SOVIET BLOC AND NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE CSCE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) (CDE-VII & CDE-VIII) 10 SEPTEMBER - 18 OCTOBER 1985 5 NOVEMBER - 20 DECEMBE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-01168R000100060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 389
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Volume II
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-VII & CDE-VIII)
10 September -18 October 1985
5 November - 20 December 1985
CR 86-10190
February 1986
Copy 0 3 4
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~~~C1
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-VII & CDE-VIII)
10 September -18 October 1985
5 November - 20 December 1985
Volume II
This rP/erence aid was prepared by the O,,~ice oJ.
Central RPlerence. Comments and questions may be
directed to Chic,/; USSR-EE Division, OCR;
This document, done as a "service of common
concern," contains sensitive diplomatic infor-
mation and is disseminated to recipients by
name for work under their cognizance. Fur-
ther dissemination may occur only with the
concurrence of C/USSR-EE/OCR/CIA.
Secret
CR 86-10190
February 1986
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07729
SUBJECT: SATISFACTOAY.AGREEMENT APPARENTLY REACHED ON
TRANSITION TO CDE EXPLORATORY PHASE
REF: STATE 301423
1. CDE VII - 041.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE NATO CAUCUS BAS APPARENTLY REACHED A
SATISFACTORY AD REFERENDU?i AGREEMENT WITH THE EASTERN
AND NNA GROUPS ON A FRAMEWORK FOR THE TRANSITION TO THE
EXPLORATORY PEASE OF THE CDE. BECAUSE THE DELEGATION
AGREES TEAT THE AGREEMENT PROTECTS OUR INTERESTS ON ALL
IMPORTANT POINTS AND BECAUSE IT IS CONSISTENT WITH
REFTEL, I HAVE SAID THAT I BELIEVE IT WILL BE
ACCEPTABLE TO WASHINGTON. IN THE ABSENCE OF
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, I WILL GIVE OUR FORMAL
AGREEMENT TO THE CAUCUS MEETING AT 10:30 LOCAL TIME
OCTOBER 10.
k. THE TEXT OF TBE "AGREEMENT" (TRANSMITTED SEPTEL)
WOULD BE CIRCULATED TO ALL DELEGATIONS AS EARLY AS
POSSIBLE; ACCOMPANYING ORAL STATEMENTS (ALSO SEPTEL)
WOULD PROBABLY BE READ BY THE NNA COORDINATOR. IN
BRIEF, THE FOLLOWING REY POINTS RAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY
THE EAST:
- A. NATO CAUCUS FORMULATION ON VERIFICATION,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION HAS SURVIVED INTACT ("IN
THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM COMPRISING A SET
OF MUTUALLY COIiPLEMENTARY CSBMS").
B. NATO CAUCUS FORMULATION ON VERIFICATION
SURVIVES INTACT ("CSBMS TO BE ADOPTED WILL BE PROVIDED
WITS ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO
THEIR CONTENT").
- C. AN ADEQUATE FORMULATION ON CONSTRAINTS SURVIVES
FROM ORIGINAL "NON-US NON-PAPER" ("CONSTRAINING
MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY
ACTIVITIES").
- D. US POSITION ON DRAFTING IS ADEQUATELY
PROTECTED. THERE WILL BE AN INFORMAL ORAL STATEMENT,
SEPARATE FROM THE "AGREEMENT," WHICH WILL READ, "IT IS
UNDERSTOOD THAT TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING STAGE SHOULD
S?ART, IF POSSIBLE, DURING THE EIGHTH SESSION." IT IS
CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE MUS? BE CONSENSUS FOR
DRAFTING TO BEGIN, THIS POSITION IS SUPPORTED BY THE
TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT, AND WE GAVE CLEARLY SIGNALLED
THAT WE WILL NOT AGREE TO DRAFT UNLESS WE ARE SATISFIED
WITS THE EXPLORATORY PEASE.
- E. OUR POSITION ON "CONSULTATIONS AND RAPID MEANS
OF COMMUNICATIONS" IN TBE CONTEXT OF THE
VERIFICATION/INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION PACKAGE IS
PROTECTED, t.E., THE ABOVE PHRASE WILL NOT BE PART OF
.THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE WILL BE AN ORAL
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THESE TOPICS~WILL BE
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RAISED, BUT THIS WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION IN ANY CASE;
WE COULD NOT_PREVENT THE ROMANIANS/NNAS FROM INCLUDING
THEM UNDER THE SUBJECT OF "COMMUNICATIONS".
S. THERE WAS UNANIMOUS APPROVAL OF THE AGREEMENT
PACKAGE IN THIS MORNINGS NATO CAUCUS. THE UK
REPRESENTATIVE, WITH WHOM I HAVE CONSULTED CLOSELY,
EXPECTS A GREEN LIGHT FROM LONDON.
6. THE NNA ARE A POSSIBLE FLY-IN-THE-OINTMENT SINCE
THEY HAVE NOT YET FORMALLY ACCEPTED THE PACKAGE, BUT
TBEY ARE NOT EXPECTED TO RAISE DIFFICULTIES GIVEN THEIR
EAGERNESS TO MOVE AHEAD.
7. EVEN IF WE AGREE ON MONDAY TO MOVE INTO THE
FROM USDEL CDE
FOR USIA PM DIRECTOR HOLMES FROM BARRY
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT APPARENTLY REACHED ON
EXPLORATORY PHASE AND HAVE A COUPLE OF TRIAL RUNS
BEFORE THIS ROUND CLOSES, PROCEDURAL WRANGLES WILL
CONTINUE TO OCCUPY MUCH OF OUR TIME. PARALLEL WITH
SUBSTANCE, THE ERPLORATORY PHASE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER
HOW TO STRUCTURE DRAFTING. THIS COULD TARE THE ENTIRE
EIGHTH ROUND, BUT THIS GIVES US ANOTHER "FIREBREAK" IF
NEEDED.
8. NONETHELESS, THE MOVE TQ A MORE INFORMAL STAGE
GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE A MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY
T~ SUBSTANCE, WHICH IN TURN ENHANCES THE PROSPECTS FOR
OUR CSBMS. THIS IS AN ACCOMPLISHMENT WE CAN POINT TO
WITH SATISFACTION. MUCH OF THE CREDIT BELONGS TO JIM
GOODBY, WHO STRUCTURED THE BASIC OUTLINES OF 'fHE
TRANSITIONAL FRAMEWORK. '
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L S?OCRHOLM 07730
SUBJECT: TEXT OF INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AND ORAL
- STATEMENTS
1. CDE VII - 042 - C - ENTIRE TEXT
T. FOLLOi~IING IS THE TEXT DESCRIBING A FRAMEWORK
FOR THE TRANSITION TO AN EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE CDE, AS
WELL AS TEXT OF ORAL REMARKS WHICH WOULD ACCOMPANY WRITTEN
TEXT. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, THIS LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTED
AD REF BY THE NATO CAUCUS OCTOBER 9.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
(1) THE EXIS?ING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS A MEANS
OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH
MIGHT FIGURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCESS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE
ON A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSHM'S, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE MANDATE, FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT.
(2) IN INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS THE
FOLLOWING TOPICS WILL BE TAKEN UP:
WORKING GROUP A
- TUESDAY NON-USE OF FORCE
WEDNESDAY EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION,
- - - COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION, AND
- - - DEVELOPMENT OF'MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, IN
- - - THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
- - - COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY
- - - CSBM'S
- THURSDAY CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF
- - CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
WORKING GROUP B
- TUESDAY NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
- THURSDAY OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(3) INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS SHOIILD START DURING THE 7TH
SESSION () WITH A VIEW TO FACILITATING AN EARLY
- TRANSITION ?0 THE DRAFTING STAGE.
(4) BOTH IN THE EXPLORATION OF THE TOPICS MENTIONED ABOVE
- AND IN SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF LANGUAGE FOR A
- CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ALL WORK AND ALL DRAFT TEXTS WILL
- BE CONSIDERED PROVISIONAL AND WILL NEITHER IMPLY NOR
- PREJUDICE FINAL AGREEMENT ON ANY OF THE ELEMENTS
- DISCUSSED.
(S) IT IS RECALLED THAT THE CSBM'S TO BE ADOPTED WILL BE
- PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH
CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.
U THE EXACT DATE (OCTOBER 15) MIGHT NOW BE INDICATED.
END TEX?.
4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ORAL REMARKS:
BEGIN TEXT:
(1) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT
OF HEANS OF COMiiiJNICATION, CONSULTATIONS AND RAPID EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S WILL ALSO
BE DISCUSSED;
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(2) INFORMAL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WILL BE CHAIRED BY
ROTATING CHAIRMEN;
(3) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING STAGE
SHOULD START, IF POSSIBLE, DURING THE 8TH SESSION.
OCTOBER 9, 1985
NOTE: THE NN-DELEGATIONS WISH TO LEAVE OUT THE REFERENCE
TO COORDINATORS
END TE7C? .
BARRY
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CONF IDENTIALSTOCRHOLM07781
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING, OCTOBER 10, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7730
1. CDE VII - 044.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE CDE NATO CAUCUS OCTOBE& 10, DUE TO A FRENCH
RESERVE, FAILED TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE WRITTEN
AGREEMENT AND ORAL UNDERSTANDINGS ON INFORMAL WORKING
STRUCTURE REPORTED REFTEL. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS,
GASCBIGNARD (FRANCE) BLOCKED CONSENSUREQUIRING A
CHANGE OF THE WORD "WILL" TO "COULD" IN THE AD REF
WORDING OF THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING ON CONSULTATIONS --
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT
OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, CONSULTATIONS AND RAPID
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
CSBM'S WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED." PARIS HAD INSTRUCTED
GASCHIGNARD TO OBTAIN CAUCUS AGREEMENT THAT THE NATO
SPOKESMEN WOULD TELL RAHILUOTO (FINLAND) THAT NATO WAS
PREPARED TO GIVE FULL AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT'S WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF THIS CHANGE. GASCHIGNARD EXPLAINED THAT
THIS WAS MEAN? TO PROVIDE A POLITICAL,SIGNAL OF THE
DIFFICULTY WE HAVE WITH T'HE CONCEPT OF CONSULTATIONS.
THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS IN THE CAUCUS TO ACCEPT THE
FRENCH POSITION, WHICH MOST DELEGATIONS VIEWED AS
DANGEROUS BOTH BECAUSE IT WOULD PROMPT OTHER CHANGES
FROM THE EAST AND NNA'S, AND WOULD MARE THE WEST APPEAR
TO BE BLOCKING AN AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE, GASCHIGNARD
FURTHER INDICATED THAT, IF THE CAUCUS COULD NOT AGREE
TO HAVE THE SPOKESMEN HARE THIS POINT ON BEHALF OF
NATO, HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH RAHILUOTO AS SOON A
POSSIBLE (I.E., TODAY) AND MARE IT IN HIS NATIONAL
CAPACITY.
4. THE CAUCUS SPENT SEVERAL HOURS SEARCHING FOR A
SOLUTION OF THIS SEEMING IMPASSE. DISCUSSION WAS
PARTICULARLY CHARGED FOLLOWING GASCHIGNARD'S
ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD GO TO RAHILUOTO DIRECTLY IF
THE CAUCUS COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FRENCH POSITION.
BARRY (U.S.) SUPPORTED FRANCE'S SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS ON
CONSULTATIONS, AND REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT HE ALSO HAD
VOICED SOME CONCERN OVER THE VERB "WILL" IN THE ORAL
UNDERSTANDING. HE NOTED THAT MANY, IF NOT ALL, CAUCUS
MEMBERS PROBABLY SHARED FRANCE'S SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS
ON THIS ISSUE. FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION OF SEVERAL
OPTIONS, THE CAUCUS AGREED TO AN APPROACH SUGGESTED BY
THE U.S. WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE FRENCH TO SEND THEIR
POLITICAL SIGNAL WITHOUT DEMANDING A CHANGE IN THE
TEXT, THEREBY PREVENTING AN OPEN DISPLAY OF CAUCUS
DISUNITY. THE CAUCUS INSTRUCTED THE NATO SPOKESMEN TO
TELL RAHILUOTO (ON THY. EVENING OF OCT. 10) THAT "THE
CAUCUS HAS NOT ARRIVED AT A FINAL CONSENSUS; A PROBLEM
REMAINS WITH RELATION TO CONSULTATIONS." IF PRESSED BY
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RAHILUOTO AS TO WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS, THE SPOKESMEN
WERE INSTRUCTED TO RESPOND THAT " WE (THE CAUCUS) WILL
TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM AMONG OURSELVES." ON THE
BASIS OF THIS APPROACH, GASCHIGNARD AGREED NOT TO
APPROACH RAHILUOTO AT THIS TIME.
S. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION, THE CAUCUS WAS
INFORMED THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAD PASSED VIRTUALLY THE
SAME MESSAGE TO RAHILUOTO BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN "UNABLE
TO SOLVE ROMANIA'S PROBLEM" (ROMANIA APPARENTLY WANTED
THE ORAL POIN? ON CONSULTA?IONS EITHER STRENGHTENED OR
MADE PART OF THE WRITTEN TExT). THE CAUCUS AGREED TO
CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE AT 9:45 AM ON OCTOBER
11.
BARRY
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CONF IDENT IALSTOCRHOLM07822
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, OC?OBER 10, 1985
1. CDE VII - 04S
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BECAUSE OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS' PREOCCUPATION
WITH REACHING A PROCEDURAL SOLUTION ONLY THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR DELIVERED A PREPARED STATEMEN? AT THE OCTOBER
11 PLENARY. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY REAFFIRMED GORBACHEV'S
ACCEPTANCE OF AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL, FORECASTS WHICH
WOULD COVER NAVAL, AIR, GROUND ACTIVITIES AND
MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS. IN SO DOING, HE NO?ED THAT THE
SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS MORE MEANINGFUL THAN THE WEST'S
LIIiITED MEASURE WHICH ONLY DEALT WITH LAND ACTIVITIES.
IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) SAID GORBACHEV'S
ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS WAS A POSITIVE STEP, BUT
$IS DELEGATION WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE "SMALL PRINT"
OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE ANNUAL FORECASTS OF
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. (FULL TEXT OF
GRINEVSRY'S S?ATEMENT SENT SEPTEL.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07821
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD
- OF USSR DELEGATION TO CDE, OCTOBER 11, 1985
REF: TEL CDE VII - 045
1. CDE VII - 046
2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE STATEMENT DELIVERED OCTOBER 11,
1985, BY THE HEAD OF THE USSR DELEGATION TO THE CDE
FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,
- ADDRESSING IN PARIS MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT
THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MIKHAIL GORBACBEV REAFFIRMED THE READINESS OF OUR COUNTRY
TO PROMOTE THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF STRENGTHENING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT IS PRECISELY WITH
THIS AIM IN MIND, WITH THE AIM OF SEEKING ACCORDS REGARD-
ING THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE IN THE MILITARY FIELD THAT
THE SOVIET UNION, AS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV INDICATED, WAS
PREPARED TO ACCEPT AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL
PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS SOVIET
PROPOSAL IS AIMED A? GIVING NEW IMPETUS TO THE WORK OF
THE STOCKHOLM FORUM. IN FACT, ANOTHER IMPORTANT TOPIC IS
BEING INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE, THAT OF
EXCHANGING ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND NOT
IN A CURTAILED FORM PROPOSED BY SOME STATES BUT ON A
BROAD PLANE COVERING ALL TYPES OF MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS
OF FORCES. IT IS SUCH AN APPROACH TO AN AGREEMENT IN
THI$ FIELD THAT WILL HELP OVERCOME SUSPICION ANH=IMPEDE
A COVERT PREPARATION OF WAR.
- MARE YOUR JUDGMENT. THE NUMBER OF MILITARY MANEUVERS
IN EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREAS AND AIR
SPACE HAS BEEN GROWING WITH EACH YEAR. THEY REPRESENT
THOROUGHLY COORDINATED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN LAND AND
SEA ?HEATERS AND IN AIR. IN THEIR FRAMEWORK AIR AND
NAVAL MANEUVERS AND TRANSFERS OF TROOPS HAVE BEEN ACQUIR-
ING AN EVER-THREATENING DIMENSION. THE SCOPE AND THE
SCALE OF THOSE MANEUVERS CONDUCTED ON LAND, AT SEA AND
IN AIR ARE SUCH THAT THEY COULD BE UTILIZED TO DEMONS-
TRATE FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. ALL THIS IS
ELOQUENTLY MANIFESTED BY NUMEROUS FACTS NOT ONLY OF PAST
BUT OF RECENT HISTORY.
- IF WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT A GREAT NUMBER OF GROUND
TROOPS, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES ARE PUT IN FULL COMBAT
READINESS AND HAVE THE NECESSARY AMMUNITION THIS ACTIVITY
RESEMBLES, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, A PRELUDE TO WAR
AND THUS LEADS TO INCREASED SUSPICION AND DISTRUST.
THESE SERIOUS QUESTIONS HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON CONFI-
DENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND BUST BE CONSIDERED AT
THE CONFERENCE.
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IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO ELABORATE SOMEWHAT ON
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION
REGARDING EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS PROPOSAL LIKE OTHER CBM'S,
WHETHER LIMITATION, NOTIFICATION OR OBSERVATION MEASURES,
SHOULD, AS THE SOVIE? UNION REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT,
ENSURE THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO EQUAL SECURITY AND
ASSURE A SITUA?ION WHERE NO STATE OR GROUP OF STATES
COULD OBTAIN ADVAN?AGES OVER THE OTHERS.
THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS COULD NOT SATISFY THIS
REQUIREMEN? UNLESS THEY COVER THE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY
NOT ONLY OF GROUND TROOPS BUT ALSO OF AIR AND NAVAL
FORCES, AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF TROOPS OF
EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREAS AND AIR
SPACE. THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDS HERE FROM THE PRINCIPLE
OF INDIVISIBLE SECURITY, ITS COMPREHENSIVE CONSIDERATION
FROM USDEL
USU FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.o. izss6: N/A
?AGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD
IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES. WE ARE OPPOSED
TO ANY SELEC?IVE COVERAGE BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
OF A PARTICULAR TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. ABROAD
APPROACH IS IN FULL AND COMPLETE ACCORD WITH THE MANDATE
OF THE CONFERENCE. THE "MILITARY ACTIVITIES" CONCEPT IN
THE MANDATE IS FAR BROADER THAN THE ACTIVITIES OF GROUND
TROOPS OR THE SO-CALLED OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES.
IT MUST BE ADMITTED ?HAT INFANTRY IS NO LONGER THE
QUEEN OF BATTLEFIELDS. NEW GODS OF WAR AT SEA AND IN
AIR WITH THEIR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES AND FORMIDABLE
WEAPONRY ROCK SECURITY IN EUROPE DURING MANEUVERS. IT
IS PRECISELY THESE MAJOR MANEUVERS, THEIR AREAS AND
DATES THAT ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ALL-EUROPEAN
PROCESS SHOULD BE INFORMED OF IN ADVANCE. THEY SHOULD
BE NOTIFIABLE AND SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN
ANNUAL PLANS. IN THIS WAY WE COULD REDUCE SUSPICIONS
AND IMPEDE A COVERT PREPARA?ION OF WAR.
- INCIDENTALLY, SOME OF OUR COLLEAGUES HERE IN THIS
HALL HAVE SPENT MUCH EFFORT TO TRY AND CONVINCE THE
CONFERENCE THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY IS THREATENED ONLY
WITH GROUND TROOPS AND THAT AS FAR AS AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES GO THEY ARE JUST A SORT OF INNOCENT TOURIST
CRUISES IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, LET ME QUOTE A DIFFERENT
OPINION BY A NO LESS AND, PERHAPS, EVEN MORE AUTHORITA-
TIVE EXPERT ON THE MATTER. I HAVE IN MIND GENERAL
ROGERS, SUPREME COMMANDER OF NATO ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE,
WHOSE OPINION, APPARENTLY, SHOUf.D NO? BE OVERLOOKED. IN
HIS RECENT INTERVIEW TO THE FRENCH SCIENCE ET VIE
MAGAZINE PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER UNDER THE HEADLINE "NEW
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STRATEGY FOR EUROPE" HE SAID THAT MODERN WARFARE MUST
ACHIEVE BASIC OBJECTIVES BY AIR STRIKES OF OUR (U.S.)
AIRCRAFT AND OUR (U.S.) KISSILES AND NOT ON LAND AND NOT
BY GROUND FORCES. THE SAME GOES FOR THE Navy.
- WHAT ARE, THEN, THE GROUNDS ON WHICH I? HAS BEEN
PERSISTENTLY SUGGESTED TO US THA? AIR AND NAVAL FORCES
-- THESE STRIKE FORCES OF MODERN WARFARE WHICH, ACCORDING
TO GENERAL ROGERS, MUST ACHIEVE BASIC OBJECTIVES -- BE
EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IiEASURES?
THE ANSWER CAN BE SIMPLE: EITHER THEY DO NOT WAN? TO
STRENG?HEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE OR THEY WANT
TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR THEMSELVES.
- BOTH APPROACHES ARE ALIEN TO THE SOVIET UNION'S
POSITION.
- NOW THAT THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS OF NOTIFI-
ABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FIGURES IN THE PROPOSALS OF ALL
THREE GROUPS OF STATES THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE
SUBJECT AND THE NEGO?IA?ION OF CORRESPONDING AGREEMENTS
COULD BE INTENSIFIED. WE WILL HAVE TO AGREE ON ONE
QUESTION: WHA? SHOULD BE THE CONTENT OF THOSE FORECASTS,
WHAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THEM AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE
MAGNITUDE OF INFORMATION GIVEN ON EACH ACTIVITY.
CERTAINLY, THE ISSUE AT HAND SHOULD BE THE INCLUSION NOT
OF THE DAY-TODAY COMBAT TRAINING OF GROUND TROOPS AT
TRAINING FIELDS, TEST RANGES AND FIRE RANGES WHERE TROOPS
OF ANY STA?E ARE ENGAGED IN ROUTINE TRAINING BUT RATHER
OF MAJOR MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS AND AIR AND
NAVAL FORCES WHICH INDEED POSE A THREAT TO SECURITY.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
- THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DEMONSTRATE IN PRACTICE
?HEIR READINESS TO INTENSIFY THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE
AND TARE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIONS OF OUR NEGOTIATING
PARTNERS. IT IS CLEAR FROM OUR STA?ED READINESS TO
ACCEPT AGREEKEN? ON MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF
FROM USDEL
USIA FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: STA?EKENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSRY, HEAD
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE EXPECT APPROPRIATE RESPONSES
FROM THE OTHER PARTICIPATNS IN THE CONFERENCE IN ORDER
TO START, AT LAST, MOVING TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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SECRET
S TATELREN T
by Oleg A. GRIl~TEVSKY,
Ambassador at I+arge,
Head of the USSR Delegation
to the Coafereace on Confidence- and Security-
Building Neasures and Disarmament is
Europe
Stockholm, October 11, 1985
216
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fir. Chairman,
~ddressiao is Paris members of the French Parliament the
General Secretary o! the CP.SII Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev
reffirmed the readiness of our country to promote the solution
of the problem of ?.strengthening confidence and security is
Europe. It is precisely with this aim in mind, with the aim of
seeking accords regarding the problem of confidence in the
military field that the Soviet IInion, as Mikhail Gorbac'~ev
inaicated, was prepared to accept agreement on the exchange of
annual plans of notifiable military activities. This Soviet
proposal is aimed at giving new impetus to the work of the
Stockholm forum. Ia fact, another important topic is being
included in the agenda of the Conference, that of exchanging
annual pleas o! military activities, and not in a curtailed form
proposed by some states but on a broad plane covering all t;~pes
of manoeuvres and movements o! forces. It is such as approach to
an agreement is this field that Hill help overcome suspicion
and impede a covert preparation of war.
~dake your ~udgemeat. The number of military manoeuvres in
$urope anti in the ad~o;~ sea (ocean) areas any air space aas
been growing with each year. They represent thoroughly coorciinater~
military activities in lead and sea theatres and in air. In their
framecrork air and naval manoeuvres and transfers of troops
t
have been acquiring as ever tY~ceatening dimension. Tne scope
and the scale o! those manoeuvres conducted on !anti, at sea
and in air are such that they could-be utilized to demonstrate
force for political intimidation. gll this is eloquently manif este
by numerous !acts not only of past but o! recent history.
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2.
If ire take into account that a great number o! ground troops,
air and naval forces are put in lull combat readiness and have
the necessary ammunition this activity resembles, ror all
practical
purpos+s, a prelude to war and thus leads to encreas:d
su8picion and distrust. ~cuese serious questions have a direct
bearing on confidence' and security in ]~Vrope and must be
considered at the Conference.
Ia this connection I wish to elaborate somewhat on certain
aspects of the position o! the Soviet union regarding exchaa6es
o! annual pleas o! notifiable military activities. 'this proposal
like other CBllds, whether limitation, no-cificatioa or observation
measures, should, as the Soviet Union repeatedly pointed out,
ensure the right o! each state to equal security and assure a
situation where no state or group o! states could obtain
.advantages over the others.
:Che exchange of annual plans could not satisfy this
requirement unless they cover the notifiable activity not onl;~
o! ground tTOgas but also o! air and naval rorces, as well as
movements (transfers) o! troops in Europe and is the aa~oinir~r,
sea (ocean) areas and air space. The Soviet union proceeas here
from the principle of indivisible security, its comprehensive
consideration is the interests o! all hliropeen states. V1e are
opposed to nay selective coverage by confidence-builr..ing measures
o! a particular type of military activity. A broad approach is
in lull and complete accord with the mandate o! the Conference.
The "military activities" concept in tae mandate is ra~r broader
than the activities o! ground troops or the ?o palled out-of- _
garrison activities.
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sEC~er 3.
It must be admitted that infantry is ao longer the queen
of battlefields. New gods of war at sea and is a1r Frith their
advanced technologies and formidable weaponry rock security
in lsvrope during manoeuvres. It is precisely these mayor
manoeuvres, their areas and dates that all the participants
in the all-L+1~sopeen process should be iaYormed off. in advance.
They ahovld~be aotiYiable and such iaf ormation should be iacludea
is annual pleas. Ia this way we could reduce suspicions and
impede a covert preparation of war.
Incidentally, same of our colleagues here is this hall
have spent aucu erf ort to try and convince the Conference that
~:uropeen security is threatened only Kith ground troops 2na
that as far as air and naval activities go they are dust a sort
of innocent tourist cruises in Europe. However, let me quote a
diPferant opinion by a no less and, perhaps, even more
authoritative expert on the natter. I have in mind general Rogers,
Supreme Commander of NA'1.'0 armed forces in Europe, whose opinion,
apparently, should not be overlooked. In his recent intervievr
to the r'reach Science Et Vie magazine published in October
under the Headline "New strategy for Etiirope" he said that modern
warfare must achieve basic objectives by air striKes of our (II.S.)
aircraft and our (U.S.) missiles sad not oa lead and not b9
ground forces. The same goes ror the Navy.
What are, then, the grounds on which it Has been persistently
suggested to us that air and naval forces -these striKe forces
of modern warfare which, accoraing to General Rogers, must
achieve basic ob~ectivea - b.e excludes rrom the scope of
confidence-building measures? The anstiver can~be simple: either ~~
they uo not want to strengthen confidence aa~i security is Europe
or they x ant to obtain unilateral advantages for themselves. 219
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4.
Both approaches are alien to the Soviet IInioa~s position.
Noa that the exchange o! annual loredasts o! notifiable
military activities figures is the proposals o! all three groups
o! states the exchange o! visas on the subject and the ne~etiation
o! correapoadiab agreements could be intensified. die will have
to agree oa one questions what should be the content o! those
forecasts, what should be included is them and ghat should be
the.nagnitude o! information given oa each activit
y Certainly,
the issue at head should be the inclusion not o! the day-to-day
combat training of ground troops at tr
suing fields, test ranges
and rite ranges where troops o! any state are engaged in routine
tram but rather of mayor manoeuvres and movements o! troops
and air wad naval forces which indeed pose a threat to security.
Mr.Chairmaa,
The socialist countries demonstrate in practice there
readiness to intensify the work o! the Conference and take into
account the positions o! our negotiating partners. It is clear
from our stated readiness to accept agreement on mutual exchanges
o! annual plans o! military activities. Y;e expect appropriate
responses from the other participants in the Coaf erence in order
to stt~rt, at last, moving to mutually acceptable accords.
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C O N F I D E N? I A L COMPLET O1 OF OS STOCKHOLM 08022
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF
OCTOBER 7-11, 1985
1. THIS IS CDE -061.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. LITTLE NEW GROUND WAS PLOWED, AS NATO AND
WTO CONTINUED TO HOLD THEIR OWN. NNA REMAINED QUIET.
FOR THE SECOND WEER, THE WTO ALSO REMAINED SILENT IN
THE WORKING GROUP ON VERIFICATION. AND, OF INTEREST,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA INDICATED THAT THE WTO MAY BE READY TO
DISCUSS THE OBSERVATION REGIME, PROVIDED IT IS
CONSIDERED "HAND IN HAND" WITH THE ELABORATION OF
ACTIVI?IES TO BE NOTIFIED. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING GROUP AB.
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF WG AB THIS WEER.
5. WORKING GROUP B: NOTIFICATION -- OCTOBER 8, 1985.
DEMARR (HOWARD) DEFENDED SC.1'S FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES AS GROUND FORCES CAN SEIZE AND OCC~FPY
TERRITORY. SMALL STATES BELIEVE LOWER THRESHOLDS FOR
NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, HE SAID. HOWARD NOTED THAT THE
SC.1 PROPOSAL ON "ALERT" ACTIVITIES STRIKES A GOOD
BALANCE BETWEEN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND THE LEGITIMATE
NEEDS OF MILITARY FORCES TO CONDUCT REALISTIC TRAINING.
POLAND (STANIEVSRY) ASSERTED THAT THE MEANING OF THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT IS STILL UNCLEAR AND ACTIVITIES
TO BE COVERED ARE UNCLEAR. A CLOSE EXAMINATION REVEALS
THAT SC.1 SPONSORS SPEAK ONLY OF MANEUVERS. STANIEVSRY
ASKED IF SC.1 AUTHORS ENVISAGID DIFFERENT NOTIFICATION
PARAMETERS FOR MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS.
NETHERLANDS (VAN DER GRAAF) SAID THAT DESPITE
ASSURANCES THAT THE EXERCISE "DRUZHBA 85 " WAS WELL
BELOW THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, UP TO 30,000 TROOPS
COULD HAVE PARTICIPATED, USING THE USSR (TATARNIROV)
MODEL FOR STRUCTURING AN EXERCISE. THE PRESENCE OF
HIGH-RANKING AUTHORITIES AND THE LEVEL OF PRESS
COVERAGE ALSO SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE EXERCISE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. VAN DER GRAAF SAID.
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FRG (SCHMIDBAUER) NOTED THAT IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF
DIFFERENT STRENGTHS OF DIFFEREN? DIVISIONS,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA MADE REFERENCE ONLY TO PERSONNEL, NOT
OTHER~I2~ORTANT DIVISION ELEMENTS. DIVISIONS ARE
STRUCTURED AS EACH COUN?RY SEES FIT, HE NOTED, JUST AS
MOSCOW HAS DETERMINED WTO DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE.
FRANCE (!ERIC) SAID THAT THE WEST HAS NOT REJECTED
NUI~RICAL PARAMETERS. HE ACCUSSED CZECHOSLOVAKIA OF
BEING MORE RIGID THAN ITS EASTERN COLLEAGUES. IF YOU
WON'T LISTEN TO SC.1 SPONSORS, HE SAID, AT LEAST LISTEN
TO YOUR WTO COLLEAGUES.
UR (BACK). ANALYZING THE NOTIFICATION OF "RAVRAZ 85" IN
TERMS OF THE HFA AND WTO WGB.1 CRITERIA, SAID THE
RESULT REPRESENTED LITTLE IF ANY IMPROVEMENT OVER THE
HFA.
USSR (TATARNIROV) ROSE TO THE DEFENSE OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, TELLING FRANCE (!ERIC) NOT TO WORRY
ABOUT NUANCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE HE AGREED
THAT EVERY STATE HAS A RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN
DIVISIONAL STRUCTURES, TATARNIROV SAID THAT MANNING
LEVELS MUST BE CONSIDERED. SOME DIVISIONS, FIE
CONCLUDED, ARE MANNED AT AS LOW AS 20 PER CENT; WHILE
ONE G-N HARDLY CALL THAT A DIVISION, IT MAY PLAY AS A
DIVISION IN AN EXERCISE.
FRANCE (!ERIC) STATED THAT A NUANCE WAS THE USSR'S
(TATARNIROV) EXPLANATION OF THE 20,000 NUMERICAL
THRESHOLD IN TERMS OF STRUCTURE.
END OF .*iESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 2 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PAR!, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE; WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF
SWITZERLAND (SCHARLI) SOUGHT TO HEAD OFF CRITICISM OVER
THE FACT THAT SWITZERLAND DID NO? INVITE OBSERVERS TO
ITS NATIONAL EXERCISE "TORNADO", NOTIFIED ON AUGUST 25,
WHICH BEGAN OCTOBER 7 AND RUNS UNTIL OCTOBER 17,
PROVIDING SOME DETAIL ON THE EXERCISE. THE FACT THAT
2'HE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION DID NOT CORRESPOND TO
SWITZERLANp'S VIEWS ON STANDARDIZED NOTIFICATION WAS
NOT A CONTRADICTION, HE ASSERTED. ALL S?AYES MUST
FIRST DEIiONSTRA?E A WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN
SUCH NOTIFICATIONS. SWITZERLAND WILL NOT RISK THE
FIRS? STEP IN SUCH SENSITIVE AREAS (ARMY MOUNTAIN CORPS
3) UNTIL OTHERS SHOW GOOD WILL.
6. WORKING GROUP A: NON USE OF FORCE -- OCTOBER 8,
1985.
