OUTCOME IN THE CONFERENCE -- CREDIT
WHICH THEY, WHO HAVE DELAYED PROGRESS THROUGH MUCH OF
CDE, HARDLY DESERVE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS
WILL BE BUILDING A RECORD IN ORDER TO BLAME THE WEST IN
CASE OF FAILURE.
5. WHICHEVER WAY CDE GOES, THE WESTERN RECORD IS
STRONG. THE TRICK WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT THE RECORD
GETS ACROSS ACCURATELY TO THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC. WE
APPRECIATE EFFORTS OF DEPARTMENT, USIA AND POSTS IN
HIGHLIGHTING OUR POSITIONS IN CDE DURING THE FINAL
WEEKS BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
22/
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
grrprr
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06703
SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS AS OF
AUGUST 22, 1986
1. CDE XII - 015
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL THE LANGUAGE THAT HAS
BEEN REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK FOR ALL
WORKING GROUPS AT CDE. (REQUEST LANGUAGE SERVICES
TRANSLATE THE TEXTS BELOW AND ALL SUBSEQUENT TEXTS INTO
RUSSIAN ASAP.)
BEGIN TEXT:
A-1 (NON-USE OF FORCE):
THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND
INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO
UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS
DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS
AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.
. . . . (3/11/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE. THAT THE ADOPTED SET
OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S, WHICH ARE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE MADRID MANDATE, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION
TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE
OF FORCE. (5/20/86)
. . . THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGA-
TION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN
THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER
MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO
RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE
FINAL ACT. (6/17/86)
THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY
STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF
ALLIANCE. (7/8/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO
STRESS.. THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR
BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY. (8/19/86)
222
25X1
SECRET
n.rincQifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECONFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVFREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES
AND STRESS.. THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTFRNATIONAL LAW. (8/19/86)
A-2 (INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION):
THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE
AGREED UPON WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT . . .
(2/26/86)
ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBM'S
WILL BE ALLOWED TO . . . . (4/30/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS . . . WILL STATE
THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST. (4/30/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A
REQUEST WILL . . . WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME.
? ? ? ? (5/7/86)
THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTICIPATING
STATE(S) ON WHOSE TERRITORY IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBM'S COMPLIANCE WITH THF AGREED CSBM'S IS IN
DOUBT (6/11/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS . . . WILL
SPECIFY THE AREA WHERE . . . . (7/2/86)
A-3 (ANNUAL CALENDAR AND CONSTRAINTS):
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, WITHIN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S, FORFCASTED FOR THE SUBSEQUENT
CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN
WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER THAN
. . . FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR . . . (3/6/86)
TO BE DEFINED
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION
ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING MODEL:
? ? ? ? (5/22/86)
- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION
- GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
- NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
? ? ? ? (7/3/86)
B-1 (NOTIFICATION):
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WILL GIVE . . . IN WRITING
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF
CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES . . . DAYS OR
MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES
223
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
. . . WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE
TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE
PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED
IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE
LFVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES
OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE . . IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT
IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL. (3/4/86)
TO BE DEFINED
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S IS AS FOLLOWS:
ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, BALANCE AND
RECIPROCITY, EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF
ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATFS, AND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN FUROPE, THESE CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE AS WELL AS THF ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE.
THEY WILL BE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND POLITICALLY
BINDING AND WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.
AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IS
CONCERNED, THE MEASURES WILL BE APPLICABLE TO THE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES
TAKING PLACE THERE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT
SECURITY IN FUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF
ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS
REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH THEY WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY.
NECESSARY SPFCIFICATIONS WILL BE MADE THROUGH THE
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AT THE CONFERENCE.
NOTHING IN THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE GIVEN ABOVE WILL
DIMINISH OBLIGATIONS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE FINAL
ACT. THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO
BE AGREED UPON AT THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO BE APPLICABLE
IN ALL ARFAS COVERED BY ANY OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE
FINAL ACT RELATING TO THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT.
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NOTION OF ADJOINING SEA AREA IS
UNDERSTOOD TO REFER ALSO TO OCEAN AREAS ADJOINING EUROPE.
HEREINAFTER THE ABOVE MENTIONED WILL BE REFERRED TO AS
"THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S." (3/11/86)
THF PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE . . . IN WRITING
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF
CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES . . . DAYS OR
MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.
224
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
. . . WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE
TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE
PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED
IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES
OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE . . IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT
IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL. (3/11/86)
TO BE DEFINED
MILITARY ACTIVITIES . . . CONDUCTED IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED
BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED. (5/13/86)
. . . WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED
FORM OF CONTENT:
? ? ?
- THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE NAMES OF THF STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
- . . . OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY
. . . (6/13/86)
? ? ?
- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION PROVIDED
IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY
- RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES. (6/24/86)
THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS . . .
LANDING . . . IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BF SUBJECT TO . . . WHENEVER
THIS LANDING . . . INVOLVES AT LEAST . . . . (7/15/86)
THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES . . . CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH
ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
WHENEVER . . . .
THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCFS OF THE PARTICIPATING
STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS
FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY . . . OR
MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE
FLOWN.
IN THIS CONTEXT, THF TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES. (7/16/86)
THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT
BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BF SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP INVOLVES AT LEAST . . . .
(7/18/86)
225
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECR FT
8-2 (OBSERVATION):
A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO . . . .
THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.
REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT
LATER THAN . . . DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION.
IF THE INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME IT WILL BE
ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT. (2/27/86)
OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND OFFERED
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.
(3/6/86)
THE INVITING STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS RESPONSIBI-
LITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ENGAGED IN
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE INVITING
STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE INVITING STATE WILL SPECIFY
THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS INVITATION TO
OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY. (3/13/86)
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL
PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR
REPLY TO THE INVITATION. (3/13/86)
THF INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE wmnnum TO SEND MILITARY
AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MFMBERS OF ITS
PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. (4/17/86)
THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH TRANSPORTATION
TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND BACK. THIS
TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER THE CAPITAL
OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE
INVITATION, SO THAT OBSERVERS ARE IN A POSITION BEFORE
THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. (4/24/86)
THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY. (4/24/86)
THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THF OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. (4/24/86)
THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS
OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION
SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THF HOST STATE, AND
BACK. (5/1/86)
TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE
A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:
? ?
- THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF OBSERVERS;
25X1
226
SECRET
nna-Ineeifiari in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001000800017
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME;
- LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR
TRANSLATION;
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF
THE OBSERVERS;
? ? ?
? ? ?
(6/26/86)
THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS
IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
(7/3/86)
AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE A
BRIEFING OF THE PURPOSF, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE PHASES
OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH
THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A DAILY
SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE BASIC
SITUATION. (7/3/86)
IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSFRVATION PROGRAMME GIVE THE
OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE
VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR
DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR
POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY . . . .
? ? ? (7/3/86)
THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING
OUT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY,
MEDICAL CARE. (7/17/86).
THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT. (8/21/86)
THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION. THE HOST STATE WILL
BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE
NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE. (8/21/86)
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
227
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 06636
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP 8-2 (OBSERVATION)
1. CDE XII - 016
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ON AUGUST 21, WORKING GROUP 8-2 AGREED TO NOTE TWO
SENTENCES WHICH COMPLETE ALREADY NOTED PARAGRAPHS ON THF
INVITATION OF OBSERVERS AND THE GUIDANCE OF OBSERVERS IN
THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. IN EACH CASE THE
NEWLY NOTED SENTENCE IS THE SECOND SENTENCE IN THE
PARAGRAPH.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION. THE HOST STATE WILL
BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE
NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE.
END TEXT.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS ISSUFD BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
228-
25X1
SECRET
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06652
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS -
- AUGUST 19-22, 1986
1. CDE XII - 017
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THERE WAS MUCH
TACTICAL MOTION BUT LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT DURING
THE FIRST WEEK OF THE LAST SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE. WHILE THE WEST AND THE NNA WORKED FEVERISHLY
BEHIND THE SCENES (AS MUCH INTRA- AS INTER-GROUP) ON THE
KEY QUESTIONS OF NOTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION, THE ONLY
LANGUAGE NOTED WAS ON OBSERVATION AND NON-USE OF FORCE.
PROGRESS ON NOTIFICATION IS HUNG UP IN THREE KEY AREAS:
1) THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT; 2) THE COMBINED
STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL EQUIPMENT PARAMETER FOR GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES, AND 3) THE DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN THE PUBLIC
LINE THAT, WITH THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION, THE BALL
IS NOW IN THE WESTERN COURT. WHILE OUR ALLIES, BY AND
LARGE, HAVE HELD FIRMLY TO WESTERN POSITIONS, MANY ARE
CLEARLY WORRIED THAT U.S. REQUIREMENTS, PARTICULARLY ON
INSPECTION, ARE SO DEMANDING THAT THEY WILL BE FACED
EITHER WITH TAKING OUR SIDE IN A STANDOFF OR ISOLATING
US IN A BERN-LIKE OUTCOME. MEANWHILE THE NNA, AFTER
CALLING ON EAST AND WEST TO RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES
FOR OVER TWO YEARS, ARE NOW WORRIED THAT THEY ACTUALLY
WILL. THE NNA NOW FACE THE PROSPECT THAT THEIR SECURITY
INTERESTS, TOO, WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE NOTIFICATION AND
INSPECTION REGIMES -- AND THEY DON'T LIKE IT. END
SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: THE SOVIETS THIS WEEK PLAYED A
STALLING GAME WHICH SUCCEEDED IN MAKING A NUMBER OF OUR
ALLIES NERVOUS. BY FILIBUSTERING IN THE COFFEE GROUP,
THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED SERIOUSLY
TO DISCUSS THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION UNTIL THE
DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE MILTIARY ACTIVITIES IS RESOLVED.
CONSEQUENTLY, SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV'S MAIN PREOCCUPA-
TION THIS WEEK BOTH IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS AND IN
PRIVATE WAS NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS. SOVIET AND U.S.
POSITIONS ON WHEN A CSBM'S REGIME SHOULD APPLY TO
TRANSFERRED TROOPS ARE VERY CLOSE IN SUBSTANCE AND U.S.
NODIFICIATIONS TO A SOVIET TEXT ON TRANSFERS COULD BE
THE BASIS TO PUT THIS ISSUE TO REST. A DRAFTING COMBO
DEALING WITH TRANSFERS AND INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED
ON PHASES COULD ALLOW US TO RESOLVE THE TYPES OF
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND MOVE ON TO THE PARAMETER.
?10
OUT-OF-GARRISON: THE SOVIETS CATEGORICALLY REJECT THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON (00G) CONCEPT AND LINK WESTERN DROPPING
OF 00G WITH THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION. WE SUSPECT
THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT 00G WOULD COVER A BROAD
229
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECTIRT
RANGE OF ACTIVITIES, THEREBY MAKING THE SAME RANGE OF
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO INSPECTION. THEY INSIST
THAT THEIR PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF EXERCISES,
MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS COVERS ALL 00G ACTIVITIES OF
CONCERN. HOWEVER, WHEN WE DISCUSS PRIVATELY WHICH PHASES
OF A MOVEMENT OR TRANSFER WOULD BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION
AND VERIFICATION, THEIR POSITION IN PRACTICE AMOUNTS TO
OUR 00G CONCEPT WITH STARTING POINTS/ARRIVAL POINTS AND
EQUIPMENT STORAGE AREAS TREATED AS SENSITIVE POINTS,
I.E., NO OBSERVATION OR VERIFICATION PERMITTED. THE LINK
BETWEEN INFORMA'ION AND TRANSFERS CURRENTLY BEING WORKED
MAY ENABLE US TO PRESERVE THE 00G CONCEPT AND AVOID
DISCUSSION ON MOVEMEN'S.
GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD: THERE HAS BEEN A CERTAIN DEGREE
OF DISARRAY WITHIN NATO AND THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE ON
LANGUAGE FOR A COMBINED GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD. NATO
DOES NOT HAVE AGREED LANGUAGE BUT HAS ARRIVED AT A
GENERAL UNDERSTANDING THAT 1) A THRESHOLD FORMULA WOULD
CONSIST OF NUMERICAL AND EQUIPMENT ELEMENTS BACKED UP BY
STRUCTURE; 2) STRUCTURE BY ITSELF WOULD NOT TRIGGER
NOTIFICATION, AND 3) THAT EITHER NUMERICAL OR EQUIPMENT
ELEMENTS WOULD REQUIRE STRUCTURE IN ORDER TO TRIGGER
NOTIFICATION. THESE NATO REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN FURTHER
COMPLICATED BY SOVJET AND SWISS PREOCCUPATIONS:
TATARNIKOV EXPLAINED TO US PRIVATELY THAT THE STRUCTURAL
ELEMENT OF A THRESHOLD FORMULA MUST CAPTURE NATO AND WTO
FULL-STRENGTH SINGLE-DIVISION EXERCISES BUT NOT SOVIET
SINGLE DIVISION EXERCISES CARRIED OUT BY INCOMPLETE
DIVISIONS (5-6,000 TROOPS). THE SWISS ARE ADAMANT ABOUT
EXCLUDING FROM NOTIFICATION THEIR MOUNTAIN BRIGADES,
WHICH, THEY ARGUE, ARE NOT THREATENING.
5. VERIFICATION: THE WEEK OPENED WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR
GRINEVKSY'S FIRST PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE USSR'S
WILLINGESS TO ACCEPT OBLIGATORY INSPECTION IN A CDE
AGREEMENT PROVIDED THERE IS A PASSIVE QUOTA OF "ONE OR
TWO." HAVING GONE THAT FAR, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS NOW
SEEM DETERMINED TO DELAY THE DRAFTING OF INSPECTION
MODALITIES UNTIL AS LATE IN THE GAME AS POSSIBLE TO
ENHANCE THEIR PROSPECTS OF ESCAPING WITH ONLY SOFT
MODALITIES FOR GROUND INSPECTION AND TO LEAVE NO TIME FOR
CONSIDERATION OF AERIAL MODALITIES. THE NNA ATTEMPTS TO
KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR THEIR CHERISHED OBSERVATION
UPON REQUEST PROPOSAL IS ONE MORE IMPEDIMENT TO DRAFTING
PROGRESS. IT HAS BELATEDLY DAWNED ON THE NNA THAT THEY
WILL HAVE TO ALLOW VERIFICATION (I.E., INSPECTION) TO
TAKE PLACE ON THEIR TERRITORY -- OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST
HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO SPARE THEM THIS THROUGH ITS REQUIRE-
MENT FOR JUSTIFICATION OF REQUESTS AND ITS RIGHT OF
REFUSAL CLAUSE; THEY (PARTICULARLY THE SWEDES) ARE FIND-
ING THIS A BITTER AND DIFFICULT PILL TO SWALLOW. (A MORE
DETAILED REPORT ON VERIFICATION DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWS
25X1
230
SECRET
nni-laccifiinri in Part - Sanitized Coov Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
SEPTEL.)
6. OBSERVA'ION: TWO ADDITIONAL TEXTS WERE NOTED THIS
WEEK STIPULATING: 1) THAT THE "HOST STATE" IS THE STATE
ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE (OF
NO'E BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED THEIR EARLIER PRE-
CONDITION FOR A CONFERENCE-WIDE UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORD
"TERRITORY"); AND 2) THAT OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE (TEXTS PROVIDED
SEPTEL). IN THE WORKING GROUP, POLISH AMBASSADOR
KONARSKI, AFTER HAVING ALERTED THE PRESS TO A MAJOR
DEVELOPMENT, DROPPED THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A QUOTA ON
MANDATORY OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSED INSTEAD THAT A
SEPARATE THRESHOLD ABOVE THE AGREED NOTIFICATION LEVEL BE
ESTABLISHED FOR MANDATORY OBSERVATION. KONARSKI HAS
OFFERED NO INDICATION OF THE LEVEL OF HIS NEW THRESHOLD,
BUT THE SOVIET "NEGOTIATING" POSITION IS 16,000 (FOR
NOTIFICATION)-20,000 (FOR OBSERVATION) AND THEIR
"SERIOUS" POSITION IS 12,000-16,000. THE ALLIANCE IS
CONTINUING INTERNAL CONSIDERATION OF A SIMILAR "SPLIT-
LEVEL" APPROACH; HOST COULD AGREE TO 10,000-15,000. FOR
ITS PART, NATO PROPOSED THAT OBSERVATION BEGIN ONCE THE
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD IS REACHED OR EXCEEDED AND END
WHEN THE THRESHOLDS ARE NO LONGER MET (THIS IS VIRTUALLY
IDENTICAL TO THE ALREADY TABLED EASTERN AND NNA
PROPOSALS). NATO ALSO SPURNED AN EASTERN OFFER TO TRADE
OFF THE USE OF PERSONAL BINOCULARS FOR AGREEMENT TO
PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH TIMELY COMMUNICATIONS. NEXT WEEK
DISCUSSION WILL TURN TO THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF SCOPE OF
OBSERVATION.
7. ANNUAL FORECASTS: THERE IS CONTINUING DISAGREEMENT
OVER WHETHER THE "AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY" IN THE
ANNUAL FORECAST SHOULD BE DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES
(EASTERN AND NNA PREFERENCE) OR GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES
(NATO PREFERENCE). THE CURRENT COORDINATOR'S TEXT WOULD
ALLOW EITHER TO BE PROVIDED IN THE CALENDAR. IT IS THE
VIEW OF MOST OF OUR ALLIES THAT NATO CAN BE FLEXIBLE ON
THIS QUESTION IF WE CAN AGREE TO GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES
IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. WE EXPECT TO AGREE ON
TEXTS ON BOTH THE "AREA" AND "DURATION" THE NEAR FUTURE.
8. CONSTRAINTS: THE EAST HAS SIGNIFICANTLY ELEVATED
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTRAINTS ALTHOUGH THEY ARE CLEARLY
FLEXIBLE ON SUBSTANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT, SEEING THE
OUTLINES OF A DOCUMENT WHICH WILL CONTAIN LITTLE OF
EASTERN ORIGIN, THE EAST HAS DECIDED THAT A SEPARATE
SECTION ON CONSTRAINTS IS ESSENTIAL. NATO NOW AGREES
THAT THE IRISH CONCEPT OF TIME CONSTRAINTS, I.E.,
ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE WOULD HAVE TO BE
FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE, SHOULD BE USED BOTH TO
DEFUSE EASTERN AND NNA PRESSURE ON OTHER CONSTRAINT
MEASURES AND TO OBTAIN SOME LEVERAGE FOR EASTERN AND NNA
CONCESSIONS ELSEWHERE. NATO IS ALSO CONSIDERING A LIMIT
231
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
CZY'D .1v
ON 'HE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE ADDED TO THE
CALENDAR, OR WHICH COULD BE PRIOR NOTIFIED WITHOUT BEING
FORECAST. ACTIVITIES NOTIFIED AT THE TIME THEY COMMENCE
WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM ANY SUCH RESTRICTION.
9. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE FINAL FORM OF THE NON-USE OF
FORCE SECTION IS TAKING SHAPE. THIS WEEK LANGUAGE WAS
NOTED ON COMPLIANCE AND SOVEREIGN EQUALITY/ EQUAL RIGHTS
AND DUTIES. ALMOST ALL THE WESTERN-ORIENTED PASSAGES
NOW HAVE BEEN REGISTERED WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS OF
"TERRORISM" AND "HUMAN RIGHTS:" BUT EVEN ON THESE ISSUES
THE EVOLUTION OF DRAFTING IS IN A WESTERLY DIRECTION.
THUS, MOST OF THE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS, E.G., REFERENCE
TO MILITARY FORCE/ARMED FORCES, THE MEDITERRANEAN,
DISARMAMENT, ARE EASTERN AND NNA ISSUES. IN OTHER WORDS,
THE EAST AND THE NNA, PARTICULARLY MALTA, FIND THEMSELVES
IN THE ROLE OF THE DEMANDEURS. ACCORDINGLY, EASTERN
SPOKESMAN KORMENDY (HUNGARY) HAS OFFERED US A DEAL: THEY
WILL ACCEPT MOST OF THE WESTERN/NNA HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE
IF WE WILL BUY A MODIFIED PASSAGE ON "ARMED FORCES,"
I.E., BASED ON THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE, P.83, AND
WITHOUT REFERENCES TO NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WAR. THE
NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) IS ALSO ANXIOUS TO
CLOSE UP THE NUF SHOP. WHILE SOME OF ALLIES ARE UNCOM-
FORTABLE WITH THIS PRESSURE, THE ALLIANCE HAS SO FAR
HELD FIRM. OVER THE NEXT WEEK WE INTEND TO SIT TIGHT AND
SEE WHAT KIND OF DEALS THE EAST AND NNA HAVE TO OFFER.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
232-
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06677
SUBJECT: CDE: KEY PROBLEM AREAS
1. CDE XII-018. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON A WEEKLY BASIS WE PLAN TO BRIEFLY IDENTIFY AND
DISCUSS KEY SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS IN THE CDE ENDGAME.
3. INSPECTION: DRAFTING IN THIS CRUCIAL AREA IS
STILL STALLED DUE TO SOVIET FOOT-DRAGGING, NNA RESISTANCE
AND ALLIED DISUNITY. THE MAIN ISSUES ARE:
- A. AIR INSPECTION: WE HAVE CONFRONTED THIS ISSUE
HEAD-ON, MUCH TO OUR ALLIES' DISCOMFORT. THE SOVIETS
ARE WHISPERING THAT AT THE END OF THE ROAD THEY WILL
ACCEPT AIR INSPECTION AS LONG AS IT'S THEIR AIRPLANE.
WE ARE LETTING IT BE KNOWN THAT THE LEAST WE COULD
ACCEPT WOULD BE A NEUTRAL AIRPLANE. OUR AIM IS TO
FORCE THE SOVIET "CONCESSION" ON THE USE OF THEIR OWN
AIRCRAFT EARLY SO THAT THERE WILL BE TIME TO PRY OUT
THE SECOND "CONCESSION" ON NEUTRAL AIR LATER. THIS IS
HOLDING UP DRAFTING ON MODALITIES AND MAKING OUR ALLIES
NERVOUS. DESPITE PRO-FORMA SUPPORT WE ARE ALONE IN
THINKING NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT ESSENTIAL. WASHINGTON CAN
EXPECT DEMARCHES SOON.
- B. RESTRICTED AREAS: THE SOVIET POSITION IS THAT
THEY WILL NOT AGREE TO A LIMITATION ON A MAXIMUM PER-
CENTAGE OF CLOSED AREAS NOR WILL THEY EXCHANGE MAPS
UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 19. WE HAVE DISMISSED THIS POSI-
TION AS RIDICULOUS. THE FRG AND TURKEY, THE LAST NATO
HOLDOUTS, HAVE NOW COME ABOARD ON OUR POSITION THAT WE
SHOULD DEFINE WHAT IS OPEN, NOT WHAT IS CLOSED AND TRY
TO GET A FORMULA WHICH SAYS THAT NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES
WILL NOT BE HELD IN CLOSED AREAS. WE THINK THE EAST
WILL ACCEPT THIS.
- C. QUOTAS: THE SOVIET POSITION IS THAT EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE SHOULD BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT A
MAXIMUM OF 2 INSPECTIONS PER YEAR (PASSIVE QUOTA).
NATO ACCEPTS THE PASSIVE QUOTA CONCEPT, BUT IS SEEKING
A 5 INSPECTION CEILING. WE BELIEVE THERE SHOULD ALSO
BE AN ACTIVE QUOTA - A RIGHT FOR EACH COUNTRY TO ASK FOR
A CERTAIN NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS. A COMBINATION OF
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE QUOTAS OF EQUAL NUMBERS PRODUCES
EQUAL OBLIGATIONS TO ACCEPT INSPECTION ON EACH SIDE.
BUT AT LEAST ONE ALLY - TURKEY - FLATLY REFUSES TO
ACCEPT ANY ACTIVE QUOTA ABOVE ONE. THE NNA DISLIKE
ALL INSPECTION WITHOUT A RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND HAVE BEEN
RESISTING THE PASSIVE QUOTA CONCEPT. A NUMBER OF HYBRID
PROPOSALS ATTEMPTING TO PRESERVE A RIGHT OF REFUSAL
HAVE EMERGED FROM THE NN AND HAVE BEEN SWATTED DOWN.
MOST OPPOSE THE ACTIVE QUOTA. SOME - E.G. AUSTRIA - ARE
INSISTING THAT COUNTRIES SHOULD BE FREE TO ASK FOR
INSPECTIONS AFTER THE PASSIVE QUOTA IS EXHAUSTED. IN
SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, REQUESTS WOULD HAVE TO BE JUSTIFIED
233
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRFT
AND THERE WOULD BE A RIGHT OF REFUSAL. THIS WOULD BE
UNACCEPTABLE TO US AND MOST OF NATO.
- D. NNA OBSERVATION OF INSPECTION: SOME NNA ARE
INSISTING THAT THIRD PARTIES MUST BE INVITED BY THE
INSPECTED STATE TO OBSERVE AN INSPECTION. THEY WOULD
NOT SUBMIT REPORTS, BUT WOULD BE "GUARANTORS AGAINST
ABUSE" AND WOULD LEARN THE INSPECTION TRADE. THE
EAST IS MAKING ENCOURAGING NOISES. WE ARE TRYING
TO DISCOURAGE THE IDEA BY PLAYING UP THE RISK THAT
THEY WILL LOSE THEIR NEUTRAL VIRGINITY BY BEING
FORCED TO SERVE AS JUDGES. THE KEY PROMOTERS -
AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND - ARE HINTING THAT IF THEY ARE
NOT ALLOWED TO PLAY THEY WILL NOT BE READY TO PARTICI-
PATE IN SUPPLYING AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTIONS.
4. NOTIFICATION.
- A. TRANSFERS: WE ARE CLOSE TO A SOLUTION TO THIS
PROBLEM. WE WILL AGREE TO A FORMULATION THAT GIVES
NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS BUT PROTECTS OUR POSITION
AND EXTRACTS A PRICE FROM THE EAST IN TERMS OF INFORMA-
TION ON ALL PHASES OF AN ACTIVITY. LANGUAGE WILL PROTECT
U.S. POSITION THAT TRANSITS WILL NOT BE NOTIFIED OR
OTHERWISE CAPTURED.
- B. "OUT-OF-GARRISON" FORMULA: SINCE THE SOVIETS
FLATLY REFUSE TO DISCUSS ANY VARIATION OF THE
"OUT-OF-GARRISON" CONCEPT THE CHALLENGE IS TO FIND A
COMPREHENSIVE FORMULA WHICH DOES NOT GIVE THE EAST A
LOOPHOLE FOR CIRCUMVENTION ON GROUNDS THAT THE ACTIVITY
IN QUESTION DOES NOT FIT INTO A LIST OF TYPES OF NOTI-
FIABLE ACTIVITIES. WE ARE PURSUING VARIOUS CONCEPTS,
SOME OF WHICH MIGHT FILL THE BILL.
- C. GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS: THE SOVIETS CONTINUE
TO RESIST A STRUCTURAL ELEMENT, AND THE ALLIES WOULD
SIDE WITH THEM WERE IT NOT FOR OUR INSISTENCE THAT THIS
WOULD MEAN NO AGREEMENT. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS WE THINK
THE SOVIETS WILL COME AROUND. IT IS NOT YET TIME TO
NEGOTIATE ON NUMBERS, BUT WHEN WE DO WE THINK WE CAN
GET 10,000 TROOPS AND 250 TANKS FOR NOTIFICATION AND
A STRICTLY NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF 15,000 TROOPS FOR
OBSERVATION.
5. CONSTRAINTS: WE ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN NEGOTIA-
TING A TIME CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL. IN ADDITION TO THIS
PROPOSAL, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE NOTIFYING EXERCISES OF
40,000 TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE, NATO IS ALSO CONSIDERING
A PROHIBITION ON ADDITIONS TO THE CALENDAR OF EXERCISES
ABOVE 75,000 (EXCEPT ALERTS) AS WELL AS AN EXEMPTION
FROM THE PASSIVE QUOTA FOR ADDITIONS BELOW 75,000.
6. OBSERVATION: THE EAST REMAINS FIRM IN REJECTING
BOTH PERSONAL BINOCULARS AND MAPS ON A REASONABLE SCALE,
AND, THUS, SHOW THEIR TRUE COLORS ON THE "OPENNESS"
234
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
QUESTION. CONTROVERSIAL ASPECTS OF "SCOPE" OF OBSER-
VATION HAVE YET TO BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AND ARE LIKELY
TO PROVE DIFFICULT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
235
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06715
SUBJECT: CDE: KEEPING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 6552, B) STOCKHOLM 6627,
C) STATE 126401
1. CDE XII - 019
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: IF CDE SUCCEEDS, THE SOVIETS WILL CLAIM
CREDIT; IF IT FAILS, THEY WILL BLAME THE WEST. IN
FACT, CDE HAS FOLLOWED A WESTERN AGENDA, TO A VERY
LARGE DEGREE IN THE FACE OF EASTERN OBSTACLES. THIS
MESSAGE PROVIDES TALKING POINTS ON THE EVOLUTION OF CDE
AND IDENTIFIES BACKGROUND MATERIAL SUPPORTING US VIEW.
ASSISTANCE REQUEST PARA. 6. END SUMMARY.
4. AS CDE ENDS, THE SOVIETS ARE STEPPING UP PROPAGANDA
EFFORTS TO TAKE CREDIT FOR SUCCESS OR, CONVERSELY, PUT
THE BLAME ON THE WEST FOR FAILURE. IN FACT, AS THE
CHRONOLOGY DEMONSTRATES IN OUTLINE (REFS A AND B), CDE
IN ITS PRESENT FORM WAS A WESTERN INITIATIVE WHICH, IN
FOCUSING ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BULDING
MEASURES (CSBM), NOT ON DECLARATORY OR SYMBOLIC
MEASURES, HAS FOLLOWED A WESTERN CONCEPTION. THE EAST
INITIALLY TRIED TO DIVERT CDE TO USE IT AS A PROPAGANDA
FORUM BUT FAILED TO DO SO. THE EAST THEN ADOPTED AN
OBSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH TO MINIMIZE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT
OF ANY CSBM'S AGREED IN CDE.
-- AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE, THE WEST TABLED
SIX CSBM'S (01/24/84), CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES WITH
CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.
-- THE SOVIET MEASURES TABLED 5/8/86 WERE LARGELY
DECLARATORY, RECYCLED POLITICAL/PROPAGANDA PROPOSALS.
THE ONE CONCRETE CSBM, THEIR MEASURE SIX, WAS VERY
VAGUE. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS CLAIMED THEIRS WERE
SWEEPING POLITICAL-MILITARY MEASURES "SUITED TO THE
CURRENT TENSE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION". THEY BELITTLED
WESTERN PROPOSALS AS NARROW "MILITARY-TECHNICAL"
MEASURES.
-- MUCH OF THE FIRST YEAR AND A HALF OF CDE WAS SPENT
DISPOSING OF SOVIET DECLARATORY MEASURES AND
REAFFIRMING CDE'S MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE CONCRETE,
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CSBM'S. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
DUBLIN INITIATIVE (6/4/84) ON MON-USE OF FORCE (NUF)
WAS AN EFFORT TO MOVE THE CONFERENCE IN THAT DIRECTION.
-- REF C (PARAS. 7-8) DESCRIBES THE STRATEGY OF DELAY
BY WHICH THE EAST RAISED ONE OBSTACLE AFTER ANOTHER AND
THEN CLAIMED CREDIT FOR MAKING MAJOR CONCESSIONS WHEN
THEY ACCEPTED SOLUTIONS FOR REMOVING THEM. THE 6/16/86
RESOLUTION OF THE AIR ISSUE IS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS
EASTERN APPROACH. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, THE SOVIETS
PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MAJOR INITIATIVES/CONCESSIONS, ONLY
TO QUALIFY THEM OUT OF EXISTENCE AT THE NEGOTIATING
TABLE (CF 10/3/85 ON CALENDARS; 1/15/86 ON NAVAL
236
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
ACTIVITIES).
-- SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF "ON-SITE INSPECTION" FOR
VERIFICATION (8/19/86) COULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP
FORWARD; THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE EAST WILL
AGREE TO CONCRETE PROVISION FOR CARRYING OUT
INSPECTIONS TO CREATE AN OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE
INSPECTION REGIME.
-- IF SUCCESSFUL, CDE WILL ESTABLISH A MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME BASED ON GREATER
OPENNESS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ABOUT MILITARY AFFAIRS.
THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS IS WESTERN; THE EAST
STILL EXPLICITLY REJECTS IT IN CDE.
5. IN ADDITION TO THE CHRONOLOGY, WE SUGGEST THE
FOLLOWING AS USEFUL SOURCES OF BACKGROUND ON CDE AND US
POSITIONS IN THE CONFERENCE.
A) PRESIDENTIAL: THE WHITE HOUSE HAS ISSUED STATEMENTS
ON CDE AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH ROUND, MOST RECENTLY:
8/19/86; 6/10/86; 4/15/86; 1/28/86. THE PRESIDENT ALSO
ADDRESSED CDE IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG (5/8/85) AND IN HIS SPEECH
BEFORE THE IRISH PARLIAMENT (6/4/84). THE US-SOVIET
JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE GENEVA SUMMIT ADDRESSED CDE
(11/21/85).
B) RECENT OTHER US: SPEECHES BY AMB. ROBERT L. BARRY,
HEAD USDEL CDE, IN BERN, SWITZERLAND (2/27/86) AND AT
CHATHAM HOUSE, LONDON (2/4/86). THE WIRELESS FILE
CARRIES NUMEROUS US SPEECHES MADE IN THE CONFERENCE,
MOST RECENTLY 8/19/86.
C) OTHER: THE USIA PAMPHLET ON CDE 7/85) REMAINS AN
EXCELLENT BACKGROUND SOURCE ON THE FIRST HALF OF THE
CONFERENCE, LAYING OUT NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND EARLY
KEY US STATEMENTS. THE CHRONOLOGY FILLS IN LATER
DEVELOPMENTS. NATO REVIEW (6/84 AND 2/85) ALSO CARRIES
BACKGROUND ARTICLES.
6. WE APPRECIATE ASSISTANCE OF USIS POSTS IN
EXPLAINING US CDE POSITIONS TO JOURNALISTS WHO MIGHT BE
WRITING ON THE CONFERENCE. MOST OF THE MATERIAL NOTED
ABOVE IS AVAILABLE IN THE WIRELESS FILE. WE CAN SUPPLY
COPIES OF OTHER TEXTS ON REQUEST.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
237
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06722
SUBJECT: CDE: RESTRICTED AREAS: TURKISH POSITION
1. CDE XII - 20.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. TURKISH CDE ACTING REP BOLUKBASI INFORMED
U.S. CDE DEPUTY REP, AMB. HANSEN ON AUGUST 23 OF NEW
INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING TURKEY'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
OF RESTRICTED AREAS IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY CDE
AGREEMENT. IN BRIEF, FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE, TURKEY
WILL DROP ITS INSISTENCE ON A PERCENTAGE OF RESTRICTED
AREAS APPROACH; THUS, THE TURKISH RESTRICTED AREA
PRACTICE, WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN IN FORCE, WILL
NOT BE APPLIED BY TURKEY FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE.
TURKEY SUPPORTS A "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO RAS; ONE THAT
WOULD DEFINE WHERE AN INSPECTION CAN TAKE PLACE RATHER
THAN WHERE IT CANNOT. TURKEY NONETHELESS WANTS A
REFERENCE TO BOTH SENSITIVE POINTS (IN THE SC.1 SENSE OF
THE TERM) AND "PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS" IN ANY TEXT
ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF AREAS DESIGNATED/SPECIFIED
FOR INSPECTION. BOLUKBASI INDICATED THAT TURKEY HAS
MADE THIS ROVE IN AN EFFORT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS FACING
THE WEST CONCERNING THE RESTRICTED AREA/EXCEPTIONS
PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF CDE. KEY ELEMENTS OF NEW
TURKISH POSITION FOLLOW. END SUMMARY.
4. AS INDICATED REFTEL (STOCKHOLM 05710), U.S. CDE
DEPREP AMB. HANSEN CONSULTED DURING ROUND 11 WITH
TURKISH CDE DEPREP BOLUKBASI ON THE SUBJECT OF
RESTRICTED AREAS WITH A VIEW TO RESOLVING THIS ISSUE IN
THE CONTEXT OF AN INSPECTION MEASURE. ONE OF THE KEYS
TO RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, IN THE U.S. VIEW, WAS
TURKISH AGREEMENT TO DROP OR AT LEAST MODIFY, IN THE
CONTEXT OF ANY CDE AGREEMENT, THE TURKISH PRACTICE OF
RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH, AS ARTICULATED AT NATO, REQUIRES
A 5 TERRITORIAL ALLOTMENT FOR PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED
AREAS AND 10 FOR TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED AREAS. ON
AUGUST 22, BOLUKBASI INFORMED HANSEN OF THE RESULTS OF
TURKEY'S REVIEW OF ITS POSITION.
5. BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, AND FOR U.S. INFORMATION ONLY,
BOLUKBASI NOTED THAT IN THE TURKISH/USSR BORDER AREA THE
GENERAL DEFENSE POSITIONS (GDPS), OR RATHER THE
PEACETIME AND WARTIME POSITIONS, ARE MORE OR LESS THE
SAME FOR CERTAIN UNITS. THESE UNITS EXERCISE IN THEIR
GDPS OR IN THE GDP AREA. GDPS, HE NOTED, ARE NOT ALL IN
THE BORDER AREA. HE ALSO RECALLED THAT ALL SENSITIVE
MILITARY AREAS IN TURKEY ARE CLOSED TO THE PUBLIC AND
THAT THE AREA RESTRICTED IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES IS THE
WHOLE AREA, EVEN IF SUCH AN AREA IS NOT DECLARED A
RESTRICTED AREA; IN PRACTICE IT IS A RESTRICTED AREA.
AT A NOTIFICATION LEVEL OF 10,000, TURKEY DOES NOT
BELIEVE IT WILL FACE PROBLEMS CONCERNING NOTIFICATION OR
OBSERVATION OF THESE UNITS. TURKEY IS CONCERNED,
233
25X1
SECRET
npciassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SPC.RFT
25X1
HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET'S MAY REQUEST AN INSPECTION OF
AN ACTIVITY BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. IT THEREFORE IS
NOT WILLING TO DO AWAY ENTIRELY WITH THE CONCEPT OF RAS
IN THE CONTEXT OF CDE.
6. DRAWING ON INSTRUCTIONS, BOLUKBASI OFFERED THE
FOLLOWING:
-- ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO UNDERSTANDING FROM ALLIES
REGARDING TURKEY'S SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS WITH
CERTAIN POSITIONS, SUCH AS MEASURE 1, TURKEY HAS DECIDED
NOT TO MAKE A PROBLEM OUT OF RESTRICTED AREAS IN
CONNECTION WITH DESIGNATED AREAS FOR INSPECTION.
-- TURKEY THUS DROPS ITS INSISTENCE ON A PERCENTAGE
RESTRICTED AREA APPROACH FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE.
TURKEY IS NOT CONVINCED THAT THIS APPROACH WILL WORK IN
THE CONTEXT OF CDE AND RECOGNIZES THE POTENTIAL FOR
SOVIET ABUSE WHICH WOULD WORK TO THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE
AND TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF TURKEY.
-- THE TURKISH RESTRICTED AREA PRACTICE, ALREADY
ESTABLISHED, WILL NOT BE APPLIED FOR THE PURPOSES OF
CDE. OTHERWISE IT WILL REMAIN IN FORCE. THUS, HE
REITERATED, TURKEY IS NOT INSISTING ON A BROADER CONCEPT
OF RESTRICTED AREAS IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL
TERRITORY. TURKEY ALSO DOES NOT SUPPORT AN APPROACH
WHEREBY THERE WOULD BE AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN PARTICIPATING
STATES OF LISTS OR MAPS OF RESTRICTED AREAS. IT IS
TURKEY'S VIEW THAT THERE WOULD BE 93 PROVISION FOR TRAS.
-- THERE ARE CERTAIN CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THIS NEW
POSITION, NAMELY THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN ACTIVE
INSPECTION QUOTA OF ONE AND THAT NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS
ARE AT A LEVEL OF AT LEAST 10,000/ONE DIVISION SIZED
EXERCISE. IN THIS CONTEXT, BOLUKBASI ALSO INDICATED
THAT TURKEY WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A PASSIVE INSPECTION
QUOTA OF FIVE, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT INFORMATION HE IS
PREPARED TO SHARE WITH OTHERS AT THIS TIME.
-- THE ABOVE REPRESENTS A BIG SACRIFICE FOR TURKEY, AND
TURKEY HOPES OTHERS WILL UNDERSTAND IT WAS NOT EASY FOR
THEM TO DROP THE RESTRICTED AREA APPROACH IN TERMS OF
PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL TERRITORY FOR PURPOSES OF CDE.
-- ON A PERSONAL NOTE, BOLUKBASI RECALLED THAT HE HAD
GIVEN HANSEN HIS WORD OF HONOR THAT HE WOULD TRY TO
SOLVE THE PROBLEM, AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPES THAT THIS
WOULD FACILITATE THE SOLUTION.
7. FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF THE TURKISH POSITION, AMB.
HANSEN ASKED HOW THIS POSITION COULD BE REFLECTED IN
TERMS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE, BASED ON LANGUAGE THAT HAD
BEEN DISCUSSED DURING PREVIOUS CONSULTATIONS. BOLUKBASI
RESPONDED AS FOLLOWS:
-- TURKEY CAN ACCEPT THE APPROACH OUTLINED BY HANSEN IN
JULY WHEREBY THERE IS A REFERENCE TO WHAT THE DESIGNATED
AREA FOR INSPECTION WILL INCLUDE, I.E. TRAINING AREAS
AND PUBLIC TERRAIN AND WILL BE LIMITED TO PLACES WHERE
239
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFrRFT
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION CAN BE CONDUCTED.
-- TURKEY WANTS A REFERENCE IN DRAFTING LANGUAGE TO
RESTRICTED AREAS AND THE FOLLOWING KIND OF LANGUAGE, AS
DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY WITH HANSEN, IS ACCEPTABLE: IN A
DESIGNATED AREA, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE
ACCOMPANIED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INSPECTED STATE,
BUT THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY
AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE POINTS AND
AREAS AS WELL AS PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS, NOT
INCLUDING TRAINING AREAS, TO WHICH ACCESS BY THE GENERAL
PUBLIC IS NORMALLY RESTRICTED OR DENIED. HANSEN
INDICATED THAT, AS A STARTING POSITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS,
IT WAS THE U.S. PREFERENCE NOT TO MAKE REFERENCE TO
RESTRICTED AREAS. IN RESPONSE, AND FOR U.S. INFORMATION
ONLY, BOLUKBASI INDICATED THAT IF A REFERENCE TO
PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS MIGHT CAUSE A PROBLEM,
TURKEY WILL RE-CONSIDER SUCH A REFERENCE WHEN/IF SUCH A
PROBLEM ARISES.
-- IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ABOVE-CITED LANGUAGE, BOLUKBASI
INDICATED THAT IT IS TURKEY'S UNDERSTANDING THAT THE
REFERENCE TO "SENSITIVE POINTS" ONLY COVERS THE
EXCEPTIONS ALREADY ENUMERATED AS EXCEPTIONS IN
SC.1/AMPLIFIED/MEASURE 5/PARAGRAPH 7. THE CONCEPT OF
"SENSITIVE POINTS", IN TURKEY'S UNDERSTANDING, WOULD
ALSO COVER THE AIRSPACE OVER TURKEY, I.E. AIRSPACE OVER
"SENSITIVE POINTS".
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
25X1
240
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
ANZral-oor
Mr. Chairman,
during the past weeks the outlines of a surprising turn
of events have appeared in the important field of verification,
a turn which the Austrian delegation welcores, both in
principle and in the interest of a result in Stockholm. This
development found confirmation in the last plenary when
Ambassador Grinevsky accepted the conduct cf on site-inspections
of confidence building measures on the basis of a limited quota
per year on the territory of each State. In the corridors this
idea is referred to as passive quota and it seems to imply that
inspections within the framework of such a quota may not be
refused under any circumstances.
This very important step by the Soviet Union has created a
new situation within the Conference and has largely improved
the prospects for a positive conclusion of our work. A concrete
result in Stockholm - and nobody is talking any more of only
a mini-package - has always been the essential aim for Austria:
we expect that the ensuing improvements of the political and
in the longer run hopefully also for the military situation
in Europe will indirectly also increase our own security.
In as far as vital security interests of the Republic of Austria
are not endangered we have always tried to facilitate and
promote results in Stockholm and will continue to ,do so with
determination and within the framework of our possibilities.
One such vital security interest is the exenption of mobilization
)
from notifiable activities - mobilization being the calling up
reservists from the civilian population ,irrespective of whether
this activity were to be called mobilization, concentration of
forces or something else.. Contrary to bigger countries with
considerable standing forces the Austrian militia-type defence
system has to depend heavily on mobilization; the employment of
such mobilized forces in defence positions is essentially
different from a transfer of standing forces and consequently
cannot in the same way be subject to CSBMs.
241
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
2 -
On the basis of this clear position 1..:t with an open mind
to whatever ideas can advance the co:;:se of our negotiations,
I would like to make some remarks re:ating to the system of
verification on which the views of the two alliances seem to
be converging. I consider this converzence as a positive,
? -.
though certainly not as the only or even the decisive element
required for an agreement.
My considerations and questions start from the assumption that
verification should be effective and not only a theoretical,
abstract principle. I also take it fcr granted that an agreement
in Stockholm will - as all other CSCi-agreements, including
the CBMs of the Helsinki Final Act - contain obligations un-
limited in time which therefore are nr.t only designed for
seasons of political good weather. An only this assumption
makes it understandable for example that all CSBM-proposals
submitted in Stockholm foresee except:ons from the notification
of notifiable activities.
The passive quotas I mentioned before seem to be based on the
understanding that a certain amount cf inspection requests per
year may not be refused. This might create certain problems
and concerns for a State like Austria which for its security
does not rely on alliance membership ut which - situated in
the center of military power concentration in Europe - is
itself surrounded by members:of opposing alliances. We are
aware that members of alliances sometimes have little
understanding for these problems but this is precisely the
reason why it is necessary to recall this aspect in order to
increase comprehension for the security requirements of N+N-
countries.
On the other hand /Austria is also conscious of its share of
responsibility for the future of the CSCE-process; we will
therefore try to stretch ourselves tc the limits of what is
possible and reasonable in order not to complicate understandings
between the alliance partnersin the difficult field of
verification.
242
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
-
But if the system of passive q-otas is not to be only a coat
to cover the otherwise naked ;rinciple of non-refusal it
must be clear, to start with, that passive quotas will not
be used up by members of the sane alliance among themselves.
noreover, the consumption of the passive quota of one State
should not exclude the right'at least to request inspections
beyond that passive quota. (An! in this context just a short
additional remark: according t: the existing note book-texts
requests would be addressed tt the States on whose territories
-an activity is taking place; thus the quota for example of
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic would be very rapidly exhausted whereas no requests
could be addressed to the United States of America and Canada).
The right for additional requests beyond the passive quota
cannot be contested on logica: grounds: because non-compliance
with the CSBM-regime could - h:pefully only in theory - arise
more often than is covered by the inspections admitted under
the passive quota. This aspect is all the more serious if for
example some notifiable activfties were in part to be exempted
from observation. Inspection v:uld thEn remain the only
means of compliance-control. Eyen if criteria of "Realpolitik"
can be adduced in defence of passive quotas, the limitation
of requests to the passive ql4stta would only il_pe,a political
manifestation of the principle of non-refusal but not assure
effective verification - in particular if the passive quotas
were to be relatively low.
The introduction of an explicit limitation of the right to
request an inspection, an active quota as it is called in the
corridors would be even worse: this would lead to absurd
consequences and undermine the whole idea of verification. Up to
a certain degree and in the interest of consensus one can decide
to overlook the fact that verification solutions are proposed to th.
CSCE-conference that satisfy the interests of the alliances.
243
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
-4-.
This cannot, however, bring a non-alliance State to total
self-denial. With an active quota the members of NATO who
underline their firm co=non position and their intensive
cooperation would in reality dispose of 16 times the right
to request inspections that Austria would possess. One cannot
al-title that this is the polit4cal reality of the existence
of alliances: to the contrary, political reality requests
that each and every State has so many rights of request as it
itself considers necessary in order to safeguard its own
security interests. This can only be judged by the concerned
country itself,Arestrictfon of the obligation to accept an
inspection by introducing passive quotas would in itself be
bad enough: an additional explicit limitation even of the
right to put forward a request by establishing active cuotas
has nothing to do neither with an effective, workable verifi-
cation system nor with the fundamental principles of the CSCE
and would not be in line with the interests of my country.
Passive quotas with their lack of a right of refusal and
thus the inherent danger of a possible abuse of inspections
present in our view shortcomings in a verification system.
This is particularly true for smaller non-alliance States.
The seemingly intended restriction of the right to request
inspections to the passive quota will be another deficiency
of this. system which we perhaps also will have to live with.
But the necessity to alleviate such deficiencies of the
joint NATO-WP-approach gives increased importance to an
element contained in SC.7, that is the presence of a
third State during the conduct of an inspection.
The invitation of a third State by the requested State introduces
a cooperative aement of confidence-building into the verifi-
cation system: in the case of misunderstandings or frictions
between the requesting ani the requested State during the
practical conduct of the inspection a third party would through
its mere presence constitute a moderating influence. The
244
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
-5-
.
representatives cf a third State would not be inspectors
themselves but follow and observe the entire inspection.
The invitation would not create any administrative difficul-
ties and would not hinder the conduct of the inspection.
Austria considers this element of cooperation as particularly
important for reducing the block-to-block-character of the
emerging inspection system and thereby for strengthening
the element of confidence-building in the interest of the
longer-term CDE-development.
The participation cf a third State upon invitation by
the requested State also provides some reassurance for a
smaller State which does not rely for its security on
membership in an alliance, in case an unjustified inspection
request were used for an attempt to exert pressure on
such a State. The presence of a third party would have
a certain counter-balancing effect. And I wish to repeat:
the inspection system is not valid only for seasons of
political good weather.
In addition to the purpose of verifying CSBM-compliance -
an aim that passive quotas can achieve only to a limited
extent - the motive of gaining experience is sometimes
mentioned as afl a:sument for the introduction of a somewhat limited
verification system. Particularly for this reason the
limited passive quotas should be used in the best- possible
way in order to permit a broad distribution of experience
amongst the participating States. After all it is not
only of interest to the requesting State if an inspection
were to prove CSEM-non-compliance. This broader possibility
to gain experience by inviting a third party so as to have
both members and non-members of alliances present during
an inspection would be a desirable collateral effect of the
inclusion of a third State.
245
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
?
?
-6
In order to attain the aims mentioned above the choice of the
invited third party must be left to the requested State.
However, the obligation to invite a third participating
State ought to be well defined: Measures agreed in
Stockholm have to be politically binding and should
therefore not be left to the discietion of the
participating States. Otherwise we would fall back into a
situation such as for example the observation system of the
Final Act where some States invited more often than others,
which is precisely what the Madrid Mandate wanted to exclude.
Whether the invitation is accepted or not is another question:
SC.7 does not want to force any State to accept an invitation
if in a particular situation it does not feel like doing so.
Mr. Chairman,
for the reascns indicated above Austria is particularly
interested in the participation of a-third State in inspections.
We are theref:re encouraged that this idea has e.g. been
taken up very positively in recent declarations made by
State Minister Renton and the Spanish Head of Delegation.
We have alS: nr,ticed with satisfaction that this concept
is under acti*:e consideration in the relevant working body
of the Conference.
We would therefore hope, Mr. Chairman, that this important
element submi:ted by the N+F. in their proposal SC.7 will
find its place in the drafting of the principles and modalities
of inspection which is now under way.
Thank you, Chairman
246
n,,,-.1,ccificai ir Part - Sanitized CODV Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
RFCRFT
25X1
SECRET STOCKHOLM 06717
SUBJECT: ON THE VERIFICATION FRONT: WEEK ONE OF THE
FINAL ROUND
1. CDE XII - 021
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SOVIETS' ANNOUNCED READINESS AT
THE OPENING PLENARY TO ACCEPT A PROVISION FOR
OBLIGATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION WAS FOLLOWED BY A WEEK OF
SOVIETS' STONEWALLING AND NNAS' COMPLICATING OF WESTERN
EFFORTS TO DRAFT EFFECTIVE INSPECTION MODALITIES. THE
SOVIETS CLEARLY HAVE NO INTEREST IN EFFECTIVE
MODALITIES AND PROBABLY INTEND TO PRESENT THE US WITH A
BERN-LIKE DILEMMA ON 19 SEPTEMBER: AN AGREEMENT WITH
MUSHY INSPECTION MODALITIES OR NO AGREEMENT AT ALL.
THE LACK OF DRAFTING PROGRESS AT THE END OF WEEK ONE
HAS RAISED ALLIED ANXIETIES AND IS COMPLICATING OUR
ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A COHERENT TACTICAL NEGOTIATING
APPROACH. THE NNA ARE IN DISARRAY, DISMAYED IF NOT
OUTRAGED AT THE PROSPECT OF AN INSPECTION REGIME WITH
NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL. KEY ISSUES BOUND TO CONFRONT US
EARLY IN WEEK TWO ARE RESTRICTED AREAS, AERIAL
INSPECTION AND THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION. END SUMMARY.
4. SOVIETS AND THEIR INSPECTION PROPOSAL. SOVIET
AMBASSDOR GRINEVSKY MADE HEADLINES WITH HIS STATEMENT
IN THE OPENING PLENARY (8/19/86) OF EASTERN READINESS
TO ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION. GRINEVSKY SPOKE OF
INSPECTION IN THE FORM OF A PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM WHICH
WOULD LIMIT EACH STATE'S LIABILITY TO NO MORE THAN TWO
INSPECTIONS PER YEAR. PRIVATELY, THE SOVIETS HAVE
INDICATED, WITHOUT MUCH ELABORATION, THAT THEY WOULD BE
WILLING TO ENTERTAIN A COMBINED ACTIVE AND PASSIVE
QUOTA SYSTEM. AS THE WEEK ENDED LITTLE DOUBT REMAINED
THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO FRUSTRATE OUR EFFORTS
TO DEVELOP MEANINGFUL MODALITIES FOR AN EFFECTIVE
INSPECTION REGIME; THE ATTAINABILITY OF SUCH MODALITIES
IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION.
5. A PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM, AS SOVIET DELEGATES EXPLAIN
IT, WOULD EQUALIZE THE EXPOSURE OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO
ON-SITE INSPECTION. TO THE SOVIETS, IT HAS THE OBVIOUS
APPEAL OF A FAR LOWER POTENTIAL NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS
OF THE USSR THAN THE WO-LIMIT APPROACH OF SC.7 OR THE
COLLECTIVE THREAT OF 16 NATO INSPECTIONS, THE NUMBER
IMPLICIT IN THE CURRENT WESTERN POSITION. THE
GRINEVSKY SCHEME WOULD LIMIT THE USSR'S VULNERABILITY
TO A MAXIMUM OF TWO INSPECTIONS PER YEAR. A COMBINED
EQUAL ACTIVE-PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM, MENTIONED PRIVATELY
BY ONE SOVIET DELEGATE AS A POSSIBILITY, COULD
COMPENSATE FOR THE DISPARITY IN THE SIZE OF NATO AND
THE WTO, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PRESERVING A COMMON
COLLECTIVE CEILING OF INSPECTION ENTITLEMENTS. IN THE
EXAMPLE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS, THE THREE ACTIVE QUOTA
247
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
WOULD MEAN THAT NATO COULD CONDUCT 48 INSPECTIONS OF
THE WTO ANNUALLY; THE SEVEN-MEMBER WTO'S ACTUAL
COLLECTIVE VULNERABILITY WOULD BE LIMITED, HOWEVER,
THROUGH THE PASSIVE QUOTA BRAKE, TO 21 INSPECTIONS.
THE THREE ACTIVE QUOTA WOULD LIMIT WTO INSPECTIONS OF
NATO TO A SIMILAR NUMBER. (COMMENT: WE HAVE NOT YET
EXPLORED THESE CONCEPTS EXTENSIVELY WITH SOVIET REPS
LEST THE SUBJECT OF QUOTAS DOMINATE DISCUSSIONS IN THE
DRAFTING SESSIONS. BESIDES THAT, AT LEAST ONE ALLY AND
SEVERAL NNA HAVE ALREADY COME OUT AGAINST ANY ACTIVE
QUOTA AT ALL. END COMMENT)
6. NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE
FOLLOWING THE PLENARY GRINEVSKY STRESSED THAT
INSPECTION UNDER THE SOVIET PASSIVE QUOTA PROPOSAL
WOULD BE OBLIGATORY. STATES WOULD HAVE TO ACCEDE TO
REQUESTS FOR AN INSPECTION SO LONG AS THEIR QUOTAS WERE
NOT EXHAUSTED. IN BOTH HIS PLENARY AND PRESS
CONFERENCE STATEMENTS, HOWEVER, GRINEVSKY ADDED A
PRECONDITION. ONLY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
WOULD BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION; THESE HE IDENTIFIED AS
MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS. THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, HE EMPHASIZED, WAS
INCOMPATIBLE WITH INSPECTION. TO ILLUSTRATE WHAT HE
TERMED THE ABSURDITY OF THE CONCEPT, GRINEVSKY CITED
THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WOULD ALLOW FOR INSPECTION OF
TROOPS ENGAGED IN FLOOD RELIEF. (COMMENT: GRINEVSKY'S
PRECONDITION PRESUMES INSPECTING STATES HAVE NO
DIFFICULTY DISCERNING WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTIVITY
CONSTITUTES A MANEUVER, MOVEMENT OR TRANSFER, BUT MAY
HAVE LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER AGREED
THRESHOLDS FOR THESE ACTIVITIES ARE MET OR EXCEEDED.
THE PRECONDITION ILLUSTRATES THE ADVANTAGE OF THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A
DETERMINATION ONLY THAT TROOPS EQUIPPED FOR COMBAT ARE
NOT IN GARRISON AND NOT THAT THEY ARE ENGAGED IN A
SPECIFIC ACTIVITY WHOSE CHARACTERISTICS MAY BE
DIFFICULT, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, TO DEFINE OR DISCERN.
HOWEVER THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN SOME READINESS TO
ACCOMMODATE THIS CONCERN THROUGH A COMPREHENSIVE
DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD ADDRESS
THE PROBLEM. END COMMENT)
7. IN THE DRAFTING TRENCHES. THIS WEEK'S EXERCISE
PORTENDS A DOWN-TO-THE WIRE STRUGGLE IF WE ARE TO GET
AN INSPECTION REGIME WHICH MEETS OUR REQUIREMENTS. IN
OUR FIRST ATTEMPTS AT DRAFTING MODALITIES, WE MADE IT
EXPLICIT AT THE OUTSET THAT WE WOULD INSIST ON AIR
INSPECTION AND INTENDED TO ESTABLISH PROVISIONS WHICH
WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR BOTH GROUND AND AERIAL
INSPECTION. THE SOVIETS STONEWALLED, ACCUSING US OF
LINKING ACCEPTANCE OF AERIAL INSPECTION TO MOVEMENT ON
THE DRAFTING OF MODALITIES FOR GROUND INSPECTION.
248
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
8. IN THEIR OWN "CONTRIBUTIONS" TO DRAFTING, THE
SOVIETS MADE SELECTIVE USE OF SC.1. THEIR SNIPPETS
WERE DESIGNED TO PRECLUDE MODALITIES FOR AN AERIAL
OPTION, AND ATTEMPTS BY THE WEST TO PRESERVE THE
ORIGINAL CONTEXT WERE EFFECTIVELY THWARTED. INITIAL
INDICATIONS OF SOVIET READINESS TO DRAFT ON THE TIMING
OF A RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION, ENTRY
ONTO TERRITORY OF THE INSPECTED STATE, ARRIVAL AT THE
SPECIFIED AREA AND DURATION OF THE INSPECTION, AS WELL
AS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE INSPECTION TEAMS, FAILED
TO MATERIALIZE IN RECORDED TEXT. AT ONE POINT THE
SOVIETS ALSO SEEMED READY TO AGREE THAT THE ACTUAL
CONDUCT OF THE INSPECTION COULD BEGIN 90 LATER THAN 24
HOURS AFTER THE INITIAL REQUEST. A DAY LATER THEY
BACKTRACKED AND ATTEMPTED TO TACK ON A 12 HOUR BUFFER
WHICH WOULD HAVE MEANT 36 HOURS BEFORE THE START OF AN
INSPECTION.
9. NNA REACTION TO PASSIVE QUOTA PROPOSAL. THE NNA
ARE IN DISARRAY, DISMAYED IF NOT OUTRAGED AT THE
PROSPECT OF AN INSPECTION REGIME WHICH, FROM THEIR
PERSPECTIVE, WOULD MAKE THEM MORE VULNERABLE TO
INSPECTION THAN WOULD SC. 1 OR THEIR OWN PROPOSAL. THE
SWEDES, WHO ARE THE AUTHORS OF THE SC.7 APPROACH TO
VERIFICATION, ARE LEADING THE OUTCRY WITH THE AUSTRIAN__
CLOSE BEHIND. NN CRITICISMS HAVE RANGED FROM PRIVATELY
MADE ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET-US COLLUSION IN PROMOTING
THE PASSIVE QUOTA CONCEPT To A SERIES OF ARGUMENTS
BASED ON SC.7 THEOLOGY. FOR INSTANCE, THEY SAY THAT
QUOTAS ON THE RIGHT TO INSPECT, WHETHER ACTIVELY
IMPOSED OR PASSIVELY LIMITED, ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH
EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION AND NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE
MANDATE.
10. NNA ARGUMENTS, HOWEVER, BELIE THE REAL CONCERNS.
THE PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM WITH ITS 90 RIGHT OF REFUSAL,
IN THE NNA VIEW, WOULD MAKE INSPECTIONS OF THEIR OWN
TERRITORIES AND ACTIVITIES MORE LIKELY THAN WOULD SC.7
OR NATO'S ACTIVE QUOTA-CUM-NO-RIGHT-OF-REFUSAL
APPROACH. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD NOT ONLY PROSCRIBE
REFUSAL BUT ALSO ROB THE NNA OF ANOTHER SC.7 SAFEGUARD,
THE REQUIREMENT TO JUSTIFY AN INSPECTION. IN THE NNA
VIEW, THE SOVIETS COULD NOT CREDIBLY SUBSTANTIATE A
REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION OF AN NN STATE ON THE GROUNDS
STIPULATED IN SC.7, VIZ., THREAT TO THE USSR'S NATIONAL
SECURITY. THE PASSIVE QUOTA PROPOSAL WOULD OFFER NO
SUCH PROVISION. THE PASSIVE APPROACH ALSO WOULD NOT
PROVIDE FOR THE INCENTIVE IN SC.1 FOR WTO AND NATO
STATES TO CONSERVE ONE'S LIMITED NUMBER OF CHALLENGES
TO INSPECT FOR CONTINGENCIES INVOLVING THE OTHER'S
ARMED FORCES. PASSIVE QUOTAS, THE NNA FEAR, WOULD
INVITE INSPECTION BECAUSE THE OPPORTUNITY IS THERE.
THE PASSIVE APPROACH WOULD ALSO ENHANCE MOSCOW'S
249
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRWT
ABILITY TO DETER THE NN FROM REQUESTING INSPECTION OF
SOVIET TERRITORY THROUGH INTIMIDATION, I.E., THE
PROSPECT OF RECIPROCAL INSPECTIONS. A FINAL,
LEGITIMATE NNA CONCERN IS THAT STATES WITH NTMS WOULD
LIKELY HAVE FIRST CRACK AT EXHAUSTING AVAILABLE
INSPECTION QUOTAS BECAUSE SUCH STATES ARE BEST EQUIPPED
TO DETECT ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY WARRANT INVESTIGATION.
11. THE NN SCRAMBLE TO PROTECT THEIR OWN SPECIFIC
INTERESTS HAS RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF SCHEMES WHICH
HAVE BEEN FLOATED DURING THE WEEK. GENERALLY THESE RUN
ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:
. -- OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST FOR USE ONLY BY THE NNA
WITH THE CONCOMITANT RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND REQUIREMENT
TO JUSTIFY AND A PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM FOR USE BY THE
TWO MILITARY BLOCS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. THIS HAS NOW
DIED AS A RESULT OF EASTERN AND WESTERN REFUSAL TO
CONSIDER IT.
. -- A RIGHT TO REQUEST INSPECTION AFTER THE PASSIVE
QUOTA HAS BEEN USED UP, BUT WITH THE NEED TO JUSTIFY
AND THE RIGHT TO REFUSE. WE HAVE BEEN EQUALLY HOSTILE
TO THIS, BUT SO FAR TO NO AVAIL.
12. SPECIFIC KEY ISSUES. THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WILL
CONFRONT US THIS WEEK AND OUR ABILITY TO RESOLVE THEM
SOON WILL DETERMINE TO A LARGE EXTENT OUR CHANCES OF
DRAFTING MODALITIES ALONG THE LINES AND AT THE PACE WE
DESIRE.
. -- RESTRICTED AREAS. THE ALLIANCE WHICH HAS NO
FULLY DEVELOPED POSITION HAS FOUND ITSELF IN THE
AWKWARD POSITION OF HAVING TO SAY THANKS BUT NO THANKS
TO THE SOVIET OFFER TO DRAFT EXCEPTIONS LANGUAGE ON THE
BASIS OF SC.1. A SOLUTION, HOWEVER, IS IN THE WORKS.
LATE LAST WEEK THE TURKISH DELEGATE ACTING ON
INSTRUCTIONS OFFERED US A FLEXIBLE FORMULA (REPORTED
SEPTEL) WHICH WILL PERMIT US TO SMOKE OUT THE SOVIETS
ON THIS ISSUE WELL BEFORE THE ELEVENTH HOUR. THE TURKS
WILL SUPPORT A POSITIVE APPROACH, VIZ., AREAS THAT WILL
NOT BE RESTRICTED.
. -- AERIAL INSPECTION. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS OF
THE ALLIANCE'S OWN DOING. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO SOLVE IT
HERE. THE FRENCH HAVE INFORMED US OF THEIR
INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT US FULLY ON THIS QUESTION.
UNFORTUNATELY FRENCH DILIGENCE IS LIKELY TO BE
HANDICAPPED BY THE FRENCH ASSESSMENT THAT AERIAL
INSPECTION IS UNATTAINABLE. THE FRENCH MIL REP'S
GAMEPLAN, ACCORDINGLY, IS TO ELICIT THE ANTICIPATED
SOVIET REJECTION FORMALLY SO THAT WE CAN GET ON WITH
DRAFTING GROUND INSPECTION MODALITIES. FROM OUR
PERSPECTIVE THE SOVIETS HAVE AVOIDED SEVERAL CONVENIENT
OPPORTUNITITES TO UTTER THE REJECTION. WE SURMISE
MOSCOW HAS GIVEN ITS DELEGATION THE GREENLIGHT TO
DELIVER IF WEST MAKES IT AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT. A
25X1
250
SECRET
npdassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CALCULATED OUTCOME FOR THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AN ELEVENTH
HOUR OFFER BUT WITH A SOVIET AIRCRAFT OR SOVIET PILOT
CLAUSE. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR AERIAL INSPECTION IS A
REQUIREMENT FOR US AND A SOVIET AIRCRAFT OR PILOT OFFER
WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE.