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ASSERTING ?HAT SC.l SPONSORS WERE ADDRESSING NUF IN
MORE CONCRETE TERMS, GDR (GEORGI) ANNOUNCED THAT I? WAS
NOW "HIGH TIME" TO SEER COMMON NUF LANGUAGE AND HOVE TO
CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS. THE CRITERIA FOR A CREDIBLE NUF
COMMITMENT, AS OUTLINED BY THE FRG ON OCT 1, WERE MET
IN SC.6'S BASIC ELEMENTS. THE GDR SUPPORTS ENRICHING
THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE "CSCE
DIMENSION", TO SERVE AS THE CORNERSTONE FOR A NEW PHASE
OF DETENTE IN EUROPE. GEORGI ASKED THE FRG DELEGATION,
IN LIGHT OF AN EARLIER STATEMENT, FOR ITS IDEAS ON A
CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONCRETE NUF FORMULATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF CONCRETE CSBM'S, AND FOR NUF FORMULATIONS
THAT WOULD HAVE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE POLITICALLY
BINDING EFFEC?.
HUNGARY (RORMENDY) NOTED APPROVINGLY THAT THE FRG HAD
SAID EARLIER THAT "NO POLITICAL AIM, NO CONCEPTION OF
LAW OR RIGHTS, NO IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION CAN JUSTIFY
THE USE OF FORCE." HE INTERPRETED THIS STATEMENT IN
STRICT WTO TERMS: NUCLEAR ARSENALS HAVE CHANGED THE
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OR MANIFESTATION OF
FORCE AND THUS JUSTIFY A NEW EMPHASIS ON THE NUF
COMMITMENT. RORMENDY AGREED WITH AN EARLIER U.S.
STATEMENT THAT THE APPROACH TO A NUF REAFFIRMATION:
SHOULD BE PRECISE, "BE BASID ON" THE LANGUAGE OF THE UN
CHARTER AND THE FINAL ACT (AS OPPOSED TO U.S. REP'S
STATEMENT THAT THIS LANGUAGE SHOULD BE "USED"), SHOULD
DEAL WITH BOTH THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE, AND SHOULD
APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES IN THEIR
MUTUAL, AS WELL AS THEIR INTERNATIONAL, RELATIONS.
RORMENDY DID NOT CHALLENGE THE CREDIBILITY AND VALIDITY
OF THE TEN FINAL AC? PRINCIPLES, BUT DID NO?E THAT
HUNGARY INTERPRETS THEIR PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND
EQUALITY DIFFERENTLY THAN DOES THE U.S. AS FOR THE
U.S.~(GUNDERSEN) VIEW THAT AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM
WOULD BE REVIEWED PERIODICALLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
THE HELSINKI REVIEW PROCESS, ADVOCATED CONSULTATIONS
AND EXCHANGE OF NECESSARY INFORMA?ION IN THE EVENT OF
THE RISK OF WAR (AS OUTLINED IN PARA 8 OF SC.6) INSTEAD.
BULGARIA (RADOUROV) CONTENDED THAT THE UN CHARTER, THE
FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ADDRESSED
THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY
ASPECTS OF SECURITY. HE CRITICIZED THE "MINIMALIST"
APPROACH OF SOME (WESTERN) DELEGA?IONS WHICH FAVOR THE
"MERE REPETITION" OF UN CHARTER AND FINAL AC? NUF
LANGUAGE, ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD NOT GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THE NUF OBLIGATION IN ALL WAYS AND FORMS,
AS CALLED FOR IN THE FINAL ACT.
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SPAIN (LOAENZO) DEBUNKED THE EAST'S EFFORTS AT
PROMOTING A NUF TREATY, CITING ARTICLE 35 OF THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON LAWS AND TREATIES TO THE EFFECT THAT A
TREATY IS VOID WHEN IT GOES AGAINST. AN IMPERATIVE NORM
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (NORM OF THE SAME CHARACTER).
NOTING THAT THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IS SUCH A
NORM, THE SPANISH DELEGATE CRITICIZED THE SC.6'S
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 3 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF
EMPHASIS ON A TREATY WHEN NUF ALREADY HAS A MAXIMUM
OBLIGATORY NATURE. RECALLING THE CYPRIOT SUGGESTION
THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION INCLUDE THE MANIFESTATION OF
FORCE, LORENZO REMINDED THE CONFERENCE THAT IN 1959 THE
UN CREATED A SPECIAL COMMITTEE WHICH TOOK MORE THAN A
QUARTER OF A CENTURY TO COME UP WITH A DEFINITION OF
AGGRESSION AND p NON-RESTRICTIVE LIST OF ACTS WHICH
CONSTITU?E AGGRESSION. $E FUR?HER ARGUED THAT THE
MADRID MANDATE DID NOT CALL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OR
CODIFICATION OF SUCH PRINCIPLES, BUT RATHER HAD CHARGED
THE CONFERENCE TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF
PRINCIPLE THROUGH NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS,
I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S.
RARHMANINOV (USSR) DISAGREED WITH LORENZO'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE UN CHARTER, ARGUING THAT IT DOES
NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIONAL AGREEMENTS
WHICH "INCLUDE THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF
SECURITY." HE INSISTED THA? THE CDE DID NO? NEED
PERMISSION TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF
PRINCIPLE.
CYPRUS (PAPADAPOULOS) AGAIN SAID THAT WE ARE CHARGED TO
GIVE THE NUF PRINCIPLE A "CDE DIMENSION"; IT IS NO
ACCIDENT THAT THE NUF PRINCIPLE WAS SINGLED OUT IN THE
MADRID MANDATE. HE ACCEPTED THE FRG'S TERM "CSCE
DIMENSION", SAYING THAT IT ALSO WOULD GIVE THE
PRINCIPLE THE "CDE DIMENSION", I.E., THE "MANIFESTATION
OF FORCE" AS PART OF THE DEFINITION OF THE SCOPE OF THE
PRINCIPLE. HE ASKED OTHERS FOR PROPOSALS ON HOW TO DO
THIS.
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7. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION,
COMMUNICATION -- OC?OBER 9, 1985.
ITALY (DE BERNARDIN) STRESSED THE NEED FOR ADEQUA?E
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS COUPLED WITH THEIR TIMELY
IMPLEMENTATION. AN ESSENTIAL PAR? OF
VERIFICATION/INSPECTION IS ITS PREPARATION INCLUDING
?HE REQUEST AND RESPONSE. DEDICATED COl~IIitJNICATION
LINKS WILL ENHANCE TIMELY PREPAMTION, AND COULD ALSO
BE USED TO MANAGE THE NORMAL FLOW OF INFORMATION
RELATING TO CSBM'S. DE BERNARDIN SAID THAT THE SC.1
VERIFICATION PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO FIT THE NEED AND
NOT BE OVERLY INTRUSIVE. 'T'HUS, THE INSPECTION TEAM
SHOULD NOT PROLONG ITS ACTIVITIES OVER 48 HOURS.
SC.1/MEASURE 1 PROVIDES FOR PROVISION OF STATIC
INFORMATION THAT WILL ASSIST IN 'I`HE DETERMINATION OF
THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY AND WILL ALLOW THE AUTHORITY
REQUESTING AN INSPECTION TO BE EXACT IN SPECIFYING
LOCATION. PRIOR INFORMATION ASSISTS A COUNTRY IN
DEVELOPING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS TO ASR AND THEREBY
FACILITATES SPEEDY INSPECTION.
ROMANIA (BUHOARA) CONTINUED ITS SEARCH FOR COMMON
GROUND, ASSERTING THAT PROPOSALS TO DATE CONFIRM
"WITHOUT A DOUBT" THE IMPORTANCE COUNTRIES ATTACH TO
SETTING UP MEANS AND PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION,
CONSULTATION, AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN STATES.
DIFFERENCES IN POSITIONS NOTWITHS?ANDING, SEVERAL
CONVERGENT AND COMPLIMENTARY ELEMENTS ARE EMERGING.
THE ESTABLISHMEN? OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROCEDURES
FOR IMPLEMENTATION, COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION
CONSTITUTE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE SAME EFFORT -- TO
CONTRIBUTE TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION AND TO COMPLIMENT AND
STRENGTHEN EACH OTHER. SC.1, SC.3, AND THE ROMANIAN
AIDE-MEMOIRE ALL ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF
CONSULTATIONS. AND THOSE WITH NO CONCRETE PROPOSALS,
HE ASSERTED, HAVE BEEN FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS
CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE. HE CITED THE SEPTEMBER 23
U.S. (HANSEN) STATEMENT AS ENCOURAGING, INASMUCH AS THE
U.S. AGREES PARTIALLY THAT AT LEAST IN GENERAL TERMS
CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION ARE
IMPORTANT. HE CONTENDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S.
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 4 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVa FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP AC?IVITIES, WEER OF
225
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MISUNDERS?OOD T$E ROMANIAN) POSITION?
AIDE-MgKOIRE ADDRESSES THE THE ROMANIAN
FACT-FINDING PROCEDURES ~DEg STION OF ESTABLISHING
~ ~GUED AGAINST AN ~~~ CIRCUMSTANCES.
THEE WERE ONLY EARLIER PORTUGUESE ASSERTION ?HAT
VERIFICATION AT TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF
APPRO THIS CONFERENCE, RECALLING 0
ACHES OUTSIDE OF THE TWO BLOCS: THER
(VERIFICA?ION BY CHALLENGE), AUSTRIA VERIFICATION BY
CHOICE), AND ROMANIA (FACT-PINDING).
DENMARK (ROSENTHAL) NOTID TEAT 7~ DEGREE OF CRITICISM
OF THE SC.1 VERIFICA?ION/INSPECTION PROPOSAL VARIES.
SOME HAVE ADMITTED
INSPECTION, SUCg IDEAS TAT ARE NOT DIFFERENT FROM
OBSERVATION BY C~~~FICATION BY CHALLENGE,
FACT-FINDING. ALL RAVE IN ~p~ON CONCEPT OF
ACTIVITIES WILL TARE p T~ VIEW THAT THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES. CRITICI~SH OUNDERIEI(TRAORDINARY
HE OBSERVED, ON THE ASSUMPTION QUENTLY BASED,
WILL LEAD TO A MASSIVE TAT ITS I~'LEMENTATION
NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS. THE WTO
CARR OUTUT 1'WO INS~pECTIpNSCI OF THE 35 STATES COULD
STATES, IT WOULD RESULT IN OVER OF THE PARTICIPATING
A YEAR. BU? SC.1 STATES THAT 2,000 SUCH INSPECTIONS
COULD CARRY OUT NO MORE ~~ PARTICIPATING STATE
-- A TOTAL OF ONLY 70? 2'HAN TWO INSPECTIONS PER YEAR
INSPECTIONS ARE NOT ~' ROSENTHAL SAID,
INSPEC?IONS" NECESSARY SO-CALLED "ON-SITE
OR ON ~ Z~ INSPECTION CAN BE BASED IN
TAE ~O~' ~ AERIAL. INSPECTION W THE AIR
ON=SI?E INSPECTION. IN ANY EVENT. IT IS U~IVLIK~L~
THE QUOTA FOR INSPECTIONS WILL BE FILLED THAT
COUNTRY WILL WANT TO HOLD A? LEAS? ONE IN RESERVE AS A
SHOULD IT BE NEEDED LATER. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT
THE SC.1 OBJECTIVES WERE MODEST -- TO ESTABLISH A
NARROWLY LIMITED SYSTEM OF INSPECTION
TO COPE EFFEC?IVELY WITH A KIND OF SITU pNILL BE ABLE
LEAD TO HOSTILITY. (COMMENT: SEVERAL, NATO DELEGATIOONS
QUESTIONED HIS CONTENTION THAT AN AERIAL INSPECTION
OVER A CER?ASIN AREA WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN
"ON-SITE" INSPECTION PER SE. ~ CO~~T?)
$. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATION --
IRELAND (0'CONNEL) SAID WE MUST DEVELOPTAN OBSERVATION
REGIME THAT MEETS I?S AGREED PURPOSE. OUTLINING A
NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS FOR INCORPORATION IN AN
OBSERVATION REGIME IN ORDER TO MEET ITS PURPOSE, HE
OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NO ACCIDENT THAT HIS IDEAS
PARALLELED THOSE OF OTHERS (SC.1/AMPLIFIED). WHILE THE
FINAL ACT HAS A STRONG DIMENSION OF GOOD WILL, IT IS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE PURPOSE.
HE OBSERVED, OBSERVATION IS MORE STRINGEN~AND ISSTEM,
CONNECTED WITH A STRONG VERIFICATION DIMENSION. IN
CONCLUSION, O'CARROL SUGGESTED 'THAT THIS MAY BE A
PERTENENT EXAMPLE FOR (1tiR njSCUSSIONS.
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U.S. (MCPEAR) AGREED WITH ?WO USSR (TATARNIROV)
REMARKS: IT IS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE PRACTICE OF
OBSERVATION BE TRANSFORMED INTO VERIFICATION, AND THE
SECURITY OF THE STATE HOSTING OBSERVERS SHOULD NO? BE
ADVERSELY AFFECTED. OBSERVATION WILL NOT FULFILL THE
MADRID MANDATE CRITERIA THAT CSBMS BE ADEQUATELY
VERIFIABLE, HE STATED. SC.1'S OBSERVATION MEASURE IS
DESIGNED TO MEASURE COIipLIANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
ROUTINE, WHILE ITS VERIFICATION MEASURE IS DESIGNED TO
FOCUS PRIMARILY ON ANOMALOUS SITUATIONS. AND WHILE IT
IS TRUE THAT AN OBSERVER CANNOT SEE EVERY ASPECT OF
EVERY PHASE OF A MANEUVER, HE POINTED OUT, IT IS
INCUMBENT UPON THE HOST STATE TO ENSURE THAT AS MUCH AS
CAN BE SEEN WILL BE SEEN.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA REITERATED THAT AN AGREEMENT OF WHAT
ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED AND S~SEQUENTLY SUBJECT
TO OBSERVATION MUST BE REACHED PRIOR TO DEVELOPMENT OF
END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION s ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DEL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF
AN OBSERVATION REGIME. ALTHOUGH WE HAVEN'T REACHED
SUCH AN AGREEMENT, HE SAID, THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE
HAVE NOT ACCOMPLISHED ANYTHING. WE HAVE BEEN
DEVELOPING THE PREREQUISITES FOR FURTHER AND MORE iN
DEPTH CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM, FOR ITS PART, THE
WTO HAVE ATTEMPTED TO FURTHER THE DIALOGUE BY PUTTING
FORWARD OBSERVATION SCENARIOS. AND, HE SAID, ENOUGH
PREREQUISITE GROUNDWORK HAS BEEN LAID TO BEGIN
CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF OBSERVATION IN ITS FULL
AGE, SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH NOTIFICATION. RECALLING THAT
SC.1 PROVIDES FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, HE
ASKED FOR THE VIEWS OF SC.1 SPONSORS ON HOW OBSERVATION
OF THESE NAVAL AND SEA ELEMENTS WOULD PROCEED. HE
CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT: (1) WE NEED TO DETERMINE THE
ACTIVITIES TO WHICH OBSERVERS ARE INVITED, AND (2) TO
DETERMINE THE INTERACTION BETWEEN NOTIFICATION AND
OBSERVATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADEQUATE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION OF THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION
ACTIVITIES. THIS REQUIRES A REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL
AND MILITARY EFFECTS OF THE MEASURES ADOPTED,
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9. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS -- OCTOBER 10, 1985.
THIS REMARKABLY BRIEF MEETING FEATURED A SHORT
STATEMENT BY ITALY (BLAIS). BLAIS CRITICIZED THE
INTERPRETATION OF HIS OCTOBER 3 SPEECH FROM ITALIAN
INTO RUSSIAN, NOTING THAT IT SAD BEEN RELAYED FROM
FRENCH. JUDGING FROM THE USSR'S (TATARNIROV) REACTION
TO THIS STATEMENT (BUIS' IDEAS WERE CSARACTERIZED AS
"EXTRAVAGANT" AND "NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ADEQUATE LOGICAL
ARGUMENTS,"), BLAIS SURMISED TEAT SOME OF THE
SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF SIS REMARKS MUST HAVE BEEN LOST
IN THE TRANSLATION. SE CONCLUDED BY PRECISELY
REPEATING THE MAIN POINTS OF SIS OCTOBER 3 STATEMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDEN?IAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L S?OCRHOLM 07820
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS OF OCTOBER 11, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7781
1. CDE VII - 48
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THREE NATO CAUCUS SESSIONS ON OCTOBER 11 ONCE AGAIN
FOCUSED ON THE PENDING INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE
AGREEMENT, AND THE CON?INUING FRENCH RESERVE TO THE
ORAL UNDERSTANDING ON CONSULTATIONS (REFTEL). BY THE
END OF THE DAY IT APPEARID THAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS
THE ONLY REMAINING OBSTACLE TO FULL CONFERENCE ACCORD
ON THE AGREEMENT. DURING THE MORNING CAUCUS SESSION
GASCHIGNARD INDICATED THA? THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN
HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM OCTOBER 10 (WHICH APPARENTLY
ALLOWED HIM NO ROOM TO MANEUVER), AND THA? FRANCE
CONTINUID TO BELIEVE THAT A STRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL
NEEDED TO BE SEN? ON CONSULTA?IONS. GASCHIGNARD WAS
UNMOVED BY THE COMMENTS OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT THE
NATO SPOKESMEN HAD SENT SUCH A SIGNAL THE PREVIOUS
EVENING WHEN THEY HAD ?OLD RAHILUOTO (FINLAND) THAT,
"ONE PROBLEM REMAINS WI?H RELA?ION TO CONSULTATIONS".
BARRY (U.S.) SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS OTHER WORDING OF
THE ORAL POINT COULD RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM. CITRON
(FRG) PROPOSED, "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN THE CONTEXT
OF DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, THERE WILL BE
A POSSIBILITY TO DISCUSS CONSULTATION AND RAPID
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
CSBM'S". GASCHIGNARD aGREED TO THIS SUGGESTION;
HOWEVER, AS THERE WAS NO CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO PRESENT' IT
AS A NATO POSITION, THE SPOKESMEN WERE INSTRUCTED TO
COIWEY IT TO RAHILUOTO AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE
"CONSULTA?IONS PROBLEM".
4. DURING THE AFTERNOON, THE CAUCUS SPOKESMEN REPORTED
THE RESULTS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS WZTH RAHILUOTO.
RAHILUOTO HAD INDICATED THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE PROPOSED
LANGUAGE TO THE NNA CAUCUS, BUT THAT THE CAUCUS DID NOT
WANT TO REOPEN DISCUSSION AND HAS TAKEN THE FIRM
POSITION THAT THERE SLOULD BE NO FURTHER CHANGES TO THE
TEXTS. RAHILUO?0 HAD FURTHER INFORMED THE SPORESIiEN
THAT CETERCHI (ROMANIA) HAD TOLD HIM THA? ROMANIA WOULD
NOT BLOC CONSENSUS ON THE AGREEMENT, WHICH IT WAS
PREPARED TO GIVE ONCE THE WEST HAD ACCEPTED THE FULL
TEXTS. FOLLOWING THIS REPORT, THE CHAIR (NORWAY)
REMARKED THAT THE CAUCUS HAD NOW SENT A FORCEFUL SIGNAL
ON OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH CONSULTATIONS AND ASKED IF THE
CAUCUS COULD NOW ACHIEVE CONSENSUS TO ACCEPT THE
PACKAGE AS DRAFTED. GASCHIGNARD, HOWEVER, MAINTAINED
HZS POSITION AND THE FRENCH RESERVE ON THE AGREEHEN?.
DISCUSSION CLOSED ON THIS TOPIC WITH CITRON (FRG)
CALLING ON FRANCE TO RECONSIDER THE APPEAL OF THE
CAUCUS THAT IT JOIN IN~CONSENSUS, AND MELLBIN (DENMARK)
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TESTILY AND WITH EVIDENT FRUSTRATION NOTING THAT WE HAD
REACHED THE "END OF THE ROAD" IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH
RAHILUOTO, AND RHETORICALLY ASKING IF FRANCE'S "ALLIES
AND FRIENDS" SHOULD NOT EXPECT A POSITIVE ANSWER FROM
THE FRENCH ON MONDAY.
S. COMMENT; MANY IN THE CAUCUS ARE CLEARLY FRUSTRATED
WITH THE FRENCH POSI?ION, AND MANY DELEGA?IONS NOW FEAR
THAT THE EAS? WILL USE THIS DELAY TO ACCUSE NATO OF
BLOCKING PROGRESS. GASCHIGNARD, WHO HAS APPRECIATED
U.S. SUPPORT ON THIS MATTER, TOLD AMBASSADOR BARRY
FOLLOWING THE MEETING THAT HE HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO
FALL-OFF HIS POSITION, BUT COULD NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE
NEW INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE MONDAY BECAUSE D'ABOVILLE (QUAI
DISARMAMENT CHIEF) WAS OUT OF PARIS. IN ANY EVENT,
GASCHIGNARD WAS NOT POSITIVE HIS INSTRUCTIONS WOULD
CHANGE UPON D'ABOVILLE'S RETURN. THIS DRAWN OUT
SQUABBLE IS ALREADY CAUSING PERSONAL AND NATIONAL
ANIMOSITIES TO SERVICE AMONG CAUCUS MEMBERS.
CONSEQUENTLY, IF THE FRENCH STICK ON THIS POSITION
CAUCUS UNITY WILL DISSIPATE AS OTHER DELEGATIONS "GO
PUBLIC" 'TO AVOID RESPONSIBILITY FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS.
END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENT IALSTOCRHOLM07847
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS HEFTING, OCTOBER 14, 1985
REF: STOCI~OLM 7730
1. CDE VII - 051
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEX?.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE OCTOBER 14 CDE NATO CAUCUS
SESSION, FRANCE WITHDREW ITS RESERVATION ON INFORMAL
WORKING STRUCTURE AND JOINED FULL CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON
THE AGREEMENT. ADOPTION OF THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE BY
THE CONFERENCE WAS BRIEFLY THREATENID BY MALTA, WHICH
WITHDREW ITS EARLIER CONCURRENCE. HOWEVER, UNDER NNA
PRESSURE MALTA ACCEPTED THE AGREEMENT AT THE LAST MINUTE.
INFORMAL DISCUSSSIONS BEGAN ON OCTOBER 1S. END SUMMARY.
4. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) OPENED THE OC?OBER 14 NATO
CAUCUS MEETING BY WITHDRAWING THE FRENCH RESERVA?ION ON
THE ORAL UNDERS?ANDING ON CONSULTA?IONS AND JOINING IN
CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE
AGREEMENT (REF A). GASCHIGNARD ADDID THAT FRANCE STILL
REGARDED THE ISSUE OF CONSULTATIONS AS ONE.OF GREAT
IMPORTANCE AND BELIEVED ;THAT THE FRENCH POSITION HAD
RESULTID IN THE CAUCUS SENDING A "USEFUL POLITICAL
SIGNAL" SON ?HIS SUBJECT TO THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE.
HE ALSO FEL? THAT THE FRENCH POSITION HAD BEEN INSTRU-
MENTAL IN SECURING ROMANIAN AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT AS
DRAFTED. (BEGIN COMMENT: WHILE MANY DELEGATIONS THANKED
THE FRENCH DELEGATION FOR JOINING THE CAUCUS CONSENSUS
ON THE ISSUE, THERE IS A LINGERING SENSE OF FRUSTRATION
ABOUT FRENCH TACTICS ON THE PAR? OF SOME CAUCUS MEMBERS.
BUWALD~A (NETHERLANDS), FOR EXAMPLE, ARGUED THAT THE ONLY
POLITICAL SIGNAL THAT THE CAUCUS HAD SENT BY DELAYING
APPROVAL OF THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT WAS
OF ALLIID DISSONANCE. END COMMENT.)
5. THE NATO SPOKESMAN IMMEDIATELY INFORMED KAHILUOTO
(FINLAND) OF NATO'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT IN
ANTICIPATION THAT THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE COULD BE
IMPLEMENTED AT THE AFTERNOON MEETING OF WORKING GROUP
AB. THE PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, WAS IN
CONSIDERABLE DOUBT FOR SEVERAL HOURS, AS RAHILUOTO
INFORMID THE NATO SPOKESMEN THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM
VALLETTA MALTA HAD WITHDRAWN ITS CONCURRENCE WITH THE
AGREEMENT. THE MALTESE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE INFORMAL
WORKING STRUCTURE AGREEMENT, RALILUOTO HAD SAID, BUT
RATHER WITH THE LONG-AWAITED (AND LONG-DEBATED) NNA
POSITION PAPERS, AND WERE WITHHOLDING CONSENSUS TO ENSURE
THAT MALTESE VIEWS WERE ADEQUATELY CONSIDERID IN THOSE
PAPERS WHICH ARE NOW (PERHAPS) BEING FINALIZED. CITRON
(FRG) ADVISED THE CAUCUS THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM ANOTHER
SOURCE THAT WHAT MALTA WANTED WAS THE INCLUSION OF INDE-
PENDENT NAVAL MOVEMENTS IN THE MIDITERRANEAN IN THE NNA
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PAPERS. (COMMENT: SEVERAL NNA CON?ACTS HAVE INDICATED
TO US THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD BEEN PRESSING THE MALTESE ON
THIS POINT, AND WERE NOT DISPLEASED WITH THE MALTESE
GAMBIT. END COMMEN?.) BOTH CITRON AND CIARRAPICO (ITALY)
FELT THAT SOME NATO REACTION WAS WARRANTED (CITRON
WONDERING IF IT MIGHT NOT SOON BE TIME FOR THE CDE TO
MOVE FORWARD WITHOUT MALTA), BUT MOST AGREED THAT THE
NNA COULD BEST HANDLE THIS PROBLEM. THE SUSPENSE WAS
SHORT-LIVED, AS THE OTHER NNA MEMBERS, IN FAC?, WERE
ABLE TO PRESSURE MALTA TO JOIN IN THE CONFERENCE
CONSENSUS IN TIME FOR THE AFTERNOON AB MEETING. AT
THIS TIME, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER MALTA SIMPLY SUCCUMBED
TO NNA PRESSURE OR A DEAL WAS STRUCK WITHIN THE NNA
CAUCUS TO SECURE MALTA'S AGREEMENT. WITH T$E MALTESE
PROBLEM SOLVED, WORKING GROUP AB QUICKLY ADJOURNED ITS
FORMAL SESSION AND ADOPTED THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE
WITHOUT DISCUSSION. INFORMAL CLUSTER MEETINGS BEGIN ON
OCTOBER 15.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCIOiOLM 07830
SUBJECT: CDE PUBLIC DIPLOMACX/NEW EXPLORATORY PHASE
REF: STOCKHOLM 6852
1. CDE VIII - 050.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE STOCI~OLM CONFERENCE (CDE) ADOPTED A MORE
I1~'ORMAL STRUCTURE TODAY (OCTOBER 14) TO BEGIN
A NBW EXPLORATORY PHASE OF ITS WORN. USDEL CDE
HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING LINE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH
TME PRESS:
BEGIN TALKING POINTS:
THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THE ADOPTION OF A NEW
INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT FOR THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS LONG CALLED FOR
MORE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS AS A NECESSARY PRELUDE
TO ACTUAL DRAFTING OF A FINAL AGREEMENT; WE HOPE
THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE NOW BEGINNING WILL SEE
THE KIND OF SUBSTANTIVE GIVE AND TAKE NEEDED TO
RESOLVE TID: COMPLEX AND IMPORTANT ISSUES WHICH ~~
STILL REMAIN BEFORE THE CONFERENCE.
QUESTION: DOES THIS ARRANGEMNT REPRESENT A DEALT
HAS NATO MADE CONCESSIONS ON ITS MEASURE ONE
(EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION) AND MEASURE
FIVE (VERIFICATION) IN RETURN FOR EASTERN AGREEMENT
TO DROP ITS NON-STARTERS?
ANSWER: N0. WE HAVE MADE NO CONCESSIONS, AND THIS
DECISION DOES NOT COMPROMISE ANY OF OUR MEASURES.
OUR DOCUMENT SC.1/AMPLIFIED REMAINS INTACT AS A
COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING DOCUMENT. END TALKING
POINTS.
4. AS NOTED, THIS INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT SHOULD SEE
INTENSIFICATION OF DISCUSSIONS ON SUBSTANCE;
SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES ON KEY ISSUES REMAIN.
USDEL PLENARY SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 10 (REF)
OUTLINES WESTERN POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES. USDEL
WILL DEVELOP MORE DETAILED BRIEFS ON THESE
ISSUES WHICH, P/PFE IN USIA CONCURRING, WE WILL
DISTRIBUTE THROUGH THE WIRELESS FILE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07896
SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: THE UN-CDE RELATIONSHIP
REF: A) STATE 266848, B) USUN 2605, C) USUN 2574,
- D) STATE 299182
1. CDE VII - 052
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: U.S. DELEGATION HAS INFORMED ALLIES
OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CDE OF A
UN DRAFTING EXERCISE ON T$E NON-USE OF FORCE. WHILE MOST
ALLIED DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM WERE INITIALLY UNAWARE OR
UNCONCERNED ABOUT T$E UN DIMENSION OF NUF, THERE SEEMS
TO BE AN INCHOATE AWARENESS THAT DRAFTING ON A UN
DECLARATION ON NUF WILL COMPLIGTE OUR WORK IN
STOCKHOLM. ACCORDINGLY, DELEGATION CONCURS WITH USUN'S
REQUEST FOR DEMARCHES IN SELECTED CAPITALS. ON THE SUBJECT
(SEE PARR 6). END SUMMARY.
4. DRAWING ON REF A ANALYSIS, AMBASSADOR BARRY RELAYED
TO THE NATO GUCUS U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMPLICATIONS
FOR THE CDE POSED BY A UN DRAFTING EXERCISE ON NUF
DOMINATED BY THE NONALIGNED MOST DELEGATIONS WERE
EITHER UNAWARE OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLIGTIONS OF
A UN NON-USE OF FORCE DRAFTING EXERCISE FOR THE CDE;
ONLY THE UR AND THE FRG SEEMED TO HAVE FORMED COHERENT
(AND DIVERGENT) VIEWS. THE UR, ON THE ONE HAND,
STRONGLY SUPPORTS OUR VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS
TO SHIFT FUTURE UN WORK ON NUF TO THE CHARTER
COMMITTEE. ON THE OTHER HAND, FRG AMBASSADOR CITRON, AN
OLD UN HAND, SEES AN "ENDLESS" DRAFTING EXERCISE ON A UN
DECLARATION ON NUF AS PREFERABLE FROM A CDE POINT OF
VIEW TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD TREATY ON THE
SUBJECT.
5. GIVEN THE DIFFERING LEVELS OF INTEREST AND
DISINTEREST ON A SUBJECT THAT MAY WELL AFFECT OUR FUTURE
DELIBERATIONS, U.S. DELEGATION HAS CONDUCTED A SORT OF
CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING EXERCISE AMONG SELECTED CDE
DELEGATIONS (PARTICULARLY ITALY, THE FRG, AND FRANCE) ON
THE DANGERS OF AN NNA-CONTROLLED DRAFTING EXERCISE AT
THE UN. WITHOUT EXAGGERATING THE INFLUENCE OR THE
COMMITMENT OF SOME~OF OUR FELLOW NATO DELEGATIONS, THERE
SEEMS TO BE AN INCHOATE AWARENESS THAT DRAFTING A UN
DECLARATION ON NON-USE OF FORCE MAY HAVE NEGATIVE
RAMIFIGTIONS FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THERE IS
ALSO SOME CONCERN ON THE PART OF OUR ALLIES HERE IN
STOCKHOLM THAT ONE NUF HAND (STOCKHOLM) DOES NOT KNOW
WHAT THE OTHER (NEW YORK) IS DOING. ACCORDINGLY, NOW
THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE JETTISONED THEIR WORLD NUF TREATY
IDEA AND NOW ADVOGTE PREPARATION OF A UN DECLARATION ON
THE SUBJECT, SOME OF THESE DELEGATIONS SEEM PREPARED TO
RAISE THE SUBJECT WITH THEIR CAPITALS DURING THE COMING
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RECESS (OCTOBER 18 - NOVEMBER S).
6. BASED ON THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, U.S. DELEGATION
CDE CONCURS WITH REF B REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT TO
CONSIDER DEMARCHES IN BONN, PARIS, AND ROME WHILE CDE
DELEGATIONS ARE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS, I.E.,
OCTOBER 21 - NOVEMBER 1.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COIiPLET O1 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07987
SUBJECT: USDEL OBJECTIVES FOR EXPLORATORY PHASE OF CDE
1. CDE - VII S3.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE CONFERENCE NOW HAS ADOPTED AN
INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE DELEGATION
BELIEVES CAN BE USED PROFITABLY TO PURSUE SEVERAL BASIC
OBJECTIVES: FURTHER NATO COORDINATION; RAISE THE WEST'S
GENERAL LEVEL OF UNDERS?ANDING AND KNOWLEDGE OF OUR
PACKAGE WITHIN NATO CAUCUS; EXPLORE MORE FULLY
CONVERGENCES/DIVERGENCIES WITH THE IDEA OF FORCING THE
EAST TO DISCUSS OUR PACKAGE; FURTHER GAIN NNA SUPPORT.
END SUMMARY
4. THE CONFERENCE NOW HAS ADOPTED AN INFORMAL WORKING
ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE DELEGATION BELIEVES CAN BE USED
PROFITABLY TO PURSUE SEVERAL BASIC OBJECTIVES. THE
FOLLOWING ARE DELEGATION VIEWS ON WHAT WE WILL TRY TO
ACHIEVE.
S. MAINTAINING/ENHANCING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND
EDUCATION: ?HE MAJORITY OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS,
INCLUDING IiANY NATO CAUCUS MEMBERS, DOWNPLAY THE
POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING ANYTHING POSITIVE DURING THIS
INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE AND, THEREFORE, WANT TO MOVE
IN?0 DRAFTING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS RUSH TOWARDS
DRAFTING IS, IN OUR VIEW, ILL-ADVISED FOR TWO REASONS:
FIRST, WE AREN'T READY AS A CAUCUS TO DRAFT, AND SECOND,
IMPORTANT GROUNDWORK REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE
CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE FOR DRAFTING. ENTERING MORE
INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS, THE CAUCUS NEEDS TO TIGHTEN
ARGUMENTS ON DETAILS OF THE NATO PACKAGE AND ALSO
DEVELOP ERPERTISE IN ARTICULATING CONVINCING
ARGUMENTATION. THUS, DURING THIS INFORMAL PERIOD, WE
HOPE TO RAISE THE GENERAL LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE OF SOME
CAUCUS MEMBERS AND ALSO WILL TRY TO IMPROVE NATO
COORDINATION TO ENSURE ALL SPEAR WITH ONE VOICE IN
CONSTANTLY EVOLVING NEGOTIATING CONDITIONS.
6. TOUTING OUR PACKAGE: INFORMAL STRUCTURE SHOULD
ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER EDUCATION OF THE CONFERENCE
ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE NATO PACKAGE AND COMMITMENT OF
NATO TO FUNDAMENTAL, POSITIONS AND PRINCIPLES. FOR
EXAtiPLE:
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INVIOLABILITY OF VERIFICATION: THE ABSOLUTE
REQUIREMENT FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION AND ITS CONNECTION TO
THE REST OF OUR PACKAGE ARE NOT FULLY APPRECIATED, EVEN
WI?HIN THE NATO CAUCUS. WE WILL STRESS THIS CONCEPT AND
THE NECESSITY FOR ITS UNIVERSAL APPLICATION TO CSBMS.
- DOWNPLAY OF NUF/CONSTRAINTS: WE WILL EXERCISE
EXTREME CAUTION ON THESE TWO ISSUES SINCE BOTH HAVE
GREAT POTENTIAL TO AFFECT OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. SOME
ALLIES ARE URGING US TO ADOP? A MORE "FORTHCOMING"
STANCE A? THE CDE ON THESE TWO ISSUES, ESPECIALLY NUF.
THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO LINK THE VERIFICATION OF NUF
WITH A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, MOVING THEMSELVES ONE
STEP CLOSER TO THEIR LONG-DESIRED OBJECTIVE OF A "DROIT
DE REGARD" OVER EUROPEAN SECURITY MATTERS. NEVERTHE-
LESS, THE INFORMAL PHASE WILL GIVE US AN OPERATIONAL
"TESTING GROUND" FOR OUR ARGUMENTATION AND SHOULD ALLOW
US ?0 POSITION OURSELVES BETTER TO PREVENT SOVIET
EXPLOITATION OF THESE ISSUES.
REJECTION OF LINKAGE: THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO
LINK PROGRESS IN ONE AREA WITH PROGRESS IN OTHERS,
PARTICULARLY LINKING NUF AND CSBMS, ON THE ONE HAND, AND
CSBMS APPLYING TO LAND FORCE. ACTIVITIES AND EASTERN
PROPOSALS FOR CSBMS INVOLVING INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES ON THE OTHER. WE WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT SUCH
LINKAGE IS A NON-STARTER.
NO KINI-PACKAGE: THE EAST CAN BE EXPECTED TO WORK
TOWARDS REDUCING THE OUTCOME HERE TO THE ADOPTION OF A
"MINI-PACKAGE" (I.E., NUF, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION,
ALL WITH INADEQUATE VERIFICATION)CONFIDENTIAL ON
END OF MESSAGE
***??< SECTION 2 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJEC?: USDEL OBJECTIVES FOR EXPLORATORY PHASE OF CDE
PERCEPTIONS OF "PROGRESS" AT THE CDE, MANY EUROPEANS MAY
OPT FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME AS WE APPROACH THE END GAME,
EITHER AS A "FINAL" AGREEMENT OR AS AN "INTERIM"
SOLUTION PRIOR TO A CALL FOR RECONVENING THE CDE AFTER
THE VIENNA REVCON. OUR EFFORTS IN THE EXPLORATORY
PHASE, BOTH IN THE WORKING STRUCTURE AND ON THE MARGINS,
WILL CON?INUE TO MARE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IDEA OF A
"MINI-PACKAGE" IS A NON-STARTER.
237
SECRET
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' MAINTAIN THE MANDATE:
PUSH FOR NOTIFICATION OF INDEPEND THE EASTERN G
ACTIVITIES AS ENT AIR AMBIT TO
AN ATTEMPT TO RENEGOTIATE THED NAVA1,
MANDATE BY CHANGING THE PRESENT CDE FOCUS FRO~EUROPE
A GEOGRAPHIC ENTITY TO A BROADER AS
AIMS TO INCLUDE WHAT THE SOVIETS RE~ATDGIC ONE WHICH
SUPPIO T?FOR OUR REJECTIONOOF ~ FORWARD BASED
TF~+ WE CONTINUE TO BUILD
OUR PRINCIPAL TOOL. THIS, USING THE
T? EXPLORING CONVER ~-DATE AS
STRUCTURE G~CES/DIVERGENCIES: THE INFORMAL
BASIC ISSUESRIN ~ DER TO FOR US TO HOME IN
WORK, PARTICULARLY ON SUCH~E THE STRUC UPON THE
GARRISON REY SUBJECTS ~'URE OF FUTURE
' STRUCTURAL APPROACH ~ OUT-OF-
~D CONSTRAINTS. VERIFICATION, INFO
8? GAIN NNq RMATION
AGREED SUPPORT: BECAUSE TAE 1VNA
UPON A pACRAGE OF THEIR O~ HAVE NOT YET
,?WE CAN USE THE-EARLY
PART OF ?HIS PHASE TO
PRODUCT. TRY TO INFLUENCE THEIR FINAL,
THIS GROUp~SO' ~ WILL CONTINUE COURTING
OUR POINTS OF VIEi~ TO GAIN THEIR AND EDUCATING
AT LEAST LONG ENOUGH TpE EXPLORATORY~pH?4SESSHOULD LAST
BE DISCUSSED, SINCE THISSSHOULD NNA PACRAGE EMERGE
ON SOME ISSUES. STRENGTHEN 0 `~
HOWEVER. THIS SHOULD NOT BE AN IrQiUTABLEOGOALON
UNIFIED PA T~ NNA MAY FAIL TO COME FORWARD WITH A
CRAGE OR WE MAY LEARN
SHIFTING IN WAYS WHICH WILL Dp THAT ITS SUBSTANCE IS
~~ ~ MAY WANT TO MOVE ON US MORE HARK THAN GOOD.
TAT ARRIVES. ANOTHER TACK BEFORE THE NNA
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9? THESE ARE THE OBJECTIVES WE PLAN
EXPLORATORY PHASE. IF WASHINGTON WISHESPUSS 0 PURSUE
B RR~ GOALS, WE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ~CORDINGLY.
END OF IiESSAGE
NNNN CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET O1 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07942
SUBJECT: NATO CAUCUS VIEWS ON FUTURE CDE STRATEGY
1. CDE VII-054. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN TWO MEETINGS RESTRICTED TO HEADS
OF DELEGATION ONLY, THE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSED OUR GOALS
DURING THE CURRENT EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE CDE AND THE
QUESTION OF HON HEST TO MANAGE SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRAFT
SIMULTANEOUSLY ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND CSBMS. ONLY THE
U.S., UK, FRANCE AND PORTUGAL BELIEVE AN EXTENDED
EXPLORATORY PHASE WOULD BE USEFUL; THE REST WANT TO MOVE
ON TO DRAFTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS FAR AS NUF/CSBM
LINKAGE IS CONCERNED, ONLY FRANCE AND THE U.S. ARGUED
THAT WE SHOULD TRY HARD TO GET DRAFTING STARTED ON OUR
MEASURES WHILE STONEWALLING ON NUF. TENSIONS BETWEEN
THE "WETS" AND "DRYS" WILL SURFACE EARLY IN THE NEXT
ROUND. END SUMMARY
3. AT MY SUGGESTION, THE NATO HEADS OF DELEGATION MET
IN RESTRICTED SESSION TWICE ON OCTOBER 15 TO DISCUSS
STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT ROUND. THE TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
CONSIDERED WERE:
-- WHAT SHOULD OUR GOALS BE DURING THE EXPLORATORY
PHASE WE ARE NOW IN?
-- HOW SHOULD WE MANAGE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE
LATERAL LINKAGE BETWEEN THEIR NON-USE OF FORCE
PROPOSAL AND CSBMS?
4. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, MOST HEADS
OF DELEGATION ARGUED FOR KEEPING IT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE
AND MOVING INTO THE DRAFTING STAGE SOME?IME DURING THE
NEX? ROUND. SOME, LIRE THE FRG, SUGGESTED THAT THE
PHASE COULD BE USED TO ORGANIZE NATO DELEGATIONS TO
SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS.
OTHERS SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY
FOR THE NNA PAPERS TO EMERGE AND BE DISCUSSED. MANY,
(NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, DENMARK, TURKEY, GREECE, SPAIN,
CANADA AND ITALY) POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED
TO MARE SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE
AND THAT IT WOULD THEREFORE BE.UNLIRELY THAT THE SOVIETS
WOULD DO S0. EVEN THE USUALLY HARDLINE UR SUGGES?ED
IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT A REAL NARROWING OF SUB-
STANTIVE DIFFERENCES DURING THIS PERIOD; HOWEVER, HE
THOUGHT THAT A RATHER LENGTHY EXPLORATORY PERIOD WOULD
BE USEFUL BECAUSE IT WOULD PERMIT NATO TO PROMOTE ITS
OWN PACKAGE MORE EFFECTIVELY. HE PARTICULARLY URGED THA?
WE TRY HARDER TO SELL OUR POSITION ON "STATIC INFORMATION"
TO THE NNA'S DURING THIS PERIOD. FRENCH AMBASSADOR
GASCHIGNARD ARGUED FOR A LENGTHY EXPLORATORY PHASE WHICH
WOULD BE USED TO "FILTER" ?OPICS FOR DRAFTING. HE SAID
WE SF~OULD TRY TO EXTRACT SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS FROM
THE SOVIETS ON THIS PHASE AND DEFINE AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT
IS POSSIBLE. PART OF OUR PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO ACTIVATE
240
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THE DISCUSSION OF OUR PROPOSALS AND, IF POSSIBLE, START
DRAFTING ON SOME ?OPIC OF INTEREST TO US WHILE STONE-
WALLING ON NUF. I SUPPORTED THE FRENCH POSITION.
S. ON TACTICS FOR HANDLING SOVIET LINKAGE, THE FRG
SUGGESTED "LURING" THE SOVIETS INTO DRAFTING ON ISSUES
OF INTEREST TO US, SUCH AS NOTIFICATION, BEFORE WRITING
DOWN ANYTHING ON NUF. AT AN EARLY STAGE, HOWEVER, WE
WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE SOME OF OUR NUF LANGUAGE - SAY
THE UN CHARTER PROVISION. FROM THAT POINT ON, DRAFTING
WOULD CONTINUE ON NUF AND CSBMS AT A PACE WE CONTROLLED -
SAY FIVE TINES AS MUCH ?EXT ON CSBMS AS ON NUF. ?HE UK
SUGGESTED THAT THE PROPER TACTIC WAS A "DEAL" (PREFERABLY
STRUCK BEHIND THE SCENES) TRADING OFF SOMETHING ON NUF
FOR SOMETHING ON CSBMS. OTHERWISE THE SOVIETS WILL
BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE DRAFTING BECAUSE, UNDER THE
PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED
THEY CAN ALWAYS VETO DRAFTED LANGUAGE ON CSBMS IF THEY DO
NOT GET WHAT THEY WANT ON NUF. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS
(ITALY, DENMARK AND SPAIN) ADVOCA?ED DEVELOPING A NUF
TEXT WITHIN NATO. FRANCE WAS THE ONLY ADVOCATE OF
"SEQUENTIALISM" - INSISTING ON STONEWALLING ON NUF WHILE
PRESSING AHEAD ON CSBMS. NUF SHOULD NOT EVEN BE DISCUSSED
WITHIN NATO UNTIL THE NNA PAPERS EMERGE; WE MAY FIND THE
NNA POSITION A BETTER STARTING POINT THAN A TEXT WE
DRAFTED. FRANCE SAID THE BASIC TRADEOFF IN CDE WAS
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 2 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PAR, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: NATO CAUCUS VIEWS ON FUTURE CDE STRATEGY
BETWEEN CSBMS AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE CDE PROCESS,
NOT BETWEEN NUF AND CSBMS. I OPPOSED DISCUSSION OF NUF
IN NATO SINCE IT INEVITABLY WOULD LEAK. FROM WHAT I KNEW
OF THE SOVIET POSITION I DOUBTED THAT SEQUENTIALISM WOULD
WORK, BUT I SUPPORTED TRYING IT.
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6. COMMENT: IN OUR DISCUSSIONS BOTH OF PROCEDURE AND
OF STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE IT APPEARED THA? TENSIONS
BETWEEN THE "WETS" AND "DRYS" ARE RUNNING HIGH, WITH THE
"WETS" INCREASINGLY ACCUSING THE "DRYS" OF TRYING TO
PREVEN? ANY OUTCOME AT ALL IN THE CONFERENCE. SORE OF
THIS IS DUE TO PENT UP FRUSTRATIONS CREATED BY ARGUING
OVER TEXTS FOR THE PAST SIX WEEKS, BUT I SUSPECT THAT
THE BREAK WILL NOT HEAL ALL WOUNDS. THE DISPUTES WILL
PROBABLY REEMERGE EARLY IN THE NEXT SESSION.
END COMMENT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07969
SUBJECT: KAMPLEMAN-BRUNNER DISCUSSION ON STOCKHOLM
- CONFERENCE
REF: GENEVA 9731
1. CDE VII-056. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USDEL POSI?ION ON RELATIONSHIP OF STOCKHOLM TO MADRID
IS IDENTICAL TO THAT DESCRIBED IN PARR 4 OF REFTEL. ON
THE QUESTION OF A TERMINA?ION DATE, WE HAVE EXPRESSED A
PREFERENCE FOR A FIRM DATE IN JULY. THERE WILL NOT BE
CONSENSUS ON THIS, HOWEVER. WE WILL PROBABLY END UP WITH
A JULY 18 TARGET DATE FOR COMPLE?ION PLUS AN "OPTIONAL"
ADDITIONAL SESSION BEGINNING IN LATE AUGUST AND ENDING
WHEN THE VIENNA PREPCOM BEGINS IN SEPTEMBER. THE CATCH
IS THAT IT WILL TARE CONSENSUS NOT TO MOVE ON TO OPTIONAL
SESSION, WHICH MEANS WE WILL HAVE IT.
3. AS FOR ?HE NNA, WE ARE NOT PRESSING ?HEM A? ALL ?0
TABLE ?HEIR PAPERS; IN FACT WE HOPE THEY WILL NOT EMERGE
IN THEIR CURRENT STA?E BECAUSE WE S?ILL HOPE TO INFLUENCE
THEIR CONTENT. THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT BE TABLED UNTIL
WELL INTO THE NEXT ROUND, IF THEN. WE AGREE WITH BRUNNER
ABOUT THE RELA?ION OF CDE. TO THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV GENEVA
MEETINGS; THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS HERE IN
ADVANCE OF GENEVA SINCE WE RECESS FROM OCT. 18 - NOV. 5
IN ANY CASE.
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4. WE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE SWISS DELEGATION HERE AND
APPRECIATE THE SUPPORT THEY HAVE PROVIDED FOR U.S.
POSITION WITHIN THE NNA. THEY ARE AKONG THE MOST ACTIVE
AND CONSTRUCTIVE ELEIiENTS HERE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFTDEN?IAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET O1 OF 03 S?OCRHOLH 08026
SUBJECT: EASTERN VIEWS ON CDE AND VERIFICA?ION
?1. CDE VII -062.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. SELF-PROCLAIMED "HONEST BROKER" ISTVAN
RORMENDY, DEPUTY HEAD OF HUNGARIAN DELEGATION, TREA?ED
US CDE DEPUTY TO LUNCH ON 17 OCTOBER 85 WHICH, IN
ADDITION TO DELIGHTS FROM THE SWEDISH KITCHEN, INCLUDED
A MENU OF VIEWS ON CDE ISSUES THAT RORMENDY DESCRIBED
AS RECIPES FROM MOSCOW. THE SOVIET UNION WANTS A CDE
AGREEMENT AS PART OF ITS NEW EMPHASIS ON EUROPE AND
WILL THEREFORE REQUIRE LITTLE MORE FROM THE WEST THAN A
REAFFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLE TWO OF THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT IN THE REALM OF POLITICAL MEASURES. SOVIETS ARE
ALLEGEDLY WILLING ?0 MARE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN
HELSINKI FINAL ACT CBMS BUT WANT SOME FACE-SAVING
WESTERN MOVE ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN
RETURN FOR COVERAGE OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE
URALS. RORHENDY'S PAPER ON VERIFICA?ION OF CSBMS
PRESENTED IN A RECEN? SWEDISH VERIFICATION SYMPOSIUM
WAS TOUTED AS CONTAINING SOVIET VIEWS ON HOW ON-SITE
INSPECTION COULD BE PART OF AN OUTCOME OF THE CDE
PROCESS. SELEC?ED EXCERPTS FROM THE PAPER ARE
FORWARDED IN PARR 7. END SUMMARY.
4. HUNGARIAN CDE DEPUTY RORMENDY REFERRED TO THE
HUNGARIAN ROLE IN STOCKHOLM AS BEING THA? OF "HONEST
BROKER" BETWEEN SOVIE? AND US DELEGATIONS. (COMMENT:
RORMENDY HAS ALSO BEEN REGARDED BOTH AS AN INFLUENCE
PEDDLER FOR ?HE SOVIETS AND AN AGENT OF
DISINFORMATION. END COMMENT) IN THIS SELF-PROCLAIMED
CAPACITY RORMENDY SAID HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT
SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE
RECEN?LY ADOPTED INFORMAL WORKING SCHEME SHOULD BE
UNDERSTOOD AS AN INDICATION OF SOVIET IMPATIENCE AND
DESIRE ?0 HAVE AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER 1986
PREPARATION FOR THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE. ?HE
SEPTEMBER DATE FOR ENDING THIS PHASE OF THE MEETING HAS
MORE OR LESS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS, RORMENDY
OPINED. BU?, HE ADDED, THE SOVIETS WANT A SUBSTANTIVE
DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE SUFFICIENT ?0 END THE FIRST
STAGE AND CLAIM THE CONFERENCE TO BE A SUCCESS. THIS,
RORMENDY EMPHASIZED, WAS IN HARMONY WITH THE NEW
EMPHASIS ON EUROPE WHICH HAS EMERGED IN THE FOREIGN
POLICY ES?ABLISHMENT OF GORBACHEV/SHEVARDNADZE -- AN
ELEMENT OF WHICH IS TO CONVINCE THE EUROPEANS THAT THE
SOVIET UNION DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO EUROPEAN
SECURITY.
S. THE WEST, RORMENDY CLAIMED, WILL ONLY HAVE ?0 AGREE
TO A REPACKAGING OF THE NUF LANGUAGE ALREADY CONTAINED
IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT TO MEET SOVIET DEMANDS IN
THAT AREA. IT WILL BE THE VOLUME OF VERBIAGE RATHER
245
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THAN THE SUBSTANCE WHICH MUST SATISFY SOVIET PRESTIGE
IN A FINAL OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM. TURNING TO CONCRETE
CSBtiS, KORMENDY INSISTED THAT THE SOVIE?S ARE PREPARED
TO ACCEPT SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HELSINKI
CSBMS BUT THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO GIVE THE SOVIETS
SOME SATISFAC?ION ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND INDEPENDENT
AIR AC?IVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR
SPACE. HE HINTED BROADLY THAT THE CAPTURING OF
INDEPENDENT AIR AC?IVITIES WOULD ASSUAGE SOVIET HUNGER
FOR OBTAINING REVENGE FOR THE COVERAGE OF THE ENTIRE
EUROPEAN PART OF SOVIET UNION IN THE MADRID MANDATE.
RORMENDY'S OWN CONVERSA?IONS WITH SEVERAL ALLIED
DELEGATIONS, HE SAID, HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT WESTERN
EUROPEANS WILL INSIST ON AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM IN
ORDER TO OPERATIONALIZE THE CONCEPT OF EUROPE FROK THE
ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. (COMMENT; KORMENDY IS PROBABLY
THE EASTERN DELEGATE WHO MOST ACTIVELY PURSUES INFORMAL
RELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN DELEGATIONS. END COMMENT)
6. RORMENDY'S MAIN MESSAGE FOR THE DAY, HOWEVER,
CONCERNED VERIFICATION. HANDING OVER A REVISED VERSION
OF THE PAPER HE PRESENTED AT THE SWEDISH SYMPOSIUM ON
VERIFICATION OF DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, KORMENDY
COMMENTED THAT THE PAPER HAD THE BLESSINGS OF SOVIE?
AUTHORITIES. (COMMENT: A? THE SYMPOSIUM ITSELF,
DANIEL ROTFELD -- A MEMBER OF THE POLISH DELEGATION AT
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 2 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, MBFR, PARM
SUBJECT: EASTERN VIEWS ON CDE AND VERIFICATION
KADRID AND A HABITUAL ATTENDEE AT CSBK CONFERENCES --
STATED THAT RORMENDY WAS WAY OUT IN FRON? OF THE SOVIET
POSITION. END COMMENT). THE PAPER ENTITLED
ALTERNATIVE VERIFICATION MODELS FOR CSBMS IN EUROPE",
FIRST ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT THE WESTERN MODEL AS
PRESENTED IN MEASURE S OF SC.1 THEN DESCRIBES TWO
ADDITIONAL MODELS. RORMENDY SAID THE SOVIETS HAD
PROVIDED THE WORDS DEALING WITH ON-SITE INSPECTION IN
THE SECOND MODEL AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE SUBSTANCE OF THE
THIRD MODEL.
7. SINCE RORMENDY INSISTS HIS VIEWS ARE COMPATIBLE
WI?H THOSE OF THE SOVIETS (GDR AMBASSADOR BURRING HAS
ALSO INDICATED THEY ARE) THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS FROM
THE KORMENDY PAPER ARE FORWARDED.
-- HOW KUCH ON-SITE INSPECTION IS ENOUGH? THE
SELF-EVIDENT ANSWER IS THA? THE NUMBER OF ON-SITE
INSPEC?IONS, PROVIDED REASONABLE AND SHARED
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF AGREED CSBMS WOULD HAKE
THIS KETHOD NECESSARY, SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE NUMBER
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OF SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS OR AMBIGUOUS EVENTS THAT CANNOT
BE PROVED OR IDENTIFIED OTHERWISE. IT MUST NOT BE LESS
AND SHOULD NOT BE MORE.
-- A SECOND VERIFICATION MODEL THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED
FOR THE PURPOSES OF A CSBM REGIME PROVIDES FOR
MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATIVE VERIFICATION BASED ON
NA?IONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. DEPENDING ON THE SCOPE AND
NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES IT MAY INCLUDE ON-SITE
INSPECTION AS WELL.
-- AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF THIS SECOND VERIFICATION
MODEL IS THE ESTABLISHMENT DF A CONSULTATIVE FORUM
COMPOSED OF ALL PARTICIPATING S?AYES. ITS FUNCTION
WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH ANY ISSUES OR QUESTIONS OF
COMPLIANCE THAT MAY EMERGE IN THE DAY-TO-DAY
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSBM AGREEMEN?. IF THE SCOPE AND
NATURE OF CSBMS AGREED AT THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CDE DO
NOT NECESSITA?E THE FUNCTIONING OF A PERMANEN? BODY,
CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PARTICIPA?ING STATES COULD BE CONVENED AT A SHORT
NOTICE ON AN AD HOC BASIS.
-- SHOULD IT CORRESPOND TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF
CSBMS AGREED AT ?HE CDE, THERE MAY BE A NEED FOR
CONSIDERING THE IMPLEMEN?ATION OF MEANS AND METHODS OF
VERIFICATION WITH SOME OP?IONS FOR ON-SI?E INSPECTION,
DESPITE THE GROWING AWARENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS OF
?HIS MOST INTRUSIVE METHOD OF VERIFICATION.
0 IT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPATING
STATES, INCLUDING THOSE OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION SINCE ?ROOP OR FORCE MOVEMENTS FROM THEIR
?ERRITORIES INTO THE ZONE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE
NO?IFIED.
0 ON-SITE INSPEC?ION, LIRE ANY OTHER METHOD OF
VERIFICATION, SHOULD HAVE A CLEARLY DEFINED OBJECTIVE
I.E. TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THOSE CONCRETE CSBMS IN
THE FRAMEWORR OF WHICH IT WAS AGREED UPON.
-- NO REALISTIC VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT OF CSBMS
COULD SUPPORT THE USE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A
ROU?INE METHOD OF MONITORING COMPLIANCE. I? SHOULD BE
APPLIED AS A LAST RESORT AFTER THE POTEN?IALS OF OTHER
AGREED MEANS AND METHODS OF VERIFICATION HAVE BEEN
EXHAUSTED, IN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS OF CRISES OF CLEAR
VIOLATIONS THAT COULD BE FELT THREATENING BY OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES.
-- IT MAY BE EXPLORED WHETHER THE SWEDISH IDEA OF
"VERIFICATION BY CHALLENGE" COULD HAVE A USEFUL ROLE IN
VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH CSBMS. THIS CONCEPT, AS
DESCRIBED BY ALVA MYRDAL, "RELIES ON THE INTEREST OF A
PAR?Y UNDER SUSPICION TO FREE ITSELF THROUGH THE SUPPLY
OF RELEVAN? INFORMATION NOT EXCLUDING AN INVITATION TO
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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***??< SECTION 3 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, MBFR, PARM
SUBJECT: EASTERN VIEWS ON CDE AND VERIFICATION
INSPECTION BY AN OUTSIDE PARTY OR ORGAN. I? IS EASIER
TO PROVE YOUR OWN INNOCENCE THAN SOMEBODY ELSE'S GUILT.
-- ON-SITE INSPECTION BUST NOT BE CONCEIVED AS THE
CONSUMMATION OF SUSPICION BETWEEN A AND X THROUGH A
BILATERAL ACT. INSPECTORS FROM ONE OR PREFERABLY MORE
PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD CARRY OUT THEIR TASK ON
BEHALF OF THIRTY-FOUR. THIS PERCEPTION SHOULD ALSO BE
REFLECTED IN THE PATTERN OF DESIGNATION OF INSPECTORS
IN THE CONSULTATIVE BODY.
-- THE VERIFICATION PROCESS MAY HAVE TO DEAL WITH
TIME-URGENT CASES AS WELL. IA' THIS CONTEXT,
CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN AT THE CDE TO THE IDEA OF
SHORT EMERGENCY MEETINGS WHICH COULD BE CONVENED AT THE
DEMAND OF ANY ONE OF THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES WITHIN
A NUMBER OF HOURS.
-- THE CDE MAY ALSO WANT TO BUILD UPON THE IMPORTANT
EXPERIENCE WITH THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, THE SEA-BED
TREATY OR THE OUTER SPACE TREATY WHICH CONTAIN
PROVISIONS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS.
-- IN A CERTAIN STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS THE
CDE MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A THIRD MODEL BASED ON THE
ESTABLISHKEN? OF JOINT MONITORING CAPABILITIES WHICH
CAN BE CALLED INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.
-- THE VERIFICATION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
CARRIED OUT BY IAEA IS A POWERFUL EXAMPLE OF THE
FEASIBILITY OF THIS IDEA.
-- REMOTE SENSING DEVICES OPTIMALIZED FOR MONITORING
CSBM OR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS THAT MAY EMERGE FROM
SUBSEQUENT STAGES OF CDE MAY BE RENTED FROM
GOVERNMENTS, DONATED BY THEM OR PURCHASED ON A
COMMERCIAL BASIS. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WOULD HAVE
THE RIGHT TO SEND AN AGREED NUMBER OF EXPERTS TO
OPERATE THE DEVICES. OBVIOUS CANDIDATES FOR HOSTING
THE HEADQUARTERS AND THE EQUIPMENT ARE NEUTRAL AND
NON-ALIGNED STATES.
-- THE MAIN FUNCTION OF THE JOINT ORGANIZATION WOULD BE
THE CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF THE COMPLIANCE WITH
AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CDE.
'- THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING MAY BE
SOMEWHAT REDUCED BY THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF THE
DETECTION CAPABILITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL
MEANS. (COMMENT: WE ASSUME THIS REFERS TO AWARENESS
OF LIMITATIONS OF CAPABILITIES. END COMMENT)
-- BEYOND MONITORING, THE VERIFICATION PROCESS COULD BE
SUPPORTED, MUTATIS ?SU?ANDIS BY THE SAME MEANS AND
METHODS AS DESCRIBED AT THE SECOND MODEL.
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BARRY
END OF ?SESSAGE
NNNN
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UNCLAS COIiPLET O1 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 07956
SUBJECT: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT SC.1 REFERENCES TO
- NATIONAL TECHNICAL BEANS (NTM'S)
1. CDE VII --059
2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOU? PROVISIONS IN SC.1
MEASURE S FOR THE USE OF NTM'S FOR VERIFICATION CENTER
ON THE PROBLEMS THEY POSE FOR OUR NEGOTIATING TACTICS AS
WELL AS ON THE QUESTION OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO SHARE
NTM-COLLECTED EVIDENCE. USDEL HAS LEARNED THAT THE
HAGUE HAS ASKED THE NETHERLANDS NATO MISSION TO EXPLORE
WAYS TO DEFLEC? ATTENTION FROM THE ROLE GIVEN NTM'S IN
SC.1, WHICH THEY VIEW AS DETRACTING FROM OUR POSITION ON
ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE DUTCH ARE ALSO PERSISTING IN
?HEIR QUEST FOR A DEFINITIVE U.S. STATEMENT ON THE ROLE
OF NTM'S IN A CSCE CONTEXT. THE NETHERLANDS MISSION MAY
SOON BRING UP ONCE AGAIN THE QUESTION OF NTM'S IN SC.1
IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.
4. MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE
INVITED US E~. MEMBER HUCK TO LUNCH FOR
PURPOSE OF EXPLORING WAYS TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR
EXPLOITATION BY THE SOVIETS AND NEUTRALS OF REFERENCES
IN SC.1 TO A ROLE FOR NTM'S IN THE VERIFICATION OF A CDE
AGREEMENT. THE FOLLOWING DAY DEPUTY HEAD OF THE
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION SIZ00 INFORMED U.S. DEPUTY HEAD
OF DEL HANSEN THAT THE NETHERLANDS STILL BELIEVES THE
U.S. HAS NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH AN INCONSISTENCY IN ITS
POLICY ON THE QUESTION OF SHARING EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY
NTM'S. AS EVIDENCE OF THIS INCONSISTENCY, SIZ00 CITED
OUR WILLINGNESS TO PUBLICIZE NTM-COLLECTED DATA ON THE
SS-20 BUILDUP AND OUR STATED POLICY IN STOCKHOLM OF NOT
SHARING NTM DATA IN A CSCE CONTEXT.
5? THE DUTCH VIEW SC.1
REF NTM S MAINLY AS A FACTOR COMPLICATING OUR
ABILITY TO MAKE A MORE EFFECTIVE CASE FOR ON-SITE
INSPECTION. THE SOVIETS, FOR INSTANCE, SOMETIMES CITE
THE PROVISIONS IN SC.1 FOR NTM'S IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
POSITION THAT NTM'S ALONE ARE ADEQUATE FOR VERIFICATION.
THE DUTCH ALSO CONSIDER THE OCCASIONAL REQUESTS BY SUCH
NEUTRALS AS AUSTRIA FOR A DEFINITION OF WHAT NTM'S
COMPRISE AS TROUBLESOME. THE DUTCH DELEGATION
APPARENTLY HAS RECEIVED RECENT INSTRUCTIONS THAT IT
WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST TO ENGAGE IN AN
EXERCISE THAT WOULD INVOLVE DEFINING NTM'S. THE DUTCH
AMBASSADOR INDICATED RECENTLY THAT THE DELEGATION HAS
BEEN INFORMED THAT THE NETHERLANDS ITSELF HAS SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT
WISH TO BE IDENTIFIED.
6. DURING THE DISCUSSION QUOTED FROM A
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CABLE WHICH HE HAD AT HAND AND WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN
SENT TO THE NETHERLANDS MISSION TO NATO. ACCORDING TO
THE CABLE, ABOUT FOUR PAGES IN LENGTH,
PRIMARILY ADDRESSES THE RINDS OF PROBLEMS THAT HAVE
ARISEN, OR COULD ARISE, BECAUSE OF THE REFERENCES IN
SC.1 TO N?Ii'S AND NON-INTERFERENCE.
7. SOME SPECIFIC DUTCH CONCERNS, AS REFLECTED IN THE
CABLE OR ELABORATED ON BY ARE AS FOLLOWS:
- A) THE REFERENCES TO NTM'S AHEAD OF THE PROVISION
FOR INSPECTIONS IN MEASURE 5 OF SC.1 COULD BE CONSTRUED
AS SUGGESTING A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE FOR NTM'S AND MARES
IT MORE DIFFICULT TACTICALLY TO SELL ON-SITE IHSPEC?ION
AS THE CENTERPIECE OF OUR VERIFICATION PROPOSAL.
- B) THE PROVISION FOR NON-INTERFERENCE INVITES
LEGITIMATE REQUESTS FOR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTE
NTM'S, HOW THEY OPERATE, AND WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE
IMPERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE. DUTCH DELEGATION HAS
RECENTLY COME TO APPRECIATE ?HAT IT SHARES U.S. INTEREST
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
***??< SECTION 2 ??***
FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT SC.1 REFERENCES TO
IN AVOIDING DEFINITIONS OF NTM'S.
- C) NEUTRALS MAY SEIZE UPON THE INTERFERENCE
QUESTION IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH PRECEDENTS WHICH WOULD
PROTECT WHATEVER SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS THEY
MAY EVENTUALLY DEVELOP AND OPERATE. THIS COULD LEAD TO
DISCUSSION OF COMPLEX TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES, MILITARY
OPERATIONAL MATTERS AND BEHAVIOR WHICH MAY IMPEDE
COLLECTION BY NTM'S.
8. SIZ00 IN HIS MEETING WITH HANSEN MADE CLEAR THAT THE
DUTCH REGARD THE U.S. POSITION ON NTM'S AS INCONSISTENT.
HOW CAN WE MAINTAIN A POLICY THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT SHARE
EVIDENCE RELATING TO FUTURE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF A CDE
AGREEMENT AND AT THE SAME TIME RELEASE NTM-COLLECTED DATA
ON SUCH SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS THE SS-20 PROGRAM
FOR PURPOSES OF MOBILIZING ALLIED SUPPORT FOR U.S. INF
DEPLOYMENTS?