. -- THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION. THE AUSTRIANS,
BACKED BY SOME OTHER NNA, HAVE PROPOSED THAT INSPECTED
STATES SHOULD HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO INVITE A THIRD
PARTY TO OBSERVE AN INSPECTION BUT NOT REPORT ON IT).
WE HAVE BEEN ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD FORCE THE NNA TO
TAKE SIDES IN EAST-WEST DISPUTES OVER INSPECTION. THIS
ARGUMENT HAS SWAYED SOME NNAS -- ESPECIALLY INFLUENTIAL
FINLAND. BUT IN ORDER TO CONTROL THIS PROBLEM WE MAY
HAVE TO AGREE TO WHAT IS SELF-EVIDENT IN ANY CASE --
THAT AN INSPECTING STATE MAY IF IT WISHES VOLUNTEER TO
INVITE A THIRD PARTY TO OBSERVE. MEANWHILE OUR
ARGUMENT HAS BEEN THAT PROVIDING AN AIRCRAFT AND CREW
WOULD GIVE THE NEUTRALS A NON-CONTROVERSIAL BUT CRUCIAL
ROLE IN AN INSPECTION REGIME WITHOUT CREATING BAD
PRECEDENTS FOR THE FUTURE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
251
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06723
SUBJECT: TRANSLATION PROBLEMS WITH A CDE CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 5861, B) STOCKHOLM 3681,
- C) STOCKHOLM 692, D) 85 STOCKHOLM 8697.
- E) 85 STOCKHOLM 870
1. CDE XII - 022
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN LIGHT OF PAST EXPERIENCE IN CSCE
AND OTHER FORA WITH LAST MINUTE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN
SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF
AGREED TEXTS, USDEL IS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT
OFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS ARE AVAILABLE IN ALL CSCE LANGUAGES
BEFORE ANY DOCUMENT IS AGREED ON SEPTEMBER 19. WE HAVE
MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE NEITHER PREPARED TO EXTEND THE
CDE 'S WORK SCHEDULE BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19 TO ALLOW FOR
TRANSLATION, NOR TO AGREE ON ANY DOCUMENT ON SEPTEMBER 19
IN THE ABSENCE OF OFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN
RUSSIAN. AT NATO'S URGING, THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT
HAS AGREED TO BEGIN TRANSLATING ALREADY NOTED TEXTS FOR
DELEGATIONS' REVIEW AND WE WILL PRESS THE SECRETARIAT TO
ENSURE THAT THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATORS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO
STALL THIS PROCESS. FOR PRACTICAL AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIVE
REASONS, HOWEVER, THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK AND MAY
PROVE IMPOSSIBLE IF MUCH OF THE TEXT IS AGREED ONLY IN
THE FINAL HOURS. USDEL WILL REQUIRE STRONG RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE SUPPORT FROM WASHINGTON IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE
OUR OBJECTIVE. END SUMMARY.
4. IT IS USDEL'S OBJECTIVE TO HAVE ANY CDE DOCUMENT
AVAILABLE IN ALL SIX OFFICIAL CSCE LANGUAGES, PARTICU-
LARLY RUSSIAN, BEFORE IT IS AGREED ON SEPTEMBER 19. AS
THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE AND AS WE HAVE OUTLINED IN A
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS MESSAGES (REFTELS) THERE HAVE BEEN
RECURRING PROBLEMS IN RUSSIAN INTERPRETATION AND TRANS-
LATION HERE IN STOCKHOLM WHICH HAVE HAD SUBSTANTIVE AS
WELL AS LINGUISTIC IMPORT. AS AT PAST CSCE CONFERENCES,
THE SECRETARIAT'S RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS AND
TRANSLATORS ARE ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN
MINISTRY AND, AS SUCH, OFTEN ANSWER TO MOSCOW'S WISHES
RATHER THAN THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY'S. IN STOCKHOLM WE
HAVE SEEN THE SOVIET TRANSLATORS DELIBERATELY PUT A
SOVIET TWIST ON SUCH KEY MILITARY TERMS AS "CONSTRAINTS,"
"GARRISON" AND "GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES." SUCH PROBLEMS
HAVE NOT BEEN CONFINED TO STOCKHOLM: AT THE MADRID CSCE
FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN 1983, THE SOVIET INTERPRETERS
DELIBERATELY DELAYED TRANSLATION OF THE CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE, IN AN EFFORT TO TWIST A
RUSHED TRANSLATION JOB TO THE USSR'S ADVANTAGE; THE
PROBLEM MAY BE MORE SERIOUS WITH GERMAN, WHERE THE TWO
GERMANIES TRADITIONALLY ARGUE VIGOROUSLY ABOUT THE
CORRECT RENDERING OF COMPLEX TEXTS INTO ONE LANGUAGE
252
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
DIVIDED NOT ONLY BY IDEOLOGY BUT BY WORKING FROM THE
ENGLISH OR RUSSIAN VERSIONS OF THE TEXT.
5. BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES, THE TRANSLATION
ISSUE IS ALSO PRESENTING SOME ADMINISTRATIVE AND
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS. AT MADRID IT TOOK THREE WEEKS TO
PREPARE THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
HERE IN STOCKHOLM, WHERE A DOCUMENT IN ITS ENTIRETY MAY
NOT BE READY UNTIL THE LAST DAY OF THE CONFERENCE, THE
TASK OF HAVING ALL TRANSLATIONS IN ORDER AND AGREED BY
SEPTEMBER 19 WILL BE NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE IF KEY ELEMENTS
ARE NOT DECIDED UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE. IN FACT, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY HAS CLAIMED THAT HE CANNOT HAVE ALL
TRANSLATIONS READY BY THE SEPTEMBER 19 ADJOURNMENT DATE
UNLESS THE COMPLETED TEXT IS GIVEN TO HIM BY SEPTEMBER 1.
WHILE WE TAKE THIS SUPPOSED TIMETABLE WITH A GENEROUS
GRAIN OF SALT, IT IS INDICATIVE OF THE NEED TO BEGIN THE
TRANSLATION JOB NOW WITH THE TEXTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY
BEEN NOTED, RATHER THAN WAITING FOR THE ENTIRE PACKAGE
TO BE READY AS THE SECRETARIAT HAS SEEMED INCLINED TO DO.
6. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO OUR INTERLOCUTORS THAT,
WITH MANY OF THE DIFFICULT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES STILL
BEFORE US, WE MUST AVOID HAVING MAJOR LINGUISTIC
PROBLEMS CROP UP ON SEPTEMBER 19 AS WELL. AND IN LIGHT
OF THE RATHER RELAXED ATTITUDE AMONG MANY DELEGATIONS
TOWARD ALLOWING TRANSLATION WORK TO GO ON BEYOND
SEPTEMBER 19, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR: 1) THAT WE ARE
NOT PREPARED TO EXTEND THE WORK PROGRAM FOR SO CALLED
"TOILETTAGE"; AND 2) THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO AGREE
TO ANY DOCUMENT ON SEPTEMBER 19 UNLESS WE HAVE AGREED TO
ALL OFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN RUSSIAN AND
GERMAN. THIS POINT HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY OUR SWEDISH
HOSTS, WHO ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY IMPEDIMENTS TO A
SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF "THEIR" CONFERENCE, AND BY OUR
NATO ALLIES. IN RESPONSE TO SEVERAL ALLIED APPROACHES
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY INSTRUCTED SECRETARIAT TRANSLA-
TORS TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO TRANSLATE THE COORDINATORS'
NOTEBOOK TEXTS AND PROVIDE THEM TO INTERESTED
DELEGATIONS. SOME OF THE TEXTS WILL BE AVAILABLE FROM
COORDINATORS THIS WEEK AND THE NATO CAUCUS HAS SET UP A
NATO LANGUAGE EXPERTS GROUP TO REVIEW THE SECRETARIAT'S
TRANSLATIONS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.
7. TO ACHIEVE OUR TRANSLATION OBJECTIVE, WE INTEND TO
KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE SECRETARIAT TO ENSURE THAT THE
TRANSLATORS MOVE PROMPTLY, AND ON OUR ALLIES TO PREVENT
OPEN WAVERING ON THE SEPTEMBER 19 ADJOURNMENT DATE AND
EXPEDITE WORK ON TEXTS. WE WILL ALSO REQUIRE RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE SUPPORT FROM WASHINGTON, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE
WE WILL CONTINUE TO TRANSMIT ENGLISH TEXTS AS THEY ARE
NOTED. WE WILL ALSO PROVIDE RUSSIAN TEXTS BY POUCH TO
WASHINGTON AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE TO US (UNFORTUNATELY,
WE DO NOT HAVE A CYRILLIC SCRIPT FACILITY ON EITHER THE
253
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SMART
DELEGATION WORD PROCESSORS OR TYPEWRITERS). UNDER THE
BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, OBTAINING COMPLETED OFFICIAL
TRANSLATIONS IN ALL CSCE LANGUAGES BY SEPTEMBER 19 WILL
NOT BE EASY AND MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE IF MUCH OF THE TEXT IS
AGREED IN THE FINAL HOURS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
254
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONFIDENTIALSTOCIHOLM 06721
SUBJECT: NOTED TEXT IN B1 (NOTIFICATION)
1. CDE XII - 023
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING ARE TWO TEXTS NOTED IN WORKING GROUP B1
TODAY (8/26/86).
BEGIN TEXT ONE:
THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE
ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE
ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS
TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE
IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR TO BE
CONCENTRATED. THE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION OF THESE
FORCES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT
INVOLVES . . .
FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL
BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS WHEN THEY
DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION WITHIN
THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
AGREEMENT ON THIS TEXT IS PROVISIONAL PENDING
RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING NOTABLY THE
QUESTION OF EXCEPTIONS. END TEXT.
NOTE: THERE IS NO FINAL AGREEMENT ON WHERE THE
EXCEPTION PROVISIONS FOR FORCES NORMALLY STATIONED
OUTSIDE THE ZONE WILL BE PLACED. GENERAL CONSENSUS
WOULD PUT THE LANGUAGE IN AN EXCEPTIVE PARAGRAPH.
THE ADDENDUM "AGREEMENT ON THIS TEXT . . EXCEPTIONS"
IS NOT PART OF THE NOTED TEXT BUT IS ADDED IN ITALICS,
WITHOUT STATUS, AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE. END NOTE.
BEGIN TEXT TWO:
THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE (TRANSFERS,
DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, ACTIVE EXERCISE
PHASE, RECOVERY PHASE) OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS OF PARTICIPATING FORMATIONS, THE
TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING GEOGRAPHIC AREAS
(DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES) FOR EACH PHASE.
AGREEMENT ON THIS TEXT IS PROVISIONAL PENDING
RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING NOTABLY THE
QUESTION OF EXCEPTIONS. END TEXT.
NOTE: AS WITH TEXT ONE, THE ADDENDUM TO TEXT TWO HAS NO
STATUS. END NOTE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
255
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCZHOLM 06779
SUBJECT: CDE: SPECIFIED AREAS FOR
INSPECTIONS/RESTRICTED AREAS
REFS: (A) STOCKHOLM 5710, (B) STOCKHOLM 6722
1. CDE XII - 24.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. AS INDICATED REF (A), US DEL HAS PURSUED THE IDEA
OF A "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF AREAS TO BE
SPECIFIED FOR AN INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY CDE
AGREEMENT. FOLLOWING INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING TURKEY
(REF (B)), GENERAL SUPPORT HAS EMERGED FOR THE IDEA
THAT NATO SHOULD, FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE, TAKE A
"POSITIVE APPROACH" TO THE QUESTION OF RESTRICTED
AREAS, ( I.E. WHAT CAN BE COVERED IN AN INSPECTION).
LANGUAGE RESULTING FROM THESE SMALL GROUP CONSULTATIONS
WHICH REFLECTS THIS APPROACH WAS CIRCULATED FOR
CONSIDERATION IN THE NATO CLUSTER CAUCUS TASKED WITH
THE VERIFICATION ISSUES ON AUGUST 26. CDE/NATO
RECOGNIZES THE URGENT NEED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE AND
HAS AGREED TO REFER LANGUAGE REFLECTING THIS APPROACH
(SEE TEXT BELOW) TO CAPITALS FOR COMMENT AND SUBSEQUENT
DISCUSSION WITHIN THE RELEVANT NATO CLUSTER NO LATER
THAN FRIDAY, OPENING OF BUSINESS, AUGUST 29. THE
LANGUAGE ITSELF IS DESIGNED TO FOCUS NATO COUNTRIES ON
THE "POSITIVE" APPROACH IN ORDER TO DEVELOP AN AGREED
ALLIANCE POSITION THAT CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR
NEGOTIATIONS. US DEL BELIEVES THAT LANGUAGE BEING
CONSIDERED REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE
QUESTION OF "SPECIFIED AREAS" AND WHICH, IF IT PROVED
ACCEPTABLE IN THE CONFERENCE, WOULD BE A GOOD OUTCOME
ON THIS ISSUE. LANGUAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT.
"AREA FOR INSPECTION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING
COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED CSBMS, AN INSPECTING STATE IS
PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE THE AREA IN WHICH AN INSPECTION
IS TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF A
PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS. SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A
"SPECIFIED AREA." THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL INCLUDE,
INTER ALIA, TRAINING AREAS AND TERRAIN WHERE ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION CAN BE CONDUCTED. IN A
SPECIFIED AREA THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED
ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY EXCEPT FOR
SENSITIVE POINTS (E.G., DRAW FROM
SC.1/AMPLIFIED/MEASURE FIVE/LANGUAGE IN PARA 7,
SUB -PARAS (A) AND (B)) TO WHICH ACCESS BY THE GENERAL
PUBLIC IS NORMALLY RESTRICTED OR DENIED AND PERMANENTLY
RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH SHALL BE AS LIMITED IN SIZE AND
NUMBER AS POSSIBLE AND SHALL NOT INCLUDE TRAINING OR
OTHER AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN
25X1
256
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
TAKE PLACE."
END TEXT.
it. DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH OTHERS FIRST
WITHIN NATO, AND THEN IN THE CONFERENCE, ON BOTH
SECURING SUPPORT FOR THIS APPROACH AND ON SPECIFIC
LANGUAGE REFLECTING IT IN ORDER TO MEET OUR OBJECTIVES
(SEE REF A).
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
257 -
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRFT
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 06782
SUBJECT: FRG AND CDE ADJOURNMENT
REFS: A) FBIS LONDON 281341Z AUG 86; B) STATE 249735;
C) STOCKHOLM 6455
1. CDE XII - 25
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. REMARKS BY FRG MINISTER OF STATE STAVENHAGEN THAT
CDE MIGHT BE EXTENDED BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19 (REF A)
REFLECTS CONSTANT THEME OF FRG DELEGATION HERE IN
STOCKHOLM. US POSITION REMAINS FIRM THAT SEPTEMBER 19
IS THE DEADLINE AND CANNOT BE EXTENDED (REF B).
REQUEST EMBASSY BONN AT EARLIEST APPROPRIATE
OPPORTUNITY REITERATE TO FRG MFA US POSITION THAT CDE
MUST ADJOURN AS SCHEDULED ON SEPTEMBER 19 (REF C).
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
25a
25X1
SECRET
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06783
SUBJECT: OUT OF GARRISON IN CDE
REF: STOCKHOLM 06721, 06677
1. CDE XII - 6.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: DESPITE ABSENCE OF WORDS "OUT OF GARRISON"
IN THE TEXTS NOTED TO DATE, THE OUT OF GARRISON CONCEPT
IS FIRMLY EMBEDDED IN THE TEXT WHICH HAS NOW BEEN
NOTED. IT IS THE COMBINATION OF THE NOTED TEXTS DEALING
WITH TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND THAT
DEALING WITH INFORMATION TO BE SUPPLIED IN THE CONTENT
OF NOTIFICATION WHICH OPERATIONALIZES THE CONCEPT. END
SUMMARY
4. NUMEROUS U.S./SOVIET BILATERAL MEETINGS COUPLED
WITH EXCELLENT SUPPORT FROM THE FRENCH AND OTHER
DELEGATIONS RESULTED IN SOVIET RECOGNITION THAT THE
WEST WOULD NOT SETTLE FOR LESS THAN A COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH TO NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH THEY
CONSISTENTLY REJECTED ANY REFERENCE TO
OUT-OF-GARRISON" OR "NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS". IN
THE BILATERAL AND WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS ON THIS
ISSUE, USDEL SAW AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT SOVIET
ANXIOUSNESS TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT ON NOTIFYING THE
ARRIVAL DATE FOR TROOPS ENTERING THE ZONE TO
PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY (EXCLUDING
TRANSITS FROM ANY NOTIFICATION REGIME) TO WORK A DEAL
WHICH WOULD INCLUDE INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD,
IN FACT, BE AN EXPRESSION OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON
CONCEPT. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, ONE MAJOR LOOPHOLE HAD TO
BE CLOSED, I.E., THE POSSIBILITY THAT TROOPS COULD BE
MOVED SOMEWHERE AND REMAIN THERE WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANY
EXERCISE ACTIVITY. THIS LOOPHOLE WAS CLOSED BY THE
REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY ANY CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS ABOVE
THE THRESHOLD AFTER ANY MOVE FROM A GARRISON AREA IF
THE CONCENTRATION ITSELF REACHED THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
THUS, THE ACTUAL MOVE ITSELF IS NOT NOTIFIABLE,
OBSERVABLE OR INSPECTABLE (EASING MONITORING PROBLEMS)
BUT THE FACT THAT IF THEY STOP ANYWHERE, EITHER TO
EXERCISE OR AS A HALT WHICH DE FACTO CREATES A
CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, THE FACT THAT THEY WILL HAVE
MOVED OUT OF THEIR GARRISONS IS NOTIFIABLE.
5. THE SOVIETS RELUCTANTLY AGREED THAT IN THE CONTENT
OF NOTIFICATION THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON EACH PHASE
OF A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY (WHICH TAKES PLACE OUT OF
GARRISON) WILL BE GIVEN:
-- THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE (FURTHER
DEFINED AS TRANSFER, DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF
FORCES, ACTIVE EXERCISE, AND RECOVERY), THEREBY
COVERING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF AN ACTIVITY WHICH TAKES
PLACE AWAY FROM THE GARRISON AREA;
-- THE PURPOSE OF EACH PHASE;
259
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRFT
-- EACH PHASE WILL BE DELIMITED VIA GEOGRAPHICAL
COORDINATES.
6. THE EXACT LOCATION OF GARRISONS FROM WHICH FORCES
WOULD DEPLOY TO TAKE PART IN AN ACTIVITY WOULD NOT BE
GIVEN, BUT GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES WOULD DEFINE THE AREA
IN WHICH THE GARRISONS ARE LOCATED.
7. THE COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF THIS APPROACH, AGREED
TO BY EAST AND WEST, HAS TROUBLED SOME NNA STATES,
PARTICULARLY SWEDEN, WHICH HAD HOPED THAT DISPOSITION
OF THEIR FORCES, ONCE MOBILIZED, COULD BE EXEMPTED FROM
ANY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT. THUS, FOR THE TIME BEING
THEY HAVE ONLY PROVISIONALLY AGREED THAT THIS TEXT
MIGHT BE NOTED PENDING A RESOLUTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH
NNA FORCES ONCE THEY HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED. (COMMENT:
NEITHER WE NOR ANY OF OUR ALLIES HAVE SHOWN ANY
SYMPATHY TO THE SWEDISH CONCERNS. THE EAST APPEARS TO
BE EQUALLY DISDAINFUL OF THE SWEDISH POSITION, WHICH,
IN OUR VIEW IS UNSUSTAINABLE. END COMMENT)
8. ALLIED ACCEPTANCE OF THIS APPROACH TO ACHIEVING THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT HAS NOT COME EASILY. SOME HAVE
DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHAT THEY PERCEIVE IS A NEW
CONCEPT, OTHERS SMELL A U.S./SOVIET UNDERSTANDING FROM
WHICH THEY WERE EXCLUDED. USDEL, WITH THE FIRM SUPPORT
OF THE FRENCH, HAS BEEN ABLE TO GET CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO
NOTE THE LANGUAGE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME LINGERING
MISGIVINGS AMONG SOME, E.G., THE NETHERLANDS AND NORWAY.
9. WE SEE FURTHER POSSIBILITY OF STRENGTHENING OUR
CASE ON OUT-OF-GARRISON IN A FINAL DOCUMENT BY FILLING
IN THE ELIPSES IN TEXT ALREADY NOTED. USDEL WILL
PURSUE THIS EFFORT WITH DILIGENCE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
260
25X1
SECRET
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 06800
SUBJECT: CDE--CONSTRAINING MEASURES
REF: STOCKHOLM 06518
1. CDE XII - 027.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PROVIDES DETAILS OF A WESTERN
"TIME" CONSTRAINT FOR USE IN THE CONFERENCE. END
SUMMARY.
4. AS REPORTED REFTEL, NATO HAS BEEN DEVELOPING AN
AGREED APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF "TIME" CONSTRAINTS.
WE HAVE BEGUN DRAFTING ON THE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH AS YET
WE HAVE NO AGREED LANGUAGE. THE FOLLOWING TEXT HAS
BEEN AD REF AGREED BY THE US, UK, AND FRG AND IS
GENERALLY SUPPORTED BY OTHER ALLIES. IT PROVIDES FOR
THE FOLLOWING: 1) ACTIVITIES ABOVE 40,000 WILL BE
FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE; 2) NO ACTIVITIES ABOVE
75,000 WILL BE ALLOWED UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN FORECAST
TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE; 3) INSPECTION OF ANY ACTIVITY
WHICH IS PRIOR NOTIFIED BUT NOT FORECAST SHALL NOT
COUNT AGAINST ANY PARTICIPATING STATE'S PASSIVE QUOTA
FOR INSPECTION; AND 4) EXCLUSION OF ALERTS FROM BOTH
THE PRIOR FORECAST REQUIREMENT AND THE PASSIVE QUOTA
EXEMPTION.
5. BEGIN TEXT:
"I. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL COMMUNICATE, IN
WRITING, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, BY 15 NOV
EACH YEAR, INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN AN
AGGREGATE TOTAL OF 40,000 TROOPS OR ..., WHICH IT
PLANS TO CARRY OUT DURING THE SECOND SUBSEQUENT
CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH COMMUNICATION WILL INCLUDE THE
GENERAL PURPOSE, ENVISAGED TIMEFRAME AND DURATION,
AREA, AND SIZE OF EACH ACTIVITY.
II. PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING
MORE THAN AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF 75,000 TROOPS OR ...,
UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF COMMUNICATION AS
DEFINED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.
III. IF A PARTICIPATING STATE CARRIES OUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION IN ADDITION
TO THOSE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR OR THOSE THAT
HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF COMMUNICATION AS DEFINED IN
PARAGRAPH I ABOVE, INSPECTION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES SHALL
NOT COUNT AGAINST ANY PARTICIPATING STATE'S PASSIVE
QUOTA FOR INSPECTION."
END TEXT.
6. COMMENT: WE EXPECT NO OPPOSITION TO THIS APPROACH
WITHIN NATO BUT BELIEVE THE RELATIVELY LOW PARAMETERS
WILL CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR BOTH EAST AND NNA. WE
ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE PASSIVE QUOTA EXEMPTION WILL
HELP SMOOTH RUFFLED NNA FEATHERS REGARDING THE
261
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
crrizor
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PASSIVE QUOTA. USDEL HAD HOPED TO
INCLUDE ALERT ACTIVITIES ABOVE 75,000 IN THE EXEMPTION
FROM THE PASSIVE QUOTA, BUT THIS IDEA HAS GENERATED
STRONG OPPOSITION IN BONN. WE HAVE RELUCTANTLY AGREED
TO GO ALONG, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SC.1 PROVIDED
UNLIMITED INSPECTION FOR ALERTS AS WELL AS OTHER
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, SUBJECT TO THE ACTIVE QUOTA.
END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
262
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 06851
GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO CD DEL
SUBJECT: CDE--LANGUAGE NOTED IN WORKING GROUP A-3
1. CDE XII - 031.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE WAS NOTED IN WORKING GROUP
A-3 ON 28 AUGUST. IT PROVIDES FOR INFORMATION ON THE
AREA AND TIMING OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
THE DATE OF 15 NOV FOR EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS
WAS ALSO AGREED.
4. BEGIN TEXT:
"- AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, INDICATED BY
APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND/OR DEFINED BY
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THE 14
DAY PERIOD, INDICATED BY DATES, WITHIN WHICH IT IS
ENVISAGED TO START." END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
263
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 06852
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION),
AUGUST 28, 1986
1. CDE XII - 032
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ON AUGUST 28 WORKING GROUP B-2 AGREED TO NOTE TWO
ADDITIONAL SENTENCES. THE FIRST TEXT COMPLETES A
PREVIOUSLY NOTED PARAGRAPH AND IS THE SECOND SENTENCE OF
THAT PARAGRAPH.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY
AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS
PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. MILITARY
OBSERVERS WILL, NORMALLY, WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS AND
INSIGNIA WHILE PERFORMING THEIR TASKS.
END TEXT.
4. THE SECOND TEXT DEALS WITH REQUESTS AS FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS WITH REGARD TO THE
OBSERVATION PROGRAM. THE HOST STATE WILL, IF POSSIBLE,
ACCEDE TO THEM.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
25X1
264
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM o6847
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY MARSHAL SERGEI F. AKHROMEYEV
1. CDE XII - 033
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE IN CDE
PLENARY BY MARSHAL SERGEI F. AKHROMEYEV, CHIEF OF THE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR, FIRST
DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR, IN STOCKHOLM
AUGUST 29, 1986.
BEGIN TEXT:
DISTINGUISHED KR. CHAIRMAN,
I WISH TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY
PROVIDED TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
TO ADDRESS THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,
THIS IMPOSING INTERNATIONAL FORUM. I AM ACTING ON
INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SOVIET GOVRENMENT.
TODAY YOUR WORK IS IN THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION OF THE
NATIONS OF EUROPE AND NOT ONLY OF EUROPE. THE STATE OF
AFFAIRS AT THE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN CONSTANTLY KEPT
WITHIN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR
STATE. WE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY
ANALYZING THE COURSE OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE
PARTICIPATION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN IT, HAVE BEEN
STUYDING AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS AND
PROPOSALS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION ALL THE FACTS WE MAKE DECISIONS WITH THE
AIM OF ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCPETABLE SOLUTIONS, THUS
ENSURING A CONSTRUCTIVE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE.
THIS ATTENTION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND
THE SOVIET PUBLIC TO THE CONFERENCE IS UNDERSTANDABLE,
FOR IT WAS EUROPE WHERE WORLD WARS FLARED UP TWICE IN
WHICH OUR NATION SUFFERED PARTICULARLY HEAVY LOSSES.
WE IN THE SOVIET UNION ALWAYS REMEMBER THOSE
IRRETRIEVABLE LOSSES. IN EUROPE TWO GROUPINGS OF
FORCES, EACH MILLION STRONG, OF THE BIGGEST MILITARY
ALLIANCES, NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY, FACE EACH OTHER
EVEN TODAY. AT PRESENT THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT IS ONE
OF THE MOST DANEROUS AREAS IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR
CONFRONTATION. OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS HAVE ALSO BEEN
CONCENTRATED HERE IN A GREAT DEGREE. EUROPE TODAY IS
AN AREA OF THE WORLD OVER WHICH MANY DANGERS LOOM
LARGE, THEREFORE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AMONG STATES AND
PEOPLES IS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE HERE.
PREREQUISITS EXIST FOR THIS. EUROPE HAS A VALUABLE
EXPERIENCE IN PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION.
THE CSCE FINAL ACT ADOPTED IN HELSINKI IN 1975 LAID THE
FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER REDUCING MILITARY CONFRONTATION
AND PROMOTING DISARMAMENT. THE ADOPTION OF THE FINAL
ACT CREATED CONDITIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF NEW
265
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY." THE
MEASURES ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND REDUCTION OF THE
MILITARY THREAT RECORDED IN IT REFLECTED VIVIDLY A
QUALITATIVELY NEW STAGE OF THE PRESENT DAY AND
ASPIRATIONS FOR A BETTER FUTURE IN RELATIONS AMONG
STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS. AS GENERAL
SECRETARY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV POINTS OUT, "IT IS
IMPORTANT, WHILE PRESERVING THE ASSETS THAT HAVE
ALREADY BEEN ACCUMULATED, TO MOVE FURTHER: FROM THE
INITIAL TO A MORE LASTING PHASE OF DETENTE, TO MATURE
DETENTE, AND THEN TO THE BUILDING OF DEPENDABLE
SECURITY ON THE BASIS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND A
RADICAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS."
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS A GREAT ROLE TO PLAY IN
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS GOAL. THE SOVIET UNION CAME TO
THIS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FIRMLY DETERMINED TO WORK FOR
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE BALANCE OF INTERESTS. IT IS OUR PROFOUND
CONVICTION THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION ON THE
EUROPEAN CONTINENT, PEACE AND TRANQUILITY IN OUR
EUROPEAN HOME WOULD BE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE NOT ONLY
FOR OUR CONTINENT BUT FOR ALL OTHER CONTINENTS AS WELL.
THE SOVIET STATE HAS NEVER SET ANY OBJECTIVES IN ANY
AREA, INCLUDING THE MILITARY AREA, WHICH WOULD BE AIMED
AT GAINING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, DIMINISH OTHER
STATES' SECURITY, OR RUN COUNTER TO THE INTERESTS OF
OTHER NATIONS. OUR MILITARY DOCTRINE HAS A STRICTLY
DEFENSIVE THRUST. THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES ARE
DETERMINED OPPONENTS OF WAR IN ANY OF ITS VERSIONS.
THE SOVIET UNION ASSUMED AN OBLIGATION NOT TO BE THE
FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER
STATES DECLARED TO THE ENTIRE WORLD THAT THEY WILL
NEVER BEGIN MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST ANY STATE UNLESS
THEY THEMSELVES BECOME SUBJECT TO AGGRESSION.
IN THE MILITARY FIELD OUR COUNTRY INTENDS TO ACT IN
SUCH A WAY THAT NOONE WOULD HAVE GROUNDS FOR CONCERN
ABOUT THEIR SECURITY. AT THE SAME TIME BOTH WE AND OUR
ALLIES WANT, IN OUR TURN, TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT THAT
IS LOOMING OVER US. THEREFORE WE PRESS FOR A RADICAL
REDUCTION OF THE CURRENT HIGH LEVEL OF MILITARY
EQUILIBRIUM, FOR A TOTAL EXCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER
TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FROM ARSENALS,
SEEK TO REDUCE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE OPPOSING
GROUPINGS OF ARMED FORCES SO THAT THEY WOULD BECOME A
MEANS OF DEFENSE FOR ALL MILITARY ALLIANCES AND
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES.
THE USSR PROVES ITS COMMITMENT TO THE LIMITATION OF
ARMS AND REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY THREAT IN PRACTICE.
THE RECENT EXTENTION OF OUR UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON
266
25X1
SECRET
narlaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001000800017
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TILL JANUARY 1, 1987 IS YET ANOTHER BIG
STEP OF THE SOVIET UNION TO BREAK THE VISCIOUS CIRCLE
OF THE ARMS RACE, TO MAKE A BEGINNING FOR A TOTAL
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS. THIS DECISION OF OURS
MEETS THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES.
IT EVIDENCES THAT THE USSR HAS NO OTHER INTENTION BUT
TO SEEK AN END TO NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION. THE SOVIET
MORATORIUM, AS A CONCRETE ACTION AND NOT JUST AS A
PROPOSAL, PROVES THE SERIOUSNESS AND HONESTNESS OF OUR
PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, OF OUR CALLS FOR NEW
POLICIES -- THE POLICES OF REALISM, PEACE AND
COOPERATION.
THE EXTENTION OF THE MORATORIUM IS NOT TO THE LIKING
ONLY OF THOSE WHO TRY TO DRAW THE SOVIET UNION INTO A
RACE TO DEVELOP EVER NEWER WEAPONS, WHO WISHES TO PUSH
US TO THE ROAD OF CONFRONTATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. THESE
QUARTERS TRY TO DISLODGE US FROM THE ROAD OF DETENTE
WHICH WE HAVE CHOSEN. THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIET UNION
TO STEER INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS DETENTE IS
CONSISTENT WITH OUR PHILOSOPHY AND OUR MORALS.
THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR FIRENDS PURSUE ALSO HERE, AT
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, A CONSTRUCTIVE LINE TO
ACHIEVE IN EUROPE A TRUE ATMOSPHERE OF SECURITY AND TO
DEVELOP A BROAD SPECTRUM OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES OF A POLITICAL AND MILITARY CHARACTER.
THE SOVIET DELEGATION, ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN
COOPERATION WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE
HAVE DONE MUCH TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SUCH KEY ISSUES AS
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
NON-USE OF FORCE, NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS
AND MOVEMENTS OF FORCES, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, AND
VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS ACHIEVED.
WE ASSESS POSITIVELY THE AGREEMENT ON TRANSFERS OF
FORCES TO EUROPE THAT WAS ACHIEVED THE OTHER DAY. THIS
IS SERIOUS AGREEMENT WHICH CAN BECOME AN IMPORTANT LINK
IN THE SYSTEM OF ACCORDS DESIGNED TO ENSURE EUROPEAN
SECURITY. THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL TERMS
NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF FORCES CAN, UNDOUBTEDLY,
INCREASE THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE, CONTRIBUTE TO THE
REDUCTION OF CONCERN AND ALARM RELATED TO THE BUILD-UP
OF FORCES IN EUROPE.
AT THE SAME TIME WE SHARE THE VIEW OF THE NEUTRAL AND
NONALIGNED COUNTRIES TO THE EFFECT THAT AN AGREEMENT AT
THE CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT COVER MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES
OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES. INDEED, MOBILIZATION
ACTIVITIES CONCERN SENSITIVE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL
SECURITY OF MOST STATES AND AFFECT THEIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES IN A DIFFERENT DEGREE.
OUR DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO SEEK MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE SAKE OF
267
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFPRFT
COMMON INTERESTS WE ACCEPTED THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL
PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AGREED TO
REDUCE THE LEVEL FOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS OF LAND
FORCES, AND, ALTHOUGH IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR US,
AGREED TO POSTPONE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND
NAVAL EXERCISES TILL THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.
AT THE SAME TIME ALL MUST BE AWARE THAT AIR AND NAVAL
FORCES IN GENERAL ARE THE TWO MAIN SERVICES OF THE
ARMED FORCES WHICH REPRESENT A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS
THREAT TO SECURITY. IT IS NOT ONLY WE BUT ALSO MANY
OTHER STATES THAT ARE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT EXCLUSION
FROM THE COVERAGE BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF
INDEPENDENT MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES
WHILE LAND FORCES ARE SUBJECT TO THE MAXIMAL MEASURES
OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VREIFICATION. THIS
UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS
OFFERED BY THE WARSAW TREATY STATES WHICH AGREED TO
POSTPONE THE CONSIDERATION OF NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND
NAVAL MANEUVERS. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT DURING
THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES OF THESE
SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES WILL OCCUPY AN APPROPRIATE
PLACE IN NEGOTIATION. NOTIFICATION OF THESE MANUEVERS
MUST FIND ITS SOLUTION.
OUR DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT AT THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE, LIKE OUR DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS IN GENERAL,
IS BASED ON THE AWARENESS OF THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY
FOR SECURITY OF OUR NATION AND OF ALL EUROPEAN NATIONS
AS WELL. WE ARE ENTITLED TO EXPECT RECIPROCAL STEPS ON
THE PART OF NATO STATES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TO NOTE THAT
ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES DISCUSSED AT THE
CONFERENCE MATCHING MOVEMENT ON THEIR PART IS CLEARLY
INSUFFICIENT.
THE SOVIET UNION MADE A PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS. MANY PARTICIPANTS IN THE
CONFERENCE SUPPORTED US IN THIS RESPECT. WE CANNOT
UNDERSTAND THE STUBBORN REFUSAL TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS, AS IT EXEMPTS THE MOST
DANGEROUS TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE FROM
ANY LIMITATION. WHAT DO MODERN MAJOR MANEUVERS MEAN?
THEY MEAN PUTTING THE ARMED FORCES IN COMBAT READINESS
ON THE SCALE OF THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, PUTTING
COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTERS UP TO THE HIGHEST ECHELON
INTO THE WAR-TIME REGIME, AND MOVING GROUND FORCES,
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
AVIATION AND NAVAL FORCES TO COMBAT POSITIONS.
IN THE COURSE OF SUCH MANUEVERS LARGE CONTINGENTS OF
TROOPS AND AIR FORCES ARE TRANSFERRED TO EUROPE FROM
OVERSEAS. THEY ARE ACCOMPANIED BY A BROAD MOBILIZATION
OF HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES.
THUS, THE AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISE OF NATO FORCES WHICH
260
25X1
SECRET
narlaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001000800017
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
WILL BE ALSO CONDUCTED THIS YEAR INVOLVES UP TO 300
THOUSAND TROOPS, APPROXIMATELY 4 THOUSAND TANKS, 2
THOUSAND AIRCRAFT AND 300 NAVAL SHIPS. THE EXERCISE
COVERS THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF WESTERN EUROPE (FROM
NORTH CAPE TO THE SOUTHERN COAST OF TURKEY) AND THE
AJOINING SEA AREA. IN THE COURSE OF THIS EXERCISE WITH
THE ENTIRE DURATION OF OVER TWO MONTHS THEY PRACTICE
PLANS OF PREPARING AND CONDUCTING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF
WAR WITH THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, TEST NEW WEAPONS AND HARDWARE AND VARIOUS
METHODS OF WARFARE. SUPPOSE THAT A SIMILAR EXERCISE
WOULD BE CONDUCTED BY THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION AT
THE SAME TIME? THE SITUATION IN EUROPE IN SUCH PERIODS
WOULD BECOME CRITICAL.
WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SUCH EXERCISES ARE NOT REQUIRED
FOR NORMAL TRAINING OF TROOPS AND NAVAL FORCES. THESE
EXERCISES ARE USED AS A MEANS OF MILITARY PRESSURE. WE
DO NOT CONDUCT SUCH EXERCISES. GIVEN THE DANGEROUS
DESTABILIZING NATURE OF SUCH EXERCISES, THE DEMAND OF
MOST COUNTRIES THAT MAJOR EXERCISES MUST BE
SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITED IS QUITE LEGITIMATE.
THERE IS ALSO OBVIOUSLY THE PROBLEM OF COVERING THE US
TERRITORY WITH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. WE ARE
SPEAKING OF IT IN TERMS OF THE FUTURE. IT CONCERNS
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY EUROPE. MILITARY ACTIVITIES
WITH RESPECT TO THE EUROPE CONTINENT OF ONE OF THE
PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE WHICH POSSESS THE
BIGGEST ARMED FORCES BECOME FREQUENTLY UNPREDICTABLE.
THE NONCOVERAGE BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF US
MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON ITS TERRITORY BECOMES DANGEROUS
AND PUTS AT A DISADVANTAGE THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE RECENT STATEMENT OF THE
US ADMINISTRATION ON THE FINAL SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE REFERRED TO USEFULNESS OF
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, TO THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO
THE PREDICTABILITY OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE
DEPENDS TO A LARGE EXTENT ON THE PREDICTABILITY OF US
ACTION, THEIR READINESS TO COVER WITH
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THEIR OWN MILITARY
ACTIVITIES, IN PARTICULAR, MAJOR MANEUVERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES.
IF MANEUVERS OF TROOPS NEAR THE VOLGA RIVER AND THE
URALS ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION
LEGITIMATE THOUGHTS COME TO PEOPLE'S MINDS AS TO WHY
THE SAME ACTIVITIES ARE NOT VERIFIED NEAR THE MISSIORUI
RIVER AND CLEVELAND.
AVOIDING THIS ISSUE UNDER VARIOUS PRETEXTS THE UNITED
STATES SEEK AT THE SAME TIME TO PUT UNDER CONTROL AND
DAY-TO-DAY TRAINING OF SUBUNITS AND UNITS OF LAND
FORCES IN AREAS OF PERMANENT LOCATION IN THE FORM OF
THE SO CALLED "OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES." WHAT LIES
269-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
BEHIND THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES" CONCEPT? THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE US POSITION, UPON CLOSE SCRUTINY, ON
THIS QUESTION MEANS CONTROL FOR THE STATE OF UNITS AND
SUBUNITS WHEN THEY ARE ENGAGED IN COMBAT TRAINING IN
AREAS OF PERMANENT LOCATION.
IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF ANY
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IT IS NECESSARY TO DEFINE
CLEARLY WHAT SPECIFIC MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE
SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION AND, ACCORDINGLY,
VERIFICATION. THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES" CONCEPT
FOR NOTIFICATION OR ITS MODIFICATION, THAT OF "OUTSIDE
PERMANENT LOCATIONS", PROVIDES NO SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM. IT CONTAINS MANY LEEWAYS FOR ABUSE AND
INTERFERENCE INTO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES AND
THUS CANNOT SERVE AS THE CRITERION FOR NOTIFICATION.
WE CAN SAY WITH EVEN GREATER JUSTIFICATION THAT THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH
INSPECTIONS. INSPECTION MUST HAVE A CONCRETE ADDRESS,
I.E., MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES
WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.
THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO AGREE TO ANY REAONSABLE
VERIFICATION MEASURES PROMOTING THE LIMITATION OF THE
ARMS RACE AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AMONG COUNTRIES.
OBVIOUSLY, VERIFICATION IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF. ITS
SCOPE AND METHODS DEPEND ON THE CHARACTER AND VOLUME OF
CONCRETE AGREEMENTS REGARDING MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT
AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.
ANY ATTEMPTS TO PORTRARY THINGS IN SUCH A WAY AS IF THE
USSR IS AGAINST INSPECTIONS AND HENCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE
TO AGREE ON ANY REAL DISARMAMENT STEPS CONSTITUTE A
DELIBERATE LIE. WE ACCEPT THE WIDEST POSSIBLE
INSPECTION TO TERMINATE NUCLEAR TESTING. BY THE WAY,
WHEN WE RAISED THIS QUESTION IN THIS FASHION IN
NEGOTIATION IT TURNED OUT THAT OUR COUNTERPARTS WERE
SIMPLY BEING CUNNING: THEY MADE OUT OF THE
VERIFICATION PROBLEM AN ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLE COVERING UP
FOR THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE UP NUCLEAR TESTING. WE
ARE READY TO ACCEPT INSPECTION IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM
OF BANNING AND COMPLETELY ELIMINATING CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES ENVISAGED
ON-SITE INSPECTIONS IN THEIR PROPOSALS REGARDING THE
REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
IN EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. IN BRIEF,
THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM DOES NOT EXIST. THE USSR IS
AGREEABLE TO VARIOUS FORMS OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING
INTERNATIONAL ONES. WE CONFIRM THIS HERE, AT THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, AS WELL IN SOLVING QUESTIONS OF
VERIFICATION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.
OF COURSE, WE REGRET THAT OUR MOST ACTIVE INTERLOCUTOR
27a
25X1
SECRET
nni-laccifiinri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
ON THE INSPECTION ISSUE AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE
CONFERENCE WHILE SPEAKING IN FAVOUR OF "OPENNESS OF ALL
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE" PUTS ITS OWN TERRITORY
OUTSIDE VERIFICATION. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT IN THIS
CASE THERE IS A DESIRE TO OPEN ("MAKE TRANSPARENT")
EUROPE TO THE URALS AND CLOSE ITS OWN MILITARY
ACTIVITIES.
DESPITE THIS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DEEMED IT POSSIBLE
TO AGREE TO INSPECTIONS IN ORDER TO VERIFY
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. THE USSR IS DOING SO
GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTIONS AT THE CONFERENCE AND TO
CONCLUDE IT BY CONCRETE RESULTS. OBVIOUSLY, WE BELIEVE
THAT INSPECTIONS MUST NOT BE TURNED INTO AN
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING INSTRUMENT, I.E., THEY MUST NOT
DIMINISH ANYONE'S SECURITY. SPECIFICALLY, THE USSR
CONSIDERS THAT EACH STATE PARTICIPATING IN THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE COULD ALLOW THE CONDUCT OF ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS ON ITS TERRITORY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN
CONTINENT BASED ON THE QUOTA OF ONE TO TWO INSPECTIONS
PER YEAR ON REQUESTS FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES,
IF SUSPICIONS ARISE REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WILL BE NEGOTIATIED.
UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
THE INSPECTION AREA SPECIFIED IN THE REQUEST OF AN
INSPECTING STATE FORMS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THIS
SCHEME. IT SHOULD BE AN AREA WHERE A NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE -- TROOPS OR OPERATIONAL
AND TACTICAL EXERCISES, MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS OF FORCES,
AND EXERCISE- AND MOVEMENT-RELATED CONCENTRATIONS OF
FORCES OUTSIDE AREAS OF PERMANENT LOCATION ABOVE A
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. IN ORDER NOT TO DIMINISH SECURITY OF
THE INSPECTED STATE REQUESTS SHOULD NOT CLAIM THE
CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS IN CLOSED AREAS OR IN MILITARY
AND DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS WITH RESTRICTED ACCESS. AT
THE SAME TIME WE ACT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SUCH CLOSED
AREAS WILL BE DEFINED AS APPLIED TO AN AGREEMENT ON
VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CSBMS. NATURALLY, THE
NUMBER AND EXTENT OF THESE CLOSED AREAS SHOULD BE KEPT
WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS, I.E., THEY SHOULD BE SO AS TO
ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE
CONFERENCE. THEY SHOULD NOT INCLUDE AREAS WHERE
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE.
THERE ARE STILL DIVERGENCIES AT THE CONFERENCE
REGARDING METHODS FOR INSPECTION: NATO COUNTRIES, IN
PARTICULAR, INSIST ON AIR INSPECTION.
I'LL BE FRANK, TO US, MILITARY MEN, INSPECTION FROM THE
AIR HAS BEEN A TRADITIONALLY DIFFICULT QUESTION SINCE
THE "OPEN SKIES" DOCTRINE PROCLAIMED BY PRESIDENT
EISENHOWER. AT THAT TIME, AS IS KNOWN, NO AGREEMENT
271
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
WAS REACHED TO THIS EFFECT. HOWEVER, TIME MOVES US TO
NEW FRONTIERS, REQUIRES NEW POLIICAL AND MILITARY
APPROACHES TO QUESTIONS OF ENSURING PEACE AND
COOPERATION, CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN THE ENTIRE
WORLD AND ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE.
WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
SITUATION AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WE COULD THINK OF
ADOPTING AN AIR/GROUND VERSION OF ON-SITE INSPECTION ON
THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT INSPECTIONS WOULD BE
CARRIED OUT FROM TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT
PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTED STATE. IN OUR VIEW,
DELEGATIONS COULD CONSIDER IT AT THE CONFERENCE.
SUCH ARE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS OF THE USSR AND OTHER
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AIMED AT ACHIEVING AGREEMENTS ON
THE MAJOR ISSUES OF THE CONFERENCE. OUR STEPS ARE
DICTATED BY THE PEACEFUL POLICIES OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND FOLLOW FROM THE DEFENSIVE NATURE OF OUR MILITARY
DOCTRINE.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE CONFERENCE IS STILL PROCEEDING
SLOWLY AND THERE REMAIN MANY UNRESOLVED ISSUES ALTHOUGH
TIME IS RUNNING OUT. IT WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE TO COME
TO GRIPS WITH ALL THE QUESTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION
WITHOUT PUTTING ANYTHING OFF TILL THE END OF THE
CONFERENCE SO THAT IT WOULD COMPLETE ITS WORK ON
SEPTEMBER 19 BY ADOPTING SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS.
WE COUNT ON A RECIPROCALLY CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH OF ALL
THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE. IN SO DOING WE
ASSUME THAT THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY TODAY IS OUR COMMON
PROBLEM AND HENCE OUR COMMON CONCERN AND OUR COMMON
RESPONSIBILITY. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THIS TRUTH IS
EVIDENT TO ALL. HOWEVER, THE WORK FOR DETENTE,
ENHANCED STABIITY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE WORLD TAKES
PLACE IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. ON THE ONE HAND, THE
SOVIET MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTS HAS BEEN IN FORCE
FOR THE SECOND YEAR, WE HAVE DECLARED AND PUT ON THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE IN ALL FORA OUR CONSTRUCTIVE
PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ON
ARMS LIMITATION. FORCES WORKING FOR PEACE HAVE
UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
INTENSIFIED THEIR EFFORTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. ON THE
OTHER HAND, THERE EXISTS A DIRECT AND OPEN REFUSAL TO
TERMINATE NUCLEAR TESTING, STUBBORN COMMITMENT TO THE
ARMS RACE, OPPOSITION TO PACE INITIATIVES, AND
DISREGARD FOR THE PEOPLES' CONCERNS ABOUT THE DANGEROUS
COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE WORLD.
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO CONCLUDE
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE POSITIVELY. THE MAIN
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS FACE WOULD BE THAT THERE WOULD BE
MADE AN IMPORTANT STEP FOR THE BETTER IN EUROPEAN
AFFIARS AND IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE IN GENERAL.
272
25X1
SECRET
narlaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001000800017
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06853
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH SWISS MILITARY
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AT THE REQUEST OF THE SWISS DELEGATION IN
STOCKHOLM, U.S. DEPUTY, AMBASSADOR HANSEN MET WITH THE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE SWISS ARMED FORCES IN BERN ON 25
AUG 86 TO DISCUSS SWISS MILITARY OBLIGATIONS UNDER A
POSSIBLE CDE AGREEMENT. SWISS HAVE AGREED THAT NONE OF
THEIR FORCES NEED BE EXCLUDED FROM A FUTURE NOTIFICATION
REGIME, BUT THAT ACTUAL MOBILIZATION PRACTICES, THE
STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF INDEPENDENT BRIGADES, AND THE
SECRECY OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS TO WHICH THE PUBLIC
DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS MUST BE PROTECTED. SWISS REQUESTED
THAT THE MERE FACT THAT SUCH CONSULTATIONS HAVE OCCURED
BE REGARDED AS SECRET AND SENSITIVE. END SUMMARY
3. IN STOCKHOLM, THE SWISS DELEGATION HAS BEEN AT THE
FOREFRONT OF NNA ATTEMPTS TO EXEMPT FROM NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS FORCES WHICH MUST BE MOBILIZED IN ORDER TO
CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES AT FORESEEN THRESHOLDS.
FOR THE MOST PART, THESE EFFORTS HAVE FOCUSSED ON THE
FACT THAT SUCH FORCES ARE MOBILIZED FOR DEFENSIVE
PURPOSES AND THEREFORE DO NOT POSSESS EITHER THE
MOBILITY OR FIREPOWER REQUIRED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS. THE SWISS INTEREST HAD BEEN TO PROTECT ALL
THEIR ALPINE FORCES (BOTH DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES) AS
WELL AS ALL THE BRIGADES WHICH MOBILIZE IN THEIR
PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND REMAIN THERE THROUGHOUT
AN EXERCISE.
4. THE SWISS AGREED THAT DIVISIONS, NOT EVEN ALPINE
DIVISIONS, NEED BE EXCLUDED FROM A POSSIBLE NOTIFICATION
REGIME. MOREOVER, THE ACTIVITIES OF DIVISIONS COULD BE
BOTH OBSERVED AND NOTIFIED. OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION
OF NOTIFIED DIVISION-EXERCISES IN BRIGADE-AREAS WOULD BE
EXCLUDED AS SENSITIVE POINTS/AREAS. BRIGADES, ON THE
OTHER HAND, WOULD NEVER OPERATE TOGETHER IN SUFFICIENT
STRENGTH TO TRIGGER A NOTIFICATION ON THEIR OWN. THEY
MIGHT, HOWEVER, DURING AN EXERCISE BE SUBORDINATED TO AN
EXERCISING DIVISION AND THEIR NUMBERS INCLUDED IN THE
TOTAL WHICH TRIGGERS NOTIFICATION OF THE DIVISION
EXERCISE. THESE BRIGADES CONDUCT THEIR ENTIRE EXERCISE
ACTIVITY IN THEIR WARTIME DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND CANNOT
UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BE EITHER OBSERVED OR INSPECTED,
ACCORDING TO SWISS LAW. INFORMATION ON BRIGADES WHEN
SUBORDINATED TO A DIVISION PARTICIPATING IN A NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITY COULD NOT BE GIVEN.
5. INASMUCH AS OBSERVATION IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE
HOST COUNTRY AND DEFENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS WOULD BE
CONSIDERED TO BE SENSITIVE POINTS TO WHICH NEITHER
OBSERVERS NOR INSPECTORS WOULD NEED BE ADMITTED, THE
DISPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SWISS BRIGADES WOULD
NOT BE COMPROMISED EVEN THOUGH THEIR NUMBERS MIGHT BE
273
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
INCLUDED IN AN ACTUAL NOTIFICATION. PARTICIPATION OF
BRIGADES IN NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES COULD BE
INDICATED AS A PHASE IN CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.
6. UNDER THE LANGUAGE NOTED FOR THE CONTENT OF
NOTIFICATION, THE SWISS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE
START AND END DATES OF THE DEPLOYMENT PHASE OF A
NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND DEFINE THE AREA IN WHICH THE
DEPLOYMENT TAKES PLACE USING GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES,
BUT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO IDENTIFY ANY MOBILIZATION
PRACTICES, ASSEMBLY AREAS OR INFRASTRUCTURE, IT BEING
UNDERSTOOD THAT MOBILIZATION TERMINATES AT THE END OF
THE DEPLOYMENT-PHASE OF DIVISIONS.
7. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE POLITICAL EFFECT OF
REQUIRING EXCLUSIONS FROM A NOTIFICATION REGIME OF
CERTAIN SWISS FORCES AND WITH A CONDITION THAT A
NOTIFICATION REGIME, INCLUDING OBSERVATION AND
INSPECTION, WOULD NOT VIOLATE SWISS LAW CONCERNING THEIR
MOBILIZATION PRACTICES, THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF
THEIR INDEPENDENT BRIGADES IN THEIR STATIC LOCATIONS,
THE SWISS AGREED THAT NO SWISS FORCES NEED BE EXEMPTED
FROM NOTIFICATION. THE CONCEPT OF SENSITIVE POINTS
WOULD BE EMPLOYED TO PROTECT MOBILIZATION PROCEDURES AND
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS TO WHICH THE PUBLIC IS NOT
ALLOWED ACCESS.
8. THE GENERAL STAFF CONFIRMED SWISS WILLINGNESS TO
PROVIDE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR AERIAL INSPECTION.
9. SWISS CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THESE CONSULTATIONS TOOK
PLACE AS SECRET AND REQUEST THIS REPORT BE TREATED AS
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 06853
SENSITIVE INFORMATION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
274-
25X1
SECRET
in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 06868
SUBJECT: CDE: AIR INSPECTION ISSUE COMES TO A HEAD
1. SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF, MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV MADE THE
EXPECTED SOVIET MOVE ON AERIAL INSPECTION IN HIS AUGUST
29 STATEMENT OT THE CDE PLENARY; HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET
UNION MIGHT AEOW AIR INSPECTION IF IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT
THE INSPECTED STATE WOULD SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT. AS
ALREADY ARRANGED IN THE NATO CAUCUS, FRG AMBASSADOR
CITRON TOOK THE FLOOR TO OFFER A WESTERN CONCESSION;
NATO WOULD NO LONGER INSIST ON USING ITS OWN AIRCRAFT
IF A COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE SYSTEMS WOULD OFFER
TO SUPPLY ONE.
2. THE NNA CHIMED IN SPONTANEOUSLY. THE AUSTRIAN
REPRESENTATIVE LEAD OFF WITH A STRONG INDICATION THAT
AUSTRIA WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO MAKE SUCH AN OFFER.
THE SWEDES, SWISS AND FINNS SUGGESTED THAT THEY ALSO
MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE SUCH OFFERS. MALTA, CYPRUS AND
YUGOSLAVIA MADE POSITIVE WISES ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF NNA INVOLVEMENT.
3. UNFORTUNATELY THE LOCAL PRESS DID NOT ASK AKHROKEYEV
ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NNA AIRCRAFT IN HIS POST-PLENARY
PRESS CONFERENCE. EASTERN DIPLOMATS,CLEARLY CHAGRINED
THAT NATO AND THE NNA HAD STOLEN AKHROMEYEV'S THUNDER,
GENERALLY EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD EVER
ACCEPT ANY FOREIGN AIRCRAFT CARRYING OUT INSPECTIONS OVER
SOVIET TERRITORY.
4. ALSO THE SWISS SOUNDED RESERVED ABOUT THE IDEA BECAUSE
OF AN EXCESS OF CAUTION. THEIR PLAN IS TO MAKE A PUBLIC
STATEMENT FROM BERNE FOR THE ROLE. THEY ARE IN FACT THE
MOST ENTHUSIASTIC. IF THE SOVIETS DON'T FLATLY REJECT
THE IDEA FIRST, FOREIGN MINISTER AUBERT PLANS TO MAKE
THE OFFER OFFICIALLY DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT SEPTEMBER
3-7. WE EXPECT THE SWEDES, FINNS AND AUSTRIANS TO ALSO
OFFER AIRCRAFT.
5. THE SWISS WOULD LIKE TO BE THE SOLE PROVIDERS AS
REFLECTED IN CITRON'S STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE DESIR-
ABLE FOR ONE NEUTRAL COUNTRY TO BE THE SUPPLIER OF AIR-
CRAFT AND CREW. OUR POSITION IS THAT THIS IS A QUESTION
FOR THE INTERESTED NEUTRALS TO WORK OUT FOR THEMSELVES
(ALTHOUGH PRIVATELY WE HAVE ENCOURAGED THE SWISS MORE
THAN THE OTHERS.)
6. COMMENT: IN STAGING THE WESTERN "CONCESSION" ON
NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT, WE HOPED TO STEAL AKHROKEYEV'S HEAD-
LINES AND PREVENT A GROUND SWELL OF ALLIED SUPPORT FOR
ACCEPTING THE SOVIET OFFER OF AIR INSPECTION WITH THE
INSPECTED COUNTRY'S AIRCRAFT. THE SURPRISINGLY ENTHU-
SIASTIC NNA REACTION WAS MORE THAN WE HAD HOPED FOR.
HOWEVER, WE FEAR THAT IF THE SOVIETS REJECT THE
POSSIBILITY PUBLICLY, THE NNA WILL NOT PRESS THEIR OFFER.
BARRY
275 -
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
END OF MESSAGE
276
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06882
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS --
- AUGUST 25-29, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 6783
1. CDE XII - 034.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: SOVIET CHIEF
OF THE GENERAL STAFF ADDRESSED THE PLENARY AUGUST 29 TO
ANNOUNCE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF AERIAL INSPECTION --
PROVIDED THE AIRCRAFT ARE PROVIDED BY THE HOST STATE.
NATO WAS EXPECTING THIS ANNOUNCEMENT AND RESPONDED WITH
A COUNTEROFFER -- AERIAL INSPECTION COULD BE CONDUCTED
USING NNA AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THIS NEW NATO POSITION
WAS GREETED WITH ENTHUSIASM BY NNA REPRESENTATIVES. IT
IS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT NON-
SOVIET MEANS OF TRANSPORT IN AN INSPECTION REGIME. IN A
MAJOR STEP FORWARD THIS WEEK, THE LIST OF TYPES OF
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WAS CLOSED WITH THE NOTING
OF LANGUAGE WHICH PRESERVES THE OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH
AND EXCLUDES TRANSITS. WHILE THE NNA WERE DISMAYED TO
FIND THAT THE NEW LANGUAGE -- MAKING CONCENTRATIONS OF
FORCES NOTIFIABLE -- MAKES ACTIVITIES BY MOBILIZED FORCES
SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION, THEY NONETHELESS ACCEPTED THE
LANGUAGE. THE FOCUS NOW WILL TURN TO THE NEXT
NOTIFICATION PROBLEM AREA: THE THRESHOLD. THIS WEEK
NATO ALSO OUTLINED COMPROMISE PROPOSALS ON CONSTRAINING
MEASURES TIED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. AS THE CONFERENCE
ENTERS THE SEPTEMBER STRETCH RUN, INTENSIVE, FRUSTRATING
AND PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE
USSR AND THE U.S. AND THE USSR AND FRANCE, CONTINUE
BEHIND THE SCENES TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES. END
SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: IN AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD THE
CONFERENCE NOTED TWO TEXTS WHICH CLOSED THE LIST OF
TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND OPENED THE
WAY FOR DRAFTING ON THRESHOLDS AND THE CONTENT OF
NOTIFICATION. ONE TEXT COVERS NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS
INTO AND WITHIN THE ZONE AND CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES;
THE SECOND REQUIRES INFORMATION ON ALL PHASES OF AN
ACTIVITY. ALTHOUGH THE WEST MADE AN IMPORTANT MOVE BY
NOT INSISTING ON THE TERM "OUT-OF-GARRISON" IN THE
LANGUAGE AGREED THIS WEEK, THE BREAKDOWN OF NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES INTO PHASES WHICH AMOUNT TO THE
PERIODS WHEN UNITS ARE AWAY FROM THEIR GARRISONS
PRESERVES THE SUBSTANCE OF NATO'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT
(SEE REF A). MOREOVER, BY MAKING NOTIFICATION OF
TRANSFERS FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE CONDITIONAL UPON THE
PARTICIPATION OF TRANSFERRED FORCES IN A NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITY OR IN A CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AT
AGREED THRESHOLDS, THE AGREED TRANSFERS LANGUAGE EXEMPTS
277
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
gFrRFT
TRANSITS FROM NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AS EFFECTIVELY
AS SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
THE NNA SWALLOWED HARD BEFORE ACCEPTING THE LANGUAGE ON
NOTIFICATION: BY MAKING CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES
NOTIFIABLE, THE PROVISION COULD CAPTURE NNA MOBILIZED
FORCES MOVING TO THEIR FORWARD DEFENSE POSITIONS, A
CONTINGENCY WHICH THE NNA WOULD EXERCISE ONLY IN A
CRISIS. (THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) EXCLUDES SUCH A
CONTINGENCY FROM ALL REQUIREMENTS OF A NOTIFICATION
REGIME.)
5. VERIFICATION: THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WEEK
CAME IN FRIDAY'S PLENARY AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE
MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV UNVEILED A NEW SOVIET POSITION
ACCEPTING AERIAL INSPECTION -- COMBINED WITH GROUND
INSPECTION -- IF CARRIED OUT BY AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS
AND VEHICLES OF THE INSPECTED STATE. (BEGIN COMMENT:
THIS REFLECTS A BROADER SOVIET DESIRE TO ENSURE THAT THE
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 06882
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
INSPECTED STATE IS IN CONTROL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM, A
DESIRE WHICH IS SLOWING DOWN DRAFTING ON INSPECTION
MODALITIES. END COMMENT.)
RESPONDING IMMEDIATELY, THE FRG, ON BEHALF OF NATO,
WELCOMED THIS NEW POSITION AND PROPOSED A COMPROMISE:
AERIAL INSPECTIONS COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH THE AIRCRAFT
AND CREW PROVIDED BY A EUROPEAN NEUTRAL (RATHER THAN BY
THE INSPECTING STATE, NATO'S PREVIOUS POSITION). (BEGIN
COMMENT: SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA HAVE EXPRESSED
INTEREST TO US IN THIS IDEA. END COMMENT.) NEARLY ALL
NNA MEMBERS WELCOMED THIS IDEA AS A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION
AND SAID THEY WOULD STUDY IT URGENTLY. AUSTRIA EXPRESSED
CONFIDENCE THAT VIENNA WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE
ACTIVELY.
THE NATO COUNTEROFFER ACHIEVED AT LEAST TWO MAJOR
OBJECTIVES: 1) IT IMMEDIATELY BLUNTED, WITHIN THE
CONFERENCE AT LEAST, THE IMPACT OF AKHROMEYEV'S
STATEMENT; AND 2) IT MAY HELP TO MITIGATE NNA IDEAS OF
REQUIRING THE INSPECTED STATE TO INVITE A THIRD STATE TO
OBSERVE EACH INSPECTION. WE ARE MAKING THE PITCH TO THE
NNA (WHO ARE CONCERNED THAT AN INSPECTION SYSTEM WITH A
PASSIVE QUOTA WOULD EFFECTIVELY CUT THEM OUT OF THE
VERIFICATION PROCESS) THAT BY PROVIDING AIRCRAFT AND
CREW THE NNA WOULD BE VERY INVOLVED IN THE INSPECTION
PROCESS. (BEGIN COMMENT: FOR THE NEAR FUTURE, THE NNA'S
POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE FRG PROPOSAL MAY ALSO SERVE TO
QUIET NATO AGITATION AGAINST AERIAL INSPECTION. END
COMMENT.) AKHROMEYEV'S OFFER, THE NATO COUNTEROFFER AND
NNA RESPONSE RAISE THE POSSIBLITY THAT THIS KEY ASPECT
OF THE INSPECTION ISSUE MAY BE RESOLVED SOON; THE
QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS WILL FEEL PRESSURED
INTO AGREEMENT.
273
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
IN THE ACTUAL DRAFTING PROCESS, A PARTIAL TEXT WAS NOTED
ON THE CONTENT OF INSPECTION (REPORTED SEPTEL). ALSO
DISCUSSED THIS WEEK WERE COMMUNICATIONS, EQUIPMENT AND
LOGISTICS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE
THEIR EFFORT TO SLOW DRAFTING IN THE HOPE OF ESCAPING
WITH MUSHY INSPECTION MODALITIES IN LAST-MINUTE
NEGOTIATIONS. MEANWHILE, BEHIND THE SCENES, NATO HAS
BEGUN TO GRAPPLE WITH THE PROBLEM OF AREAS TO BE
SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION/RESTRICTED AREAS. AGREEMENT TO
ADOPT A "POSITIVE" APPROACH -- IDENTIFYING WHAT CAN BE
INSPECTED -- SEEMS TO BE IMMINENT ALTHOUGH DETAILS STILL
NEED TO BE WORKED OUT.
6. OBSERVATION: WRAPPING UP SOME MINOR QUESTIONS, TWO
TEXTS (PROVIDED SEPTEL) WERE NOTED THIS WEEK, ONE DEALING
WITH THE WEARING OF UNIFORMS BY MILITARY OBSERVERS, AND
THE OTHER STATING THAT OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS
REGARDING THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM TO WHICH THE HOST STATE
WILL, IF POSSIBLE, ACCEDE. STILL OUTSTANDING, HOWEVER,
ARE THREE MAJOR ISSUES: THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION, THE
DURATION, AND THE QUESTION OF UNITARY OR SPLIT NOTIFICA-
TION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLDS. NATO HAD HOPED TO FOCUS
DISCUSSION THIS WEEK ON THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION AND HAD
PREPARED A NEW DRAFT ON THE SUBJECT WHICH WAS TABLED AT
THE COFFEE GROUP. HOWEVER, A REFERENCE TO DIRECT
OBSERVATION OF "MOBILIZATION" IN THIS PAPER (INSERTED AT
BRITISH INSISTENCE) RESULTED IN THE NNA REP (LIKO -
AUSTRIA) STORMING OUT OF THE MEETING, BECAUSE HE FELT THE
WEST WAS BACKTRACKING ON "SOLEMN PROMISES" TO EXCLUDE
MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY FROM NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION
(SEE PARA 4). SUBSEQUENT USDEL BILATERAL CONTACTS
MANAGED TO EASE NNA FEARS, AND THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION
WILL BE DISCUSSED NEXT WEEK WITHOUT REFERENCE TO
MOBILIZATION, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS IN THE NATO PAPER. AS
WE UNDERSTAND IT THE UK'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS THAT THE
ACTIVITY OF MOBILIZED FORCES BE COVERED BY CSBM'S; THIS
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 06882
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN B-1. SINCE THE ACT OF
MOBILIZATION HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITY, IT IS BY DEFINITION NOT OBSERVABLE. WITH THE
NOTING OF LANGUAGE IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP ON
CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES, THE DURATION ISSUE WILL HEAT
UP IN THE OBSERVATION GROUP AS WE DISCUSS OBSERVATION OF
ALERT ACTIVITIES. WE CAN EXPECT THE NNA TO WORK VERY
HARD TO LIMIT OBSERVATION OF ALERT ACTIVITIES.