9. COMMENT: WE WELCOME DUTCH INTEREST IN REDUCING THE
ROLE OF NTM'S IN THE VERIFICATION PORTION OF OUR NEGO-
TIATING PACKAGE. WE STILL FACE THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, OF
PERSUADING THE DUTCH TO BACK OFF THE QUESTION OF SHARING
THE RESULTS OF NTM'S. THE DUTCH MAY F$EL THEY HAVE SOME
LEVERAGE TO PUSH THE SHARING ISSUE IN VIEW OF A PROBABLE
POSITIVE DECISION ON NOVEMBER 1 TO ACCEPT U.S. CRUISE
MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS. IN THE ABSENCE OF DEFINITIVE
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WASHINGTON GUIDANCE, U.S. REPS HAVE CONSISTENTLY VOICED
THE VIEW THAT WE WILL NOT SHARE INFORMATION FROM NTM'S
IN THE CDE. WHZLE THIS ISSUE IS PROBABLY MANAGEABLE
HERE, IT MAY BE USEFUL IF USNATO AND USDEL COULD BE
PROVIDED WITH ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR OUR POSITION.
END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET O1 OF 06 STOCKHOLM 08083
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING
PAPERS
REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 7415 (B) STOCKHOLM 6957
1. CDE VII - 060.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TERT.
3. SUMMARY. THE NNA HAVE BEEN WORKING DOWN TO THE WIRE
THIS ROUND TO DEVELOP A SERIES OF POSITION PAPERS TO
SUPPLEMENT SC.3. A "CORE" GROUP OF THREE DELEGATIONS
(SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA) REACHED AD REF AGREEMENT
ON SUCH A PACKAGE, BUT HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET
YUCASLAVIa, MALTA, CYPRUS AND FINLAND FULLY ON BOARD.
IT MAY BE THAT THESE PROBLEMS WILL BE RESOLVED DURING
THE BREAK AND A PAPER WILL BE TABLED EARLY IN ROUND
VIII. U .S. DEL, THROUGH A VARIETY OF CONTACTS, HAS
BEEN ABLE TO PIECE TOGETHER THE ANTICIPATED PACKAGE.
IN PARTICULAR, THE NNA SEEK TO HAVE COME A LONG WAY
TOWARDS OUR STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AND OUT-OF-GARRISON
CONCEPT. THERE WILL BE A SEPARATE VERIFICATION SECTION
("OBSERVATION BY REQUEST") WHICH BASICALLY PROVIDES FOR
ON-SITE INSPECTION, BUT ALSO FOR THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL.
THE SECTION ADDRESSING NON-USE OF FORCE CONTAINS
LARGELY UNERCEPTIONAL LANGUAGE FROM THE UN CHARTER AND
THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, BUT ITS LENGTH AND DETAIL MAY
CAUSE US TACTICAL DIFFICULTIES. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NNA HAVE CONTINUED TO WORK FEVERISHLY BEHIND
THE SCENES DAY, NIGHT AND WEEKENDS -- TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF PAPERS FOR TABLING AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH A "CORE" GROUP OF THREE DELEGATIONS
(AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND SWEDEN) FINALLY REACHED AN
ACCOMMODATION LATE IN THE SESSION, THEY HAVE SO FAR
BEEN UNABLE TO BRING FINLAND, MALTA, CYPRUS AND
YUGOSLAVIA ON BOARD. THE "CORE" GROUP HAD HOPED TO
SECURE AD REF AGREEMENT ON THE PACKAGE HERE IN
STOCKHOLM, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT CAPITALS WOULD
REVIEW THE PACKAGE DURING THE BREAK, FOR TABLING EARLY
ON DURING THE NEXT ROUND. AT LEAST FIVE STICKING
POINTS, HOWEVER, HAVE PREVENTED SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE
PRODUCT WILL NONETHELESS BE REVIEWED IN CAPITALS DURING
THE BREAK. THE MORE OPTIMISTIC AMONG THE NNA HOPE THAT
THE PAPER WILL BE READY TO TABLE BY THE SECOND WEER OF
THE NEXT ROUND. AMORE PESSIMISTIC NNA VIEW IS THAT
THE "CORE" GROUP, AND POSSIBLY FINLAND, MIGHT BE FORCED
TO TABLE A PARCEL OF PAPERS WHICH WOULD NOT REPRESENT
THE ENTIRE NNA.
THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS INVOLVED IN
DEVELOPING THE PAPER IS REVEALING. THAT YUGOSLAVIA
POSED PROBLEMS CAKE AS NO SURPRISE; HOWEVER MEMBERS OF
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THE "CORE" GROUP EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND FRUSTRATION
THAT FINLAND PROVED SO DIFFICULT (THE FINNS HAVE
USUALLY PLAYED A CONCILATORY ROLE AMONG THE NNA). THE
FINNS, AS WE UNDERS?AND IT, PROFESS RELUCTANCE TO GO
T00 FAR AFIELD FROM THE REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, HAVING A PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN
PRESERVING THE PROCESS; THEY THUS SHY AWAY FROM
EMBARKING UPON SOMETHING T00 NEW AND DIFFERENT AND
HENCE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS.
THIS LONG, DIFFICULT ROAD TO CONSENSUS AMONG THE NNA
HAS THUS EXACTED ITS TOLL ON THE GROUP IN TERMS OF
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 2 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING
PERSONAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS. ALTHOUGH THE NNA FUNCTION
AS WELL AS CAN BE EXPECTED -- GIVEN THEIR DIVERSE
SECURITY INTERESTS AND PERSONALITIES -- THERE HAVE BEEN
INDICATIONS OF TENSION IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS,
PARTICULARLY AS THEY DRAW CLOSER TO AN AGREEMENT.
ONE WELL-TIMID PLOY WAS INFORMATION ON THE NNA POSITION
WHICH WAS LEAKED TO THE BONN NEWSPAPER, "GENERAL
ANZEIGER" AND HIT THE NEWS STANDS ON OCTOBER 10TH. (WE
HAVE HEARD AUSTRIA IS RESPONSIBLE.) THIS ARTICLE
OUTLINED THE AREAS WHICH PROBABLY WILL BE COVERED IN
THE NNA PACKAGE, WITH A SHORT PARAGRAPH OF WHAT IS
CONTAINID IN EACH. WHILE THE "BLUE" NNA -- SWISS,
AUSTRIANS -- NO DOUBT WERE PLEASED WITH THEIR COUP, IT
DREW THE IRE OF THE HOLDOUTS (FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA) AS A
HEAVY HANDED AT?EMPT TO FORCE CONSENSUS AMONG THEM.
ANOTHER "ACTIVE MEASURE" EMPLOYID TO PRESSURE OTHERS
EMBARRASSED THE MALTESE ON SWEDISH TELEVISION FOLLOWING
THE AGREEMEN? TO MOVE TO INFORMAL WORKING DISCUSSIONS.
THE MALTESE, WHO HAD BLOCRID CONSENSUS FOR A DAY, WERE
FEATURID ON SWEDISH TELEVISION THAT NIGHT. AS THE
CAMERA ZOOMID IN ON THE MALTESE DELEGATE, THE SOUND OF
LAUGHTER FROM OTHER DELEGATES COULD BE HEARD IN THE
BACKGROUND. THE MALTESE DELEGATE IS CONVINCED THE
SWIDES WERE BEHIND THIS.
THERE ALSO ARE INDICATIONS OF SOME SNIPING AMONG THE
SWIDES, FINNS, AUSTRIANS AND SWISS. THE FINNS
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REPORTEDLY ARE UNHAPPY WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE NNA
NO?IFICATION PROPOSAL. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, AT LEAST,
THIS HAS INCREASED THE FRICTION BETWEEN THEM AND THE
SWEDES, WHILE THE SWISS HAVE JOINED THE SWEDES IN A
MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE. NORMALLY, THE SWISS DEPRECATE
THE SWEDES, WHO TRY TO HAVE AN ANSWER FOR EVERYTHING.
THE YUGOSLAVS REMAIN THE MOST UNPLACABLE IN THE GROUP,
AND AS A RESULT, HAVE BEEN UNDER HEAVY NNA PRESSURE.
IT IS INTERESTING THAT IN ARGUING AMONG THEMSELVES THE
NNA HAVE BEEN SURPRISINGLY INFORMATIVE IN PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WEST. THIS MAY WELL BE DUE TO A
NEED TO CLARIFY WHAT THE PROBLEMS ARE, AND TO
DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THEM. IN OTHER WORDS., IT
IS EASY FOR THE SWISS OR AUS?RIANS TO DISCUSS THE
PACKAGE AND THE NNA PROBLEMS, BECAUSE ?HEY ARE NOT THE
REASON FOR THE NNA DELAY.
5. SERIOUS WORK HAS GONE INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
"CORE" GROUP'S PACKAGE AND THE "CORE" GROUP IS, BY AND
LARGE, BOTH PLEASED WITH, AND PROUD OF, ITS PRODUCT.
THERE IS SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE -- ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT
ENOUGH FOR SOME. ONE "CORE" GROUP DELEGATE
CHARACTERIZED THE PAPER AS "65 PER CENT NATO." AND
YUGOSLAVIA IS RUMORED, AT FIRST BLUSH, TO HAVE DUBBED
I? OUTRIGHT AS A "NATO PAPER." THE PROOF, HOWEVER, IS
IN THE PUDDING. U.S. DEL, THROUGH A VARIETY OF
CONTACTS, HAS TRIED TO GET A HANDLE ON WHAT WE MIGHT
EXPECT TO SEE FROM THE NNA'S EARLY NEXT ROUND -- AN
"SC.3/AMPLIFIED". IT IS POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, THAT THE
PRICE OF SECURING YUGOSLAV AND FINNISH SUPPORT OR EVEN
THE REVIW BY CAPITALS WILL RESULT IN CHANGES.
NONETHELESS, PIECING TOGETHER VARIOUS BITS OF
INFORMATION, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS A
FAIRLY ACCURATE, ALBEIT GENERAL, PICTURE OF WHAT THE
PACKAGE LOOKED LIRE AT THE END OF THIS ROUND.
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 3 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING
6. GENERAL. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE PRESEN?ED SOMEWHAT
DIFFERENTLY, THE NNA APPEAR TO HAVE MOVED TOWARDS OUR
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STRUC?URAL PARAMETER AND OUR OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT.
WE UNDERSTAND THA? AC?IVITIES TO BE PRE-NO?IFIED ARE
MANEUVERS COVERID BY THE MANDATE. HOWEVER, MANEUVERS
WILL BE DEFINED BASICALLY AS FORMATIONS ,OR UNITS
OU?-OF-GARRISON, ALTHOUGH GARRISON WILL BE REFERRED TO
AS A "PEACETIME LOCATION." AND PEACE?IME LOCATION WILL
BE DEFINED IN SUCH A WAY SO AS TO EXCLUDE WHAT WE HAVE
?ERMED THE MOBILZEA?ION PHASE (I.E., FOR A COUNTRY THAT
MOBILIZES OUT OF VILLAGES, THE PEACETIME LOCATION WILL
BE WHERE THEY GATHER AND PICK UP EQUIPMENT.). NORMAL
PEACETIME LOCATIONS WILL BE SPECIFIID. THE THRESHOLD
iS a STRUCTURAL ONE, THE Divi5i0N, ALTHOUGH DIViSiON IS
FURTHER DEFINED IN TERMS OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS
(NUMBERS OF TROOPS) WITH ACCOMPANYING EQUIPMENT (TANKS,
HELICOPTERS, ETC.), OR AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE, OR
AIR-MOBILE UNITS ON THE LEVEL OF A BA?TALION
ACCOMPANIID BY AN AS YET UNDESIGNATID NUMERICAL
THRESHOLD, AND SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY OF A CERTAIN
NUMBER OF SQUARE METERS.
7. RELEVANT DEFINITIONS WILL BE, WE UNDERSTAND, ALONG
THE FOLLOWING LINES:
-- riILITARY MANEUVERS: ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY
FORMA?IONS AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL IN
COMBAT-RELATID EXERCISES OU?SIDE THEIR PEACETIME
LOCATIONS, INCUDING ?HE RELOCATION OF SUCH FORMATIONS
AT A NOTIFIABLE LEVEL BETWEEN PEACETIME LOCATIONS AND
T$E EXERCISE AREA AS WELL AS BETWEEN DIFFERENT PHASES
OF THE EXERCISE. (BEGIN COMItEN?; THE NNA WILL BELIEVE
THIS IS AS FAR AS THEY CAN GO, AND YUGOSLAVIA, AND
PERHAPS FINLAND, THINK IT IS T00 FAR. END COMMENT.)
-- MOVEMENTS; THE RELOCATION OF FORMATIONS, IN
NON-COMBAT RELATID ACTIVI?IES, AT OR ABOVE THE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO AND FROM PEACETIME
LOCATIONS/S?AGING AREAS. (BEGIN COMMENT; ACCORDING TO
THE SWISS, THE NNA DESIGNED THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT
TO POSE PROBLEMS TO NATO MOVEMENTS/TRANSITS. END
COMMENT.)
-- DIVISION: MOBILE MILI?ARY UNITS TEMPORARILY OR
PERMANENTLY UNDER ONE COMMAND IN HEADQUARTERS, COMBAT
AND SUPPORT ELEMEN?S AND ?WO-FIVE UNITS AT
BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL WITH X TANKS, ARMOURID FIGHTING
VffiICLES, HELICOPTERS OR X TROOPS AND Y TANKS, ARriOURED
FIGHTING VffiICLES, HELICOPTERS. BEGIN COMMENT: USING
THIS APPROACH, "DIVISION", PER SE, IS NOT A THRESHOLD
FOR NOTIFICATION, BUT IS NOTIFIID UNDER A NUMERICAL
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD. END COMMENT.)
8. TIMING AND CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. WE HAVE
LEARNED THAT NOTIFICATION IS TO BE GIVEN 42 DAYS IN
ADVANCE (PRECISELY TWICE THE NUMBER OF DAYS CALLED FOR
UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.) THE NNA PACKAGE WILL
NOT HAVE AN INDEPENDENT STA?IC INFORMATION MEASURE, BUT
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RATHER WILL CALL FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION, IN
FAR GREATER DETAIL THAN THAT PROVIDID FOR IN
SC.1/AMPLIFIED, IN THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION.
INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED WILL FALL INTO FOUR
CA?EGORIESs GENERAL (THIS WILL INCLUDE CERTAIN
"STATIC" INFORMATION, WHICH IS A REY ELEMENT OF
YUGOSLAVIA'S CON?INUED OPPOSITION ?0 THE TOTAL
PACKAGE), PARTICIPATING UNITS, INFORMATION ON DIFFERENT
PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL
DEFINITION, AND OTHER INFORMATION (TO INCLUDE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE EXERCISE TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES.)
***??< SECTION 4 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PK/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJEC?: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING
NOTIFICATION
9. THE PACKAGE WILL ALSO INCLUDE A SEC?ION ON
ACTIVITIES NOT NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE -- BASICALLY SHORT
NOTICE MANEUVERS ("ALERT" ACTIVITIES) AND MOVEMENTS.
THE TRIGGERING MECHANISM FOR NOTIFICA?ION WILL BE THE
SAME AS THAT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY?
MANEUVERS.
CONSTRAINTS
10. WE UNDERS?AND THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE BASICALLY ALONG
THE LINES OF THOSE OUTLINED IN REF (B). IT WOULD
APPEAR THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN THEIR
ATTEMPTS TO COMPLETELY BAN CONCURRENT LARGER-SCALE
MANEUVERS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT A NEW ELEMENT
-- A RESTRICTION ON THE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY TO NO
MORE THAN 17 DAYS -- WILL BE ADDED.
11. THE NNAS HAVE DEVELOPED A COMPREHENSIVE OBSERVER
REGIME ?HAT WILL REQUIRE MANDATORY INVI?ATION OF
OBSERVERS TO ALL PRE-NOTIFIED MILITARY MANEUVERS AND TO
NOTIFIED MILITARY MANEUVERS (ALERTS) WHEN THE DURATION
OF A MANEUVER EXCEED'S AN AS YET UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF
HOURS. THE REGIME WILL REQUIRE THAT CERTAIN
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACTIVITY BE PROVIDED IN THE
OBSERVER INVI?ATION, AND ALSO WILL ADDRESS IN
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CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE MODALITIES AND GUIDELINES FOR
OBSERVATION, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF MAPS.
INVITA?IONS WILL BE EXTENDED AT T$E TIME OF T$E
NOTIFIGTION. THE MOMENT AT WHICH I'HE OBSERVATION
STARTS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WHAT WE WOULD
HAVE HOPED FOR -- AN OBSERVA?ION WILL START NOT LATER
THAN AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF SOURS AFTER/AFTER THE
ACTIVITY HAS STARTED. WHILE OBSERVERS WILL HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW ALL THE MAIN PHASES OF THE
ACTIVITY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A SPECIFIC
PROVISION ALLOWING THE OBSERVER TO OBSERVE THE DURATION
OF THE ACTIVITY FROM START TO FINISH AND RETURN ?0
GARRISON (PEACETIME LOCATIONS). (BEGIN COMMENT; THIS
IS EVIDENCE THAT THE NNA DO NOT FULLY EMBRACE THE OOG
CONCEPT. THEY DEFINE "MANEUVER" CLOSE TO OOG, BUT DO
NOT APPLY IT ?0 THE PERIOD OF OBSERVATION. THIS WILL
BE A PROBLEM AREA FOR US. END COMMENT.)
12. THIS ISSUE WILL APPARENTLY BE ADDRESSED UNDER ?HE
TERMS OF "OBSERVATION BY REQUEST AND NTM'S." WHILE IT
APPEARS TO BE MUCH MORE THAN INITIALLY WAS INDICTED BY
?HE NNA, IT NONETHELESS LOOKS AS IF I? WILL FALL SHORT
OF WHAT WE WANT. WHILE CHARACTERIZED BY SOME OF THE
NNA AS A "NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL ON-SITE INSPECTION", IT
DOES NO? REALLY SEEM TO BE THAT AT ALL, AS WE BELIEVE
THERE MAY BE TWO CATCHES. AN "OBSERVATION" READ
INSPECTION) MAY ONLY BE REQUESTED IF A STATE DEEMS ITS
OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS TO BE IN JEOPARDY OR IF A STATE
BELIEVES THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSBM REGIME (AS
A WHOLE) IS CALLED INTO QUESTION. THUS, THE
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH SUCH AN "OBSERVATION" COULD
BE REQUESTED ARE EXCEPTIONAL. IN ADDITION, A STATE MAY
REFUSE SUCH A REQUEST ON GROUNDS OF SUPREME NATIONAL
INTERESTS. THE ELEMENT OF TIMELINESS WILL, HOWEVER, BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, PROBABLY REQUIRING A STATE TO
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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***??< SECTION S ??,t**
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD ?~ LYNN HANSEN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OpDR DEL, US NST DEL
?AGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, pREL
SUBJECT: CDE: CURREN? S?ATUS OF NNA --
INVITE "OBSERVERS", OR A? LEAST RESPOND rp EKING
REQUEST, WITHIN TWELVE HOURS,
ALWAYS BE PART OF AND ~ NNA OBSERVER WILL
APPEARS THAT '~ RE~ STSS ORA" BSERVgETION"FIN`E'LY, IT
INVITATIONS/RESPONSES WILL HAVE TO BE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SOME PROVISIONS FOR AGREED PROCEDURES FOR RAPID
COMMUNICATIONS.
----------------------------------------------
COMMUNIG-TIONS/CONSULTA?IONS
---------------------------------------------
13. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH
MODALITIES FOR "RAPID COMMUNICATION" (TELECOMMUNICATION
LINES), IT APPEARS THAT THE PROVISIONS TO BE INCLUDED
IN ?HIS BECTON WILL BE, BY-AND-LARGE, VOLUNTARY IN
NA?URE. WHILE COMMUNICATIONS MUST BE TRANSMITTED TO
ALL PAR?ICIPATING STATES, THE RAPID MODALITY
COMMUNICATIONS "CAN" RATHER THAN "MUST" BE USED. AND,
SHOULD CLARIFICATION AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BE NECESSARY, AGAIN, THIS
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM "CAN" BE USED. CONSULTATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE ENVISAGED EI?HER ON AN AD HOC
BASIS. OR AT REGULAR INTERVALS AS DECIDED BY THE
STATES, BUT NOT, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, REQUIRED. THE
SWISS CONCEPT OF SALON DES AMBASSADEURS HAS NOT
DISAPPEARED ENTIRELY. THERE MAY BE A PROVISION FOR A
CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM LINKED TO "OBSERVATION ON
REQUEST."
ANNUAL CALENDERS
----------------------------
14. WE UNDERSTAND THEIR ANNUM, CALENDAR PROPOSAL WILL
BE SIMILAR TO SC.1/AMPLFIED. THERE MAY BE A FEW
DIFFERENCES, AS THE NNA PAPER IS LIKELY TO CALL FOR
MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE TYPES OF FORCES
PARTICIPATING, TO WIT: LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING
AND COMMANDING THE ACTIVITY; NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE
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PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS OF
GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES; AND NUMBER AND TYPES?OF
THE PARTICIPATING AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIR-MOBILE
BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT
INFORMATION FOR THE IDENTIFICA?ION OF THE PARTICIPATING
UNITS, BY ORGANIZATIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS,
WILL BE CALLED FOR.
-- --------- ----------------------------
NON-USE OF FORCE
15. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WILL CONTAIN FIFTEEN ELEMENTS
ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY DRAWN FROM THE UN CHARTER AID
HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE POINTS, IN AND OF THEPSSELVES,
ARE LARGELY UNEXCEPTIONABLE INCLUDING SECTIONS ON THE
PRIMACY OF THE CHARTER, BALANCE IN THE HELSINKI
PROCESS, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (TO
MOLLIFY THE SWISS). THERE IS ALSO A YUGOSLAV-INSPIRED
SECTION ON TERRORISM. WHILE THE NNA DRAFT IS A LO?
LONGER THAN WE WOULD HAVE WISHED, AT LEAST IT DOES NOT
CONTAIN THE DETAILID DEFINITIONS OF FORCE ("THE CDE
DIMENSION") ADVOCATED BY THE CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVE.
---------------------------------
PROBLEMS
--------------------------------------
16. AS INDICATED EARLIER, BOTH YUGOSLAVIA AND FINLAND
HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE PACKAGE AS IT HAS NOW
EVOLVED, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST FIVE
MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES. FINLAND DOES NOT LIKE THE
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 6 ??***
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/CDE: AMBASSADOR BARRY AND LYNN HANSEN
GENEVA FOR U.S. SCC DEL; US CD DEL; US NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: CURRENT STATUS OF NNA -- AND WORKING
DEFINITIONS OF MOVEMENTS AND DIVISIONS, OSTENSIBLY
BECAUSE THEY STRAY T00 FAR FROM ACCEPTED HELSINKI FINAL
AC? CONCEPTS, BUT MOST LIKELY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WOULD
HAVE TROUBLE ACCEP?ING THEM. SPECIFICALLY, THE FINNS
WOULD LIRE TO SET THE TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION OF A
MANEUVER AT THREE, VICE TWO UNITS OF A DIVISION.
FINLAND ALSO HAS A PROBLEM WITH THE TREATMENT OF WHAT
WE CALL "ALERT" ACTIVITIES. YUGOSLAVIA, IN TURN, HAS
DIFFICULTY ACCEPTING THE NOTION OF SPECIFYING PEACETIME
LOCATIONS (ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THAT, IN AN ATTEMPT
TO BRING THE YUGOSLAVS ON BOARD, ONE OF THE NNA
DELEGATES PULLED OUT A MAP AND POINTED OUT YUGOSLAV
PEACETIME LOCATIONS IN ORDER TO PROVE TO YUGOSLAVIA
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THAT THESE LOCATIONS WERE HARDLY A SECRET), AND WITH
OBSERVA?ION BY REQUEST; HERE, YUGOSLAVIA WOULD LIRE TO
LIIiIT THE RATIONALE FOR HARING SUCH A REQUEST STRICTLY
TO SUPREKE NATIONAL INTERESTS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDEN?IA1.
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.~~~~w>~.,~
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY ~ DELEGATIONS OF
AUSTRIA, CYPRUS, FINLAND,~MALTA, SAN MARINO,
SWEDEN,ccS//WIT1ZERLAND, YUGOSLAVIA
x~ 7
The abo~-e-sentioned Stites,
Renewing their commitment to document CSCE/SC.3,
Expressing their wish to contribute to the further progress of the
Conference,
Submit the following:
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PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
The participating States x311 Give prior notification to all other
participating States of military manoeuvres, covered by the mandate, i.e.
- the engagement of military formations at or above the notifiable
level as defined below outside their normal locations in combat-
related exercises and
- movements of such formations at or above the notifiable level between
their normal locations and the exercise areas as xell as between the
areas of the different phases of the exercises.
Such manoeuvres rill be subject to prior notification, whenever they
- numerical total(s) - to be defined - of forces participating in the
activity as a whole, emphasizing mobility and firepower or
- three amphibious, airborne, air-mobile units on battalion level
or combinations thereof and a total number of xx troops or a total
number of xx troops and a total of yy square metres of shipborne
loading capacity.
*For the purpose of the agreement a division or equivalent formation is
defined as
- a mobile military unit structured, permanently or temporarily,
under one casaand in headquarters, combat and support elements or
- achy other group of forces of equivalent capability
containing 2-5 units on brigade/regiment level with a total number of
at least x fro ns and y tanks/armoured fighting vehicles/helicopters or
a total number of at least z tanks/armoured fighting vehicles/heli-
copters.
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Prior notification will be given by the participating States on whose
territory these manoeuvres take place as well as by those States carrying
them out. Prior notification gill also be Miven by States participating in
these manoeuvres whenever their participation reaches notifiable level.
Prior notification will be given 42 days or more is advance of the start
of these military manoeuvres in'a standardized format containing the following
information:
1. General information
1.1. Type and designation of the activity
1.2. Main purposes
1.3. Timeframe of the activity
1.4. Area of the activity
1.5. Level of command, organizing gad commanding the activity
1.6. Psrticipating States
1.7. Number gad types of participating divisions or equivalent formations of
ground, naval and air forces
1.8. Number gad types of participating amphibious, airborne and air-mobile
brigades or regiments
1.9. Numerical strength of the activity and the number of troops of each
participating State
2. Information on oarticipatin? units
2.1. Number, types, and, whenever possibls, names of units of each partici-
pating State involved in the activity, down to and including
- brigade and/or regiment level; equivalent level of ground, naval gad
air forces
- battalion level in case of amphibious, airborne and air-mobile units
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2.2. Numerical strenNth (manpower) of
- directinN staff, including umpires
- each a-a~or unit. at
- divisional level or above
- battalion level in case of amphibious, airborne and air-mobile
units
2.3. Number and/or type of the followin~+-:
- tanks
- other armoured fi2htina vehicles
- river crossing and other types of heavy assault er~ineerin2 equipment
- logistic assault support equipment
- selfpropelled artillery and multiple rocket launches (more than
- other artillery and multiple rocket launches (more than 100 mm),
as wll as mobile surface to air missile launches
- heavy live ammunition
- combat aircraft
- combat helicopters
- transport aircraft
- transport helicoptes
- naval cosibatants
- landing crafts
- amphibious vessels, including shipborne loading capacity
- auxiliary amphibious ships, including shipborne loadinN capacity
?level of detail to be defined
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3. Int'ormation on different abases of the mili activity and their
teoaraahical definition
5.1. The starting and finishing dates of the s~ovesients of forces involved,
whenever they reach notifiable level, as well as the period of absence from
their normal locations
3.2. Duration of each phase, tactical purpose and corresponding geographical
areas, including staging areas, and final positions before returning to
their normal locations
4. Other information
4.1. Additional relevant information to be defined on the units participating
in notifiable activities.
4.2. Substantial changes and additions to the annual calendar+- as well as
reasons for such changes
4.3. Relation to other notifiable activities
4.4. State responsible for the observation programme
?See page 6
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ANNUAL CALENDAR OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
The participating States will transmit to all other participating States
the calendar of their military activities subject to prior notification and
plarn:ed for the calendar year beginning on the subsequent January 1st.
This annual calendar will be transmitted every year, not later than October lat-
in a standardized format containing the following in!'ormation:
1. Type of activity
2. Main purposes
3. Timeframe of the activity with envisaged starting and finishing dates
4. Area of the activity
5. Level of command, organizing and commanding the activity
6. States participating in the activity
7. Number and types of the participating divisions or equivalent formations
of ground. naval and air forces
8. Number and types of the participating amphibious. airborne and air-mobile
10. Numerical strength of the activity in terms of manpower as well as the
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INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION
The participating States will invite observers tY`om all other partici-
pating States to military manoeuvres subject to prior notification in accord-
ance with the provisions set out below.
1. The invitation of observers will be extended simultaneously with the
prior notification of the military activity.
2. In addition to the basic information aa~ the military activity, given in
the prior notification, the invitation will specify
- State responsible for the observation programme
- the period of observation
- the number of observers invited per participating State
- the languages used in interpretation and translation during the
observation. '
The deadline for accepting the invitation will be 21 days before the
start of the observation. If no reply is given in time, it will be assumed -:
that no observers will be seat.
3. Additional information will be sent not later than 14 days before the
start of the observation to those States which have accepted the invitation
or which request such additional informatia~n. The information will include
- basic situation and main phases of the activity
- maps of the area of activity with a scale to be specified
- general practical arrang~eata for the observers
- authorized equipment for the observers
- general observation programme
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4. At latest when the observation begins information rill be given to the
observers on the
- detailed observation programme '
- directing staff responsible for the observation
- details of practical arrangements.
S. The observation will cover the duration of the activity, as notified,
whenever it reaches the notifiable level, during phases to be defined.
6. The invitation will be valid for at least one observer from each
participating State; in case of larger scale activities at least two observers
will be invited. In the case of particularly large activities an even higher
number of observers could be envisaged.
7. While the observers are on the territory of the State where the activity
takes place, their persons and property, as well as their living quarters,
will be granted the same privileges and immunities as those accorded to
diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
S. The invited State decides whether to send military and/or civilian
9. Observers from all participating States will be treated without discrimi-
nation and offered equal opportunities to carry out their functions.
10. Observers will be given the possibility to use high capability optical
11. The use of photographic equipment is generally prohibited, unless the
irniting State grants exceptions.
12. Irrespective of the language(s) used in briefings and information,
it/they will be interpreted or, respectively, translated into at least one
working language of the CSCE. Languages to be used will be indicated in the
invitations given.
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18. The observers will be divan extensive and wthoritative information on
the Pu~'pose, the basic situation and the prodrsss of the activity throudh
detailed daily briefings rich the help of asps and drawing describing the
' current situation.
14. In particular the observers, in order to evaluate wheth~? the activities
are carried out in cont'ormity with the prior notification and whether they
are ran-threatening in nature, will be diver opportunity
- to observe ground, naval and air units carrying out the main activities
se well as areas that are essential for the above purposes of obser-
vation
- to visit, within the framework of alternatives offered, field units on
levels to be defined and to follow their utivitiea and to communicate
with commanders and troops
- to be briefed on unit levels, to be defined, by camnandera or members
of their staff
- to be provided with information concerning their approximate position,
geographically and in relation to units referred to in earlier briefings.
They will be provided with appropriate means of transportation.
15. The inviting State will also consider requests made by other partici-
pating States before the start of the observation programme with regard to
possibilities to supplement the observation programme in order to meet
particular concerns expressed.
16. The inviting State rill guide the observers in the area of activities.
Observers will follow the relevant instructions issued by the inviting State
is accordance with the provisions set out in this document. The inviting
State will not be required to permit observatia~n of restricted installations
such as fortifications or similar defence sites.
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17. Observers will be Siven the opportunity to commursicate with their
tabassies and/or with their home authorities.
18. The invitir~ State will cover the costs of board and.lod~in~ during the
observation pro~raame.
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NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF ![ILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE
1. The participating States trill give notification to all other participating
States of military aanoeuvrss u defined on page 2, covered by the mandate,
~+hich are carried ont at short notice, ~+henever they reach botifiable level
u defined on page 2.
2. The participating States Mill give notification to all other participating
States oP such military movements which are not in conjunction with combat-
related exercises, of military formations at or above notifiable level to and
Pram normal locations/staging areas, covered by the mandate, whenever they
reach notifiable level as defined on page 2.
3. Notification Mill be given by the participating States on whose territory
these manoeuvres and movements take place u well u by those State: carrying
them out. Notification will also be given by States participating in these
manoeuvres and movements ~fienever their participation reaches notifiable level.
4. Notification will be given at the earliest possible opportunity prior to
the start of these manoeuvres and movements in a standardized format containing
information as outlined under the section on prior notification Mith exceptions
to be defined.
S. The participating States will invite observers from all other participating
States to military manoeuvres carried out at short notice, when the duration
of the activity at or above notifiable level exceeds ... hours, in accordance
with provisions to be elaborated.
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CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN lIILITARY ACTIVITIES
1. The participating States gill abide by the following constraints on the
notifiable military activities referred to in this section:
2. No individual solitary manoeuvre will exceed five times the notifiable ,
level and its duration at or above notifiable level will not exceed 17 days..
3. The States will neither permit on Choir own territory nor carry out or
participate in more than a total of five notifiable military manoeuvres per
calendar year which are of a size leas than two times the notifiable level;
moreover, the States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out
or participate? in a total of more than one such manoeuvre at the same time.
However, if such manoeuvres are notified in the annual calendar by the
States on whose territory they take place as well as by those States carrying
them out, the total number per calendar year and the number of such manoeuvres
taking place at the same time will not be restricted.
4. The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or
participate+ in more than a total of five military manoeuvres per calendar
year, which are of a size of two times the notifiable level or above. Such
r---
manoeuvres will be notified already in the annual calendar by the States on
whose territory they take place as well as by those States carrying them out.
The States will neither permit on their own territory nor carry out or
participate? in a total of more than two such manoeuvres at the same time.
However, once a year two such manoeuvres may be combined but not exceed a total
of seven times the notifiable level.
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OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST OF 1RLITARY ACTIVITIES
A participating State Which considers that its national security interests
are at stake or that the continued elfeetiveness of the agreement is seriously
feopardized because of specific circ~s~stanoes in the oontest of the implemen-
tation oP measures contained in the preceding sections, Kill be entitled to
request to send observers to another participating State n:- very short notice.
The request vrill be addressed to the State on whose territory the activities
or presumed activities are carried out. It Kill define the requested observation
area and cite the relevant measures on which the request is based as well as
state the reasons for the request.
The State which has received such a request will, within twelve hours
after receiving the request, im-ite the requesting State to carry out the
observation. The modalities and guidelines for such observation, including
exceptions which apply to restricted areas, will be defined.
If, for reasons of supreme national security interests, a State which
has been requested to receive observers would find itself compelled not to
grant the request, it will state the ressons which in the particular situation
have caused the refusal in an answer addressed to the requesting State within
twelve hours after receiving the request.
In view of the fact that the CSCE proeesa takes place outside military
alliances, the requested State will in addition invite observers from a third
participating State with which it does not maintain relations of military
alliance.
If observers from a third State take part, they will participate in the
whole observation together with the observers iron the requesting State, and
be provided xith the same facilities.
After a requested observation has been carried out, the requesting State,
the inviting State as well as the invited third State, Kill each submit a report
to the other participating States Kithin ... hours upon completion of the
observation. -
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The request and the answer thereto as well as the reports on the obser-
vation will be transmitted in accordance with the provisions contained in the
following section.
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ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING MITE INFORMATION NOTIFICATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE
OF VIEMS MITH REGARD TO THE MLASZAtES TO BE ADOPTED
1. General provisions for communication
Each participating State gill transmit all eoms~unioations foreseen in the
preceding sections to all other participating States.
Such oommunications can be transmitted in oonforaity with the modalities
for rapid communications set out below.
The participating States can also make use of the rapid communication
system in order to provide and request clarification and additional information
as well as in order to exchange views concerning the implementation of the
measures in the preceding sections.
2. Modalities for rapid communications
In order to ensure that the eommunications can be transmitted without
delay and at all times, the participating States will keep telecommunication
lines accessible between the designated representatives of the participating
States for transmitting and receiving printed text, charts and maps.
Access to all such communications will be restricted in accordance with
CSCE practice.
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CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
Arrangements for short aeetings of representatives of all the participating
States, in relatioa to the implementation of the measures in the preceding
sections, should also be envisaged.
Such aeetings could be eomened
- on an?ad hoc basis, at the request of any participating State, to deal
with exceptional situations
- at intervals and dates to be decided by the participating States, to
proceed to an exchange of vie~+s on the routine implementation of the
measures
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30CRL~!'
NON-USE OF FORCE
The participating Statss stress their oommitment to the Final Act of the
CSCE and the need for improved and oonsistent impleaentation of all its pro-
visions, and thus to further the process of increuing security and dsveloping
oo-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to intsrnatioasl peace and security
in the xorld u a vdtole. They are also oonscious of the interrelation betxeen
security in 8urope u a xhole, and security in the Mediterranean area.
All the principles set forth in the Final Act are of primary significance
and, accordingly, xill all be equally gad unreservedly applied, each of them
being interpreted taking into account the others. Respect for these principles
rill encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress
of co-operation among the participating States in all fields.
The participating States are oonscious of the complementary nature of
the political and military aspects of security xithin the CSCE.
They stress that the principle of refraining from the threat or use of
force is a universally recognized obligation in international law, binding
all States, and that non-compliance xith it consequently constitutes a violation
of international lax.
They reaffirm their determination to respect this principle, contained
in the Final Act, so ss to ensure that, as a norm of international life, it is
strictly and effectively observed. No consideration may be invoked to serve
to xarrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this
principle.
They recall the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
if as armed attuk occurs.
The participating States rill refrain, in their mutual as xell as in their
international relations in general,
from the threat or use of force against the territorial iategrity or
political independence of any State, or in a~y- other manner inconsistent
xith the purposes of the United. Nations and xith the Final Act, and,
accordingly, -
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- from any manifestation of force, direct or iadireet, for the purpose
of inducing any State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign
rights,
regardless of this Status political, social, economic, or cultural system and
irrespective of whether?or not they aaintain with this State relations of
alliance.
No territorial occupation or acquisition resulting from the threat or
use of force will be recognized as legal.
The participating States stress their firm cosjmitment to the principle of
peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in the Final Act, convinced that
it is an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat
' or use of force. They reaffirm their resolve to settle exclusively by peaceful
means any dispute existing or arising between them. They also express their
determination to reinforce, improve and develop the methods at their disposal
for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The participating States confirm the universal significance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, the respect for which is an essential factor
for the CSCE process and for international peace and security as well as for
the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as
among all States.
The participating States confirm that they will refrain from direct or
indirect sssistance to terrorist activities or to subversive or other activities
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating
State. Tbey express their determination to take effective measures for the
prevention and supression of acts of terrorism and will take all appropriate
measures in preventing Chair respective territories frog being used for the
preparatioa, organization or commission of terrorist activities, including
measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups
and organisations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of
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The participating States ~+ill fulfil in good faith their obligations
under international law. They declare that their existing international
eoomitments, rights and obligations do not conflict Math the present document.
They confirm that in the event of a conflict betMSen the obligations of
the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and
their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their
obligations under the Charter ~+ill prevail.
The participating States are convinced that the situation in Europe and
the equal respect for the legitimate security interests of every participating
State require determined efforts by all of them to build mutual confidence,
lessen military confrontation, strengthen security for all and promote
disarmament.
By their very nature concrete CSBI[s serve to give effect and expression
to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force.
- ~- ~ SE1c!uc~
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08027
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, OCTOBER 18, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7956, B) STOCKHOLM 7994
1. CDE VII - 064
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE U.S. AND USSR WEIGHED IN ON THE
ISSUES WHICH MUST BE RECONCILED IF THERE IS TO BE AN
AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. (TEXTS OF BOTH SPEECHES SENT
REFS A AND B.) CANADA ENUMERATED PROBLEM AREAS REVEALED
DURING INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. LUXEMBOURG SPORE ON BEHALF
OF THE EC-10 END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR BARRY OUTLINED DIFFERENCES WHICH MUST BE
RESOLVED IN ORDER FOR THE CONFERENCE TO MOVE INTO INTEN-
SIFIED NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIVE
AGREEMENT. HE CALLID ON THE EAST TO CEASE ITS EFFORTS
TO CHALLENGE THE CDE ZONE OF APPLICATION. (TEXT OF
SPEECH SENT REF A.)
5. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY'S COUNTERPOINT GENERALLY PLAYED
UP TO THE EUROPEANS, PLACING THE CONFERENCE IN THE
OVERALL CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN DETENTE. HOWEVER, HE ALSO
CRITICIZED THE ALLEGED ATTEMPT OF THE U.S. TO "EXPOSE"
THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF FORCES; TO CONSIDER ONLY
GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY; AND TO "DELAY" DEVELOPMENT OF
NUF. (TEXT SPEECH SENT REF B.)
6. AMBASSADOR DELWORTH (CANADA) URGED THE CONFERENCE TO
MOVE QUICKLY INTO DRAFTING VIA CONCRETE CONSIDERATION OF
SUBSTANCE IN THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT
THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALREADY REVEALED PROBLEMS, E.G.,
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(1) ON VERIFICATION/INFORMATION, WHICH IS REJECTED BY
THE EAST; (2) ON THE EAST'S ATTEMP? TO ERTEND THE CDE
ZONE; AND (3). ON THE EAST'S DESIRE TO DRAFT NUF LANGUAGE
BEFORE MOVING TO DRAFTING IN OTH$R GROUPS.
7. IN A BRIEF STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE EC-10, DEPUTY
HEAD OF DELEGATION RAYSER (LU%EMBOURG) CHARACTERIZED THE
AGREEMENT ON INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS AS A "TURNING
POINT" IN DISCUSSIONS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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SBC88T'
SUGJ 'T:_ U.S. CDE PLENARY SPEECH, `0/8/85
1. ~
2. U-ENTT TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE ADDRESS AMBASSADOR
ROBERT L. BARRY, FTIF:AD OF USDEL CDE, GAVE IN PLENARY
TODAY, OCTOBER L8. BEGIN TEXT:
THIS CONFERENCE HAS JUST CROSSED A THRESHOLD. WE HAVE, I
EDPE, DECIDED TO LEAVE PROCEDURE BEHIND AND CONCENTRATE
ON SUBSTANCE. MY DELEGATION, WITH OTHERS, WORKED HARD TO
BRING ABOUT THE TRANSITION, AND WE WELCOME IT AS LONG
OVERDUE. IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, PRESIDENT REAGAN
EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WOULD
SOON SEE "THE BEGINNING OF PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
SUBSTANCE OF A FINAL AGREEMENT." IN MAY, THE PRESIDENT
SAID: "THE CONFERENCE IS NOW AT A POINT WHERE IT COULD
MOVE INTO A 108E INTENSE NEGOTIATING PHASE..." WE HAVE
FINALLY TAKEN THAT STEP. MY PREDECESSOR,
AMBASSADOR GOODBY, PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN GETTING
THE SOMETIMES CUMBERSOME CONSENSUS PROCESS UNDER WHICH WE
OPERATE TO WORK. SO DID MANY OTHER DELEGATES.
BUT LET US NOT BE T00 FREE WITH SELF-CONGRATULATIONS.
LET US REFLECT ON NEARLY TWO YEARS OF DISCUSSION WHICH
HAVE DONE LITTLE TO MAKE EUROPE MORE SECURE OR
CONFIDENT. THE TIME REMAINING TO US IS SEVERELY
LIMITED. THE TIME SPENT ON PROCEDURE DURING THIS PAST
ROUND, HOWEVER NECESSARY, HAS NOT LED 1'0 SIGNIFICANT
CONVERGENCE ON THE ISSUES; IF ANYTHING, IT HAS SERVED AS
A SUBSTITUTE FOR SUBSTANCE. AS WE LOOK AHEAD TO THE NEXT
ROUND, WE SHOULD HAVE A CLEAR VIEW IN MIND OF THE
COMPLEXITY AND URGENCY OF THE TASK BEFORE US.
DURILG THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WE ARE NOW IN, OUR AIM
SHOULD BE TO FIND OUT IF THERE IS INDEED SUFFICIENT
COMMON GROUND AMONG US ON WHICH A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME CAN
BE BUILT AND TO DETERMINE WHEN AND HOW WE CAN BEST MOVE
TO ACTUAL DRAFTING. LET'S NOT DELUDE OURSELVES; ALTHOUGH
THERE ARE SIGNS OF EMERGING CONSENSUS ON SOME ISSUES,
SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON MOST. FINDING SOLUTIONS TO
THEM WILL BE DEMANDING.
THE UNITED STATES IS READY FOR SUJSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION.
IN A STATEMENT ON SEPTEMBER L0, AMBASSADOR GOODBY
IDENTIFIED THE MAIN ISSUES BEFORE THE CONFERENCE AND
OUTLINED THE POSITIONS OF THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.L ON
THEM. AMONG OTHER THINGS, HE EXPRESSED OUR FUNDAMENTAL ?_
BELIEF THAT THE THRESHOLD FOR I~TIFICATION MUST BE
SIGNIFICANTLY LOWERED; HE ARGUED FOR THE OUT-OF-GARRISON
CONCEPT AND THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO NOTIFICATION; HE
EXPLAINED OUR VIEWS ON OBSERVATION AND ON-SITE
INSPECTION. AND HE EXPLAINED THE NEED FOR AN ANNUAL
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EXCHANGE OF INFORM~ITION ON MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURES AND
LOCATIONS.- THESE POSITIONS ON THE CONTENT OF CONCRETE
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES LIE AT THE
HEART OF DEGATE HERE AND WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS OF OUR
CONTRIBUTION TO DRAFTING. IF WE CAN NEGOTIATE AN
AGREEMENT ON SUCH MEASURES, WE WILL HAVE MADE THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE IN EUROPE LESS LIKELY; THEN, A
REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE COMMITMENT, AS PART
OF THAT AGREEMENT, WOULD HAVE REAL MEANING.
OTHER QUESTIONS WE WILL ADDRESS HERE NOT BECAUSE WE
BELIEVE THEY ARE PART OF OUR MANDATE, BUT BECAUSE
OTHERS HAVE RAISED THEM. I HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY
ATTEMPTS TO ALTER THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. THE
MANDATE IS CLEAR IN REFERRING TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE
AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE; IT IS
EQUALLY CLEAR IN AFFIRMING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO
ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE.
STATED MOST PLAINLY, ACTIVITIES IN THOSE AREAS ARE
COVERED ONLY WHEN THEY MEET BOTH OF TWO CRITERIA:
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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~??< SECTION 2 ??~'*~
FRO1 USDEL CDE
USIA FOR P/PFE
E.O. L235b: N/A
TAGS: CSCE, CDE, PARM, PREL
WHEN THEY AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AND WHEN THEY
ALSO CONSTITUTE A PART OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN
EUROPE FOR WHICH NOTIFICATION IS REQUIRED. WE ARE
PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT THE MANDATE IN THIS REGARD AS
IN ALL OTHERS; THE ZONE OF APPLICATION IS MOT OPEN TO
RENEGOTIATION OR REINTERPRETATION.
MR. CHAIRMAN, MY GOVERNMENT AND, I BELIEVE, MOST
OTHERS HERE WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT EMPTY
FORMULATIONS WHICH PROMISE SECURITY TO OUR PUBLICS
BUT DO NOTHING TO FULFILL THE PROMISE. AS THE MADRID
MANDATE SAYS, THE PRODUCT OF OUR WORK HERE MUST HAVE
MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. BY MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, I
MEAN A SUBSTANTIVE, QUALITATIVE ADVANCE OVER THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT, MEASURES WHICH CAN IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF EVERY
PARTICIPATING STATE TO UNDERSTAND THF. INTENTIONS AND
PURPOSES BEHIND THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS REQUIRES A MUTUAL[.,Y
COMPLEMENTARY SET OF MEASURES ADDRESSING THE WHOLE
SPECTRUM OF 1ILITARY ACTIVITY, NOT ISOLATED MEASURES
DIRECTED AT SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES. ONLY IN THIS WAY
CAN WE ESTABLISH A RELIABLE PROFILE OF THE ACTIVITIES
WHICH ROUTINELY OCCUR OVER A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME SO
AS, FINALLY, TO DEVELOP NORMS FOR MILITARY BEHAVIOR.
TO OUR MINDS, BUILDING SUCH A PROFILE REQUIRES A
SYSTEM OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND NOTIFICATIONS OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE EVALUATED AGAINST
THE BACKGROUND OF INFORMATION ABOUT FORCES NORMALLY
STATIONED IN THE AREA. ONLY SUCH AN INTERRELATED
SYSTEM WOULD ALLOW REALLY INFORMED ANALYSIS AND
JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE MEANILG OF ACTIVITIES IN THE
OVERALL MILITARY CONTEXT.
IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THE
STATEMENT GENERAL SECRETARY CORBACHEV MADE IN PARIS
ON OCTOBER 3 THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO
ACCEPT "MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION." THE SIXTEEN
SPONSORS OF DOCUMENT SC.L, INCLUDING MY COUNTRY,
PROPOSED SUCH AN EXCHANGE AS ONE OF THE SIX MEASURES
WE TABLED AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THIS CONFERENCE,
UNCLAS
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IN JANUARY, L984. DOCUMELT SC.3, TABLED BY THE
NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES IN MARCH OF THAT YEAR,
ALA CONTAINS SUCH A PROPOSAL. SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF
THIS CONCEPT SERVES AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE
GONVERGQYCE OF VIEWS NECESSARY FOR A FINAL
COMPREFIENSIVE AGREEMENT. I MUST ADD, HOWEVER, THAT
THE RECENT REMARKS ON THIS SUBJECT BY THE
DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION,
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, EQUATING INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND
AIR ACTIVITIES WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES,
.QUALIFIES GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT IN
A WAY WHICH UNDERCUTS THE EMERGING AGREEMENT ON THIS
MEASURE.
MR. CHAIRMAN, AS OUR MANDATE STATES. AND AS WE HAVE
BEEN STRESSING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS
CONFERENCE, THE REQUIREMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
ALSO MEANS THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED HERE MUST BE:
VERIFIABLE AND PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE MEANS OF
VERIFICATION. IN RELATION TO I~TIFICATION OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THIS REQUIRES THAT EVERY STATE
HAVE THE ABILITY TO ASSURE ITSELF THAT ALL OTHER
STATES ARE PROVIDING I~TIFICATION FOR EVERY ACTIVITY
WHICH MEETS THE AGREED PARAMETERS. WITHOUT THE MEANS
OF VERIFYING THAT ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY
SITUATION IS ACCURATE AND COIPLETE, NO STATE CAN GAIN
REAL CONFIDENCE FROM A SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, AND NO SUCH SET CAN BE OF
TRUE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. I KNOW THAT THE UNITED
STATES, ITS GOVERNMENT, CONGRESS AND PEOPLE, COULp
NEVER ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT HERE WHICH WAS NOT
VERIFIABLE IN ALL ITS OPERATIVE PARTS.
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
+~??< SECTION 3 ??~~~r
FRO1 USDEL CDE
USIA FOR P/PFE
MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SPOKEN GENERALLY TODAY TO REMIND
THE CONFERENCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS OF MY
DELEGATION AS WE ENTER INTO A NEW PHASE OF OUR WORK.
I HAVE NOT ADDRESSED ALL ISSUES BEFORE US; I HAVE NOT
TRIED TO ARGUE THE DETAILS 0~' OUR POSITIONS. I HAVE
SIMPLY TRIED TO DESCRIGE--IN OUTLINE--OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS REQUIRED BY OUR MANDATE AND
BY THE EXPECTATIONS OF OUR STATES AND PEOPLES. I
LOOK FORWARD TO A PRODUCTIVE NEXT ROUND, ONE IN WHICH
ACTUAL DRAFTING COULD BEGIN. BUT AS AN EXPERIENCED
OPTIMIST I AM ALWAYS LOOKING FOR THE RAIN CLOUDS OVER
? SESS ONIZON. THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS DURING THIS
T~iAT SOME DELEGATIONS WOULD LIKE TO IMPOSE A
KIND OF DUAL LINKAGE ON THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS,
INSISTING THAT PROGRESS ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, AS DEFINED BY OUR
2R(
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MANDATE, BE HELD HOSTAGE BOTH TO PROGRESS ON THE
NON-USE OF FORCE ISSUE AND ALSO TO WORK ON PROPOSALS
WHICH, IN FACT, LIE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF OUR MANDATE.
THIS IS A FORMULA FOR COMPLETE STALEMATE, WHATEVER WE
CALL THE STAGE WE ARE IN.
FINALLY, LET ME NOTE THE BROADER CONTEXT IN WHICH WE
WORK. IN ABOUT ONE YEAR, OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL GATHER
IN VIENNA TO EVALUATE PROGRESS IN THE WHOLE CSCE
PROCESS, INCLUDING THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. OUR
IMMEDIATE JOB HERE IS MORE NARROW; IT IS TO ENACT A
SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.
BUT IT IS WELL. TO KEEP IN MIND, AS MY DELEGATION AND
OTHERS HAVE SAID BEFORE, THAT OUR SPECIFIC WORK CAN
ACHIEVE ITS FULLEST SIGNIFICANCE ONLY IN THE BROADER
CONTEXT OF SECURITY WHICH TRANSCENDS MILITARY AFFAIRS
AND ENCOMPASSES POLITICAL, CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND
HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AS WELL. PART OF THAT BROADER
CONTEXT WAS THE OTTAWA MEETING ON HUMAN RIGHTS HELD
LAST JUNE; ANOTHER IS THE CULTURAL FORUM WHICH OPENED
IN BUDAPEST ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER L5. AND THE BERN
MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS, COMING IN THE SPRING OF
NEXT YEAR, CAN CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE
BALANCE OF THE OVERALL CSCE PROCESS.
MR. CHAIRMAN, I BEGAN WITH A CALL FOR HASTE. LET ME
END BY SUGGESTING PATIENCE AS WELL. ONE OF OUR MOST
BELOVED WRITERS, E. B. WHITE, DIED A SHORT TIME ACA;
ONE OF THE LOST FAMOUS PASSAGES HE WROTE GOES AS
FOLLOWS: "AS LONG AS THERE IS ONE UPRIGHT MAN, AS
LONG AS THERE IS ONE COMPASSIONATE WOMAN, THE
CONTAGION MAY SPREAD AND THE SCENE IS NOT DESOLATE.
HOPE IS THE THING THAT IS LEFT TO US, IN A BAD TIME.
I SHALL GET UP SUNDAY MORNING AND WIND THE CLOCK AS A
CONTRIBUTION TO ORDER AND STEADFASTNESS." NEARLY TWO
YEARS OF WINDING THE CLOCK HAS BROUGHT US TO THIS NEW
THRESHOLD. MY DELEGATION, LIKE OTHERS, HAS HELD THE
HOPE OVER THOSE MONTHS THAT PATIENCE, STEADFASTNESS,
AND DETERMINATION CAN FINALLY LEAD TO SOLID RESULTS.
THE CONFERENCE HAS NOW, I BELIEVE, TAKEN A STEP
TOWARD THAT END. MY DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO WORK
STEADILY AND CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO HELP MAINTAIN BOTH
THE MOVEMENT AND THE PATIENCE NECESSARY FOR FINAL
SUCCESS.
THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLAS COMPLET O1 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07994
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSRY,
- HEAD OF USSR DELEGATION TO THE CDE,
- OCTOBER 18, 1985
1. CDE VII - OS8
2. T'$E FULL TEXT OF THE STA?EMENT MADE BY THE HEAD OF
THE USSR CDE DELEGATION FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
DIS?INGUISHED MR. CHAIRMAN,
- IT WILL NOT BE AN OVERSTATEMENT TO SAY THAT THIS
SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS BEEN UNUSUAL.
ITS WORK CAN BE DESCRIBED THIS TIME AS POSITIVE. WHILE
IT IS STILL ?00 EARLY TO MARE A FINAL JUDGMENT WE BELIEVE
THAT IT HAS MARRED A CERTAIN TURN AT THE CONFERENCE
TOWARDS MOVING OVER TO MORE PRODUCTIVE WORK.
- THE CONFERENCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN AFFEC?ED BY MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL EVENTS. IN THIS RESPECT IT CAN BE CALLED,
TO USE A FIGURE OF SPEECH, THE BAROMETER OF POLITICAL
MOODS IN THE CAPITALS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, THE
INDICATOR OF, FIRST AND FOREMOST, THE REALIZATION BY THE
EUROPEANS OF THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS.
- THE STOCKHOLM FORUM WAS POSITIVELY AFFECTED BY THE
RECENT SOVIE?-FRENCH SUMMIT MEETING WHICH HAD AN
IMPORTAN? SIGNIFICANCE FOR STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN
SECURITY, BROADENING THE ALL-EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND
IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE VISIT TO
FRANCE BY THE GENERAL SECRE?ARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMI??EE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV LAID A GOOD BASIS BOTH FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT' OF THE SOVIE?-FRENCH COOPERATION WHICH
IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR OF STABILITY IN EUROPE AND FOR A
TURN TO A RADICAL IMPROVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND TO ENHANCED SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES.
- ADVANCE ALONG THE TRAIL BLAZED IN HELSINKI HAS ALWAYS
DEPENDED ON THE CLIMATE PREVAILING IN EUROPE, THE POLITI-
CAL WILL AND INITIATIVE TO PURSUE DE?ENTE AND SECURITY
AND ON THE STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN S?AYES.
THE HIGHER THE LEVEL OF THOSE RELATIONS AND THE FIRMER
THE WILL TO COOPERATE, THE DEEPER IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS. EUROPE, WHERE DETENTE WAS
BORN' CAN AND SST P1~AY AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE IN THE
ACTIVE SEARCH FOR WAYS LEADING ?0 A DRASTIC IMPROVEMENT
IN THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY FACILITATED
BY A SUBS?ACTIVE OU?COME OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
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- INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT A
TENDENCY IS GAINING MOMENTUM IN EUROPE TO OVERCOME THE
LOGIC OF CONFRONTATION. THIS REQUIRES RESOLUTE AND BOLD
ACTIONS, A FRESH VIEW OF AND APPROACH TO NUMEROUS INTER-
NATIONAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY WI?H RESPECT TO A000M-
PLISHING THE TASKS OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURI~'Y-BUILDING
IN EUROPE. SPEAKING IN PARIS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV STATED
THAT THE TINE HAS COME TO TURN MORE RESOLUTELY THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TO THE NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENTS AS
THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES HERE TO INTENSIFY THE SEARCH FOR
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLD?IONS."
- ONE OF THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THOSE OPPORTUNITIES WAS
THE DECISION TO MOVE AT THE CONFERENCE OVER TO EXPLORA-
TION AND SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF ISSUES WHICH WOULD SHAPE
THE FRAMEWORK OF POSSIBLE ACCORDS ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE COMPLETING THE
FIRST STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. REPRESENTATIVES
OF ALL THE THREE GROUPS OF STATES, NEUTRAL AND
NONALIGNED, WARSAW TREATY, AND NATO, DEMONSTRATED THEIR
FLEXIBILITY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN PREPARING THAT
DECISION. I WOULD LIRE TO PAY SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO
AMBASSADOR KAHILUO?0, DISTINGUISHED HEAD OF THE REPUBLIC
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
***??< SECTION 2 ??***
FROM USDEL
USIA FOR IP/PFE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSRY,
OF FINLAND, FOR THE IMPORTANT ROLE WHICH HE PLAYED IN
REACHING THIS AGREEMENT, WHOSE DIPLOMATIC MASTERSHIP
MADE IT POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME MANY OBSTACLES.
- WE SHARE THE OPINION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE STEP
TAKEN BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE ESTABLISHES
THE FRAMEWORK AND GUIDELINES FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF OUR
WORK, MARES IT POSSIBLE TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN SEEKING
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS AND SETS THE CONFERENCE
AT A BUSINESSLIKE TEMPO.
. 289
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' UNFORTUNATELY, THE UNITED STATES AND
COUNTRIES CONTINUE THE LINE A? NARROWING DOWN OTHER NATO
AND CAPACITY OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE SCOPE
REDUCE EVERYTHING TO MEASURES WHIG CONCERNTO~NLYTRLAYNDO
FORCE ACTIVITIES WHILE LEAVING ASIDE THE MOST DANGEROUS
TYPES OF FORCES, I.E., AIR AND NAVAL, FORCES. HOWEVER, IT
IS WITH THEIR STRIKES THAT BIG AND SHALL WERE STARTED
MORE THAN ONCE DURING THE LAST SO
OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THEY p YEARS OR S0. INSTEAD
MEASURES DESIGNED TO ALM OFF ITS ANTIPODE --
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF~POSE THE LOCATIONS AND STRUCTURES
~I~-TE~. ADVANTAGES. THE EUROPEAN STATES AND TO SECURE
MANY WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE CLEARLY
GUOUSLY IN FAVOR OF NON-USE OF FORCE BECOMING THE INDIS-
PUTABLE LAW OF '~ IAMBI
HARING I?S WEIGHTTY CONTRUIBUT ONTTO S' OF THE CONFERENCE
?HIS CAUSE. HOWEVER,
A LINE IS CLEARLY VISIBLE HERE, T00, TO DELAY THIS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.
' THE CURRENT SITUATION REQUIRES AS NEVER BEFORE THE
NEED TO GIVE MORE EFFECT TO THE RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE
OF NO USE OR THREAT OF FORCE, AND IN ITS MOST IMPORTANT
DIRECTION AT THAT, THAT OF PROHIBITING THE USE OF ANY
RINDS OF WEAPONS, NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ALIKE. IT IS
ON THIS PREKISE THAT IS BASED THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIAL-
IST COUNTRIES TO CONCLUDE A TREATY ON THE RENUNCIATION OF
THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL
RELATIONS.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
- THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM REQUIRES
ENERGETIC SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD COMBINE
MUTUALLY SUPPLEMENTARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY BOTH IN THE
POLITICAL AND THE MILITARY FIELDS. ADVANCEMENT SHOULD
BE ALONG BOTH DIRECTIONS. ATTEMPTS AT PUSHING THE
CONFERENCE ONTO A ONE-WAY ROAD WILL LEAD TO NOTHING.
- WE FACE CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS: A CAREFUL EXPLORATION
OF THE ISSUES TO ELABORATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS.
290
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A WEER OF INFORMAL, DISCUSSIONS HAS SHOWN THAT THE
CONFERENCE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.
NO MATTER HOW COMPLEX THE ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION IN
STOCIOiOLM ARE, THEY CAN PRODUCE RESULTS, PROVIDED THERE
IS THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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IIno!licial translation
ssasaYSxs
by Oleg A. GRIl~95~,
lmbassador at I+arge,
Head of the DSSR Delegation
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in
~lzrope
Stockholm, October 18, 1985
SEc`urT
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Diet{~,~shed yr..Chairman,
It will not ~e as overstatement to nay that this session
of the Stockholm Coaiereace has been uatisnal. Zts work can be
described this time ~aa positive. chile it is still too early
~to make a~tinal ~adgement we believe that it has marked a
certain turn at the Conference towards moving over to more
productive work.
she Conference has always been affected by mayor international
events. In this respect it cea be called, to use a fugure of
speech, the barometer of political goods in the capitals oY the
participating states, the indicator ot, first sad foremost, the
realization by the 3uropeeas of thdir security interests.
The Stockholm foram was positively affected by the recent
Soviet-preach summit meeting which had an important Bigniticance
for strengthening 8tiiropeea security, broadening the all-European
cooperation and improving the international situation. The visit
to France by the General Secretary of the CPSII Central Committee
Mikhail Gorbachev laid a good basis both for the development of
the Soviet-drench cooperation which is a signiticeat factor oY
stability is Slirope and for a fora to a radical improvement is
international relations a~ad to enhanced security of all countries.
Ldvaace along the trail blazed in Helsinki has always
depended on the climate prevailing in blirope, the political will
sad initiative to pnrsne detente sad security sad on the state
o= bilateral relations between states. The higher the level of
bho.e s+elationa sad the Sirmer the will to cooperate, the deeper
is the development of the all-St~sopeen process. 81,trope, where
detente was born, can and must play ea indispensable role is the
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2.
active search !or ways leading to a drastic improvement is the
~itaation.which world be significantly facilitated by a substaa-
tiv+e aratco~me of the Stocrholm Coalersnce.
3ateraational developments have demonstrated that a tendency
ie g~i-~g momentum in 3lzrope to overcame the logic o! conlron-
tatioa. '!'his regalres resolute and bold actions, a lresh view o!
and approach to nnmeroas international problems, particularly
with respect to accompliahiag the tasks of confidence-and securit9-
building in lhzrope. ~pea]~ing is Paris yikpgil Gorbachev stated
that the time has come to turn sore resolutely the Stockholm
Conference to the negotiation od agreements as "there are
opportunities here to intensity the search !or mutually acceptable
solatioas?.
One of the maaiiestatio~ of those ..opportunities was the
deaieion to move at the Conference over to ezpioration and
snbasqueat drafting of isen~ea which would shape the rramework o!
possible accords oa coaiiavnce-had securi~-builaing measures za
btirope eomp1etiia~ 4he a.ireg .tags tir ?he svoektiosn Coatereace.
itepreseatatiives o! all the three groups o! states, neutral and
no~'aligaed, Narsaw 'rraety and !~d'!'O, demc'nstrsted their lleaibility
and mutual aaderstanding 1n preparing that decision. I world lies
to pa, special tribute to dmbassador Bahiluoto, distinguished
head o! the Hepablia of 1'inland, !or the important sole which ae
ple~ea is reaching this agreement, whose diplomatic mastership
made it possible to overcome many obstacles.
Ms~ahare the opinion?to the errwct that the step tares by
the Pestioipaata is the Conference eat:bushes the frameworY
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?he achievement o! success is Stockholm requires energetic
search !or solutions which would eombiae antually supplementary
aspects o! security both in the political and tha military fields.
~dvancsment should be along both directions. lttempts at pushing
the Conference onto a aae~~ road will lead to nothing.
~s lace concrete negotiations: a carei'vl ezploration o! the
issues to elaborate mutually acceptable accords.
~ wee]c o! informal discussions has shown that the Conference
has the potential !or posl~tive development. bo matter how complez
the issues under discussion in Stockholm are, they can produce
results, provided there is the necessary political will.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION O1 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE; WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF
OCTOBER 14-~8, 1985.
1. CDE VII -063.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - EN?IRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. THIS WEER MARRED THE TRANSITION OF CDE
WORK INTO A MORE INFORMAL SETTING, AS AGREEMENT WAS
REACHED ON MONDAY TO HOLD INFORMAL MEETINGS IN EACH OF
T$E FIVE CLUSTERS. THESE INFORMALS, FROM OUR
PERSPECTIVE, WEN? WELL AS NATO WAS EFFECTIVE IN BOTH
FOCUSING AND DIRECTING DISCUSSIONS IN MOST OF THE
MEETINGS. IN THE POLITICAL GROUP (NUF) THE WARSAW PACT
PUSHED FOR EARLY DRAFTING AND PRESENTED AN OUTLINE OF A
POSSIBLE NUF AGREEMENT. WHILE LITTLE NEW SUBSTANTIVELY
EMERGED, WE ARE SATISFIED TEAT THE "GIVE-AND-TARE" WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO THE SHARPENING OF FOCUS NECESSARY BEFORE
COMMON GROUND WILL EMERGE. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING GROUP AB -- OCTOBER 14, 1985.
THERE WERE NO SPEAKERS AT THIS MEETING. AT AN INFORMAL
MEETING IMKEDIATELY FOLLOWING, THE CDE AGREED ON AN
INFORMAL STRUCTURE FOR ITS FUTURE WORK. (SEE SEPTEL.)
FRG (SCHMIDBAUER) RICKED OFF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS
WITH A PREPARED LARGELY POLITICAL, STATEMENT OF WELCOME
FOR THE INFORMAL MEETINGS. HE IDENTIFIED AS AREAS OF
COMMON GROUND THE DESIRE TO IMPROVE UPON THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT BY LOWERING THESHOLDS AND DEVELOPING
MANDATORY PROVISIONS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT
DIVERGENT VIEWS REMAINED ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT
ISSUES. WE MUST EXPLORE RAPPROCHEMENT POSSIBILITIES,
HE CONCLUDED.