7. ANNUAL CALENDARS: WORK ON THE CALENDAR CONTINUES TO
MOVE EXCRUCIATINGLY SLOWLY. TWO TEXTS ON THE CONTENT OF
THE CALENDAR -- DURATION AND AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY -- WERE NOTED THIS WEEK. (HAVING OBTAINED THE
PRECISE FORMULATION OF "GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES" IN THE
NOTIFICATION, WE HAVE AGREED TO "GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES
279
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
gFrAFT
AND/OR COORDINATES" IN THE CALENDAR.) THE DATE FOR THE
ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF CALENDARS -- NOVEMBER 15 -- ALSO WAS
AGREED. ITEMS REMAINING FOR NEGOTIATION INCLUDE THE
SIZE OF AN ACTIVITY AND INFORMATION ON PARTICIPATING
UNITS AS WELL AS A PROVISION FOR CHANGES/ADDITIONS TO
THE CALENDAR.
8. CONSTRAINING MEASURES: NATO THIS WEEK ANNOUNCED
THAT IT WAS ABLE TO ACCEPT TWO ELEMENTS OF AN EARLIER
COORDINATOR'S NON-PAPER ON A "TIME" CONSTRAINT:
1) ACTIVITIES ABOVE 40,000 MUST BE ANNOUNCED TWO YEARS
IN ADVANCE; 2) THERE MAY BE NO ADDITIONS OF ACTIVITIES
"SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION" (THIS EXEMPTS ALERTS
WHICH ARE NOTIFED AT THE TIME THEY OCCUR, NOT IN
ADVANCE) WHICH ARE LARGER THAN 75,000 TROOPS. THIS
ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TIMED TO PREEMPT AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENT
AT THE END OF THE WEEK WHICH, MANY EXPECTED, WOULD LINK
SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF AERIAL INSPECTION WITH THE WEST'S
ACCEPTANCE OF A "REAL" CONSTRAINT, I.E., A CEILING, NOT
A TIME CONSTRAINT. IN FACT, HE DID NOT MAKE THIS
LINKAGE EXPLICITLY BUT CRITICIZED NATO FOR ITS "STUBBORN
REFUSAL TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS."
ALTHOUGH NATO IS WILLING TO DRAFT ON ITS TWO IDEAS FOR A
"TIME" CONSTRAINT, THE EAST IS RELUCTANT TO DO SO UNTIL
IT SEES WHETHER IT CAN ATTACH ANY CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS
TO THE "TIME" CONSTRAINT. SUCH EASTERN TACTICS SEEM TO
BE RELATED TO A CHANGE IN THE EASTERN APPROACH TO
CONSTRAINTS: IN THE PAST EAST EUROPEAN DELEGATES HAD
LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE SATISFIED
SIMPLY WITH A SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS SECTION WITHOUT ANY
SUBSTANCE. THIS WEEK WE GOT THE MESSAGE THAT THE
SOVIETS MAY BE INCREASING THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTRAINTS,
IN PART AS A "QUID" FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON
INSPECTION. AKHROMEYEV DEVOTED SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS OF
HIS PLENARY STATEMENT TO AN ATTACK ON NATO'S "AUTUMN
FORGE" EXERCISE AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF EXERCISE
WHICH SHOULD BE LIMITED.
YUGOSLAVIA INTRODUCED A PAPER ON "CONSTRAINING MEASURES"
WHICH COMBINED ELEMENTS OF THE WEST'S "TIME" CONSTRAINT
WITH SOME OF THE NNA LIMITATIONS ON FREQUENCY AND
DURATION; IT ALSO INTRODUCED A REQUIREMENT TO ANNOUNCE
TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE AMPHIBIOUS AND/OR AIRBORNE
ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN 10,000 TROOPS. IN
PLENARY AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC, TAKING HIS CUE FROM
AKHROMEYEV, INSISTED THAT CONSTRAINTS MUST FIGURE IN A
STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT.
9. NON-USE OF FORCE: DRAFTING PROGRESSED SLOWLY BUT
STEADILY AS THE EAST SULKED BECAUSE THE WEST DID NOT
JUMP AT ITS DEAL TO EXCHANGE THE EAST'S NEW "BOTTOM
LINE" TEXT ON ARMED FORCES FOR A WESTERN-BASED "HUMAN
RIGHTS" TEXT. LANGUAGE ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF
DISPUTES AND TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION WAS AGREED AND THE
230-
25X1
SECRET
npriaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
NNA MOVED TOWARDS WESTERN LANGUAGE ON DISARMAMENT AND
TERRORISM. HOWEVER, A SERIES OF NETTLESOME, YET
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 04 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 06882
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
ULTIMATELY RESOLVABLE, ISSUES REMAIN. THIS SUITS US
JUST FINE: WE ARE IN NO HURRY TO RELINQUISH THE LIMITED
NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE WE RETAIN WITH THE NNA AND THE EAST
BY CONTROLLING THE PACE OF THE NUF DISCUSSIONS SEE
SEPTEL FOR A FULL UPDATE ON NUF).
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
231
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFPRF'T
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06889
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF AKHROMEYEV CDE ADDRESS
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 6847, B) STOCKHOLM 6868
1. CDE XII - 035
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF
AKHROMEYEV'S SPEECH TO THE CDE PLENARY AUGUST 29 CENTERED
ON VERIFICATION AND OFFERED AERIAL INSPECTION PROVIDED
THAT AIRCRAFT AND CREWS ARE FROM THE INSPECTED STATE.
WHILE AGREEMENT TO AERIAL INSPECTION IS A SIGNIFICANT
DEVELOPMENT, THE SOVIET POSITION ON TRANSPORT CLEARLY
REFLECTS THEIR CONTINUED DESIRE TO CONTROL THE ACTIVITIES
OF INSPECTION TEAMS ON THEIR TERRITORY. THE QUESTION NOW
WILL BE WHETHER THE WEST AND NNA CAN PRESSURE THE SOVIETS
INTO ACCEPTING NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AS A COMPROMISE. USDEL
FOUND AKHROMEYEV'S DISCUSSION OF RESTRICTED AREAS
ENCOURAGING AS HE SEEMED TO MOVE TOWARD OUR "POSITIVE
APPROACH" THAT SUCH AREAS CANNOT BE WHERE NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES COULD TAKE PLACE AND SHOULD BE KEPT TO A
MINIMUM. THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF'S HISTORIC DISGRUNTLE-
MENT WITH THE CDE ZONE OF APPLICATION, AS WELL AS WITH
SOVIET DECISIONS ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND
INSPECTION, WAS EVIDENT THROUGHOUT AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENT
AND PERHAPS EXPLAINS THE LACK OF EMPHASIS ON THE BUDAPEST
APPEAL. ON NOTIFICATION ISSUES, DESPITE THE RECENT
AGREEMENT WHICH CREATES A COMPREHENSIVE EQUIVALENT TO
THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, AKHROMEYEV ATTACKED THE
CONCEPT VEHEMENTLY (A GOOD INDICATION THAT THE GENERAL
STAFF WAS OVERRULED ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL) WHILE HE
TOUCHED ON CONSTRAINTS, IT SEEMED MORE TO LAMENT THEIR
PASSING THAN TO MAKE THEM A PRECONDITION FOR SOVIET
ACCEPTANCE OF AN AGREEMENT. HE RECAPITULATED THE
STANDARD LITANY OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS,
HIGHLIGHTING THE SOVIET MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING.
AKHROMEYEV'S ADDRESS ALSO DEMONSTRATED NEW SOVIET DESIRE
TO CONCLUDE CDE BY SEPTEMBER 19, MOST LIKELY IN ORDER TO
FACTOR ITS RESULTS INTO THE SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE
MEETING. END SUMMARY.
4. FIRST DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE SOVIET
GENERAL STAFF SERGEI AKHROMEYEV ADDRESSED THE CDE PLENARY
ON AUGUST 29 (FULL TEXT PROVIDED REF A). THE FOCUS OF
AKHROMEYEV'S ADDRESS WAS CLEARLY ON VERIFICATION AS HE
UNVEILED A NEW SOVIET OFFER TO ACCEPT AERIAL INSPECTION
PROVIDED THAT THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW ARE FROM THE
INSPECTED STATE. THIS POSITION, ALONG WITH IDENTICAL
PROVISIONS FOR GROUND TRANSPORT, REFLECTS A SOVIET DESIRE
TO ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTION TEAM REMAINS UNDER THE
CONTROL OF THE INSPECTED STATE. NATO IMMEDIATELY
232-
25X1
SECRET
narAnQcifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
RESPONDED TO AKHROMEYEV'S OFFER BY PROPOSING THAT, AS A
COMPROMISE, AIRCRAFT AND CREWS COULD BE PROVIDED FROM THE
NEUTRAL COUNTRIES -- A CONCEPT THAT WAS WELL RECEIVED BY
THE NNA (REF B). THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY ACCELERATE
ACTION ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE COMBINED NATO/NNA
PRESSURE WILL FORCE THE SOVIETS TO TAKE THE FINAL STEP
IN OUR DIRECTION. HOWEVER, HAVING MADE THIS POINT OF
PRINCIPLE AT SUCH A HIGH LEVEL, IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER
THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS MUCH FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE.
5. ON THE SUBJECT OF RESTRICTED AREAS IT APPEARS, IF
AKHROMEYEV PROVIDED AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF MOSCOW'S
THINKING, THAT U.S.AND SOVIET POSITIONS MAY BE CONVERGING
AROUND THE SO-CALLED "POSITIVE APPROACH" THAT AREAS WHERE
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES CAN TAKE PLACE WILL NOT BE
RESTRICTED AREAS. HE INDICATED THAT STATES SHOULD NOT
REQUEST INSPECTIONS "IN CLOSED AREAS" OR IN MILITARY AND
DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND INDICATED THAT SUCH CLOSED
AREAS WOULD BE "DEFINED AS APPLIED TO" A CDE AGREEMENT
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06889
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
(I.E., NOT THE PRESENT SOVIET LIST OF CLOSED AREAS). HE
ADDED THAT "NATURALLY THE NUMBER AND EXTENT OF THOSE
CLOSED AREAS SHOULD BE KEPT WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS,
I.E., THEY SHOULD BE SO AS TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE CONFERENCE" AND "SHOULD NOT
INCLUDE AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKE
PLACE." IN SUBSEQUENT BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE
BULGARIAN DELEGATION AND THE POLISH AMBASSADOR WE
LEARNED THAT AKHROMEYEV HAD BRIEFED THE EASTERNERS ON
AUGUST 28 AND HAD INDICATED THAT "CLOSED AREAS" FOR THE
PURPOSE OF A CDE AGREEMENT WOULD BE BOTH DIFFERENT AND
LESS EXTENSIVE THAN THOSE CURRENTLY DESIGNATED AND WOULD
NOT INCLUDE TRAINING AREAS OR PLACES WHERE NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE.
6. AKHROMEYEV HAD OPENED HIS STATEMENT WITH A RITUAL
REHASHING OF IMPORTANT SOVIET STEPS FOR PEACE AND
DISARMAMENT WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE NUCLEAR
TESTING MORATORIUM, NO DOUBT TO DEMONSTRATE ONCE AGAIN
THAT THE MILITARY SUPPORTS THE IDEA. OF INTEREST TO
USDEL WAS THE SCANT ATTENTION DEVOTED TO THE BUDAPEST
APPEAL AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A CDE PHASE II DEALING WITH
CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT. THIS COULD BE INDICATIVE OF
THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR
GORBACHEV'S RECENT PROPOSALS AND THE PROSPECT OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS.
IN FACT, AN UNDERCURRENT OF GENERAL STAFF DISGRUNTLEMENT
WITH SOVIET CSCE POLICY WAS EVIDENT AT SEVERAL POINTS
DURING THE SPEECH. REFLECTING HISTORIC GENERAL STAFF
DISLIKE OF THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CDE WHICH WAS
AGREED ON AT MADRID AND WHICH WAS FORCED DOWN THEIR
233
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
CLTIOL?Te
THROATS BY BREZHNEV, AKHROMEYEV CARPED ABOUT "NONCOVERAGE
BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF U.S. MILITARY
ACTIVITIES ON ITS TERRITORY" WHICH HE ALLEGED "BECOMES
DANGEROUS AND PUTS AT A DISADVANTAGE THE OTHER
PARTICIPANTS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE."
AKHROMEYEV ALSO STRONGLY FOCUSED ON ANOTHER AREA WHERE
THE GENERAL STAFF'S ATTEMPT TO EXTEND THE ZONE WESTWARD
(THROUGH NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR
ACTIVITIES) HAD BEEN OVERRULED BY POLITICAL AUTHORITIES.
AKHROMEYEV OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS "GREATLY
CONCERNED ABOUT THE EXCLUSION FROM COVERAGE BY
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF INDEPENDENT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES WHILE LAND FORCES ARE
SUBJECT TO THE MAXIMAL MEASURES OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVA-
TION AND VERIFICATION." HE CONCLUDED THAT NOTIFICATION
OF THESE MANEUVERS "MUST FIND ITS SOLUTION" IN THE
SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT
AGREEMENT TO GO ALONG WITH THE ANNUAL CALENDAR AND A
SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED NOTIFICATION LEVEL HAD BEEN
"DIFFICULT STEPS" FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (READ:
GENERAL STAFF). AKHROMEYEV 'S OBVIOUS MESSAGE ON THESE
ISSUES ISSUE AS WELL AS ON INSPECTION WAS THAT THE
GENERAL STAFF HAD TAKEN THESE DIFFICULT DECISIONS AFTER_
WEIGHING THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL STAKES INVOLVED. IN
OUR VIEW HIS MORE SUBLIMINAL MESSAGE WAS THAT THESE
DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN AT POLITICAL LEVELS AGAINST THE
ADVICE OF THE GENERAL STAFF.
7. ON NOTIFICATION ISSUES, AKHROMEYEV EXPRESSED THE
GENERAL STAFF'S SOMEWHAT MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THE
RECENTLY NOTED TEXT WHICH CLOSED THE LIST OF NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. HE "ASSESSED POSITIVELY" THE AGREE-
MENT ON NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS AND CONCENTRATIONS AND
CURRIED NNA FAVOR BY SUPPORTING THE EXCLUSION OF
MOBILIZATION FROM NOTIFICATION. LATER, HOWEVER, HE
RESUSCITATED SOVIET ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE OUT-OF-GARRISON
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06889
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
CONCEPT WHICH "IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH INSPECTION" BECAUSE
INSPECTION MUST RELATE TO "MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND
TRANSFERS OF FORCES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION."
DESPITE HIS OWN MILITARY REP'S (TATARNIKOV) CONCESSION
AT STOCKHOLM THAT THE RECENT AGREEMENT CLOSES THE LIST
OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WITHOUT REFERENCE TO EITHER
MANEUVERS" OR "MOVEMENTS," AKHROMEYEV 'S RETURN TO OLD
POSITIONS IS A GOOD INDICATION THAT THE GENERAL STAFF
WAS OVERRULED ON THIS -- AS EARLIER ON INDEPENDENT AIR
AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. (THE AGREEMENT ALSO CREATES A
COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION WHICH IS THE
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT.)
DEMONSTRATING SOVIET SKILL AT USING WESTERN ARGUMENTS
25X1
234
SECRET
npriassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
OUT OF CONTEXT WHEN IT SUITS SOVIET PURPOSES, AKHROMEYEV
FOLLOWED HIS ATTACK ON OUT-OF-GARRISON BY ADAPTING THE
CONCEPT TO DESCRIBE WHAT AREAS COULD BE SPECIFIED FOR
INSPECTION, I.E, "IT SHOULD BE AN AREA WHERE A NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE . . . OUTSIDE AREAS OF PERMANENT
LOCATION ABOVE A NOTIFIABLE LEVEL." HOWEVER,
AKHROMEYEV'S HARPING ON THIS THEME REFLECTS A KEY SOVIET
CONCERN -- THAT THE ACTIVITIES TO BE SUBJECT TO INSPEC-
TION BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED. IN THIS CONTEXT THE WEST'S
BROAD OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE
IT COULD COVER A RANGE OF ACTIVITIES. THEY ARE, THUS,
CONTINUING TO REJECT OUT-OF-GARRISON AS IT APPLIES TO
INSPECTION AND ARE INSTEAD TRYING TO LIMIT INSPECTION TO
THE "LIST" OF ACTIVITIES AGREED UPON FOR NOTIFICATION.
IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WHILE THE GENERAL STAFF MAY HAVE
LOST SOME BATTLES, IT HAS YET TO GIVE UP THE FIGHT.
8. AKHROMEYEV TOUCHED ON CONSTRAINTS, NOTING THE SOVIET
PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF MAJOR MANEUVERS ("THE MOST
DANGEROUS TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EUROPE") AND
BEMOANED "THE STUBBORN REFUSAL" OF SOME TO ACCEPT THIS
PROPOSAL. IN AN EFFORT TO STIR UP EUROPEAN PUBLIC FEAR
AND CONCERN OVER SUCH EXERCISES HE HIGHLIGHTED NATO'S
"AUTUMN FORGE" WHICH HE ALLEGED WAS A SINGLE EXERCISE
INVOLVING UP TO "300,000 TROOPS, 2,000 AIRCRAFT" WHICH
WILL PRACTICE PLANS FOR "CONDUCTING THE INITIAL PERIOD
OF WAR WITH THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS." HE SAID SUCH EXERCISES ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR
NORMAL TRAINING AND ACCUSED THE WEST OF USING "AUTUMN
FORGE" "AS A MEANS OF MILITARY PRESSURE." WHILE USING
THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE TO SCORE PROPAGANDA POINTS,
HOWEVER, AKHROMEYEV 'S STATEMENT SEEMED MORE OF A LAMENT
THAT CONSTRAINTS WILL NOT APPEAR IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT
THAN A CONDITION FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT. IN FACT, HIS
BOTTOM LINE MESSAGE WAS SOLELY THAT THE "DEMAND" FOR
SUCH A MEASURE WAS "QUITE LEGITIMATE."
9. IN CONCLUSION, AKHROMEYEV STRESSED THE NEED TO
COMPLETE THE CONFERENCE WORK WITH SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS
BY SEPTEMBER 19. AS THE SOVIETS HAVE OFTEN EXPRESSED
WILLINGNESS, IF NOT EAGERNESS, TO WORK BEYOND THE 19TH,
WE FIND IT NOTEWORTHY THAT A SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL
WOULD MAKE THIS POINT. WE SUSPECT THE SOVIETS MAY NOW
WANT TO STICK TO THE ADJOURNMENT DATE IN ORDER TO FACTOR
THE RESULTS OF STOCKHOLM INTO THE SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE
MEETING SEPTEMBER 19-20.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
205
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06879
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S RIDGWAY AND HOLMES
JCS FOR LTG VESSER AND BG DENSON
ACDA FOR DIRECTOR ADELMAN
OSD FOR DAS FEITH
CIA FOR RUTHERFORD
SUBJECT: CDE: THREE WEEKS TO GO
1. CDE XII-036. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: WE PROMISED TO LET THE POLICY COMMUNITY
KNOW THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT HALFWAY THROUGH THE
FINAL ROUND. IN SUM, A REASONABLE AGREEMENT IS WITHIN
SIGHT. THE KEY REMAINING ISSUE IS WHETHER THE EAST
WILL ACCEPT THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREW IN
AN INSPECTION REGIME. WE ARE TELLING OUR ALLIES THAT
WE CANNOT ACCEPT CONSENSUS ON AN AGREEMENT USING AIR-
CRAFT SUPPLIED BY THE INSPECTED STATE, E.G. BY THE
SOVIET UNION. OUR ALLIES ARE TELLING US THAT WE WOULD
BE ISOLATED IN SUCH A SITUATION. PROBLEMS REMAIN IN
ALL OTHER AREAS AS WELL, BUT THEY ARE PROBABLY MANAGE-
ABLE. END SUMMARY.
3. VERIFICATION:
- A. NEUTRAL AIR. NNA ENTHUSIASM FOR OUR PROPOSAL
THAT THEY PROVIDE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT HAS UPSTAGED
AKHROMEYEV'S OFFER OF INSPECTION IN HOST-STATE (I.E.
IN THE CRUCIAL INSTANCE, SOVIET)AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS
HERE AT THE CONFERENCE. (SEPTELS) THE SOVIETS ARE
PRIVATELY REJECTING THE NEUTRAL OFFER; THEY SAY THEY
WILL BLOCK DRAFTING ON AERIAL INSPECTION UNLESS WE
ACCEPT HOST-STATE AIRCRAFT. WE WILL SOON COME UNDER
STRONG ALLIED PRESSURE EITHER TO ACCEPT HOST-STATE AIR-
CRAFT OR ACCEPT GROUND INSPECTION ONLY. OUR ALLIES TELL
US THAT WE WILL BE ALONE IN TURNING DOWN AN AGREEMENT
BECAUSE OF THE ISSUE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT. FOR THIS
WEEK, HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT WILL
PROBABLY BE KEPT ALIVE BY ANNOUNCEMENTS IN VARIOUS
NEUTRAL CAPITALS OF WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY AIRCRAFT IF
ALL PARTICIPANTS WISH.
- B. RESTRICTED AREAS:
- WE BELIEVE A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND ON
THE BASIS OF DEFINING WHERE INSPECTIONS CAN TAKE PLACE
AND SPECIFYING THAT CLOSED AREAS WILL NOT BE USED TO
PREVENT INSPECTIONS. AKHROMEYEV ESSENTIALLY SAID THIS
IN HIS SPEECH AND PRESS CONFERENCE FRIDAY.
- C. QUOTAS:
- THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME IS A CEILING ON THE NUMBER
OF INSPECTIONS ANY COUNTRY MUST ACCEPT DURING A YEAR
(THE SOVIETS WANT A MAXIMUM OF TWO BUT MIGHT ACCEPT 3-4)
WITH 90 ACTIVE QUOTA BUT A PROVISION THAT NO COUNTRY
CAN CARRY OUT MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION ON ANOTHER. AN
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME WOULD BE MIXED ACTIVE/PASSIVE QUOTA -
SAY 3:3 OR 4:4 - WHICH WOULD RESULT IN EQUAL OBLIGATIONS
25X1
206 -
SECRET
npriacsified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
BETWEEN THE MILITARY ALLIANCES. IT WILL BE EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE A FORMULATION WHICH SPECIFICALLY
GUARANTEES THAT THE NNA WILL NOT USE UP THE QUOTA.
- D. NEUTRAL PARTICIPATION IN INSPECTION:
- THIS ISSUE HAS ESSENTIALLY BEEN DEFUSED, THE NNA GOAL
AT THE MOMENT IS TO PROVIDE AIRCRAFT, NOT TO OBSERVE
INSPECTIONS.
4. NOTIFICATION:
- A. GROUND FORCE PARAMETER:
- WE THINK THE SOVIETS ARE NOW READY TO AGREE TO AN
ACCEPTABLE FORMULA COMBINING STRUCTURE WITH TROOPS OR
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06879
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S RIDGWAY AND HOLMES
JCS FOR LTG VESSER AND BG DENSON
ACDA FOR DIRECTOR ADELMAN
OSD FOR DAS FEITH
CIA FOR RUTHERFORD
TANKS. IN ORDER TO GET THE NUMBERS LOW ENOUGH, WE WILL
PROBABLY HAVE TO AGREE TO A SPLIT THRESHOLD FOR NOTI-
FICATION AND OBSERVATION. THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING THEY
COULD "THINK ABOUT" 12,000-16,000. OUR "BOTTOM LINE"
IS 10,000-15,000. WE THINK THAT 250 IS A NEGOTIABLE
TANK FIGURE.
- B. INFORMATION:
- WE THINK WE CAN GET THE DESIGNATIONS FOR DIVISIONS
PARTICIPATING IN AN EXERCISE AND, THROUGH LANGUAGE
ALREADY NOTED ON INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED ABOUT PHASES
OF ACTIVITIES, THE GENERAL AREA THEY COME FROM BUT NO
PRECISE LOCATIONS OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.
5. OBSERVATION:
- WE SEE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS HERE; WE WILL HAVE TO DRAFT
NEW PROVISIONS IF WE HAVE TO AGREE TO A HIGHER NUMERICAL-
ONLY THRESHOLD FOR OBSERVATION. THERE WILL BE LAST MINUTE
NNA PRESSURE TO LIMIT THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION TO, SAY,
72 HOURS. WE ARE CONSIDERING COUNTERING WITH AN OFFER
TO LIMIT OBSERVATION TO A WEEK IN RETURN FOR NNA COOP-
ERATION ON INSPECTION AND NOTIFICATION. WE CONTINUE TO
HOLD OUT FOR THE RIGHT TO BRING OUR OWN BINOCULARS.
6. ANNUAL FORECASTS:
- AGAIN WE FACE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS. OUR OBJECTIVE IS
TO GET AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE.
7. CONSTRAINING MEASURES:
- OUR INTRODUCTION OF A TIME CONSTRAINT HAS HELPED US
TACTICALLY IN FENDING OFF LAST-MINUTE DEMANDS FOR
LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY EXERCISES. THE EAST IS RELUC-
TANT TO AGREE TO OUR PROPOSAL OF A REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY
EXERCISES ABOVE 40,000 TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE UNLESS THEY
ACTUALLY HAVE A CONSTRAINING ELEMENT ATTACHED. WE
EXPECT OUR OFFER OF A PROHIBITION ON ADDITIONS OF
EXERCISES OVER 75,000 TO THE CALENDAR (EXCEPT AS
287
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
ALERTS) TO FILL THIS BILL. IF AND WHEN THE CONCEPT
OF EXTRA INSPECTIONS IN CASE THESE SCHEDULES ARE NOT
HELD TO GETS OFF GROUND, WE EXPECT EASTERN OPPOSITION.
IF NECESSARY IN THE LAST DAYS WE WILL ALLOW A SEPARATE
CHAPTER FOR CONSTRAINING MEASURES (WITH ONLY THIS TIME
CONSTRAINT IN IT) AS A PRICE FOR AVOIDING SUBSTANTIVE
LIMITATIONS ON EXERCISES.
8. NON-USE OF FORCE:
- THE NUF SECTION WILL INCLUDE ALL POINTS OF THE
WESTERN PROPOSAL, NOTABLY A PASSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
CLOSE TO THE WESTERN TEXT. SINCE THE EAST HAS DROPPED
OFF ITS DEMAND FOR A "MILITARY FORCE" REFERENCE, WE
CAN ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCES" BASED ON
HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE.
9. COMMUNICATIONS:
- THE LAST VESTIGE OF "CLARIFICATIONS" WILL PROBABLY
END UP HERE, TOGETHER WITH A STRAIGHTFORWARD PROVISION
THAT NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WILL BE USED FOR
COMMUNICATIONS. THE NNA MAY, HOWEVER, SEEK SOME
VAGUE LANGUAGE LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISH-
ING "RAPID MEANS" OR "DEDICATED LINKS" FOR COMMUNICATION
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06879
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S RIDGWAY AND HOLMES
JCS FOR LTG VESSER AND BG DENSON
ACDA FOR DIRECTOR ADELMAN
OSD FOR DAS FEITH
CIA FOR RUTHERFORD
AT SOME LATER POINT. THE CONCEPT OF AD HCC MEETINGS ALONG
THE LINES OF THE SWISS IDEA OF A SALON DES AMBASSADEURS
IS ALSO LIKELY TO RAISE ITS HEAD AGAIN IN THE WANING
MOMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE.
09. TIMING:
- A STANDOFF ON THE AIR INSPECTION ISSUE COULD LEAVE
US WITH GREAT GAPS IN THE VERIFICATION TEXT BY SEPTEMBER
19. OTHERWISE WE THINK THE SUBSTANCE WILL BE WRAPPED UP.
WE ARE LESS CONFIDENT ABOUT THE APPROVAL OF TRANSLATIONS
AND FINAL EDITORIAL WORK, WHICH WILL PROBABLY NOT BE DONE
IN TIME.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
20a
25X1
SECRET
nprdaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06879
CORRECTED COPY-PARA NUMBER)
SUBJECT: CDE: THREE WEEKS TO GO
AT SOME LATER POINT. THE CONCEPT OF AD HOC MEETINGS ALONG
THE LINES OF THE SWISS IDEA OF A SALON DES AMBASSADEURS
IS ALSO LIKELY TO RAISE ITS HEAD AGAIN IN THE WANING
MOMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE.
10. TIMING:
- A STANDOFF ON THE AIR INSPECTION ISSUE COULD LEAVE
US WITH GREAT GAPS IN THE VERIFICATION TEXT BY SEPTEMBER
19. OTHERWISE WE THINK THE SUBSTANCE WILL BE WRAPPED UP.
WE ARE LESS CONFIDENT ABOUT THE APPROVAL OF TRANSLATIONS
AND TIME.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
239
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRFT
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06880
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
SUBJECT: EXCERPTS FROM PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY
MARSHAL SERGEI F. AKHROMEYEV, STOCKHOLM 08/29/86
REF: STOCKHOLM 6847
1. CDE XII - 037
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESS
CONFERENCE GIVEN BY MARSHAL SERGEI F. AKHROMEYEV, CHIEF
OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR,
FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR, IN
STOCKHOLM AUGUST 29, 1986. QUESTIONS WERE WRITTEN,
ANSWERS ORAL. (REF PROVIDES TEXT OF HIS PLENARY
ADDRESS IN CDE.)
BEGIN TEXT:
? ? ?
Q: FIRST: HOW DOES THE SOVIET UNION SEE THE PRACTICAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF ON-SITE INSPECTION?
A: AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, HERE IN THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE DELEGATES ARE NEGOTIATING ON NOTIFICATION
AND VERIFICATION OF SUCH MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS
MANUEVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES. WE
BELIEVE THAT THESE TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE THE
MAIN AND DETERMINING ELEMENT AS REGARDS ANY THREATENING
CHARACTER TO ANY OF THE STATES, AND THEY SHOULD BE
VERIFIED, INCLUDING BY ON-SITE INSPECTION. IN OTHER
WORDS, IF ANY STATE BELIEVES THAT ANOTHER STATE
VIOLATES ITS ASSUMED OBLIGATIONS IN CARRYING OUT THE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES I HAVE REFERRED TO, AND THEN IT CAN
CLAIM OR REQUEST AN INSPECTION OF THE ACTIVITY IN THE
SPECIFIED AREA. AND THE REQUESTED STATE, THAT IS THE
STATE TO WHICH A REQUEST IS ADDRESSED, SHOULD PROVIDE
POSSIBILITIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION. THE
INSPECTED STATE, THE REQUESTED STATE, SHOULD, WITHIN
THE BRIEFEST POSSIBLE TIME, TRANSPORT THE INSPECTING
TEAM TO THE AREA WITH REGARDS TO WHICH DOUBTS ARISE AS
TO COMPLIANCE. AND THE INSPECTED STATE SHOULD PROVIDE
POSSIBILITIES TO THE INSPECTING GROUP TO SURVEY THE
AREA AND ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE ACTIVITIES CORRESPOND TO
THE MEASURE OF NOTIFICATION OR NOT. THIS INSPECTION
COULD BE CONDUCTED FROM THE GROUND AND, PERHAPS, FROM
THE AIR; THAT IS, THE QUESTION IS BEING DISCUSSED AT
THIS MOMENT IN THE CONFERENCE: FROM THE AIR, INCLUDING
BY AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER.
Q: UPI AND REUTERS: DOES YOUR OFFER ON ON-SITE
INSPECTION FROM THE AIR MEAN THAT SOVIET PILOTS WOULD
HAVE TO FLY SOVIET PLANES ON AN INSPECTION OVER SOVIET
TERRITORY? AND ON CLOSED AREAS: ARE YOU PREPARED TO
ALLOW ON-SITE INSPECTION IN MANY OF THE AREAS WHICH ARE
REGULARLY CLOSED TO FOREIGNERS? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF A
25X1
290
SECRET
n.rincQifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
COUNTRY SAID IT SUSPECTED THE SOVIET UNION HAD
CONCENTRATED ITS NAVAL FORCES IN THE KOLA PENINSULA?
WOULD FOREIGN INSPECTORS BE ALLOWED TO CHECK THESE
ACTIVITIES IN SOVIET PORTS?
AND: WOULD NOT INSPECTION BE WATERED DOWN BECAUSE VAST
AREAS OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES ARE CLOSED ZONES
DUE TO MILITARY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS? HOW MUCH OF
THE SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE WOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM
ON-SITE INSPECTION?
A: IT IS DIFFICULT TO GIVE A BRIEF ANSWER TO THESE
QUESTIONS. FIRST, ON ON-SITE INSPECTION FROM AIR: WE
ARE SUGGESTING THAT INSPECTION OF THE AREA WHERE
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06880
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
EXERCISES ARE TAKING PLACE, AND IN REGARD TO WHICH
THERE ARE DOUBTS OR SUSPICIONS ON THE PART OF ANOTHER
STATE, COULD BE INSPECTED BOTH FROM THE AIR AND FROM
THE GROUND. BY AERIAL INSPECTION, WE MEAN THAT THE
INSPECTING TEAM OF THE OTHER STATE WILL FLY IN AIRCRAFT
WHICH WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTED STATE. AND WE
DON'T SEE ANY CONTRADICTIONS HERE. YOU ARE SPEAKING OF
SOVIET PILOTS AND SOVIET AIRCRAFT, BUT IT IS APPLICABLE
TO FLIGHTS PLACE OVER SOVIET TERRITORY. WHEN FLIGHTS
ARE TAKING OVER THE FRG, THEN AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS WILL
BE GERMAN. AND INSPECTION WILL BE CARRIED OUT NOT BY
PILOTS THEMSELVES BUT BY INSPECTIONS TEAMS. AND IT
WILL TELL THE PILOTS WHERE TO FLY, WHERE TO SEARCH,
WHERE TO TURN AND WHERE THEY COULD SEE THE AREA. SO I
DON'T SEE WHAT IS IMPROPER HERE. THERE IS ANOTHER
QUESTION. YOU CAN IMAGINE A CASE WHEN A FOREIGN PLANE
IS FLYING OVER THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER SOVEREIGN
STATE. AND THIS PLANE COULD BE STUFFED WITH
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING EQUIPMENT, INTELLIGENCE WHICH
WOULD VERIFY NOT ONLY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TROOPS
TAKING PLACE BUT ALSO THE DIFFERENT INSTALLATIONS AND
FACILITIES WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH VERIFICATION.
THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPERMISSABLE INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING ACTIVITY AND WOULD AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A STATE. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE OUR
POSITION ON THE MATTER IS JUST.
AS TO CLOSED AREAS, TODAY IN MY STATEMENT . . I HAVE
ALREADY DEALT IN GREAT DETAIL WITH THIS ISSUE. I
BELIEVE THAT THESE CLOSED AREAS SHOULD BE REASONABLE IN
SIZE AND SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO ASSURE THAT INSPECTION
WHICH WOULD BE AGREED ON IN STOCKHOLM. IN OTHER WORDS,
AREAS WHERE EXERCISES AND MOVEMENTS ARE TAKING PLACE
AND WHICH SHOULD BE VERIFIED, THAT IS, THESE EXERCISES
AND MOVEMENTS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN THE AREAS WHICH
SHOULD (NOT ?) BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION. (AS HEARD)
NOW, ON THE KOLA PENINSULA: THE KOLA PENINSULA IS THE
NORTHERN COAST OF THE SOVIET UNION AND, I'LL BE FRANK,
291 -
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
IT IS A BASE FOR THE SOVIET NAVY. SEA-BASED STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE BASED ON THE KOLA
PENINSULA. IF THE US ASSURES THE RIGHT TO VERIFY ITS
ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC COASTS, AREAS WHERE ITS SEA-BASED
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ARE BASED, THEN AND ONLY THEN A
QUESTION COULD BE RAISED ABOUT VERIFYING THE KOLA COAST
LINE. SO FAR, WE HAVE NOT HEARD FROM THE US ANY
PROPOSALS OF THIS KIND. HOWEVER, IF WE ARE SPEAKING
ABOUT EXERCISES OF TROOPS IN THE AREA OF THE KOLA
PENINSULA, THEN THESE EXERCISES WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE
SAME VERIFICATION AS EXERCISES IN ANY OTHER AREA. I
THINK I HAVE PROVIDED AN ANSWER TO CLOSED AREAS.
Q: ? UPI: HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE NATO PROPOSAL REGARDING
CONSTRAINT ON EXERCISES WHICH EXCEED THE LEVEL OF
75,000 TROOPS AND WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN NOTIFIED TWO
YEARS IN ADVANCE?
A: WE ASSESS THIS PROPOSAL POSITIVELY BECAUSE IT MOVES
SOMEWHAT THE CONFERENCE FORWARD. HOWEVER, THE MAIN
THING DOES NOT LIE IN THIS FACT. THE MAIN THING IS NOT
TO CONDUCT SUCH GREAT MANUEVERS OR EXERCISES IN EUROPE
WHICH ARE BEING CONDUCTED BY NATO COUNTRIES. THE
AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISES HAVE ACTUALLY STARTED. AND THE
ARMED FORCE 5 OF NATO COUNTRIES START MOVING THROUGHOUT
EUROPE FROM NORTH CAPE TO THE SOUTHERN COAST OF
TURKEY. TRANSFERS ARE EFFECTED OF GROUND FORCES AND
AIR FORCES FROM THE US TO EUROPE. AND HEADQUARTERS OF
NATO COUNTRIES LEAVE THEIR PERMANENT LOCATIONS AND MOVE
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06880
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
TO THE FIELD. THE EXERCISES INVOLVE MORE THAN 300,000
TROOPS, 2000 AIRCRAFT, 4000 TANKS AND 300 NAVAL SHIPS.
NATO FORCES ARE MOVING CLOSER TO THE BORDERS OF THE
WARSAW TREATY MEMBERS STATES. HOW SHOULD WE REACT? IT
IS HARD TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THESE EXERCISES AND AN
ACTUAL PREPARATION FOR WAR. THEREFORE, WE ARE IN FAVOR
OF NOT CONDUCTING SUCH LARGE SCALE EXERCISES. AS WE
ARE ALSO TRAINING OUR FORCES TO REPEL AGGRESSION, BUT
WE D3 NOT CONDUCT EXERCISES ON THIS SCALE. AND WE CALL
ON THE OTHER SIDE NOT TO CONDUCT THEM EITHER. HOWEVER
WE ARE FACED WITH A REFUSAL SO FAR.
Q: ? WOULD AN AGREEMENT IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE NOW
REPRESENT THE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL PROCESS WHICH
THE SOVIET UNION SAYS IS NECESSARY FOR A SECOND
US-SOVIET SUMMIT?
A: I THINK YOU ARE RIGHT IN THE WAY YOU ARE RAISING
THIS QUESTION. THAT IS IF DURING THIS STAGE OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THERE WILL BE SUCCESS AND IF
PARTICIPANTS AGREE ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES AND NOTIFICATION OF THOSE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
292
SECRET
25X1
nRciassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
MEASURES AND VERIFICATION OF THEM, THEN THERE WILL BE A
BASE FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT. IT IS NOT AN ACCIDENT THAT
THE CONFERENCE IS ENTITLED THE CONFERENCE ON
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND
DISARMAMENT. AND IF WE AGREE ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURE S NOW, THEN IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO RAISE AT THE
NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE OTHER MEASURES, THAT IS,
MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT. AND MEASURES DESIGNED TO
REDUCE THE ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE ARE PRECISELY THE
OBJECTIVE SET BY THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WTO
MEMBERS. YOU KNOW OUR PROPOSALS SET FORTH IN THE
BUDAPEST DOCUMENT. END PRESS CONFERENCE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
293
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SPCTIFT
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06887
SUBJECT: NUF UPDATE
REF: STOCKHOLM 6449
1. CDE XII - 038
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
MIN
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: VARIOUS TEXTS AWAIT JUDGMENT DAY IN
THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP. WE HAVE NOW NOTED
ALMOST ALL WESTERN TEXTS, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS OF
SELF-DEFENSE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM (AND WE HAVE
MADE PROGRESS ON THESE TEXTS). HOWEVER, AS WE ENTER END
GAME TRADE OFF WE MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER, FOR TACTICAL
REASONS, ACCEPTING SOME NNA TEXTS, AS LONG AS THESE ARE
CONSISTENT WITH CONSENSUS LANGUAGE IN THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. WE HAVE PLACED THE
REMAINING TEXTS IN THREE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES BASED ON
THEIR DRAFTING STATUS. INCLUDED IN THESE CATEGORIES ARE
TEXTS RIPE FOR NOTATION, OTHER MORE CONTROVERSIAL TEXTS,
AS WELL AS THOSE "GRAB BAG" TEXTS OF THE NNA AND EAST.
END SUMMARY.
4. TEXTS RIPE FOR NOTATION CONSIST OF LANGUAGE ON
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (PSD), TERRITORIAL
OCCUPATION, DISARMAMENT, MEDITERRANEAN, SELF-DEFENSE,
AND NONCOMPLIANCE. AGREEMENT ON THE PSD TEXT MAY BE
POSSIBLE NOW THAT THE SWISS HAVE DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE
ON A SENTENCE THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES' "DETERMINA-
TION" TO "DEVELOP" PSD MECHANISMS IN A CSCE CONTEXT. THE
TEXT, WHICH INCLUDES A NEW ADDITIONAL SENTENCE PROPOSED
BY THE SWISS, NOW READS AS FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS
CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN
ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL
FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE
AND SECURITY. THEY RECALL.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO
REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL
FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. (HFA, P.84.)
THEY REAFFIRM.. THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO
SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN
THEM.
END TEXT.
5. IN THE DISARMAMENT TEXT, NATO HAS SUCCEEDED IN
SEPARATING THE NOTION OF DISARMAMENT FROM THREE CDE
OBJECTIVES, "LESSENING MILITARY CONFRONTATION, BUILDING
MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND ENHANCING SECURITY." THE NNA
RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT THIS DEMARCATION, DESPITE THEIR DESIRE
FOR A MORE PROMINENT ROLE FOR DISARMAMENT IN THE TEXT.
THE EAST IS STILL HOLDING OUT FOR A LONGER TEXT.
294
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE FOLLOWING TEXT CAN FORM THE
BASIS FOR A COMPROMISE.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE
EFFORTS TO LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION, BUILD MUTUAL
CONFIDENCE, AND ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY ARE ALSO
COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.
END TEXT.
6. WE ARE ALSO READY TO NOTE LANGUAGE ON "TERRITORIAL
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 06887
OCCUPATION." THE EAST HAS DROPPED OFF ITS INSISTENCE ON
LINKING THIS TEXT WITH THE FINAL ACT'S PRINCIPLE OF THE
"INVIOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS;" HOWEVER, WE DOUBT WE HAVE
HEARD THE LAST OF THIS "FRONTIERS" MOVE (POLAND AND THE
FRG ARE CURRENTLY DISCUSSING THIS ON THE MARGINS OF THE
CONFERENCE). THE LANGUAGE TO BE NOTED:
BEGIN TEXT:
NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
END TEXT.
7. WE ARE ALSO PROGRESSING ON LANGUAGE ON THE
MEDITERRANEAN. (BEGIN COMMENT: MALTESE AMBASSADOR GAUCI
ASSURES US THAT THIS IS THE ONLY REFERENCE TO THE
MEDITERRANEAN HIS AUTHORITIES WILL INSIST UPON IN THE
STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. END COMMENT.) THE USDEL WANTS TO
KEEP THIS TEXT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE AND HAS PROPOSED THE
FOLLOWING LANGUAGE, WHICH HAS HERETOFORE BEEN THE BASIS
OF THE WEST'S NEGOTIATING POSITION.
BEGIN TEXT:
THEY ARE ALSO AWARE, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD
SECURITY, OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY IN
EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
AREA.
END TEXT.
HOWEVER, ALL OF OUR ALLIES BELIEVE WE NEED TO BE MORE
FORTHCOMING TOWARD THE NNA, PARTICULARLY THE MALTESE, ON
THIS ISSUE, AND POINT OUT THAT BOTH THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT GO WELL BEYOND
THE LIMITED U.S. LANGUAGE ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. THEY
ALSO ARGUE THAT THIS MIGHT BUY OFF MALTA ON OTHER ISSUES,
E.G., NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THEREFORE, ITALY HAS PROPOSED
THAT NATO ADOPT THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE AS A COMPROMISE
PROPOSAL.
BEGIN TEXT:
THEY ARE ALSO CONVINCED THAT SECURITY IN EUROPE IS TO BE
CONSIDERED IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY AND
IT IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
AREA AS A WHOLE. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY REAFFIRM THEIR
INTENTION TO CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE NON-
295 "
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES, WITH DUE REGARD TO
RECIPROCITY, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH
IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS
BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT TO
THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF
THE FINAL ACT.
END TEXT.
8. THE TEXT ON SELF-DEFENSE IS STILL BEING HELD IN
ABEYANCE WHILE WE TRY TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE BETWEEN THE
SWISS AND IRISH POSITIONS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE
FOLLOWING TEXT MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH THE SWISS AND
THE IRISH.
BEGIN TEXT:
THEY RECALL.. THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 06887
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS
SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
END TEXT.
9. THE ONLY OTHER TEXT RIPE FOR NOTATION IS NON-
COMPLIANCE. WHILE FRANCE HAS EXPRESSED ITS DISAPPROVAL
OF THIS TEXT IN THE DRAFTING DISCUSSION, USDEL REGARDS
THE FOLLOWING NONCOMPLIANCE TEXT AS A HARMLESS IF
UNNECESSARY ADDITION TO THE NUF SECTION. FURTHERMORE,
THE TEXT HIGHLIGHTS THE ISSUE OF "NONCOMPLIANCE" AND
MIGHT BE A BONE WE CAN THROW IN THE DIRECTION OF THE
TROUBLESOME BUT INFLUENTIAL CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR WE HAVE
REJECTED MOST OF HIS OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS).
BEGIN TEXT:
THEY STRESS.. THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION OF
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVEN-
TION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW. (TEXT PROPOSED BY CYPRUS.)
END TEXT.
10. OTHER MORE CONTENTIOUS TEXTS THE WORKING GROUP IS
CONSIDERING INCLUDE "ARMED FORCES" (FORMERLY "MILITARY
FORCE"), TERRORISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. ON "ARMED FORCES,"
THE EAST HAS DROPPED BACK TO WHAT IT CHARACTERIZES AS ITS
"ABSOLUTE BOTTOM LINE." THE EASTERN REP HAS ALSO SAID
IF WE CAN AGREE ON THIS TEXT, THE SOVIETS WILL BE
FLEXIBLE ON ALL OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DISARMAMENT. THE EASTERN TEXT IS BASED ON LANGUAGE FROM
THE FINAL ACT, P.83, AND DROPS REFERENCES TO "MILITARY
FORCE" IN FAVOR OF "ARMED FORCES." WHILE WE HAVE NOT
EXPLICITLY SAID SO FOR TACTICAL REASONS, WE HAVE HINTED
WE CAN ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCES" BASED ON THE
HFA LANGUAGE. HOWEVER, WE EXPLICITLY HAVE OPPOSED THE
NON-FINAL ACT LANGUAGE IN THE TEXT, WHICH INCLUDES
REFERENCES TO "PREVENTING ANY KIND OF WAR." (BEGI
296
SECRET
25X1
npriacsified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
COMMENT: IF WE WANT A STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT WE MAY
HAVE TO CONSIDER AT THE VERY LAST MOMENT HFA "ARMED
FORCES" LANGUAGE PLUS A FEW MORE WORDS, E.G., RECALLING
HFA LANGUAGE ON PEACE AND SECURITY.) THE NEW EASTERN TEXT
READS AS FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT, TO
PRESERVE PEACE AND TO PREVENT ANY KIND OF WAR, THEY WILL
REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH
THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.
END TEXT.
11. THE TERRORISM TEXT, TOO, IS STALLED BY A FEW
OBSTACLES. THE YUGOSLAVS, SUPPORTED BY THE EAST, HAVE
DEMANDED A REFERENCE TO "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED
TOWARD THE REGIME OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE."
USDEL HAS TRIED TO ELIMINATE REFERENCE TO "VIOLENT
OVERTHROW" WHILE PUTTING "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES" IN THE
CONTEXT OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AIMED AT TERRORISM.
SEVERAL ALLIES, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED DISCOMFORT WITH
OUR OBDURATE POSITION, I.E., OPPOSING FINAL ACT LANGUAGE
WHICH INCLUDES REFERENCE TO "VIOLENT OVERTHROW," AND
WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE YUGOSLAV (AND NNA)
LANGUAGE ON THE SUBJECT. THE TEXT ALSO CONTAINS THREE
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 04 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 06887
DOTS WHERE THE EAST AND NNA WOULD PREFER TO INSERT THE
WORDS "IN ANY FORM." IRONICALLY, THE YUGOSLAVS NOW SAY
THEY MAY ACCEPT THE U.S. APPROACH BUT SOME OF OUR
ALLIES, E.G., ITALY, THE UK, HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH EITHER
OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONDEMN.. TERRORISM . .
INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND
EMPHASIZ.. THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO
COMBAT IT. THEY EXPRESS.. THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE
EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION AND
SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL
APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION,
ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
(THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR
TERRITORIES SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF
PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE,
ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF
TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES
AND THEIR CITIZENS.) OR (THEY CONFIRM.. THAT THEY WILL
REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE ON THEIR
TERRITORIES TO SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF
PERSONS, GROUPS, AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ACTS OF TERRORISM,
297
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR
CITIZENS.)
END TEXT.
12. THE PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON A NATO-ORIENTED
HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT ARE VERY PROMISING, ALTHOUGH THE EAST
WILL PROBABLY INTRODUCE NETTLESOME AMENDMENTS AND
WITHHOLD CONSENSUS UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT FOR TACTICAL
REASONS. LAST WEEK THE U.S. INTRODUCED A PROPOSAL BASED
ON LANGUAGE FROM THE NNA AND WESTERN TEXTS, AS WELL AS
FROM SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S MOST RECENT PLENARY
STATEMENT. THIS TEXT, WHICH NOW FORMS THE BASIS OF
DRAFTING, READS AS FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY (REAFFIRM.. / CONFIRM..) THE
UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF
THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE
CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND
SECURITY, AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL
STATES.
END TEXT.
THE EAST IS TRYING TO INTRODUCE LEAD-OFF LANGUAGE TYING
HUMAN RIGHTS TO "TRUE AND LASTING PEACE FREE FROM THREATS
TO OR ATTEMPTS AGAINST THE SECURITY" OF ALL PARTICIPATING
STATES (P.77, FINAL ACT), I.E., THE SOVIET VERSION OF
RIGHT TO LIFE.
13. THE FOLLOWING NNA AND EASTERN TEXTS, WHICH ESTABLISH
THE NUF PRINCIPLE AS AN EFFECTIVE "NORM" OF INTERNATIONAL
LIFE, REPRESENT "GRAB BAG" LANGUAGE. NATO HAS REJECTED
THE EASTERN LANGUAGE ON THE PREMISE THAT THE NON-USE OF
FORCE PRINCIPLE IS ALREADY A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE
AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ACTIVITY OR MEASURES TO MAKE IT AN
EFFECTIVE NORM BUT INACTIVITY, I.E., REFRAINING FROM THE
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 05 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 06887
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. WE HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE NNA
TEXT AS UNNECESSARY; HOWEVER, SINCE BOTH THE EASTERN AND
NNA TEXT ARE CONTAINED IN THE HFA AND MADRID CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT RESPECTIVELY, WE MAY EVENTUALLY HAVE TO ACCEPT
THE NNA TEXT. HERE ARE BOTH TEXTS.
BEGIN NNA TEXT:
THEY REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT THIS
PRINCIPLE, CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, SO AS TO ENSURE
THAT, AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, IT IS STRICTLY
AND EFFECTIVELY OBSERVED. (NNA TEXT.)
END NNA TEXT.
BEGIN EASTERN TEXT:
REAFFIRMING THEIR OBLIGATION UNDER THE UN CHARTER TO
REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR
25X1
298 -
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE, THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE CONFERENCE
CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO MAKE THIS PRINCIPLE AN EFFECTIVE
NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE. (EASTERN TEXT)
END EASTERN TEXT.
14. BOTH THE NNA AND EAST HAVE INTRODUCED LANGUAGE ON
THE "COMPLEMENTARY NATURE" OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY
ASPECTS OF SECURITY. AGAIN, THE WEST HAS OBJECTED TO
THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS ILL-DEFINED CONCEPT INTO THE
NUF SECTION OF THIS DOCUMENT, BUT IN THE END WE MAY AGREE
TO APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE TAKEN FROM THE FINAL ACT, E.G.,
P.87, UNDER "GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS."
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
299
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFrRF1'
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06881
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
SUBJECT: ON THE VERIFICATION FRONT - WEEK TWO OF THE
FINAL ROUND
REF: STOCKHOLM 06779
1. CDE XII - 039
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK WAS SOVIET OFFER OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF AERIAL INSPECTION WITH INSPECTED
COUNTRY AIRCRAFT AND CREW. NATO'S COUNTERPROPOSAL OF
NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREW DREW A RESOUNDING ENDORSEMENT
FROM THE NNA. DRAFTING ON MODALITIES PROCEEDED AT
CATERPILLAR PACE. MAIN ISSUES LOOMING INCLUDE
RESTRICTED AREAS, SPECIFYING THE AREA FOR INSPECTION,
QUOTAS, AERIAL MODALITIES AND WINNING NNA SUPPORT ON
THE DRAFTING OF MODALITIES. END SUMMARY.
EASTERN ACTIVITIES
I. CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF, AKHROMEYEV,
ADDRESSING THE END-OF-WEEK PLENARY, OFFERED THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN AIR MODALITY, APPARENTLY LINKED WITH
GROUND, FOR INSPECTION BUT WITH AN IMPORTANT HOOK--THE
INSPECTED STATE WOULD PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW.
NATO WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF INSPECTION FROM THE AIR
BUT REJECTED THE HOST-COUNTRY PROVISION. ASA
COMPROMISE, NATO OFFERED THE USE BY THE INSPECTING
STATE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE NNA, HUNGRY
FOR SOME THIRD PARTY ROLE, HEARTILY ENDORSED THE NATO
OFFER.
5. AKHROMEYEV ALSO REITERATED THE SOVIET POSITION ON
OTHER VERIFICATION-RELATED ISSUES. THE INSPECTED STATE
WOULD ALSO PROVIDE TRANSPORT FOR GROUND INSPECTORS.
ON-SITE INSPECTION IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NATO
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. INSPECTION "MUST HAVE A
CONCRETE ADDRESS," THAT IS, THE AREA TO BE INSPECTED
MUST BE AN AREA WHERE MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION ARE CONDUCTED. HE DEFINED THESE
ACTIVITIES AS "TROOP OR OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL EXERCISES,
TROOP MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, AND CONCENTRATIONS OF
TROOPS ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVELS OUTSIDE THEIR PERMANENT
LOCATIONS IN RELATIONSHIP WITH EXERCISES AND
MOVEMENTS." CLOSED AREAS AND DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS, HE
SAID, WOULD BE OFF LIMITS TO INSPECTORS. HE ADDED THAT
THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF CLOSED AREAS MUST BE KEPT TO
REASONABLE LIMITS.
NNA HIGHLIGHTS
6. NNA PREOCCUPATIONS DURING THE WEEK CENTERED ON
SECURING A ROLE FOR THEMSELVES AS THE THIRD PARTY IN
THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS AND ON SCOTCHING ANY RIGHT
OF REFUSAL. THE AUSTRIANS ARE THE PRINCIPAL CHAMPIONS
OF THE CONCEPT OF THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION; AUSTRIAN
AMBASSADOR LOIBL DEVOTED A LENGTHY STATEMENT IN WORKING
25X1
300
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
GROUP A/B TO THE DEFICIENCIES OF A PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM
AND THE MERITS OF MANDATORY THIRD PARTY OBSERVERS AS A
SAFEGUARD AGAINST THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE INHERENT IN
SUCH A SYSTEM. EXTENSIVE LOBBYING BY USDEL AGAINST THE
CONCEPT OF MANDATORY OBSERVERS, TOGETHER WITH THE
PROPOSAL FOR NEUTRAL AIR, HAD BY WEEK'S END DAMPENED
NNA ENTHUSIASM FOR THE AUSTRIAN IDEA. MEANWHILE, SWISS
REPS HAVE BEEN WORKING BEHIND THE SCENES TO BUILD
WESTERN SUPPORT FOR AN EXCLUSIVE SWISS ROLE AS THE
PURVEYORS OF THE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE SWISS HAVE
BEEN STRONG, BUT UNTIL NOW SOMEWHAT SILENT, PROPONENTS
OF AERIAL INSPECTION. THE NEUTRAL AIR PROPOSAL WILL
PROBABLY ENCOURAGE THEM TO VOCALIZE THEIR SUPPORT. THE
SWISS AMBASSADOR'S INITIAL ENDORSEMENT OF NATO'S
PROPOSED COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO THE AIRCRAFT/CREW
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06881
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
PROBLEM WAS FAINT, AS HE FELT OBLIGED TO REPRESS HIS
ENTHUSIASM BECAUSE OF HIS ROLE AS COORDINATOR OF THE
VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP.
(COMMENT. THE NATO NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREW PROPOSAL
EVOKED AN ENTHUSIASTIC CHORUS OF SUPPORT FROM ALL THE
NNA, INCLUDING YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA AND CYPRUS. SWISS
ATTEMPTS TO CAPTURE THE CONCESSIONARY RIGHTS, IF THEY
CONTINUE, MAY FURTHER CONTRIBUTE TO NNA DISARRAY, AS
OTHERS DEMAND THEIR OWN PIECE OF THE ACTION. THE
SWISS, SWEDES AND AUSTRIANS ARE ALL LIKELY TO BE
SERIOUS CONTENDERS FOR THIS ROLE IF THE IDEA EVER GETS
OFF THE GROUND. MEANWHILE, NNA ARDOR FOR THIRD PARTY
PARTICIPATION WILL PROBABLY COOL NOW THAT THE NEUTRAL
AIR OPTION IS ON THE TABLE. END COMMENT.)
NATO HIGHLIGHTS
7. EGOS, WOUNDED EARLIER IN THE WEEK AS WORD OF US AND
UK INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS LEAKED OUT, NOW
SEEM SALVED. THE ALLIANCE APPEARS ON VERGE OF A COMMON
OPENING POSITION ON RESTRICTED AREAS (REFTEL). SOME
CONFUSION REMAINS OVER THE PARTICULARS OF WHAT WE ARE
ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE IN THE DRAFTING OF MODALITIES.
MINOR DISPUTES OVER KINDS OF CAMERAS AND COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT INTENDED ORIGINALLY BY THE AUTHORS OF SC. 1,
FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE LENT AN AIR OF DISARRAY TO WESTERN
ATTEMPTS AT DRAFTING MODALITIES. THE SOVIETS HAVE
SMUGLY BEEN ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION.
DRAFTING SESSIONS
8. AS THE DEMANDEUR ON INSPECTION, THE ALLIANCE FINDS
ITSELF AT THE MERCY OF SOVIET OBSTINACY IN CONFEREE'S
ATTEMPTS TO DRAFT ON MODALITIES. ATTEMPTS TO ADVANCE
DRAFTING BY FOCUSSING ON THE MORE INNOCUOUS MODALITIES
SUCH AS THOSE RELATING TO RATIONS AND LODGING HAVE
GENERALLY BEEN STYMIED. ATTEMPTS TO DRAFT ON THE
STICKIER MODALITIES, E.G., TIMING OF THE ENTRY OF
301
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
INSPECTORS, DURATION OF THE INSPECTION, AND MODES OF
TRANSPORT, WHICH RELATE TO THE ISSUE OF AERIAL, AS WELL
AS GROUND, INSPECTION, HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL.
SOVIET AGREEMENT TO AERIAL INSPECTION IN PRINCIPAL IS
NOT LIKELY TO FREE UP THE LOGJAM. THE SOVIETS NO DOUBT
WILL INSIST UPON AGREEMENT TO HOST COUNTRY CONTROL AS A
CONDITION FOR DRAFTING PROGRESS. ALL OF THE ALLIES,
BUT ESPECIALLY FRANCE AND TURKEY WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS
FOR DRAFTING ON GROUND MODALITIES IN THE BELIEF THAT
PURSUIT OF AIR MODALITIES COULD PREJUDICE OUR ABILITY
TO GET EFFECTIVE GROUND MODALITIES.
ISSUES
9. ISSUES LIKELY TO PREOCCUPY US IN THE COMMING WEEK
AND AFFECT THE PACE OF DRAFTING ARE THE FOLLOWING:
-- RESTRICTED AREAS. THE ALLIANCE HAS A MORE OR LESS
UNIFIED OPENING GAMBIT WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO BROACH
THE ISSUE AND MAKE THE SOVIETS DEMANDEURS ON THIS
ISSUE. THE ALLIANCE WILL GO IN WITH A POSITION ASKING
FOR NO RESTRICTED AREAS; AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION
DEVELOPS WE WILL STRESS THE POSITIVE APPROACH, NAMELY,
NO AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES CAN TAKE PLACE
WILL BE OFF LIMITS TO INSPECTORS. THE SOVIETS
MEANWHILE ARE PURPOSEFULLY SENDING MIXED SIGNALS ABOUT
THEIR POSITION IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT LATENT SPLITS
AMONG THE ALLIES. THE UK, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD LIKE TO
EXCHANGE LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS IN ORDER TO PREVENT
SOVIET ABUSE WHILE THE FRG IS STILL FLIRTING WITH A
PERCENTAGE APPROACH. UNDER PRESSURE OF THE
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06881
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
NEGOTIATIONS THE TENUOUS ALLIANCE UNITY ON THIS ISSUE
MAY CRUMBLE. WE HAVE HEARD, PARTICULARLY AFTER
AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENT, THAT THE SOVIET POSITION IS
GENERALLY SIMILAR TO THE POSITIVE APPROACH. WE ALSO
CONTINUE TO ENCOUNTER SOVIET SUGGESTIONS, HOWEVER, THAT
SENSITIVE POINTS AND PERCENTAGES ARE THE WAY TO GO AND
THAT THESE WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH INSPECTIONS.
-- DESIGNATING INSPECTION AREAS. THE SOVIETS HAVE A
CONCERN SHARED BY OUR ALLIES -- HOW TO MINIMIZE THE
POTENTIAL FOR FISHING EXPEDITIONS? INFORMALLY THE
SOVIETS ARE PUSHING THE CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING
RULES-OF-THUMB FOR DELIMITING THE AREA INSPECTORS COULD
SEARCH FOR SPECIFIC KINDS OF NON-COMPLIANCE. THUS, A
SUSPECTED ACT OF NON-COMPLIANCE OF ONE TYPE, E.G., AN
UNNOTIFIED DIVISION-LEVEL EXERCISE, WOULD LIMIT THE
INSPECTION TO AN AREA OF 300 SQ KM. SUSPECTED
NON-COMPLIANCE INVOLVING TRANSFERS OR CONCENTRATIONS
WOULD HAVE THEIR AREA SPECIFICATIONS. WE, OF COURSE,
SEE THIS AS AN IMPOSSIBLE APPROACH AND WILL ARGUE
AGAINST ANY REQUIREMENT TO LINK THE SIZE OF THE
SPECIFIED AREA TO A PARTICULAR ACTIVITY. (COMMENT:
25X1
302
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
DRAFTING ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DESIGNATE AN AREA
FOR INSPECTION WILL PROVE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT. THE
SOVIETS HAVE AN ULTERIOR MOTIVE IN THEIR APPROACH; THEY
INTEND TO HAVE THE INSPECTING STATE SPECIFY WHAT KIND
OF VIOLATION IT SUSPECTS IS OCCURRING AND THUS POSSIBLY
CREATE THE LOOPHOLE FOR REJECTING THE REQUEST ON
GROUNDS THAT THE REASONS CITED DO NOT FIT THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. END COMMENT).
-- QUOTAS. BOTH EAST AND NNA SEEM TO FAVOR NO ACTIVE
QUOTA. THE SOVIETS, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, PREFER THIS
APPROACH (IT WOULD ALLOW THEM TO CONDUCT ALL WTO
INSPECTIONS). ALTHOUGH AKHROMEYEV REITERATED
GRINEVSKY'S PASSIVE QUOTA OF 1-2, WE EXPECT, IN THE
END, SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THREE. USDEL IS CONSIDERING,
IN ADDITION TO THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A PASSIVE QUOTA OF
THREE, WHETHER OR NOT A NO ACTIVE QUOTA COULD BE MADE
ACCEPTABLE IF IT CONTAINED A PROVISION THAT NO STATE
MAY INSPECT ANY OTHER STATE MORE THAN ONCE.
-- AERIAL INSPECTION. WHILE NATO WILL BE FOCUSSING ON
THE RECENT IMS PAPER, USDEL WILL ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP A
COMPREHENSIVE SET OF AIR MODALITIES WHICH WE HOPE TO
USE WITH APPROPRIATE NNA.
-- CURRYING NNA FAVOR. AS AN ISSUE THIS MAY HAVE BEEN
DEFUSED BY THE NATO AIR PROPOSAL. WE CAN PROBABLY
EXPECT NNA SUPPORT IN THE DRAFTING OF AIR MODALITIES.
IF, FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN, THEY CONTINUE TO HAVE
DIFFICULTY WITH THE PASSIVE QUOTA CONCEPT AND USE THIS
AS A PRETEXT FOR IMPEDING DRAFTING, WE MAY HAVE TO FIND
A WAY OF ASSUAGING THEM. ONE IDEA FLOATED BY THE
SOVIETS IS TO BUY THE NNA OFF BY OFFERING THEM A QUOTA
OF ONE NO-RIGHT-OF-REFUSAL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
363
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 06903
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
SUBJECT: CDE: RESTRICTED AREAS
REFS: (A) STOCKHOLM 6779 (B) STOCKHOLM 6722
(C) STOCKHOLM 5710
1. CDE XII - 42.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. NATO/CDE HAS REACHED AGREEMENT ON A
"GOING-IN" POSITION FOR CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
SUBJECT OF RESTRICTED AREAS/AREAS TO BE SPECIFIED FOR
INSPECTION, IN THE CONTEXT OF CDE. THE GOING-IN
POSITION DOES NOT/NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO PERMANENTLY
RESTRICTED AREAS. SHOULD THE EAST INSIST ON A REFERENCE
OF SOME KIND TO PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS, NATO
AGREED TO FALL BACK TO LANGUAGE ALONG THOSE LINES,
ALTHOUGH SOME DISCUSSION OF SPECIFICS WILL BE REQUIRED
WITHIN NATO. IN FACT, SHOULD A FALLBACK POSITION BE
REQUIRED, THE POTENTIAL FOR THE AGREED NATO POSITION
COMING UNGLUED IS HIGH.
4. FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 28 AND
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN THE
RELEVANT NATO CAUCUS CLUSTER GROUP ON LANGUAGE TO
REPRESENT NATO'S "POSITIVE APPROACH" AND THE "GOING-IN"
NEGOTIATING POSITION ON THE SUBJECT OF RESTRICTED
AREAS/AREAS TO BE SPECIFIED FOR AN INSPECTION, IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE INSPECTION MEASURE OF ANY CSBM AGREEMENT
REACHED HERE IN CDE. DISCUSSION WAS BASED ON LANGUAGE
FORWARDED REF (A) AND AGREEMENT WAS REACHED THAT, IN
ORDER TO ENSURE THAT NATO WAS NOT THE DEMANDEUR ON
"PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS," THE REFERENCE TO SUCH
AREAS SHOULD BE DELETED FROM THE "GOING-IN" TEXT. IT
WAS UNDERSTOOD IN THE CLUSTER CAUCUS, HOWEVER, THAT IF
THE EAST INSISTS ON SUCH LANGUAGE, NATO WILL BE PREPARED
TO INCLUDE AN APPROPRIATE REFERENCE, ALONG THE LINES OF
THAT IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE LANGUAGE FORWARDED REF
(A). IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH A FALLBACK
APPROACH AND SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WILL REQUIRE DISCUSSION
WITHIN NATO SHOULD THE NEED ARISE. PROBLEMS IN
IMPLEMENTING A FALLBACK POSITION ARE DISCUSSED IN
PARAGRAPH 6 OF THIS CABLE. LANGUAGE REPRESENTING AGREED
POSITION FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT.
"AREA FOR INSPECTION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING
COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED CSBMS, AN INSPECTING STATE IS
PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE THE AREA IN WHICH AN INSPECTION
IS TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF A PARTICIPATING
STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. SUCH AN
AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A "SPECIFIED AREA." THE
SPECIFIED AREA WILL INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, TRAINING AREAS
AND TERRAIN WHERE ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION CAN
BE CONDUCTED. IN A SPECIFIED AREA THE INSPECTING STATE
25X1
304
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRE
WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY
EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE POINTS (E.G. DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS,
FOR EXAMPLE, NAVAL BASES, DOCKYARDS, GARRISONS, MILITARY
AIRFIELDS, FIRING RANGES, BUILDINGS OR DEFENCE RESEARCH
DEVELOPMENT OR PRODUCTION ESTABLISHMENTS; NAVAL VESSELS,
MILITARY VEHICLES OR AIRCRAFT) TO WHICH ACCESS IS
NORMALLY RESTRICTED OR DENIED."
END TEXT.
NOTE: THE ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE IN THE EARIER
FORMULATION (REF A), DROPPED FROM THIS ONE, BUT UPON
WHICH IT WAS AGREED ANY FALLBACK SHOULD BE BASED, READS
"AND PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH SHALL BE AS
LIMITED IN SIZE AND NUMBER AS POSSIBLE AND SHALL NOT
INCLUDE TRAINING OR OTHER AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN TAKE PLACE."
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 06903
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
5. TWO INTERPRETATIONS WERE ATTACHED TO THIS TEXT. THE
FRG UNDERSTANDS THAT THE REFERENCE TO "ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION" IN THE AGREED TEXT, AND THE
REFERENCE TO "WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITES CAN
TAKE PLACE" IN THE SENTENCE THAT MAY BE DRAWN ON IF THE
EAST INSISTS ON A REFERENCE TO PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED
AREAS (SEE REF (A)), MEANS BOTH ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE
BEEN NOTIFIED AND THOSE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED.
WITH FURTHER U.S. CLARIFICATION THIS INTERPRETATION WAS
ACCEPTED. U.S. CLARIFICATION WAS THAT THE FRG REFERENCE
TO "THOSE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED" ALSO COVERS
THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE NOT NOTIFIED BUT ABOUT WHICH
WE HAVE DOUBTS WHETHER THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OR
NOT, EVEN IF AN INSPECTION SHOWS IN THE END THAT THEY
DID NOT REQUIRE NOTIFICATION. NORWAY RECALLED THAT IT
HAS A PRACTICE OF ESTABLISHING TEMPORARY RESTRICTED
AREAS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THE
CONCEPT OF "SENSITIVE POINTS", NOT FULLY DEFINED IN THE
TEXT, COULD BE APPLIED TO ANY TRA'S ESTABLISHED BY
NORWAY, IF NECESSARY. THIS UNDERSTANDING WAS ACCEPTED.
6. FALLBACK POSITION: COMMENTS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE CLUSTER CAUCUS AGREED THAT THE FALLBACK POSITION
WOULD MAKE REFERENCE TO "PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS,"
IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT
SHOULD A FALLBACK BE REQUIRED. LURKING BEHIND THIS
FACADE OF UNITY ARE DIVERSE NATIONAL POSITIONS; SHOULD A
FALLBACK POSITION BE REQUIRED, THIS TENUOUS UNITY COULD
COME UNGLUED. WE HAVE LEARNED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THIS
"GOING-IN" POSITION REPRESENTS FOR FRANCE THE ONLY
POSITION; FRANCE IS NOT/NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT A
REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED AREAS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE
FRG POSITION REALLY REQUIRES A REFERENCE TO PERMANENTLY
RESTRICTED AREAS; FOR THEM THE "GOING-IN" POSITION IS
TACTICAL AND THEY AGREED TO IT ONLY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE
305
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
THE EAST WILL NEVER ACCEPT IT. AND ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE
NOT RAISED IT RECENTLY, THE FRG HAS NOT LEFT BEHIND THE
IDEA OF IDENTIFYING IN A CDE AGREEMENT THE PERCENTAGE OF
NATIONAL TERRITORY THAT COMPRISES RESTRICTED AREAS.
AND, IF PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS COME BACK INTO
PLAY, THE UK MAY AGAIN ASSERT ITS DESIRE FOR AN EXCHANGE
OF LISTS OF SUCH AREAS, IN ORDER TO CLOSE A WHAT THEY
PERCEIVE TO BE A MAJOR LOOPHOLE -- THAT THE EAST COULD,
AT RANDOM, DECLARE ANYTHING THEY WANT TO BE A
RESTRICTED AREA AND THUS STYMY INSPECTION. IT IS,
HOWEVER, OUR BELIEF THAT THE "GOING-IN" POSITION MAY
WELL PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST; IT IS VERY CLOSE TO
THE POSITION OUTLINED IN AHKROMEYEV'S PLENARY STATEMENT
LAST WEEK. THIS, OF COURSE, WILL PLACE THE FRG IN A
DIFFICULT SITUATION AND THEY MAY WELL BE ISOLATED IN
NATO ON THIS POINT. THE FRG CLAIMS ITS REQUIREMENT FOR
RESTRICTED AREAS IS TO PROTECT U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE; WE
HAVE SOUGHT TO REASSURE THEM THAT WE DON'T SEE A
REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT OUR FORCES THROUGH THE CONCEPT OF
PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS. END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
25X1
306
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
AMBASSADOR O'BROIN, IRELAND, WORKING GROUP A + 8) 1.9.1986
Friday's Plenary brought good news in the speech of Ambassador Citron, who
confirmed the willingness of the sponsors of SC.1 to accept a constraining
measure which would prohibit the conduct of military activities involving
more than 75.000 troops unless announced two years in advance. This is an
important step.
The particular measure accepted by Ambassador Citron was framed in a co-
ordinator's paper and is also close to proposals made by the Irish delegation
at an earlier stage of negotiations. It is our belief that a time-constraint,
while not the most immediately glamorous of constraining measures, has solid
attractions. In a time-constraint, we name a figure for what is implicitly re-
garded as a large and exceptional activity,thereby establishing an important
reference point and helping to shape the psychological climate in which military
activities are planned. The attachment of special conditions to such large acti-
vities is tantamount to an acknowledgement that the state conducting them owes
an explanation, as it were, to its neighbours. Announcing large activities far
in advance may help to convince others that these activities are genuinely for
training purposes.Other states are given the opportunity to take whatever steps
they may find necessary. Finally, a measure of this kind limits the freedom of
action of states and is therefore, if we are to discuss definitions, constrain-
ing in its effects. I make no apology for underlining this last point.States will
have an assurance that their neighbours, who have not announced very large activi-
ties, will not carry out such activities over the coming two years.
My delegation believes that the effectiveness, both practical and psychological,
of a time-constraint may prove itself over time to be comparable to the effective-
ness of constraints based on absolute ceilings, especially if by basing a system
on periods of preannouncement, we are able to agree on more favourable parameters
than would otherwise be the case. 307
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
We believe that a time-constraint of the kind now accepted by Ambassador Citron
should be welcome to all delegations who look forward to a Europe in which mili-
tary exercises are conducted with respect for the perceptions of others and for
training purposes only.
My delegation hopes that further progress on constraining measures can be made in
the weeks remaining to us. Perhaps a formula can now be found to give expression to
the general view that once a list of activities subject to regular notification is
transmitted in an annual calendar, deviations from that list should be as limited
as possible.
I will enter for a moment into detail:
A two year time-constraint implies a fortiori that an activity above a certain
level - 75.000 troops, to use Ambassador Citron's figure - may not be added to
the list of activities transmitted in the calendar. But this, as a restriction
on alterations to the calendar, appears capable of improvement. Would it be pos-
sible to limit the number of activities, or of larger activities, that may be -
added to the list furnished in the annual calendar? Could one envisage a ceiling
on the size of any additional activities lower than the level of 75.000 troops
just mentioned?
Mr. Chairman,
My delegation also welcomes the contribution to our work made in Friday's Plenary
by our distinguished visitor, the First Deputy Minister of Defence the USSR Marshal
Akhromeyev. I am thinking in particular of that section of his speech in which he
expressed the readiness of his delegation to consider an air/ground version of on-
site inspection. This step, one of several important steps taken in recent months
by delegations representing various points of view, brings us closer than ever be-
fore to a significant agreement at the present phase of the CDE. As we attempt to
bring our efforts to a successful conclusion, we must increase our determination to
308
Dnr+ - qnniti7Pd Cony Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
avoid the fate of Sisyphus, who pushed his boulder almost to the crest of the
slope only to lose control at the last moment and see it roll away.
Marshal Akhromeyev stipulated that aircraft for inspection should be provided by
the inspected State. Others have consistently taken the view that inspection teams
should rely on their own equipment. It is to be hoped that these and other differen-
ces over practical arrangements will not prove too intractable in the days to come.
The Irish delegation would like to add its voice to those who expressed interest,
at Friday's Plenary, in a compromise solution according to which aircraft and crew
for inspections could be provided by a third State not belonging to a military alli-
ance.
At present there are no clear indications as to what type of aircraft and what other
material resources will be required for purposes of inspection. Ireland would be
willing, as a State outside military alliances, to examine different options with
a view to discovering whether there is any practical contribution which we could
make to the conduct of ground/air inspections.
A role for third States in inspection deserves to be examined not only as a possible
solution to a difficult practical problem, but also for broader political reasons.
Such involvement of a third State in a ground/air inspection if it is accepted by
this Conference would underline our common interest in upholding a CSBM regime. If
all thirty-five States could come to feel comfortable with this solution, it might
point the way to a future in which the sense of community now existing within groups
of States in our midst, could become a characteristic of the entire region.
Mr. Chairman,
The Irish delegation has often argued that observers under a regime of CSBM will
have a serious job of reporting to do and that the modalitites of observation which
we adopt should ensure the observer's right to fulfil the tasks assigned to him.
309
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
In the light of this general approach to the role of observers, we have listened
carefully to the argument that observation should focus on activities of a certain
size or significance. We have come to the conclusion that if the agreed threshold
for notification is low, for example low enough to capture activities throughout the
zone, serious attention should be given to the possibility of reaching agreement on
some arrangements which- would ensure that the weighty instrument of mandatory ob-
servation is economically employed.
Mr. Chairman,
My delegation was moved by the exhortation of Ambassador Delworth on Friday not to
forget the expectations and fears of millions of people who may not fully comprehend
the details of our discussions here but who understand what is at stake. I echo
Ambassador Delworth's call. Let us not discover in ourselves, on a mid-September
morning, the sense of futility of Samuel Beckett's Vladimir:
' Was I sleeping while the others suffered? ... tomorrow, when I wake.., what shall
I say of today? That with Estragon my friend, at this place, until the fall of night,
I waited for Godot?'
310
npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Jtlatti
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 06890
SUBJECT: CDE: INSPECTION BY NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT
1. CDE XII-043. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING SOVIET CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,
MARSHALL AKHROMEYEV'S AUGUST 29 CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE
OF AERIAL INSPECTION,FRG OFFERED A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
TO USE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE NNA'S HERE
SPOKE WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM ABOUT THE
IDEA OF THEIR PROVIDING THE PLANE AND CREW. IRELAND,
A LATE COMER, JOINED THE REST ON SEPTEMBER 1.
3. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE THE MOST LIKELY TO COME
FORWARD WITH SPECIFIC OFFERS OF AIRCRAFT. THE SWISS,
SWEDES AND AUSTRIANS MIGHT MAKE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN
CAPITALS IN THE COMING WEEK.
4. US DEL WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ADVISED IMMEDIATELY
OF ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT.
5. WE ALSO THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT A SWISS OFFER MIGHT
BE CONVEYED TO THE SOVIETS DURING THE VISIT OF FOREIGN
MINISTER AUBERT TO MOSCOW SEPTEMBER 3-7. WOULD APPRE-
CIATE EMBASSY MOSCOW'S TRACKING THIS ISSUE WITH THE
SWISS EMBASSY. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
31/
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
;311
SECRETSTOCKHOLM 06901
SECSTATE PASS JCS AND SECDEF
BONN FOR A/S RIDGWAY
SUBJECT: CDE: LAST MINUTE PROBLEMS ON AIR INSPECTION
AND RESTRICTED AREAS
REF: STOCKHOLM 6890
1. CDE XII-045. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUDDEN SHIFTS IN THE FRENCH AND GERMAN POSITIONS
CREATE MAJOR COMPLICATIONS IN THE LAST DAYS OF CDE.
THE FRENCH HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS NOT REPEAT NOT
TO ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT OVER FRANCE IN INSPECTION.
THE FRENCH INSIST THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT NO REFERENCE TO
CLOSED AREAS IN SECTION ON EXCEPTIONS TO INSPECTION
REGIME. THE GERMANS ARE INCREASINGLY NERVOUS ABOUT
ANY LANGUAGE WHICH DOES NOT REFER TO CLOSED AREAS.
NEUTRAL AIR
3. WE WERE INFORMED BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION ON
SEPTEMBER 2 THAT THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS
TELLING THEM NOT TO ACCEPT THE NATO CAUCUS POSITION
THAT INSPECTIONS MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT
NOT THOSE OF INSPECTED STATE. THE FRENCHARE TO CALL
FOR A REGIME WHICH LEAVES IT TO THE INSPECTED STATE TO
CHOOSE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT OR THOSE OF INSPECTED OR
OF INSPECTING STATE. IN EFFECT THIS MEANS INSPECTIONS
BY INSPECTED STATE AIRCRAFT. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO
FRENCH DEL THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING THE NEUTRAL
AIRCARFT OPTION FOR MONTHS NOW AND THAT SUCH A SHIFT OF
POSITION IN THE MIDDLE OF THE END GAME IS POTENTIALLY
DISASTROUS. WE HAVE ALSO URGED THEM NOT TO GO PUBLIC
WITH THEIR POSITION THIS WEEK PENDING CONSULTATIONS WITH
WASHINGTON; OUR GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL NOT KEEP SILENT
FOR LONG.
4. THE FRENCH SAY THEIR CONCERN IS SECURITY; WE
SUSPECT IT IS NEGOTIABILITY. THEIR DELEGATION HERE HAS
OPPOSED OUR EFFORT TO SEEK SOUND INSPECTION MODALITIES.
THEY OBVIOUSLY REALIZE THAT ANY INDICATION THAT FRANCE
CANNOT ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT WOULD FINISH THE IDEA.
5. THE SOVIETS HERE STOPPED SHORT OF PUBLIC REJECTION
OF THE NN OFFER OF AIRCRAFT - GRINEVSKY HAS ARGUED PRIVA-
TELY AGAINST THE CONCEPT ON PRAGMATIC GROUNDS, BUT HAS
NOT CLOSED THE DOOR. HOWEVER, SOVIET DELEGATION IS
STALLING ON DRAFTING AIR MODALITIES ACROSS THE BOARD;
WE THINK THEIR TACTIC IS TO DELAY UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE
AND THEN USE THE EXCUSE THAT THERE IS NO TIME TO DRAFT
ON SUCH A COMPLEX IDEA.
RESTRICTED AREAS
6. HERE THE FRENCH AND FRG POSITIONS ARE AT OPPOSITE
ENDS OF THE SCALE. THE FRENCH SAY THEY CAN ACCEPT NO
REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED AREAS IN THE EXCEPTIONS SECTION
OF INSPECTION. THIS HAS BEEN THE NATO "GOING IN"
POSITION WHICH HAS MADE THE GERMANS VERY JUMPY. NOW
312
SECRET
25X1
npHaccifieci in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
THE SOVIETS (NO DOUBT WITH SOME PRODDING BY THE GERMANS)
HAVE REJECTED ANY FORMULA WHICH DOES NOT REFER TO RESTRIC-
TED AREAS. WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT WE CAN ACCEPT
SOME REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED AREAS AS LONG AS IT DOES
NOT CREATE A TAUTOLOGY WHICH EXCLUDES NOTIFIABLE ACTI-
VITIES IN RESTRICTED AREAS FROM NOTIFICATION. HOWEVER,
WE MIGHT SOON BE FACED WITH A DEADLOCK IN NATO ON THIS
SUBJECT; IF SO WE WILL ENCOURAGE SOMEONE (SUCH AS THE
UK) TO CUT A PRIVATE DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
313
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
%FM:19T
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM O6968
SUBJECT: STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT
REF: A) BONN 26553, B) STOCKHOLM 6518
1. CDE XII - 046
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE PRELIMINARY
FRAMEWORK OF A STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT AS DRAWN UP BY THE
COORDINATOR FOR STRUCTURE, FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO.
USDEL BELIEVES THE PAPER PROVIDES A GOOD BASIS FOR
DISCUSSION AND IS CONSISTENT WITH NATO'S APPROACH TO THE
STRUCTURE OF THE DOCUMENT. SEE PARA 6 FOR OUR
PRELIMINARY COMMENTS. END SUMMARY.
4. AFTER PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE EAST, NNA AND WEST (THE AMBASSADORS OF THE
NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, CANADA AND DENMARK) THE
COORDINATOR (KAHILUOTO - FINLAND) OF THE CONTACT GROUP
ON STRUCTURE HAS GIVEN NATO AND ALL OTHER CONFERENCE
PARTICIPANTS THE FOLLOWING FRAMEWORK OF THE STOCKHOLM
DOCUMENT.
BEGIN TEXT:
DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
- ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND
- DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE CONVENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
- THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
OF THE MADRID MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE
HL SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
TRE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CYPRUS,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
GREECE, THE HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY,
LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MONACO, THE
NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SAN
MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND YUGOSLAVIA, MET IN STOCKHOLM
FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986 IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE
MADRID MEETING RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE SWEDISH PRIME
MINISTER, THE LATE OLOF PALME, ON 17 JANUARY 1984.
OPENING STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND OTHER HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. THE PRIME
MINISTER OF SPAIN AS WELL AS MINISTERS AND SENIOR
OFFICIALS OF OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES ADDRESSED THE
CONFERENCE LATER.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
314
SECRET
25X1
nna-Inecifiarl in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
THE CONFERENCE ON 6 JULY 1984.
CONTRIBUTIONS WERE ALSO MADE BY THE FOLLOWING NON-
PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES: ALGERIA, EGYPT,
ISRAEL, LEBANON, MOROCCO, SYRIA, AND TUNISIA.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THAT THE AIM OF THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06968
INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO
UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS
DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS
AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.
4M,
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THAT MUTUALLY
COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, WILL BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND
BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE
AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES
HAVE DECLARED THE FOLLOWING:
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
HAVE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING:
PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
CONSTRAINING MEASURES: ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN
MILITARY ACTIVITIES
COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION
COMMUNICATION
THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN THIS DOCUMENT WILL COME INTO
FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1987.
HOWEVER, THE ANNUAL CALENDARS CONCERNING NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES FORECAST FOR 1987 WILL BE EXCHANGED
NOT LATER THAN 15 DECEMBER 1986.
THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE
PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS ALSO REQUESTED TO
TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
NONPARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.
THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE, WHICH WILL DISSEMINATE IT AND MAKE
IT KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES EXPRESS
THEIR PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF
315
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRFT
SWEDEN FOR THE EXCELLENT ORGANIZATION OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE AND WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO THE
DELEGATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENCE.
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986
END TEXT.
5. THE WEDNESDAY P.M. NATO CAUCUS WILL TAKE UP THE
KAHILUOTO PAPER. USDEL BELIEVES THE PAPER PROVIDES A
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06968
GOOD BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE
GENERAL WESTERN APPROACH AS AGREED UPON AT THE HAGUE
BRAINSTORMING MEETING (REF B). OTHER GROUPS SEEM
ANXIOUS TO AGREE ON THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DOCUMENT, SO
THAT THEY MAY CONCENTRATE ON THE REMAINING UNRESOLVED
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.
6. USDEL'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS:
-- WE ARE SATISFIED WITH THE TITLE OF THE DOCUMENT; IT
AVOIDS ANY MENTION OF AGREEMENT, CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OR
ANYTHING THAT MIGHT GIVE US LEGAL OR LEGISLATIVE DIFFI-
CULTIES. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SOME SENTIMENT IN THE
CAUCUS FOR DROPPING THE FULL TITLE, I.E., THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
-- THE REST OF THE "TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION" FOLLOWS THE
STANDARD FORMATS ESTABLISHED IN HELSINKI AND MADRID.
-- NATO IS CONSIDERING ADDING ONE SECTION DRAWN FROM
THE FIRST PARAGRAPHS OF THE WESTERN NUF TEXT TO REPLACE
THE ELLIPSES AFTER THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE. FOR
EXAMPLE:
"ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES ADOPTED A SET OF
CSBM'S, WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY
BINDING, PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION
AND WHICH COVER THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S, AS
LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID MANDATE."
-- NATO INSISTED THAT A CLEAR DISTINCTION BE MADE
BETWEEN THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTIONS AND THE CORE OF
THE DOCUMENT -- THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. THIS
IS DONE BY LEADING INTO THE NUF SECTION WITH THE "LINK"
(I.E., CSBM'S, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION
air
TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE
OF FORCE) AND BY NOTING THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES
"DECLARED" THEIR NUF REAFFIRMATION, WHILE THEY HAVE
"ADOPTED" THE CSBM'S.
REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF THE "BERLIN" ISSUE IN THE
CDE, THE FRG DELEGATION ARGUES THAT ALLIED RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BERLIN HAVE BEEN RESERVED IN THE
CSCE CONTEXT BY THE "SAVINGS CLAUSE" UNDER PRINCIPLE 10,
I.E., THE PRESENT DECLARATION DOES NOT AFFECT THEIR
316
SECRET
25X1
narlaccifian in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, NOR THE CORRESPONDING TREATIES
AND OTHER AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS (SEE REF A).
FURTHERMORE, THE DELEGATION POINTS OUT THAT LANGUAGE TO
BE NOTED ON THE COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT IN THE NUF
SECTION, I.E., "THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL
THE PRINCIPLES" OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, SPECIFICALLY
COVERS THE "SAVINGS CLAUSE" UNDER PRINCIPLE 10.
USDEL MADE A FORMAL RESERVATION IN THE CAUCUS TO
ACCEPTING CHAPTER HEADINGS AT THIS STAGE OF THE
DISCUSSION SINCE, IN PARTICULAR, THERE IS NO AGREEMENT
ON CONSTRAINING MEASURES. NATO REPRESENTATIVES HAVE
MADE THIS POINT IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH KAHILUOTO.
(HOWEVER, EVEN THE UNOFFICIAL EXISTENCE OF CHAPTER
HEADINGS DOES PREJUDICE OUR POSITION ON CONSTRAINING
MEASURES.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
317
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
crrimr
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07020
SUBJECT: NAC DISCUSSION OF CDE
REF: USNATO 04725
1. CDE XII-048. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE THINK THE ALLIES ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT IN
OPPOSING AN INSTRUCTED SESSION OF THE COUNCIL ON
CDE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 19. ALL ALLIES ARE NOW IN THE
PROCESS OF RECEIVING MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY AND
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON CDE WHICH WILL
HAVE TO BE IGNORED OR OVERRULED BETWEEN NOW AND
SEPTEMBER 19. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BRITISH RECEIVED
TODAY INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCEPT A QUOTA OF NO LESS THAN
5 INSPECTIONS; THE FRENCH RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS THE
SAME DAY TO ACCEPT NO MORE THAN 3.
3. THE LAST THING WE NEED AT THIS STAGE IS AN
EXERCISE WHICH GENERATES MORE SUCH INSTRUCTIONS AND
FORCES COUNCIL MEMBERS TO AIR THEM PUBLICLY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
318
SECRET
25X1
nprlacsifiAri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07021
SUBJECT: CDE: NEUTRAL INSPECTING AIRCRAFT
1. CDE XII-049. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE THINK THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE EAST WILL
ACCEPT THE CONCEPT THAT CDE INSPECTIONS CAN BE CARRIED
OUT BY NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT IF THE NNA PRESS THEIR CASE.
WE UNDERSTAND THAT SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA HAVE
DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE TO OFFER SUCH AIRCRAFT AND MAY
MAKE THEIR DECISIONS PUBLIC AT THE CDE PLENARY SEPTEMBER
5 - WHEN SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER AUBERT IS IN MOSCOW.
3. WE SUGGEST DEMARCHES IN BERN, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM
AND VIENNA PRIMARILY BUT ALSO IN OTHER NNA CAPITALS
URGING THEM TO PRESS THEIR CASE PUBLICLY. THESE
DEMARCHES SHOULD BE TAILORED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CASE BUT
SHOULD GO ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:
- CDE IS AT A CRITICAL STAGE; CREDIBLE INSPECTION
MODALITIES WILL MAKE OR BREAK THE CONFERENCE.
-- US AND ITS ALLIES WERE FIRM IN THEIR BELIEF THAT
THE INSPECTING STATE SHOULD SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT FOR
AIR INSPECTION. BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET OFFER
TO ACCEPT AERIAL INSPECTION WE MADE AN IMPORTANT COMPRO-
MISE OFFER - TO ACCEPT USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT.
-- WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT INSPEC-
TING STATE AIRCRAFT BE USED. WE DO NOT THINK THIS
WOULD BE SEEN BY WESTERN PUBLICS AS CREDIBLE OR
EFFECTIVE INSPECTION.
-- WE APPRECIATED POSITIVE REACTION OF NNA TO OUR
OFFER TO ACCEPT NNA AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION. SOVIET
COMMENTS TO US HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE, BUT THEY HAVE NOT
CLOSED THE DOOR. WE THINK THEY WILL RESPOND MORE
POSITIVELY TO A NEUTRAL KNOCK.
-- TIME IS VERY SHORT. WITH ONLY TWO WEEKS REMAINING
IN THE CONFERENCE THE ISSUE OF THE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT
IS KEY. WE THINK THAT REPEATED UNAMBIGUOUS PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF READINESS TO OFFER AIRCRAFT COULD
HELP ENSURE SUCCESS AT STOCKHOLM.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
31.9
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRFT
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07052
SUBJECT: CDE: EAST TRIES TO DEFLECT NEUTRAL OFFER OF
INSPECTION AIRCRAFT
1. CDE XII -050.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND OFFICIALLY
OFFERED TO PROVIDE THEIR AIRCRAFT AND CREW FOR
INSPECTIONS. HUNGARY, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE EAST,
SAID THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES TO
NEGOTIATE SUCH A REGIME IN THE REMAINING TIME BUT DID
NOT EXPLICITLY REJECT THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT.
ITALY AND THE U.S. SAID THESE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES
COULD BE RESOLVED AND SAID THAT THE NEUTRAL OFFER WOULD
ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
INSPECTION. END SUMMARY.
4. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS,
SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA SEPARATELY OFFERED "IN
PRINCIPLE" TO PROVIDE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR INSPECTION
OF A STOCKHOLM CSBM'S REGIME. THEY BOTH INDICATED THAT
THIS OFFER COULD FIT INTO A COOPERATIVE EFFORT WITH
OTHER NNA AND SUGGESTED THAT RESOLUTION OF THIS THORNY
ISSUE WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP AT THE CONFERENCE. AT THE
SAME TIME, BOTH CAREFULLY NOTED THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT
MUST BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPATING STATES.
5. ON BEHALF OF THE EAST, AND ECHOING THE PROPOSAL OF
SOVIET MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, HUNGARY RESPONDED INDIRECTLY
TO THE NEUTRALS. WHILE HE DID NOT EXPLICITLY REJECT THE
USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT, HE SAID "THE COMPLEX FINANCIAL,
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL" DIFFICULTIES, AS WELL AS THE LACK
OF TIME MADE THE USE OF ANYTHING BUT THE AIRCRAFT OF THE
"INSPECTED" STATE INFEASIBLE. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO
EXAMINE A NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT FOR "UNAUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT"
AND ARGUED THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE
TERRAIN, INSPECTED STATE CREWS AND AIRCRAFT WOULD BE
SAFER. THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO OUTLINED THE
EASTERN APPROACH: BOTH GROUND AND AIR TRANSPORTATION
WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTED STATE "TO AVOID
DELAYS." THE RECEIVING STATE COULD, HOWEVER, AT ITS
DISCRETION, INVITE NNA REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE INSPECTION. THE INSPECTED STATE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO
DELIVER THE INSPECTORS TO THE AREA DESIGNATED FOR
INSPECTION IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME AND GIVE THEM
THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS MILITARY ACTIVITY IN
PROGRESS. IN THE AREA OF THE INSPECTION THE AIRCRAFT
CREW WOULD FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE INSPECTORS.
6. ITALY (CIARRAPICO) AND THE U.S. RESPONDED TO THE
ABOVE STATEMENTS CIARRAPICO SAID THE WEST WELCOMED THE
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AND RESOLVE THE PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH NEUTRAL AIR. BARRY WELCOMED THE
NEUTRAL OFFER AND SAID IT WOULD MAKE A "CREDIBLE AND
25X1
320
SECRET
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
EFFECTIVE" INSPECTION REGIME POSSIBLE. HE ARGUED THAT
THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ALLUDED TO BY THE HUNGARIAN
AMBASSADOR, E.G., FLIGHT SAFETY, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES, WERE RESOLVABLE AND SHOULD NOT DELAY AGREEMENT
ON AN INSPECTION REGIME. HE ALSO DOUBTED THAT INSPECTED
STATES NEED FEAR THAT THE NEUTRAL WOULD PLACE
UNAUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT ON BOARD. HE STRESSED THE U.S.
PREFERENCE FOR INSPECTING STATES' AIRCRAFT BUT SAID THE
U.S. COULD ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO MOVE THE
CONFERENCE AHEAD.
7. THE EAST CLEARLY WANTS TO DIVERT THE NNA BY
PROPOSING THAT THEY PARTICIPATE IN THE INSPECTIONS
RATHER THAN SUPPLYING THE AIRCRAFT, WHICH ECHOES EARLIER
NNA PROPOSALS. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS THE SOVIETS AND
OTHER WTO REPRESENTATIVES CITE THE ADVANTAGES OF USING
INSPECTED STATE AIRCRAFT AND THE PROBLEMS OF USING
NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT, BUT THEY DO NOT REJECT THE NEUTRAL
OFFER FLATLY. THEIR TACTIC IS SIMPLY TO LET TIME RUN
OUT ON THE IDEA. MEANWHILE THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO SAY
PRIVATELY THAT THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WOULD REQUIRE THEM TO
VETO ANY REQUIREMENT FOR NEUTRAL AIR, BUT THEY HAVE NOT
YET SAID SO PUBLICLY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
32].
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SEr.RFT
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKBOLM 07069
SUBJECT: CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION
1. CDE XII - 051.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. PROVIDED BELOW ARE 22 ELEMENTS CURRENTLY
CONSIDERED AS ACCEPTABLE FOR THE CONTENT OF
NOTIFICATION. THESE ELEMENTS COMBINED WITH THE SEVEN
WE ALREADY HAVE WILL EVENTUALLY FORM THE FINAL
NOTIFICATION ANNOUNCEMENT. THOSE IDENTIFIED WITH A
PLUS 0 HAVE, IN FACT, BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL SIDES AND
WILL PROBABLY BE NOTED ON MONDAY. ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED
WITH A DOUBLE PLUS 0 ARE GENERALLY AGREED AND WILL
BE NOTED PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING
DESIGNATION.
4. BEGIN TEXT OF ELEMENTS:
- THE START AND END DATES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TAKING PART IN THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY, THAT IS GROUND TROOPS, AMPHIBIOUS
TROOPS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS, AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS
PARTICIPATING FOR EACH STATE INVOLVED, IF APPLICABLE
- DESIGNATION AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING
AND THE LOCATION OF EACH DIVISION'S HQS (FOR DIVISIONS
WITH TROOPS AND UNITS IN MORE THAN ONE LOCATION THE
LOCATION OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER'S HEADQUARTERS WILL
BE GIVEN)
- NUMBER AND TYPE OF BRIGADES/REGIMENTS IN EACH
DIVISION
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES AND MULTIPLE
ROCKET LAUNCHERS (100MM OR ABOVE)
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCHERS MOUNTED ON ARMORED
CARRIERS
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS, BY CATEGORY
- ENVISAGED NUMBER OF SORTIES
- PURPOSE OF AIR MISSIONS
- CATEGORIES OF AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATING
- AREA, DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES, OF AIR
FORCE PARTICIPATION
- NAME OF THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND
COMMANDING THE AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION
- INDICATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE (SIMULATED OR LIVE
FIRE)
- NAME OF THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND
COMMANDING THE NAVAL FORCE PARTICIPATION
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS LANDED IN A NOTIFIABLE
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING, OR DROPPED IN A NOTIFIABLE
PARACHUTE ASSAULT
- THE NUMBER OF LANDING CRAFT TO BEACH IN AMPHIBIOUS
LANDINGS
- THE NUMBER OF BATTALION SIZED UNITS LANDED IN A
NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR DROPPED IN A
25X1
322
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
NOTIFIABLE PARACHUTE ASSAULT
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSFERRED TROOPS FOR EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE
- DESIGNATION AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING IN
THE TRANSFER
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS PARTICIPATING IN A
TRANSFER
- GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF POINTS OF ARRIVAL AND
POINTS OF CONCENTRATION
- THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY DELIMITED BY
GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES TOGETHER WITH GEOGRAPHIC
COORDINATES, AS APPROPRIATE
5. THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO
PROVIDING MUCH OF THE INFORMATION, AND ON THE BASIS OF
RECIPROCITY USDEL AND NATO REPS HERE BELIEVE WE SHOULD
ALSO. WE WILL HAVE TO NOTE AD REFERENDUM TEXT
BEGINNING SEPT 8. PLEASE ADVISE BY SEPT 8 IF ANY OF
THESE TEXTS ARE UNACCEPTABLE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
323
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07070
SUBJECT: VERIFICATION WRAPUP - WEEK THREE OF THE FINAL
ROUND
REF: STOCKHOLM 07019
1. CDE XII - 052.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA CAME THROUGH
WITH ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THEIR READINESS TO PROVIDE NNA
AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE EAST, UNABLE TO STAVE OFF THE
NNA WITH CREDIBLE ARGUMENTS, SEEMS TO HAVE LINKED
ACCEPTANCE OF A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD OF 16,000 WITH
ACCOMMODATION ON VERIFICATION ISSUES AND MAY PURSUE
THIS LINKAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NNA AERIAL OPTION.
TEXTS NOTED IN THE WORKING GROUP IMPLICITLY
ESTABLISHED THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION FROM THE AIR
OR GROUND OR BOTH. BEHIND THE SCENES BILATERAL WORK
BETWEEN THE UK AND USSR IS FOCUSSING ON THE ISSUES OF
RESTRICTED AND SPECIFIED AREAS. WE CONTINUE TO WORK
PRIVATELY WITH THE NNA ON AIR MODALITIES WHILE NATO
FUMBLES FOR ITS OWN AGREED APPROACH. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NEWS OF THE WEEK WAS THE ANNOUNCED READINESS
OF VIENNA AND BERN TO SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS
FOR AERIAL INSPECTION. LATE FRIDAY EVENING A REUTER
PRESS RELEASE FROM MOSCOW, WHERE SWISS FOREIGN
MINISTER AUBERT IS ON OFFICIAL VISIT, INDICATED THAT
SHEVARDNADZE HAD CONDITIONALLY AGREED TO THE NNA
CONCEPT. THIS WAS LATER CONFIRMED BY THE SWISS DEL
WHICH HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH BRUNNER IN BERN.
EARLIER IN THE DAY IN PLENARY, HOWEVER, THE EAST HAD
ATTEMPTED TO BUY OFF THE NNA BY OFFERING THEM, AS AN
ALTERNATIVE, A ROLE AS THIRD PARTY PARTICIPANTS IN
INSPECTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME THEY TRIED TO POUR COLD
WATER ON THE NNA OPTION BY CONJURING UP LOGISTICAL,
TECHNICAL AND LEGALISTIC HURDLES WHICH THEY PORTRAYED
AS TOO FORMIDABLE TO RESOLVE BEFORE CONFERENCE
ADJOURNMENT.
5. IF THE REPORT OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE IS ACCURATE,
THE EAST IS LIKELY TO ATTACH CONDITIONS, SUCH AS NNA
AIR AS AN OPTION OF CHOICE OF THE INSPECTED STATE. AN
ACCEPTABLE VARIANT FOR US WOULD BE NEUTRAL AIR OR
INSPECTED STATE AIR AT THE CHOICE OF INSPECTING
STATE. THE EAST MAY ALSO TRY TO LINK PROGRESS IN THE
DRAFTING OF NEUTRAL AERIAL MODALITIES TO ACCEPTANCE OF
THEIR PROPOSED NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD OF 16,000
TROOPS. SOVIET REP ROZANOV ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY
OF SUCH LINKAGE EARLIER IN THE WEEK, AS DID THE
HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR, IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT.
LINKAGE OR NOT, HOWEVER, WE WILL HAVE A FORMIDABLE
TASK OF COAXING THE SOVIETS TO DRAFT MODALITIES WHICH
WOULD PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE MONITORING FROM THE AIR BY
25X1
324
SECRET
nprlacsifiAri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
19 SEPTEMBER. WE EXPECT NNA HELP HERE NOW THAT THEY
HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES. MEANWHILE, IF MOSCOW IS
INDEED READY TO ACCEPT THE NNA AERIAL OPTION, THE
FRENCH MAY BE THE LAST TO HOLDOUT AGAINST IT. THE
FRENCH, WHO HAVE BEEN COUNTING ON THE SOVIETS DOING
THEIR DIRTY WORK, ARE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS TO
SAFEGUARD FRENCH TERRITORY FROM AERIAL INSPECTION BY
EITHER NNA OR INSPECTING STATE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS.
THE FRENCH HAVE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL NOT
BE THE LONE HOLDOUT; THEY PROBABLY COULD LIVE WITH A
FORMULA WHICH PERMITTED A CHOICE BETWEEN THE USE OF
INSPECTED STATE OR NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT.
DRAFTING
6. EFFORTS FOCUSSED MAINLY ON THE LESS CONTROVERSIAL
MODALITIES. WE MANAGED, HOWEVER, TO RECORD TEXT WHICH
ESTABLISHES THAT INSPECTION COULD BE FROM THE AIR OR
GROUND OR BOTH. THIS LANGUAGE ESTABLISHED THE
PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEITY BUT FELL SHORT OF OPENING
THE DOOR TO THE USE OF NON-HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT (SEE
REFTEL). SOVIET EFFORTS WERE CLEARLY INTENDED TO
PRESERVE THE INSPECTED STATE'S CONTROL OF THE GROUND
AND AIR TRANSPORT USED BY THE INSPECTORS. THEY
BLOCKED ATTEMPTS, FOR INSTANCE, TO RECORD LANGUAGE
THAT WOULD PROVIDE IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES FOR
NON-HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL ACCOMPANYING INSPECTORS.
ISSUES
T. RESTRICTED AREAS. WE ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC
ABOUT WORKING OUT WITH THE SOVIETS A SOLUTION BY LATE
NEXT WEEK WHICH WOULD BE SUBSTANTIVELY COMPATIBLE WITH
OUR POSITION. THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND WE NEED A
FORMULA WHICH WOULD NOT PRECLUDE INSPECTION IN ANY
AREA CAPABLE OF ACCOMMODATING A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY;
THEY APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE OUR REQUIREMENT. FOR THEIR
PART, THE SOVIETS NEED A FORMULA CONTAINING A
REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED OR SENSITIVE AREAS. THE
FRENCH, HOWEVER, HAVE INDICATED THEY CANNOT ACCEPT
SUCH A REFERENCE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR NOTION
OF "SENSITIVE POINTS" SEEMS TO INCORPORATE WHAT OTHERS
MIGHT REFER TO AS RESTRICTED OR SENSITIVE AREAS. ON
SPECIFIED AREAS, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PUSH FORMULAS
WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE AREA OF INSPECTION TO THE NATURE
OF THE SUSPECTED VIOLATION, E.G., AN UNNOTIFIED
DIVISION-LEVEL EXERCISE, AN UNNOTIFIED OPERATIONAL-
TACTICAL EXERCISE, ETC. WE CONTINUE TO SAY THIS
APPROACH IS UNACCEPTABLE.
8. AIR MODALITIES. WHILE THE NATO CLUSTER GROUP
CONTINUES TO MASSAGE THE IMS PAPER, THE USDEL IS
WORKING QUIETLY WITH SELECT NNA EXPERTS TO DEVELOP A
SET OF MODALITIES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT
WHICH WOULD MEET OUR OBJECTIVES AND WHICH THE EAST
WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY CREDIBLY REJECTING. THE SWISS
325
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
HAVE BEEN OUR PRINCIPAL COLLABORATORS BUT WE HAVE
RECENTLY BEEN APPROACHED BY AUSTRIAN, SWEDISH AND EVEN
IRISH REPRESENTATIVES. WE SEE SOME POTENTIAL FOR
MINOR FRICTION AMONG THE NNA BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES
OVER MODALITIES; SOME NNA PARTIES HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO
DISPARAGE AS SUITABLE AIRCRAFT MODELS WHICH OTHERS ARE
WILLING TO OFFER AS CANDIDATES. NEVERTHELESS, USDEL
WILL ASSIST THE MORE SERIOUS NNA CONTENDERS IN
DEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS AND DEVELOPING THE SOLUTIONS
FOR INSPECTION FROM THE AIR. WE BELIEVE IT TACTICALLY
TO OUR ADVANTAGE IF THE NNA THEMSELVES TABLED THE
MODALITIES WE JOINTLY DEVELOP.
9. QUOTAS. A PREFERENCE IS EMERGING FOR PASSIVE, AS
OPPOSED TO ACTIVE, QUOTAS. UNFORTUNATELY, AMONG THE
ALLIES VARYING AND INCOMPATIBLE NUMBERS OF INSPECTIONS
HAVE BEGUN TO SURFACE. THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING CLEAR
THEY DO NOT WANT AN ACTIVE QUOTA; AN ACTIVE QUOTA
WOULD DENY THEM THE ROLE OF INSPECTION EXECUTOR ON
BEHALF OF THE WTO. SOVIET OPPOSITION TO AN ACTIVE
QUOTA, HOWEVER, WOULD ALSO IMPLY NO SERIOUS OBJECTION
TO THE POTENTIAL PROSPECT OF THE U.S. OR FRG
MONOPOLIZING THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS WHICH COULD BE
VISITED UPON THE SOVIET UNION UNDER A PASSIVE QUOTA
SYSTEM. THE NNA APPEAR RESIGNED TO QUOTAS BUT ARE AS
CONFUSED AS THE REST OF US ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF
FINDING AN EQUITABLE FORMULA. THE NNA WOULD PREFER A
HIGH NUMBER OF PERMISSIBLE INSPECTIONS. THEY ARE
CONCERNED THAT A LOW NUMBER COULD READILY BE EXHAUSTED
BY MEMBERS OF EITHER OF THE TWO MILITARY ALLIANCES.
AS FOR THE ALLIES, THE BRITISH INFORM US THEY WILL
SUPPORT A PASSIVE QUOTA OF NO LESS THAN FIVE; THE
FRENCH SAY THEY CAN ACCEPT NO MORE THAN THREE. OUR
TASK THIS COMING WEEK WILL BE TO DEVELOP FORMULAS
WHICH WOULD DENY THE SOVIETS THE POSSIBILITY OF
INSPECTING ON BEHALF OF THE WTO AND SATISFY THE NNA
PERCEIVED REQUIREMENT FOR A HIGH NUMBER. AT THE SAME
TIME, WE CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR A FORMULA WHICH WOULD
PRECLUDE THE NNA USE OF INSPECTION QUOTAS TO WHICH
NATO AND THE WTO WOULD BE LIABLE. THIS IS PROVING
PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AND WE ARE CURRENTLY FAVORING
AN APPROACH OF UNLIMITED ACTIVE, BUT WITH A CLAUSE TO
PREVENT ANY ONE STATE FROM CONDUCTING MORE THAN ONE
INSPECTION ON ANY OTHER STATE'S TERRITORY.
10. IN A LATE DEVELOPMENT ON SEPT 6, GRINEVSKY TOLD
US THAT HIS INITIAL READOUT IS THAT MOSCOW'S POSITION
IS THAT NEUTRAL AIR CAN BE USED FOR INSPECTION AT THE
OPTION OF THE INSPECTED STATE. SINCE THE USSR WOULD
SURELY CHOOSE ITS OWN AIRCRAFT IN SUCH SITUATIONS,
THIS REPRESENTS NO REAL CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION.
SUSPICIOUS MINDS WOULD NOTE THAT THIS IS ALSO THE
FRENCH POSITION. AT LEAST THIS GIVES US THE CHANCE TO
25X1
326
SECRET
n.rincQifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
DRAFT ON MODALITIES FOR NEUTRAL AIR WHILE LEAVING
ASIDE THE PARAGRAPH ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF WHO GETS
TO MAKE THE CHOICE OF NNA AIRCRAFT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
25X1
327
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07071
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS --
- SEPTEMBER 1-5, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 7019
1. CDE XII - 053.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE HIGHLIGHT
OF THE WEEK WAS THE BUILDING MOMENTUM FOR THE USE OF
NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT IN THE INSPECTION REGIME. AT FRIDAY'S
PLENARY AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND OFFICIALLY OFFERED TO
PROVIDE THEIR AIRCRAFT AND CREW FOR THE PURPOSES OF
INSPECTION OF A STOCKHOLM CSBM'S REGIME. HUNGARY,
SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE EAST, SAID THAT THERE WERE TOO
MANY PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A REGIME
IN THE REMAINING TIME BUT DID NOT EXPLICITLY REJECT THE
USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT. THE U.S. ARGUED THAT THESE
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES COULD BE RESOLVED AND SAID THAT
THE NEUTRAL OFFER WOULD ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INSPECTION.
THERE IS, UNFORTUNATELY, A PERHAPS FATAL FLAW IN THIS
ROSY SCENARIO: FRANCE. PARIS HAS NOW SAID IT CAN ONLY
GO ALONG WITH THE USE OF INSPECTED STATE AIRCRAFT.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE FRENCH ARE NOT ALONE IN RAISING
DIFFICULT, AND SOMETIMES NON-NEGOTIABLE, DEMANDS. AS
THE THOUGHT BELATEDLY DAWNS ON OTHER DELEGATIONS AND
THEIR CAPITALS (AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES) THAT THERE
ACTUALLY MAY BE AN AGREEMENT AFFECTING THEIR SECURITY
INTERESTS COMING OUT OF STOCKHOLM, THE COLONELS HAVE
BEGUN TO REVOLT. VARIOUS DELEGATIONS HAVE COME UP WITH
LAST-MINUTE FIXES TO PROTECT THEIR PERCEIVED SECURITY
INTERESTS. THE FRENCH, OF COURSE, LEAD THE WAY. THEY
HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT NO MORE THAN THREE
PASSIVE INSPECTIONS AND CANNOT ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT
FOR THOSE INSPECTIONS. THE BRITISH MINISTER OF DEFENSE
IS UPSET THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS EXEMPTED MOBILIZATION
FROM NOTIFICATION. FINALLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR OWN
AGENDA; MUCH OF IT IS NEGATIVE. THEY ARE THEREFORE
DRAGGING THEIR FEET ON INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF
NOTIFICATION AND INSPECTION MODALITIES IN ORDER TO
EMASCULATE THOSE REGIMES. THERE ARE NOW TWO WEEKS
REMAINING TO RESOLVE THESE AND OTHER PROBLEMS. END
SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: EVERYTHING WAS ON HOLD WHILE A
FORMULA FOR THE NOTIFICATION PARAMETER FOR GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES WAS BEING WORKED ON BEHIND THE SCENES. WITH
NATO'S BLESSING FRENCH DEPUTY FELIX-PAGANON CONDUCTED
INTENSIVE PRIVATE TALKS WITH SOVIET MAJOR GENERAL
TATARNIKOV TO COME UP WITH A FORMULA FOR THE STRUCTURAL
ELEMENT OF THE GROUND FORCE PARAMETER. THE SOVIETS WANT
THE WORDS "ORGANIZED INTO DIVISIONS..." WHILE THE WEST
328
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
AND NNA CAN ACCEPT "ORGANIZED INTO MULTIPLE MAJOR COMBAT
ELEMENTS". THE SOVIET FORMULA IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE
IT WOULD EXCLUDE EXERCISES BY SINGLE FULL STRENGTH
DIVISIONS. MEANWHILE, HUNGARY ANNOUNCED IN PLENARY
(9/5/86) THAT THE EAST COULD ACCEPT A NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD OF 16,000 IF ITS VERIFICATION CONCERNS ARE
HET.
WHILE THIS ISSUE WAS BEING WORKED OUT BILATERALLY, THE
FOCUS IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS THIS WEEK WAS ON THE
CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. EARLY IN THE WEEK THE SWEDISH
COORDINATOR (LIDGARD) DISTRIBUTED A PAPER (BASED LARGELY
ON A USDEL PAPER) ON THE SUBJECT. TATARNIKOV ARGUED
THAT THE COORDINATOR'S EFFORT WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE
IT CONTAINED NOTHING ON TRANSFERS. AFTER A NUMBER OF
SEPARATE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE COORDINATOR AND U.S. AND
SOVIET NEGOTIATORS, IT APPEARED THAT EIGHT ENTRIES COULD
BE NOTED. HOWEVER, THIS EMERGING CONSENSUS WAS BLOWN
OUT OF THE WATER WHEN TATARNIKOV INSISTED ON A FOOTNOTE
WHICH STATED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS ONLY PROVISIONALLY
AGREED PENDING AGREEMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE
THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION. WE REJECTED THE SOVIET
CONDITION. TATARNIKOV EVENTUALLY WITHDREW THIS
REQUIREMENT, BUT THEN DEMANDED INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER
AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS FOR TRANSFERRED TROOPS. WE ARE
INSISTING THAT THE DESIGNATION OF SUCH DIVISIONS ALSO BE
GIVEN. A STALEMATE HAS RESULTED.
IN OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, THE BRITS, REPORTEDLY ALL THE WAY
UP TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, WERE SMARTING OVER THE
ALLIANCE'S DECISION TO DROP MOBILIZATION AS A NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITY AND WERE LOOKING AT WAYS TO MAKE THE
EAST AND NNA PAY MORE FOR THIS CONCESSION. WE ALSO CAN
EXPECT THE NNA TO BE DIFFICULT ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AS THEY SEE THIS AS THE ONLY
OUTSTANDING ISSUE WHERE THEY CAN HAVE ANY REAL INFLUENCE.
5. VERIFICATION: THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IN VERIFICATION
THIS WEEK WAS THE SWISS AND AUSTRIAN ANOLTNCEMENTS IN
PLENARY THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED, IN
PRINCIPLE, TO MAKE AIRCRAFT AND CREW AVAILABLE FOR
INSPECTION. THE EASTERN REACTION, DELIVERED BY HUNGARY,
RESTATED THAT AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE
INSPECTED STATE, BUT DID NOT REJECT THE NEUTRAL AIR
CONCEPT ONLY "REGRETTING" THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TIME LEFT TO CONSIDER IT. THE EAST ALSO TRIED TO "THROW
A BONE" TO THE NNA BY PROPOSING THAT THE INSPECTED
STATE, AT ITS DISCRETION, COULD INVITE A THIRD PARTY
WITHOUT ALLIANCE RELATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
INSPECTION. (COMMENT: OUR EASTERN INTERLOCUTORS HAVE
BEEN STUDIOUS IN AVOIDING ANY PRINCIPLED OBJECTION TO
NEUTRAL AIR, BASING THEIR CASE AGAINST IT SOLELY ON THE
SHORT TIME REMAINING AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS. AS THIS
329
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
:Di
IS MUCH THE SAME OPENING LINE THEY TOOK ON INSPECTION IN
GENERAL, WE BELIEVE THERE IS STILL A GOOD CHANCE FOR
SUCCESS, IF BOTH NATO AND, PARTICULARLY, NNA PRESSURE IS
KEPT ON THE EAST. END COMMENT). IN FACT, THE SOVIETS MAY
HAVE LEFT THEIR HUNGARIAN COLLEAGUES OUT ON A LIMB AS A
REUTERS STORY CARRIED LATER IN THE DAY SUGGESTED THAT
MOSCOW HAD "CONDITIONALLY" ACCEPTED THE SWISS OFFER
DURING A MEETING BETWEEN SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER AUBERT
AND SHEVARDNADZE.
IN THE WORKING GROUP, FIVE TEXTS (REFTEL) WERE NOTED AS
THE EAST LET UP ON THE DRAFTING BRAKES SOMEWHAT. THE
MOST IMPORTANCE OF THESE CONCRETIZED SOVIET AGREEMENT
THAT INSPECTION COULD BE FROM THE AIR OR GROUND OR
BOTH. IN SUBSEQUENT COFFEE GROUPS, SEVERAL MORE TEXTS
WERE "PRE-NOTED," LEAVING TRANSPORTATION, SPECIFIED
AREAS AND INSPECTION QUOTAS AS THE BIG ISSUES
REMAINING. IN BILATERAL CONTACTS ON RESTRICTED AREAS,
THE SOVIETS APPEAR WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH OUR
"POSITIVE APPROACH" THAT AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE CANNOT BE DECLARED CLOSED, AND
HAVE REAFFIRMED THAT CLOSED AREAS IN THE CONTEXT OF CDE
WOULD BE DIFFERENT AND LESS EXTENSIVE THAN THOSE
EXISTING CURRENTLY. THEY ARE INSISTING, HOWEVER, ON A
REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED AREAS IN THE TEXT, WHICH WILL
POSE PROBLEMS FOR THE FRENCH WHO SAY PARIS CAN ONLY
ACCEPT "SENSITIVE POINTS". IN COFFEE GROUP DISCUSSION
THE SOVIETS HAVE TRIED TO BUILD THE CASE FOR A PASSIVE
QUOTA OF 1-2, BUT HAVE RECEIVED A COOL NNA RECEPTION.
NATO HAS YET TO GET ITS OWN ACT TOGETHER ON NUMBERS AS
THE FRENCH INSIST ON NO MORE THAN THREE, WHILE THE UK
MUST HAVE NO LESS THAN FIVE. FOR NOW, WE ARE CONTINUING
TO ADVOCATE AN ACTIVE QUOTA, AND ONLY SAYING THAT A
PASSIVE QUOTA OF 1-2 IS INSUFFICIENT.
6. OBSERVATION: DISCUSSION THIS WEEK FOCUSED ONCE
AGAIN ON THE CORE OF THE OBSERVATION REGIME, SCOPE OF
OBSERVATION BUT DUE TO EASTERN STALLING TACTICS NO
PROGRESS WAS MADE. THE EAST HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED THAT
THE LONGER IT CAN HOLD OFF DRAFTING ON THIS ISSUE, THE
LESS IT WILL HAVE TO AGREE TO ALLOW OBSERVERS TO SEE AND
DO. A VARIETY OF STALLING TACTICS HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED,
RANGING FROM INSISTING ON DISCUSSION OF THE OBSERVATION
OF ASSOCIATED AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS BEFORE FOCUSING
ON THE ACTUAL GROUND ACTIVITY TO TABLING LANGUAGE WHICH
WOULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT OBSERVERS COULD VISIT UNITS OF
EACH DIVISION TAKING PART IN AN EXERCISE. DISCUSSION
BROKE DOWN COMPLETELY LATE IN THE WEEK WHEN THE SOVIETS
TABLED A PAPER REFERRING TO THE OBSERVATION OF
"TRANSFERS OF FORCES," WHICH ARE, IN FACT, NOT
OBSERVABLE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY
UNDER THE RECENT AGREEMENT IN B-1. WHILE WE EXPECT THIS
"MISUNDERSTANDING" TO BE RESOLVED FAIRLY QUICKLY, IT HAS
25X1
330'
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
WASTED ANOTHER FEW DAYS. NATO (AND THE NNA) WILL
CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR SERIOUS DRAFTING ON THE SCOPE OF
OBSERVATION NEXT WEEK, AS MOST OF THE OTHER MAJOR ISSUES
REMAINING IN OBSERVATION (E.G, DURATION, OBSERVATION OF
ALERTS, AND THE QUESTION OF SPLIT OR UNITARY
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLDS) CONTINUE TO
AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS IN B-1.
7. ANNUAL CALENDAR: THE SOVIETS BLOCKED PROGRESS THIS
WEEK ON THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDER PENDING PROGRESS ON
THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. ONCE THE LATTER ISSUE IS
RESOLVED WE MAY GET AGREEMENT ON SEVERAL ADDITIONAL
ITEMS OF INFORMATION IN THE CALENDAR (E.G., ON THE SIZE,
THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, NUMBER AND TYPES OF DIVISIONS),
ALTHOUGH WE EXPECT THESE ITEMS WILL NOT BE EASY TO
EXTRACT FROM THE EAST. WE ALSO BELIEVE THEIR
WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER MORE INFORMATION IS LINKED TO
WHAT THE WEST IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE ON CONSTRAINTS.
8. CONSTRAINTS: IN THE FRIDAY PLENARY (9/5/86),
BULGARIA (TODOROV), IN A PREPARED STATEMENT, FURTHER
DEVELOPED THE EAST'S SET OF LIMITATIONS PROPOSALS. HE
PROPOSED THAT NOT JUST "LARGEST SCALE" EXERCISES, BUT
MEDIUM-SIZED EXERCISES AS WELL, SHOULD BE COVERED BY
CSBM'S AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, PROPOSED THAT NO MORE THAN
A CERTAIN NUMBER OF EXERCISES (HE PROPOSED THE NUMBER
SIX) ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE (HE PROPOSED 40,000) SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. HE NOTED THAT THE
EAST, "IN THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE" COULD ACCEPT 75,000
AS THE PARAMETER FOR A LIMITATION (READ CEILING) ON
"LARGEST SCALE" EXERCISES; BUT SUGGESTED THAT
OCCASSIONALLY THIS CEILING MIGHT BE EXCEEDED. TODOROV
ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE SWISS COORDINATOR'S NON-PAPER BE
USED AS THE BASIS FOR DRAFTING.
THE EAST'S APPETITE FOR A LIMITATION CLEARLY HAS NOT
BEEN ASSUAGED BY NATO'S ENDORSEMENT OF A "TIME"
CONSTRAINT. WTO REPRESENTATIVES ARE VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED
TO THE CONCEPT AND WE WILL FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT
TO NEGOTIATE PARAMETERS LOW ENOUGH TO AFFECT THE PACT AS
WELL AS NATO.
THE BULGARIA STATEMENT CLEARLY INDICATED AN EASTERN
PREFERENCE FOR A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES
FORECAST. HOWEVER, NATO HAS BEEN EXAMINING A RELATED
NNA IDEA: A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ADDITIONS TO THE
ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE ONLY APPARENT AREA OF COMMON
GROUND LIES IN THE AREA OF LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF
ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY BE ADDED TO THE CALENDAR; THERE ARE
PROBLEMS WITH THIS IDEA, HOWEVER: NATO (PRIMARILY THE
FRG) CANNOT ACCEPT A NUMBER LOWER THAN 75,000 WHILE THE
EAST AND NNA WANT 40-50,000. AND FINALLY, USDEL REMAINS
TACTICALLY OPPOSED TO A SEPARATE MEASURE ON CONSTRAINTS,
ALTHOUGH, UNFORTUNATELY, MOST ALLIES ALREADY APPEAR TO
HAVE GIVEN THIS AWAY.
331 ,
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
CV1"13C"P
9. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE EAST AND NNA ARE PUTTING ON A
FULL COURT PRESS TO COMPLETE WORK ON NUF AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. WHILE SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO
COMPLETE THE NUF GAME, LAST WEEK THE U.S. HELD THE BALL
ANTICIPATING BREAKS IN THE EASTERN/NNA DEFENSE. THIS
STRATEGY SERVED TWO PURPOSES: TO GET BETTER (OR lEsS
BAD) LANGUAGE ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS "THE MEDITERRANEAN"
AND "ARMED FORCES" AND TO KEEP SUCH TROUBLESOME PLAYERS
AS THE EASTERN CAPTAIN (KORMENDY - HUNGARY) AND THE
MALTESE AMBASSADOR (GAUCI) PREOCCUPIED WITH NUF AND OUT
OF THE CRUCIAL CSBM'S GAME. THIS STRATEGY HAS LARGELY
SUCCEEDED. HOWEVER, AS THE FRUSTRATION FACTOR RISES AND
THE FRENCH, THE ULTIMATE NON-TEAM PLAYERS, BEGIN TO
INTRODUCE THEIR OWN MISCHIEVOUS LANGUAGE, THIS STRATEGY
IS RAPIDLY APPROACHING A POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURNS.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT IT IS NOW TIME TO CUT A
DEAL. SEPTEL SPELLS OUT THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE AND
STRUCTURE OF A POSSIBLE COMPLETE NUF SECTION, INCLUDING
ARMED FORCES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND MEDITERRANEAN TEXTS. THE
DEAL WILL NOT INCLUDE LANGUAGE ON THE COMPLEMENTARY
NATURE OF POLITICAL/MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, THE
NUF NORM, EQUAL SECURITY, PREVENTION OF ANY KIND OF WAR,
ETC. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EASTERN AGENDA. USDEL
BELIEVES IF SUCH A TRADE OFF IS ATTAINABLE WE SHOULD
STOP THE GAME AND DECLARE VICTORY. THIS RESULT,
HOWEVER, IS NOT A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
332
25X1
SECRET
nprdaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07075
SUBJECT: CDE: NEUTRAL INSPECTING AIRCRAFT
REF: STATE 280986
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. DRAWING ON REFTEL, POLCOUNS SEPT. 8 DISCUSSED QUESTION
OF NNA AIRCRAFT AND CREWS BEING USED FOR AERIAL INSPECTION
WITH ANNE KALLIN OF MFA CDE SECTION. KALLIN SAID THAT,
ALTHOUGH THE GOS HAS NOT YET MADE AS EXPLICIT A STATEMENT
AS THE AUSTRIANS AND THE SWISS, THE GOS HAS MADE CLEAR AT
THE CDE ITS POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THIS PROPOSAL.
KALLIN SAID THAT SWEDISH MILITARY OFFICIALS ARE CURRENTLY
EXAMINING THE DETAILS OF AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND THAT HE
UNDERSTANDS THAT A SUITABLE SWEDISH AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN
IDENTIFIED.
3. KALLIN TOOK THE USG POINT ABOUT THE UTILITY OF
PUBLICIZING PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY, NNA WILLINGNESS TO
PROVIDE INSPECTION AIRCRAFT. WHILE KALLIN DID NOT PROMISE
ANY IMMEDIATE COS ACTION, HE REITERATED THAT THE GOS HAS
THE MATTER UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION AND THAT THERE WOULD
BE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR A POSSIBLE GOS
STATEMENT TO BE MADE. NEWELL
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
333
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
_SECRET-
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07090
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FINAL NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT OF THE
STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT
1. CDE XII - 054
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE POSSIBLE
FINAL STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE
SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. IN USDEL'S VIEW, IT
CONTAINS ALL KEY WESTERN LANGUAGE AND ELIMINATES OR
EMASCULATES THE MOST OBNOXIOUS EASTERN AND NNA TEXTS.
TACTICALLY WE ARE IN A GOOD POSITION AND BELIEVE IT IS
TIME TO STRIKE A DEAL WITH THE NNA AND EAST ON THE NUF
SECTION. WE PLAN TO DO SO THIS WEEK. (SEE PARA 6 FOR
ACTION REQUESTED AND PARA 7 FOR POSSIBLE FINAL NUF TEXT.)
END SUMMARY.
4. THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE POSSIBLE FINAL STRUCTURE AND
LANGUAGE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM
DOCUMENT. IT INCLUDES ALL KEY WESTERN LANGUAGE, E.G., ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, TERRORISM, COMPLIANCE, ETC., AND DOES NOT
INCLUDE SOME EASTERN PASSAGES, E.G., ON EQUAL SECURITY,
THE NUF NORM, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY, ETC.
THE SECTION WILL ALSO INCLUDE PER FORCE LANGUAGE ON
"ARMED FORCES" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. MOREOVER, TO
ENSURE THAT THERE CAN BE NO UNDUE FOCUS ON THESE TEXTS,
WE PROPOSE USING EXISTING HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND MADRID
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT LANGUAGE. OTHER LANGUAGE PREVIOUSLY
NOTED IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP SUCH AS ON THE AIM OF THE
CONFERENCE AND THE CSBM'S NUF LINK WILL PROBABLY APPEAR
IN THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT. FRENCH-INSPIRED
LANGUAGE SPELLING OUT THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE AND
THE GOAL OF DISARMAMENT IS EITHER REDUNDANT OR
MISCHIEVOUS; WE, THEREFORE, PROPOSE DROPPING THESE TEXTS
FROM THE NUF SECTION. (IN ANY CASE, WE WILL HAVE TO
ACCEPT SOME ANODYNE LANGUAGE ON DISARMAMENT PROBABLY IN
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT.) FINALLY, THE POLES
ARE STILL PUSHING FOR LANGUAGE ON INVIOLABILITY OF
FRONTIERS TAKEN FROM THE FINAL ACT. WHILE WE MOULD NOT
BLOCK FINAL ACT LANGUAGE ON THE SUBJECT IF A STRONG
CONSENSUS DEVELOPS, WE HAVE HERETOFORE OPPOSED THIS
LANGUAGE AS UNNECESSARY AND AS COMING TOO LATE IN THE
GAME. WE HOPE IT WILL DISAPPEAR IN THE FINAL DEAL.