UR (BACK) FOCUSED ON THE OUT-OF-GARRISON (OOG) CONCEPT
AS AN IMPROVEMEN? OVER THE USE OF TERMS "MOVEMENTS AND
MANEUVERS," WHICH WOULD REQUIRE DEFINITION. LIMITED
DEFINITIONS WOULD BE OPEN TO CIRCUMVENTION AND BROAD
DEFINITIONS WOULD LOSE THE UTILITY OF DISTINCTION. THE
WTO HAS ALSO INTRODUCED A CONCEPT NOT IN THE FINAL ACT,
HE SAID, -- THAT OF TRANSFERS. HE NOTED, THE TERM
MOVEMENTS IS ALWAYS QUALIFIED BY THE TERM TRANSFER AN
ASKED WHY; COULD THERE BE MOVEMENTS THAT ARE NOT
TRANSFERS, WAS A TRANSFER A PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY
REDEPLOYMENT, AND WOULD IT COVER STAGED TRANSFERS,
SUCH AS SEMI-ANNUAL TROOP ROTA?IONS? THE OOG CONCEP?
IS COMPRESHENSIVE, HE SAID; IT CAN'T BE CIRCUMVENTED,
AND IS EASY TO VERIFY. ONLY ONE DEFINITION -- THAT OF
GARRISON -- IS REQUIRED. THAT DEFINITION WAS PROPOSED,
AND HAS NOT BEEN REJECTED, HE OBSERVED.
USSR (TATARNIKOV), SAID THAT THE SEARCH FOR COMMON
GROUND MUST BE BASED ON THE MANDATE WHICH CALLS FOR
COVERAGE OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE, AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR
SPACE. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT ACTIVITIES THE
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OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT INCLUDES. IT DOESN'T SEEM TO
INCLUDE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR
ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING AREA, WHICH ARE COVERED
UNDER THE MANDATE AND REPRESENT A THREAT. WE MUST TAKE
SUCH ACTIVITIES INTO ACCOUNT. IN RESPONSE TO THE UK,
HE SAID THAT THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS INCLUDES
THE MOVEMEN? OF FORCES USING VARIOUS FORMS OF
TRANSPORTATION, INCLUDING RAILWAYS, DURING MANEUVERS OR
THE ROTATION OF TROOPS. THE CONCEPT IS ALSO ADDRESSED
IN MILITARY MANUALS. TATARNIROV SAID A TRANSFER IS
AKIN TO A MOVEMENT BUT INCLUDES ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT
OVER A LONGER DISTANCE, SUCH AS BRINGING TROOPS FROM
THE FAR EAST OR THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE.
UR (BACK) NOTED THAT THE MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTION TO THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT APPEARED TO BE BASED ON THE
EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HE
CHALLENGED THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO JOIN IN DEVELOPING
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25X1
C O~N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJEC?: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVI?IES, WEER OF
COMMON GROUND ON USING THE OU?-OF-GARRISON APPROACH,
WITH RESPECT TO NOTIFYING ACTIVITIES BY GROUND FORCES
WHICH DWELL IN GARRISONS.
FRANCE (FELIX-PAGANON) IDENTIFIED THREE PROBLEMS IN THE
AREA OF NO?IFICATION: (1) SCOPE OF NOTIFICATION (WHAT
DO WE WANT TO NOTIFY); (2) LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION
(?HItESHOLD); AND (3) THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICA?ION (WHAT
INFORMATION TO EXCHANGE). SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE
IN THE AREA OF THRESHOLDS, HE ASSERTED. WE ARE ALL
AGREED ON THE NECESSITY OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS, THE
FRENCH DEPUTY STATED, CLAIMING THAT NO ONE QUES?IONS
THE PRINCIPLE OF A NUMERICAL ?HRESHOLD. BUT THE
SITUA?ION IS LESS CLEAR REGARDING STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLDS. HOWEVER, THOSE WHO ARGUE AGAINST THE
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN
INTRODUCING A STRUCTURAL DIIiENSION TO THE NUMERICAL
PARAMETERS. WE SHOULD DETERMINE HOW TO USE THIS
APPROACH. (BEGIN COMMENT: MANY OF OUR NATO COLLEAGUES
WERE CONCERNED WITIi THE FRENCH REFERENCE TO THE
ACCEPTABILI?Y OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS AND THE ALLUSION
TO THE POSSIBILI?IES OF COMBINING NUMBERS WI?H
STRUCTURE. WHEN CHALLENGED BY TURKISH AND DUTCH
DELEGA?ES LATER AT A NATO MINI-CAUCUS MEETING, HOWEVER,
THE FRENCH CONTENDED THAT THEY HAD SAID NO SUCH THING.
END COMMENT.)
YUGOSLAVIA (BOZOVIC) SAID THAT THE ONLY THING HE KNEW
ABOUT THE OU?-OF-GARRISON CQNCEPT WAS THAT IT WAS
SIMPLE, NEEDS NO DEFINITION, AND WAS SO ALL-EMBRACING
I? CAN'T BE CIRCUMVEN?ED. "HOW CAN WE TAKE A STAND ON
AN ISSUE WHEN WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IT IS?", HE ASKED.
U.S. (HANSEN) QUICKLY RESPONDED THAT EVERY MILITARY
EXERCISE OF GROUND FORCES WAS INCLUDED IN THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT ENCOURAGING BOZOVIC TO TARE
HIS PENCIL IN HAND AND WRITE DOWN A TYPICAL LIST,
HANSEN NOTED THAT A LIST WOULD INCLUDE MANEUVERS,
MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS, COMMAND STAFF EXERCISES, COMMAND
POST EXERCISES, GROUND TRAINING EXERCISES, ROAD
MARCHES, AND REDEPLOYMENTS -- IF THEY MET AN AGREED
THRESHOLD. ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED UNDER
THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT MIGHT BE, FOR EXAMPLE,
TROOPS USED FOR HARVESTING OR DISAS?ER RELIEF, BECAUSE
THE OOG CONCEPT FOCUSES ON COMBAT ELEMENTS AND COMBAT
CAPABILITIES.
DENMARK (HOWARD) HIGHLIGHTED AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT -- I? COVERS MILITARY
AC?IVITIES FROM THE VERY START OF THOSE AC?IVITIES.
USSR (TATARNIROV) STATED`THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME
HE HAD HEARD SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF OOG.
THERE IS EVEN SOME COINCIDENCE OF VIEWS, HE NOTED,
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INASMUCH AS OOG INCLUDED ACTIVITIES THAT THE W?0 HAS
ADDRESSED IN ITS PROPOSALS. BUT, HE ASKED, WHY SHOULD
WE TRY SO HARD TO DO SOMETHING DIFFERENT, WHICH RIGHT
EVEN REQUIRE A LISTING OF EXCEPTIONS, WHEN WE ARE
ALREADY AGREED UPON THE SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES TO BE
COVERID. UK (BACK) RESPONDED THAT ONE TERM TO COVER
MANY ACTIVITIES WAS PREFERABLE TO MANY TERMS.
U.S. (HANSEN) REITERATED THAT THE REFERENCE TO
EXCEPTIONS FROM THE OOG CONCEPT WAS MERELY
ILLUSTRATIVE. THERE WERE AC?IVITIES WHICH WOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED OUT-OF-GARRISON (OOG), ACCORDING TO
PROVISIONS OF MEASURE 3, BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT INVOLVE
PARTICIPATION OF MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS.
S. WORKING GROUP A: POLITICAL -- OCTOBER 15, 1985.
THE EAST ATTEMPTID TO PUSH THIS WORKING GROUP IN THE
DIRECTION OF DRAFTING ON NUF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVI?IES, WEER OF
USSR PRESENTED THE MOS? DETAILED DESCRIPTION TO DATE OF
THE STRUCTURE OF A NUF AGREEMEN?. CYPRUS WAS
ENCOURAGED BY THE SOVIET STATEMENT AND PRESENTED ITS
OWN FRAMEWORK FOR A NUF DECLARATION. ?HE U.S., NOTED
THAT EVERYONE SEEMED TO AGREE THAT NUF LANGUAGE SHOULD
BE PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND WARNED THAT EFFORTS TO
MOVE BEYOND UN CHARTER LANGUAGE WOULD LEAD THE
CONFERENCE INTO TREACHEROUS WATERS. TOWARD THE END OF
THE MEETING POLAND SUGGESTED THAT THE NUF CLUSTER,
INDEPENDENT OF THE OTHER MEETINGS, HOVE TO DRAFTING AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.
USSR (RARHMANINOV) DESCRIBID THE STRUCTURE OF A NUF
AGREEMENT, CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
-- A PREAMBLE MADE UP OF PROVISIONS FROM THE UN
CHARTER, THE FINAL ACT AND, PERHAPS, THE MADRID
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT;
-- A GENERAL AFFIRMATION FOLLOWED BY AN ELABORATION OF
THE TYPES OF FORCE TO BE BANNED, WITH PRIDE OF PLACE
GIVEN TO THE "MOST DANGEROUS FORM, MILITARY FORCE;"
-- SPECIFIC POINTS, I.E., A "CONCRETIZA?ION" OF THE
MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE "AS APPLIED TO THE
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND OUR MANDATE;"
-- A REFERENCE ?0 IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN;
-- A CONCLUDING SECTION WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE SUCH
PROVISIONS AS: CONSULTATIONS; THE POSSIBILITY OF
REQUESTING CLARIFICA?IONS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION;
"OTHER POINTS IN SC.6;" A REAFFIRMATION OF FUNDAMENTAL
ARTICLES OF THE UN, SUCH AS ARTICLES 51 AND 103.
IN ADDITION, RARHMANINOV OFFERED THE FOLLOWING AS
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF LANGUAGE FOR A NUF AGREEMENT:
-- THE DECLARATION ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS;
-- THE DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY;
-- THE DECLARATION ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE;
-- THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION;
-- BILATERAL SOVIET-U.S., SOVIET-FRENCH AND SOVIET-U.K.
DOCUMENTS .
CYPRUS (PAPADAPOULOS) WAS "ENCOURAGED" BY THE SOVIET
STATEMENT, AS IT REFLECTED THE TYPE OF ISSUES HE HAD
TRIED TO EXAMINE IN MARCH 1985. HE SUPPORTED
"COMPLETING" THE CONCEPT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE BY
COVERING ALL ELEMENTS OF ESCALATION, I.E., THE THREAT
OF FORCE, THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE AND, FINALLY, THE
USE OF FORCE. HE OFFERED HIS FRAMEWORK FOR A NUF
DECLARATION:
-- A DEFINITION OF THE ELEMENTS OF NUF;
-- THE ROMANIAN IDEA OF SPECIFYING THE ACTIONS FROM
WHICH STATES WOULD HAVE TO REFRAIN;
-- THE CDE (CSCE) DIMENSION: THE LINKAGE BETWEEN
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CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE; I.E., THE
CREATION OF OPERA?IONAL BARRIERS AGAINST TAE USE OF
FORCE;
-- OTHER ADDITIONAL OR SUPPORTIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING
CONSULTATIONS, ETC.;
-- AN EXCEPTION TO THE BAN ON THE USE OF FORCE ARTICLE
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
S1 (SELF-DEFENSE).
U.S. (GUNDERSEN) AGREED WITH CYPRUS THAT THE DISCUSSION
OF NUF WOULD BE COMPLEX, BUT NOTED THAT ALL AGREE THAT
NUF LANGUAGE SHOULD BE PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS. HE
WARNED THA? MOVING BEYOND T$E AUSTERE BUT UNIVERSAL
LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER, WOULD BE A MOVE INTO
TREACHEROUS AND UNCHARTED WATERS. THE CDE'S GOAL IS
TEAT OF HARING THE USE AND THREAT OF FORCE LESS LIKELY,
NOT OF FORMULATING NEW NUF LANGUAGE. A NUF
REAFFIRMATION WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT CSBM'S WOULD BE WORSE THAT MEANINGLESS; IT
WOULD GIVE ONLY ?HE ILLUSION OF SECURITY. OP THE
MYRIAD OF INTERWAR NUF AGREEMENTS, WHETHER IN THE GUISE
OF NON-AGGRESSION PACTS OR FRIENDSHIP TREATIES, ALMOST
ALL WERE UNAMBIGUOUSLY BROKEN, HE SAID.
ROMANIA (BUHOARA) STRESSED THE NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR
UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT POSITIONS ON SUBSTANCE. HE
AGREED THAT MORE IS REQUIRED TO GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE THAN MERE ENUNCIATION. HE
RECOMMENDED IDENTIFYING BOTH THE CONCRETE FORMS OF
MILITARY FORCE OR THE THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE FROM
WHICH STATES WOULD HAVE TO REFRAIN, AND "POST?IVE
ACTIONS". TO SAVE TIME THE ROMANIAN DELEGATE
RECOMMENDED USING EXISTING AGREED TEXTS.
RARHMANINOV INSISTED THAT CSBM'S SHOULD FLOW FROM A
REAFFIRMATION OF NUF. THE FINAL ACT IS BASED ON THE
MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND
MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, HE SAID, AND HE STRESSED
THE NEED TO APPROACH A NUF REAFFIRMATION AND
SUBSTANTIAL CSBM'S IN THE MILITARY SPHERE "HAND IN
HAND."
POLAND (KONARSKI) SUGGESTID A MOVE TO DRAFTING IN THE
NUF CLUSTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WOULD MAKE MORE
SENSE TO MOVE TO DRAFTING, HE SAID, "IN AREAS (E.G.
NUF) WHERE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT SO DEEP AND WHERE WE
DON'T HAVE MUCH ?0 SAY IN AN EXPLORATION PHASE, AS
OPPOSED TO A DRAFTING PHASE WHERE WE WILL HAVE MORE TO
SAY." THE EXPLORATORY PHASE COULD BE USED
PRODUCTIVELY, HE NOTED, IF DELEGATIONS TRIED TO
FORMULATE A RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET OUTLINE OF A
POSSIBLE DOCUMENT, BAKING CLEAR WHA? THEY DO AND DON'T
WANT INCORPORATED IN SUCH A DOCUMENT.
6. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION,
COMMUNICATION -- OCTOBER 16, 1985.
IN A WELL-COORDINATED EFFOR?, NATO COUNTRIES HOMED IN
ON THE SUBJECT OF INFORMATION. THE USSR SPORE OFTEN,
AND ASSERTED THAT THE ISSUES OF INFORMATION,
VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION WERE TO BE CONSIDERED
IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. WE COUNTERED THIS
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ASSERTION, BUT WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CON?INUE
TO PUSH THIS INTERPRETATTATARNIROV) EXPRESSED SURPRISE WITH SPAIN'S
STATEMENT. THE CONFERENCE, HE ASSERTED, HAD REACHED A
CLEAR CUT DECISION THAT INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND
COMMUNICATION WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF
NOTIFICA?ION, AND THE USSR IS READY TO PROVIDE
APPROPRIATE INFORMATION IN THAT CONTEXT. AS TO THE
QUESTION ABOUT PEACETIME LOCATIONS, TATARNIROV SAID
THAT THERE MAY BE DIFFERENT RINDS -- BARRACKS, CAMPS,
SOME OTHER RIND OF DISPOSITION OF FORCES, AND
GARRISONS. PRECISE DEFINITIONS ARE AVAILABLE, IF
NEEDED. INFORMATION SHOULD BE EXCHANGED AT THE TIME OF
NOTIFICATION, HE SAID, AND THE INFORMATION WILL DEPEND
ON THE TYPE OF MANEUVER NOTIFIED AND WHETHER IT
INVOLVES GROUND, SEA OR AIR FORCES.
UR (FREEMAN) RECITED THE TITLE OF THE MEETING IN ITS
ENTIRETY FOR THE BENEFI? OF THE USSR. REGARDING USSR
COMKENTS ON PEACETIME LOCATIONS, HE ASKED WHETHER THEY
RECOGNIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION ON THE
LOCATION OF THOSE VARIOUS ELEMENTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE
CSBM REGI2~E.
USSR (TATARNIROV) ALSO REFERRED TO THE TITLE OF THE
MEETING, CONTENDING THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED ON OCTOBER
14 THAT INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION
WILL BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SYSTEM OF
NOTIFICATION. WE ARE PROCEEDING ON THAT UNDERSTANDING,
HE SAID. THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON
PERMANENT LOCATIONS, HE SAID, AS SUCH INFORMATION IS
NOT OF ANY INTEREST. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS WHERE THE
EXERCISE TAKES PLACE. IN A THINLY VEALED ALLUSION TO
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY IF
SOMEONE ELSE NEEDED TO KNOW THIS INFORMATION.
FREEMAN (UR) AND HANSEN (U.S.) BOTH REAFFIRMED THAT
THIS INFORMAL CLUSTER WOULD DISCUSS INFORMATION AND
VERIFICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS.
FRANCE (MERIC) VEERING MORE THAN A BIT OFF COURSE, SAID
EVERYONE THINKS THAT WE WILL ONE DAY MOVE TO A
DISARMAMENT STAGE IN THE CDE. FOR THIS, INFORMATION
WILL BE CRITICALLY ESSENTIAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE
FRENCH DELEGATION WAS INSTRUCTED TO DO THE MAXIMUM TO
MAKE PRQGRESS AT CDE, AND NOTED THAT THE CONFERENCE HAS
NOT YET HEARD THE FRENCH POSITION ON ALL OF THE ISSUES.
USSR (TATARNIROV) SAID THAT WHEN THE DISARMAMENT STAGE
IS REACHED, ALL THE CARDS WILL BE LAID ON THE TABLE, AS
DURING SALT I AND SALT II. AS TO WHERE TROOPS COME
FROM (I.E. PEACETIME LOCATIONS), THAT WOULD BE COVERED
UNDER THE WTO PROVISIONS ADDRESSING MOVEMENTS AND
TRANSFERS.
7. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATION -- OCTOBER 17, 1985.
THE FNFORMAL SESSION ON OBSERVATION WITNESSED LONG
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DISCUSSION WITH MANY PARTICIPANTS. THE USSR IMPLIED
THAT IN THE CASE OF TROOPS MOVING TO AN EXERCISE AREA,
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP AC?IVI?IES, WEER OF
THEIR PEACETIME LOCATION WOULD BE NG?IFIED UNDER THE
CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THE WTO MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS
PROPOSAL. WTO STILL WON'T ACCEPT THE MANDATORY NATURE
OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME OR THE INVITATION OF ALL
STATES TO AN EXERCISE.
POLAND (STANIEWSRI) IDENTIFIED SOME AREAS OF
CONVERGENCE REGARDING OBSERVATION KODALITIES: DETAILED
BRIEFINGS; ABILITY TO OBSERVE "TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE"
ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMAND STAFF; AND NEED TO HAVE
DIRECT CONTACTS WITH PERSONNEL "WHERE CONDITIONS PERMIT
AND ARE JUSTIFIED." THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM, HOWEVER,
SHOULD BE DEFINED BY THE HOST STATE AND IT IS IN ?HE
HOST
STATE'S INTEREST TO ENSURE THAT THE PROGRAM WILL MEET
ITS NEEDS. THE HOST COUNTRY MUST ALSO ENSURE THE
SECURITY OF THE OBSERVERS; THE METHODS MAY DIFFER
ACCORDING TO THE ACTIVITY BEING OBSERVED. STANIEWSRI
IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF OU?S?ANDING ISSUES ON WHICH HE
BELIEVED AGREEMEN? SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT, NAMELY:
CONDITIONS FOR OBSERVERS, LODGING, ATTENDANCE, MEANS OF
TRANSPORT AND MEDICAL RESOURCES. BUT ON SOME ISSUES,
HE NOTED, THEE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES AND FURTHER
IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION IS REQUIRED. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME
CONTEND THAT AN OBSERVER SHOULD BE PRESENT AT ALL
ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION FROM THE START TO
THE FINISH; WHILE OTHERS BELIEVE THAT IT IS SUFFICIENT
FOR THE OBSERVER TO OBSERVE MAIN EPISQDES (HE SUPPORTED
?HE LATTER POSITION). HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT
OBSERVATION FOR THE DURATION OF THE MANEUVER, WHICH
COULD L
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CDE, CSCE, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEER OF
PARTICULARLY IF IT IS CLOSE ?0 A BORDER. POLAND
RESPONDED THAT ACTIVITIES AREN'T NOTIFIED UNTIL THEY
REACH THE NOTIFIABLE THRESHOLD -- WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO
HAPPEN UNTIL THE TROOPS HAVE GATHERED AT THE EXERCISE
AREA. DENMARK SAID ?HAT IT WAS PAR?ICULARY IMPORTANT
THAT THE RETURN TO GARRISON BE OBSERVED, AS TROOPS
HAVING JUST COMPLETED A TRAINING EXERCISE WERE PREPARED
FOR WAR AND THUS MOST THREATENING.
FRANCE (MERIC) ASSERTED THAT WE MUST KNOW WHERE THE
TROOPS COME FROM; OBSERVERS MUST HAVE ACCESS TO
INFORMATION, AND MAPS SHOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED FOR
OBSERVERS. USSR (TATARNIROV) RESPONDED THAT THAT THE
AREA OF THE MANEUVER WOULD BE CLEARLY INDICATED AND IN
THE SOVIE? PROPOSAL ON MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, TROOPS
COKING FROM FAR AWAY WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS TO WHERE
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THEY ARE FROM.
TATARNIROV TOLD DENMARK (HOWARD) THA? THE USSR HAD
NEVER SAID THAT AFTER TRAINING THE OBSERVERS WOULD BE
IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWN. THE TRANSFER OF FORCES, UNDER
THE WTO PROPOSAL, WILL REQUIRE OBSERVATION AND, HE
POINTED OUT THAT IN THE WTO SCENARIOS WE MARE SURE
OBSERVERS CAN WATCH THE RETURN OF TROOPS.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) ASKED THE U.S. WHETHER IT WAS
WILLING TO DISCUSS AN OBSERVER REGIME FOR AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCES. U.S. (BLANK)
TOOK THE QUESTION UNDER ADVISEMEN?.
8. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS/FORECASTS --
OCTOBER 17, 1985.
IN INFORMALS, THE NETHERLANDS (VAN GORP) WELCOMED
GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS OF
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, NOTING THAT IT HAD PLACED NO
PRECONDITIONS ON WHAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. BECAUSE OF
THE BROAD CONSENSUS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FORECASTS, VAN
GORP SAID HE DID NO? FORESEE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN
AGREEING TO SPECIFIC MODALITIES. HE ASKED HOW THE
SOVIET UNION ENVISAGED THE STRUCTURE OF ANNUAL
FORECASTS. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT FORECASTS HAVE A
CONSTRAINING EFFECT ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES,
E.G., PREPARATIONS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK OR ACTIVITIES
AIMED AT INTIIiIDATION.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) INSISTED THAT FORECASTS WOULD
ENSURE THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO EQUAL SECURITY ONLY
IF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES, I.E., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL
MANEEVERS, AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS, ARE INCLUDED IN
THEM. HE CRITICIZED NATO FOR ITS "SELECTIVE" APPROACH
AND ARGUED THAT AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, EQUIPPED WITH
MODERN WEAPONRY, REPRESENT A THREAT TO SECURITY IN
EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE.
THE FRG (METSCHER) CRITIZED THE FINE PRINT -- A
DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WHICH INCLUDED
GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND
TRANSFERS -- GRINEVSRY HAD GRAFTED ONTO GORBACHEV'S
PARIS PROPOSAL. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHAT
IS NOTIFIABLE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NOTIFICATION
MEETING IN WORKING GROUP B. METSCHER PRESSED FOR A
DISCUSSION OF THE STRUCTURE OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST:
WOULD IT BE BROKEN UP BY QUARTERS, WHAT KIND OF
INFORMATION WOULD I? CONTAIN -- THE NAME AND
DESIGNATION OF EXERCISES, THEIR DURATION, ETC?
THE USSR (TATARNIROV) FOCUSED ON THE DEFINITION' OF
"MILITARY ACTIVITIES", AS CONTAINED IN THE MANDATE AND
ASSERTED THAT IT INCLUDED A BROAD RANGE OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES, E.G., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS,
MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS. HE CRITICIZED THE FRG FOR
INCLUDING ONLY GROUND ACTIVI?IES. TA?ARNIKOV ALSO
ARGUED THAT ROUTINE COMBAT TRAINING AT FIRING RANGES
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVI?IES, WEER OF
PARTICULARLY IF IT IS FLOSS TO A BORDER. POLAND
RESPONDED THAT ACTIVITIES AREN'T NOTIFIED UNTIL~THEY
REACH THE NOTIFIABLE THRESHOLD -- WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO
HAPPEN UNTIL THE TROOPS HAVE GATHERED AT THE EXERCISE
AREA. DENMARK SAID THAT IT WAS PARTICULARY IMPORTANT
THA? THE RETURN TO GARRISON BE OBSERVED, AS TROOPS
HAVING JUST COMPLETED A TRAINING EXERCISE WERE PREPARED
FOR WAR AND THUS MOST THREATENING.
FRANCE (MERIC) ASSERTED THAT WE MUST KNOW WHERE THE
TROOPS COME FROM; OBSERVERS MUST HAVE ACCESS TO
INFORMATION, AND MAPS SHOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED FOR
OBSERVERS. USSR (TATARNIROV) RESPONDED THAT THAT THE
AREA OF THE MANEUVER WOULD BE CLEARLY INDICATED AND IN
THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, TROOPS
COMING FROM FAR AWAY WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS TO WHERE
THEY ARE FROM.
TATARNIROV TOLD DENMARK (HOWARD) THAT THE USSR HAD
NEVER SAID THAT AFTER TRAINING THE OBSERVERS WOULD BE
IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWN. THE TRANSFER OF FORCES, UNDER
THE WTO PROPOSAL, WILL REQUIRE OBSERVATION AND, HE
POINTED OUT THAT IN THE WTO SCENARIOS WE MAKE SURE
OBSERVERS CAN WaTCH THE RETURN OF TROOPS.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) ASKED THE U.S. WHETHER IT WAS
WILLING TO DISCUSS AN OBSERVER REGIME FOR AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCES. U.S. (BLANK)
TOOK THE QUESTION UNDER ADVISEMENT.
8. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS/FORECASTS --
OCTOBER 17, 1985.
IN INFORMALS, THE NETHERLANDS (VAN GORP) WELCOMED
GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS OF
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, NOTING THAT IT HAD PLACED NO
PRECONDITIONS ON WHAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. BECAUSE OF
THE BROAD CONSENSUS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FORECASTS, VAN
GORP SAID HE DID NOT FORESEE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN
AGREEING TO SPECIFIC MODALITIES. HE ASKED HOW THE
SOVIE? UNION ENVISAGED THE STRUCTURE OF ANNUAL
FORECASTS. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT FORECASTS HAVE A
CONSTRAINING EFFEC? ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES,
E.G., PREPARATIONS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK OR ACTIVITIES
AIMED AT INTIMIDATION.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) INSISTED THAT FORECASTS WOULD
ENSURE THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO EQUAL SECURITY ONLY
IF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES, I.E., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL
MANUEVERS, AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS, ARE INCLUDED IN
THEM. HE CRITICIZED NATO FOR ITS "SELECTIVE" APPROACH
AND ARGUED THAT AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, EQUIPPED WITH
MODERN WEAPONRY, REPRESENT A THREA? TO SECURITY IN
EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE.
THE FRG (METSCHER) CRITIZED THE FINE PRINT -- A
. 308
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DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WHICH INCLUDED
GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND
TRANSFERS -- GRINEVSRY HAD GRAFTED ONTO GORBACHEV'S
PARIS PROPOSAL. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHAT
IS NOTIFIABLE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NOTIFICA?ION
MEETING IN WORKING GROUP B. METSCHER PRESSED FOR A
DISCUSSION OF THE STRUCTURE OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST:
WOULD IT BE BROKEN UP BY QUARTERS, WHAT RIND OF
INFORMA?ION WOULD I? CONTAIN ~- THE NAME AND
DESIGNATION OF EXERCISES, THEIR DURA?ION, ETC?
THE USSR (?ATARNIROV) FOCUSED ON THE DEFINITION OF
"MILITARY AC?IVITIES AS CONTAINED IN THE MANDATE AND
ASSERTED THAT I? INCLUDED A BROAD RANGE OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES, E.G., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS,
MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS. HE CRITICIZED THE FRG FOR
INCLUDING ONLY GROUND ACTIVITIES. TATARNIROV ALSO
ARGUED THA? ROUTINE COMBAT TRAINING AT FIRING RANGES
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 08 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08104
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT SC.1 IS NOT THE ONLY PROPOSAL
ON THE TABLE AND URGED DELEGATIONS TO FOCUS ON COMMON
GROUND, NOT CONTRADICTIONS, IN THEIR POSITIONS.
TURKEY (BOLUICBASI) REMINDED THE CONFERENCE OF THE
THREE-YEAR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH RESULTED IN THE MADRID
MANDATE AND BLUNTLY WARNED THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD
NOT ACCEP? THE SOVIE? INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE.
ROMANIA (BUHOARA) CITED SEVERAL UNATTRIBUTED, BUT
CLEARLY NATO, STATEMENTS TO ARGUE THAT CONSTRAINTS
SHOULD NOT MERELY CODIFY CURRENT MILITARY PRACTICE OR
BEHAVIOR, BUT SHOULD LIMIT THEM. HE ALSO DISAGREED
WITH WESTERN DELEGATIONS WHICH GIVE A LOW PRIORITY TO
CONSTRAINTS. THE ROMANIAN INSTEAD ECHOED HIS EASTERN
COLLEAGUES IN INSISTING THAT ALL ISSUES BE TAKEN UP IN
PARALLEL.
CANADA (NAMIESNIOWSRI) EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE CDE,
LIRE THE TOPHEAVY SWEDISH WARSHIP, THE VASA, WHICH
OVERTURNED ON ITS MAIDEN VOYAGE, WOULD FAIL TO REACH
CONCENSUS IF IT WERE OVERLOADED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COMPLET O1 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 08084
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
1. CDE VII - 066
2. C - EN?IRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SEVENTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE WAS DOMINATED BY PROSAIC PROCIDURAL
PROPOSITIONS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE CDE
BEAST, EVEN SEEMINGLY BENIGN PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS HAVE
LONG-TERM SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. DURING THE LAST
WEER OF THE SESSION, THE CONFERENCE ACCEPTID A
STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO DRAFTING BEGINNING WITH AN
INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE WHICH REFLECTID THE U.S.
APPROACH. DURING THE "TEST" RUN OF INFORMAL
DISCUSSIONS, MOREOVER, NATO FARID WELL AND, ON THE
WHOLE, WAS ABLE TO DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON WESTERN TERMS.
WHILE THE CONFERENCE ESSENTIALLY ACCEPTED THE WESTERN
APPROACH TO PROCIDURE, IT HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT A PRICE
FOR WESTERN UNITY. THE SEEMINGLY'ENDLESS SERIES OF
MEETINGS LEADING TO CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON WORKING
STRUCTURE CONTRIBUTED TO A CLEAR DIVISION OF NATO INTO
"WETS" AND "DRYS," WHICH DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR END
GAME NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS, IN THE MEANTIME, WERE
ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR AS THEY COURTID THE EUROPEANS.
WHILE THEY WERE ACCOMMODATING ON PROCIDURE, ON SUBSTANCE
THEY HELD THEIR GROUND. THE NNA WERE CONSPICUOUS BY
THEIR PUBLIC SILENCE. HOWEVER, THEY WORKED FEVERISHLY
BEHIND THE SCENES -- DAY, NIGH?, AND WEEKENDS -- TO
REACH AGREEMENT ON AN ELABORATED NNA PACKAGE. THIS SO
FAR UNSUCCESSFUL QUEST FOR CONSENSUS HAS LID TO MUTUAL
RECRIMINATIONS, WITH A CHANGING CAST OF CHARACTERS
(YUGOSLAVIA, FINLAND, CYPRUS, AND, OF COURSE, IaALTA)
ASSUMING THE ROLE OF NNA SCAPEGOAT. THE STRAINS WITHIN
THE NNA WERE AT ONCE UNEXPECTED AND INEVITABLE.
UNEXPECTED IN THAT, HERETOFORE, THE NNA HAVE BEEN ABLE
TO PLAY THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKERS BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST. INEVITABLE, IN THAT, PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME
. IN HISTORY, THEY HAVE HAD TO IDENTIFY COMMON SECURITY
CONCERNS. THE NNA'S LONG NIGHT'S JOURNEY TOWARD A
CONSENSUS DOCUMENT HAS AFFORDED US TIME TO SEDUCE THEM
-- WITH SOME SUCCESS -- TO HOP INTO THE WESTERN
CONCEPTUAL BED ON SUCH TOPICS AS OUT-OF-GARRISON
ACTIVITIES AND THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD. FINALLY, LESS
BECAUSE OF MALICIOUS INTENT THAN OF CAPRICIOUS
INCOMPETENCE, PROBLEMS WITH RUSSIAN TRANSLATIONS
CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.
NATO
4. THE NOT SO MAGNIFICENT OBSESSION. FOR MUCH OF THE
SEVENTH ROUND THE NATO CAUCUS WRESTLED WITH THE PROSAIC
QUESTION OF HOW AND WHEN TO MOVE INTO AN INFORMAL
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EXPLORATORY NEGOTIATING PHASE. ?HE PROTRACTED AND
SOMETIMES HEATED DEBATE OVER PROCEDURE MOVED SUBSTANCE
TO THE BACK BURNER. THE PAPER CIRCULATED BY AMBASSADOR
GOODBY CONTAINING SOVIET SUGGESTIONS ON WORKING
STRUCTURE. WHICH EVOLVED OUT OF GOODBY'S EXCHANGES WITH
SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY -- AND HOW TO RESPOND TO IT
-- WAS AT THE CORE OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS. WHILE MOST OF
OUR ALLIES WANTED TO BEGIN DRAFTING SOONER RATHER THAN
LATER, THEY EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED A MORE CAUTIOUS
APPROACH. DRAFTING WILL BE PRECEDED BY AN INFORMAL,
EXPLORATORY PHASE. THIS APPROACH, IN OUR VIEW, PROTECTS
THE U.S. AND ALLIID STANCE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.
WHILE THE CONFERENCE ESSEN?IALLY BOUGHT THIS WESTERN
APPROACH ?0 INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, IT HAS NOT BEEN
WITHOUT COSTS.
S. CONTRETEMPS AND CONCORD. DURING THE CAUCUS
DISCUSSIONS ON HOW TO BREAK THE PROCEDURAL IMPASSE, THE
ALLIES DISPLAYED A MORE THAN HEALTHY DOSE OF CENTRIFUGAL
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 2 ??***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
PROCLIVITIES. MOST OF OUR.AI.LIES ARGUED FOR A QUICK AND
FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET SUGGESTIONS ON
WORKING STRUCTURE, WITH MINIMAL CHANGES. THESE
DELEGATIONS WERE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY (IF NOT
I2QlEDIATE) TRANSITION TO DRAFTING, WITHOUT ANY
SIGNIFICANT "FIREBREAK" BETWEEN THE EXPLORATORY AND
DRAFTING PHASES. OTHERS, NOTABLY THE FRENCH, THE UR,
AND THE U.S., WERE EXTREMELY CHARY ABOUT ENTERING INTO
ANY INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE AND
PREDETERMINE THE EVENTUAL DRAFTING STRUCTURE. WE
SHOULD, ACCORDING TO THEIR VIEW, MARE HASTE CAUTIOUSLY.
IN ANY CASE, THE FINE PRIN? IN EACH CLAUSE OF THE
NON-AMERICAN, NON-PAPER" WAS EXAMINED LIRE A USED CAR
GUARANTEE. CAVEAT EMPTOR.
6. HALUR, FELIR, AND I. WHEN ACCORD WAS FINALLY
REACHED WITHIN THE CAUCUS, THREE SPOKESMEN, TURKISH
AMBASSADOR HALUR OZGUL, BELGIAN AMBASSADOR FELIX
STANDAERT, AND DANISH AMBASSADOR SRJOLD MELLBIN, WERE
APPOINTED TO PRESENT NATO'S POSI?ION TO THE EAST AND THE
NNA. AFTER EAC~i ROUND OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, MELLBIN
WOULD OPEN THE FOLLOWING CAUCUS MEETING WITH THE
REFRAIN, -'?ODAY, HALUR, FELIX, AND I ." WITH EACH
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TURN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE CAUCUS DESIGNATION FOR THE
TRIO SEEIiED TO CHANGE. THEY WERE FIRST DUBBED THE
SPOKESMEN, THEN THE WISE MEN, THE TROIKA, THE TRINITY,
AND THE MUSKETEERS. (MERCIFULLY, BECAUSE OF THEIR QUIET
AND EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY, THEY ESCAPED THE THREE STOOGES
APPELLATION.)
7. "WETS" AND "DRYS." IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO DRAFT
EARLY, THE "WETS" DEMONSTRATED A WORRISOME WILLINGNESS
TO ACCOMMODATE THE EAST BY ADVOCATING A MINIMALIST,
"CONSENSUS-BUILDING" NATO OPENING POSITION IN THE
NEGOTIATION OF AN INFORMAL STRUCTURE. IT TOOK ENERGETIC
EFFORTS BY THE "DRYS" (UR, U.S., FRANCE, AND PORTUGAL)
TO HEAD OFF "WET" EFFORTS TO CONCEDE A SIGNIFICANT
PORTION OF THE NATO POSITION IN AN IN?ERNAL CAUCUS
PRE-NEGOTIATION. IRONICALLY, IT WAS THE "WETS," LED BY
CANADIAN AMBASSADOR DELWORTH (WHO HAD EARLIER REFERRED
TO THE NA?0 POSITION AS A "TOMBSTONE PROPOSAL") WHO WERE
MOST VOCAL IN CONGRATULATING THE CAUCUS WHEN THE EAST
ACCEPTED MOST NATO CHANGES.
8. THE FRUSTRATION FACTOR. THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS
SERIES OF MEETINGS LED TO BICKERING AND RECRIMINATIONS
IN THE CAUCUS -- DUE AS MUCH TO PERSONAL PIQUE AS TO
POLITICAL POSITIONS. AT VARIOUS TIMES THE UR, BELGIUM,
CANADA, AND FRANCE WERE ACCUSED OF HOLDING UP CAUCUS
CONSENSUS. THE U.S. DID NOT ESCAPE ITS NIGHT IN THE
BARREL.
9. THE FRENCH FACTOR. THE FRENCH, IN PAR?ICULAR, WON
FEW FRIENDS AND INFLUENCED FEWER PEOPLE DURING THE
SEVENTH SESSION. THE SO-CALLED FRENCH SOFT-TRANSITION
OPTION, "LA TRANSITION EN DOUCEUR," WAS SO NUANCED THAT
ITS INTRICACIES MYSTIFIID NOT ONLY FRANCE'S NATO
PARTNERS, BUT THE FRENCH THEMSELVES. FRANCE'S
LAST-MINUTE RESERVE ON THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE
AGREEMENT AND OPEN THREAT TO BREAK RANKS AND APPROACH
THE NNA COORDINATOR, FINNISH AMBASSADOR RAHILUOTO,
BILATERALLY ON ?HE CONSULTATIONS ISSUE HAD, HOWEVER, THE
MOST SERIOUS RAMIFICATIONS. SEVERAL SHARP EXCHANGES
OVER THIS ISSUE ERUPTED IN THE CAUCUS; THE ATMOSPHERE
WAS PARTICULARLY TENSE BETWEEN BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) AND
GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE). SOME DELEGATIONS WONDERED ALOUD
WHY THE ALLIANCE BOTHERED TO MEET IN CAUCUS AT ALL IF
THE FRENCH (AND BY INFERENCE ALL OTHERS) COULD PRESENT
THEIR NATIONAL VIEWS AS THEY PLEASE. ONE SPANISH
DELEGATE NOTED ACIDLY, "CAN YOU IMAGINE LIVING NEXT TO
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 3 ??***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
313
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FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
THESE PEOPLE FOR THE LAST 100,000 YEARS?" WHILE OTHERS
MANAGED TO CONTAIN THEMSELVES IN CAUCUS, FRUSTRATION AND
ANGER WITH FRENCH TACTICS WERE VIRTUALLY UNIVERSAL. TO
AVOID ISOLATING THE FRENCH ENTIRELY, THE U.S. PROVIDED
SUPPORT FOR THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION IF NOT THEIR
TACTICS. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ANTICIPATE THAT LINGERING
RESENTMENT WITH THE FRENCH WILL NOT QUICKLY DISSIPATE
AND COULD PRESENT ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR ALLIANCE
COHESION IN STOCKHOLM IN THE FUTURE. FOR THEIR PART,
THE FRENCH ACTIONS SUGGEST THAT THEY WILL INCREASINGLY
KEEP THEIR OWN COUNSEL AND ASSERT THEIR NATIONAL
POSITION AS THE CONFERENCE PROGRESSES. ALTHOUGH WE
SHARE MANY OF THEIR BASIC POSITIONS, GALLIC PRIDE AND
PREROGATIVES WILL MARE FRANCE AN UNPREDICTABLE FACTOR IN
FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.
10. AND THE .GOOD NEWS. ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, WHILE
NATO HEADS OF DELEGATION ENGAGED IN A LONG -- AND AS YET
INCONCLUSIVE -- DEBATE OVER HOW TO ORGANIZE COORDINATING
TEAMS FOR THE EXPLORATORY MEETINGS IN THE EIGHTH ROUND,
INFORMAL WORKING LEVEL MEETINGS AND DISCUSSIONS PAID OFF
IN A GOOD FIRST WEER PERFORMANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE. A
GOOD DEGREE OF COORDINATION WAS ACHIEVED IN ALL WORKING
CLUSTERS, WITH A NUMBER OF WESTERN SPEAKERS ACTIVELY
ENGAGED IN EACH. A DIALOGUE WAS INITIATED WITH THE EAST
ON A NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES WHICH PROMISES TO CLARIFY BOTH
AREAS OF COMMON GROUND AND AREAS OF DIVERGENCE. AS THE
SESSION CLOSED, THE ALLIANCE'S GENERAL VIEW WAS THA? WE
WERE OFF TO A GOOD START IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE.
THE EAST.
11. THE NEW SOVIET MAN, STOCKHOLM STYLE. THE SOVIETS
WERE ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR THIS ROUND. WHETHER IT BE A
REFLECTION OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP OR ANTICIPATION OF THE
NOVEMBER SUMMIT, EVEN THE OFTEN CHURLISH SOVIET
AMBASSADOR WAS UNCHARACTERISTICALLY UPBEAT IN HIS PUBLIC
STATEMENTS. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS "RIPE" FOR
GETTING DOWN TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS, GRINEVSRY
DECLARED IN HIS OPENING PLENARY STATEMEN?, AND THE
SOVIET GOVERNMEN? IS PREPARED TO DO ITS PART. DURING
THE PROCEDURAL NEGOTIATIONS I? BECAME CLEAR THAT THE
SOVIETS INDEED WERE ANXIOUS TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS --
BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR BASIC POSITIONS. WHEN
THE ALLIANCE HUNG TOUGH ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS, THE
SOVIETS ACCEPTED MOST OF NATO'S SUGGESTED CHANGES ON THE
COMPROMISE WHICH EVENTUALLY LED TO AGREEMENT ON AN
INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. IN HIS
CLOSING MESSAGE, GRINEVSKY AGAIN ADOPTED AN
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ACCOMMODATING TONE. PRIVATELY, HE IMPLIED NO GIVE ON
SUBSTANCE.
12. NOT SO BENIGN INTENT. FROM AN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE, HOWEVER, THE INTENT OF GRINEVSRY'S SOOTHING
LANGUAGE IS FAR FROM BENIGN. HIS IS A MESSAGE WE HEARD
AT THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THIS
AUGUST AND ONE WE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL HEAR IN GENEVA THIS
NOVEMBER. IT IS A MESSAGE INTENDED FOR EUROPEAN, RATHER
THAN AMERICAN, EARS: THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHO SHARE
"OUR COMMON HOME" SEE THE IMPERATIVE TO "GET DOWN TO
BUSINESS" IN STOCKHOLM; THE "SOVIET-FRENCH SUMMIT HAS
POSITIVELY AFFEC?ED" THE WORK FOR "DETENTE IN EUROPE;"
"THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FAVOR
ACCELERA?ING THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE." IF
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD FAIL TO RESOLVE
EAS?-WEST DIFFERENCES, ACCORDING TO THIS LOGIC, IT WOULD
NOT BE THE FAULT OF THE SOVIET UNION BUT THE UNITED
STATES AND ?HE PEOPLE AND NATIONS OF EUROPE WOULD BE THE
LOSERS. WE HAVE PUT FORWARD REASONABLE PROPOSALS; WE
HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE AND HAVE
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 4 ??***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
DEMONSTRATED THE POLITICAL WILL TO NEGOTIATE, MOSCOW
PROFESSES. IT IS ONLY THE "UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN
NATO ALLIES" WHO "HOLD STUBBORNLY" TO POSITIONS DESIGNED
TO GAIN THEM "UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES." MOSCOW'S INTENT,
THEREFORE, MAY BE TO PREPARE THE PROPAGANDA GROUNDS FOR
FAILURE AS MUCH AS SUCCESS.
13. DOUBLE LINKAGE. THE NON-USE OF FORCE AND
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN THE FOCAL
POINTS OF EASTERN WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES. THESE
SUBJECTS ARE NOT UNRELATED. THE SOVIETS ARGUE THAT
PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATING A COMPLETE PACKAGE OF CSBM'S,
INCLUDING GROUND ACTIVITIES, IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF THE
WEST ACCEPTS NEGOTIATIONS ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL
AC?IVITIES. FURTHERMORE, PROGRESS IN DRAFTING CSBM'S IS
CONTINGENT ON COMPARABLE PROGRESS ON DRAFTING A NUF
COMMITMENT. "NOW IS THE TIME," POLISH AMBASSADOR
RONARSKI CLAIMED, "TO BEGIN DRAFTING ON NUF" (READ: WE
WILL NOT BEGIN REAL DRAFTING ON CSBM'S WITHOUT AT LEAST
PARALLEL PROGRESS ON NUF DRAFTING). THIS APPROACH, OF
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COURSE, IS A RECIPE FOR S?ALEMATE. THE EASTERN IDEA OF
LINKAGE WILL LEAD TO A PARALLELISM THAT IS MORE
GEOMETRIC ("TWO PLANES THAT DO NOT INTERSECT") THAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ("DEVELOPING READILY RECOGNIZED
SIMILARITIES"). A MAJOR TASK DURING THE NEXT ROUND WILL
BE HOW BEST TO MANAGE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE LATERAL
AND INTERNAL LINKAGE BETWEEN NUF AND CSBM'S AND BETWEEN
GROUND AND INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES,
RESPECTIVELY. IT WILL NO? BE EASY.
14. CHTO DYELA?. IDEAS ON HOW TO BREAK THE SOVIET
DOUBLE LINKAGE WERE AS NUMEROUS AND NUANCED AS THE WINES
OF FRANCE. SOME DELEGATIONS SUGGEST "LURING" THE
SOVIETS INTO DRAFTING ON ISSUES OF INTEREST TO US, SUCH
AS NOTIFICATION, BEFORE WRITING DOWN ANYTHING ON NUF.
AT AN EARLY STAGE, HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE FRG, WE
WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE SOME OF OUR NUF LANGUAGE -- SAY
THE UN CHARTER PROVISION. FROM THAT POINT ON, DRAFTING
WOULD CONTINUE ON NUF AND CSBM'S AT A PACE WE CONTROLLED
-- E. G., FOUR OR FIVE TIMES AS MUCH TEXT ON CSBM'S AS ON
NUF. A COUPLE OF DELEGATIONS BELIEVE ?HAT THE PROPER
TACTIC WOULD BE TO MAKE A "DEAL" (PREFERABLY STRUCK
BEHIND THE SCENES) TRADING OFF SOMETHING ON NUF FOR
SOMETHING ON CSBM'S. OTHERWISE THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE
TO CONTROL THE DRAFTING BECAUSE, UNDER THE HALLOWED CSCE
PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS
AGREED, THEY CAN ALWAYS VETO DRAFTED LANGUAGE ON CSBM'S
IF THEY DO NOT GET WHAT THEY WANT ON NUF. SOME OF THE
"WETTER" DELEGATIONS ADVOCATE DEVELOPING A NUF ?EXT
WITHIN NA?0. STILL OTHERS, PARTICULARLY FRANCE, INSIST
ON A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH, I.E., STONEWALLING ON NUF
WHILE PRESSING AHEAD ON CSBM'S. NUF SHOULD NOT EVEN BE
CONSIDERED WITHIN NATO UNTIL THE NNA PAPERS EMERGE, THE
FRENCH ARGUE; WE MAY FIND THE NNA POSITION A BETTER
S?AR?ING POINT THAN A TEXT WE DRAFTED. THE BASIC
TRADEOFF IN CDE WAS BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE CONTINUATION
OF THE CDE PROCESS, NOT BETWEEN NUF AND CSBM'S,
ACCORDING TO SOME OF THE NATO "DRYS." WE ARE
SYMPATHETIC TO THIS APPROACH. IN ADDITION, WE ARE
SKEPTICAL ABOUT DEVELOPING A COMMON NATO NUF TER? FOR
POLITICAL (THE EAST SHOULD REMAIN THE DEMANDEURS ON NUF)
AS WELL AS PRACTICAL (ANY NATO TEXT WOULD INVARIABLY
LEAK) REASONS.
THE NNA
15. THE STOCKHOLM MARATHON. THE NNA HAVE CONTINUED TO
WORK FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES -- DAY, NIGHT, AND
WEEKENDS -- TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF PAPERS
FOR TABLING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH A "CORE"
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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***??< SECTION S ??***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBS?
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS., ROUND VII
GROUP OF THREE DELEGATIONS (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND
SWEDEN) FINALLY REACHED AN ACCOMMODA?ION LATE IN THE
SESSION, THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO BRING FINLAND
AND YUGOSLAVIA ON BOARD. THE "CORE" GROUP HAD HOPED TO
SECURE AD REF AGREEMENT ON THE PACKAGE HERE IN
S?OCRHOLM, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT CAPI?ALS WOULD
REVIEW 'fHE PACKAGE DURING THE BREAK. A NUMBER OF
S?ICRING POINTS, HOWEVER, HAVE PREVENTED SUCH AN
AGREEMENT. THE HOST OPTIMISTIC OF THE NNA NOW EXPRESS
"'THE HOPE" THAT THE PAPER WILL BE READY TO TABLE BY THE
SECOND WEER OF THE NEXT ROUND.
16. THE COURTSHIP OF THE NNA. THE NNA'S LONG NIGHT'S
JOURNEY TOWARD A CONSENSUS DOCUMEN? HAS ALLOWED US TO
CONTINUE COURTING THEM. IN PUBLIC PLACES AND PRIVATE
CONTACTS, WE HAVE -- WITH SOME SUCCESS -- ATTEMPTED
THROUGH GENTLE PERSUASION (SOME CALL IT SEDUCTION) TO
GET 'THE NNA TO HOP INTO THE WESTERN CONCEPTUAL BED.
BASED MAINLY ON WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE,
THE NNA HAVE MOVED TOWARD NATO'S POSITIONS BY DEFINING
MANEUVERS IN THEIR PAPER TO BE LARGELY SYNONYMOUS WITH
OUR OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT
OBSERVATION CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR VERIFICATION.
HOWEVER, WHILE OUR NNA COLLEAGUES ASSURE US THAT THEIR
PAPER WILL CONTAIN NO SURPRISES AND WILL BE CONSISTENT
WITH WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS, WE ARE NOT TOTALLY
REASSURED. THE PORTIONS ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS WILL
MOST LIKELY POSE PROBLEMS FOR US.
17. THE STRAINS WITHIN THE NNA WERE AT ONCE UNEXPECTED
AND INEVITABLE. HERETOFORE, THE NNA HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
PLAY THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.
THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO ELABORATE A COMMON SECURITY
POSITION. HOWEVER, NOW, FOR THE FIRST ?IME IN HISTORY,
THE NNA HAVE BEEN FORCED ?0 IDENTIFY COMMON SECURITY
CONCERNS -- AND IT AIN'T EASY. (SEPTEL DESCRIBES THE
CURRENT SHAPE OF THE NNA PAPERS IN DETAIL.)
18. THE FINNISH ENIGMA. THE LONG AND YET UNFINISHED
ROAD TO CONSENSUS ALSO HAS TAKEN ITS TOLL ON THE NNA IN
TERMS OF BO?H PERSONAL AND NATIONAL RELATIONS. MEMBERS
OF THE "CORE" GROUP, FOR EXAMPLE, EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND
FRUSTRATION THAT FINLAND HAS PROVEN TO BE SO DIFFICULT.
THAT YUGOSLAVIA POSED PROBLEMS CAME AS NO SURPRISE.
RELYING AS THEY DO ON A CONCEPT OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE,
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THEY HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITHOUR INFORMATION MEASURE.
VARYING ACCOUNTS HAVE FINLAND HIDING BEHIND YUGOSLAVIA
AND VICE VERSA. THE FINNS, DISPLAYING A CERTAIN
PROPRIE?ARY INTEREST -- AND A DESIRE TO BEEP THE CSCE
PROCESS ALIVE -- ARE RELUC?ANT TO GO T00 FAR AFIELD FROM
THE REGIME ESTABLISHED~BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IN
ADDITION, THE FINNS MAY NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS ACCEPTING
CONCEPTS WHICH ARE T00 NEW AND DIFFERENT AND HENCE
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS. FINALLY SOME SOURCES ARGUE
THAT FINNISH RELUCTANCE TO JOIN THE "CORE" GROUP WAS DUE
TO I?S DESIRE NOT TO BE SEEN AS PART OF A PRESSURE GROUP
ON YUGOSLAVIA. FINLAND HAS PLAYED A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE
ROLE DURING PROCEDURAL NEGOTIATIONS. FINNISH AMBASSADOR
RAHILUOTO ACTED AS HONEST BROKER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
IN FASHIONING THE FINAL COMPROMISE, WHICH LED TO
AGREEMENT ON ENTERING INTO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. THIS,
T00, MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO FINLAND'S ROLE IN HOLDING
UP THE TABLING OF THE NNA PAPERS.
19. AND THE MA3.TESE GAMBIT. IF FINLAND PLAYED ITS
TRADITIONAL ROLE ON THIS QUESTION, MALTA PLAYED THE ROLE
OF, WELL, MALTA. AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR, THE MALTESE SAID
THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM VALLETTA, IT WOULD WITHDRAW
ITS CONCURRENCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT. THE
MALTESE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE INFORMAL WORKING
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
***??< SECTION 6 ??***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIR/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII -
STRUCTURE, ACCORDING TO RAHILUOTO, BUT RATHER WITH THE
LONG-AWAITED (AND LONG DEBATED) NNA POSITION PAPERS.
THEREFORE IN A CLASSIC MALTESE BARGAINING STANCE, MALTA
WI?HIiELD CONSENSUS TO ENSURE THAT MALTESE VIEWS WERE
ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED IN THOSE PAPERS. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT MALTA WANTED THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL
MOVEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE NNA PAPERS.
SEVERAL NNA CONTACTS INDICATED TO US THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD
BEEN PRESSING THE MALTESE ON THIS POINT AND WERE NOT
DISPLEASED WITH THE MALTESE GAMBIT. SOME OF OUR
FRUSTRATED NATO COLLEAGUES OPENLY WONDERED WHETHER IT
WAS NOT TIME TO PRESS MALTA THROUGH DEMARCHES OR MERELY
TO IGNORE MALTA, THEREBY BREAKING THE CONSENSUS RULE.
VALLETTA, NO DOUBT, WOULD HAVE LOVED THE LIMELIGHT.
HAPPILY, COOLER HEADS PREVAILED AND THE NNA WERE LEFT TO
DEAL WITH THEIR MALTESE ALBATROSS. THE SUSPENSE WAS
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SHOR?-LIVED, AS THE NNA WERE ABLE TO PRESSURE MALTA TO
JOIN IN THE CONFERENCE CONSENSUS IN TIME FOR FORMAL
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INFORMAL COMPROMISE IN WORKING GROUP
AB THAT AFTERNOON (OCTOBER 14). WE THINK MALTA SIMPLY
WAS SENDING THE CONFERENCE A POLITICAL SIGNAL AS IF THE
34 OTHER PARTICIPANTS COULD EVER FORGET THA? MALTA
INDEED HAD ITS OWN SPECIAL PLACE IN THE CSCE PROCESS.
20. WORKING GROUPS. THE FIRST FIVE WEEKS SAW BOTH NATO
AND WTO DELEGATIONS POSI?ION THEMSELVES FOR THE
ANTICIPATED TRANSITION TO THE INFORMAL WORKING
STRUCTURE. NATO DELEGATIONS HELD THEIR GROUND WELL AND,
IN OUR VIEW, THROUGH FURTHER CLARIFICATION, ENHANCED
UNDERSTANDING OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE
NNA. (WE WILL BE ABLE TO MEASURE OUR EFFECTIVENESS WHEN
THE NNA POSITION PAPERS FINALLY EMERGE.) THE NNA WERE
VIRTUALLY SILENT AS THEY WORKED FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE
SCENES IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THESE PAPERS.
THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE FLOOR REFLECTED AN
INFORMAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE NNA'S NOT TO SPEAR UNLESS
SPORfiN T0. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE YUGOSLAVS ON
VERIFICATION AND THE CYPRIOTS ON NUF, THE NNA DISPLAYED
COMMENDABLE DISCIPLINE.
21. SUBTLE SIGNALS. THE EAST HINTED AT SOME
FLERIBILITY ON BOTH THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD AND THE
OU?-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. WHILE REJECTING BOTH PROPOSALS
AS SUBSTITUTES FOR THE TRIED-AND-TRUE TERMS AND PRACTICE
OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT REGIME, THE EAST LEFT THE DOOR
OPEN FOR THESE NEW CONCEPTS TO "SUPPLEMENT" EXISTING
ONES. ON THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, THE SOVIET
DELEGATION SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT IT DID NOT REJECT
THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, NOTING THAT STRUCTURAL
INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED IN THE NOTIFICATION
TRIGGERED BY NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. THE EAST'S PROFESSED
MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
ALONE IS BASED ON THE DISPARITY BETWEEN DIVISIONS FROM
COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. IMPLICIT IN THIS OBJECTION,
HOWEVER, WAS AN INDICATION THAT A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER
IN SOME RIND OF COMBINATION WITH A NUMERICAL PARAMETER
MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. THE EASTERN "NON-STARTERS"
VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED FROM THE AGENDA, AS THE EAST,
REALIZING THA? THE CONFERENCE'S PATIENCE WITH THESE
PROPOSALS WAS RAPIDLY RUNNING OUT, FOCUSED ON "NON-USE
OF FORCE." FINALLY, CERTAIN EASTERN SOURCES HAVE MADE
DISCREET, AND AS YET UNCONFIRMED, NOISES THAT THE
SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT SOME VERY DILUTED FORM OF ON-SITE
INSPECTION IN THE END GAME.
22. ON THE DOWN SIDE, THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO ARGUE
THAT THE ISSUES OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION CANNOT
BE DISCUSSED INDEPENDENT OF A NOTIFICATION MEASURE. IN
FACT, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN THE ONLY WARSAW PACT
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DELEGATION TO SPEAR ON THIS SUBJECT THIS ROUND,
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
3Z0
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***??< SECTION 7 ??***
DEPAR?MENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
REFLECTING MOSCOW'S LACK OF TRUST IN ITS ALLIES' ABILITY
TO HANDLE SENSITIVE SUBJECTS IN ANY GIVE-AND-TAKE WITH
?HE WEST. THE SOVIETS, WITH SOME ASSISTANCE FROM THEIR
LOYAL GDR COLLEAGUES, ALSO HAVE CARRIED THE BALL ON
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, ASSERTING THAT
THESE PROPOSALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FINAL ACT AND
THE MADRID MANDATE. THE SOVIETS HAVE, MOREOVER, REFUSED
TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF OBLIGATORY INVITATION OF
OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO ALL
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, AND THEY CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT
AN OBSERVATION REGIME CANNOT BE DEVELOPED UNTIL IT IS
DETERMINED WHICH ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED, AND,
THUS, CANDIDATES FOR OBSERVATION.
23. WORKING GROUP DYNAMICS CHANGED FURTHER DURING THE
LAST WEER OF THE ROUND AS THE CONFERENCE ENTERED INTO
THE INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE. DURING THIS "TEST" RUN
OF INFORMAL MEETINGS THE WEST FARED WELL AND WAS ABLE TO
DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON ITS TERMS. THE USSR, LED BY
SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIROV, HOWEVER, AGGRESSIVELY ARGUED
ITS CASE ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, WHILE
AMBASSADOR RAKHMANINOV PLAYED THE DEMANDEUR ROLE IN THE
GROUP DEALING WITH NON-USE OF FORCE. ALL IN ALL,
HOWEVER, THE GIVE-AND-TARE THAT CHARACTERIZED THESE
MEETINGS BODES WELL FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS DURING THE
NEXT ROUND.
24. PROCEDURAL PROBLEM FOR THE NEXT ROUND. JUDGING BY
WHAT WE HEAR FROM THE SOVIETS AND SOME OTHER WTO'S, THEY
ARE CONSIDERING A MAJOR PROCEDURAL OFFENSIVE IN THE NEXT
ROUND TO ESTABLISH THE POINT THAT THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE CAN EXTEND ITSELF. YET THERE APPEARS TO BE
NO MAJOR OBSTACLE TO SUSPENDING THE CONFERENCE BEFORE
THE SEP?EMBER PREPCON FOR THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE.
WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE, NATO, AND MANY NNA'S
WOULD BLOCK CONCENSUS ON MEETING WHILE THE VIENNA
MEETING IS IN PROGRESS, INSISTING THAT ONLY THE CSCE
REVIEW CONFERENCE ITSELF CAN DEBATE ON WHEN, AND
WHETHER, CDE RESUMES. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THIS IS AN
ESSENTIAL LEVERAGE ON SOVIET POSITIONS ON CSBM'S. WE
MUST ENSURE THAT WE ARE SUPPORTED BY NATO, AS WELL AS
? 321
SECRET
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REY NNA'S. THIS, IN OUR VIEW, SHOULD BE A CENTRAL THEME
OF DISCUSSIONS WITHIN NATO AND WITH THE NNA COUNTRIES.
25. DELIVERING MOSCOW'S MESSAGE TO STOCKHOLM. PROBLEMS
WITH THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE
CONFERENCE. THIS ROUND THE ISSUE HAS BEEN LESS ONE OF
MALICIOUS INTENT THAN OF CAPRICIOUS INCOMPETENCE. WE
HAVE SEEN IN THE PAST, AND NO DOUBT WILL SEE IN THE
FUTURE, COLLUSION BETWEEN THE SOVIET-SUPPLIED RUSSIAN
LINGUISTS AND THE SOVIET DELEGATION. THIS ROUND, SHEER
INCOMPETENCE CAUSED US MORE PROBLEMS THAN DELIBERATE
MISTRANSLATIONS. AS A RULE, THE SOVIETS HAVE ROTATED
DIFFERENT INTERPRETERS THROUGH STOCKHOLM VIRTUALLY EVERY
ROUND, WITH THE UNFORTUNATE RESULT THAT THEY ARRIVE
UNFAMILIAR WITH THE SPECIALIZED CDE VOCABULARY AND, BY
THE TIRE THEY LEARN IT, MOVE ON TO SOMETHING ELSE. EVEN
THE SECRETARIAT, EVER ANXIOUS TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH THE
SOVIETS, HAS COMPLAINED ABOUT THE FREQUENT CHANGES OF
PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, STOCKHOLM APPEARS TO BE THE
PLACE WHERE INEXPERIENCED SOVIET LINGUISTS CUT THEIR
TEETH AND THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT IS NOT PAR?ICULARLY
PLEASED TO HAVE THE SOVIET LINGUISTS RECEIVE THEIR ON
THE JOB TRAINING IN S?OCRHOLM. AND FINALLY, THE -BAST
SOVIET INTERPRETERS PRESUMABLY ARE BEING SIPHONED OFF
FOR THE U.S.-SOVIET GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS.
26. AMONG OUR ALLIES, ONLY THE GERMANS AND THE BRITISH
CONCUR THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE TO RECTIFY THE
CURRENT HIRING PRACTICES; THE OTHERS APPEAR WILLING TO
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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***??< SECTION 8 ??***
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/CDE - AMBASSADOR BARRY; LYNN HANSEN;
AND FAIM/LS - HARRY OBST
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: FINAL WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, ROUND VII
FOLLOW OUR LEAD, BUT SEEM TO SEE THE PROBLEM AS A
U.S.-SOVIET DISPUTE.
27. WE HAVE TALKED WITH THE SECRETARIAT FOR THE PAST
SIX MONTHS ABOUT ADOPTING THE SAME RECRUITMENT PRACTICES
FOR RUSSIAN AS THOSE USED FOR THE OTHER FIVE LANGUAGES
-- HIRING INDEPENDENT FREELANCERS. THERE IS
CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM,
BUT A NATURAL BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA ?OGETHER WITH A
FATALISTIC BELIEF THAT ?HERE ARE NO COMPETENT RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION MARE THE
SECRETARIAT EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO ROCK THE BOAT. THIS
LATTER CONVICTION IS A LINE WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE FED
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS FOR DECADES WITH CONSIDERABLE
SUCCESS -- AND TO A CERTAIN DEGREE IT HAS BECOME A
SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY: BECAUSE OF THE LONGSTANDING
PRACTICE IN UN AND OTHER MULTILATERAL MEETINGS OF HIRING
ONLY SOVIETS FOR THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTHS, GIFTED
YOUNG IN?ERPRETERS HAVE BEEN DISCOURAGED BY THE LACK OF
JOB PROSPECTS FROM DEVELOPING THE ABILITY TO INTERPRET
INTO RUSSIAN. NONETHELESS, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED ONE SUCH
GENEVA-BASED INTERPRETER, WHO COMES WELL RECOMMENDED,
BUT HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE SECRETARIAT THAT ITS OWN
ADVISERS IN GENEVA DO NOT RECOMMEND HER.
28. WHILE IRKSOME NOW, SOVIET CONTROL OF THE RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR
NATO IN THE FINAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE
AGREED ENGLISH TEXT WILL NEED TO BE TRANSLATED INTO THE
OTHER OFFICIAL LANGUAGES. WE CAN EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO
USE THEIR RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PERSONNEL TO WIN BACK POINTS
IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION THAT THEY LOST DURING THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARIAT IS NOW HIRING
INTERPRETERS FOR THE FIRST SESSION OF 1986. THEREFORE,
ANY ASSISTANCE DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE IN IDENTIFYING
QUALIFIED INDEPENDENT RUSSIAN LINGUISTS WOULD BE GREATLY
APPRECIATED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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SECRE?
UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08422
SUBJECT: START OF CDE ROUND VLLL
L. CDE VIII - OOL
2. UNCLASSIFIED-ENTIRE TEx?
3. ROUND VIII OF CDE RESUMES TOMORROW, NOVEMBER S, IN
STOCKHOLM. IT WILL CONTINUE UN?IL DECEMBER 20.
4. USDEL CDE HEAD, AMBASSADOR BARRY; HAS BEEN DELAYED IN
WASHINGTON. I HAVE ASSUMED CHARGE. HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 085 31
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 4, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 004
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: TEE CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF
NOVEMBER 4 DISCUSSED RECENT OVERTURES GRINEVSRY (USSR)
HAS MADE TO SEVERAL ALLIED DELEGATIONS CONCERNING THE
POSSIBLILITY OF THE CDE ESTABLISHING ITS OWN RESUMPTION
DATE. CAUCUS CONSENSUS WAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE CDE
DOES NOT HAVE THIS AUTHORITY. WITH REGARD TD THE
ANTICIPATED NNA PAPER, THE CAUCUS DETERMINED THAT WE
SHOULD TRY TO POCKET ANY POSITIVE POINTS, BUT SHOULD
AVOID APPEARING OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC. DISCUSSION OF THE
1986 CALENDAR WAS GENERALLY INCONCLUSIVE, BUT JANUARY 21
DID EMERGE AS THE MOST LIKELY DATE FOR CONVENING THE
NINTH SESSION. NORWAY AND DENMARK ARGUED ,THAT NO
"ARTIFICIAL" CUTOFF DATE FOR THE CDE SHOULD BE SET PRIOR
?0 THE START OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 4
FOR POLITICAL REASONS, WHILE THE U.S. AND FRANCE
COUNTERED THAT THE CDE SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND
SEPTEMBER 19 AT THE LATEST TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CDE IS
SUBORDINATE TO THE FULL CSCE. END SUMMARY.