5. SUBSTANTIVELY, IN USDEL'S VIEW, WE HAVE EVERYTHING
WE CAN REASONABLY EXPECT IN A NUF SECTION AND HAVE
ELIMINATED OR EMASCULATED THE MOST OBNOXIOUS EASTERN AND
NNA TEXTS. TACTICALLY, THEN, IT IS NOW TIME TO STRIKE
THE FINAL DEAL WITH THE EAST AND NNA. MOREOVER, OVER THE
PAST WEEK, THE FRENCH HAVE INTRODUCED SEVERAL MISCHIEVOUS
AMENDMENTS TO THE WESTERN POSITION, THEREBY HOLDING UP
AGREEMENT ON SEVERAL WESTERN-ORIENTED PASSAGES, E.G.,
334
25X1
SECRET
npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES, NONCOMPLIANCE. THE
NNA, PARTICULARLY THE AUSTRIAN COORDINATOR, ARE BECOMING
FRUSTRATED AT ALLEGED AND REAL WESTERN FOOT DRAGGING.
THEREFORE, USDEL PROPOSES CONCLUDING WORK ON THE NUF
SECTION BY THE END OF THIS WEEK WITH THE GOAL OF NOTING
THE FINAL TEXT BY TUESDAY (SEPTEMBER 16) AT THE LATEST.
WE WILL PROPOSE THE LANGUAGE COMBINED IN PARA 7 AS OUR
"BOTTOM LINE." IT IS FAR FROM A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT
THE WORKING GROUP WILL ACCEPT THIS PACKAGE. THE FRENCH
MAY NOT ACCEPT THIS AS A WESTERN POSITION, THE SOVIETS
PROBABLY WILL NOT ACCEPT THE "ARMED FORCES" AND "HUMAN
RIGHTS" LANGUAGE AND THE NNA WILL PUT FORWARD MINOR
FIXES. HOWEVER, WE INTEND TO USE EASTERN AND NNA ANXIETY
TO CONCLUDE WORK ON NUF TO OUR ADVANTAGE IN ARGUING OUR
CASE AND TO CONCENTRATE ON THE CSBM'S END GAME.
6. ACTION REQUEST: UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED BY COB
SEPTEMBER 9, WE WILL OFFER THE FOLLOWING NUF PACKAGE TO
THE EAST AND NNA BY MID-WEEK.
7. THE FINAL NUF SECTION WITH THE LEAD-IN PARAGRAPH
LINKING THE NON-USE OF FORCE REAFFIRMATION TO THE ADOP-
TION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBMS, I.E., THE LINK, FOLLOWS
(THE HEADING FOR EACH PARAGRAPH, E.G., THE REAFFIRMATION,
SELF-DEFENSE, WILL NOT APPEAR IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT, BUT
IS INCLUDED FOR CLARITY'S SAKE. LANGUAGE WITHIN THE
PARENTHESES WILL NOT BE PART OF THE WESTERN FINAL DEAL
OFFER.)
BEGIN TEXT:
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNISE THAT THE ADOPTED
SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE
AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE DECLARED THE FOLLOWING:
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
HE REAFFIRMATION
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION
TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER
MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT
AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL
ACT. (NOTED 6/17/86)
NO CONSIDERATION
- NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO SERVE TO
WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRA-
335
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
_SECRET__
VENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE. (NOTED 9/2/86)
SELF-DEFENSE
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF
INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK
OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS. (NOTED 9/2/86)
MANIFESTATION OF FORCE
- THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE
FOR THE PURPOSES OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE
TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.
(EAST AND NNA WANT TO ADD "IN ANY FORM" OR "INDIRECT OR
DIRECT" AFTER "ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE.")
ARMED FORCES
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT
TO PEACE AND SECURITY. ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT
THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSIS-
TENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION
ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING
STATES AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, IN PARTICULAR
FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.
- (EAST "BOTTOM LINE" LANGUAGE: "IN ORDER TO REDUCE
THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT, TO PRESERVE PEACE AND TO _
PREVENT ANY KIND OF WAR, THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE
OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND
PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.)
TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION
- NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
- (THE FRENCH HAVE PROPOSED SIGNIFICANT DRAFTING
CHANGES: "THEY MOREOVER RECALL THEIR COMMITMENT TO
RESPECT THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES
AS SET FORTH IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN PARTICULAR
THEY STRESS THAT NO MILITARY OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORIES BY THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVEN-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.")
ERGA ONES
- THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY
STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF
ALLIANCE. (NOTED 7/8/86)
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH NUF
- THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION
OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRA-
VENTION OF THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED
336 ?
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
NATIONS CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
(NOT NOTED -- FRENCH OBJECTIONS; THIS PASSAGE IS
ADMITTEDLY REDUNDANT, BUT IT IS CAREFULLY WORDED AND MAY
ALLOW US TO TRADE OFF THIS HARMLESS TEXT FOR THE NNA
DROPPING OFF THEIR POSITION ON OTHER ISSUES, E.G.,
MANIFESTATION OF FORCE.)
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS
CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN
ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL
FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE
AND SECURITY. THEY MULL THEIR COMMITMENT TO REINFORCE
AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR
RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY
PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM. THE FRENCH
OBJECTED TO THIS TEXT AT THE LAST MOMENT.)
COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS, AND THUS TO FURTHER THE
PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION
IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. (NOT AGREED,
ALTHOUGH CONSENSUS IS NEAR.)
COMMITMENT TO ALL PRINCIPLES
- THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE
THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO
PRACTICE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR
SOCIAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL
LOCATION OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
- ALL THESE PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE
AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY
APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE OTHERS. (THE EAST WANTS TO INSERT THE LIST
OF ALL TEN PRINCIPLES AT THIS POINT IN THE TEXT.)
- RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES
WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS
COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.
HUMAN RIGHTS
- IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.
RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE CSCE PROCESS
D FOR KNRNATKONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY, AS
25X1
337
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
WELL AS FOR TE DEVELOPMENT 01FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES.
THE MEDITERRANEAN
- THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD
SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH
SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN THIS
CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP GOOD
NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE REGION, WITH
DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY (IN THE SPIRIT OF THE
25X1
PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES
GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES) OR (TO
PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE PREVAIL
IN THE REGION) AND TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ADOPTED
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE. (POSSIBLE COMPROMISE
TEXT NOT YET ACCEPTED BY THE NNA.)
TERRORISM
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO
TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT
TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE
EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION
AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL
TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE
PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON
THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND
ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE
PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE
DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.
SOVEREIGN EQUALITY/EQUAL RIGHTS AND DTIEST- THE PARTPJOPAIN
STSS G CONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT
TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF
STATES AND STRESS THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND
DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
(NOTED 8/19/86)
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO
STRESS THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR
BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY. (NOTED 8/19/86)
ARTICLE 103
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
338 ,
SECRET
nprdaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF
THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY
OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL. (NOTED 9/2/86)
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
339,
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SE RET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07121
SUBJECT: CDE: KEY ISSUES AS OF SEPTEMBER 8
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AS WE MOVE INTO THE HOME STRETCH, ALLIED
POSITIONS ARE BEGINNING TO COME TOGETHER. THE SOVIETS
ARE CLEARLY FRUSTRATED BY WESTERN AND NNA PRESSURE FOR
USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT IN INSPECTIONS AND MAY BE PRE-
PARING EITHER TO YIELD ON THE ISSUE OR TO THREATEN THE
BREAKUP OF THE CONFERENCE. THE NNA ARE PREPARING TO
INSIST ON EXEMPTION OF THE MOBILIZED FORCES. WE HOPE
TO ACCELERATE DRAFTING THIS WEEK AND WIND UP AS MANY
ISSUES AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.
3. GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV RETURNED TO MOSCOW ON
SEPTEMBER 7, PRESUMABLY FOR LAST-MINUTE CONSULTATIONS
ON NEUTRAL AIR AND OTHER CDE ISSUES. GRINEVSKY IN
PARTICULAR HAS EXPRESSED ANGRY FRUSTRATION WITH WESTERN
PRESSURE ON INSPECTION ISSUES AND WITH GENERAL INABILITY
TO PIN DOWN AGREEMENT ON KEY NOTIFICATION ISSUES. HE
MAY RETURN FROM MOSCOW WITH INSTRUCTIONS EITHER TO GIVE
IN ON NEUTRAL AIR OR TO THREATEN NO AGREEMENT.
NEUTRAL AIR
4. SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER AUBERT REPORTEDLY PRESSED
SHEVARDNADZE HARD ON THE NEUTRAL AIR QUESTION ON
SEPTEMBER 5. SHEVARDNADZE'S INITIAL REACTION WAS TO
SAY THAT AKHROMEYEV HAD OFFERED THE LAST WORD IN ACCEPT-
ING AERIAL INSPECTION WITH THE INSPECTED STATE'S AIR-
CRAFT. IN THE FACE OF SWISS PERSISTENCE, SHEVARDNADZE
SAID THE SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT NNA AIRCRAFT IF ABSOLUTELY
ESSENTIAL FOR VERIFICATION. OTHER SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS
TOOK THE LINE THAT THERE WAS NO TIME TO DRAFT MODALITIES
COVERING NNA AIRCRAFT. THE SWISS SAID THAT DETAILS COULD
BE WORKED OUT AFTER SEPTEMBER 19.
5. GRINEVSKY'S SEPTEMBER 6 VERSION OF THE MOSCOW LINE
WAS THAT THE INSPECTED STATE COULD CHOOSE EITHER NNA
AIRCRAFT OR INSPECTED STATE'S AIRCRAFT, BUT HE EMPHASIZED
THAT HE HAD ONLY A GENERAL READOUT FROM MOSCOW. THIS,
OF COURSE, IS THE SAME AS THE FRENCH POSITION AND WOULD
RESULT IN THE INVARIABLE WTO CHOICE OF INSPECTED STATE'S
AIRCRAFT. OUR POSITION IS THAT THE CHOICE MUST BE THE
INSPECTING STATE'S.
6. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THIS NEW SOVIET POSITION OPENS
THE WAY FOR DRAFTING ON MODALITIES FOR THE USE OF NNA
AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS INSPECTED STATE'S AIRCRAFT; WE WILL
MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO CHOICE -- IT IS UP TO THE
INSPECTING STATE. THE ALLIES HAVE GENERALLY AGREED TO
PROCEED THIS WAY. THIS ROUTE DOES, HOWEVER, LEAVE THE
QUESTION OF WHO MAKES THE CHOICE UNTIL THE VERY END WHEN
PRESSURES FOR COMPROMISE WILL BE AT THEIR HEIGHT.
7. WE BELIEVE THAT RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF QUOTAS
WILL MAKE THE QUESTION OF NNA AIR EASIER TO SOLVE. THE
UK IS THE MOST CAUTIOUS OF ALL ALLIED DELEGATIONS ON
340
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
THIS POINT. WE ARE URGING THE ALLIES TO COME TOGETHER
ON A POSITION OF NO ACTIVE QUOTA, 5 PASSIVE AND A PRO-
VISION THAT NO COUNTRY HAS TO ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE IN-
SPECTION FROM ANY OTHER.
8. NEGOTIATIONS ON RESTRICTED AREAS AND AREAS WHERE IN-
SPECTION CAN BE CARRIED OUT ARE MOVING AHEAD; WE BELIEVE
THAT THE FRENCH AND GERMANS CAN LIVE WITH THE TEXT THE
BRITISH ARE NEGOTIATING, WHICH INCLUDES MENTION OF
RESTRICTED AREAS.
NOTIFICATION
9. THE KEY REMAINING ISSUE HERE IS THRESHOLDS. THE DIS-
CUSSION OF THE STRUCTURAL FORMULA HAS COME ABOUT AS FAR
AS IT CAN FOR THE MOMENT, AND WE STILL LACK AN ACCEPTABLE
FORMULA. WE PLAN TO SHIFT THE FOCUS TO NUMBERS OF TROOPS
AND TANKS HOPING THAT A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION WILL HELP
US WITH THE STRUCTURAL FORMULA. THIS WILL BE A VERY
TOUGH NEGOTIATION, WHICH IS PRIMARILY IN THE HANDS OF
THE UK, NORWAY AND FRG.
10. WE RESIGNED TO THE FACT THAT THE DESIGNATION OF
DIVISIONS AND THEIR HEADQUARTERS LOCATIONS WILL BE IMPOS-
SIBLE TO GET, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO PRESS. THE
REMAINDER OF THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION WILL INCLUDE
MUCH, BUT NOT ALL, OF THE INFORMATION WHICH INTERESTS
US.
11. THE MAIN "SLEEPER" ISSUE HERE IS POSSIBLE INSISTENCE
BY SOME NNA THAT THEIR MOBILIZED FORCES BE EXPLICITLY
EXEMPTED IN SOME FASHION FROM CSBMS. WE SAY THIS IS
UNREALISTIC, BUT THE SOVIETS ARE SIGNALING THAT THEY
CAN AGREE WITH THIS.
OBSERVATION
12. WE ALSO BELIEVE OBSERVATION CAN BE CLOSED OFF THIS
WEEK EXCEPT FOR THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF SEPARATE
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLDS. WE HAVE PRO-
POSED A COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD RESOLVE THE
ISSUE OF OBSERVERS' BINOCULARS.
CALENDARS/CONSTRAINTS
14. OUR PROPOSAL OF TWO YEARS' ADVANCE NOTICE FOR EXER-
CISES ABOVE 40,000 HAS THE SOVIETS ON THE DEFENSIVE.
WE MAY END UP WITH NO TIME CONSTRAINTS AT ALL. IN THE
MEANTIME, WE WILL TRY TO SECURE A CLOSING-OFF OF
CLAENDAR DRAFTING WITH WHATEVER LEVEL OF DETAILED
INFORMATION WE CAN GET.
NON-USE OF FORCE
15. COMPLETION OF DRAFTING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED THIS WEEK
ON TERMS SATISFACTORY TO NATO AND INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
NNNN
341
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFrRFT
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07160
SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS AS OF
SEPTEMBER 5, 1986
1. CDE XII - 055
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL THE LANGUAGE THAT
HAS BEEN REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK FOR
ALL WORKING GROUPS AT CDE AS OF 9/5/86. THE TEXTS HAVE
BEEN ARRANGED IN LOGICAL SEQUENCE, RATHER THAN
CHRONLOGICALLY AS IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES.
BEGIN TEXT:
(POSSIBLE INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE)
... THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND
INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE
ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT,
SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF
STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN
THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL ...
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE.. THAT THE ADOPTED
SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS, WHICH ARE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE, BY THEIR SCOPE AND
NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
A-1 (NON-USE OF FORCE)
... THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR
OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS
WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL,
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN
ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT
TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID
DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT.
NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT
RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION
OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED
ATTACK OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS.
THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY
STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
342
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THE STATE RELATIONS OF
ALLIANCE.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO
STRESS.. THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR
BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECONFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT
TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF
STATES AND STRESS.. THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS
AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM, THAT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY
OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL.
A-2 (INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION)
THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE
AGREED UPON WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT ... .
ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS
WILL BE ALLOWED TO .
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS ... WILL STATE
THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST.
THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTICIPATING
STATE(S) ON WHOSE TERRITORY IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBMS COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS IS IN DOUBT.
? ? ?
IN ITS REQUEST, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL NOTIFY THE
RECEIVING STATE OF:
(A) THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST ...;
(B) THE LOCATION OF THE SPECIFIED AREA ... DEFINED BY
GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES;
? ? ?
( ) WHETHER THE INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED FROM THE
GROUND, FROM THE AIR OR BOTH;
INFORMATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF DIPLOMATIC VISAS TO
INSPECTORS ENTERING THE RECEIVING STATE.
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS ... WILL SPECIFY
THE AREA WHERE ... .
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A
REQUEST WILL ... WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. ...
WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE INSPECTION
TEAM AT THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE INSPECTION WILL BE
TERMINATED.
THE ... WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE
343
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS
IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RECEIVING STATE WILL
ACCOMPANY THE INSPECTION TEAM, INCLUDING WHEN IT IS IN
LAND VEHICLES AND AN AIRCRAFT FROM THE TIME OF THEIR
FIRST EMPLOYMENT IN THE INSPECTION UNTIL THE TIME THEY
ARE NO LONGER IN USE FOR THE PURPOSES OF INSPECTION.
THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE THE USE OF ITS OWN MAPS,
OWN ..., OWN ... AND OWN DICTAPHONES.
A-3 (ANNUAL CALENDAR AND CONSTRAINING MEASURES)
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, WITHIN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECASTED FOR THE SUBSEQUENT
CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN
WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER THAN 15
NOVEMBER FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR.
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION
ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING
MODEL: ...
TO BE DEFINED
- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION
- GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
- NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
-AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, INDICATED BY
APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND/OR DEFINED BY
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THE 14
DAY PERIOD, INDICATED BY DATES, WITHIN WHICH IT IS
ENVISAGED TO START.
B-1 NOTIFICATION
1.0 PRIOR NOTIFICATION
1.1 THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE ... IN WRITING
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF
CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES ... DAYS
OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS.
1.2 ... WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON
WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED
TO TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE
NOT ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS
BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO
GIVE ..., IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED
344
25X1
SECRET
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
2.0 ... MILITARY ACTIVITIES ... THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
POR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED BELOW,
WILL BE NOTIFIED.
2.1 THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES ... CONDUCTED ...
INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE
AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
IN THIS CONTEXT, TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.
2.2 THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES
2.3 ...
2.4 THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE
NOTIFICATION IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE
OF THE ACTIVITY ... OR MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT,
EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.
2.5 THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES ... IN AN
AMPHIBIOUS ... LANDING ... IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
2.6 THESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO ...
WHENEVER THE ... LANDING INVOLVES AT LEAST ...
2.8 THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE
ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN
THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE,
TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY
. THE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES
WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES
2.9 ...
2.10 FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE
WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS
WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE
IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION
WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING OF EACH
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED
FORM OF CONTENT.
3.1.1- THE NAME OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
3.1.2- THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
3.1.3- THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY
3.1.4- NAME OF THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND
COMMANDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
3.5.2- THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE
(TRANSFERS, DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES,
ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE, RECOVERY PHASE) OF ACTIVITIES
IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS OF PARTICIPATING
345.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
FORMATIONS, THE TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS (DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHICAL
COORDINATES) FOR EACH PHASE
3.6.1- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION
PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY
3.6.2- RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES
3-2 OBSERVATION
1. A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM
ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO ....
2. THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN
WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.
THE HOST STATE WILL BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON
WHOSE TERRITORY THE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY WILL TAKE
PLACE.
3. THE HOST STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS
RESPONSIBITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING
STATE ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE
TERRITORY OF THE HOST STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE
HOST STATE WILL SPECIFY THE ALLOCATION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE
ACTIVITY.
4. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO
OBSERVERS TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.
5. THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND
MILITARY AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING
MEMBERS OF ITS PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST
STATE. MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL, NORMALLY, WEAR
THEIR UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA WHILE PERFORMING THEIR
TASKS.
6. REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING
NOT LATER THAN ... DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE
INVITATION.
7. THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION
WILL PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS
IN THEIR REPLY TO THE INVITATION. IF THE
INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME IT WILL BE
ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT.
8. TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL
PROVIDE A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
. 8.1 -
. 8.2 - THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF
. . . OBSERVERS;
. 8.3 - PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME;
. 8.4 - LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR
. . . TRANSLATION;
. 8.5 - ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND
? . TRANSPORTATION OF THE OBSERVERS;
346
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
. 8.6 -
. 8.7
9. THE OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS WITH REGARD TO THE
OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. THE HOST STATE WILL, IF
POSSIBLE, ACCEDE TO THEM.
10. ...
11. THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH
TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY
AND BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED
FROM EITHER THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE
LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT
OBSERVERS ARE IN A POSITION BEFORE THE START OF THE
OBSERVATION PROGRAMME.
12. THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES
FOR ITS OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER
SUITABLE LOCATION SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF
THE HOST STATE, AND BACK.
13. OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND
OFFERED EQUAL OPPORTUNTIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR
FUNCTIONS.
14. THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR
MISSION, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO
DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
15.
16.
. 16.1 -- AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION
PROGRAMME GIVE A BRIEFING OF THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC
SITUATION, THE PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE
CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE
THE OBSERVERS WITH A MAP OF THE AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY ... AND AN OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH A
DAILY SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE
BASIC SITUATION.
. 16.2
. 16.3 -- IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME
GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF
HAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT
THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY ....
. 16.4
. 16.5
. 16.6 -- GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.
. 16.7 -- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY.
. 16.8
. 16.9 -- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
347
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING
OUT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY,
MEDICAL CARE.
16.10 --
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
343 ?
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
SECRET STOCKHOLM 07170
SUBJECT: CDE: MOSCOW REJECTS NNA AIRCRAFT: HOPES TO
AVOID NEW "CONCESSIONS"
1. SUMMARY: BACK FROM A LIGHTNING TRIP TO MOSCOW FOR
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION,
SOVIET HEAD OF DELEGATION GRINEVSKY AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV
TOLD US FOR THE FIRST TIME ON SEPTEMBER 9 THAT THEIR
AUTHORITIES COULD NOT ACCEPT NNA AIRCRAFT. WE SAID THIS
COULD PREVENT AGREEMENT. ON OTHER INSPECTION ISSUES,
IN PARTICULAR, ON CLOSED AREAS AND THE INSPECTION AREA,
U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ARE CLOSE AND THE FOCUS IS ON
FINDING ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE. THE OTHER MAIN ISSUE
IDENTIFIED AS OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE WAS THAT OF STRUC-
TURAL AND NUMERICAL ELEMENTS OF THE NOTIFICATION/
OBSERVATION THRESHOLD. END SUMMARY
NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT:
2. BACK FROM A LIGHTNING TRIP TO MOSCOW FOR INSTRUC-
TIONS ON THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION, SOVIET
HEAD OF DELEGATION GRINEVSKY AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV
TOLD US IN SEPARATE MEETINGS ON SEPTEMBER 9 WITH BARRY
AND HANSEN THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES COULD NOT ACCEPT NNA
AIRCRAFT. GRINEVSKY DENIED THE ACCURACY OF PRESS
REPORTS OF SHEVARDNADZE'S COMMENT TO SWISS FM AUBERT
THAT THE USSR WOULD CONSIDER NNA AIR INSPECTION IF
ESSENTIAL TO VERIFICATION. "AT NO LEVEL OF THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT," HE SAID, "WAS SUCH A POSITION STATED."
WHEN PRESSED, GRINEVSKY ADMITTED THAT THE SOVIET
POSITION ALSO WAS THAT GROUND VEHICLES WOULD BE PRO-
VIDED BY THE INSPECTED STATE; HE ARGUED THAT THE
IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE WAS NOT AFFECTED BY
INSPECTED STATE TRANSPORT, BECAUSE IT IS THE INSPECTORS,
NOT THE AIRCRAFT OR GROUND VEHICLES, WHICH INSPECT AND
THEY WOULD GIVE THE ORDERS TO THE PILOTS REGARDING WHERE
IN THE INSPECTION AREA TO GO.
3. BARRY POINTED OUT THAT WASHINGTON WOULD NOT AGREE
WITH THAT INTERPRETATION AND POINTED OUT THAT THE
ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN INSPECTING STATE
AIRCRAFT; WE HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT COMPROMISE IN
ACCEPTING NNA AIRCRAFT. BARRY STRESSED THAT THE PRIN-
CIPLE OF CHOICE WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. HE
INDICATED THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION
AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AS TO WHETHER IT COULD ACCEPT AN
AGREEMENT WITH THE INSPECTORS' TRANSPORTATION IN THE
HANDS OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY. HANSEN MADE THE SAME
POINT WITH TATARNIKOV. IN FACT, AGREEMENT COULD BREAK
DOWN ON THIS POINT.
4. GRINEVSKY DOUBTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD WALK AWAY
FROM AGREEMENT WITHOUT NNA AIR. FIRST, HE SAID, SOME
OF OUR ALLIES CANNOT ACCEPT THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT
(THE FRENCH BACK CHANNEL AT WORK?) SECOND, MANY OF THE
349.
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
NNAS DON'T LIKE THE IDEA AND ALL HAVE MADE THEIR OFFER
CONDITIONAL ON ACCEPTANCE BY ALL PARTICIPANTS - A
CONDITION WHICH HAD NOT BEEN MET.
5. BOTH GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV NOTED THAT INSPECTORS
WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CHOOSE WHETHER AIR INSPECTION
WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY PLANE OR HELICOPTER, STRESSING
THAT HELICOPTERS WERE BETTER SUITED FOR INSPECTION.
REITERATING PREVIOUS PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS, TATARNIKOV
INDICATED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN WITH SOVIET "AIR SPECIAL-
ISTS, NAVIGATORS AND OTHER SPECIALISTS" ABOUT AIR
INSPECTION AND ALL HAD CONCLUDED THAT FOR REASONS BOTH
FOR SAFETY FOR THE CREW AND INSPECTORS AND OF THE
SECURITY OF THE INSPECTED STATE, INSPECTED STATE AIR-
CRAFT WERE SUPERIOR. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT U.S.
MILITARY SPECIALISTS MOULD RECOGNIZE THIS POINT AND
ACCEPT THAT THEIR VERSION OF AERIAL INSPECTION WAS
MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OURS. BARRY REPLIED THAT IT WAS
LESS CREDIBLE, AND THIS WOULD BE A CRUCIAL CONSIDERA-
TION IN THE ALLIANCE.
CLOSED AREAS:
6. REFERRING TO HIS MOSCOW CONSULTATIONS, TATARNIKOV
SAID THAT ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
WOULD BE INSPECTED AND THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT
AND COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT IN CLOSED AREAS. HE
INDICATED THAT EVEN IN AREAS CLOSED TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATS,
E.G., THE KOLA PENINSULA AND GORKY, ACTIVITIES WHICH
EXCEEDED THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD WOULD BE OBSERVABLE,
VERIFIABLE, INSPECTABLE. HE DIFFERENTIATED SUCH
"MILITARY" CLOSED AREAS FROM "MISSILE" CLOSED AREAS,
SAYING THAT THE LATTER ARE WELL KNOWN AND ARE FEW IN
NUMBER; MOREOVER MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT TAKE
PLACE THERE.
INSPECTION AREAS:
7. GRINEVSKY DID NOT PROVIDE ANY SPECIFIC NEW IDEAS
ON HOW TO DEFINE INSPECTION AREAS. BARRY NOTED THAT
THE PURELY SOVIET APPROACH OF APPLYING THE AREA COVERED
BY DIVISIONAL AND OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL EXERCISES TO THE
AREA OF INSPECTION WOULD NOT WORK BECAUSE THE CONCEPT
WAS PURELY SOVIET AND IMPLIED STRICT GEOGRAPHIC LIMITA-
TIONS WHICH THE WEST WOULD NOT AGREE TO. HE INSISTED
THAT THE AREA FOR INSPECTION MUST BE TIED TO THE
CONCEPT OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
??
THRESHOLDS:
8. ASKED TO IDENTIFY ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH U.S.-SOVIET
POSITIONS REMAINED FAR APART, BARRY MENTIONED THRESHOLDS.
BOTH THE STRUCTURAL FORMULA AND THE NUMERICAL VALUES
WERE NOT AGREED, AND ON NUMERICAL VALUES WE WERE VERY
DISTANT. BARRY SAID U.S. - AND THE ALLIANCE - STRONGLY
PREFERRED A SINGLE THRESHOLD; CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS
350
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE WITH NATO TROIKA, NORWAY, FRG,
UK. GRINEVSKY SAID SINGLE THRESHOLD COULD BE 20,000.
BARRY SAID HE PREFERRED CAUCESCU'S PROPOSAL (12,000).
CONCLUSIONS:
9. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS
OBJECTING STRONGLY TO SUGGESTIONS THAT IT MIGHT BE
"ROLLED" ON THE QUESTION OF NEUTRAL AIR. THEY HAD
INTENDED THAT AKHROMEYEV WOULD HAVE THE LAST WORD ON
INSPECTION, AND RESENTED BEING SANDBAGGED BY THE
NEUTRALS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY WILL SHOW ANY FLEXI-
BILITY IN THE REMAINING 9 DAYS. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY
THAT SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO GIVE GROUND ON
THIS IN WASHINGTON (IF SUCH A MEETING TAKES PLACE).
BUT IF SO HE WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO TRADE THIS OFF
AGAINST ANOTHER ISSUE - PROBABLY A HIGH GROUND-FORCE
THRESHOLD. THIS WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE ALLIED
RESENTMENT SINCE THEY WANT LOW THRESHOLDS MUCH MORE
THAN NNA AIRCRAFT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
351
SECRET
25X1
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07180
SUBJECT: FUNCTIONAL NAVAL AND THE CONTENT OF
NOTIFICATION
1. CDE XII - 057
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WHILE MANY WOULD LIKE TO THINK
OTHERWISE, THE IDEA OF FUNCTIONAL NAVAL ACTIVITIES IS
NOT DEAD IN STOCKHOLM. THE EAST HAS CONSISTENTLY MADE
A LINK TO ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA, AND THE
NEUTRAL HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT DETAILED INFORMATION ON
FUNCTIONAL NAVAL ACTIVITIES. OUR WORK HAS BEEN TO
LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF FUNCTIONAL NAVAL INFORMATION TO BE
INCLUDED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION, AND WE HAVE
SUCCESSFULLY DONE THAT. HOWEVER, IF WE RETURN TO OUR
GOING IN POSITION OF INDICATING ONLY WHEN WE WILL HAVE
NAVAL GUNFIRE WE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT ALL OF OUR
WORK ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION WILL COME
UNRAVELED. END SUMMARY.
4. AT THE BEIGNNING OF THIS ROUND WORK BEGAN IN
EARNEST ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. OUR WORK WAS
COMPOUNDED BY TATARNIKOV'S AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE
ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION THAT WE HAD ORIGINALLY BELIEVED
HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE. GEN. TATARNIKOV INDICATED THAT
HE WAS WILLING TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON
FUNCTIONAL NAVAL ACTIVITIES:
. A) THE COMPOSITION OF THE NAVAL COMPONENT.
. B) LEVEL OF NAVAL COMMAND.
. C) NUMBER OF LANDING CRAFT PARTICIPATING.
. D) NUMBER OF COMBAT SHIPS AND AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS
PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTIVITY.
. E) NUMBER OF NAVAL PERSONNEL INVOLVED.
5. THE NEUTRAL COUNTRIES WERE EVEN MORE AMBITIOUS IN
THEIR DEMANDS FOR INFORMATION ON FUNCTIONAL NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. THEY WANTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
? A) NUMBER OF COMBAT SHIPS.
? B) NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS.
? C) NUMBER OF AUXILIARY SHIPS.
? D) DESIGNATION OF THE NAVAL COMMANDER.
? E) TROOP CARRYING CAPACITY FOR AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS.
? F) NUMBER OF LANDING CRAFT PARTICIPATING.
. G) TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING FORCES IN THE
ACTIVITY AS A WHOLE.
6. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WE WERE RECEIVING A GREAT DEAL
OF PRESSURE TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY CONCERNING NAVAL
INFORMATION. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONFERENCE
DELIBERATIONS WE DEVELOPED A POSITION THAT WAS TOTALLY
FUNCTIONAL, AND PROTECTED US SECURITY INTERESTS. WE
WERE ABLE TO NARROW DOWN THE INFORMATION WISH LIST OF
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS TO A LEVEL THAT WAS REALISTIC
AND MANAGEABLE. IN THE END WE WERE ABLE TO GET GENERAL
CONSENSUS AMONG THE 35 TO NOTE 22 ELEMENTS IN THE
25X1
352
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. IN THIS REGARD THERE WERE 3
ELEMENTS THAT DEALT WITH NAVAL RELATED ACTIVITIES;
HOWEVER, ONE OF THESE WOULD ONLY BE REQUIRED WHEN THERE
WAS A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING. THE THREE DATA
ELEMENTS AGREED TO WERE AS FOLLOWS:
. A) NAME OF THE LEVEL OF COMMAND ORGANIZING AND
COMMANDING THE NAVAL FORCE PARTICIPATION. (FYI: THIS
PARALLELS THE LAND FORCE COMMANDER AND IS NOT INTENDED
TO CAPTURE THE COMMANDER AFLOAT, BUT THE MAJOR
COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANIZING THE ACTIVITY.
THIS INFORMATION WOULD ONLY BE PROVIDED WHEN THE NAVAL
ACTIVITY SUPPORTED A NOTIFIABLE LAND FORCE MILITARY
EXERCISE ACTIVITY. WHILE UNDER OUR FORMULATION THIS
WOULD CALL FOR 6TH FLEET, OR CINCLANTFLT, IF THE
SOVIETS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN AVOIDING DESIGNATION, IT
WOULD SIMPLY SAY "LEVEL OF COMMAND IS FLEET." END FYI)
. B) INDICATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE (SIMULATED OR LIVE).
. C) NUMBER OF LANDING CRAFT TO BEACH IN A NOTIFIABLE
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING. (FYI: THIS WORDING WAS BASED ON
THE JCS DEFINITION OF LANDING CRAFT AND REPRESENTS THE
PURE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS WHEN THE
LANDING CRAFT COMES UP ON THE BEACH IN FULL VIEW OF THE
OBSERVERS. THIS INFOKRATION IS PROVIDED ONLY WHEN
THERE IS A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AND REQUIRES
NO SPECIFICATION OF TYPE, BUT ONLY THE NUMBER LANDING.
THIS INFORMATION IS TOTALLY DESCRIPTIVE, AND IS NOT A
VERIFICATION ELEMENT. END FYI)
7. WE HAD CLOSED THE LIST OF ELEMENTS TO APPEAR IN THE
CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AS OF LAST FRIDAY. BACKING
AWAY FROM THIS LIST NOW POTENTIALLY THROWS OPEN THE
ENTIRE LIST. IF WE GO IN TO REMOVE OUR TWO, WE CAN
EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO COME IN AND ASK FOR THEIR TWO.
WHAT IMPACT THIS WILL HAVE ON THE NEUTRALS IS
UNCERTAIN. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WE CAN EXPECT TROUBLE.
ALLIES ALREADY BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE BEEN INFLEXIBLE ON
THIS ISSUE, AND FURTHERMORE THEY BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD
PROVIDE THE INFORMATION ANY TIME THERE IS FUNCTIONAL
ACTIVITY, WHEREAS WE HAVE LIMITED THE TIMES THAT THIS
INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED.
8. OUR POSITION ON THE NAVAL ISSUE BECOMES EVEN MORE
DIFFICULT TO MANAGE WHEN WE LOOK AT WHAT WE HAVE DONE
ON FUNCTIONAL AIR. THE CURRENT POSITION OF JCS THAT WE
ARE PUTTING AT RISK OPSEC REQUIREMENTS AND FUTURE
CONTINGENCIES OF AIR CUSHIONED LANDING CRAFT AND ARE
OPENING THE DOOR FOR THE EAST TO DEMAND MORE
INFORMATION IS UNFOUNDED. WE HAD THE LIST CLOSED ON
FRIDAY. AMB. HANSEN AND MAJ. TYO HAD THIS ISSUE
RESOLVED, WHAT THE DELAY HAS DONE IS UNCERTAIN, BUT WE
THINK WE CAN GET BACK TO WHERE WE WERE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
353 ?
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRFT
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07203
SUBJECT: FULL AD REFERENDUM NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT OF
THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7071, B) STOCKHOLM 7090
1. CDE XII - 058
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP
HAS PROVISIONALLY AGREED TO THE FULL TEXT OF THE NUF
SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. IN USDEL'S VIEW, THE
TEXT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH TO
NON-USE OF FORCE. THEREFORE, UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED
BY COB SEPTEMBER 11, WE INTEND TO AGREE TO NOTING THIS
FULL TEXT ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12. SEE PARA 8 FOR FULL
TEXT. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP HAS PROVISIONALLY
AGREED ON THE FULL TEXT OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION
OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. AS NOTED REFTELS, IN USDEL'S
VIEW THE TIME WAS PROPITIOUS FOR CONCLUDING THE WORK OF
THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE: WE HAD NOTED
OUR MOST IMPORTANT TEXTS (E.G., ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE,
COMPLIANCE) WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS;
WE HAD DILUTED OBJECTIONABLE LANGUAGE ON THE
MEDITERRANEAN AND TERRORISM; AND WE RISKED THE DANGER OF
UNRAVELING THE DELICATE CONSENSUS ON THESE AND OTHER
TEXTS IF WE WERE TO DELAY ANY LONGER. THEREFORE, IN A
SEVEN-HOUR LATE-NIGHT SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 9, THE WEST
PRESSED FOR FINALIZING THE TEXTS ON ALL REMAINING
SUBJECTS WHICH STOOD A CHANCE OF GAINING CONSENSUS,
THEREBY ELIMINATING OBJECTIONABLE EASTERN AND NNA
LANGUAGE STILL ON THE TABLE, E.G., ON THE NUF NORM,
EQUAL SECURITY, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY.
5. THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS THE RESULT OF THIS EFFORT.
WITH A FEW MINOR EXCEPTIONS, IT FOLLOWS VERBATIM THE
TEXT SENT IN REF B. IT PROTECTS ALL OUR MAIN INTERESTS
AND ELIMINATES ALL OUR MAJOR CONCERNS. THEREFORE, USDEL
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FULL TEXT BE NOTED AS
STATED IN PARA 8. ALL OTHER WESTERN CDE DELEGATIONS
CONCUR WITH THIS JUDGMENT. (ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO
PREDICT REACTION IN CAPITALS, PARTICULARLY IN PARIS.)
ACCORDINGLY, UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, USDEL WILL
AGREE TO THE NOTING OF THIS FULL TEXT AT THE
SEPTEMBER 12 - A.M. WORKING GROUP.
6. THE TEXT FOLLOWS VERBATIM THE TEXT PROVIDED IN REF B
WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS:
-- ON TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION, THE LANGUAGE "AS SET
FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT" WAS ADDED AT FRENCH INSISTENCE.
-- ON ARMED FORCES, AFTER PERFUNCTORY ATTEMPTS TO GO
BACK TO THE ORIGINAL EASTERN TEXT, THE EAST ACCEPTED
VERBATIM THE WESTERN "BOTTOM LINE" ARMED FORCES
COUNTERPROPOSAL.
-- ON NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE NUF OBLIGATION, THE FRENCH
25X1
354'
SECRET
npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
OBJECTED TO THE LANGUAGE "IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS" BECAUSE
THIS REFERENCE DID NOT COVER THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE,
IN THEIR VIEW. THE SWISS COULD NOT ACCEPT THE LANGUAGE
"IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UN CHARTER" BECAUSE, THEY
ARGUED, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO AGREE THAT
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH A TREATY (UN CHARTER) TO WHICH THEY
WERE NOT A PARTY WAS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
RATHER THAN DROP THE WHOLE REFERENCE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS, AS SUGGESTED BY THE COORDINATOR, THE U.S.
PROPOSED THAT THE WORDS "AS RECALLED ABOVE" BE ADDED TO
RECALL THE NUF OBLIGATION OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE
RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE (AS SET FORTH IN THE UN CHARTER)
WHICH HAD BEEN DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY. THAT IS ADMITTEDLY
NOT A HAPPY OR IDEAL COMPROMISE BUT IT DOES, IN USDEL'S
VIEW, PROTECT THE U.S. POSITION.
-- ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS, "DETERMINATION AND THE
NECESSITY" WAS SUBSTITUTED FOR "COMMITMENT" TO WEAKEN
SOMEWHAT THE COMMITMENT TO REINFORCING AND IMPROVING PSD
MECHANISMS. ADMITTEDLY, THIS LANGUAGE IS NOT ELEGANT
BUT, BY MERELY REPEATING FINAL ACT LANGUAGE, IN USDEL'S
VIEW IT ACCOMPLISHES THE PURPOSE OF NOT PREJUDICING THE
WORK OF ANY FUTURE PSD MEETINGS
-- ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ONLY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IS IN
THE DELETION OF THE WORDS "FOR THE CSCE PROCESS" AND THE
ADDITION OF THE LANGUAGE "AS SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION
ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING
STATES." THIS CHANGE DOES WEAKEN SOMEWHAT THE HUMAN
RIGHTS-CSCE LINK IN THE NUF CONTEXT. HOWEVER, THE EAST
ARGUED THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE COULD NOT SAY THAT
ONE PRINCIPLE, HUMAN RIGHTS, WAS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR
THE CSCE PROCESS AND NOT THE OTHERS. FURTHERMORE, THE
NNA, WHICH ORIGINALLY HAD PROPOSED THE LINKAGE, QUICKLY
RETREATED FROM ITS POSITION. THEREFORE, THE WEST
PROPOSED TO SUBSTITUTE THE LANGUAGE ON THE DECLARATION
ON PRINCIPLES FROM THE FINAL ACT, WHICH WAS EVENTUALLY
ACCEPTED BY THE EAST.
-- ON TERRORISM, THE GROUP EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED THE
LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN REF B. IN INTERPRETIVE STATEMENTS,
VARIOUS WESTERN DELEGATIONS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE
"SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES" REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT WERE
CLEARLY ILLEGAL AND WERE AIMED AT "THE PERPETRATION OF
ACTS OF TERRORISM."
7. IN THIS NUF MEETING, LANGUAGE WAS ALSO AGREED TO ON
"THE LINK" AND "DISARMAMENT" WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE
PLACED IN THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT
(SEE SEPTEL). FINALLY, THE EAST HAS FREQUENTLY AND
PUBLICLY MADE THE POINT THE WESTERN AGREEMENT ON A NUF
TEXT WOULD BE SEEN AS "AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL SIGNAL"
AND WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS IN THE OTHER WORKING
GROUPS. ACCORDINGLY, ONCE FINAL AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON
355
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
sFrRrr
THE NUF TEXT (PERHAPS ON FRIDAY) WE INTEND TO USE
WHATEVER LEVERAGE WE CAN GET FROM WESTERN AGREEMENT ON
NUF TO SPEED WORK IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS.
8. THE FOLLOWING TEXT FOLLOWS THE MOST LIKELY ORDER OF
THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT.
BEGIN TEXT:
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNISE THAT THE ADOPTED
SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE
AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE DECLARED THE FOLLOWING:
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION
TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN
THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER
MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO
RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN
IN THE FINAL ACT.
- NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT
RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
THIS PRINCIPLE.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT
OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED
ATTACK OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS.
- THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE
FOR THE PURPOSES OF INDUCING ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE
THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.
- AS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT NO OCCUPATION OR
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL
BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT
TO PEACE AND SECURITY. ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT
THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANT USE OF ARMED FORCES
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE
DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN
PARTICIPATING STATES AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING
STATE, IN PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK ON ITS
TERRITORY.
- THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY
STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
356
SECRET
25X1
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF
ALLIANCE.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS
CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN
ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL
FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE
AND SECURITY. THEY RECALL THEIR DETERMINATION AND THE
NECESSITY TO REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT
THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.
THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO
SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN
THEM.
- THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION
OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AS
RECALLED ABOVE CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR FULL
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS, AND THUS TO
FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND
DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING
TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A
WHOLE.
- THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE
THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO
PRACTICE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR
SOCIAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL
LOCATION OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
- ALL THESE PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE
AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY
APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
- RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES
WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS
COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT
TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF
STATES AND STRESS THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND
DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
- THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE
EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE
ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND
SECURITY, AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL
357.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFT'RFT
STATES, AS SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES
GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES.
- THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD
SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH
SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN THIS
CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP GOOD
NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE REGION, WITH
DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY IN THE SPIRIT OF THE
PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES
GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES SO AS TO
PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE PREVAIL
IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ADOPTED IN
THE FINAL ACT.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO
TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT
TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE
EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION
AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL
TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE
PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON
THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND
ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE
PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE
DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO
STRESS THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR
BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF
THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY
TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
353
25X1
SECRET
npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07231
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS: THE END GAME.
REF: STOCKHOLM 07160
1. CDE XII - 059.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. AS THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNMENT DATE DRAWS
NEAR, THE ALLIES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY ANXIOUS TO
DEVELOP =PROMISE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD LANGUAGE
THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH WEST AND EAST. THE U.S. IS
QUICKLY BECOMING ISOLATED BY ALLIES WHO HAVE EXPRESSED
THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD
BASED ON AN UNDEFINED DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE, THAT WAS
WORKED OUT DURING SOVIET/FRENCH BILATERALS. THE U.S.
HAS INFORMED THE USSR AND THE ALLIES THAT THIS
FORMULATION IS UNACCEPTABLE, BUT THERE IS A DANGER
THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY, SOME ALLIES - ESPECIALLY
THE FRG - WILL URGE US EITHER TO ACCEPT THE
FRENCH-SOVIET FORMULA, OR GIVE UP STRUCTURE ENTIRELY.
END SUMMARY
4. AFTER MONTHS OF TRYING TO DEVELOP A NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS,
PRESSURE IS MOUNTING WITHIN NATO TO RESOLVE THIS
ISSUE. THE FRENCH, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE NATO
CAUCUS, HAVE BEEN PURSUING THIS ISSUE IN BILATERALS
WITH THE SOVIETS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS SESSION.
THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS THE RESULT OF THESE
DISCUSSIONS. (NOTE: TEXT IS LINE 2.3 IN REFTEL.)
BEGIN TEXT:
NOTIFICATION
2. 3 AT LEAST . . . TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT
TROOPS, OR
AT LEAST . . . BATTLE TANKS,
IF ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR INTO
BRIGADES AND REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY SUBORDINATE TO
THE SAME DIVISION.
END TEXT:
5. FOLLOWING LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS IN THE NOTIFICATION
TEAM, CLUSTER, AND AMONG NATO HEADS OF DELEGATIONS,
ALL ALLIES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE U.S. AND NORWAY,
HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT THIS
FORMULATION. NORWAY ALONE AGREES WITH THE U.S. THAT
EMPHASIS ON "DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE" IN THIS FORMULA
WILL SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING
POSITION FOR A HIGH PERSONNEL THRESHOLD, I.E.,
16,000. HOWEVER THIS IS NORWAY'S ONLY PROBLEM; IF WE
ARE SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING A LOW NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD
THEY WILL ACCEPT THE FORMULA.
6. THE U.S. (BARRY) INFORMED THE ALLIES THAT THIS
PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. BECAUSE A
359
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRFT
THRESHOLD BASED ON AN UNDEFINED DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE
WOULD NOT ONLY PREJUDICE THE PERSONNEL THRESHOLD, BUT
WOULD CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR COMPLIANCE
MONITORING. MANY - ESPECIALLY THE FRG - HAVE
SUGGESTED TO US THAT IF WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE
"DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE" FORMULA, THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE
MIGHT BE TO ABANDON THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENT ENTIRELY.
7. WE HAVE TOLD GRINEVSKY THAT THE "DIVISIONAL
STRUCTURE" FORMULA IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. AND
THAT THEY OUGHT TO ACCEPT THE "MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS"
CONCEPT. FOR THE MOMENT, NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
STRUCTURAL FORMULA ARE ON HOLD WHILE WE WORK ON THE
NUMERICAL VALUES FOR TROOPS AND TANKS; MEANWHILE WE
ARE LOOKING FOR ACCEPTABLE WAYS TO MODIFY THE
FRENCH-SOVIET FORMULA.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
359e
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07251
SUBJECT: CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT FOR FINAL CDE PLENARY
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 6968, B) STOCKHOLM 3458,
- C) STATE 146054
1. CDE XII - 060
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: NATO REPS TO THE CONTACT GROUP ON
THE STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT REPORTED TO THE
CAUCUS SEPTEMBER 10 THAT THE GROUP IS CONSIDERING A
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT FOR THE FINAL PLENARY WHICH WOULD
DEAL WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC CSBM'S (E.G.,
ANNUAL CALENDARS) AND THE QUESTION OF RAISING UNRESOLVED
ISSUES AT POSSIBLE FUTURE CDE MEETINGS (THE EAST'S
"PRICE" FOR DROPPING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES). ON THE
LATTER POINT NATO REPS HAVE OBTAINED AD REF AGREEMENT ON
A TEXT WHICH WE BELIEVE DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHT OF
THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO DECIDE ON THE MANDATE OR
THE NATURE OF ANY FUTURE CDE MEETINGS. END SUMMARY.
4. FOLLOWING THEIR LATEST CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE EAST AND NNA, NATO'S REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
CONTACT GROUP ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT
(BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, CANADA AND DENMARK) REPORTED TO
THE CAUCUS SEPTEMBER 10 ON THE GROUP'S DISCUSSION OF THE
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT FOR THE CLOSING PLENARY. THE GROUP
DISCUSSED A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT CONTAINING TWO PARTS
WHICH WOULD BE ANNEXED TO THE DOCUMENT ITSELF. THE FIRST
PART WOULD DEAL WITH THE DATES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CSBM'S AGREED AND WILL BUILD ON THE PROVISION IN THE
DOCUMENT ITSELF WHICH STATES THAT "THE MEASURES ADOPTED
IN THIS DOCUMENT WILL COME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1987"
(COMMENT: THIS TEXT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE CAUCUS AS IT IS
DRAWN DIRECTLY FROM MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT LANGUAGE
THAT "THE PROVISIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE NEGOTIATORS WILL
COME INTO FORCE IN THE FORMS AND ACCORDING TO THE
PROCEDURE TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE CONFERENCE." (P.38
ENGLISH TEXT). END COMMENT). THE CONTACT GROUP EXPLORED
FOUR ITEMS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE STATEMENT:
-- 1) ANNUAL CALENDARS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES FOR 1987 WILL BE EXCHANGED NO LATER THAN
DECEMBER 15, 1986.
-- 2) NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN
THE FIRST 42 DAYS OF 1987 WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CBM'S OF THE FINAL ACT, ALTHOUGH PARTICIPATING STATES
WILL, IN THE NOTIFICATON, FOLLOW THE PROVISIONS OF THE
STOCKHO.M DOCUMENT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.
-- 3) FOR SUCH NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, STATES WOULD
ENDEAVOR TO INVITE OBSERVERS (BUT WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED
TO).
(COMMENT: THE REASONING BEHIND ITEMS 2 AND 3 IN THE
360
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONTACT GROUP WAS THAT SINCE THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT COME
INTO FORCE UNTIL 1 JANUARY PARTICIPATING STATES COULD NOT
MEET THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR THE FIRST
SIX WEEKS OF NEXT YEAR. IN THE NATO CAUCUS, HOWEVER,
ALTHOUGH NO STRONG VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED, THERE WAS A
GENERAL FEELING THAT ITEMS 2 AND 3 WOULD COMPLICATE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOCUMENT AND WERE BEST AVOIDED. AN
EXCEPTION TO THE 1 JANUARY DATE COULD THEREFORE BE
PROVIDED, BRINGING THE NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS INTO FORCE
AS OF NOVEMBER 15 SO THAT ALL 1987 ACTIVITIES ARE
COMPLETELY COVERED BY CSBM'S. NATO REPS. WILL TRY TO
SECURE THIS POSITION IN THEIR NEXT CONTACT GROUP MEETING.
END COMMENT.)
-- 4) IF IT IS AGREED THAT NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES ABOVE
A CERTAIN SIZE WILL BE FORECAST IN ADVANCE, ACTIVITIES
FOR 1988 MUST BE FORECAST BY JANUARY 1, 1987 (OR ANOTHER
DATE TO BE DETERMINED).
5. THE SECOND PART OF THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT WOULD
ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE PARTICIPATING STATE'S RIGHT
TO RAISE ISSUES IN ANY FUTURE CDE MEETING WHICH ARE NOT
RESOLVED IN STOCKHOLM. SUCH A STATEMENT IS THE MINIMUM
PRICE THE EAST HAS INSISTED NATO PAY FOR ITS "DEFERMENT"
OF NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
AT THE CAUCUS' INSTRUCTIONS, THE NATO REPS SOUGHT CHANGES
TO A DRAFT PROPOSED BY AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND).
KONARKSI HAD PROPOSED " . . . THAT EACH PARTICIPATING
STATE CAN RAISE ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE EXISTING
MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE . . . AT THE NEXT STAGE." IN
OUR VIEW THIS LANGUAGE WOULD HAVE PREJUDICED THE RIGHT OF
THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO SUPPLEMENT THE MANDATE
AND DETERMINE THE NATURE OF ANY CONTINUATION (I.E., NO
CONTINUATION, PHASE 1B, PHASE 2). NATO REPS WERE ABLE
TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS AND THE CONTACT GROUP AGREED
TO THE FOLLOWING TEXT ON AN AD REF BASIS:
BEGIN TEXT:
THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE
CAN RAISE ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IN ANY CONTINUATION OF THE
CONFERENCE.
END TEXT.
(COMMENT: IN USDEL'S VIEW THIS TEXT IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE TEXT PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY WASHINGTON (REFS B AND C)
AND SECURES OUR OBJECTIVE OF NOT PREJUDICING ANY DECISION
THE VIENNA MEETING MAY WISH TO TAKE ON EITHER THE MANDATE
OF THE CONFERENCE OR THE NATURE OF ANY FURTHER CDE
MEETINGS. END COMMENT.) THE TEXT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE
CAUCUS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION WHICH
IS SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS.
BARRY
361 ?
25X1
SECRET
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07252
SUBJECT: CDE: INSPECTION MODALITIES
1. AT A SEPTEMBER 11 MEETING WITH FRENCH, GERMAN,
BRITISH, ITALIAN, SOVIET, GDR AND POLISH AMBASSADORS
AMBASSADOR BARRY SAID THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS, HE
REQUESTED THAT THE EAST RECONSIDER ITS POSITION ON THE
USE OF NNA IN AN INSPECTION REGIME. HE SAID THAT USG
CONSIDERED THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT ESSENTIAL FOR A
CREDIBLE INSPECTION REGIME. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE
HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO INFORM HIS GROUP IN ADVANCE OF
THIS PARTICULAR DEMARCHE, IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE
VIEWS OF ALL 16. UK AND FRG AMBASSADORS CONFIRMED
THIS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS SILENT (BUT IN PRIVATE
THEY HAVE BEEN HELPFUL).
2. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY SAID THAT AKHROMEYEV
HAD MADE THE FINAL MOVE ON INSPECTION BY ACCEPTING AIR
INSPECTION USING INSPECTED STATES' AIRCRAFT. HIS
INSTRUCTIONS WOULD NOT PERMIT DISCUSSION OF NNA AIR.
BARRY SAID THAT WHAT HE WAS ASKING WAS THAT SOVIETS
REVIEW THEIR POSITION AND REVISE INSTRUCTIONS ACCORDINGLY.
3. POLISH AND GDR AMBASSADORS RAISED THE VARIOUS
TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES OF USING NNA AIRCRAFT. BARRY
SAID THIS WAS A POLITICAL ISSUE AND REQUIRED A
POLITICAL RESPONSE. GRINEVSKY AGREED, AND SAID WE
HAD RECEIVED IT. HOWEVER HE AGREED TO REPORT BARRY'S
STATEMENT.
4. COMMENT: IN THE MEETINGS OF THE VERIFICATION
WORKING GROUP, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NOT CATE-
GORICALLY RULED OUT THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT, BUT THEY
REFUSE TO DRAFT ON IT. IN OUR VIEW, THEIR TACTIC IS TO
RUN OUT THE CLOCK AND FINALLY INTRODUCE THEIR OWN
DETAILED MODALITIES FOR AIR/GROUND INSPECTION USING
INSPECTED STATE TRANSPORT, INCLUDING HELICOPTERS AND
THE REQUIREMENT THAT INSPECTORS BE TAKEN WHERE THEY
WANT no GO IN THE INSPECTION AREA.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
362 '
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
SECRETSTOCIEHOLM 07276
SUBJECT: CDE: REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON AIR INSPECTION
1. I WILL NEED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CDE ENDGAME BY
SEPTEMBER 17 IF WE ARE TO MANAGE THE ALLIANCE AND EXERT
MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS. THE INSTRUCTIONS
SHOULD COVER TWO SEPARATE ISSUES:
- - WHEN TO PLAY OUR FINAL CARDS ON INSPECTION.
- - WHEN THE FINAL CARDS WILL BE.
2. WHEN. THE QUESTION HERE IS WHETHER WE SHOULD HOLD
OUT FOR NNA AIR UNTIL SEPTEMBER 19 WHEN SHEVARDNADZE IS
IN WASHINGTON. THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO GO FOR AN ACCEPT-
ABLE FALLBACK ON SEPTEMBER 18. THE ADVANTAGE OF WAITING
UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE IS THAT IT WILL FORCE A NEW
DECISION AT THE POLITBURO LEVEL. THE DISADVANTAGE IS THAT
ALLIED PRESSURE WILL PROBABLY FOCUS ON US AT THE END,
NOT THE SOVIETS AND THERE IS THE DANGER OF BEING
ISOLATED AS IN BERN. THE OTHER PROBLEM IS THAT THE
OTHER "BIG" ISSUE WILL BE LEFT OPEN ALSO - GROUND FORCE
THRESHOLDS: THE ALLIES CARE MORE ABOUT LOW THRESHOLDS
THAN ABOUT NNA AIR: THEY WOULD BE VERY RESENTFUL IF WE
TRADED SOMETHING WE WANT FOR SOMETHING THEY WANT.
3. WHAT: THE FOLLOWING ARE THE SUBSTANTIVE OPTIONS AS
I SEE THEM; ASSUMING THAT THE SOVIETS WON'T COME AROUND
ON NNA AIR INSPECTION.
- A. REFUSE TO JOIN CONSENSUS ON AN AGREEMENT. WE
WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE ALONE IN DOING SO.
- B. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT ANY INSPECTION PRO-
VISIONS, LEAVING THE ISSUE FOR A POST-VIENNA CDE.
- C. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH ONLY GROUND INSPECTION
BEING IMPLEMENTED NOW GIVING THE INSPECTING STATE THE
RIGHT TO USE ITS OWN VEHICLES WHERE FEASIBLE (BY
IMPLICATION INSPECTED STATE'S VEHICLES WOULD BE USED IN
REMOTE AREAS). AIR INSPECTION WOULD BE AGREED IN
PRINCIPLE, BUT WORK ON CONCRETE MODALITIES WOULD BE
DEFERRED.
- D. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH GROUND AND AIR INSPECTION,
BUT WITH THE INSPECTED STATE'S AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER
AND INSPECTING STATE'S VEHICLES (WHERE FEASIBLE).
- E. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH GROUND AND AIR INSPECTION
BUT INSPECTED STATE'S TRANSPORTATION.
- F. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH INSPECTING STATE'S CHOICE
OF NNA OR HOST COUNTRY AIR INSPECTION, BUT WITH THE UNDER-
STANDING THAT FOR THE FIRST YEAR OR SO HOST COUNTRY AIR-
CRAFT WILL BE CHOSEN. THERE WOULD ALSO BE INSPECTED
STATE'S HELICOPTERS AND GROUND TRANSPORT THROWN IN. THIS
IS A CONCEPT THE YUGOSLAVS ARE PUSHING, AND IT HAS WON
SOME SUPPORT AMONG THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT NNA AIR INSPEC-
TION WOULD NOT BE IMMEDIATELY FEASIBLE IN ANY CASE FOR
TECHNICAL REASONS.
4. US DEL POSITION ON THESE OPTIONS ARE DIVIDED ALONG
THE SAME LINE AS THEIR PARENT AGENCIES. HANSEN PREFERS
363 '
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
OPTION C. MY OWN PREFERENCE IS FOR D OR E; F HAS SOME
ATTRACTIVE FEATURES IF COMBINED WITH EITHER OF THEM -
I.E. A HYBRID POSITION THAT INSPECTING STATES' RIGHT
TO CHOOSE NNA AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CONTAINED IN THE AGREE-
MENT BUT WOULD ONLY BE OPERATIONALIZED WHEN THE SPECIFIC
MODALITIES WOULD BE AGREED IN A POST-VIENNA CDE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
364
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
gym:Ppm
SECRET STATE 290917
SUBJECT: CDE - AERIAL INSPECTION
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. OUR STRONG PREFERENCE REMAINS FOR USE OF INSPECTING
NATION'S AIRCRAFT OR NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT FOR AERIAL
INSPECTION. WE ALSO BELIEVE SOVIET DESIRE FOR A SUCCESSFUL
STOCKHOLM CONCLUSION MAY LEAD THEM IN THE END TO ACCEPT NNA
PLANES AND PILOTS IF ALL NATO ALLIES REMAIN STRONGLY UNITED
BEHIND THAT DEMAND AS A smam LINE. WE HAVE THUS MADE A
STRONG AND HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH TO THAT END.
3. WE BELIEVE WE MUST PROTECT THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE
INSPECTING STATE CONTROLS THE MEANS OF INSPECTION. TO THIS
END, YOU SHOULD ENSURE NOW, BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ENDS,
THAT THE INSPECTING STATE HAS THE CHOICE AMONG SEVERAL
OPTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CHOICE BETWEEN GROUND OR AIR OR
BOTH, THE CHOICE OF USING HELICOPTERS OR FIXED-WING
AIRCRAFT, THE RIGHT TO ITS OWN COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATION
EQUIPMENT (E.G., NAVSTAR GPS), AND THE RIGHT FOR INSPECTING
STATE PERSONNEL TO BE PRESENT ON THE FLIGHT DECK. YOU
SHOULD ALSO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN THE CHOICE OF THE
INSPECTING STATE USING ITS OWN GROUND VEHICLES HHERE
FEASIBLE.
4. WE DO NOT WANT THE CONFERENCE TO FAIL ON THE ISSUE OF
WHO PILOTS THE AIRCRAFT, PARTICULARLY SINCE NEUTRAL PILOTS
OVER THE USSR WOULD FOLLOW THE "ADVICE" OF SOVIET
OBSERVERS. NOR DO WE WANT TO RISK LOSING THE POSSIBILITY
OF AERIAL INSPECTION OVER THE SOVIET UNION. OBTAINING
AERIAL INSPECTION IN CDE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHETHER
NEUTRAL OR INSPECTED STATES PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT AND
AIRCREWS. INDEED, FROM A STRICTLY MILITARY VIEWPOINT, WE
WOULD PREFER THE LATTER, BOTH OVER OUR FORCES AND PACT
FORCES, FOR REASONS OF AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT AND CREWS,
TIMELY RESPONSE, SECURITY, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, AND
SAFETY.
5. WE WOULD PREFER THAT YOU DELAY MAKING THIS DECISION AS
LONG AS POSSIBLE, BUT BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD PLAY THIS
CARD, SHOULD YOU BELIEVE IT NECESSARY, WHILE WE CAN STILL
USE THE NNA AIR ISSUE AS LEVERAGE TO GET CONCESSIONS ON
MODALITIES AND OTHER ISSUES (E.G. THRESHOLDS). IN MAKING
YOUR DECISION AS TO WHEN TO ACCEPT USE OF INSPECTED
STATE'S AIRCRAFT, YOU SHOULD NOT DELAY SO LONG AS TO RISK
ALLOWING THE CONFERENCE TO RUN BEYOND ITS SEPTEMBER 19
ADJOURNMENT DATE. IF YOU DO IN THE END ACCEPT HOST NATION
PLANES AND PILOTS, YOU SHOULD DO SO HAVING ENSURED
AGREEMENT ON DETAILS OF MODALITIES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH
THREE ABOVE, AND YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE CONSIDER
THIS ACCEPTABLE ONLY BECAUSE (UNLIKE, E.G., MBFR) NO
REDUCTIONS OR LIMITATIONS OF FORCES ARE INVOLVED, AND ONLY
ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS TO GAIN EXPERIENCE IN CONDUCTING
CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IT MUST BE VERY CLEAR TO ALL THAT
THIS IS NOT A PRECEDENT FOR THE KIND OF OSI WE WOULD
365.
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
REQUIRE TO VERIFY A REDUCTIONS OR LIMITATIONS AGREEMENT. SHULTZ
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
366 ?
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SWCRWT
SECRET STATE 294016
SUBJECT: CDE - AERIAL INSPECTION
REF: STATE 290917
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PARAGRAPH FOUR, SENTENCE FOUR OF REFTEL SHOULD READ AS
FOLLOWS:
"INDEED, FROM A STRICTLY MILITARY VIEWPOINT, WE SEE SOME
ADVANTAGES TO THE LATTER, BOTH OVER OUR FORCES AND PACT
FORCES, FOR REASONS OF AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT AND CREWS,
TIMELY RESPONSE, SECURITY, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, AND SAFETY..
SHULTZ
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
25X1
367
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07277
SUBJECT: CSBM'S DISARMAMENT TEXTS
REF: STOCKHOLM 6968
1. CDE XII - 061
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ON SEPTEMBER 10 THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP
AGREED ON AND FORWARDED THE FOLLOWING TEXTS ON CSBM'S
AND DISARMAMENT TO THE GROUP WORKING ON THE STRUCTURE OF
THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. THE STRUCTURE GROUP WILL
DETERMINE WHERE THESE TEXTS WILL BE PLACED IN THE
DOCUMENT, MOST LIKELY RIGHT AFTER THE CSBM'S SECTION
(ONLY THE FRENCH OBJECT TO THIS PLACEMENT).
BEGIN TEXT:
THEY STRESS.. THAT THESE CSBM'S ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE
THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR
MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EMPHASIZE THAT
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THESE OBJECTIVES.
REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT,
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE
BUILDING CONFIDENCE, TO LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION
AND TO ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY ARE ALSO
DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
368'
SECRET
25X1
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07254
SUBJECT: CDE: US-SOVIET AD REF AGREEMENT ON
NOTIFICATION TEXT
1. CDE XII -062.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. DURING THREE HOURS MEETING TODAY BETWEEN AMB HANSEN
AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV AD REF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO
DELEGATIONS WAS REACHED AS INDICATED IN THE FOLLOWING
TEXT. BRACKETED TEXT INDICATED WHERE NO AGREEMENT WAS
POSSIBLE. SPECIFICALLY, THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON
NUMERICAL PARAMETERS, DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF
DIVISIONS OR ON EXCEPTIONS. THE FOLLOWING TEXT WILL NOW
BE ADDRESSED BY NATO AND WTO GROUPS AND THEN, IF
MUTUALLY AGREED, GIVEN TO THE NNA FOR THEIR
CONSIDERATION OVER THE WEEKEND. UNLESS THERE ARE
SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES, THIS TEXT COULD BE NOTED IN THE
NEXT MEETING OF THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP, EITHER
MONDAY OR TUESDAY.
BEGIN TEXT:
PRIOR NOTIFICATION
THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION IN
WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF
CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES 42 DAYS OR
MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON
WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO
TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT
ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE
NOTIFICATION, IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED
MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
EACH OF THE FOLLOWING MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD
CONDUCTED AS A SINGLE ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED
BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED:
THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES ASTERISK)
OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE SAME EXERCISE
ACTIVITY CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND
INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR
NAVAL COMPONENTS.
THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT THE SAME TIME :
- - AT LEAST ... TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
- - AT LEAST ... BATTLE TANKS
- IF ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR AT
LEAST TWO BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY
SUBORDINATE TO THE SAME DIVISION.
THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING
STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS
369 ?
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY 200 OR MORE
SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE
FLOWN.
THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN AN
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE
FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
THESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WHENEVER THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING INVOLVES AT
LEAST ... OR WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP INVOLVES AT
LEAST ...
THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE
OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE,
OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO
POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A
NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED.
(ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.
THE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES WILL BE
SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT THE SAME
TIME :
- AT LEAST ... TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
- - AT LEAST ... BATTLE TANKS
- IF ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR AT
? LEAST TWO BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY
- SUBORDINATE TO THE SAME DIVISION.
FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE
SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS WHEN THEY
DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A
NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE
ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING OF EACH NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED FORM OF CONTENT
A - GENERAL INFORMATION
THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY
LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
THE START AND END DATES OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
B - INFORMATION ON PARTICIPATING FORCES, FOR EACH STATE
ENGAGEMENT OF LAND FORCES INDEPENDENTLY OR IN
COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL
- COMPONENTS
- - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TAKING PART IN THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY (I.E., GROUND TROOPS,
AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE
TROOPS) AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS PARTICIPATING
369a.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRFT
25X1
FOR EACH STATE INVOLVED, IF APPLICABLE
DESIGNATION NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS
PARTICIPATING AND THE LOCATION OF EACH
DIVISION'S HEADQUARTERS (FOR DIVISIONS WITH
TROOPS AND UNITS IN MORE THAN ONE LOCATION, THE
LOCATION OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER'S
HEADQUARTERS WILL BE GIVEN)
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES AND
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (100 MM OR ABOVE)
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS AND THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCHERS
MOUNTED ON ARMORED VEHICLES
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS, BY CATEGORY
- ENVISAGED NUMBER OF SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT,
EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS
- PURPOSE OF AIR MISSIONS
- CATEGORIES OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED
- AREA OF AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION
- LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE
AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION
INDICATION OF NAVAL SHIP-TO-SHORE GUNFIRE
(SIMULATED OR LIVE FIRE)
- LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE
NAVAL FORCE PARTICIPATION
- AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS
- - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS INVOLVED
IN NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AND/OR THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRBORNE TROOPS INVOLVED IN
NOTIFIABLE PARACHUTE ASSAULTS.
- - THE NUMBER OF BATTALION SIZED UNITS LANDED IN A
NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR DROPPED IN A
NOTIFIABLE PARACHUTE ASSAULT
- - IN THE CASE OF A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING,
THE POINT OR POINTS OF EMBARKATION IF IN THE
ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
- NOTIFIABLE TRANSFER OF LAND FORCES
- - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TRANSFERRED
- - DESIGNATION NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS
PARTICIPATING IN THE TRANSFER
- - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS PARTICIPATING
IN A NOTIFIABLE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION.
? - GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES FOR POINTS OF ARRIVAL
AND FOR THE POINTS OF CONCENTRATION.
C - THE AREA AND TIMEFRAME OF THE ACTIVITY
THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY DELIMITED BY
? GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES TOGETHER WITH GEOGRAPHIC
- COORDINATES, AS APPROPRIATE
^ THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE (TRANSFERS,
? DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, ACTIVE
? EXERCISE PHASE, RECOVERY PHASE) OF ACTIVITIES IN
^ THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS OF PARTICIPATING
3691Q
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
FORMATIONS, THE TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS (DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHICAL
- COORDINATES) FOR EACH PHASE
- BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH PHASE
D - OTHER INFORMATION
- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION
- PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE
- ACTIVITY
? RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE
- ACTIVITIES
- EXCEPTIONS
- ALERTS ACTIVITIES, THAT IS THOSE ACTIVITIES CARRIED
- OUT WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED,
- ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR
- NOTIFICATION TO BE MADE 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE.
- NOTIFICATION OF ALERT ACTIVITIES, ABOVE THE AGREED
- THRESHOLDS, WILL BE GIVEN AT THE TIME THE TROOPS
- INVOLVED COMMENCE SUCH ACTIVITIES.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
3690
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07278
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXTS IN WORKING GROUP 8-2 (OBSERVATION)
1. CDE XII - 063
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. WORKING GROUP B (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE THE
FOLLOWING THREE TEXTS ON SEPTEMBER 11.
(1) BEGIN TEXT:
IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE OBSERVERS TO CONFIRM THAT THE
NOTIFIED ACTIVITY IS NONTHREATENING IN CHARACTER AND
THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE APPROPRIATE
PROVISIONS OF THE NOTIFICATION, THE HOST STATE WILL:
END TEXT.
(2) (NOTE: THE NEW SENTENCE NOTED TODAY APPEARS AFTER
THE ELLIPSES IN THE FOLLOWING PARA.)
BEGIN TEXT:
THE HOST STATE WILL IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION
PROGRAM GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP
OF MAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT
THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY . . . . IN THE CASE OF A
.AND FORCE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH AIR OR
NAVAL COMPONENTS, BRIEFINGS WILL BE GIVEN BY REPRESENTA-
TIVES OF THESE FORCES.
END TEXT.
(3) BEGIN TEXT:
A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO THE FOLLOWING NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
-- THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES . . . CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH
ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
-- THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS
. . . LANDING . . . IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBM'S.
-- THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN A PARACHUTE
ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBM'S.
-- IN THE CASE OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND
FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM
OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S TO ARRIVAL
POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICA-
TION FOR CSBM'S TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE,
TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR TO
BE CONCENTRATED, THE CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES WHICH
HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO
ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBM'S WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR
ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBM'S.
-- THE ABOVE MENTIONED ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO
370
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
OBSERVATION WHENEVER . . .
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.
END TEXT.
(COMMENT: THIS TEXT WILL BE THE LEAD PARAGRAPH OF THE
OBSERVATION MEASURE. WHILE IT IS NOT NATO'S FIRST
CHOICE -- WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A SIMPLE REFERENCE TO
"NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES" -- THE EAST AND NNA INSISTED ON
A FULL RECITATION FROM THE B-1 TEXT OF THE LIST OF
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED (FOLLOWED BY A SEPARATE LISTING
OF THE OBSERVATION THRESHO.DS, WHICH WOULD BE DISTINCT
FROM NOTIFICATION IF THE CONFERENCE ADOPTS A SPLIT
APPROACH. ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL EASTERN PROPOSAL ON THIS
SUBJECT HAD ATTEMPTED TO CAPTURE UNDER OBSERVATION THE
MOVEMENT OF FORCES TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE FROM A
POINT OF ARRIVAL TO A POINT OF CONCENTRATION, THE NATO
CLUSTER WAS SATISFIED THAT THE LANGUAGE AS AGREED FULLY
RETAINS THE EXEMPTION OF THOSE FORCES FROM OBSERVATION.
END COMMENT.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
371
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
SECRETSTOCKHOLM 07306
SUBJECT: ALLIES DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT U.S. MAY BREAK
CONSENSUS
1. CDE XII - 064
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. I BRIEFED THE UK, FRENCH, AND FRG AMBASSADORS TODAY
ON THE RANGE OF OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN
WASHINGTON IF THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT AGREE TO NEUTRAL
AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTIONS. ALTHOUGH I HAD EARLIER
MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY, THEY REACTED EMOTIONALLY TO
THE IDEA THAT WE MIGHT DECIDE TO BREAK CONSENSUS ON AN
AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION BY
NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT. THEY ALSO REGISTERED STRONG OBJECTION
TO THE IDEA OF GOING FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH NO INSPECTION
OR AN AGREEMENT WITH GROUND INSPECTION ONLY.
4. ALL INSISTED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD WANT TO BE
CONSULTED, NOT INFORMED, OF THE U.S. DECISION, AND THEY
SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DEEPLY RESENTED IN THEIR CAPITALS
IF THEIR CONSULTATION TOOK PLACE ONLY ON SEPTEMBER 17 OR
18. UK AMBASSADOR IN PARTICULAR STRESSED THAT HMG WOULD
BE VERY ANGRY TO BE "BOUNCED" BY WASHINGTON AT THE LAST
MOMENT.
5. ALL THREE STRESSED THAT THEY HAD SUPPORTED US ON NNA
AIR EVEN THOUGH THEIR CAPITALS WERE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC;
THE FRENCH WERE ACTIVELY OPPOSED BUT HAD REMAINED
SILENT. CDE HAS, UP UNTIL NOW, BEEN AN EXCELLENT
EXAMPLE OF ALLIED UNITY. IF WE BREAK RANKS AT THE LAST
MINUTE, THIS WILL HAVE A FAR-REACHING EFFECT EXTENDING
WELL BEYOND CDE.
6. UK AMBASSADOR SAID U.S. SHOULD REALIZE THE EUROPEAN
ALLIES WERE SENSITIVE THAT U.S. TERRITORY WAS NOT
INCLUDED IN INSPECTION (THOUGH U.S. FORCES WERE) AND
THUS THEY RESENTED U.S. PRESSURE ON THE INSPECTION
ISSUE. HE ALSO UNDERLINED THAT GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS
WERE MUCH THE MORE IMPORTANT ISSUE TO THEM THAN
INSPECTION AND THAT THEY ALL CONSIDERED AERIAL
INSPECTION WITH HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT TO BE ACCEPTABLE.
7. THE THREE INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THE
OPTION TO USE THEIR OWN VEHICLES WHERE FEASIBLE IN A
GROUND INSPECTION ESSENTIAL BUT THAT THEY COULD SUPPORT
IT. THE FRENCH HAVE SERIOUS MISGIVINGS FOR SECURITY AND
SAFETY REASONS BUT WILL ACCEPT IT IF WASHINGTON THINKS
IT NECESSARY.
7. COMMENT: AS A SUBSTANTIAL CDE AGREEMENT GETS
CLOSER, ALLIED APPETITE FOR IT GROWS. I AM SURE THE
REMAINDER OF THE 16 WILL REACT JUST AS STRONGLY TO THE
PROSPECT THAT WE MIGHT WALK AWAY. THEY WILL ALSO SHARE
MISGIVINGS ABOUT TURNING DOWN INSPECTION OR GOING FOR
GROUND INSPECTION ONLY. I URGE THAT OUR DECISION BE
MADE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 17 AND BE CONVEYED TO NATO
CAPITALS IN A CONSULTATIVE, NOT INFORMATIVE, MODE. END
372
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
COI4MENT .
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
NNNN
373
SECRET
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07318
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS -
- - SEPTEMBER 8-12, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 7203
1. CUE XII - 065
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: WE ARE GETTING
CLOSER TO A COMPLETE AGREEMENT. VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE
NOTIFICATION SECTION, ONE OF THE TWIN PILLARS OF THE
DOCUMENT'S CSBM'S REGIME, WAS COMPLETED DURING INTENSIVE
U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS LAST WEEK, WITH THE
NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. IF THIS
SECTION CAN SURVIVE ALLIED AND NNA SCRUTINY, WE WILL HAVE
CLEARED ONE OF THE LAST SUBSTANTIVE HURDLES. ANOTHER
MAJOR -- AND THE MOST DIFFICULT -- HURDLE REMAINS:
VERIFICATION. WHILE PROGRESS WAS MADE ON THE IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS OF RESTRICTED AREAS AND INSPECTION QUOTAS,
EAST AND WEST ARE AT LOGGERHEADS OVER THE USE OF NEUTRAL
AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION, WHILE THE NNA PRESS OFTEN
CONFLICTING NATIONAL POSITIONS. SOVIET AMBASSADOR
GRINEVSKY RETURNED FROM A LIGHTNING TRIP TO MOSCOW WITH A
BIG "NYET" ON THIS ISSUE BUT THE EAST HAS NOT, IN FACT,
REJECTED NEUTRAL AIR DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE SUSPECT
THAT THE EAST MAY HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION
BUT THEY MAY LINK IT TO UNACCEPTABLY HIGH NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLDS.
THE ENTIRE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION WAS REGISTERED; IT
REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY, INCLUDING
LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM. ALTHOUGH A
NUMBER OF OBSERVATION ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED,
INCLUDING THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION AND THE POTENTIAL
PROBLEM OF A SEPARATE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION
THRESHOLD, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DIFFICULTIES IN
WRAPPING UP THIS SECTION EARLY IN THE WEEK. THE ANNUAL
CALENDAR MEASURE WILL ALSO BE COMPLETED, ALBEIT WITHOUT
DETAILED INFORMATION ON DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF
DIVISIONS. ON CONSTRAINTS, THE EAST AND NNA SEEM
RESIGNED TO ACCEPTING A TIME CONSTRAINT BASED ON THE
ANNUAL CALENDAR. END SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: INTENSIVE U.S.-FRENCH-SOVIET
NEGOTIATIONS BORE FRUIT FINALLY THIS WEEK IN A LANDMARK
BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE NOTIFICATION
SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. FOR THE MOST PART,
OUR ALLIES ARE SATISFIED WITH THE BREAKTHROUGH, ALTHOUGH
A FEW, NOTABLY THE DANES AND THE NORWEGIANS, ARE UPSET
THAT THEIR PET INTEREST (INFORMATION RELATED TO LANDING
CRAFT IN AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING) WAS DROPPED. THERE
REMAIN A NUMBER OF ESSENTIAL OUTSTANDING ISSUES:
NUMERICAL PARAMETERS; AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE STRUCTURE; THE
25X1
374
SECRET
in Part - Sanitized Com Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS AND THE LOCATIONS
OF THEIR HEADQUARTERS (WHICH WE WILL NOT GET); AND
EXCEPTIONS, I.E., THE PROVISION FOR ALERTS, ALTHOUGH
U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THIS LAST ISSUE EXISTS. (THIS
UNDERSTANDING IS ON THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING
TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE REQUIREMENT
FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO BE MADE 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE.
NOTIFICATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES, ABOVE THE AGREED
THRESHOLDS, WILL BE GIVEN AT THE TIME THE TROOPS INVOLVED
COMMENCE THE ACTIVITY.) IN ADDITION, THE SWISS CONTINUE
TO STRUGGLE WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT MOBILIZED FORCES
WHICH HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS MIGHT
BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION. DESPITE THESE PROBLEM AREAS,
IF THE U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT CAN SURVIVE ALLIED AND THEN
CONFERENCE SCRUTINY, WE WILL HAVE MADE A MAJOR STEP
TOWARD AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM.
5. VERIFICATION: THREE CRITICAL ISSUES REMAIN ON
INSPECTION: NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT, RESTRICTED/SPECIFIED AREAS
AND QUOTAS. ON NEUTRAL AIR, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY
RETURNED FROM A LIGHTNING TRIP TO MOSCOW WITH A HARD LINE
THAT THE USSR WOULD NEVER ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIR. IN COFFEE
GROUP MEETINGS HOWEVER, THE SOVIET REP HAS STUDIOUSLY
AVOIDED CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF THE USE OF NEUTRAL
AIRCRAFT, AND WE CONTINUE TO SUSPECT THAT THE EAST MAY
HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION WHICH COULD BE
LINKED TO WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF AN UNACCEPTABLY HIGH
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD (E.G., 16,000). THE PRINCIPAL
NEUTRALS BEHIND THE IDEA (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND
SWEDEN) REMAIN COMMITTED BUT ARE NOT PUSHING THE ISSUE
IN PUBLIC. THE PROBLEM IS THAT WHILE THEY ARE WORKING
THE ISSUE INTERNALLY THEY ARE NOT PRESSURING THE SOVIETS
IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF. ONLY THE FINNS AND THE IRISH
HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE THIS WEEK, EACH WITH RATHER
LUKEWARM STATEMENTS THAT THEY WILL CONSIDER WHETHER THEY
CAN MAKE A CONTRIBUTION IF IT IS NECESSARY FOR AN AGREE-
MENT AND ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING THAT
MANY OF THE ALLIES WILL NOT INSIST ON NN AIR AT THE END
OF THE WEEK.
INTENSIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET REP
(ROZANOV) AND THE NATO TEAM LEADER (FREEMAN - UK) HAVE
ADVANCED DISCUSSION ON BOTH RESTRICTED/SPECIFIED AREAS
AND QUOTAS. THE SOVIETS NOW APPEAR READY TO ACCEPT A
TEXT ALONG THE LINES OF OUR "POSITIVE APPROACH" TO
RESTRICTED AREAS, I.E., THAT THEY CANNOT BE USED TO
PREVENT AN INSPECTION. THE REAL PROBLEM, HOWEVER, MAY
LIE IN BONN, NOT MOSCOW, AS THE FRG MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
IS INSISTING THAT IT NEEDS RESTRICTED AREAS WHERE IT CAN
CONDUCT ACTIVITIES ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL WHICH ARE
EXEMPT FROM CSBM'S. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY WILL BLOCK
375
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE, HOWEVER. ON QUOTAS, THE
COORDINATOR INTRODUCED A TEXT (THE RESULT OF UK-SOVIET
BILATERALS) IN THE COFFEE GROUP WITH SOVIET AGREEMENT
THAT WOULD ESTABLISH A PASSIVE QUOTA BUT NO ACTIVE QUOTA.
INSTEAD IT CONTAINS A "REVERSE ACTIVE QUOTA" STIPULATING
THAT STATES NEED NOT ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION
FROM ANY OTHER STATE AND THAT MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE
COULD NOT CONSUME EACH OTHERS' PASSIVE QUOTAS. A
PASSIVE QUOTA NUMBER REMAINS TO BE ADDRESSED AND THERE
REMAIN DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THESE NUMBERS.
THE WORKING GROUP ITSELF NOTED SIX TEXTS THIS WEEK
(SEPTEL) RANGING FROM ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES TO THE
PRINCIPLE THAT INSPECTIONS CAN BE FROM THE GROUND OR THE
AIR. AT U.S. URGING, DRAFTING WILL BEGIN THIS WEEKEND
ON AERIAL MODALITIES. THE PROBLEM HERE IS THAT THERE IS
NO AGREEMENT IN NATO OR AMONG THE NNA ON TEXTS.
6. OBSERVATION: THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT THIS WEEK WAS
AGREEMENT ON A TEXT IDENTIFYING THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES
TO BE OBSERVED WHICH, AT EASTERN AND NNA INSISTENCE, IS
LARGELY A REPETITION OF THE LIST OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES
FROM B-1. THIS LANGUAGE WAS AGREED AFTER THE WEST
REJECTED AN INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE
THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE FROM
THEIR ARRIVAL BASES TO A CONCENTRATION SUBJECT TO
OBSERVATION (REFLECTING A CONSCIOUS "MISINTERPETATION" BY
THE SOVIET MILREP TATARNIKOV OF WHAT WAS AGREED IN B-1.)
THE NOTED TEXT PROTECTS OUR INTERPRETATION THAT SUCH
MOVEMENTS ARE EXCLUDED FROM OBSERVATION; SUBSEQUENT
BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY
INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NO LONGER SEEKING SUCH
OBSERVATION. THE TEXT WILL ALSO INCLUDE THE THRESHOLDS
FOR OBSERVATION, WHICH WILL BE DEPENDENT ON WHETHER THE
CONFERENCE DECIDES IN FAVOR OF SPLIT OR UNITARY
OBSERVATION/NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS. TEXTS WERE ALSO
NOTED ON THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVATION, AND ON BRIEFINGS TO
BE GIVEN ON THE AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS OF ACTIVITIES.
A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED IN THE
FINAL WEEK, INCLUDING SCOPE OF OBSERVATION (THE EAST
STILL SEEKS TO LIMIT SCOPE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE),
THRESHOLDS AND DURATION OF OBSERVATION (WHICH ARE TIED
TO DEVELOPMENTS IN B-1), AND THE OBSERVATION OF ALERTS.
ON PERSONAL BINOCULARS, THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED OUR
PROPOSAL THAT THEY BE PERMITTED PROVIDED THAT THE HOST
STATE CAN EXAMINE THEM. ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL WORK TO
BE DONE, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES IN
WRAPPING UP THE OBSERVATION MEASURE.
7. ANNUAL CALENDAR: ALTHOUGH THE COFFEE GROUP MANAGED
TO NOTE THREE MORE TEXTS IN THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR
(SIZE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
AND CHANGES TO THE CALENDAR), THE EAST STONEWALLED ANY
25X1
376
SECRET
nprdaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
PROGRESS ON IMPORTANT UNRESOLVED ITEMS IN THE CONTENT OF
THE CALENDAR (E.G., THE NUMBER, TYPE, DESIGNATION AND
LOCATION OF DIVISIONS).
8. CONSTRAINTS: THE COFFEE GROUP CAME CLOSE TO
AGREEMENT THIS WEEK ON LANGUAGE ON 1) THE TWO-YEAR TIME
CONSTRAINT; 2) A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES
WHICH COULD BE PRIOR NOTIFIED IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN
INCLUDED IN THE TWO-YEAR ADVANCE CALENDAR; AND 3) A
LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE PRIOR
NOTIFIED IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL
CALENDAR. THERE HAS BEEN, HOWEVER, LITTLE ACTIVITY ON
THE PARAMETERS FOR THESE PROVISIONS: EAST, WEST AND NNA
HAVE ONLY AGREED THAT THE LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF
ACTIVITIES YOU CAN ADD THAT WERE NOT FORECAST TWO YEARS
IN ADVANCE WILL BE 75,000 (ALERTS, AS ALWAYS, WILL BE
EXEMPT).
9. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF
THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT IS COMPLETE. THIS SECTION, IN
OUR VIEW, FULFILLS ALL THE PRIMARY WESTERN OBJECTIVES:
IT JUSTIFIES THE NUF REAFFIRMATION BY THE ADOPTION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S; IT REFLECTS THE
BROADER WESTERN CONCEPT OF SECURITY, INCLUDING RESPECT
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS; AND IT ELIMINATES ALMOST ALL EASTERN
DECLARATORY LANGUAGE (SEE REFTEL FOR FULL TEXT). IN THE
FINAL ANALYSIS, THE NATO STRATEGY TO REGISTER THE MAIN
ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN NUF PAPER EARLY PUT PRESSURE ON
EASTERN AND NNA DELEGATIONS TO PLEA FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE
CAUSES DURING THE LAST-MINUTE RUSH TO JUDGMENT. THE
POLES PUSHED FOR INCLUSION OF A PARAGRAPH ON THE
INVIOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS, THE CYPRIOTS ARGUED FOR
ENLARGING THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE CONCEPT, THE EAST
PRESSED FOR THE ADDITION OF DECLARATORY LANGUAGE TO THE
FINAL ACT'S REFERENCES TO ARMED FORCES, AND THE FRENCH
INAISTED ON ITS OWN GALLIC NUANCES ABOUT EVERYTHING ELSE
(OFTEN UNINTELLIGBLE TO THE ANGLO-SAXON OR ANY OTHER
MIND). REMINISCENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL TAX REFORM
DEBATE, INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS FEVERISHLY LOBBIED TO
PROTECT THEIR PET PROJECTS. HOWEVER, IT SOON BECAME
CLEAR THAT ACQUIESCENCE TO ANY AMENDMENTS WOULD RESULT
IN PRESSURE TO ACCEPT ALL OF THEM. THUS, THE COORDINATOR
WAS ABLE TO REJECT ALL SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS DURING AN
EIGHT-HOUR SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 9. ON FRIDAY,
SEPTEMBER 12, THE FULL TEXT WAS NOTED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
377
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07320
SUBJECT: CDE: VERIFICATION LANGUAGE NOTED IN WORKING
GROUP
1. CDE XII -066.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. DRAFTING IS PROGRESSING ON VERIFICATION, WITH SIX
MORE TEXTS PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN THE RELEVANT WORKING
GROUP ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10. MAJOR ISSUES STILL
OUTSTANDING ARE SPECIFIED AREAS/RESTRICTED AREAS,
INSPECTION QUOTAS, TRANSPORTATION (WHO HAS THE KEYS TO
THE CAR), AND MODALITIES FOR AERIAL INSPECTION. LURKING
IN THE WINGS ARE COMMUNICATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS
ISSUES, BUT NO ONE SEEMS TO BE PRESSING PET IDEAS IN
THIS REGARD AT THE MOMENT, AS ALL WORK HAS FOCUSED ON
DRAFTING INSPECTION MODALITIES. ON SPECIFIED
AREAS/RESTRICTED AREAS AND INSPECTION QUOTAS, BILATERAL
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE CHIEF NATO SPOKESPERSON
(UK-FREEMAN) AND THE USSR (ROZANOV) ARE PROGRESSING WELL
FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. WITH A WEEK TO GO, THE PACE OF
MEETINGS IS ACCELERATING -- COFFEE GROUP MEETINGS ARE
SCHEDULED FOR BOTH SATURDAY AND SUNDAY. TEXTS NOTED ON
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10 ARE AS FOLLOWS.
4. PASSAGE OF INSPECTION TEAM: A TEXT, BASED ON THE
LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 12 OF SC.1/MEASURE 5, WAS NOTED AS
FOLLOWS:
"ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FACILITATE THE PASSAGE OF
INSPECTION TEAMS THROUGH THEIR TERRITORY."
5. INSPECTION REPORT: A TEXT, BASED ON SC.1/MEASURE
5/PARA 11, WAS NOTED. ELLIPSES ARE UNDERSTOOD BY WEST
TO DEAL WITH A TIME ELEMENT, I.E. A REPORT SHOULD BE
PREPARED IN AS SHORT A PERIOD OF TIME AS POSSIBLE; NNA
WOULD LIKE TO SPECIFY A PERIOD OF TIME, SUCH AS 48
HOURS. NNA AND EAST MAY TRY TO PROVIDE FOR THE
PROVISION OF A REPORT FROM THE INSPECTED STATE.
"THE INSPECTING STATE WILL PREPARE A REPORT OF ITS
INSPECTION AND WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF THAT REPORT TO ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES . . . . (FULL STOP)"
6. COMPOSITION OF INSPECTION TEAM. A TEXT, BASED ON
SC.1/MEASURE 5/PARA 13 WAS NOTED. ELLIPSES IN OUR VIEW
ARE TO PROVIDE FOR AIRCRAFT CREW AND DRIVERS, AS WELL AS
TO ALLOW FOR PERSONNEL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM TO BE
DRAWN FROM THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR FACILITIES OF THE
INSPECTING STATE IN THE RECEIVING STATE.
"THERE WILL BE NO MORE THAN FOUR INSPECTORS IN AN
INSPECTION TEAM . . . "
7. LOGISTIC SUPPORT. LANGUAGE, BASED ON SC.1/MEASURE
5/PARA 15, AND DRAWN PARTIALLY FROM A TEXT PROVISIONALLY
NOTED IN THE OBSERVATION WORKING GROUP, WAS NOTED AS
FOLLOWS:
"THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE THE INSPECTION TEAM
WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION
378
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION, AND, WHEN
NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE; HOWEVER THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE
THE USE BY THE INSPECTION TEAM OF ITS OWN TENTS AND
RATIONS."
8. COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS. BASED ON SC.1/MEASURE
5/PARA 8, THE FOLLOWING WAS NOTED:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS
FOR COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING INSPECTIONS."
9. METHOD --PRINCIPLE. BASED ON SC.1/MEASURE 5/PARA 5,
THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE CONTAINING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE
INSPECTION METHODS WAS NOTED. FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES ARE
TO PROVIDE FOR THE WORDS "OR BOTH," IN ORDER TO ALLOW
FOR BOTH AIR AND GROUND INSPECTION, AND TO ALLOW FOR
THEM TO BE CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE SECOND SET OF
ELLIPSES REFLECTS A USSR DESIRE TO SPECIFY WHO PROVIDES
THE TRANSPORT/VEHICLES -- FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE, THE
INSPECTED STATE.
"INSPECTION WILL BE PERMITTED ON THE GROUND, FROM THE
AIR . . . .(FULL STOP) INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED
FROM LAND VEHICLES AND FROM AIRCRAFT . . . "
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
NNNN
379
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SWINT
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07319
SUBJECT: VERIFICATION WRAPUP - WEEK FIVE OF FINAL ROUND
1. CDE XII - 067
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: DESPITE THE RECENT "NO DEAL" MESSAGE FROM
MOSCOW THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS YET FORMALLY TO REJECT
CATEGORICALLY THE POSSIBILITY OF NEUTRAL AIR FOR
INSPECTION. THE NNA CONTINUE TO EXPRESS THEIR SUPPORT
FOR THE CONCEPT AND TO ELICIT OUR HELP IN FORMULATING
APPROPRIATE MODALITIES. THE SOVIETS MEANWHILE RESIST
DRAFTING ANY MODALITIES WHICH WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT
WITH INSPECTED STATE CONTROL. ON QUOTAS, THERE IS
GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF A PASSIVE SYSTEM. SOVIET SUPPORT
FOR A RESTRICTED AREA CONCEPT CLOSE TO OURS SHOULD
FACILITATE EARLY DRAFTING ON THE QUESTION. SUPPORT FOR
THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION AS OBSERVERS IN THE
INSPECTION PROCESS IS WANING. THE CHALLENGE OF THE
FINAL WEEK WILL BE TO DRAFT MODALITIES WHICH WILL
ESTABLISH AND PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION WITH NNA AIRCRAFT
AND CREWS. END SUMMARY.
4. AERIAL INSPECTION. MOSCOW'S RECENT "NO DEAL" TO
NEUTRAL AIR, WHICH GRINEVSKY HAS COMMUNICATED TO
VARIOUS DELEGATIONS PRIVATELY, HAS NOT BEEN EXPLICITLY
ECHOED IN THE WORKING GROUPS. FINLAND AND IRELAND HAVE
FORMALLY EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT, AND
IN THE WORKING GROUP THE NNA MOST INTERESTED
(SWITZERLAND AND SWEDEN) CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR
MODALITIES WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE NNA TO CARRY OUT SUCH
A ROLE. THE SWISS STILL HANKER FOR RUNNING THE WHOLE
NEUTRAL AIR SHOW, IF WE SUCCEED IN GETTING IT. THEY
ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF
CHOICE BETWEEN NEUTRAL AND INSPECTED STATE AIR. THEY
BELIEVE THE WEST WILL ALWAYS OPT FOR NNA AIR AND THE
EAST FOR INSPECTING STATE, THUS MAKING THE NEUTRALS
(READ: SWISS) THE AGENTS FOR WESTERN INSPECTIONS. THE
AUSTRIANS ARE LAYING BACK. IN PRIVATE, THEY SAY WE
WILL HAVE TO FIGHT FOR NEUTRAL AIR IF WE WANT TO BRING
THE SOVIETS AROUND. "IT WAS YOUR IDEA," THE AUSTRIANS
SAY. THE SOVIET PRICE FOR NEUTRAL AIR, IF IT IS TO BE
HAD, COULD WELL BE UNACCEPTABLY HIGH TROOP THRESHOLDS
FOR NOTIFICATION. THE USDEL IN THESE FINAL DAYS WILL
CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR DRAFTING ON MODALITIES THAT WOULD
CLEARLY BE APPLICABLE TO THE NEUTRAL OPTION; WE EXPECT
THE SOVIETS TO RESIST DRAFTING ON THESE PARTICULAR
MODALITIES. TO MAKE INSPECTED STATE AIR LESS
OBJECTIONABLE, THE SOVIETS ARE SUPPORTING THE PRINCIPLE
THAT INSPECTED STATE AIRCREWS WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO
DIRECTION FROM THE INSPECTORS. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO
PUSHING HELICOPTERS AS THE MOST SUITABLE PLATFORM FOR
BOTH INSPECTION AND TRANSPORT WITHIN THE SPECIFIED
INSPECTION AREA. THEY ARGUE THAT HELICOPTERS COULD BE
330
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
USED TO GET AN OVERVIEW OF THE INSPECTED AREA AND THAT
GROUND TRANSPORT COULD BE USED FOR FOLLOWUP
INVESTIGATION OF SUSPICIOUS AREAS. FIXED WING
AIRCRAFT, THEY SAY, WOULD BE UNSAFE WHERE LOW-LEVEL AIR
MISSIONS ARE BEING FLOWN AS PART OF EXERCISES.
5. QUOTAS. THE SOVIETS PRIVATELY HAVE INDICATED THEY
COULD ACCEPT A STIPULATION THAT WOULD ALLOW ANY ONE
STATE TO INSPECT ANOTHER ONLY ONCE PER YEAR. SOME NNA
(AUSTRIA) SEE NO NEED FOR SUCH A LIMITATION SINCE IT
SMACKS OF ACTIVE QUOTA. THE AUSTRIANS ARGUE THAT NO
ONE STATE WOULD RISK TARNISHING ITS CREDIBILITY BY
REPEATEDLY SEEKING TO INSPECT A PARTICULAR GIVEN
STATE. WE DO BELIEVE WE CAN GET AGREEMENT TO SUCH A
PROVISION. IN ADDITION, THE NNA SEEM RECONCILED TO
ACCEPTING PASSIVE QUOTAS. WE PROBABLY WILL MANAGE TO
ADOPT FRAMEWORK LANGUAGE ON QUOTAS BY THE MIDDLE OF THE
COMING WEEK BUT NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE ON THE NUMBERS
THEMSELVES UNTIL THE FINAL DAY.
6. RESTRICTED AREAS. THE UK-USSR FIX SEEMS TO BE IN.
SOVIET REP ROZANOV HAS INDICATED ACCEPTANCE OF AN
APPROACH CLOSE TO OURS. THE FRG MAY CONTINUE TO HAVE
SOME PROBLEMS BUT BY THE END OF THE WEEK WILL PROBABLY
COKE AROUND. ON SPECIFIED AREAS THE SOVIETS SEEM READY
TO DROP THEIR COOKIE-CUTTER APPROACH, VIZ., THE SIZE OF
THE AREA SHOULD CONFORM TO THE NATURE OF THE SUSPECTED
INSTANCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE. THEY WILL, HOWEVER,
REQUIRE 93ME REFERENCE TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
SPECIFIED AREA AND THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE SUSPECTED
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY.
7. THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION. MUCH OF THE ATTRACTION
TO THIS NOTION HAS SHIFTED TO THE CONCEPT OF NNA AIR.
THE AUSTRIANS ARE ALONE AMONG THE NNA STRONGLY
ADVOCATING THIRD PARTY PRESENCE AS OBSERVERS DURING
INSPECTION. ?THE EAST, WHICH LAST WEEK HELD OUT THIRD
PARTY PARTICIPATION AS A WAY OF SATISFYING NNA
ROLE-PLAYING ASPIRATIONS, HAS NOT PRESSED ITS CASE.
8. DRAFTING. MORE NON-CONTROVERSIAL TEXT HAS BEEN
NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. ATTEMPTS TO DRAFT
ON INSPECTION MODALITIES MET WITH SOVIET EFFORTS TO
PRESERVE INSPECTED STATE CONTROL OF TRANSPORT FROM
POINT OF ENTRY AND THROUGHOUT THE INSPECTION TOUR. THE
NNA ATTEMPTED TO MOVE DRAFTING ON MODALITIES IN THEIR
DIRECTION BY ADDRESSING LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
AERIAL INSPECTIONS, BUT THUS MADE IT EASY FOR THE EAST
TO ARGUE THAT THE HOST STATE IS BEST EQUIPPED TO ENSURE
THE RELIABILITY OF AERIAL TRANSPORT AND INSPECTION
PLATFORMS. WE NOW EXPECT DRAFTING TO MOVE REASONABLY
WELL ON SOME DIFFICULT ISSUES: RESTRICTED AREAS,
SPECIFIED AREAS, AND QUOTAS. REGARDING AERIAL
MODALITIES, HOWEVER, WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE FACT THAT
THE NNA WILL NOT JOINTLY BE ABLE TO PRESENT A
3R1
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
COMPREHENSIVE SET FOR DRAFTING PURPOSES. CONTINUED
DELAY WILL ONLY CAUSE THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRAL AIR TO
ATROPHY; THIS IS CLEARLY THE SOVIET INTENTION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
332
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07344
SUBJECT: CDE - STATUS OF CONSTRAINING MEASURES
1. CDE XII - 068.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH THERE IS AS YET NO LANGUAGE
NOTED, DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT A "TIME CONSTRAINT"
WILL, DURING THE FINAL WEEK, BE AGREED BY THE
CONFERENCE. THIS MEASURE, WHILE CLEARLY RELATED TO
THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, HAS, IN MOST PARTICIPANT'S EYES,
A LIFE OF ITS OWN. AT THIS POINT, THEREFORE, IT
APPEARS LIKELY THAT IT WILL FIND A SOMEWHAT
INDEPENDENT PLACE IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT: EITHER UNDER
THE TITLE "CONSTRAINING MEASURES" OR WITHIN THE ANNUAL
CALENDAR BUT WITH A SEPARATE INTRODUCTION AS A
"CONSTRAINING PROVISION." END SUMMARY.
4. BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES
BETWEEN BOUNDS XI AND XII, INCLUDING THE 9 AUGUST IG,
USDEL HAS PURSUED DEVELOPMENT OF A "TIME CONSTRAINT"
BOTH WITHIN NATO AND THE CONFERENCE. AS ORIGINALLY
FORMULATED BY THE IRISH DELEGATION, THIS WAS A TWO
TIER SYSTEM OF ADVANCE FORECASTING (I.E., ACTIVITIES
ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE MOULD BE FORECAST TWO TEARS IN
ADVANCE AND EVEN LARGER ACTIVITIES WOULD BE FORECAST
THREE YEARS IN ADVANCE). WE PURSUED A SINGLE TIER
SYSTEM WHICH HAD THREE PARTS: 1) A REQUIREMENT TO
FORECAST ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE (E.G.,
40,000) TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE; 2) A LIMITATION ON THE
SIZE OF ACTIVITIES (E.G., 75,000) WHICH COULD EITHER
BE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR OR PRIOR NOTIFIED
IF THEY HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TWO YEAR
FORECAST; AND 3) A SANCTION OF EXEMPTION FROM THE
PASSIVE QUOTA FOR INSPECTION FOR ACTIVITIES (BETWEEN
THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AND 75,000) WHICH WOULD BE PRIOR
NOTIFIED BUT HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TWO YEAR
FORECAST OR ANNUAL CALENDAR. THIS THIRD ELEMENT NEVER
RECEIVED THE APPROVAL OF THE NATO CAUCUS FOR TWO
REASONS: 1) CONCERN OVER ESTABLISHING THE CONCEPT OF
A "PENALTY," AND 2) CONCERN THAT THE SANCTION WOULD,
IN CASES WHERE A COUNTRY HAD NOT INCLUDED THE ACTIVITY
IN THE CALENDAR OR TWO YEAR FORECAST, HAVE CREATED A
DISINCENTIVE TO PRIOR NOTIFY.
5. AS IT STANDS NOW, THE "TIME CONSTRAINT" IS BASED
ON THE FIRST TWO PARTS OF OUR ORIGINAL CONCEPT AND A
THIRD ELEMENT WHICH DERIVES FROM THE SECOND: A LIMIT
ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES (E.G., 40,000) WHICH CAN BE
PRIOR NOTIFIED IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE
ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE PRECISE LANGUAGE, AS IT
CURRENTLY STANDS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, OF THESE THREE
ELEMENTS FOLLOWS:
383
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
cwrinur
BEGIN TEXT:
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL COMMUNICATE, IN WRITING, TO
ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, BY 15 NOVEMBER EACH
YEAR, INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN
40,000 TROOPS ..., WHICH IT PLANS TO CARRY OUT IN THE
SECOND SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH COMMUNICATION
WILL INCLUDE PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY,
AS TO ITS GENERAL PURPOSE, TIMEFRAME AND DURATION,
AREA, SIZE AND STATES INVOLVED.
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING
MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS ..., UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN THE
OBJECT OF COMMUNICATION AS DEFINED ABOVE.
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING
MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS ... UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN
INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR NOT LATER THAN 15
NOVEMBER EACH YEAR.
(EXCEPTIONS CONCERNING ALERTS/ACTIVITIES ON SHORT
NOTICE ARE PRESUMED.)
END TEXT.
6. TO THIS POINT, NATO HAS NOT ENDORSED A FOURTH
ELEMENT WHICH THE EAST AND NNA STRONGLY SUPPORT: A
LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ADDITIONS (I.E., TWO PER YEAR)
TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. LIKE THE OTHER IDEAS, IT IS
CLOSELY RELATED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. IN FACT, IT
IS INTELLECTUALLY DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE A LIMITATION ON
ADDITIONS TO THE CALENDAR PER SE WHEN OUR OWN INTENT
IN THE CALENDAR IS THAT ADDITIONS WOULD BE USED
RARELY, IF EVER. USDEL BELIEVES, HOWEVER, ANY
FLEXIBILITY WE MIGHT SHOW IN THIS AREA WOULD HAVE TO
BE LINKED TO EASTERN CONCESSIONS ON ISSUES OF GREAT
IMPORTANCE TO US (I.E., INSPECTION AND/OR NOTIFICATION
PARAMETERS).
7. THERE ARE SEVERAL POINTS WORTH NOTING REGARDING
THIS CONCEPT: ALERT ACTIVITIES ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE
ENTIRE REGIME, THUS PRESERVING OUR OPERATIONAL
FLEXIBILITY; ALTHOUGH THE DOTS IN THIS TEXT ARE
CURRENTLY ACTING AS A PLACEHOLDER FOR A STRUCTRUAL
EQUIVALENT OF THE NUMERICAL TROOP LEVEL, IT IS USDEL'S
AND NATO'S VIEW THAT THE NEGOTIATION OF A STRUCTURAL
EQUIVALENT WOULD PROVE THOROUGHLY IMPRACTICAL -- WE,
THEREFORE, PLAN TO USE A NUMERICAL TROOP PARAMETER
ONLY; THIRDLY, THE NUMERICAL TROOP PARAMETER IS THE
CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN AN
ACTIVITY (AS IN THE NOTIFICATION PROVISION OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT) RATHER THAN THE SNAPSHOT FIGURE
("AT THE SAME TIME") IN THE CDE NOTIFICATION MEASURE.
8. IT IS USDEL'S AND NATO'S VIEW THAT ESTABLISHING
25X1
384
SECRET
npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
AGREEMENT ON THIS TYPE OF CONCEPT WOULD SERVE OUR
INTERESTS REGARDING THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS.
IT WILL ALSO, IN A WAY WHICH SUPPORTS THE WESTERN
APPROACH TO THE CDE, SERVE TO SATISFY NNA AND EASTERN
REQUIREMENTS FOR A CONSTRAINING MEASURE IN THE FINAL
DOCUMENT. AS IT IS RELATED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR,
OUR APPROACH TO THE CDE BASED ON OPENNESS AND
PREDICTABILITY WOULD BE REINFORCED. FURTHERMORE, WE
BELIEVE IT COMPLICATES, ALBEIT IN A MINOR WAY BECAUSE
OF THE ALERT EXEMPTION, EASTERN MILITARY OPTIONS FOR
CONDUCTING LARGE ACTIVITIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF
INTIMIDATION.
9. REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PLACEMENT OF THIS CONCEPT
IN A FINAL DOCUMENT, WE BELIEVE THERE ARE BASICALLY
TWO OPTIONS. FIRST, IT COULD BE PLACED AS A SEPARATE
MEASURE UNDER THE TITLE, "CONSTRAINING MEASURES."
SECOND, IT COULD FALL WITHIN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR,
INTRODUCED BY A PHRASE SUCH AS, "THE FOLLOWING
CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR
WERE ALSO AGREED:". WE HAVE WITHHELD ENDORSEMENT OF
EITHER OPTION BOTH BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN OVER THE
ATTENTION AND STATUS IT GIVES TO CONSTRAINING MEASURES
AND BECAUSE OF ITS VALUE AS NEGOTIATING CAPITAL. WE
BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT EITHER OPTION IS ULTIMATELY
ACCEPTABLE AND THAT INCLUSION OF THE WORDS
"CONSTRAINING MEASURES" IN A CDE DOCUMENT DOES NOT IN
ANY WAY PREJUDICE OUR POSITION REGARDING CONSTRAINTS
IN THE FUTURE. WHILE WE WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD THIS
LEVERAGE FOR THE FINAL DAYS, WE BELIEVE THAT, IN THE
END, CONSTRAINING MEASURES WILL STAND IN ONE OF THE
TWO WAYS OUTLINED ABOVE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
385
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07334
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
SUBJECT: CDE: STATE OF PLAY ON RESTRICTED/SPECIFIED
AREAS: GERMAN CONCERNS.
1. CDE XII -069.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. USSR SEEMS TO HAVE GENERALLY ACCEPTED
NATO'S "POSITIVE APPROACH" TO RESTRICTED AREAS/AREAS TO
BE SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL
SEARCHING BOTH FOR WAYS TO LIMIT THE SPECIFIED AREA AND
FOR LOOPHOLES REGARDING NON-NOTIFIED SUSPECT
ACTIVITIES. NONETHELESS, LANGUAGE DISCUSSED BETWEEN
THE EAST AND WEST IS NOW IN PLAY IN THE WORKING/COFFEE
GROUP. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WE HAVE WORKED CLOSELY TO
ACCOMMODATE NORWEGIAN, TURKISH AND GERMAN CONCERNS.
GERMANS, HOWEVER, STILL HAVE PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.
4. LANGUAGE ON RESTRICTED AREAS/SPECIFIED AREAS FOR
INSPECTION WORKED EXTENSIVELY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
(UK-USSR), HAS NOW SURFACED FOR DISCUSSION IN THE
RELEVANT WORKING/COFFEE GROUP. WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL
IN SELLING OUR "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO THE USSR. THE
WORKING TEXT, CONTAINING ELLIPSES TO COVER UNRESOLVED
PROBLEMS, HAS TWO PARAGRAPHS: THE FIRST ADDRESSES WHAT
A SPECIFIED AREA IS AND THE RIGHTS OF STATES TO
DESIGNATE SUCH AN AREA FOR INSPECTION; THE SECOND
ADDRESSES RESTRICTED AREAS AND SENSITIVE POINTS AND THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THESE AREAS AND POINTS TO THE SPECIFIED
AREA AND THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTION. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
RELATE TO THE USSR'S DESIRES TO LIMIT THE AREA OF
INSPECTION IN WAYS UNACCEPTABLE TO MOST OF NATO, I.E.
TO ENSURE THAT LARGE AREAS OF THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT
BE DECLARED A SPECIFIED AREA FOR INSPECTION. THE
SECOND SOVIET INTEREST IS TO OBTAIN TWO SENTENCES
CONTAINING LANGUAGE STATING ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED IN AREAS AND
SENSITIVE POINTS TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY DENIED OR
RESTRICTED OR THAT PLACES WHERE SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE
CONDUCTED WILL NOT BE DECLARED RESTRICTED. TWO
SENTENCES ARE OVERKILL AND, IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE
CONCERNED THAT THE EFFECT OF SUCH LANGUAGE COULD BE TO
ALLOW THE USSR TO PREVENT THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION
IN A RESTRICTED AREA OF A NON-NOTIFIED, BUT SUSPECT,
MILITARY ACTIVITY BECAUSE A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY COULD
NOT BE CONDUCTED IN SUCH AN AREA. ON THE OTHER HAND
THIS LANGUAGE COULD ALSO HAVE THE EFFECT OF PREVENTING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED AREAS AS A
MEANS OF PREVENTING AN INSPECTION. NATO IS PREPARED TO
ACCEPT SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES FOR THIS REASON.
5. ALL, HOWEVER, IS NOT QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT.
WHILE THE FRG CDE AMBASSADOR (CITRON) HAS GIVEN THE
NATO SPOKESPERSON (UK-FREEMAN) AND THE NATO
386
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
VERIFICATION TEAM ROOM TO "EXPLORE" THIS LANGUAGE, THE
FRG DEL HAS NOT YET RECEIVED A FINAL GREEN LIGHT FROM
BONN. AMB. CITRON IS TRYING TO MANAGE HERE IN
STOCKHOLM WHAT WE UNDERSTAND IS A SPLIT BETWEEN THE
POLITICAL AND DEFENSE SIDES OF THE HOUSE IN BONN. THE
DEFENSE MINISTRY AND MILITARY STILL APPEAR TO HAVE
CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS WITH OUR APPROACH WHICH DOES NOT
EXPLICITLY SANCTION RESTRICTED AREAS IN A CDE CONTEXT
AND WHICH WOULD, IN EFFECT, PREVENT THE EXISTENCE OF
RESTRICTED AREAS OR SENSITIVE POINTS FROM IMPEDING THE
CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION OF EITHER A NOTIFIED ACTIVITY,
OR, PARTICULARLY, OF AN ACTIVITY NOT NOTIFIED BUT WHICH
IS PRESUMED SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT BEHIND THIS CONCERN LIES A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN
OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO CONDUCT CERTAIN ACTIVITIES
ABOVE OR CLOSE TO THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AND NOT HAVE
SUCH ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO INSPECTION; ONE FRG CDE
MILITARY REP HAS TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT IT INTEND TO
RE-ORGANIZE ITS FORCES OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS AND
WISH TO MAINTAIN THEIR OPTION TO EXERCISE THEM IN THIS
NEW MODE AT A NOTIFIABLE LEVEL, BUT TO ENSURE THAT THEY
WILL NOT BE OBSERVED, WHICH MEANS THEY MIGHT NOT CHOOSE
TO NOTIFY THEM. IN EITHER CASE, THEY WOULD LIKE THE
OPTION OF EMPLOYING RESTRICTED AREAS TO AVOID
INSPECTION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES. THUS, THE MOD GERMANS
HAVE FREQUENTLY SOUGHT OUT U.S. REPS TO ELICIT BEHIND
THE SCENES SUPPORT FOR A VARIETY OF PROPOSALS, ALL OF
WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF EXPLICITLY SANCTIONING
RESTRICTED AREAS AND SENSITIVE POINTS IN A CDE REGIME
AND COULD REQUIRE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN UNWIELDY,
NON-NEGOTIABLE, AND NON-IMPLEMENTABLE SET OF MECHANISMS
RELATED TO RESTRICTED AREAS AND THE AREA TO BE
SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION. A RELATED MOD CONCERN IS TO
LIMIT THE SIZE OF THE AREA THAT COULD BE DESIGNATED AS
SPECIFIED SO AS TO ENSURE THAT A HUGE AREA OF THE FRB
UNRELATED TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS NOT
DESIGNATED AS AN AREA FOR INSPECTION.
6. RELATED TO THESE CONCERNS, FRG MILITARY REPS HAVE
FLOATED, BEHIND THE SCENES, VARIOUS IDEAS. AMONG SUCH
IDEAS ARE THE FOLLOWING:
-- IN THE CASE OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED, RESTRICTED
AREAS SHOULD BE SPELLED OUT IN ADVANCE IN THE PRIOR
NOTIFICATION;
-- IN THE CASE OF NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES, IN THE
RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION, THE INSPECTED
STATE SHOULD INDICATE THE RESTRICTED AREAS IN THE AREA
SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION;
-- RESTRICTED AREAS WITHIN ANY SPECIFIED AREA SHOULD BE
LIMITED, EITHER BY NUMBER OR PERCENTAGE;
-- A SPECIFIED AREA SHOULD BE AGREED IN ADVANCE TO BE
OF A LIMITED SIZE, I.E. IN THE CASE OF A NOTIFIED
387
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
ACTIVITY PERHAPS NO LARGER THAN TWICE THE SIZE OF THE
AREA WHERE THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY IS TAKING PLACE;
-- EXCHANGE IN ADVANCE OF ALL RESTRICTED AREAS IN CDE
COUNTRIES, EITHER BY LIST OR MAPS;
7. IN RESPONSE TO SUCH SUGGESTIONS, U.S. REPS HAVE
EXPRESSED THE FOLLOWING GENERAL CONCERNS:
-- WE ARE PURSUING AN APPROACH CONSISTENT WITH OUR
APPROACH TAKEN IN NATO OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS -- WE DO
NOT FAVOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RESTRICTED AREAS, EITHER
ON A PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY BASIS. WE CAN ACCEPT THE
CONCEPT OF "SENSITIVE POINTS" INASMUCH AS SUCH A
CONCEPT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED NATO LIST OF
"EXCEPTIONS" TO AN INSPECTION (E.G. GARRISONS , ETC.).
-- WE DO NOT FAVOR AN EXCHANGE OF LISTS, MAPS, OR ANY
ADVANCE INDICATION OF RESTRICTED AREAS OR SENSITIVE
POINTS INASMUCH AS THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A SANCTIONING
OF THE CONCEPT OF RA 'S IN A CDE CONTEXT; IT HAS BEEN
OUR JUDGEMENT THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO REGISTER RA 'S WOULD
DRIVE THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF RA'S UP TO AN UNACCEPTABLY
HIGH LEVEL. WE DO NOT WISH TO CONDONE THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF LARGE CLOSED AREAS IN THE EAST; WE
ALSO WISH TO AVOID A SITUATION WHEREBY COUNTRIES NOT
EMPLOYING THIS CONCEPT WOULD FEEL COMPELLED BY A CDE
AGREEMENT TO DO SO - THIS WOULD NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO
OPENNESS OR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN OUR VIEW. THE
FRENCH, IN ANY EVENT, WILL NOT EXCHANGE LISTS OR
INDICATE IN ADVANCE OF AN INSPECTION, WHERE OR WHAT
THEIR "SENSITIVE POINTS" ARE. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT
AGREE TO A PERCENTAGE LIMITATION AND WILL NOT EXCHANGE
LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 19.
-- WE WILL NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF OUR NATO PARTNERS
WHO HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED PRACTICES OF RESTRICTED
AREAS AND WE HAVE TRIED, IN DEVELOPING DRAFTING
LANGUAGE, TO ALLOW FOR THIS PRACTICE. AT THE SAME
TIME, WE HAVE SOUGHT LANGUAGE THAT WOULD ENSURE THAT
SUCH A PRACTICE DOES NOT IMPACT DETRIMENTALLY ON AN
EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME FOR ANY CDE AGREEMENT. A
SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWED THE EXISTENCE OF RESTRICTED AREAS
AND SENSITIVE POINTS TO PREVENT THE CONDUCT OF
INSPECTIONS WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE TANTAMOUNT TO NO
VERIFICATION AT ALL.
-- IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO LIMIT IN ADVANCE THE
NUMBER OR PERCENTAGE OF RESTRICTED AREAS ALLOWED TO BE
INCLUDED IN A SPECIFIED AREA, BECAUSE WHERE AND HOW
LARGE THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL BE WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY
ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE ACTIVITY ABOUT WHICH THERE
ARE DOUBTS. IT MAY BE CONDUCTED IN AN AREA WHERE THERE
WILL BE A NUMBER OF AREAS OR SENSITIVE POINTS TO WHICH
ACCESS IS NORMALLY RESTRICTED OR DENIED; ON THE OTHER
HAND, IT MAY NOT.
-- WHILE WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT A SPECIFIED
388
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
AREA DESIGNATED FOR INSPECTION SHOULD BEAR A
RELATIONSHIP TO THE "SCOPE AND SCALE" OF THE AGREED
CSBMS AND BE DEFINED LOOSELY IN THAT WAY, WE ARE NOT
PREPARED TO ACCEPT SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE
THAT ONE CAN DECLARE FOR A SPECIFIED AREA. IT MAY BE
DIFFICULT TO KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT THE LEVEL OF THE
ACTIVITY IS; THUS IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO AGREE TO
LIMIT AN INSPECTION TO AN AREA SAY, FOR EXAMPLE, OF A
SPECIFIC SIZE FOR A STRICTLY DIVISIONAL SIZE ACTIVITY.
8. LANGUAGE PROVIDED BY THE COORDINATOR AS "FOOD FOR
THOUGHT" ON RESTRICTED AREAS/SPECIFIED AREAS, WHICH IS
NOW UNDER DISCUSSION IN THE COFFEE GROUP, IS AS FOLLOWS:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN INSPECTION
WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST. IT IS
PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE A SPECIFIED AREA FOR INSPECTION
ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED
TO AS THE "SPECIFIED AREA". THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL
COMPRISE TERRAIN (INCLUDING TRAINING AREAS) WHERE
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED OR WHERE
ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE BELIEVES A MILITARY
ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION IS TAKING PLACE. THE
SPECIFIED AREA WILL BE DEFINED AND LIMITED BY THE SCOPE
AND SCALE OF THE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES . . .
(1)
"IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
INSPECTING STATE ACCOMPANIED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE RECEIVING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND
UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY, EXCEPT FOR AREAS OR SENSITIVE
POINTS TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY DENIED OR
RESTRICTED, IN PARTICULAR, MILITARY AND DEFENCE
INSTALLATIONS, AS WELL AS NAVAL VESSELS, MILITARY
VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT. THE NUMBER AND EXTENT OF THE
AREAS WILL BE AS LIMITED AS POSSIBLE. . . . (2)
RESTRICTED AREAS WILL NOT BE USED TO PREVGNT THE
CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS. . . (3)
(1) USSR HAS PROPOSED ADDING "I.E. DIVISION, CORPS,
ARMY EXERCISES (TRANSFERS, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES)";
WEST AND NNA HAVE COUNTERED WITH LANGUAGE ALONG
FOLLOWING LINES "OR ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE PRESUMED (OR
SUSPECTED) TO BE NOTIFIABLE."
(2) USSR HAS PROPOSED TWO ADDITIONAL SENTENCES:
"MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS WILL NOT BE
CONDUCTED IN RESTRICTED AREAS. AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE WILL NOT BE DECLARED
RESTRICTED." WEST HAS INDICATED THAT IT DOES NOT
BELIEVE SUCH LANGUAGE IS NECESSARY IN LIGHT OF LAST
SENTENCE IN THIS PARAGRAPH.
(3) USSR HAS SUGGESTED ADDITION OF FOLLOWING LANGUAGE
"OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION."
389
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
crr.gr,
WEST HAS INDICATED THAT SUCH LANGUAGE IS NOT NECESSARY,
BUT IF THE USSR INSISTS IT WOULD WISH TO SUPPLEMENT IT
WITH LANGUAGE SUCH AS "OR BELIEVED TO BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION."
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
390
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
CHECK AGM NST DELIVERY
Statement or Curt Lidg.r,d Head of the Swedish
er.ILJ5_,1236,nNeWk1LA) r u A+
Mr Chairman,
As I stated in the plenary meeting on Aug 29, my Government had
then declared itself willing to study urgently and in a positive spirit
the proposal that neutral and non-aligned States make an aircraft and
crews available for air inspection, subject to consensus among the
participating States . As I also stated, this presupposed that thereby
a difficult problem could be overcome in our negotiations and an
agreement satisfactory to all participating States could be reached.
The issue of a possible third-state aircraft is , as we know, still
subject to negotiation. We are well aware that Important political
questions are involved, which I am not going to dwell upon directly in
this intervention. As ambassador Szigeti rightly pointed out in his
Intervention on September 5, there are also many practical problems
which have to be solved in this context.
The latter questions have been discussed among the neutral and non-
aligned States and on the behalf of the delegations of Austria,
Finland and Switzerland, as well as my own, which have expressed
their readiness in principle to provide such an aircraft and crews, I
now want to indicate the most important elements which, in our
view, would need to be reflected in our document.
Provided there is consensus among the participating States to use
such an aircraft, the States on whose behalf I speak, would consult
with other participating States, in particular those not being party
to a treaty of alliance, in order to find ways and means to ensure
permanent availability, on a rotation basis, of an inspection aircraft
with its crews.
391
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
2
When a request for inspection from the air is addressed to a
participating State, the requesting State would simultaneously
inform the participating State whose aircraft is on duty according to
the rotation scheme as well as participating en-route States.
The participating States concerned would be obliged immediately to
accept the flight plan and facilitate the passage of the aircraft
through their territory.
Before the aircraft enters the specified area the receiving State
would be permitted to inspect the aircraft in the presence of
inspectors or other representatives of the requesting State. This
inspection of the aircraft must not delay the timely arrival in the
specified area.
At a suitable opportunity, which does not delay the timely arrival in
the specified area, representatives of the receiving State would
board the aircraft and stay aboard for the duration of the inspection.
As long as the inspection aircraft moves outside the specified area
and in controlled airspace it would be treated, mutatis mutandis, as
a civil aircraft according to ICAO-procedures and -regulations.
The receiving State would provide logistic support, if needed, for the
inspection aircraft and its crews.
During inspection flights in the specified area the obligations of the
crew must be unambiguous. We would envisage the the following
basic modalities:
- Inspectors would direct the course of the inspection flight, such
as flight path, speed and altitude. The directions given by
inspectors are communicated to an on-board representative of
the receiving State. That representative of the receiving State
would follow the directions given by inspectors except if the
given course crosses a sensitive point/restricted area or if
mandatory safety reasons necessitate a temporary deviation. He
then relays the directions in the form of an order to the pilot.
The pilot would follow these orders, provided flight safety is not
Jeopardized or Rules of the Air violated.
392
_ D,r4
- Qnnifi7Pri (*.env Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
3
- Any deviation from the directions given by inspoctors should at
once be explained by the on-board representative of the receiving
State.
- The crew would record all directions given by inspectors and the
subsequent orders given by the on-board representative of the
receiving Steels well as the time when directions and orders
were given, together with any possible explanation.
These may be the modalities to be included in the document which
will be adopted by our conference. Other problems of a practical
nature, would be worked out by the States, which would undertake to
provide the inspection aircraft and crews.
The practical arrangements would be agreed among these States and
communicated to all other participating States before 1 January
1987.
393
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07349
SUBJECT: GRINEVKSY POURS COLD WATER ON NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT
FOR CDE INSPECTION.
1. CDE XII - 070
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: EVEN AS THE NNA MOVED TO MAKE
INSPECTION BY NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT ACCEPTABLE AND WORKABLE,
THE SOVIETS CAME EVEN CLOSER TO SAYING CATEGORICALLY
NO. IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING SOVIET INTRANSIGIENCE,
THE NNA ARE NOW LIKELY TO BACK AWAY FROM THE NEUTRAL
AIRCRAFT IDEA AND TRY TO FIND ALTERNATIVES WHICH COULD
BE NEGOTIATED BEFORE FRIDAY. END SUMMARY
4. WORKING GROUP AB OPENED SEPTEMBER 15 WITH A SWEDISH
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF SWEDEN, AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND AND
FINLAND, REINFORCING THEIR COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE NEUTRAL
AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE INSPECTION,
IF THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO DO SO. LIDGARD (SWEDEN) SAID
THAT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT COULD BE PROVIDED ON A ROTATIONAL
BASIS AMONG INTERESTED STATES WHICH DO NOT HAVE TREATIES
OF MILITARY ALLIANCE. HE WENT ON TO PROPOSE BASIC
CONCEPTS FOR AIR MODALITIES WHICH COULD FORM THE BASIS
FOR DRAFTING IN THE DAYS REMAINING. IN HIS VIEW, ONLY
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR NEUTRAL AIR WOULD HAVE TO BE
DRAFTED BEFORE SEPTEMBER 19; TECHNICAL DETAILS COULD BE
RESOLVED IN CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO JANUARY 1. THE IRISH
DELEGATION WELCOMED LIDGARD'S REMARKS AND STATED THAT IT
WAS PREPARED TO WORK WITH OTHER STATES WITH TREATIES OF
MILITARY ALLIANCE TO PROVIDE AIRCRAFT AND CREW. THE
IRISH DELEGATION SUGGESTED THAT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON
MODALITIES COULD TAKE PLACE ON THE MARGINS OF THE VIENNA
CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING. BARRY (U.S.) WELCOMED THE
LIDGARD CONTRIBUTION AS A WAY TO "ADVANCE DISCUSSION OF
HOW PRACTICAL, CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF
VERIFICATION CAN BE DEVELOPED." HE CONCURRED WITH THE
VIEW THAT ONLY THE PRINCIPAL MODALITIES NEED TO BE
AGREED BY SEPTEMBER 19, WHILE MORE TECHICAL ASPECTS CAN
BE FINALIZED LATER.
5. GRINEVKSY (USSR) RESPONDED WITH HIS MOST CATEGORICAL
STATEMENT AGAINST NEUTRAL AIR TO DATE: PICKING UP ON
THE NNA'S LINE THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO OFFER NEUTRAL
AIR ONLY IF THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO DO SO, HE EMPHATI-
CALLY STATED THAT "THERE IS NO CONSENSUS NOW AND NONE IS
FORESEEN IN THE FUTURE." READING FROM A PREPARED TEXT,
GRINEVSKY BRANDED THE NEUTRAL AIR IDEA AS AN FRG (AND
NATO) PROPAGANDA PROPOSAL MADE TOO LATE IN THE CONFERENCE
TO BE SERIOUS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE SO-CALLED COMPROMISE
HAD ALSO BEEN AN INSULT TO SOVIET MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, WHO
HAD COME TO STOCKHOLM TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION
TO A SUCCESSFUL CDE OUTCOME WITH HIS OFFER OF INSPECTED
STATE AIR ON AUGUST 28. HE AGAIN ARGUED THAT INSPECTED
STATE AIR, WITH CREWS WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE
394
25X1
SECRET
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE INSPECTORS, WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE
WAY TO ORGANIZE AERIAL INSPECTION. HE CONCLUDED BY
CALLING FOR DRAFTING ON CONCRETE MODALITIES FOR INSPECTED
STATE AIR AND AGREEING WITH MALTA, WHICH HAD SPOKEN
EARLIER, THAT THERE WERE FAR MORE PRESSING ISSUES THAN
NEUTRAL AIR TO BE RESOLVED NOW THAT, IN FACT, WE "HAVE
NO TIME LEFT."
6. COMMENT: IN SPITE OF CLEAR AND PRACTICAL SUPPORT BY
KEY NNA FOR THE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT POSITION, IT IS LIKELY
THAT GRINEVSKY'S STRONG NEGATIVE RESPONSE WILL CAUSE THE
NEUTRALS TO LOSE THEIR ENTHUSIASM FOR THE IDEA AND BEGIN
TO SEEK ALTERNATIVES ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST AS WELL AS
TO THE WEST. THE IMPACT OF THE NNA EFFORT WAS FURTHER
DILUTED AS BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) CHOSE TO AIR PUBLICLY
HIS COMPLAINT THAT BELGRADE, WHICH IS ALSO INTERESTED IN
PROVIDING AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR INSPECTION, WAS NOT
CONSULATED BY THE FOUR NEUTRALS IN THE PREPARATION OF
LIDGARD'S MODALITIES. END COMMENT.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
395
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07368
SUBJECT: PROPOSED BERLIN DECLARATION
REF: BONN 29793
1. CDE XII - 071
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. USDEL CDE CONCURS WITH COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED IN
REFTEL, I.E., FOLLOWING ADOPTION OF STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT
FRENCH CDE DELEGATE MAKE DECLARATION AT CDE CONCERNING
ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BERLIN AND
GERMANY BASED ON TEXT PROPOSED IN PARA 3 REFTEL.
PENDING DEPARTMENT APPROVAL, U.S., FRENCH, AND UK REPS
IN STOCKHOLM WILL COORDINATE SUGGESTED DECLARATION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
396
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07439
SUBJECT: CDE: LEAKS
1. CDE XII - 072
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THOSE WHO LEAKED OUR INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PRESS
SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE COMPLETELY UNDERMINED
OUR BARGAINING POSITION HERE. THE SOVIETS WERE MOVING
IN OUR DIRECTION ON SEVERAL KEY ISSUES, SUCH AS THE
RIGHT TO CHOOSE AIRCRAFT AND GROUND VEHICLES; BUT WHEN
THEY TOOK A BREAK AND RETURNED HAVING READ OUR BOTTOM
LINE IN THE PRESS, THEY BACKED AWAY. GRINEVSKY CAME TO
MEET ME WAVING WIRE SERVICE REPORTS AND SAYING THAT I
WAS TRYING TO GET MORE THAN MY INSTRUCTIONS CALLED
FOR. I WAS, AND AM, BUT THE LEAKERS HAVE PROBABLY
DOOMED THE EFFORT TO FAILURE.
4. USDEL WOULD LIKE TO GO ON RECORD AS SAYING THAT,
ONCE AGAIN, THE LEAKERS HAVE DONE THEIR BEST TO DESTROY
OUR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS WHICH SERVE US
INTERESTS. WHY?
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
397
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRFT
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07431
SUBJECT: CURRENT STATE OF PLAY ON NEUTRAL AIR FOR CDE
INSPECTION
1. CDE XII - 073
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
414,
3. IN LIGHT OF RECENT PRESS REPORTS CONCERNING THE U.S.
POSITION ON THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR
THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTION IN A CDE VERIFICATION REGIME,
ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY BE APPROACHED BY HOST GOVERNMENTS
FOR CLARIFICATION ON THIS ISSUE. THE FOLLOWING POINTS
ON THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY ON NEUTRAL AIR IN STOCKHOLM
MAY BE DRAWN UPON BY ACTION ADDRESSEES IN CONTACTS WITH
HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:
-- OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND
CREWS FOR THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTION IN A CDE
VERIFICATION REGIME REMAINS ON THE TABLE IN STOCKHOLM.
-- NEUTRAL AIR CONTINUES TO BE OUR STRONG PREFERENCE
BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE MOST SUITABLE
ALTERNATIVE TO AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTING
STATE, AND BECAUSE IT CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A
CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME IN THE
CONTEXT OF A CDE AGREEMENT.
-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A CREDIBLE AND
EFFECTIVE CDE VERIFICATION REGIME AND TO PRESS FOR THE
NEUTRAL AIR OPTION FOR INSPECTION.
-- WE ARE NOT PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO ALLOW THE
CONFERENCE TO FAIL SOLELY ON THE NEUTRAL AIR ISSUE,
ALTHOUGH IF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD RUN AGROUND ON A
NUMBER OF CENTRAL ISSUES, NEUTRAL AIR WILL BE AMONG THEM.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
25X1
398
SECRET
npriaccifipci in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07454
SUBJECT: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR SEPTEMBER 19 PLENARY
1. CDE XII - 074
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. PENDING AGREEMENT ON THE FULL TEXT OF THE STOCKHOLM
DOCUMENT, NATO REPS, BASED ON CONSULTATIONS WITH EAST
AND NNA REPRESENTATIVES, HAVE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THE CLOSING PLENARY SESSION OF
SEPTEMBER 19. WHILE WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FORMAL
APPROVAL FROM THE OTHER GROUPS, WE EXPECT THIS SCENARIO
TO BE ENDORSED BY THEM AND TO BE FOLLOWED IN FRIDAY'S
PLENARY.
4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
- 1) CHAIRMAN ASKS CONSENSUS ON THE DOCUMENT OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
- 2) CHAIRMAN READS CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS TO BE
ANNEXED TO THE DOCUMENT.
- 3) DELEGATIONS MAKE FORMAL RESERVATIONS OR
INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENTS REGARDING THE DOCUMENT OR THE
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS (RULE 79 OF THE BLUE BOOK).
- 4) CHAIRMAN PROPOSES TO GO INTO OPEN MEETING
(RULE 80 OF THE BLUE BOOK).
- 5) STATEMENTS BY VARIOUS COUNTRIES OR IN THE NAME
OF GROUPS OF COUNTRIES.
- 6) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OR FOREIGN
MINISTER OF SWEDEN.
- 7) CHAIRMAN THANKS THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN.
- 8) CHAIRMAN STATES THAT:
"WE HAVE NOW DEALT WITH AGENDA ITEM 3 AND PROCEED TO
AGENDA ITEM 4:
"'ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONCLUDING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE
CONFERENCE.' DEALING WITH THIS ITEM IT IS MY
UNDERSTANDING THAT AT THE CLOSING OF THIS MEETING, THE
FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE WILL CONTINUE PENDING THE
CONSIDERATION BY THE VIENNA OR A FUTURE CSCE FOLLOW-UP
MEETING OF WAYS AND APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR THE
PARTICIPATING STATES TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS FOR
SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE
QUESTION OF SUPPLEMENTING THE MADRID MANDATE FOR THE
NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-
BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. IF THERE
ARE NO MORE SPEAKERS I INTEND TO CLOSE THE MEETING. THE
178TH PLENARY IS CLOSED."
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
399
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFYIRFT
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07453
SUBJECT: STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 6968, B) STOCKHOLM 7203,
- C) STOCKHO.M 7251
1. CDE XII - 075
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: PENDING CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON THE
FULL TEXT, REPRESENTATIVES OF NATO, THE WARSAW PACT AND
THE NNA TO THE CONTACT GROUP ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE
STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON A TEXT
WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED AT
WORKING GROUP AB THIS EVENING (SEPTEMBER 18). THE TEXT
(PROVIDED IN PARA 4 BELOW) CONTAINS THE OPENING AND
CLOSING SECTIONS OF THE DOCUMENT PLUS THE ALREADY
FINALIZED NON-USE OF FORCE REAFFIRMATION. AT PRESENT IT
CONTAINS ONLY THE TITLES FOR CSBM'S AS THESE SECTIONS
ARE STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION (NOTE: THERE IS NO AGREEMENT
AT THIS TIME ON A TITLE FOR THE SECTION DEALING WITH
ANNUAL FORECASTS AND CONTRAINING PROVISIONS). TEXTS FROM
AT LEAST SOME OTHER WORKING GROUPS, HOWEVER, ARE ALSO
LIKELY TO BE PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED THIS EVENING.
PARA 5 BELOW CONTAINS THE TEXT OF TWO CHAIRMAN'S
STATEMENTS ON UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
SCHEDULE FOR PROVISIONS LINKED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
IF AGREED, THESE STATEMENTS WOULD BE ANNEXED TO THE
STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. END SUMMARY.
4. THE FOLLOWING TEXT PROVIDES THE AGREED STRUCTURE OF
THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. WE ANTICIPATE IT WILL BE
PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED IN WORKING GROUP AB THIS
EVENING (SEPTEMBER 18):
BEGIN TEXT:
DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
- )N CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND
- DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE CONVENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
- THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
OF THE MADRID MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE
ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CYPRUS,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
GREECE, THE HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY,
LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MONACO, THE
NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SAN
MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND YUGOSLAVIA, MET IN
STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986 IN
25X1
400
SECRET
nna-Inecifiari in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001000800017
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING RELATING TO THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE SWEDISH PRIME
MINISTER, THE LATE 0.0F PALME, ON 17 JANUARY 1984.
OPENING STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND OTHER HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. THE PRIME
MINISTER OF SPAIN AS WELL AS MINISTERS AND SENIOR
OFFICIALS OF SEVERAL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES
ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE LATER.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
THE CONFERENCE ON 6 JULY 1984.
CONTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE BY THE FOLLOWING NON-
PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES: ALGERIA, EGYPT,
ISRAEL, LEBANON, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SYRIA, AND TUNISIA.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THAT THE AIM OF THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND
INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO
UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE
ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO
AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES
TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN GENERAL.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT THE SET OF
MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES WHICH ARE ADOPTED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT AND
WIICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, WILL BY THEIR SCOPE AND
NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE DECLARED THE
FOLLOWING:
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION
TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN
THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER
MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO
RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN
IN THE FINAL ACT.
401
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SPCRPT
- NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT
RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
THIS PRINCIPLE.
- THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS
SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
- THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE
FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE
THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.
- AS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT NO OCCUPATION OR
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL
BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
- THEY RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND
SECURITY. ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT THEY WILL
REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH
THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION ON
PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING
STATES, AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, IN
PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.
- THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY
STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF
ALLIANCE.
- THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION
OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS
RECALLED ABOVE, CONSTITUTES A VIO.ATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW.
- THEY STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE
FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT
TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE
OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE
MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY.
THEY RECALL THEIR DETERMINATION AND THE NECESSITY TO
REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL
FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY REAFFIRM
THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY
BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR FULL
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS WHICH WILL FURTHER
THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.
- THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE
402
25X1
SECRET
nar.iaccifipn in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001000800017
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE THEIR
DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE
IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL
SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
- ALL THESE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE
AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY
APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
- RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES
WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS
COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.
- THEY RECONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC
PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS
THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
- THEY REAFFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE
EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE
ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND
SECURITY, AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL
STATES, AS SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES
GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES.
- THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD
SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH
SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN THIS
CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP GOOD
NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE REGION,
WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE
PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES
GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, SO AS TO
PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE PREVAIL
IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE FINAL ACT.
- THEY EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE
MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM, INCLUDING
TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR
DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE
NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION,
FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF
TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN
PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED
FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO
PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES,
INCLUDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND
ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE
403
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE
DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.
- THEY WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS THAT STRICT
COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT
OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
CHARTER WILL PREVAIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING
MEASURES:
THEY STRESS THAT THESE CSBM'S ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE
DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR
MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EMPHASIZE THAT
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THESE OBJECTIVES.
REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT, THE
PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE BUILDING
CONFIDENCE, TO LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO
ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY ARE ALSO DETERMINED TO
ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
ANNUAL CALENDARS; CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS (OR MEASURES)
(NOTE: THIS TITLE HAS NOT BEEN AGREED PENDING FURTHER
NEGOTIATION IN THE A-3 WORKING GROUP.)
COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION
COMMUNICATION
THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE PO.ITICALLY
BINDING AND WILL COME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1987.
THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE
PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CSCE IN
VIENNA AND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS ALSO REQUESTED TO
TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
NONPARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.
THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE, WHICH WILL DISSEMINATE IT AND MAKE
IT KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.
AO
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES EXPRESS
THEIR PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF
SWEDEN FOR THE EXCELLENT ORGANIZATION OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE AND WARM HOSPITALIITY EXTENDED TO THE
DELEGATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENCE.
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986
404
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
END TEXT.
5. THE CONTACT GROUP HAS ALSO CONSIDERED TWO CHAIRMAN'S
STATEMENTS DEALING RESPECTIVELY WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SPECIFIC CSBM'S (E.G., ANNUAL CALENDARS) AND THE
QUESTION OF RAISING UNRESOLVED ISSUE AT POSSIBLE FUTURE
CDE MEETINGS (REF C), WHICH WOULD BE READ OUT AT THE
CLOSING PLENARY AND ANNEXED TO THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT.
THE TEXTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
1) (NOTE: THIS TEXT IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT
HAS BEEN ACCEPTED IN SUBSTANCE BY THE NATO CAUCUS.)
BEGIN TEXT:
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREED
DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED
IN THEM CONCERNING THE TIMEFRAMES OF CERTAIN ADVANCE
NOTIFICATIONS, AND EXPRESSING THEIR INTEREST IN AN EARLY
TRANSITION TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THIS DOCUMENT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES AGREE TO THE
FOLLOWING:
THE ANNUAL CALENDARS CONCERNING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY.
ACTIVITIES FORECAST FOR 1987 WILL BE EXCHANGED NOT LATER
THAN 15 DECEMBER 1986.
COMMUNICATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROVISIONS,
CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN
40,000 TROOPS PLANNED FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988 WILL BE
EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986.
PARTICIPATING STATES MAY UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING
MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1987 AS
LONG AS THESE ARE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR
EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986.
ACTIVITIES TO BEGIN DURING THE FIRST 42 DAYS AFTER
1 JANUARY 1987 WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE. HOWEVER, THE PARTICIPATING
STATES WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO APPLY TO THEM THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE.
END TEXT.
2) (NOTE: THIS TEXT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AD REF BY WEST,
EAST AND NNA.)
BEGIN TEXT:
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE CAN RAISE
ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AT ANY STAGE SUBSEQUENT TO THE
VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
405
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
SECRETSTOCKHOLM 07455
SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR FUTURE HANDLING OF CONVENTIONAL
ARMS CONTROL
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I'M AFRAID MY OWN VIEWS OF THE FUTURE HANDLING OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL DO NOT FIT IN ANY OF THE
INSTITUTIONAL PIGEON-HOLES.
- A. AS TO THE FORUM, I BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY WAY TO
GO IS THE TWO-CHAMBER CDE ROUTE. THE SEPARATE FORUM
HAS MANY FLAWS; ALTHOUGH I TOO SUFFER THE WEIGHT OF THE
CROSS OF LORRA INE YOU CAN'T DO THIS WITHOUT THE FRENCH.
WE CAN MANAGE ARMS REDUCTIONS EFFECTIVELY IN THE CDE
CONTEXT AS WE HAVE PROVEN WITH CSBMS.
- B. AS TO TIMING, I BELIEVE THE MANDATE OUGHT TO
BE NEGOTIATED BY THE POST-VIENNA CSCE REVCON. IN MY
VIEW WE HAVE MISREAD THE EUROPEANS' SENSE OF URGENCY
ABOUT CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. BOTH THE FRENCH
AND THE GERMANS HERE SAY THEY ARE AGAINST JUMPING RIGHT
INTO A CDE DISARMAMENT PHASE AND THEY CAN'T UNDERSTAND
WHY THE US IS IN A HURRY. TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A CDE II
MANDATE AT THE VIENNA REVCON MOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT
TO OBTAIN A BALANCE IN THE DISCUSSIONS AND WOULD BE
PREMATURE SINCE WE WILL NEED EXPERIENCE IN THE IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF CSBMS. I AM ALSO OPPOSED TO ANY EFFORT TO
NEGOTIATE A CDE II MANDATE IN MBFR; EVEN IF IT COULD
BE DONE, IT WOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NNA IN THE
CSCE CONTEXT.
- C. I THINK CDE I B OUGHT TO CONTINUE TO DO CSBMS.
SOVIET STONEWALLING ON INFORMATION IN STOCKHOLM BODES
ILL FOR ANY REDUCTION PROPOSALS, A POINT WHICH WE COULD
MAKE VERY EFFECTIVELY IN A RENEWED STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
I GUESS WE'LL HAVE LOTS OF VERIFICATION HOLES TO PLUG ALSO.
MEANWHILE WE COULD WORK ON THE ALLIED REDUCTION POSITION,
WHICH I IMAGINE COULD USE A COUPLE OF YEARS TO MATURE.
WE PROFITED GREATLY BY HAVING A FULL SET OF PROPOSALS
WHEN CDE BEGAN, WE COULD BENEFIT FROM THE SAME TACTIC
IN REDUCTIONS. THAT SAME TIME COULD BE USED TO PUSH
OUR ISSUES, PARTICULARLY VERIFICATION, IN MBFR.
- D. AS YOU KNOW, I AGREE WITH THE ACDA OPTION ON
MASSIVE US AND SOVIET BILATERAL FORCE CUTS AS A FIRST
STAGE MOVE. IT'S AN OFFER THEY CAN'T ACCEPT, SO WHY
NOT SEIZE THE HIGH GROUND BY MAKING IT?
3. I TRUST THESE VIEWS WILL MAKE ALL BUREAUCRATIC PARTI-
CIPANTS EQUALLY UNHAPPY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
406
25X1
SECRET
npriaccifiari in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07456
SUBJECT: FRENCH DIFFICULTIES WITH REFERENCES TO ALLIANCE
REF: GUNDERSEN-WEEKS TE.CON, 9/18/86
1. CDE XII - 076
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: USDEL CUE, WITH DEPARTMENT APPROVAL,
SUGGESTS THAT EMBASSY PARIS DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
DEMARCHE TO QUAI D'ORSAY AS EAR.! AS POSSIBLE, A.M.,
SEPTEMBER 19 (SEE PARA 6 FOR DEMARCHE). END SUMMARY.
4. PARIS IS AGAIN CREATING DIFFICULTIES FOR THE
ALLIANCE. THIS TIME IT IS ON THE QUESTION OF
DELEGATIONS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE 16 AT THE CLOSING
PLENARY AND EXPLICIT REFERENCES TO ALLIANCES IN THE
STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. REGARDING SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE
16, ALL NATO DELEGATIONS EXCEPT FRANCE FEEL STRONGLY
THAT AFTER OVER TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF NEGOTIATING
UNITY, E.G., INTRODUCING SC.1/AMPLIFIED, VARIOUS PLENARY
STATEMENTS, ETC., THE ALLIANCE MUST NOW MORE THAN EVER
SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS,
HOWEVER, FRENCH DELEGATION NOW SAYS IT CANNOT ALLOW A
STATEMENT TO BE MADE ON BEHALF OF THE 16 IN THE FINAL
PLENARY SESSION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY CAN GO ALONG
WITH A STATEMENT BY THE EC-12. THIS PROPOSAL, OF
COURSE, IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT WOULD BE
IRONIC, IF NOT DOWNRIGHT HARMFUL, IF THE ONLY STATEMENT
ON BEHALF OF THE WEST AT THE CLOSE OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE WOULD BE MADE BY A LIMITED POLITICAL GROUPING
(EC-12) AND NOT BY THE SECURITY ALLIANCE REPRESENTING
ALL 16 ALLIED STATES, ESPECIALLY AT A CONFERENCE DEALING
EXCLUSIVELY WITH SECURITY MATTERS. THIS POINT WAS
REGISTERED EMPHATICALLY TO THE FRENCH BY US AS WELL AS
BY OTHERS AT THE SEPTEMBER 18 P.M. CAUCUS. HOWEVER, ON
INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS, FRENCH DELEGATION STILL STICKS
BY ITS POSITION.
5. THE FRENCH ARE ALSO BLOCKING ALL REFERENCES TO ANY
ALLIANCE IN THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, E.G., IN THE
VERIFICATION SECTION, OUTLINING THE PROPOSITION THAT
ALLIANCE MEMBERS CANNOT USE UP THE INSPECTION QUOTA OF
ANOTHER ALLIANCE MEMBER. FRENCH DELEGATION CAN ACCEPT,
TOR EXAMPLE, REFERENCE TO STATES WHICH CONDUCT
"MULTINATIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES" TOGETHER. USDEL HAS
TRIED TO FIND SUCH FORMULATION WHICH ALL 16 CAN ACCEPT
BUT OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS, E.G., UK, BELGIUM, CANNOT GO
ALONG WITH THE ABOVE FORMULATIONS. THEREFORE, THE
CAUCUS IS DEADLOCKED ON THE ISSUE WITH ONLY THE FRENCH
OBJECTING TO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO "ALLIANCES." THE UK,
FRG, AND PERHAPS OTHERS, ARE PLANNING DEMARCHES IN PARIS
ON THE ISSUE.
6. SUGGESTED DEMARCHE: DEPARTMENT HAS APPROVED THE
FOLLOWING DEMARCHE, WHICH SHOULD BE MADE AS EARLY AS
POSSIBLE A.M. SEPTEMBER 19 IN PARIS.
407
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRE
-- THE 16 SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED HAVE ACTED TOGHER
IN STOCKHOLM FOR OVER TWO AND A HALF YEARS WITH
ADMIRABLE UNITY. FOR EXAMPLE, INTRODUCING SC.1 DURING
FIRST WEEK OF CONFERENCE.
-- WE MUST CONTINUE TO DO SO.
-- IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT THE 16 MAKE A
UNIFIED STATEMENT AT THE CLOSE OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE, PARTICULAR.! SINCE AT LEAST REPS OF THE
EC-12, EAST AND NNA, WILL MAKE STATEMENTS ON BEHALF OF
THEIR RESPECTIVE GROUPS.
-- WE CAN ACCEPT SUCH A STATEMENT BEING MADE ON BEHALF
OF THE CO-SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, FOR EXAMPLE.
-- REGARDING REFERENCES TO "ALLIANCES" IN THE STOCKHOLM
DOCUMENT, USDEL HAS TRIED TO FIND A FORMULATION WHICH
AVOIDS SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO "ALLIANCES" IN ORDER TO
ACCOMMODATE THE FRENCH POSITION. THIS HAS PROVEN TO BE
IMPOSSIBLE SINCE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE 16 COULD NOT GO
ALONG WITH THE VARIOUS FORMULATIONS PROPOSED. ONLY THE
FRENCH DELEGATION EXPLICITLY HAS SAID IT COULD NOT
ACCEPT EXPLICIT REFERENCES TO ALLIANCES.
-- HOWEVER, FRANCE HAS ALREADY ACCEPTED AN EXPLICIT
REFERENCE TO ALLIANCES IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION,
I.E., ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE.
-- SINCE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY ACKNOWLEDGED THE VALIDITY
OF REFERENCES TO ALLIANCES IN THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, WE
URGE PARIS TO GO ALONG WITH CONSENSUS LANGUAGE ON THE
SUBJECT EVEN IF IT ENTAILS SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO
ALLIANCES.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
408
25X1
SECRET
npriacsified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
SECRET STATE 295100
SUBJECT: CDE - URGENT DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH
REF: STOCKHOLM 7456
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOR PARIS: EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH FOREIGN
MINISTRY ON URGENT BASIS AT HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO
DELIVER POINTS IN PARAGRAPH FIVE. CDE IS SCHEDULED TO
CONCLUDE ON SEPTEMBER 19. THE TALKING POINTS IN THIS
MESSAGE SUPERSEDE THOSE IN REFTEL.
3. FOR LONDON AND BONN: EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED TO INFORM
HOST GOVERNMENTS OF OUR APPROACH TO THE GOF AND REQUEST
THEIR SUPPORT.
4. EUR DAS THOMAS MADE A DEMARCHE IN LATE AFTERNOON OF
SEPTEMBER 18 TO FRENCH DCM. THOMAS NOTED THAT THE FRENCH
POSITION WAS A BLOW NOT ONLY TO ALLIED UNITY AT STOCKHOLM,
BUT ALSO TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY
NEGOTIATIONS. THE NATO ROLE IN SECURITY DISCUSSIONS WAS A
SINE QUA NON FOR THE U.S' IN ADDITION TO PROMISING TO
REPORT THOMAS'S DEMARCHE, DCM COMMENTED THAT FRENCH REFUSAL
TO COUNTENANCE A CONCLUDING PLENARY STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF
NATO SHOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE; FRANCE HAD TRADITIONALLY
IN CSCE OPPOSED ANY ALLIANCE ROLE'
5. TALKING POINTS
-- THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE FRENCH
REFUSAL TO AGREE TO THE MENTION OF ALLIANCES IN THE DRAFT
CDE DOCUMENT AND THE FRENCH DECISION TO MOCK A FINAL
PLENARY STATEMENT BY ONE NATO MEMBER ON BEHALF OF THE
SIXTEEN.
- THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.1 AMPLIFIED HAVE WORKED
TOGETHER AT THE CDE FOR OVER TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS ON
ISSUES FUNDAMENTALLY RELATED TO THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY OF
THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE' IN LIGHT OF THE CREATIVE ROLE
PLAYED BY NATO THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE, IT WOULD BE
INCONGRUOUS FOR THE STOCKHOLM MEETING TO CLOSE WITHOUT A
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE GROUP THE FACT THAT
STATEMENTS WILL BE MADE ON BEHALF OF OTHER GROUPS, SUCH AS
EC-12, THE EAST, AND THE NNA, WILL ONLY MAKE NATO'S
EXCLUSION MORE DAMAGING TO OUR COMMON LONG-TERM SECURITY
INTERESTS AND TO FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR NEGOTIATING
INCREASED SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES THROUGHOUT
EUROPE.
-- A STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF NATO WOULD NOT BE A BREAK WITH
CDE PRACTICE. ON JUNE 30, FOR EXAMPLE, CANADIAN AMBASSADOR
DELWORTH SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED WHEN HE ADVANCED MODIFICATIONS TO OUR
PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS.
-- IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT THE 16 MAKE A UNIFIED
STATEMENT AT THE CLOSE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. WE CAN
ACCEPT SUCH A STATEMENT BEING MADE ON BEHALF OF THE
CO-SPONSORS OF SC' 1/AMPLIFIED, FOR EXAMPLE.
-- WE ARE ALSO DISTURBED AT THE POSITION THE GOVERNMENT OF
409
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Crrin'T
FRANCE HAS TAKEN ON THE MENTION OF ALLIANCES IN THE
STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT'S SECTION ON QUOTAS FOR INSPECTIONS.
-- WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO FIND A FORMULATION THAT MEETS
EVERYONE'S NEEDS, BUT OTHER ALLIES CANNOT ACCEPT THE
ALTERNATIVES SUGGESTED. SINCE THE SECTION ON NON-USE OF
FORCE CONTAINS A CLAUSE MENTIONING "RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE,"
THERE IS NO REASON OF PRECEDENCE TO AVOID USE OF THE WORD
"ALLIANCES" IN THE VERIFICATION SECTION OF THE DOCUMENT.
-- WE URGE FRANCE TO JOIN THE CONSENSUS ON THIS POINT OF
LANGUAGE. SHULTZ
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
410
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07472
SUBJECT: CDE: FORMULA ON CHOICE OF AIRCRAFT
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WASHINGTON AGENCIES SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WE ARE
TRYING TO GET THE FOLLOWING FORMULA APPROVED IN ORDER
TO KEEP THE POSSIBILITY OF NNA AIRCRAFT OPEN FOR THE
FUTURE:
- AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION WILL BE CHOSEN BY MUTUAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INSPECTING AND INSPECTED STATE
FROM AMONG AIRCRAFT OF THE INSPECTING STATE, THE
INSPECTED STATE OR A THIRD CSCE PARTICIPATING STATE.
3.. SOVIETS ARE CONSIDERING THIS FORMULA AND MAY WELL
ACCEPT IT. NATO CAUCUS HAS APPROVED IT. IT CONFLICTS
WITH SWISS INSTRUCTIONS, BUT DAS THOMAS/BRUNNER TELCON
OF LAST NIGHT MAY HAVE RESOLVED THIS PROBLEM.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
411
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07481
SUBJECT: STOPPING THE CLOCK
REF: STOCKHOLM 7545
1. CDE XII - OTT
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. IT NOW APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL NOT
RPT NOT BE ABLE TO RESOLVE ALL SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES
BEFORE COB TODAY, SEPTEMBER 19 -- THE FORMAL CLOSING
DATE OF THE CONFERENCE. OLD CSCE HANDS WILL REMEMBER
THAT STOPPING THE CLOCK DOES NOT REQUIRE A POSITIVE ACT
SUCH AS A CONSENSUS CONFERENCE DECISION; WE WOULD NOT
WANT TO JOIN A CONSENSUS TO EXTEND BECAUSE IT COULD SET
UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENTS. IN FACT, THE CONFERENCE CAN
ONLY BE ADJOURNED BY CONSENSUS -- AND THIS IS CLEARLY
LACKING. IT IS OUR VIEW, AND THE CONSIDERED OPINION OF
NATO CAUCUS' PROCEDURAL EXPERTS, THAT THE FINAL PLENARY
WILL MERELY CONTINUE, INTERRUPTED BY EXTENDED
NEGOTIATING BREAKS, UNTIL THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO
ADJOURN, I.E., WHEN THE FULL TEXT IS COMPLETED,
TRANSLATED INTO ALL SIX CSCE WORKING LANGUAGES AND
ADOPTED BY THE PLENARY. WE DOUBT THIS WILL BE BEFORE
SUNDAY.
4. THEREFORE, WE FORESEE THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO FOR
TODAY (SEPTEMBER 19):
1030 - PLENARY CONVENES (WITH PORTUGUESE CHAIRMAN);
SINCE FULL TEXT OF DOCUMENT NOT COMPLETED THE MEETING
WILL BE SUSPENDED SHORTLY THEREAFTER.
1700 - AB WORKING GROUPS TO REGISTER PROVISIONALLY
COMPLETED TEXTS, IF ANY ARE READY.
2200 - PLENARY RESUMED.
- EITHER: IF CONSENSUS HAS BEEN REACHED BUT A
DOCUMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE IN FINAL FORM FOR ADOPTION,
I.E., IN ALL SIX OFFICIAL LANGUAGES, PLENARY ONCE AGAIN
SUSPENDED UNTIL TRANSLATIONS COMPLETED.
- OR: IF CONSENSUS NOT REACHED AND IT IS CLEAR THAT
DOCUMENT WILL NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE 12:00 MIDNIGHT,
SEPTEMBER 19, CHAIR ASKS CONFERENCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TO ADJUST THE CLOCK TO GIVE CONFERENCE NECESSARY TIME TO
COMPLETE THE DOCUMENT. (MOST LIKELY SCENARIO.)
5. UPON RESUMING THE MEETING WHEN FINAL DOCUMENT IS
AVAILABLE (SEE REFTEL FOR FULL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS):
^ STOCKW.M DOCUMENT ADOPTED IN ALL SIX OFFICIAL
LANGUAGES.
-- INTERPRETIVE STATEMENTS.
- PLENARY OPEN TO MEDIA.
-- PRIME MINISTER OF SWEDEN ADDRESSES PLENARY.
-- PLENARY CLOSED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
412
SECRET
npriaccifian in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07518
SUBJECT: CDE FACT SHEET
1. CDE XII - -78
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT
3. FOLLOWING IS A FACT SHEET ON THE STOCKHOLM
DOCUMENT WHICH CDE ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 19, 1986. IT IS
MEANT FOR GENERAL BACKGROUND AND NOT AS A
COMPREHENSIVE DESCRIPTION OF ALL DETAILS OF THE
DOCUMENT. (NOTE: ACTUALLY, ADOPTION WAS SEPTEMBER
22, BUT "CLOCK-STOPPING" TECHNICALITIES KEPT THE
FORMAL DATE SEPTEMBER 19.)
CDE FACT SHEET
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
(CDE) COMPLETED ITS WORK SEPTEMBER 19, 1986, BY
ADOPTING A SET OF FIVE MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE
THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. THE
MEASURES MEET THE POUR BASIC CRITERIA LAID DOWN BY
THE MANDATE FOR THE CONFERENCE: THEY APPLY TO THE
WHOLE OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, AND
THEY ARE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, POLITICALLY BUILDING
AND VERIFIABLE. THE MEASURES GO INTO EFFECT ON
JANUARY 1, 1987.
THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT:
ANNUAL CALENDAR:
. -- A REQUIREMENT TO EXCHANGE, ON NOVEMBER 15 OF
EACH YEAR, A LIST OF ALL SIGNIFICANT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED OUT DURING THE COMING YEAR;
CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS
. -- ACTIVITIES INVOLVING 75,000 TROOPS OR MORE
MUST BE ANNOUNCED TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE; IF THEY ARE
NOT, THEY CANNOT BE HELD;
. ACTIVITIES INVOLVING 40,000 TROOPS OR MORE
SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE BUT MUST BE
ANNOUNCED ONE YEAR IN ADVANCE; IF THEY ARE NOT
ANNOUNCED ONE YEAR IN ADVANCE, THEY CANNOT BE HELD.
NOTIFICATION:
. -- A REQUIREMENT TO ANNOUNCE 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE
ALL SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, GIVING DETAILED
INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR SCOPE, PURPOSE AND LOCATION
AND ABOUT THE FORCES INVOLVED IN THEM.
IN THE CDE CONTEXT A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITY
IS ONE WHICH INVOLVED 13,000 TROOPS OR 300 TANKS
ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISION OR AT LEAST TWO REGIMENT
OR BRIGADES. A DIVISION, WHICH IS MADE UP OF
REGIMENTS OR BRIGADES, IS THE BASIC COMBAT UNIT OF
EUROPEAN ARMIES.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS ARE MADE FOR AMPHIBIOUS AND
AIRBORNE OPERATION, TRANSFERS AND CONCENTRATIONS OF
FORCES AND ALERT ACTIVITIES.
OBSERVATION:
413
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFITF'T
. -- A REQUIREMENT TO INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO ATTEND THOSE
ACTIVITIES WHICH INVOLVE 17,000 TROOPS AND WHICH
OTHERWISE MEET THE CRITERIA FOR NOTIFICATION;
. -- THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY
TO WATCH THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY, MEET
WITH COMMANDERS, AND OTHERWISE GAIN A SENSE OF THE
NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY.
VERIFICATION: INSPECTION:
. -- THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT PROVIDES FOR GROUND AND
AERIAL INSPECTION TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH
COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN CDE;
. IF ANY STATE BELIEVES THAT A MILITARY ACTIVITY
GOING ON IN ANOTHER STATE FAILS TO MEET THE
OBLIGATIONS OF THE CDE OBLIGATIONS, THE DOUBTING
STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO ENTER THE TERRITORY OF THE
OTHER STATE AND DETERMINE FOR ITSELF THE FACTS OF THE
CASE;
. NO STATE NEEDS TO ALLOW MORE THAN 3
INSPECTIONS OF ITS TERRITORY IN A YEAR; NO STATE
NEEDS TO ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION FROM ANY
OTHER SINGLE STATE; MEMBERS OF ALLIANCES ARE NOT TO
CARRY OUT INSPECTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF STATES
BELONGING TO THE SAME ALLIANCE;
. -- THE INSPECTION MEASURE CONTAINS SPECIFIC AND
CONCRETEPROVISIONS TO ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTORS CAN
CARRY OUT THE INSPECTION EFFECTIVELY.
OTHER ELEMENTS:
IN ADDITION TO THE CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH MAKE UP THE
OPERATIONAL PART OF THE CDE REGIME, THE STOCKHOLM
DOCUMENT CONTAINS STATEMENTS REAFFIRMING THE
PRINCIPLE IN THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT THAT STATES WILL NOT USE OR THREATEN TO USE FORCE
AGAINST OTHER STATES. THIS PRINCIPLE IS EXPLICITLY
RELATED IN THE DOCUMENT TO COMMITMENTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, TO THE COMMITMENTS TO FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
AND TO OTHER RELATED ISSUES.
THE CDE INVOLVED THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES:
ALL THE EUROPEAN STATES, EXCEPT ALBANIA, PLUS THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA.
THE CDE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE HELSINKI CSCE
PROCESS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION WHICH
DEALS WITH SECURITY IN ITS BROADEST SENSE,
ENCOMPASSING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND
HUMANITARIAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS MILITARY -- SECURITY
AFFAIRS.
THE RESULTS OF CDE WILL BE EVALUATED AT THE VIENNA
CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHICH BEGINS NOVEMBER 4, 1986,
AND WILL REVIEW PROGRESS IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE CSCE
PROCESS.
25X1
414
SECRET
npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
415
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07506
SUBJECT: PROVISIONALLY NOTED CDE TEXT
1. CDE XII - 081.
2. FOLLOWING IS THE COMPLETE TEXT PROVISIONALLY NOTED
IN WORKING GROUP AB IN CDE TODAY, 19 SEPT.
BEGIN TEXT:
DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE CONVENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
OF THE MADRID MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE
ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE
(1) THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
EUROPE (CSCE), AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA,
CYPRUS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, GREECE, THE HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND,
IRELAND, ITALY, LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA,
MONACO, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL,
ROMANIA, SAN MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND,
TURKEY, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE
UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
YUGOSLAVIA, MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO
19 SEPTEMBER 1986 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
CONTAINED IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID
FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CSCE.
(2) THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE PRIME
MINISTER OF SWEDEN, THE LATE OLOF PALME, ON 17 JANUARY
1984.
(3) OPENING STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY THE MINISTERS OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OTHER HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. THE
PRIME MINISTER OF SPAIN AS WELL AS MINISTERS AND
SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SEVERAL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES
ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE LATER. THE MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SWEDEN ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE ON
19 SEPTEMBER 1986.
(4) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE ON 6 JULY 1984.
(5) CONTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE BY THE FOLLOWING NON-
PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES: ALGERIA, EGYPT,
ISRAEL, LEBANON, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SYRIA, AND TUNISIA.
(6) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THAT THE AIM OF
THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS, AS A
SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL
PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW,
EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE
25X1
416
SECRET
flarlaccifiPri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND
IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS
WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.
(7) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT THE SET
OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE ADOPTED IN THE
PRESENT DOCUMENT AND WHICH ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
MADRID MANDATE SERVE BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
(8) CONSEQUENTLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE
DECLARED THE FOLLOWING:
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
(9) THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR
OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS
WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL,
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY
STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM
THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE
PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF
FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT.
(10) NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO
WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
(11) THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS
SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
(12) THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF
FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY OTHER STATE TO
RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.
(13) AS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT, NO OCCUPATION OR
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
(14) THEY RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND
SECURITY. ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT THEY WILL
REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH
THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION
ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING
STATES, AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, IN
PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.
(15) THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS
WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL,
417
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SErlIFT
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE
OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE
RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE.
(16) THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
OBLIGATION OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF
FORCE, AS RECALLED ABOVE, CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
(17) THEY STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE
FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL
COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL FACTORS
FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND
SECURITY. THEY RECALL THEIR DETERMINATION AND THE
NECESSITY TO REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT
THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY
EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY
DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM.
(18) THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT
TO THE FINAL ACT AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION
OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS, WHICH WILL FURTHER THE PROCESS
OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING CO-OPERATION IN
EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.
(19) THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE
THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO
PRACTICE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR
SOCIAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL
LOCATION OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
(20) ALL THESE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY
SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY
AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING
INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
(21) RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE
PRINCIPLES WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING
STATES IN ALL FIELDS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE
FINAL ACT.
(22) THEY RECONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC
PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND
STRESS THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
(23) THEY REAFFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR
AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY, AS WELL AS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION
25X1
418
SECRET
npdassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES, AS SET FORTH IN
THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS
BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES.
(24) THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF
WORLD SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED
WITH SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN
THIS CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP
GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE
REGION, WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, AND IN THE
SPIRIT OF THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION
ON PRINCIPLES
GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, SO AS
TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE
PREVAIL IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE FINAL ACT.
(25) THEY EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE
MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM, INCLUDING
TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS
THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH
AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF
ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE
MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES
FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR
COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO
INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES
ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES,
OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE,
ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF
TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER
STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.
(26) THEY WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR
OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS
THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.
(27) THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT IN THE
EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY
OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
(28) THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE ADOPTED THE
FOLLOWING MEASURES:
PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(29) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION
IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED
FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES 42
DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE
419
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFrPFT
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.
(30) NOTIFICATION WILL GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING
STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS
PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE
ARE NOT ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS
BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE
NOTIFICATION, IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED
MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
IN THIS DOCUMENT, THE TERM NOTIFIABLE MEANS SUBJECT
TO NOTIFICATION.
SEE ANNEX I.
(31) EACH OF THE FOLLOWING MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE
FIELD CONDUCTED AS A SINGLE ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED
BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED:
(31.1) THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES
OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE SAME EXERCISE
ACTIVITY CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND
INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR
OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
(31.1.1) THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT ANY TIME DURING
THE ACTIVITY:
- AT LEAST 13,000 TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS,
OR
- AT LEAST 300 BATTLE TANKS
IF ORGANISED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR AT LEAST
TWO BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY SUBORDINATE TO
THE SAME DIVISION.
(31.1.2) THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE
NOTIFICATION IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF
THE ACTIVITY 200 OR MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT,
EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.
(31.2) THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN AN
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY
AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
(31.2.1) THESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WHENEVER THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING INVOLVES
AT LEAST 3000 TROOPS OR WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP
INVOLVES AT LEAST 3000 TROOPS.
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.
(31.3) THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF
THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE
THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN
THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
25X1
420
SECRET
Darf - Raniti7ed CODV Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO
PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE
CONCENTRATED.
(31.3.1) THE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES
WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES,
AT ANY TIME DURING THE ACTIVITY:
- AT LEAST 13,000 TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS,
OR
- AT LEAST 300 BATTLE TANKS
IF ORGANISED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR AT LEAST
TWO BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY SUBORDINATE TO
THE SAME DIVISION.
(31.3.2) FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE
ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS
WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE
IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE
CONCENTRATED WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
(32) NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT
WITHOUT ADVANCE NOTICE TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED, ARE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION
TO BE MADE 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE.
(32.1) NOTIFICATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES, ABOVE THE
AGREED THRESHOLDS, WILL BE GIVEN AT THE TIME THE
TROOPS INVOLVED COMMENCE SUCH ACTIVITIES.
(33) NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING OF EACH
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED
FORM:
(34) A - GENERAL INFORMATION
(34.1) THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
(34.2) THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
(34.3) THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY;
(34.4) THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANISING AND
COMMANDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
(34.5) THE START AND END DATES OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY.
(35) B - INFORMATION ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(35.1) THE ENGAGEMENT OF LAND FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE SAME EXERCISE ACTIVITY
CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND
INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR
OR NAVAL COMPONENTS:
(35.1.1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TAKING PART IN
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY (I.E., GROUND TROOPS, AMPHIBIOUS
TROOPS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE TROOPS) AND THE NUMBER
OF TROOPS PARTICIPATING FOR EACH STATE INVOLVED, IF
APPLICABLE;
(35.1.2) NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING
FOR EACH STATE;
UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 16 STOCKHOLM 07506
421
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
USUN FOR ASST SEC RIDGWAY
(35.1.3) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS FOR EACH
STATE AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILE
LAUNCHERS MOUNTED ON ARMOURED VEHICLES;
(35.1.4) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES AND
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (100 MM CALIBRE OR ABOVE);
(35.1.5) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS, BY CATEGORY;
(35.1.6) ENVISAGED NUMBER OF SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT,
EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS;
(35.1.7) PURPOSE OF AIR MISSIONS;
(35.1.8) CATEGORIES OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED;
(35.1.9) THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANISING AND
COMMANDING THE AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION;
(35.1.10) NAVAL SHIP-TO-SHORE GUNFIRE;
(35.1.11) INDICATION OF OTHER NAVAL SHIP-TO-SHORE
SUPPORT;
(35.1.12) THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANISING AND
COMMANDING THE NAVAL FORCE PARTICIPATION.
(35.2) THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN AN
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY
AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS:
(35.2.1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS
INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, AND/OR THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRBORNE TROOPS INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE
PARACHUTE ASSULTS;
(35.2.2) IN THE CASE OF A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING, THE POINT OR POINTS OF EMBARKATION, IF IN THE
ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
(35.3) THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF
THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE
THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN
THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO
PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE
CONCENTRATED:
(35.3.1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TRANSFERRED;
(35.3.2) NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING
IN THE TRANSFER;
(35.3.3) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS
PARTICIPATING IN A NOTIFIABLE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION;
(35.3.4) GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES FOR THE POINTS OF
ARRIVAL AND FOR THE POINTS OF CONCENTRATION.
(36) C - THE ENVISAGED AREA AND TIMEFRAME OF THE
ACTIVITY
(36.1) THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY DELIMITED BY
GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES TOGETHER WITH GEOGRAPHIC
COORDINATES, AS APPROPRIATE;
(36.2) THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE
(TRANSFERS, DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES,
ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE, RECOVERY PHASE) OF ACTIVITIES
IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS OF PARTICIPATING
422
25X1
SECRET
npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
FORMATIONS, THE TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS (DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHICAL
COORDINATES) FOR EACH PHASE;
(36.3) BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH PHASE.
(37) D - OTHER INFORMATION
(37.1) CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION
PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY;
(37.2) RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.
OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(38) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS
FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO THE FOLLOWING
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
(38.1) - THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND
FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE SAME
EXERCISE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL
COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY
POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
(38.2) - THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN
AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY
AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
(38.3) - IN THE CASE OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS
OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A
TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE
THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO POINTS OF
CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A
NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED,
THE CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES. FORCES WHICH HAVE
BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL
PROVISIONS OF AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO
PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE
CONCENTRATED WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
(38.4) THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT
TO OBSERVATION WHENEVER THE NUMBER OF TROOPS ENGAGED
MEETS OR EXCEEDS 17,000 TROOPS, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF
EITHER AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY
AIRBORNE FORCES, WHICH WILL BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION
WHENEVER THE NUMBER OF TROOPS ENGAGED MEETS OR EXCEEDS
5,000 TROOPS.
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.
(39) THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN
WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION. THE
HOST STATE WILL BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE
TERRITORY THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE.
(40) THE HOST STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS
RESPONSIBILITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING
423
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
:
STATE ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE
TERRITORY OF THE HOST STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE HOST
STATE WILL SPECIFY THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
IN ITS INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY.
(41) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO
OBSERVERS TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.
(42) THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND
MILITARY AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS
OF ITS PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE.
MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL, NORMALLY, WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS
AND INSIGNIA WHILE PERFORMING THEIR TASKS.
UNCLAS SECTION 08 OF 16 STOCKHOLM 07506
USUN FOR ASST SEC RIDGWAY
(43) REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN
WRITING NOT LATER THAN 21 DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE
INVITATION.
(44) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION
WILL PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN
THEIR REPLY TO THE INVITATION. IF THE INVITATION IS
NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO
OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT.
(45) TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL
PROVIDE A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
(45.1) - THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF
OBSERVERS;
(45.2) - PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION
PROGRAMME;
(45.3) - LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION
AND/OR TRANSLATION;
(45.4) - ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND
TRANSPORTATION OF THE OBSERVERS;
(45.5) - ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT
WHICH WILL BE ISSUED TO THE OBSERVERS BY THE HOST
STATE;
(45.6) - POSSIBLE AUTHORIZATION BY THE HOST STATE OF
THE USE OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT THAT THE OBSERVERS MAY
BRING WITH THEM;
(45.7) - ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIAL CLOTHING TO BE
ISSUED TO THE OBSERVERS BECAUSE OF WEATHER OR
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.
(46) THE OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS WITH REGARD TO
THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. THE HOST STATE WILL, IF
POSSIBLE, ACCEDE TO THEM.
(47) THE HOST STATE WILL DETERMINE A DURATION OF
OBSERVATION WHICH PERMITS THE OBSERVERS TO OBSERVE A
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM THE TIME THAT AGREED
THRESHOLDS FOR OBSERVATION ARE MET OR EXCEEDED UNTIL,
POR THE LAST TIME DURING THE ACTIVITY, THE THRESHOLDS
FOR OBSERVATION ARE NO LONGER MET.
(48) THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH
424
25X1
SECRET
npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY
AND BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM
EITHER THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE
ANNOUNCED IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT THE OBSERVERS ARE
IN POSITION BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION
PROGRAMME.
(49) THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES
FOR ITS OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE
LOCATION SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST
STATE, AND BACK.
(50) THE OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT
AND OFFERED EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR
FUNCTIONS.
(51) THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR
MISSION, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO
DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
(52) THE HOST STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT
UNCLAS SECTION 09 OF 16 STOCKHOLM 07506
USUN FOR ASST SEC RIDGWAY
OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED LOCATIONS, INSTALLATIONS OR
DEFENCE SITES.
(53) IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE OBSERVERS TO CONFIRM THAT
THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY IS NON-THREATENING IN CHARACTER
AND THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS OF THE NOTIFICATION, THE HOST
STATE WILL:
(53.1) - AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION
PROGRAMME GIVE A BRIEFING ON THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC
SITUATION, THE PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE
CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE
THE OBSERVERS WITH A MAP OF THE AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY WITH A SCALE OF 1 TO NOT MORE THAN 500,000
AND AN OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH A DAILY SCHEDULE AS
WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE BASIC SITUATION;
(53.2) - PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT; HOWEVER, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE
ALLOWED TO USE THEIR PERSONAL BINOCULARS, WHICH WILL
BE SUBJECT TO EXAMINATION AND APPROVAL BY THE HOST
STATE;
(53.3) - IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME
GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF
MAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT
THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY; IN THE CASE OF A LAND
FORCE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH AIR OR
NAVAL COMPONENTS, BRIEFINGS WILL BE GIVEN BY
REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE FORCES;
(53.4) - PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO OBSERVE DIRECTLY
FORCES OF THE STATE/STATES ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY SO THAT THE OBSERVERS GET AN IMPRESSION OF
425
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
THE FLOW OF THE ACTIVITY; TO THIS END, THE OBSERVERS
WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE MAJOR COMBAT
UNITS OF THE PARTICIPATING FORMATIONS OF A DIVISIONAL
OR EQUIVALENT LEVEL AND, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, TO VISIT
SOME UNITS AND COMMUNICATE WITH COMMANDERS AND TROOPS;
COMMANDERS OR OTHER SENIOR PERSONNEL OF PARTICIPATING
FORMATIONS AS WELL AS OF THE VISITED UNITS WILL INFORM
THE OBSERVERS OF THE MISSION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS;
(53.5) - GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY; THE OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT;
(53.6) - PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY.
(53.7) - PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH OPPORTUNITIES
FOR TIMELY COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR EMBASSIES OR OTHER
OFFICIAL MISSIONS AND CONSULAR POSTS; THE HOST STATE
IS NOT OBLIGATED TO COVER THE COMMUNICATION EXPENSES
OF THE OBSERVERS;
(53.8) - PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING
OUT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY,
MEDICAL CARE.
(54) THE PARTICIPATING STATES NEED NOT INVITE
OBSERVERS TO NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE
CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO THE TROOPS
INVOLVED UNLESS THESE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES HAVE A
DURATION OF MORE THAN 72 HOURS. THE CONTINUATION OF
THESE ACTIVITIES BEYOND THIS TIME WILL BE SUBJECT TO
OBSERVATION WHILE THE AGREED THRESHOLDS ARE NET OR
EXCEEDED. THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WILL FOLLOW AS
CLOSELY AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE ALL THE PROVISIONS FOR
OBSERVATION SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.
ANNUAL CALENDARS
(55) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS
MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION,
WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECAST FOR
THE SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED
EVERY YEAR, IN WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS,
NOT LATER THAN 15 NOVEMBER FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR.
(56) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE
ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL
PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE FOLLOWING MODEL:
(56.1) - TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS
DESIGNATION;
(56.2) - GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY;
(56.3) - STATES INVOLVED
IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
25X1
426
SECRET
IThm.nlaccifiarl in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R0001000800017
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
(56.4) - AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, INDICATED BY
APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND/OR DEFINED BY
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES;
(56.5) - PLANNED DURATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
AND THE 14-DAY PERIOD, INDICATED BY DATES, WITHIN
WHICH IT IS ENVISAGED TO START;
(56.6) - THE ENVISAGED TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS
ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
(56.7) - THE TYPES OF ARMED FORCES INVOLVED IN THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY;
(56.8) - THE ENVISAGED LEVEL OF COMMAND, UNDER WHICH
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE;
AS DEFINED IN THE PROVISION ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION
OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(56.9) - THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS WHOSE
PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IS ENVISAGED;
(56.10) - ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING,
INTER AL IA, COMPONENTS OF ARMED FORCES, WHICH THE
PARTICIPATING STATE PLANNING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
CONSIDERS RELEVANT.
(57) SHOULD CHANGES REGARDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES
IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR PROVE NECESSARY, THEY WILL BE
COMMUNICATED TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE.INO
LATER THAN IN THE APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATION.
(58) INFORMATION ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO
PRIOR NOTIFICATION NOT INCLUDED IN AN ANNUAL CALENDAR
WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MODEL
PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS
(59) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL COMMUNICATE, IN
WRITING TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, BY 15
NOVEMBER EACH YEAR, INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING
MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS, WHICH IT PLANS TO CARRY OUT
IN THE SECOND SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH
COMMUNICATION WILL INCLUDE PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON
EACH ACTIVITY, AS TO ITS GENERAL PURPOSE, TIMEFRAME
AND DURATION, AREA, SIZE AND STATES INVOLVED.
(60) PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING
MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS, UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN THE
OBJECT OF COMMUNICATION AS DEFINED ABOVE.
AS DEFINED IN THE PROVISIONS ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION
OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(61) PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING
MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN INCLUDED
IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, NOT LATER THAN 15 NOVEMBER
427
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
CCI41,0419
EACH YEAR.
(62) IF MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR
NOTIFICATION ARE CARRIED OUT IN ADDITION TO THOSE
CONTAINED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, THEY SHOULD BE AS
FEW AS POSSIBLE.
COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION
(63) ACCORDING TO THE MADRID MANDATE, THE CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON "WILL
BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH
CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT."
(64) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS CAN PLAY A ROLE IN MONITORING
COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.
(65) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN
THIS DOCUMENT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE HAS THE RIGHT
TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF ANY OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS.
(66) ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE ALLOWED TO
ADDRESS A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION TO ANOTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY, WITHIN THE
ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, COMPLIANCE WITH THE
AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IS
IN DOUBT.
(67) NO PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT
ON ITS TERRITORY WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS, MORE THAN THREE INSPECTIONS PER CALENDAR YEAR.
(68) NO PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT
MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION PER CALENDAR YEAR FROM THE
SAME PARTICIPATING STATE.
(69) AN INSPECTION WILL NOT BE COUNTED IF, DUE TO
FORCE MAJEURE, IT CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT.
(70) THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN
INSPECTION WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST.
(71) THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH
A REQUEST WILL REPLY IN THE AFFIRMATIVE TO THE REQUEST
WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME, SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS (67) AND (68).
(72) ANY POSSIBLE DISPUTE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE
REASONS FOR A REQUEST WILL NOT PREVENT OR DELAY THE
CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION.
(73) THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN
INSPECTION WILL BE PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE FOR
INSPECTION ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WITHIN
THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, A SPECIFIC AREA.
SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS THE "SPECIFIED
AREA". THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL COMPRISE TERRAIN WHERE
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED OR WHERE
ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE BELIEVES A NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITY IS TAKING PLACE. THE SPECIFIED AREA
25X1
428
SECRET
nprdaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
WILL BE DEFINED AND LIMITED BY THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES BUT WILL NOT EXCEED
THAT REQUIRED FOR AN ARMY LEVEL MILITARY ACTIVITY.
(74) IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
INSPECTING STATE ACCOMPANIED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE RECEIVING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY
AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY, EXCEPT FOR AREAS OR SENSITIVE
POINTS TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY DENIED OR
RESTRICTED, MILITARY AND OTHER DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS,
AS WELL AS NAVAL VESSELS, MILITARY VEHICLES AND
AIRCRAFT. THE NUMBER AND EXTENT OF THE RESTRICTED
AREAS SHOULD BE AS LIMITED AS POSSIBLE. AREAS WHERE
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN TAKE PLACE WILL NOT
BE DECLARED RESTRICTED AREAS, EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN
PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WHICH,
IN TERRITORIAL TERMS, SHOULD BE AS SMALL AS POSSIBLE,
AND CONSEQUENTLY THOSE AREAS WILL NOT BE USED TO
PREVENT INSPECTION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
RESTRICTED AREAS WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED IN A WAY
INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS ON INSPECTION.
(75) WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE FORCES OF
PARTICIPATING STATES OTHER THAN THE RECEIVING STATE
WILL ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THE INSPECTION CONDUCTED BY
THE INSPECTING STATE.
(76) INSPECTION WILL BE PERMITTED ON THE GROUND, FROM
THE AIR, OR BOTH.
(77) THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RECEIVING STATE WILL
ACCOMPANY THE INSPECTION TEAM, INCLUDING WHEN IT IS IN
LAND VEHICLES AND AN AIRCRAFT FROM THE TIME OF THEIR
FIRST EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ARE NO LONGER IN
USE FOR THE PURPOSES OF INSPECTION.
(78) IN ITS REQUEST, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL NOTIFY
THE RECEIVING STATE OF:
(78.1) (A) THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST;
(78.2) (B) THE LOCATION OF THE SPECIFIED AREA DEFINED
BY GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES;
(78.3) (C) THE PREFERRED POINT(S) OF ENTRY FOR THE
INSPECTION TEAM;
(78.4) (D) MODE OF TRANSPORT TO AND FROM THE POINT(S)
OF ENTRY AND, IF APPLICABLE, TO AND FROM THE SPECIFIED
AREA;
(78.5) (E) WHERE IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE INSPECTION
WILL BEGIN;
(78.6) (F) WHETHER THE INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED
FROM THE GROUND, FROM THE AIR, OR BOTH SIMULTANEOUSLY;
(78.7) (G) WHETHER AERIAL INSPECTION WILL BE
CONDUCTED USING AN AIRPLANE, A HELICOPTER, OR BOTH;
(78.8) (H) WHETHER THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL USE LAND
VEHICLES PROVIDED BY THE RECEIVING STATE OR, IF
MUTUALLY AGREED, ITS OWN VEHICLES;
(78.9) (I) INFORMATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF DIPLOMATIC
429
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
cprurm
VISAS TO INSPECTORS ENTERING THE RECEIVING STATE.
(79) THE REPLY TO THE REQUEST WILL BE GIVEN IN THE
SHORTEST POSSIBLE PERIOD OF TIME, BUT WITHIN NOT MORE
THAN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. WITHIN THIRTY-SIX HOURS AFTER
THE ISSUANCE OF THE REQUEST, THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL
BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING
STATE.
(80) ANY REQUEST FOR INSPECTION AS WELL AS THE REPLY
THERETO WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO ALL PARTICIPATING
STATES WITHOUT DELAY.
(81) THE RECEIVING STATE SHOULD DESIGNATE THE POINTS
OF ENTRY AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE SPECIFIED AREA.
THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTION
TEAM WILL BE ABLE TO REACH THE SPECIFIED AREA WITHOUT
DELAY FROM THE POINT(S) OF ENTRY.
(82) ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FACILITATE THE
PASSAGE OF THE INSPECTION TEAMS THROUGH THEIR
TERRITORY.
(83) WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF
THE INSPECTION TEAM AT THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE
INSPECTION WILL BE TERMINATED.
(84) THERE WILL BE NO MORE THAN FOUR INSPECTORS IN AN
INSPECTION TEAM. WHILE CONDUCTING THE INSPECTION THE
INSPECTION TEAM MAY DIVIDE INTO TWO PARTS.
(85) THE INSPECTORS AND, IF APPLICABLE, AUXILIARY
PERSONNEL, WILL BE GRANTED DURING THEIR MISSION THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
(86) THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE THE INSPECTION
TEAM WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION
SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION, AND, WHEN
NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE; HOWEVER THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE
THE USE BY THE INSPECTION TEAM OF ITS OWN TENTS AND
RATIONS.
(87) THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE USE OF ITS OWN
MAPS, OWN PHOTO CAMERAS, OWN BINOCULARS AND OWN
DICTAPHONES, AS WELL AS OWN AERONAUTICAL CHARTS.
(88) THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE ACCESS TO
APPROPRIATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OF THE
RECEIVING STATE, INCLUDING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR
CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF AN
INSPECTION TEAM IN AN AIRCRAFT AND THOSE 114 A LAND
VEHICLE EMPLOYED IN THE INSPECTION.
(89) THE INSPECTING STATE WILL SPECIFY WHETHER AERIAL
INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED USING AN AIRPLANE, A
HELICOPTER OR BOTH. AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION WILL BE
CHOSEN BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INSPECTING AND
RECEIVING STATES. AIRCRAFT WILL BE CHOSEN WHICH
PROVIDE THE INSPECTION TEAM A CONTINUOUS VIEW OF THE
GROUND DURING THE INSPECTION.
(90) AFTER THE FLIGHT PLAN, SPECIFYING, INTER ALIA,
25X1
430
SECRET
npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
THE INSPECTION TEAM'S CHOICE OF FLIGHT PATH, SPEED AND
ALTITUDE IN THE SPECIFIED AREA, HAS BEEN FILED WITH
THE COMPETENT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AUTHORITY THE
INSPECTION AIRCRAFT WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE
SPECIFIED AREA WITHOUT DELAY. WITHIN THE SPECIFIED
AREA, THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL, AT ITS REQUEST, BE
PERMITTED TO DEVIATE FROM THE APPROVED FLIGHT PLAN TO
MAKE SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS PROVIDED SUCH DEVIATION IS
CONSISTENT WITH PARAGRAPH (74) AS WELL AS FLIGHT
SAFETY AND AIR TRAFFIC REQUIREMENTS. DIRECTIONS TO
THE CREW WILL BE GIVEN THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
RECEIVING STATE ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE
INSPECTION.
(91) ONE MEMBER OF THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE
PERMITTED, IF SUCH A REQUEST IS MADE, AT ANY TIME TO
OBSERVE DATA ON NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT OF THE AIRCRAFT
AND TO HAVE ACCESS TO MAPS AND CHARTS USED BY THE
FLIGHT CREW FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE EXACT
LOCATION OF THE AIRCRAFT DURING THE INSPECTION FLIGHT.
(92) AERIAL AND GROUND INSPECTORS MAY RETURN TO THE
SPECIFIED AREA AS OFTEN AS DESIRED WITHIN THE FORTY-
EIGHT HOUR INSPECTION PERIOD.
(93) THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION
PURPOSES LAND VEHICLES WITH CROSS COUNTRY CAPABILITY.
WHENEVER MUTUALLY AGREED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHY RELATING TO THE AREA TO BE
INSPECTED, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED TO
USE ITS OWN VEHICLES.
(94) IF LAND VEHICLES OR AIRCRAFT ARE PROVIDED BY THE
INSPECTING STATE, THERE WILL BE ONE ACCOMPANYING
DRIVER FOR EACH LAND VEHICLE, OR ACCOMPANYING AIRCRAFT
CREW.
(95) THE INSPECTING STATE WILL PREPARE A REPORT OF
ITS INSPECTION AND WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF THAT REPORT
TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WITHOUT DELAY.
(96) THE INSPECTION EXPENSES WILL BE INCURRED BY THE
RECEIVING STATE EXCEPT WHEN THE INSPECTING STATE USES
ITS OWN AIRCRAFT AND/OR LAND VEHICLES. THE TRAVEL
EXPENSES TO AND FROM POINT(S) OF ENTRY WILL BE BORNE
BY THE INSPECTING STATE.
(97) DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WILL BE USED FOR
COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION.
(98) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE ENTITLED TO
OBTAIN TIMELY CLARIFICATION FROM ANY OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF
AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.
COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS CONTEXT WILL, IF APPROPRIATE,
BE TRANSMITTED TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES.
(99) THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THAT THESE CSBMS
ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT
AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY
432
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
ACTIVITIES AND EMPHASIZE THAT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THESE OBJECTIVES.
(100) REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT OBJECTIVES OF THE
FINAL ACT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO
CONTINUE BUILDING CONFIDENCE, TO LESSEN MILITARY
CONFRONTATION AND TO ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY
ARE ALSO DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.
(101) THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE
POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL COME INTO FORCE ON 1
JANUARY 1987.
(102) THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS REQUESTED TO
TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
OF THE CSCE IN VIENNA AND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
THE UNITED NATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS ALSO
REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE
GOVERNMENTS OF THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN
STATES.
(103) THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE, WHICH WILL DISSEMINATE IT
AND MAKE IT KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.
(104) THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES
EXPRESS THEIR PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENT AND
PEOPLE OF SWEDEN FOR THE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS MADE
FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IIND THE WARM HOSPITALITY
EXTENDED TO THE DELEGATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE
CONFERENCE.
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986
ANNEX I
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS IS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
"ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, BALANCE AND
RECIPROCITY, EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS
OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,
THESE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WILL
COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA
AREA AND AIR SPACE. THEY WILL BE OF MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE AND POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL BE
PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH
CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.
AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IS
CONCERNED, THE MEASURES WILL BE APPLICABLE TO THE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES
TAXING PLACE THERE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT
SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF
ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS
REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH THEY WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY.
NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS WILL ME (SIC) MADE THROUGH
THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AT THE CONFERENCE.
432
25X1
SECRET
npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
NOTHING IN THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE GIVEN ABOVE WILL
DIMINISH OBLIGATIONS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE
FINAL ACT. THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON AT THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO
BE APPLICABLE IN ALL AREAS COVERED BY ANY OF THE
PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT RELATING TO
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF
SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT.
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NOTION OF ADJOINING SEA AREA
IS UNDERSTOOD TO REFER ALSO TO OCEAN AREAS ADJOINING
EUROPE."
WHENEVER THE TERM "THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS"
IS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT, THE ABOVE DEFINITION WILL
APPLY.
ANNEX II
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREED
DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND THE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THEM CONCERNING THE TIMEFRAMES OF CERTAIN
ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS, AND EXPRESSING THEIR INTEREST
IN AN EARLY TRANSITION TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCTIMENT, THE PARTICIPATING
STATES AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING:
THE ANNUAL CALENDARS CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND FORECAST FOR 1987
WILL BE EXCHANGED NOT LATER THAN 15 DECEMBER 1986.
COMMUNICATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROVISIONS,
CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN
40,000 TROOPS PLANNED FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988 WILL
BE EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986. PARTICIPATING
STATES MAY UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN
75,000 TROOPS DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1987 PROVIDED
THAT THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR
EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986.
ACTIVITIES TO BEGIN DURING THE FIRST 42 DAYS AFTER 1
JANUARY 1987 WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS
OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE. HOWEVER, THE
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO APPLY TO
THEM THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT TO THE MAXIMUM
EXTENT POSSIBLE.
THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT.
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986
ANNEX III
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE CAN RAISE
ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE
433
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AT ANY STAGE SUBSEQUENT TO THE
VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING.
THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT.
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986.
ANNEX IV
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL
THAT THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO BELONG OR NOT TO BELONG TO
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO BE OR NOT TO BE A PARTY
TO BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL TREATIES INCLUDING THE
RIGHT TO BE OR NOT TO BE A PARTY TO TREATIES OF
ALLIANCE; THEY ALSO HAVE THE RIGHT OF NEUTRALITY. IN
THIS CONTEXT, THEY WILL NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE
RIGHTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE PURPOSES OF THE SYSTEM OF
INSPECTION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PROVISION THAT NO
PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT ON ITS
TERRITORY WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLIATION FOR CSBMS, MORE
THAN THREE INSPECTIONS PER CALENDAR YEAR.
APPROPRIATE UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES
ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE EXPRESSED IN INTERPRETATIVE
STATEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE JOURNAL OF THE DAY.
THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT.
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
434
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIALSTOCKHOLM 07553
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON NUF SECTION OF STOCKHOLM
DOCUMENT
1. CDE XII - 082
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. NON-USE OF FORCE TALKING POINTS:
? THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH
TO THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE.
-- THE DOCUMENT IMPLICITLY REJECTS THE EASTERN
DECLARATORY APPROACH; IT RECOGNIZES THAT ONLY THE
ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCRETE CSBMS GIVES
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. IN OTHER WORDS,
AGREEMENT ON A VERIFIABLE AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT SET
OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS JUSTIFIES THE NUF
REAFFIRMATION IN STOCKHOLM.
-- THE ACTUAL NUF REAFFIRMATION IS PUT IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
-- THE DOCUMENT STRESSES THAT THE PROHIBITION OF THE
USE OR THREAT TO USE FORCE IS UNIVERSAL, EXCEPT FOR THE
INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AS SET FORTH IN THE UN
CHARTER; IN OTHER WORDS, IT PROHIBITS THE USE OF FORCE
IN THE MUTUAL AS WELL AS THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF
THE PARTICIPATING STATES (I.E., AFGHANISTAN) AND
INCLUDES AN EXPLICIT PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE
WITHIN ALLIANCES (ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE).
-- THE NUF SECTION ALSO REFLECTS THE BROADER WESTERN
APPROACH TO SECURITY MATTERS, WHICH INCLUDES
HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.
-- IN THIS CONTEXT, THE DOCUMENT REAFFIRMS THE
UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS AND EMPHASIZES THAT THE RESPECT FOR AND THE
EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SECURITY.
-- THE NUF SECTION ALSO COMMITS THE PARTICIPATING
STATES TO TAKE RESOLUTE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO
PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM.
-- THE TEXT STRESSES THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS
AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
-- IT ALSO STRESSES THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
435
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07554
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BARRY'S FINAL PLENARY SPEECH
1. CDE XII - 083
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR BARRY'S FINAL SPEECH
IN CDE, DELIVERED SEPTEMBER 22, 1986, ALTHOUGH THE
OFFICIAL DATE IS SEPTEMBER 19, 1986 BECAUSE THE CLOCK
WAS STOPPED.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
THE UNITED STATES WISHES TODAY TO JOIN OTHERS IN
WELCOMING THE DOCUMENT WHICH THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
HAS JUST ADOPTED. WE BELIEVE THE CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES ADOPTED HERE CAN MAKE AN
IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO A MORE STABLE AND SECURE
EUROPE AND TO AN IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP.
AS YOU KNOW, MY DELEGATION HAS BEEN AMONG THOSE WHICH
HAVE DEMANDED THAT WE PRODUCE SUBSTANCE HERE AND NOT
GENERALITIES. WE HAVE TRIED HARD TO MEET THE STRINGENT
STANDARDS OF THE MADRID MANDATE. WE ARE SATISFIED THAT
WE HAVE MET THESE STANDARDS AND PRODUCED A MANDATORY
REGIME WHICH COULD SERVE AS A FIRST STEP IN A MORE
DEMANDING ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY PROCESS.
BECAUSE OF OUR GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, MY GOVERNMENT WILL FOLLOW THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM REGIME WITH PARTICULAR
ATTENTION. WE HAVE ALL MUCH TO LEARN ABOUT
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, AND THE MEASURES ADOPTED HERE WILL
PROVIDE A TEST CASE AS WE CONSIDER HOW BEST TO PROCEED
IN THE FUTURE. FAR FROM EXHAUSTING THE POTENTIAL OF
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY- BUILDING MEASURES, STOCKHOLM
IS, WE THINK, A BEGINNING. WE SHOULD EXPAND UPON WHAT
WE HAVE DONE HERE. I THINK PARTICULARLY OF MEASURES IN
THE AREA OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE. THE CONFERENCE HAS
NOT ACHIEVED NEARLY AS MUCH HERE IN THIS AREA AS WE
THOUGHT DESIRABLE AND POSSIBLE. IT SEEMS TO US
SELF-EVIDENT, THAT AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT
FORCES ARE ROUTINELY STATIONED IN EUROPE, WITH WHAT
COMBAT CAPABILITY, IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT OF TRUE
STABILITY. EQUALLY, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INFORMATION
BASE IS A REQUIREMENT OF ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TO REDUCE
THE STRENGTH OF THESE SAME FORCES. WE HAVE NOT EVEN
BEGUN TO ESTABLISH SUCH AN INFORMATION BASE HERE IN
STOCKHOLM.
WE HAVE, ON THE OTHER HAND, TAKEN WHAT WE REGARD AS AN
IMPORTANT, EVEN HISTORIC STEP IN THE AREA OF
VERIFICATION. WITH ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION, WE HAVE
ESTABLISHED THE PRINCIPLE THAT ANY STATE WITH DOUBTS
ABOUT WHETHER THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ANOTHER ARE IN
COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITMENTS HAS THE RIGHT AND IS ASSURED
THE MEANS OF GOING INTO THE TERRITORY OF THAT OTHER
STATE TO SEE FOR ITSELF WHAT IS GOING ON. THERE IS NO
RIGHT OF REFUSAL OF THE INSPECTION ADOPTED HERE, WHETHER
436
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT. WE WILL FOLLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE INSPECTION PROVISION WITH PARTICULAR CARE. BECAUSE
WE ARE EXPERIMENTING WITH CHALLENGE INSPECTION FOR THE
FIRST TIME, WE WILL NO DOUBT HAVE TO PERFECT THE
INSTRUMENT WE HAVE BUILT HERE. WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE
THAT ANY INSPECTION REGIME INTENDED TO VERIFY ACTUAL
REDUCTIONS IN FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE RIGOROUS AND
MORE DEMANDING.
IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD NOTE THAT MY GOVERNMENT REMAINS
CONVINCED THAT THE USE OF AIRCRAFT FROM NEUTRAL AND
NON-ALIGNED STATES WOULD PRODUCE A MORE CREDIBLE AND
EFFECTIVE FORM OF AERIAL INSPECTION THAN THE USE OF
AIRCRAFT FROM THE STATE BEING INSPECTED. UNFORTUNATELY,
THE EAST REJECTED THIS IDEA AND THE OFFERS OF THOSE
STATES WHICH SAID THEY WERE PREPARED TO HELP BRING THIS
VALUABLE IDEA TO FRUITION. THIS PROPOSAL REMAINS ON THE
TABLE FOR THE FUTURE.
THE UNITED STATES ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE SUCCESSFUL
OUTCOME TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD PROVIDE A
POSITIVE POLITICAL IMPULSE TO OTHER ARMS CONTROL AND
SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP
AS A WHOLE. IN A FEW DAYS, THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING
WILL BEGIN WEIGHING THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FAILURES OF
THE CSCE PROCESS SINCE MADRID. OUR WORK IN STOCKHOLM
WILL WEIGH ON THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THAT BALANCE, BUT
THERE WILL BE MUCH ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE AS WELL. IT
WILL BE THE TASK OF THE VIENNA MEETING TO DRAW
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE, BUT THE UNITED STATES WILL
CONTINUE TO BE AMONG THOSE WHICH REQUIRE BALANCED
PROGRESS IN ALL AREAS.
THROUGHOUT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, PRESIDENT REAGAN
HAS TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS HERE. THE
FIRST FOREIGN POLICY DECISION HE TOOK IN JANUARY, 1981,
WAS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. HE HAS SPOKEN FREQUENTLY ABOUT
THE CONFERENCE AND IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO ITS
SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION BOTH IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE
CONVERSATIONS WITH ME. MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME RECALL
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT OF JANUARY 21, 1986, THAT
"THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ... CAN CONTRIBUTE TO
SECURITY IN THE LARGER SENSE, THAT WHICH ENCOMPASSES
POLITICAL ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN MATTERS
-- THAT IS HUMAN RIGHTS -- AS WELL AS STRICTLY MILITARY
MATTERS. THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS BROADER CONCEPT OF
SECURITY IS THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED
STATES." WE BELIEVE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT OUR WORK HERE
IN STOCKHOLM WILL ADVANCE THAT OVERALL OBJECTIVE.
THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN.
END TEXT.
BARRY
437
? SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07500
SUBJECT: PROVISIONALLY NOTED CDE TEXT
1. CDE XII - 079.
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN
WORKING GROUP AB IN CDE TODAY, 19 SEPT. TEXT IN THE
NOTIFICATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION SECTIONS
REMAINS TO BE NOTED.
BEGIN TEXT:
DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE CONVENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
OF THE MADRID MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE
ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CYPRUS,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
GREECE, THE HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY,
LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MONACO, THE
NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SAN
MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND YUGOSLAVIA, MET IN
STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986 IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING RELATING TO THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE SWEDISH PRIME
MINISTER, THE LATE OLOF PALME, ON 17 JANUARY 1984.
OPENING STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND OTHER HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. THE PRIME
MINISTER OF SPAIN AS WELL AS MINISTERS AND SENIOR
OFFICIALS OF SEVERAL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES
ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE LATER.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
THE CONFERENCE ON 6 JULY 1984.
CONTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE BY THE FOLLOWING NON-
PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES: ALGERIA, EGYPT,
ISRAEL, LEBANON, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SYRIA, AND TUNISIA.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THAT THE AIM OF THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND
INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO
UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE
ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO
25X1
438
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES
TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN GENERAL.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT THE SET OF
MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES WHICH ARE ADOPTED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT AND
WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, WILL BY THEIR SCOPE AND
NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE DECLARED THE
FOLLOWING:
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO
REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 07500
USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER
MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO
RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN
IN THE FINAL ACT.
NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT
RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
THIS PRINCIPLE.
THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS
SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR
THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE
FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.
AS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT NO OCCUPATION OR
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL
BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
THEY RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SECURITY.
ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM
ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES
AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, AGAINST ANOTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE, IN PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR
ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.
THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE
439
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY
STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF
ALLIANCE.
THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION OF
REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS RECALLED
ABOVE, CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
THEY STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE
FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT
TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE
OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE
MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY.
THEY RECALL THEIR DETERMINATION AND THE NECESSITY TO
REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL
FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY REAFFIRM
THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY
BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE
FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR FULL
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS WHICH WILL FURTHER
THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.
THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN
PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE THEIR DETERMINATION TO
RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF
THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT.
ALL THESE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE
AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY
APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES WILL
ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS
COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.
THEY RECONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE
OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS THAT ALL
STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
THEY REAFFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE
EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL
FACTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY,
AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES, AS SET
440
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRPT
FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS
BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES.
THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD
SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH
SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN THIS
CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP GOOD
NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE REGION,
WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE
PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES
GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, SO AS TO
PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE PREVAIL
IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE FINAL ACT.
THEY EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES
TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR
DETERMINATION 73 TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE
NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION,
FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF
TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN
PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED
FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO
PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES,
INCLUDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND
ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE
PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE
DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.
THEY WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS THAT STRICT
COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES =FIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
CHARTER WILL PREVAIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING
MEASURES:
PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(COMMENT: NONE OF THIS SECTION HAS BEEN PROVISIONALLY
NOTED, ALTHOUGH SOME COORDINATOR'S TEXT HAS BEEN
AGREED. END COMMENT.)
OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO THE FOLLOWING NOTIFIABLE
441
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECTIPT
MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
- THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES ... CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH
ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
- THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN AN
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE
FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.
- IN THE CASE OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND
FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM
OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL
POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE
ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY
OR TO BE CONCENTRATED, THE CONCENTRATION OF THESE
FORCES. FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE
ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS
WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN
A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION WITHIN
THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO
OBSERVATION WHENEVER ...
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.
THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION. THE HOST STATE WILL
BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE
NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE.
THE HOST STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES
AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ENGAGED IN THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE HOST STATE.
IN SUCH CASES, THE HOST STATE WILL SPECIFY THE
ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS INVITATION TO
OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY.
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.
THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY
AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS
PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. MILITARY
OBSERVERS WILL, NORMALLY, WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS AND
INSIGNIA WHILE PERFORMING THEIR TASKS.
REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT
LATER THAN 21 DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL
PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR
REPLY TO THE INVITATION. IF THE INVITATION IS NOT
ACCEPTED IN TIME, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS
WILL BE SENT.
25X1
442
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE
A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:
- THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF OBSERVERS;
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME;
- LANGUAGE TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR
TRANSLATION;
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF
THE OBSERVERS;
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL BE
ISSUED TO THE OBSERVERS BY THE HOST STATE;
- POSSIBLE AUTHORIZATION BY THE HOST STATE OF THE USE
OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT THAT THE OBSERVERS MAY BRING WITH
THEM;
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIAL CLOTHING TO BE ISSUED TO THE
OBSERVERS BECAUSE OF WEATHER OR ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.
THE OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS WITH REGARD TO THE
OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. THE HOST STATE WILL, IF POSSIBLE,
ACCEDE TO THEM.
THE HOST STATE WILL DETERMINE A DURATION OF OBSERVATION
WHICH PERMITS THE OBSERVERS TO OBSERVE A NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM THE TIME THAT AGREED ...
THRESHOLDS ARE MET OR EXCEEDED UNTIL, FOR THE LAST TIME
DURING THE ACTIVITY, THE ... THRESHOLDS ARE NO LONGER
MET.
THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH
TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND
BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER
THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED
IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT THE OBSERVERS ARE IN POSITION
BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME.
THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS
OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION
SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST STATE, AND BACK.
THE OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND
OFFERED EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.
THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS
IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
THE HOST STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT
OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED LOCATIONS, INSTALLATIONS OR
DEFENCE SITES.
IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE OBSERVERS TO CONFIRM THAT THE
NOTIFIED ACTIVITY IS NON-THREATENING IN CHARACTER AND
THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS OF THE NOTIFICATION, THE HOST
STATE WILL:
- AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE
A BRIEFING ON THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE
443
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED
WITH THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A
MAP OF THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WITH A SCALE OF
1 TO NOT MORE THAN 500,000 AND AN OBSERVATION PROGRAMME
WITH A DAILY SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE
BASIC SITUATION.
- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE OBSERVATION
EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO
USE THEIR PERSONAL BINOCULARS, WHICH WILL BE SUBJECT TO
EXAMINATION AND APPROVAL BY THE HOST STATE.
- IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE THE
OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE
VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR
DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR
POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY. IN THE CASE OF A LAND FORCE
ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH AIR OR NAVAL
COMPONENTS, BRIEFINGS WILL BE GIVEN BY REPRESENTATIVES
OF THESE FORCES.
- PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO OBSERVE DIRECTLY FORCES OF
THE STATE/STATES ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY SO
THAT THE OBSERVERS GET AN IMPRESSION OF THE FLOW OF THE
ACTIVITY. TO THIS END, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE MAJOR COMBAT UNITS OF THE
PARTICIPATING FORMATIONS OF A DIVISIONAL OR EQUIVALENT
LEVEL AND, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, TO VISIT SOME UNITS AND
COMMUNICATE WITH COMMANDERS AND TROOPS. COMMANDERS OR
OTHER SENIOR PERSONNEL OF PARTICIPATING FORMATIONS AS
WELL AS OF THE VISITED UNITS WILL INFORM THE OBSERVERS
OF THE MISSION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS.
- GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY. THE OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS
ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.
- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE MEANS OF
TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY.
- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH OPPORTUNITIES FOR TIMELY
COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR EMBASSIES OR OTHER OFFICIAL
MISSIONS AND CONSULAR POSTS. THE HOST STATE IS NOT
OBLIGATED TO COVER THE COMMUNICATION EXPENSES OF THE
OBSERVERS.
- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND
LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE
OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY, MEDICAL
CARE.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES NEED NOT INVITE OBSERVERS TO
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT
WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED UNLESS
THESE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES HAVE A DURATION OF MORE THAN
72 HOURS. THE CONTINUATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES BEYOND
THIS TIME WILL BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION WHILE THE
444
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
AGREED THRESHOLDS ARE MET OR EXCEEDED. THE OBSERVATION
PROGRAMME WILL FOLLOW AS CLOSELY AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE
ALL THE PROVISIONS FOR OBSERVATION SET OUT IN THIS
DOCUMENT.
ANNUAL CALENDARS
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION , WITHIN THE
ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECAST FOR THE
SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY
YEAR, IN WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER
THAN 15 NOVEMBER FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR.
AS DEFINED ...
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION
ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING MODEL:
- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION
- GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
- STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, INDICATED BY
APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND/OR DEFINED BY
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THE
14-DAY PERIOD, INDICATED BY DATES, WITHIN WHICH IT IS
ENVISAGED TO START
- THE ENVISAGED TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE TYPES OF ARMED FORCES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
- THE ENVISAGED LEVEL OF COMMAND, UNDER WHICH THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE
- THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS WHOSE PARTICIPATION
IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IS ENVISAGED
- ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING, INTER ALIA,
COMMENTS OF FORCES WHICH THE PARTICIPATING STATE
PLANNING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY CONSIDERS RELEVANT
SHOULD CHANGES REGARDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE
ANNUAL CALENDAR PROVE NECESSARY, THEY WILL BE
COMMUNICATED TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES NO LATER
THAN IN THE APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATION.
AS DEFINED ...
INFORMATION ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR
NOTIFICATION NOT INCLUDED IN AN ANNUAL CALENDAR WILL BE
COMMUNICATED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MODEL PROVIDED IN THE
ANNUAL CALENDAR.
445
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
311
CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL COMMUNICATE, IN WRITING TO
ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, BY 15 NOVEMBER EACH
YEAR, INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT
TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000
TROOPS, WHICH IT PLANS TO CARRY OUT IN THE SECOND
SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH COMMUNICATION WILL
INCLUDE PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY, AS TO
ITS GENERAL PURPOSE, TIMEFRAME AND DURATION, AREA, SIZE
AND STATES INVOLVED.
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE
THAN 75,000 TROOPS, UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF
COMMUNICATION AS DEFINED ABOVE.
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE
THAN 40,000 TROOPS UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE
ANNUAL CALENDAR, NOT LATER THAN 15 NOVEMBER EACH YEAR.
IF MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION ARE
CARRIED OUT IN ADDITION TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE ANNUAL
CALENDAR, THEY SHOULD BE AS FEW AS POSSIBLE.
COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION
(COMMENT: NONE OF THIS SECTION HAS BEEN PROVISIONALLY
NOTED, ALTHOUGH SOME COORDINATOR'S TEXT HAS BEEN
AGREED. END COMMENT)
AS DEFINED ...
COMMUNICATION
(COMMENT: NONE OF THIS SECTION HAS BEEN PROVISIONALLY
NOTED, ALTHOUGH SOME COORDINATOR'S TEXT HAS BEEN
AGREED. END COMMENT)
THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THAT THESE CSBMS ARE
DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF
MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES AND EMPHASIZE THAT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO THESE OBJECTIVES.
REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT,
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE
BUILDING CONFIDENCE, TO LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION
AND TO ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY ARE ALSO
DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.
THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE POLITICALLY
BINDING AND WILL COME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1987.
THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE
PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CSCE IN
VIENNA AND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS ALSO REQUESTED TO
TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.
THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN EACH
446
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
PARTICIPATING STATE, WHICH WILL DISSEMINATE IT AND MAKE
IT KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES EXPRESS
THEIR PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF
SWEDEN FOR THE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND THE WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED
TO THE DELEGATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENCE.
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986
ANNEX I
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREED
DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED
IN THEM CONCERNING THE TIMEFRAMES OF CERTAIN ADVANCE
NOTIFICATIONS, AND EXPRESSING THEIR INTEREST IN AN EARLY
TRANSITION TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THIS DOCUMENT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES AGREE TO THE
FOLLOWING:
THE ANNUAL CALENDARS CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND FORECAST FOR 1987 WILL
BE EXCHANGED NOT LATER THAN 15 DECEMBER 1986.
COMMUNICATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROVISIONS,
CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN
40,000 TROOPS PLANNED FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988 WILL BE
EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986. PARTICIPATING STATES MAY
UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS
DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1987 PROVIDED THAT THEY ARE
INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER
1986.
ACTIVITIES TO BEGIN DURING THE FIRST 42 DAYS AFTER 1
JANUARY 1987 WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE. HOWEVER, THE
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO APPLY TO
THEM THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT TO THE MAXIMUM
EXTENT POSSIBLE.
THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT.
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986
ANNEX II
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE CAN RAISE
ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AT ANY STAGE SUBSEQUENT TO THE
VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING.
THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT.
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986.
END TEXT.
447
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFrRFT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
NNNN
448
UNCLASSIFIED
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07503
SUBJECT: CDE: COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION MEASURE
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. ROUND-THE-CLOCK NOEGOTIATIONS -- WELL INTO
THE 48TH HOUR OF SEPTEMBER 19 -- HAVE BROUGHT THE
CONFERENCE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON A "COMPLIANCE AND
VERIFICATION" MEASURE. THE TEXT WHICH FOLLOWS, WITH
ACCOMPANYING COMMENTS, REFLECTS THE AGREEMENTS REACHED
AS WELL AS OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AS OF ADJOURNMENT AT
1:00 A.M. SEPTEMBER 21. NEGOTIATIONS RESUME AT 10 A.M.
END SUMMARY.
3. STRUCTURE. WE HAVE AGREED NOT TO HAVE SUB-TITLES IN
THIS SECTION, LARGELY BECAUSE NATO WANTED TO AVOID
GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT A VARIETY OF FORMS OF
VERIFICATION HAD BEEN AGREED, WHEN THE ONLY FORM IS
INSPECTION. THIS SECTION WILL BE ORGANIZED, HOWEVER,
INTO FIVE DISTINCT SECTIONS, DIVIDED BY EXTRA SPACES, AS
FOLLOWS:
MANDATE LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION; NTMS; INSPECTION;
COMMUNICATION; CLARIFICATIONS.
4. TEXT OF SECTION ON "COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION"
FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT.
COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION
ACCORDING TO THE MADRID MANDATE THE CONFIDENCE-AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON "WILL BE
PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH
CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT."
PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL
MEANS CAN PLAY A ROLE IN MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH
AGREED CSBMS.
MI5
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THIS
DOCUMENT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO
CONDUCT INSPECTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF ANY OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS.
ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE ALLOWED TO ADDRESS A
REQUEST FOR INSPECTION TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ON
WHOSE TERRITORY, WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBMS, COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS IS IN DOUBT.
NO PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT ON ITS
TERRITORY WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, MORE
THAN ... INSPECTIONS PER CALENDAR YEAR. (1)
449
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
qFrlIFT
25X1
NO PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT MORE
THAN ONE INSPECTION PER CALENDAR YEAR FROM THE SAME
PARTICIPATING STATE.
PARTICIPATING STATES WHICH ENGAGE IN MULTINATIONAL
MILITARY EXERCISE ACTIVITIES WILL NOT USE THEIR RIGHT TO
INSPECT THE STATES, TOGETHER WITH WHICH, THEY
PARTICIPATE IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. (2)
AN INSPECTION WILL NOT BE COUNTED IF, DUE TO FORCE
MAJEURE, IT CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT.
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN INSPECTION
WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST.
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A
REQUEST WILL REPLY IN THE AFFIRMATIVE TO THE REQUEST
WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME, SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS ... (3)
ANY POSSIBLE DISPUTE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE REASONS
FOR A REQUEST WILL NOT PREVENT OR DELAY THE CONDUCT OF
AN INSPECTION ... (4)
THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN INSPECTION
WILL BE PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE FOR INSPECTION ON THE
TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, A SPECIFIC AREA. SUCH AN AREA
WILL BE REFERRED TO AS THE "SPECIFIED AREA". THE
SPECIFIED AREA_ WILL COMPRISE TERRAIN WHERE NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED OR WHERE ANOTHER
PARTICIPATING STATE BELIEVES A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITY IS TAKING PLACE. THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL BE
DEFINED AND LIMITED BY THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES BUT WILL NOT EXCEED THAT REQUIRED
FOR AN ARMY LEVEL MILITARY ACTIVITY.
IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
INSPECTING STATE ACCOMPANIED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE RECEIVING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND
UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY, EXCEPT FOR AREAS OR SENSITIVE
POINTS TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY DENIED OR
RESTRICTED, MILITARY AND OTHER DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS, AS
WELL AS NAVAL VESSELS, AND AIRCRAFT. THE NUMBER AND
EXTENT OF THE RESTRICTED AREAS SHOULD BE AS LIMITED AS
POSSIBLE. AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES
CAN TAKE PLACE WILL NOT BE DECLARED RESTRICTED AREAS,
EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS WHICH, IN TERRITORIAL TERMS, SHOULD BE AS
SMALL AS POSSIBLE, AND CONSEQUENTLY THOSE AREAS WILL NOT
BE USED TO PREVENT INSPECTION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. RESTRICTED AREAS WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED IN A
WAY INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS ON
INSPECTION.
WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE FORCES OF PARTICIPATING
STATES OTHER THAN THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ALSO BE
SUBJECT TO THE INSPECTION CONDUCTED BY THE INSPECTING
STATE.
450
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFrI4FT
25X1
INSPECTION WILL BE PERMITTED ON THE GROUND, FROM THE
AIR, OR BOTH.
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RECEIVING STATE WILL
ACCOMPANY THE INSPECTION TEAM, INCLUDING WHEN IT IS IN
LAND VEHICLES AND AN AIRCRAFT FROM THE TIME OF THEIR
FIRST EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ARE NO LONGER IN
USE FOR THE PURPOSES OF INSPECTION.
IN ITS REQUEST, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL NOTIFY THE
RECEIVING STATE OF:
(A) THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST;
(B) THE LOCATION OF THE SPECIFIED AREA DEFINED BY
GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES;
(C) THE PREFERRED POINT(S) OF ENTRY FOR THE INSPECTION
TEAM;
(D) MODE OF TRANSPORT TO AND FROM THE POINT(S) OF ENTRY
AND, IF APPLICABLE, TO AND FROM THE SPECIFIED AREA;
(E) WHERE IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE INSPECTION WILL
BEGIN;
(F) WHETHER THE INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED FROM THE
GROUND, FROM THE AIR, OR BOTH SIMULTANEOUSLY;
(G) WHETHER AERIAL INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED USING AN
AIRPLANE, A HELICOPTER, OR BOTH;
(H) WHETHER THE INSSPECTION TEAM WILL USE LAND VEHICLES
PROVIDED HI THE RECEIVING STATE OR, IF MUTUALLY AGREED,
ITS OWN VEHICLES;
(I) INFORMATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF DIPLOMATIC VISAS TO
INSPECTORS ENTERING THE RECEIVING STATE.
THE REPLY TO THE REQUEST WILL BE GIVEN IN THE SHORTEST
POSSIBLE PERIOD OF TIME, BUT WITHIN NOT MORE THAN ...
HOURS. WITHIN ... HOURS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE
REQUEST, THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER
THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING STATE. (5)
ANY REQUEST FOR INSPECTION AS WELL AS THE REPLY THERETO
WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WITHOUT
DELAY.
0.
THE RECEIVING STATE SHOULD DESIGNATE THE POINT(S) OF
ENTRY AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE SPECIFIED AREA. THE
RECEIVING STATE WILL ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTION TEAM
WILL BE ABLE TO REACH THE SPECIFIED AREA WITHOUT DELAY
FROM THE POINT(S) OF ENTRY.
ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FACILITATE THE PASSAGE OF
THE INSPECTION TEAMS THROUGH THEIR TERRITORY.
WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM
AT THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE INSPECTION WILL BE TERMINATED.
THERE WILL BE NO MORE THAN FOUR INSPECTORS IN AN
INSPECTION TEAM. WHILE CONDUCTING THE INSPECTION THE
INSPECTION TEAM MAY DIVIDE INTO PARTS. IF LAND VEHICLES
OR AIRCRAFT ARE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTING STATE, THERE
WILL BE ONE ACCOMPANYING DRIVER FOR EACH LAND VEHICLE,
OR AIRCRAFT CREW.
THE ... WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE
451
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS
IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ... (6)
THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE THE INSPECTION TEAM
WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION
SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION, AND, WHEN
NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE; HOWEVER THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE
THE USE BY THE INSPECTION TEAM OF ITS OWN TENTS AND
RATIONS.
THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE USE OF ITS OWN MAPS, OWN
CAMERAS, OWN BINOCULARS AND OWN DICTAPHONES, AS WELL
AS OWN AIRCRAFT NAVIGATIONAL CHARTS AND WRITING
MATERIAL. (7)
THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE ACCESS TO APPROPRIATE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OF THE RECEIVING STATE,
INCLUDING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATION
BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF AN INSPECTION TEAM IN AN AIRCRAFT
AND THOSE IN A LAND VEHICLE EMPLOYED IN THE INSPECTION.
THE INSPECTING STATE WILL SPECIFY WHETHER AERIAL
INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED USING AN AIRPLANE, A
HELICOPTER OR BOTH. AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION WILL BE
CHOSEN BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INSPECTING AND
RECEIVING STATES. AIRCRAFT WILL BE CHOSEN WHICH PROVIDE
THE INSPECTION TEAM A CONTINUOUS VIEW OF THE GROUND
DURING THE INSPECTION.
AFTER THE FLIGHT PLAN, SPECIFYING, INTER ALIA, THE
INSPECTION TEAM'S CHOICE OF FLIGHT PATH, SPEED AND
ALTITUDE IN THE SPECIFIED AREA, HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE
COMPETENT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AUTHORITY THE INSPECTION
AIRCRAFT WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE SPECIFIED AREA
WITHOUT DELAY. WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE
INSPECTION TEAM WILL, AT ITS REQUEST, BE PERMITTED TO
DEVIATE FROM THE APPROVED FLIGHT PLAN TO MAKE SPECIFIC
OBSERVATIONS PROVIDED SUCH DEVIATION IS CONSISTENT WITH
PARA ( ) AS WELL AS FLIGHT SAFETY AND AIR TRAFFIC
REQUIREMENTS. DIRECTIONS TO THE CREW WILL BE GIVEN
THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RECEIVING STATE ON BOARD
THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE INSPECTION. 8)
ONE MEMBER OF THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE PERMITTED, IF
SUCH A REQUEST IS MADE, AT ANY TIME TO OBSERVE DATA ON
NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT OF THE AIRCRAFT AND TO HAVE
ACCESS TO HAPS AND CHARTS USED BY THE FLIGHT CREW FOR
THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE
AIRCRAFT DURING THE INSPECTION FLIGHT.
AERIAL AND GROUND INSPECTORS MAY RETURN TO THE SPECIFIED
AREA AS OFTEN AS DESIRED WITHIN THE 48-HOUR INSPECTION
PERIOD.
THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION PURPOSES
LAND VEHICLES WITH CROSS COUNTRY CAPABILITY. WHENEVER
MUTUALLY AGREED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFIC
GEOGRAPHY RELATING TO THE AREA TO BE INSPECTED, THE
INSPECTING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED TO USE ITS OWN
25X1
452
SECRET
nariaccifipn in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
VEHICLES.
THE INSPECTING STATE WILL PREPARE A REPORT
INSPECTION AND WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF THAT
PARTICIPATING STATES WITHOUT DELAY.
THE INSPECTION EXPENSES, EXCEPT FOR TRAVEL
AND FROM POINT(S) OF ENTRY . . . , WILL BE
THE RECEIVING STATE. (9)
OF ITS
REPORT TO ALL
EXPENSES TO
INCURRED BY
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WILL BE USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS
CONCERNING COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION.
10
e/D
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE ENTITLED TO OBTAIN
TIMELY CLARIFICATION FROM ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF AGREED CSBMS. . . .
COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS CONTEXT WILL, IF APPROPRIATE, BE
TRANSMITTED TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. (10)
END TEXT.
6. EXPLANATION OF FOOTNOTES.
(1) _RELATES TO PASSIVE QUOTA, WHICH IS NOT AGREED.
SOVIETS ARE WITHHOLDING AGREEMENT ON ANY FIGURES NOT
PREVIOUSLY AGREED UNTIL ALL FIGURES, AND PRIMARILY
THRESHOLD FIGURES, ARE RESOLVED. THREE OR PERHAPS FOUR
IS OUR GUESS FOR WHAT WOULD PROVE ACCEPTABLE, IN THE
END, TO THE EAST.
(2) THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A PLACEHOLDER FOR LANGUAGE TO
GO INTO A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT ACCOMPANIED BY A
STATEMENT IN THE JOURNAL OF THE DAY ENSURING THAT
MEMBERS OF THE SAME ALLIANCE CAN'T EXHAUST EACH OTHERS'
PASSIVE QUOTAS. LANGUAGE BASED ON THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT WILL BE EMPLOYED, NOT THE LANGUAGE CURRENTLY IN THIS
PARAGRAPH, AND IT IS STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION. THE
FRENCH HAVE BEEN PARTICULARY DIFFICULT CONCERNING A
REFERENCE TO "ALLIANCES" IN THIS CONTEXT, BUT THIS
PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED.
(3) THE PARAGRAPHS REFERRED TO ARE THOSE WHICH RELATE
TO THE QUOTA, INASMUCH AS ONCE THE QUOTAS HAVE BEEN
EXHAUSTED, A REQUEST WILL NOT REQUIRE AFFIRMATIVE
RESPONSE.
(4) THE SOVIETS WANT TO INCLUDE A SPECIFIC EXCEPTION IN
THIS PARAGRAPH FOR RESTRICTED AREAS, EITHER WITH
LANGUAGE ADDED SUCH AS "IN AREAS OPEN FOR INSPECTION,"
OR "EXCEPT FOR AREAS AS INDICATED IN PARAS ( )." WEST
HAS REFUSED ANY LANGUAGE IN THIS PARAGRAPH WHICH
CONTAINS THE NOTION OF EXCEPTION, BUT COULD ACCEPT SOME
APPROPRIATE REFERENCE TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED ON
SPECIFIED/RESTRICTED AREAS, SUCH AS ". . . WILL NOT
453
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
_SECRET__
PREVENT OR DELAY THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION IN A
SPECIFIED AREA AS DEFINED IN PARA ( )." THE SOVIETS
HAVE, SO FAR, REFUSED TO BUDGE ON THIS ISSUE, BUT WE
ANTICIPATE THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY THEY WILL ACCEPT
SOME LANGUAGE ALONG THE LINES OF THAT PROPOSED BY THE
WEST, WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SPECIFIC NOTION OF
EXCEPTION.
(5) AGAIN, SOVIETS ARE NOT FILLING IN FIGURES. WE
BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT 24
HOURS FOR A REPLY TO A REQUEST, AND 36 HOURS FOR
ENTERING THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING STATE.
(6) THERE ARE TWO OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THIS PARAGAPH.
FOR THE FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES, THE SOVIETS WANT SIMPLY
THE WORD "INSPECTORS;" WEST WANTS TO ENSURE THAT IF
DRIVERS AND CREW ENTER WITH THE INSPECTORS THEY ARE ALSO
PROVIDED NECESSARY PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AND HAS
THUS PROPOSED INSERTING IN THESE ELLIPSES: "INSPECTORS
(AND, IF APPLICABLE, AUXILLIARY PERSONNEL)." IN THE
SECOND SET OF ELLIPSES THE EAST WANTS TO MAKE SPECIFIC
REFERENCE TO WHAT WILL BE COVERED BY IMMUNITIES, I.E.
INSPECTORS, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM,
AND TO COVER THE NOTION OF WHAT IS INCLUDED IN AN
INSPECTION TEAM. IN THEIR VIEW, THE TEAM IS
INSPECTORS. OTHER ARE AUXILLIARY AND NOT INSPECTORS.
WE ARE SEEKING A SOLUTION WHICH MAKES IT CLEAR THAT
AUXILLIARY PERSONNEL ARE NOT INSPECTORS, BUT WILL BE
PROVIDED WITH APPROPRIATE IMMUNITIES IF THEY ACCOMPANY
THE INSPECTORS.
(7) "CAMERAS" IS BRACKETED BECAUSE BOTH THE NNA AND
EAST WANT TO INDICATE WHAT KIND OF CAMERAS; WEST HAS
RESISTED SUCH ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE CAMERAS BUT, IN ORDER
TO GET CAMERAS AT ALL, MAY HAVE TO ACCEPT THE TERM
"PHOTO CAMERAS" AT THE END OF THE DAY. THE SOVIETS HAVE
INDICATED THAT THE LAST PHRASE IS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THEY
HAVE LINKED ACCEPTANCE OF IT TO SATISFACTION ON CAMERAS.
(8) THE PARAGRAPH REFERENCE IS TO LANGUAGE ON
SPECIFIED/RESTRICTED AREAS, TO ENSURE NO OVERFLIGHT OF
RESTRICTED AREAS/SENSITIVE POINTS.
(9) THE EAST IS INSISTING ON LANGUAGE TO COVER THE
INSPECTION EXPENSES. SWEDEN HAS PROPOSED INSERTING
LANGUAGE IN THE ELLIPSES AS FOLLOWS: "AND COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY THE
INSPECTING STATE," IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTED
STATE DOES NOT HAVE TO PAY FOR THINGS BROUGHT IN (OR
PERHAPS LEASED) BY THE INSPECTING STATE. SOMETHING
CONTAINING THE NOTION COVERED BY THE SWEDISH FIX WILL
PROBABLY PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.
(10) ELLIPSES REFLECT AN EASTERN DESIRE TO INCLUDE A
REFERENCE TO "CONSULTATIONS." EAST HAS CLEARLY LOST THE
BATTLE TO INCLUDE ANYTHING MEANINGFUL ON CONSULTATIONS
AND THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED IS CLEARLY A FACE-SAVING
454
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
DEVICE ON THEIR PART AS IT SIMPLY STATES THE OBVIOUS,
REFERRING ONLY TO BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, NOT
MULTILATERAL. LANGUAGE PROPOSED IS:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THEY MAY,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, CONSULT
WITH EACH OTHER ON THE APPLICATION OF AGREED CSBMS."
WEST HAS HELD FIRM AGAINST ANY SUCH LANGUAGE AND HAS
INDICATED THAT IT DOES NOT BELIEVE ANYTHING SHOULD BE
INSERTED INTO THE ELLIPSES. AS LONG AS THEY HAVE
LANGUAGE ON CLARIFICATIONS, THE NNA HAVE ALSO GIVEN UP
ON CONSULTATIONS AND ARE NO LONGER PUSHING FOR ANY
CONSULTATION LANGUAGE; THEY HAVE INDICATED, HOWEVER,
THEY COULD ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THE
FRENCH, AMONG THE MOST ARDENT OPPONENTS OF
CONSULTATIONS, COULD ACCEPT THIS LANGUAGE. THE
NORWEGIANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WANT TO AVOID ANY
LANGUAGE THAT SMACKS OF BILATERALISM IN A MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE EAST WILL
CONTINUE TO INSIST ON SUCH LANGUAGE BUT DO NOT INTEND
TO WITHHOLD CONSENSUS ON THIS LANGUAGE IF IT IS THE
PRICE FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THIS SECTION.
7. COMMUNICATIONS. THE NNA (AND THE ROMANIANS) HAVE
GIVEN UP ON A SPECIAL PROVISION FOR "RAPID" OR "DIRECT"
MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS. AND, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, AS
INDICATED IN SC.1/MEASURE 6, THE DOCUMENT, DESPITE ITS
SIGNIFICANCE, WILL NOT WARRANT A SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS
MEASURE. THUS, COMMUNICATIONS LANGUAGE HAS BEEN
REFLECTED WITHIN THE COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION AND ALL
HAVE AGREED TO DISPENSE WITH A SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
455
SECRET
25X1
NNNN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SFCRFT
SECRETSTOCKHOLM 07505
SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS
REF: STOCKHOLM 7455
1. I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE THAT I DO NOT, REPEAT
NOT, FAVOR THE IMMEDIATE TRANSITION TO CDE II FOR
CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. I SEE NO REASON WHY
WE SHOULD BE MORE EAGER THAN THE EUROPEANS TO JUMP
INTO THIS PARTICULAR FIRE. LET'S DIGEST AND IMPROVE
WHAT WE HAVE DONE HERE IN CDE I B AND NEGOTIATE THE
MANDATE FOR CDE II AT THE POST-VIENNA REVCON.
2. LAST MINUTE PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH (AND THE
NNA) OVER ISSUES OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP, ETC. CAST
SOME DOUBT ON THE SUITABILITY OF CDE AS AN ARMS REDUC-
TION FORUM. IN PARTICULAR I NOW WONDER WHETHER A
TWO-CHAMBER ARRANGEMENT IS POSSIBLE. BUT HOWEVER
TROUBLESOME THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES,
THEY HAVE STUCK WITH US ON SUBSTANCE - EVEN WHEN OUR
VIEWS CONTRADICTED THEIR NATIONAL POSITION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
456
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 07587
SUBJECT: SWEDISH REACTION TO CDE AGREEMENT
REF: STOCKHOLM 6838 (NOTAL)
1. (C) SUMMARY: THE CDE AGREEMENT REACHED IN STOCKHOLM
HAS DRAWN MIXED REVIEWS FROM SWEDISH POLITICAL FIGURES.
FOREIGN MINISTRY AND DEFENSE STAFF OFFICIALS HAVE ENDORSED
THE AGREEMENT. BUT OPPOSITION POLITICAL SPOKESMEN HAVE
INDICATED RESERVATIONS AND CALLED FOR A CAREFUL ANALYSIS
OF THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES FOR SWEDEN. CONCERNS OVER
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NOTIFICATION AND INSPECTION
PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT HAD SURFACED PREVIOUSLY
(REFTEL). IN THE END, HOWEVER, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN
THE CDE AND SWEDISH UNWILLINGNESS TO BECOME AN OBSTACLE
TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON AN ARMS CONTROL ISSUE OVERCAME
ANY LINGERING DOUBTS ABOUT NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) THE CDE AGREEMENT REACHED IN STOCKHOLM HAS DRAWN
MIXED PUBLIC RESPONSES FROM SWEDISH POLITICAL LEADERS.
FOREIGN MINISTER STEN ANDERSSON IN A SPEECH TO THE
CONCLUDING SESSION OF THE CDE SAID THAT THE GOS WAS
"VERY SATISFIED" WITH THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE
CONFERENCE. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, SOURCES IN
THE SWEDISH DELEGATION ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN
DOUBTS OVER THE AGREEMENT'S INSPECTION PROVISIONS, BUT
THESE SOURCES SAID THAT THE GOS HAD DETERMINED THAT THE
AGREEMENT WOULD NOT CAUSE PROBLEMS, EITHER POLITICAL OR
MILITARY, FOR SWEDEN. MFA UNDERSECRETARY PIERRE SCHORI
EMPHASIZED HIS FIRM CONVICTION THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS A
GOOD AND DESIRABLE ONE.
3. (U) A SPOKESMAN FOR THE DEFENSE STAFF, COL. BERTIL
JOHANSSON, ALSO ENDORSED THE CDE AGREEMENT, NOTING THAT
IT WAS AN ADVANCE OVER PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI AGREE-
MENT. HE SAID THAT THE MILITARY HAVE LONG HELD
THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTIONS IS NECESSARY, EVEN IF
UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, THIS MIGHT CREATE DIFFICULTIES
FOR SWEDEN.
4. (U) SWEDISH OPPOSITION SPOKESMEN WERE MORE AMBIGUOUS.
MODERATE PARTY LEADER CARL BILDT WELCOMED THE SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION OF THE CDE CONFERENCE AND STATED THAT IT WAS
PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO
PERMIT ONSITE CHALLENGE INSPECTION. HOWEVER, HE NOTED
THAT UNDER THE AGREEMENT THE SOVIETS COULD DEMAND TO
CONDUCT AN INSPECTION ON SWEDISH TERRITORY, WHILE, AS A
PRACTICAL MATTER, SWEDEN WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONDUCT
INSPECTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE NATO WOULD NO
DOUBT USE UP THE LIMITED NUMBER THE SOVIETS ARE OBLIGATED
TO ACCEPT. BILDT SAID THAT THE SWEDISH AUTHORITIES
WOULD NEED TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
AGREEMENT FOR SWEDEN. BILDT'S CALL FOR A CAREFUL REVIEW
OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CDE AGREEMENT WAS ECHOED BY
457
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SPrA9T
LIBERAL PARTY MP INGEMAR ELIASSON AND CENTER PARTY DEFENSE
EXPERT GUNNAR BJORK.
5. (C) AS NOTED REFTEL, AMBASSADOR EARLIER RAISED
SWEDISH CONCERNS WITH MFA UNDERSECRETARY ELIASSON. IN
A LATER CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR HAD ALSO DISCUSSED
THIS ISSUE WITH MODERATE LEADER CARL BILDT EMPHASIZING
U.S. INTEREST IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD SERVE
BROAD WESTERN INTERESTS AND NOT UNDULY ADVERSELY AFFECT
ANY FRIENDLY COUNTRY. WE KNOW THAT BILDT LATER DISCUSSED
THE MATTER WITH SUPREME COMMANDER GENERAL LJUNG AND
BILDT DID NOT MAKE ANY PUBLIC OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT
AS THE CDE STRUGGLED TO REACH A FINAL COMPROMISE.
6. (C) COMMENT: WE WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY SURPRISED IF
THE GOS HAD STUCK TO A HARD LINE POSITION THAT MIGHT
HAVE JEOPARDIZED REACHING A CDE AGREEMENT. IN VIEW OF
SWEDEN'S PUBLIC IMAGE (AND ITS SELF-PERCEPTION) AS A
STRONG ADVOCATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREE-
MENTS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR
SWEDEN TO STAND IN THE WAY OF AN AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS,
SWEDEN'S SERIOUS HARD LOOK AT HOW THE CDE AGREEMENT WOULD
AFFECT ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS REFLECTS A SERIOUS CONCERN
FOR SECURITY ISSUES THAT IS SOMETIMES LACKING IN SWEDISH
POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. END
COMMENT. NEWELL
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
453
SECRET
25X1
nRciassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
25X1
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07640
SUBJ: AMB. BARRY SPEECH TO CHATHAM HOUSE (09/25/86)
L. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH AMBASSADOR
ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF US DELEGATION TO THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT (CDE) WILL
GIVE TO THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AT CHATHAM HOUSE (LONDON) THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25.
2. FOR LONDON, IF AMB. BARRY MAKES LAST MINUTE
CHANGES, PLEASE ADVISE P/PFE, MARIE KOENIG (202)
485-2112 IN TIME TO MAKE CORRECTIONS IN WIRELESS FILE
COPY. EUR/P SHOULD ALSO BE INFORMED.
FOR P/PFE: REQUEST TEXT BE CARRIED IN THURSDAY FILE,
TO APPEAR FRIDAY.
FOR EUR/P: REQUEST THIS SPEECH BE GIVEN WIDEST
DISTRIBUTION THROUGH DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION OR
OTHERWISE.
3. BEGIN TEXT: TITLE: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE.
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,
CDE, HAS JUST COMPLETED ITS WORK SUCCESSFULLY. I CAN
THINK OF NO MORE APPROPRIATE PLACE TO DISCUSS THE
CONFERENCE, ITS OUTCOME AND IMPLICATIONS THAN HERE IN
LONDON. THE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT PLAYED A
LEADING ROLE IN FORMULATING AND MAINTAINING THE
WESTERN POSITION, AND, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF
AMBASSADOR MICHAEL EDES, THE BRITISH DELEGATION AT
THE CONFERENCE WAS A STRONG FORCE IN ACHIEVING THE
POSITIVE RESULT.
THE UNITED STATES IS SATISFIED WITH THAT RESULT; THE
STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT IS A GOOD ACCORD WHICH SHOULD
CONTRIBUTE To STABILITY AND HELP TO REDUCE THE RISK
OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME ESTABLISHED EXTENDS THE
CONCEPT OF OPENNESS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND ADVANCES
THE BROADER PRINCIPLE, EMBODIED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT, THAT RELATIONS AMONG STATES -- BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST -- SHOULD BE BASED UPON COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE
AND NOT ON CONFRONTATION.
THE STOCKHOLM REGIME IS NOT PERFECT, AND MUCH MORE CAN
USEFULLY BE DONE IN THE AREA OF CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. BUT STOCKHOLM IS AN
IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD A MORE PREDICTABLE AND SECURE
EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION AND TOWARD CREATION OF THE
ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER CONFIDENCE NECESSARY FOR
CONSIDERATION OF MORE FAR-REACHING MEASURES OF ARMS
CONTROL.
WHAT STOCKHOLM ACHIEVED
WHEN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE BEGAN IN JANUARY, 1984,
THE WEST HAD A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT IT WANTED TO
459
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
ACHIEVE: SPECIFICALLY, WE SOUGHT CONCRETE MEASURES
WHICH WOULD INCREASE COMMON UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF ALL SIGNIFICANT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE; THUS, WE SOUGHT TO
REDUCE THE RISK THAT A MISCALCULATION OR
MISINTERPRETATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF THOSE ACTIVITIES
COULD SET OFF THE ESCALATING CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH,
UNCHECKED, MIGHT LEAD TO WAR. TO MEET THAT GOAL, WE
PROPOSED SPECIFIC MEASURES CALLING FOR AN EXCHANGE OF
MILITARY INFORMATION, THE FORECAST, NOTIFICATION AND
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY EXERCISES, AND INSPECTION FOR
VERIFICATION. TO A LARGE DEGREE, THE STOCKHOLM
DOCUMENT REFLECTS EXACTLY THESE MEASURES, WHICH ALSO
REPRESENT THE APPROACH SUPPORTED BY THE NEUTRAL AND
NON-ALIGNED STATES IN THE CONFERENCE.
THE EASTERN STATES IN STOCKHOLM, ON THE OTHER HAND,
INITIALLY SOUGHT TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON PURELY
DECLARATORY PROPOSALS WHICH HAD MADE UP THE POLITICAL
AGENDA THEY HAD BEEN AIMING AT WESTERN EUROPE, IN SOME
CASES FOR YEARS. THEIR TACTICS SEEMED INTENDED MORE
TO DIVIDE THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE
ISSUE OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, THAN TO
ADVANCE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE EAST'S
APPROACH FOUND NO SUPPORT IN THE CONFERENCE AND THEIR
PROPOSALS EVENTUALLY WITHERED AWAY, THIS OPENING
DIVERSIONARY TACTIC COST THE NEGOTIATION MANY MONTHS.
ONE RESULT IS THAT WE REACHED FINAL AGREEMENT ONLY
.AST FRIDAY, RATHER THAN A YEAR AGO AS THE WEST HAD
HOPED TO DO AT ONE TIME. WE HAVE NOT ACTUALLY
IMPLEMENTED THE MEASURES ADOPTED; WE STILL HAVE NO
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE WITH THEM TO GUIDE US ON THE NEXT
STEPS.
NEVERTHELESS, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE IS CONSIDERABLE. THIRTY-FIVE NATIONS HAVE
MADE THE POLITICALLY BINDING COMMITMENT TO ANNOUNCE,
FAR IN ADVANCE, SCHEDULES AND OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT
THE PURPOSE, SCOPE AND LOCATION OF THEIR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. THIS FIRMLY ESTABLISHES IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THE PRINCIPLE THAT STATES SHOULD KNOW WHAT
OTHER STATES ARE DOING AND PLANNING TO DO IN THE
MILITARY FIELD. IN PRACTICE, IT SHOULD ALSO ESTABLISH
A NORM, AN ACCEPTED STANDARD OF ROUTINE TRAINING AND
EXERCISES, WHICH SHOULD HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT ON
RELATIONS AMONG POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. WITH A COMMON
CALENDAR OF EVENTS, IN SOME CASES PROJECTED TWO YEARS
AHEAD, MILITARY COMMANDERS WILL HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF
WHAT TO EXPECT OF OTHERS; IT WILL BE EASY TO
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LARGE, PRE-PLANNED EXERCISES, TO
WHICH NO SPECIAL RESPONSE IS REQUIRED, AND UNANNOUNCED
ACTIVITIES, WHICH COULD REQUIRE COUNTER-MEASURES. FOR
EXAMPLE, IF A STATE CONCENTRATED ITS FORCES ON THE
460
SECRET
25X1
im,,,i,ecifiari in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2012/05/22 CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
BORDER OF ANOTHER STATE FOR PURPOSES OF POLITICAL
INTIMIDATION, IT WOULD BE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE
STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT AND WOULD PAY A HEAVY POLITICAL
PRICE.
THE STOCKHOLM CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WILL NOT
PREVENT DETERMINED AGGRESSION OR RULE OUT THE USE OF
FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. BUT IT WILL GREATLY
REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE "UNWANTED" OR ACCIDENTAL
WAR, AND IT WILL GREATLY RAISE THE POLITICAL COST FOR
A STATE TRYING TO INTIMIDATE ANOTHER THROUGH MILITARY
MEANS.
STOCKHOLM ADVANCES HELSINKI
IN EVALUATING THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME, A GOOD PERSPECTIVE IS
GAINED BY COMPARING IT WITH THE MODEST
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
OF 1975. THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM ARE, IN
FACT, QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS OVER
THE HELSINKI MEASURES.
- FIRST THEY ARE MANDATORY, POLITICALLY BINDING,
WHEREAS HELSINKI WAS VOLUNTARY; THUS, THE STOCKHOLM
MEASURES ARE CONCRETE COMMITMENTS TO ACTIONS, NOT
SYMBOLIC GESTURES.
- SECOND, THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES COVER THE WHOLE
OF EUROPE, FOR THE FIRST TIME TREATING THE ENTIRE
REGION AS ONE ENTITY WITH INTERRELATED SECURITY
CONCERNS; HELSINKI EXEMPTED MOST OF THE SOVIET
TERRITORY IN EUROPE.
- THIRD, THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES ARE VERIFIABLE,
A PREREQUISITE OF REAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING; IN KEEPING
WITH ITS VOLUNTARY CHARACTER, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
CONTAINED NO PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION.
- AND FOURTH, THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES COVER ALL
SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES GOING ON IN EUROPE;
HELSINKI COVERED ONLY "MAJOR MANEUVERS." THE LEVEL OF
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ACTIVITY UNDER STOCKHOLM WILL BE
MUCH GREATER AND, PRESUMABLY, THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
WILL BE AS WELL.
IN SHORT, THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES HAVE TURNED THE
CONCEPT OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES CONTAINED IN
THE F:NAL ACT INTO A PRACTICAL SYSTEM TO OPERATE IN
THE REAL WORLD OF MILITARY AFFAIRS.
IMPLICATIONS
THE NEXT STEP, OF COURSE, WILL BE IMPLEMENTATION. WE
ARE HOPEFUL THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM
REGIME WILL LIVE UP TO ITS POTENTIAL FOR REDUCING
SUSPICIONS AND BUILDING CONFIDENCE; IT IS NOW UP TO
ALL PARTIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR NEW COMMITMENTS FULLY.
THAT IS NOT TO QUESTION THE GOOD FAITH OF ANY
PARTICIPATING STATE IN UNDERTAKING THESE OBLIGATIONS;
BUT WE ARE BREAKING NEW GROUND, AND, NATURALLY, WE ALL
461
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
-- THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES AND THE EAST, AS
WELL AS THE WEST -- WILL BE WATCHING CAREFULLY TO SEE
HOW THE MEASURES ADOPTED WORK OUT IN PRACTICE.
IF IMPLEMENTATION GOES SMOOTHLY, WE SHOULD EXPLORE
WAYS TO DEVELOP CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-MEASURES
FURTHER TO INCREASE THEIR STABILIZING EFFECT. FROM
STOCKHOLM, WE ALREADY SEE SEVERAL KEY AREAS WHERE
IMPROVEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. FIRST AND FOREMOST,
WE SHOULD WORK TO EXPAND THE COMMITMENT TO EXCHANGE
INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURES AND
LUCATIONS IN EUROPE. STOCKHOLM WAS DISAPPOINTING IN
THIS REGARD; THE EAST REFUSED TO MAKE THE COMMITMENT
TO PROVIDE EVEN THE KIND OF INFORMATION THE WEST HAS
ROUTINELY INCLUDED IN ITS NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT SINCE 1975 -- THE DESIGNATION OF
UNITS PARTICIPATING IN EXERCISES. QUESTIONS OF WHAT
FORCES ARE ACTUALLY IN EUROPE AND WHERE THEY ARE --
THE INFAMOUS "DATA ISSUE" -- HAVE TIED UP THE
CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION TALKS IN VIENNA FOR
THIRTEEN YEARS. PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE IN ANY
CONTINUATION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SEEMS TO US
ESSENTIAL IF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS IS TO
ADVANCE AND, CERTAINLY, IF WE ARE TO CONSIDER NEW
EFFORTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS.
THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, FORECASTING MILITARY ACTIVITIES A
YEAR OR MORE AHEAD, COULD BE THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL
THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM. WE SHOULD
ESPECIALLY TRY TO DEVELOP THE CALENDAR'S STABILIZING
EFFECT BY MAKING IT NOT JUST DESCRIPTIVE IN ANNOUNCING
WHAT IS PLANNED TO HAPPEN BUT PROSCRIPTIVE IN LIMITING
WHAT IS ALLOWED TO HAPPEN. I BELIEVE THAT THE VALUE
OF PROHIBITING MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN
ANNOUNCED TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE, A LOGICAL ELABORATION
OF A WESTERN PROPOSAL IN STOCKHOLM, IS SELF-EVIDENT.
THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO EXPLORE THE WHOLE RELATED
AREA OF CONSTRAINTS, CEILINGS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE
SIZE AND SCOPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE NOT
FOUND A CONSTRAINT WHICH WOULD AFFECT ALL PARTIES
EQUALLY AND WOULD NOT PENALIZE A DEFENDER MORE THAN AN
AGRESSOR. BUT WE RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF
SUCH MEASURES AND CONTINUE OUR STUDY.
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, THUS, HAS TAKEN AN IMPORTANT
FIRST STEP TOWARD ESTABLISHING THE VIABILITY OF
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AS ARMS
CONTROL INSTRUMENTS; IT HAS OPENED UP A PROCESS
POTENTIALLY AS IMPORTANT AS ARMS REDUCTION EFFORTS IT
IS DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT AND SUPPORT. BUT STOCKHOLM
ALSO PROVIDES CAUTIONARY LESSONS.
CONTINUED EASTERN RESISTANCE TO EXCHANGING MILITARY
INFORMATION AND ESTABLISHING A DATA BASE ABOUT FORCES
IS AN OBVIOUS AND SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO MORE AMBITIOUS
25X1
462
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
EFFORTS. SECONDLY, AND RELATED TO THE CONCEPT OF
OPENNESS, IS THE WHOLE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION.
STOCKHOLM MADE AN HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH IN ACCEPTING
INSPECTION AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT A STATE WITH DOUBTS
ABOUT THE INTENTION BEHIND MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF
ANOTHER STATE CAN GO INTO THAT OTHER STATE AND SEE FOR
ITSELF WHAT IS GOING ON. WE HAVE A CHANCE TO TEST THE
REAL EFFECTIVENESS OF INSPECTION IN PRACTICE. BUT THE
INSPECTION REGIME FROM STOCKHOLM IS RELATIVELY MODEST
AND UNINTRUSIVE. INSPECTION MEASURES ADEQUATE FOR
VERIFYING AN ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE
MUCH MORE DEMANDING. THEY WOULD REQUIRE ACCESS FOR
INSPECTORS TO SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS, SUCH AS DEFENSE
PLANTS, GARRISONS AND WEAPONS DEPOTS, NOT JUST TO
ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE FIELD. THE
NEGOTIATIONS ON INSPECTION IN STOCKHOLM WERE VERY,
VERY DIFFICULT, BUT THEY WERE A BREEZE COMPARED WITH
NEGOTIATIONS OF MEASURES NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION OF
ARMS REDUCTION.
A FURTHER CAUTION FROM STOCKHOLM IS FOUND IN WHAT I
MIGHT CALL THE "NEUTRAL DILEMMA." THE SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS OF NEUTRAL STATES WHICH DEPEND UPON
MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIANS ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROM
THOSE OF ALLIANCES WITH STANDING ARMIES. NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENTS WHICH AFFECT STATES WITH SUCH DIFFERENT
SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS, NEEDS AND COMMITMENTS IS AN
EXTREMELY COMPLEX TASK. ONE REASON STOCKHOLM SUCCEED
IN MEETING THOSE DIVERSE NEEDS OF THIRTY-FIVE STATES
IS THAT THE MANDATE FOR THE CONFERENCE WAS LIMITED AND
PRECISE. ANY FUTURE EFFORTS ON A EUROPEAN-WIDE BASIS
MUST TAKE CARE TO START WITH INSTRUCTIONS WHICH ARE
EQUALLY CLEAR, CONCRETE AND ACHIEVABLE AND WHICH TAKE
INTO CONSIDERATION THE PECULIAR SECURITY NEEDS OF
THOSE NOT AFFILIATED WITH ALLIANCES.
EVEN AS WE IMPLEMENT THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES AND SEEK
WAYS TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THEM, WE WILL SEEK WAYS
TO APPLY THE LESSONS OF STOCKHOLM TO THE QUESTIONS OF
REDUCTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. AS YOU
KNOW, THE HIGH-LEVEL TASK FORCE IN NATO IS STUDYING
THE WHOLE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. THE
UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE OBJECTIVE OF
REDUCING CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AS WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED
THROUGH OUR PARTICIPATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
OTHERS IN THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS, ALL THESE SECURITY ISSUES ARE
INTERCONNECTED; PROGRESS IN ONE AREA CAN HELP OPEN THE
WAY TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER. BECAUSE ARMS REDUCTION
TALKS NEED A STABLE ENVIRONMENT IN ORDER TO PROCEED,
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH LEAD
GREATER OPENNESS AND UNDERSTANDING AMONG STATES
INVOLVED, AND THUS TO GREATER STABILITY, SHOULD HAVE A
463
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
KEY ROLE TO PLAY. THE LESSONS FROM STOCKHOLM SHOULD
BE INVALUABLE AS WE DECIDE WHERE TO GO NEXT.
BEYOND MILITARY SECURITY
SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM COMES AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP, IN PARTICULAR GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV,
IS ADVOCATING GREATER OPENNESS IN SOVIET AFFAIRS, AS
WELL AS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IF STOCKHOLM
REPRESENTS THE BEGINNING OF A REAL CHANGE IN SOVIET
THINKING -- A "STRATEGIC SHIFT," AS ONE COLLEAGUE
RECENTLY TERMED IT -- WE COULD HAVE BEFORE US AN
OPPORTUNITY, UNPRECEDENTED FOR MANY DECADES, TO
IMPROVE THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, EVENTUALLY PERHAPS
REESTABLISH IT ON A NEW, MORE CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS.
THIS GREATER OBJECTIVE HAS, ULTIMATELY, PROVIDED THE
FUNDAMENTAL BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND IN THE HELSINKI
CSCE PROCESS TO WHICH IT BELONGS. AS SECRETARY OF
STATE SHULTZ SAID IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE OPENING OF THE
CONFERENCE, "THE HELSINKI PROCESS IS AN HISTORIC,
PEACEFUL EFFORT TO EASE, AND IN TIME TO END, THE
DIVISION OF EUROPE. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE LARGER
SENSE MEANS PURSUING THE WORK OF HELSINKI -- THROUGH
PRACTICAL STEPS TO BREAK DOWN BARRIERS, EXPAND HUMAN
CONTACT AND INTELLECTUAL INTERCHANGE, INCREASE
OPENNESS AND STRETCH THE BOUNDARIES OF THE HUMAN
SPIRIT." IF THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO ADOPT A NEW
POLICY OF GLASNOST -- OPENNESS -- STOCKHOLM COULD GIVE
AN IMPORTANT IMPULSE TO THE WHOLE HELSINKI PROCESS.
THAT IS CERTAINLY THE HOPE OF THE UNITED STATES; WHEN
THE RESULTS OF STOCKHOLM BECAME KNOWN, PRESIDENT
REAGAN ISSUED A STATEMENT IN WHICH HE SAID: "I
WELCOME THIS POSITIVE OUTCOME AT THE CDE CONFERENCE.
IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER SECURITY IN EUROPE AND
TO IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THIS ALSO SENDS
MESSAGES THAT SHOULD BE WELCOMED BY PEOPLE THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD. IT DEMONSTRATES THAT EAST AND WEST, WITH
SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE AND HARD WORK, CAN ESTABLISH
COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO BUILD A MORE SECURE FUTURE."
IN HIS STATEMENT, THE PRESIDENT AGAIN UNDERLINED THE
NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
AND ITS PARENT, THE HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS. "THIS CDE
ACCORD CAN ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN THE BROADER
HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS," HE SAID. "THE ACCORD ACHIEVED
AT STOCKHOLM ON SECURITY ISSUES MAKES ALL THE MORE
IMPERATIVE BALANCED PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. AT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP
MEETING, WHICH BEGINS IN NOVEMBER, THE UNITED STATES
DELEGATION WILL PRESS FOR FULFILLMENT OF ALL CSCE
COMMITMENTS AND FOR BALANCED PROGRESS ACROSS THE FULL
CSCE AGENDA."
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS MOVED THE SECURITY AREA
464
25X1
SECRET
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD.
THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES ARE VALUABLE IN THEMSELVES, AND
THEY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. OTHER AREAS OF THE HELSINKI
PROCESS, HAVE NOT PROGRESSED; SOME, NOTABLY HUMAN
RIGHTS, HAVE ROVED BACKWARDS. IN THE VIENNA CSCE
REVIEW MEETING, THE UNITED STATES WILL EVALUATE THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF STOCKHOLM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN
FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO ALL THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN
IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS.
THE QUESTION OF BALANCE AMONG ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF
THE FINAL ACT WILL WEIGH HEAVILY IN OUR JUDGMENT AS WE
DECIDE HOW THE CSCE PROCESS SHOULD PROCEED AFTER
VIENNA. THAT IS NOT A QUESTION OF ARRANGING MORE
MEETINGS SPREAD EVENLY AMONG VARIOUS SUBJECTS OF
CONCERN TO VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS. IT IS A QUESTION OF
MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF CSCE AS AN ORGANIC
WHOLE. THE STOCKHOLM REGIME MAY FUNCTION, BUT THE
VIABILITY OF A SECURITY ARRANGEMENT WHICH DEPENDS ON
OPENNESS -- ON MUTUAL CONFIDENCE -- REMAINS TENTATIVE
IF PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE TO OPPOSE OPENNESS, HUMAN
CONTACTS, TRAVEL AND COMMUNICATION AMONG THE CITIZENS
OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES.
I WOULD EMPHASIZE, IN THIS REGARD, THE SERIOUSNESS
WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES VIEWS THE ARREST IN
MOSCOW OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST NICHOLAS DANILOFF ON
TRUMPED UP CHARGES. THIS ONE ACT, WHICH FLIES IN THE
FACE OF EVERYTHING THE HELSINKI PROCESS STANDS FOR,
MUST RAISE DOUBTS IN ALL OUR MINDS ABOUT SOVIET
WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE OBLIGATIONS OF HELSINKI --
INDEED, THE OBLIGATIONS OF STOCKHOLM -- SERIOUSLY.
THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
FROM ITS INCEPTION TO ITS END. WE WORKED WITH OUR
ALLIES FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, AND WE TAKE
SATISFACTION IN THE RESULT, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT WAS
AN ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE NOT JUST OF INDIVIDUAL
STATES. NATO HAD SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES, FULLY DEVELOPED
AND CLEARLY ARTICULATED, AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE
CONFERENCE, AND WE STUCK TOGETHER IN WORKING
CONSISTENTLY TO SEE THAT WE ACCOMPLISHED THEM. IN
THIS WAY, TOO, STOCKHOLM HOLDS LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE:
A COHERENT, UNIFIED ALLIANCE POSITION ESTABLISHED AT
THE VERY BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND MAINTAINED CAN
LEAD TO SUCCESS EVEN ON HIGHLY COMPLEX, MULTILATERAL
SECURITY ISSUES. QUITE SIMPLY, I BELIEVE STOCKHOLM
WOULD NEVER HAVE REACHED THE POSITIVE OUTCOME IT DID
IF THE ALLIANCE HAD NOT WORKED SO WELL TOGETHER.
THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS NOT AN
END. IT IS AN ADVANCE, AND IT OFFERS NEW
POSSIBILITIES FOR EAST-WEST AFFAIRS. ALL THIRTY-FIVE
STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN FURTHER COMMITMENTS; WE MUST
ALL LIVE UP TO THEM. WE HAVE ALSO CREATED NEW
465
SECRET
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
SECRET
OPPORTUNITIES; WE MUST ALL STRIVE NOW TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THEM. END TEXT.
CURT IN
END OF MESSAGE
466
UNCLASSIFIED
25X1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP92-01168R000100080001-7