4. CONTACTS: THE NATO CDE CAUCUS HELD ITS FIRST
SESSION OF THE EIGHTH ROUND ON NOVEMBER 4. MELLBIN
(DENMARK) REPORTED~ON GRINEVSRY'S VISIT TO COPENHAGEN
OCTOBER 20-21, DURING WHICH GRINEVSRY INDICATED THAT
?AERE WAS NO NEED TO LIMIT THE COORDINATORS FOR THE CDE
DRAFTING PHASE TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NNA, BUT THAT
NATO AND WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ALSO BE
INCLUDED. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE FORTHCOMING NNA
PAPER SHOULD NEITHER BE CONSIDERED AS A BASIS FOR
DRAFTING NOR AS A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT. U.S. DEPREP
HANSEN (THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS),
AND CITRON (FRG) ALL REPORTED THAT GRINEVSRY HAD PROBED
WESTERN VIEWS ON THE POSSIBLILITY OF THE CDE SETTING ITS
OWN RESUMP?ION DATE. U.S. AMBASSADOR BARRY, HANSEN
SAID, FIRMLY REJECTED THE SOVIET SUGGESTION.
5. NNA PAPER: IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST TO
HANDLE THE ANTICIPATED NNA PAPER, EDES (UR) AND BUWALDA
(NETHERLANDS) ADVISED THAT NATO SHOULD NOT APPEAR T00
ENTHUSIASTIC OVER ITS POSITIVE ELEMENTS, AS OVEREAGER
SUPPORT WOULD COMPLICATE THE NNA'S POSITION AT A TIME
WHEN SOME NNA MEMBERS (NOTABLY FINLAND) ALREADY FEAR
THA? THE PAPER TILTS T00 FAR TOWARD THE WEST. THERE WAS
GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH BUWALDA'S SUGGESTION FOR THE NEAR
TERM THAT, WHILE WE SHOULD POCKET THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS
OF THE NNA POSITION, IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WE SHOULD
NOTE ONLY THOSE POINTS OF SC.1 WHICH ARE MISSING AND
OVERLOOK S1t1iLARITIES WITH THE WESTERN PACKAGE OF CSBM'S.
6. CALENDAR FOR 1986: A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE 1986
CALENDAR WAS, OF COURSE, LARGELY INCONCLUSIVE BUT, ON A
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FUNDAMENTAL POINT, PRODUCED CONSENSUS THAT, CONTRARY TO
GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL, THE CDE DOES NOT HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO SET ITS OWN RESUMPTION DATE. THERE WAS
ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE
FRENCH, WHO ARE PUSHING FOR JANUARY 14) THAT JANUARY 21
IS THE EARLIEST REASONABLE DATE TO STAR? THE NINTH
SESSION IN ORDER TO ALLOW TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS IN
CAPITALS AND A POSSIBLE MEETING IN BRUSSELS. THERE WAS
NO AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC SCHED[TLE FOR 1986, AS
DELEGATIONS CONTINUE TO WRESTLE WITH DIVERGENT HOLIDAY,
TRAVEL TIME REQUIREMENTS, ETC. TURNING TO THE SUBJECT
OF AN ENDING DATE FOR CDE, SOME DELEGATIONS (NOTABLY
DENMARK AND NORWAY) WANTED TO AVOID CREATING ANY
"ARTIFICIAL" CUTOFF DATE, WHICH, IN THEIR VIEW, COULD
CREATE POLITICAL DANGERS FOR THE ALLIANCE, AND WERE
PREPARED TO STAY IN SESSION UNTIL NOVEMBER 4. THE U.S.
AND FRANCE STRONGLY OPPOSED THIS LINE AND ARGUED THAT
STOCKHOLM MUST BE SUSPENDED BY SEPTEMBER 19 (IN FACT,
FRANCE SUPPORTS ONLY A TECHNICAL SESSION AFTER THE
FRENCH CUTOFF DATE OF JULY 18) IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE
THE PROPER SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENT
(CSCE) AND CHILD (CDE). IT WAS AGREED TO RETURN TO THIS
SUBJEC? A? A FUTURE CAUCUS.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONF IDENT IALSTOCRHOLM09615
SUBJECT: CDE DRAFTING AUTHORITY
REF: STATE 30L425
L. CDE VIII -
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: WHEN CDE RECONVENES IN LA?E JANUARY, TIME
LEFT FOR NEGOTIATING A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE
VIENNA PREPCON WILL BE VERY LIMITED. IN ORDER TO GET
AS SUBSTANTIVE AN AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE AND TO MINIMIZE
LAST-MINUTE PRESSURES TO AGREE TO UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE
OR A MINI-PACKAGE, USDEL CDE BELIEVES IT NOW NEEDS
DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO DRAF? DURING THE NEXT ROUND
(IR). DRAFTING, OF COURSE, WILL BE AD REFERENDUM TO
CAPITALS, AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS AGREED
.UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED WILL BE OBSERVED. CF.
ACTION REQUEST PARR 7 AND OSD NOTE PARR 8. END SUMMARY.
4. USDEL CDE BELIEVES THAT, FOR TACTICAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, IT MUST CONSOLIDATE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT EARLY ON AS MANY OF OUR CSBM POSITIONS AS
POSSIBLE. TIME IS GROWING SHORT IN WHICH TO NEGOTIATE
THE COMPLEX ISSUES WHICH MUST BE SETTLED IF A
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT IS TO
BE ACHIEVED BEFORE THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING
BEGINS IN FALL, L986.
5. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN CDE IS AN AGREEMENT WHICH
EMPHASIZES THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) PRINCIPLE AND
EXTENDS THE CSBM ZONE THROUGH INCLUSION OF NAVAL AND
AIR ACTIVITIES, WHILE REDUCING TO A MINIMUM THE
SUBSTANCE OF ANY CSBMS. AWARE THAT T$EY WILL NOT BE
ABLE TO WIN EXTENSION OF THE ZONE, THE SOVIETS ARE
PURSUING THIS COURSE TO ENSURE A MINIMALIST OUTCOME TO
CDE. AS PART OF THEIR TACTIC, THEY ARE NOW SPREADING
THE WORD THAT REY DECISIONS ON CDE WILL BE MADE AT THE
NEXT US-SOVIET SUMMIT IN JUNE, L986. SIMILARLY, THEIR
TACTICS ON THE WORK PROGRAM FOR L986 SUGGEST THAT THEY
PLAN TO "END-LOAD" THE NEGOTIATIONS BY HARING THEIR
MINIMAL CONCESSIONS IN THE SUMMER AND PRESSING FOR A
LAST FRANTIC EFFORT TO RESCUE SOMETHING BEFORE VIENNA
CONVENES.
6. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD PUT US IN A DISADVANTAGEOUS
POSITION. UNTIL WE ARE ABLE TO CONFRONT CONFERENCE
ISSUES HEAD-ON IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS, IT WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO PIN DOWN THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF GREATEST INTEREST TO US. IT IS
IN OUR INTEREST TO RECORD AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE
ON SUBSTANCE BEFORE THE NEXT US-SOVIET SUMMIT SO THAT
WE WILL HAVE A CLEAR IDEA AS TO WHETHER AN AGREEMENT IS
IN REACH AT ALL. WHAT WE WANT TO AVOID IS HEADING INTO
A SUMMIT WITH ALL THE REY ISSUES OPEN AND ENDING UP
"TRADING" CONCESSIONS THERE AMONG CDE ISSUES, AS WELL
AS BETWEEN CDE AND OTHER ISSUES. BECAUSE OF THE
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COMPLEXITY (IF NOT TO SAY IMPENETRABILITY) OF CDE
ISSUES AND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO ALLIANCE
MANAGEMENT ASPECTS, USDEL WANTS TO KEEP CDE OUT OF THE
SUMMIT VORTEX AS MUCH AS WE CAN. BUT, WITH PROBABLY
ONLY FOURTEEN WEEKS IN OUR L986 WORK PROGRAM BEFORE THE
SUMMIT, THERE ISN'T MUCH TIME REMAINING.
7. IN KEEPING WITH THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFTEL,
USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE CDE IG WHICH WILL BEET IN EARLY
JANUARY SHOULD AUTHORIZE DRAFTING. ALL TEXT WILL
EMERGE FROM THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS AD REFERENDUM.
ON THE BASIS OF THE ESTABLISHED CSCE PRINCIPLE, NOTHING
IS AGREED UNTIL ALL IS AGREED.
8. NOTE: THE ABOVE IS THE POSITION OF ALL USDEL AGENCY
REPRESENTATIVES EXCEPT THE OSD REP. THE POSITION OF
?HE OSD REP IS THAT THE ISSUE OF DRAFTING SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED IN THE JANUARY IG AND THAT THE IG SHOULD
DETERMINE WHETHER CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR DRAFTING IN
CDE HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. END NOTE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08530
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STA?EMENTS, NOVEMBER 5
1. CDE VIII - 003
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUM?'.ARY: AT THE NOVEMBER 5 PLENARY, THE WEST
(FRG, FRANCE, NORWAY) FOCUSED ON REY UNRESOLVED
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE CLOSER ATTENTION BEFORE
MOVING INTO DRAFTING. THE EAS? (BULGARIA, USSR) ARGUED
THAT THE WEST MUST DISPLAY THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY IN
ORDER TO MARE FURTHER PROGRESS. AUSTRIA SUGGESTED AN
EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS BE LINRID TO LIMITATION
MEASURES AND COMMUNICATION/RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. END
SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD
"WELCOME A TEST RUN OF DRAFTING ALREADY THIS YEAR." HE
OUTLINED SOME REY AREAS OF "REAL" COMMON GROUND WHICH
NEED DETAILED DISCUSSION IF WE ARE TO HOVE INTO A "TEST
RUN OF DRAFTING THIS YEAR." THESE AREAS INCLUDE
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY;
AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS; AND AGREEMENT ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
VERIFICATION. CITRON STRESSED THAT NTM ALONE CANNOT
SERVE AS A REFERENCE POINT FOR COMPLIANCE OF AN AGREED
CSBM. HE CAUTIONED THE EAST AGAINST INSISTING ON
NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS
?A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATION:
5. AMBASSADOR MEVIR (NORWAY) SAID HIS DELEGATION, LIRE
THE FRG, WOULD LIRE "AT LEAST SOME WEEKS OF EXPERIENCE
IN THE DRAF?ING MODE" THIS YEAR; HE ALSO STRESSED
SUBSTANTIVE AREAS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IF WE ARE 7`0
DRAFT "WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY." WITHIN THE "CORE" AREA OF
COMMON GROUND, I.E., NOTIFICATION, MEVIR POINTED OUT
THREE ISSUES WITH WHICH THE CONFERENCE RUST STILL CORE
TO GRIPS 1) THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT; 2) USE
OF THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH AS THE MAIN NOTIFICATION
PARAMETER, UNDERPINNED BY A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD, FIRST
FOR EQUIPMENT AND SECONDARY FOR TROOPS; AND 3) A LOWER
THRESHOLD FOR AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. THE NORWEGIAN
AMBASSADOR ALSO SUPPORTED AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL
CALENDARS, DISCUSSION OF "BALANCED CONSTRAINING
MEASURES," ADEQUATE VERIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION, OBSERVATION AND A REAFFIRMATION OF NON-USE
OF FORCE. MEVIR MADE THREE POINTS OF PROCEDURE: 1) WE
MUST AVOID PROCEDURAL EXERCISES IN THE FUTURE WHICH WILL
DELAY PROGRESS; 2) THERE NEEDS TO BE A SMOOTH TRANSITION
INTO DRAFTING, WI?H SOME WEEKS OF EXPERIENCE IN DRAFTING
BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR; AND 3) WE SHOULD REACH AN
AGREEMENT "IN GOOD TIME BEFORE VIENNA BUT WITH NO
ARTIFICIAL DEADLINE." (BEGIN COMMENT: ON THESE LAST
TWO POINTS, NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE CAUCUS.
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END COMMENT.)
6. AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) REFUSED TO ASSOCIATE
HIMSELF WITH THOSE WHO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE HOVE TO
DRAFTING. HE ARGUED THAT DRAFTING CANNOT BE CONJURED UP
AS A MANIFESTATION OF PROGRESS; RATHER, PROGRESS IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS WILL DETERMINE T8E POSSIBILITIES FOR
DRAFTING. IN THIS CONTEXT, GASCHIGNARD COlQ~F.NTED THAT A
DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT
IN PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN EXPRESSED AND THOSE AREAS WHERE
THAT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE. AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL
CALENDARS, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION, AN EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION FALL INTO THE FIRST
CATEGORY~AND SHOULD FIGURE IN A FINAL AGREEMENT. THE
SITUATION IS DIFFERENT FOR EXISTING PROPOSALS ON THE
NON-USE OF FORCE, HE SAID, ALTHOUGH FRANCE DOES NOT
EXCLUDE A NUF REAFFIRMATION FROM AN AGREEMENT. HE LATER
SAID SUCH A REAFFIRMATION WOULD BE A FUNCTION OF CSBM'S,
NOT A CSBM ITSELF. THE SITUATION IS "RADICALLY
FROM USDEL
PM/CDE FOR AMBASSADOR BARRY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STA?EMENTS, NOVEMBER 5
DIFFERENT" FOR PROPOSALS FOR CEILINGS ON THE SCALE OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES ABOUT WHICH A NUMBER OF DELEGA?IONS,
INCLUDING HIS OWN, HAVF. SERIOUS RESERVATIONS, BECAUSE
CEILINGS PRESUPPOSE LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE AND
TRANSPARENCY WHICH ARE NOT PRESENT TODAY. HE DID NOT
EXCLUDE STUDYING CONSTRAINTS FORMULAS, BUT REJECTED
REDUCING CONSTRAINTS TO CEILINGS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR
CATEGORICALLY REJECTED CONSIDERATION OF A "POLITICAL
CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY" WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CSBM'S
BECAUSE 1) SUCH A MECHANISM CANNOT CONSTITUTE A
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE, AND 2) CSCE STATES AGREED
TWELVE YEARS AGO TO HOLD PERIODIC REVIEW MEETINGS TO
EXAMINE THE OVERALL PROCESS OF CONFIDENCE AND
COOPERATION, AND 3) FRANCE CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE
SUGGESTION THAT CONSUL?ATIONS BE INTEGRATED INTO CSBM'S
OR EVEN SUBSTITUTE FOR SUCH CSBM'S AS INFORMATION OR
VERIFICATION. TURNING TO THE WORK SCHEDULE FOR 1986,
GASCHIGNARD ELABORATED THE FRENCH POSITION IN
SUBSTANTIAL DETAIL: THERE SHOULD BE THREE?OR FOUR
SESSIONS BEFORE JULY; A POLITICAL AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE
WOULD BE NEEDED BY THE END OF THE SPRING; IN JULY, IF
NECESSARY, A DECISION COULD BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF
CONSENSUS TO HOLD A FINAL SESSION BEFORE THE PREPCON TO
WORK ON TERTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: ALL THREE WESTERN
SPEAKERS, WHILE DEFENDING THE ALLIANCE POSITION, LAID
DOWN CLEAR NATIONAL MARKERS IN TERMS OF THEIR PRIORITIES
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AND OUTLOOK TOWARD THE CONFERENCE. NORWAY AND FRG, FOR
EXAMPLE, DISPLAYED AN URGENCY TO MOVE QUICKLY INTO
DRAFTING, WHEREAS FRANCE MADE IT CLEAR IT REJECTED A
TIME?ABLE FOR DRAFTING. END COMMENT.)
7. AMBASSADOR TODOROV (BULGARIA) REVIEWED THE
DECLARATION OF THE OCTOBER 22-23 WARSAW PACT POLITICAL
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN SOFIA. AF?ER HIS LONG
SUMMARY OF THE MEETING, HE HAILED AN ELABORATION OF
NON-USE OF FORCE AS THE "MOST IMPORTANT" WORK OF THE
STOCRHOLIi CONFERENCE. TODOROV SUGGESTED AGREEMENT BE
REACHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON A TRANSITION PERIOD INTO
DRAFTING, AND THAT A START BE MADE ON DRAFTING TEXTS OF
MUTUALLY ACCEP?ABLE ACCORDS.
8. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY (USSR) MADE TWO POINTS IN A
RIGHT OF REPLY TO CITRON'S STATEMENT: 1) CITRON'S
EMPHASIS ON NATO PROPOSALS OMITTED THE IMPORTANT AREAS
OF NUF AND CONSTRAINTS; IS CITRON'S DEFINITION OF COMMON
GROUND, INCLUDING NUF AND CONSTRAINTS, NOT A DEPARTURE
FROM THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE ON ALL
OUTLINED AREAS? AND 2) "PRACTICALLY ALL SIDES" HAVE SAID
THEY WELCOME GORBACHEV'S READINESS TO EXCHANGE MILITARY
CALENDARS, BU? WHERE IS NATO'S RECIPROCAL MOVEMENT?
NATO HAS DONE NOTHING TO ADVANCE THE WORK OF THE
CONFERENCE, GRINEVSRY CLAIMED. AFTER HARING THESE
POINTS, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON NATO TO GIVE UP
THE "ILLUSION" ?HAT THERE CAN BE ONE-WAY NEGOTIATIONS.
IN A DEFENSIVE RESPONSE, CITRON SAID HE HAD NOT SOUGHT
TO INCORPORATE ALL AREAS OF COMMON GROUND IN HIS
COMMENTS, BUT PREFERRED INSTEAD TO FOCUS ON A FEW KEY
AREAS. CITRON ADDED THAT HE HOPED THESE REMARKS WOULD
"APPEASE" THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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Unofficial translation
by Ambassador Stephan Tododrov,
Head of the Bulgarian Delegation
to the CSCE Stockholm Conference
Plenary, November 5, I985
Mr. Chairman,
On October 2T and 23 in Sofia took place the meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, in which
the highest ranking representatives of the member-states
participated. In the capital of Bulgaria the States-members to
the Warsaw Treaty again reaffirmed the top priority they attach
to the betterment of the political climate in Europe and in the
world, to the averting of the nuclear threat overshadowing
Europe.and the world.
As it is stated in the Declaration adopted at the meeting, the
worsening of international tension has moved closer to the point
beyond which events may get out of control. The spiral of the
arms race is raising impetuously. The reasons of this state of
affairs are well-known to everyone.
Particularly alarming is the threat of the arms race spreading to
outer space which would lead to a destabilisation of the overall
strategic situation. Even the layman is well aware that this
would pose a particular threat to Europe.
The Sofia Declaration reaffirms - under no circumstances will
the Warsaw Treaty member-sates sacrifice the security of their
peoples. At the same time however they are firmly opposed to the
arms race and its escalation and declare themselves in favour
of securing a balance of power at the lowest level. The principal
objective of their foreign policy has always been the removal
of the danger of nuclear war, the lowering of the level of
military confrontation and the development of international
relations in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and detente.
A positive turn in the international situation demands a new
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political approach corresponding to the realities of the present-
day world. Aa it was underlined at the meeting, such an approach
should be based on mutual restraint and responsibility, on taking
into account the legitimate interests of all, on predictability
both in the political as well as in the military spheres.
Full support was expressed at the meeting to the recent
initiatives of the Soviet :Jnion submitted at the Soviet-American
Geneva negotiations on the whole complex of space and nuclear
issues. The moratoria in the sphere of nuclear weapons, declared
by the Soviet Union, were also supported. The conviction was
voiced that the undertaking of similar actions by the United
States would be an important prerequisite for achieving results in
the field of disarmament.
Tha leaders of the allied socialist States believe that the
upcoming Soviet-American summit should contribute to allaying
the present-day dangerous tensions in the world, to diminishing
the military threat, to achieving mutually acceptable decisions
aimed at curbing the arms race and real progress towards
disarmament.
To achieve a positive shift in the international relations
it is necessary to put an end to the power politics and
confrontation. All States should abide strictly by the principles
of respect for national independence and sovereignity, non-use
of force or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers and
territorial integrity, a peaceful settlement of disputes,
non-interference in internal affairs, equality of rights and
other universally acknowledged norms in international relations.
Slander campaigns giving a distorted account of the situation
in some countries or others and of their politics are inadmissible
By proposing a wide-ranging sat of measures and means to overcome
the tensions in the present-day political situation the Warsaw
Treaty member-states pointed out that?they were guided by the
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premise thst ideological differencies should not be transferred
into interstate relations and thus undermine their stability,
and the energetic interaction between all States and between
all forces which stand for a normalisation of the international
situation is today more necessary than ever before.
As for the political and military situation on our continent the
leaders of the allied States declared that an exceedingly
important aspect of the drive for eliminating the nuclear
menace is checking the present dangerous course of events and
lowering the level of military course in Europe. They were
guided by the understanding that European security and interna-
tional security as a w~iola cannot be achieved by military means
or by military force. Stable peace on the continent can be
secured only through detente, disarmament, the strenghtening of
confidence and the promotion of international cooperation.
In this context the participants in the Sofia meeting called
again for major complementary measures, both political and
military to be mapped out in the nearest future at the Stockholm
Conference, aimed at strenghtening confidence and security in
Europe.
The States-members to the Warsaw Treaty emphasized again the
great importance of the Conference of the leaders of the European
States, the USA and Canada held ten years ago that adopted the
most important principles and provisions on which security and
cooperation were to be built, and reaffirmed their readiness to
continua to participate constructively in the work of the
European fora. Th? Helsinki Final Act, permeated by the spirit
of detente has stood the test of time, and as the recent meeting
of foreign ministers in Helsinki proved, remains a long-term
programme for European cooperation.
It was underlined at the meeting that at the present moment it is
vitally important to strenghten mutual confidence, to deepen on
the basis of the Final Act the political dialogue between the
European countries in various fields, by various forms and at
va:'ioua levels on the interest of healing the climate on the
continent.
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various levels in the interest of healing the climate on the
continent.
It was confirmed that the participants in the meeting intend to
further their efforts so that the many-sided process which began
in Helsinki should develop in a steady and balanced manner.
The forthcoming meeting in Vienna in I986 of the participating
States in the all-European conference is called upon to play a
major role in this respect. It was also stated that the Warsaw
Treaty member-states invariably declare for a consistent trans-
lation into practice of all principles and provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act by the signatory parties. The development of
inter-State relations on such a basis would help to make Europe
a continent of lasting peace and mutually advantageous cooperation
The concrete initiatives launched by the participants at the
Sofia meeting are contained at the published Declaration which
the Bulgarian Delegation has the honour to submit in full extent
to the attention of all participants to the Stockholm Conference.
"The Declaration which we have adopted - stated the Secretary
General of the CC of the BCP and President of the State Council
of thi'PR?Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov - represents a wide-ranging
platform, a realistic understanding of what is necessary to do
in order to achieve a positive turn in the European and inter-
national situation".
Mr. Chairman,
The eighth session of the Stockholm Conference, in the opinion
of the Bulgarian Delegation, starts its work in a moment when
in the international and European context a tendency is gaining
momentum to overcome the logic of confrontation. The political
dialogue between state and political leaders of East and West
has become more intensive. Representatives of various circles
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08549
SUBJECT: GERMAN TV INTERVIEW WITH USDEL CDE DEPUTY
1. CDE VIII - 006 '
2. WEST GERMAN TELEVISION'S CHANNEL 2 OF MAINZ HAS
INTERVIEWED USDEL CDE DEPUTY LYNN HANSEN ON THE
CONNECTION BETWEEN CDE AND THE UPCOMING GENEVA
MEETING. THE INTERVIEW WILL BE AIRED ON FRIDAY,
NOVEMBER 15, AS PART OF A LONGER STORY ON EUROPEAN
SECURITY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY EVALUATION AMEMBASSY
BONN MIGHT HAVE OF THE PROGRAM AND THE HANDLING OF THE
INTERVIEW. HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08583
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 6, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 007
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: STANDAERT (BELGIUM) REPORTED ON A
MEETING IN MOSCOW DURING THE CDE INTERSESSION BETWEEN
THE BEi:GIAN Al83ASSADOR TO THE USSR AND SOVIET CDE
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY IN WHICH GRINEVSKY RAISED THE
POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING A CDE SKELETON AGREEMENT IN THE
SPRING OF 1986 AND THEN HAVING A MINISTERIAL LEVEL
MEETING LATER TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. CAUCUS
REACTION WAS HIGHLY NEGATIVE TO THIS IDEA. CANADA
REOPENED THE DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR BY PROVIDING
OTTAWA'S VIEW THAT A TEXTUAL READING OF THE RELEVANT
DOCUMENTS INDICATES THAT THE CDE COULD CONTINUE UP TO OR
BEYOND NOVEMBER 4 IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONSENSUS TO
ADJOURN. THIS INTERPRETATION WAS MET WITH VIRTUALLY
UNANIMOUS NEGATIVE REACTION, SPEARHEADED BY FRANCE AND
THE UNITED STATES. END SUINIARY.
4. CONTACTS: THE NOVEMBER 6 NATO CAUCUS MEETING OPENED
WITH STANDAERT (BELGIUM) REPORTING ON A MEETING IN MOSCOW
BETWEEN TIDr BELGIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR AND SOVIET CDE
AlH3ASSADOR GRINEVSKY DURING THE INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD.
GRINEVSKY MADE THREE POINTS AT THE MEETING: 1) CDE IS
PRIMARILY A POLITICAL CONFERENCE, THE IMPLICATION BEING
THAT WE SI~OULD NOT BE BOUND BY A STRICT TECHNICAL READING
OF THE MADRID MANDATE; 2) THE USSR ATTACHES GREAT IMPOR-
TANCE TO THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES, WHICH IT VIEWS AS A REAL THREAT TO SECURITY
IN EUROPE; AND 3) HE (GRINEVSKY) IS THINKING ABOUT
ACHIEVING A SKELETON CDE AGREEMENT IN THE SPRING, WITH
OUTSTANDING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED AT A POSSIBLE
MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS)
INDICATED THAT GRINEVSKY HAD MADE THE SAME NOISES ABOUT
A MINISTERIAL TO HIM SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, ALTHOUGH AT
THAT TIME HE HAD REFERRED TO A VICE-MINISTERS' MEETING.
IN RESPONSE TO THESE REPORTS, CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL)
OBSERVED THAT A CDE MINISTERIAL WOULD SERVE WELL THE
SOVIET INTEREST IN DIMINISHING THE STATURE OF THE VIENNA
REVIEW CONFERENCE. CITRON (FRG) ADVISED THAT WE MAKE IT
KNOWN TO GRINEVSKY EARLY ON THAT THIS IDEA WON'T FLY.
5. 1986 CALENDAR: DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS
REJOINED WHEN, ON INSTRUCTIONS, ANSTIS (CANADIAN DEPREP),
EXPRESSED OTTAWA'S VIEW THAT A PURELY TEXTUAL READING OF
THE MANDATE AND DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY
MEETING DO NOT SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT THE CDE MUST ADJOURN
BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE BEGINS, NO MATTER HOW
DESIRABLE THAT GOAL MAY BE. A CONSENSUS WILL BE REQUIRED
TO ADJOURN THE CONFERENCE, ANSTIS OBSERVED-AND, AS THIS
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WILL BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR
THE CONTINGENCY OF WORKING UP TO (OR Et1EN BEYOND)
NOVEMBER 4. IN ORDER TO AVOID PROCEDURAL HASSLES, OTTAWA
FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT WE ONLY SCHEDULE FOR NEXT YEAR ON
A SBSSION-BY-SESSION BASIS. WIT$ THE EYCEPTION OF
MELLBIN (DENMARK), WHO SUPPORTED OTTAWA'S INTERPRETA-
TIONS, CAUCUS SENTIMENT WAS CLEARLY IN OPPOSITION TO
OTTAWA'S VIEWS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH UK AND
FRG STATEMENTS THAT THE 1986 CALENDAR SHOULD BE AGREED
UPON IBIS SESSION AND NOT ON A SESSION-BY-SESSION BASIS
WHICH COULD CREATE MORE PROCEDURAL AND POLITICAL
PROBLEMS. CANADA'S INTERPRETATION THAT THE CONFERENCE
GOES ON UNLESS THERE IS CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN MET WITH
SIMILARLY NEGATIVE REACTION. FtANSEN (U.S.) INDICATED
TEAT WASHINGTON WAS CONVINCED THAT THE CDE COULD NOT
PROGRESS BEYOND THIS FIRST STAGE WITHOUT A DECISION FROM
VIENNA AND THAT WE WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTINUE
SIN STOCKHOLM AFTER THE VIENNA MEETING BEGINS. HE ALSO
STRESS? AGAIN THAT THE U.S. STRONGLY FAVORS A "NATURAL"
CUTOFF DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19, I.E., BEFORE THE VIENNA
PREPCON. CITRON (FRG) CONCLUDED TIR; DISCUSSION BY NOTING
THAT THE EAST IS APPARENTLY WILLING TO ACCEPT A CUTOFF
DATE, AND HE "PLEADED" THAT WE USE THIS FACT TO QUIETLY
AND QUICKLY SET TBE 1986 CALENDAR (FOR CITRON, WHD HAS A
MARKED TENDENCY TO CAST HIS REQUESTS OF THE CAUCUS AS
"PLEAS," THIS WAS HIS THIRD SUCH "PLEA" OF THE AFTERNOON,
THUS GIVING HIM BIS FIRST "BAT TRICK" OF TBE EIGHTH
SESSION). ANSTIS PROMISED TO REPORT TBE CAUCUS' REACTION
TO OTTAWA AND ADDED TEAT OTTAWA WOULD WELCOME ANY INTER-
PRETATION OF THE RELEVANT TE%TS THAT SUPPORTS NATO'S
POLITICAL VIEWS ON ADJOORNING THE CDE. DISCUSSION OF
SPECIFIC DATES FOR THE 1986 SESSIONS MEANDERED ON
WITHOUT CONCLUSION. END
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKI~LM 08642
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 8, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 8583
~. c~ vill - o>>
2. C -ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF
NOVEMBER 8 FAVORABLY REVIEWED WESTERN PERFORMANCE TO
DATB IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT
TBERE WAS ROOM FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN ALLIANCE
COORDINATION. THE MOST PRCSSING ISSUE WAS HOW TO FEND
OFF EASTERN QUCSTIONS ON THE DETAILS OF NOTIFICATION,
OOSERVATION AND VERIFICATION FOR AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES
RELATED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH. THE CAUCUS REFERRED THIS MATTER TO THE OBSER-
VATION WORKING GROUP MINICLUSTER FOR STUDY, WITH THE
UNDERSTANDING THAT DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS WOULD BE DEVELOPED
FOR IMMEDIATE USE, WHILE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS GOING BEYOND
SC.1 WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE
AND CAPITALS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. END SUMMARY.
4. CONTACTS: MEVIK (NORWAY) REPORTED ON A NOVEMBER 6
LUNCS WITH GRINEVSKY (USSR), WlE~O HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW
THAT FIVE COORDINATORS WOULD BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE
Nt1MBER FOR THE DRAFTING PHASE, DRAWING THREE FROM THE
NNA, ONE FROM NATO, AND ONE FROM THE WARSAW PACT. HE
ADDED TEAT IN TBE END HE COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT ONLY TWO
NNA COORDINATORS (AS NATO FAVORS), BUT THAT IT QUICKLY
WOULD BECOME APPARENT THAT THERE WAS T00 MUCH WORK FOR
TWO PEOPLE. GRINEVSKY HAD ONCE AGAIN DISCUSSED HIS IDEA
OF ACHIEVING A SKELETON AGREEMENT BY MAY OF NEXT YEAR
BUT HAD TOLD MEVIK THAT OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES COULD BE
RESOLVED BY HIGH LEVEL BILATERAL CONTACTS RATHER THAN AT
THE MINISTERIAL MEETING HE HAD MENTIONED TO EARLIER NATO
INTERLOCUTORS (REFTEL). HE HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT THE
MAIN OBSTACLE HE SAW TO AN AGREEMENT WAS THE WESTERN
EXCLUSION OF THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME.
5. REVIEW OF INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS: THE MAIN AGENDA
ITEM WAS A DISCUSSION OF NATO PERFORMANCE AND 000RDINA-
TION IN TBE INFORMAL MEETINGS TO DATE (BACKGROUND: THE
DUTCH, INTER ALIA, HAVE BEEN PUSHING THE CAUCUS TO
CONSIDER A MORE FORMAL APPROACH TO THE INFORMAL WORKING
GROUPS, I.E., TEAMS DE FILE, IN ORDER TO SMOOTH THE
TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING PHASE, PRESUMABLY LATER THIS
ROUND). GUNDERSEN (U.S.) STRESSED THAT THE FIRST WEEK
OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTIVE AND WOULD
BE BUILT UPON IN FUTURE INFORMAL MEETINGS. SINCE THIS
WAS JUST THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, BY
DEFINITION A TIME OF TRIAL AND ERROR, WE SHOULD USE THIS
PHASE TO IMPROVE OUR COORDINATION AND DISCIPLINE AND TO
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FOCUS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THERE WAS, IN OTHER WORDS,
NO NEED TO DISCUSS MOVING OEYOND THE EXPLORATORY PHASE
A? THE PRESENT TIME. PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE
DISCUSSION WERE THAT: 1) NATO HA3 TURNED IN A GENERALLY
GOOD PERFORMANCE ALTHOUGH COORDINATION COULD BE TIGHTENED
SOMEWHAT AND DELEGATES COULD SHOW MORE RESTRAINT IN
RISING TO EASTERN BAIT; 2) THE EXPLORATORY PHASE HAS BEEN
VALUABLE IN ALLOWING THE WEST TO PROMOTE FURTHER ITS
PROPOSALS AND AS AN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN PREPARATION
FOR DRAFTING; 3) NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONDUCT A HOLD-
ING OPERA?ION IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE CLUSTER; AND 4) OUR
POSITION NEED3 TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED ON NOTIFICATION,
OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES
RELATED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH. ON THE LAST POINT EDES (UK) POINTED OUT THAT
WE WERE ON THE DEFENSIVE; THE EAST HAS ASKED QUESTIONS,
AND WE HAVE HAD NO ANSWERS. THE CAUCUS AGREED THAT THE
NATO MINICLUSTER FOR THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP
SHOULD EXAMINE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES AND CONSIDER THE CONTENT OF RELATED NOTIFICA-
TION AND METHODS OF OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION. THE
NETHERLANDS AND SPAIN SUGGESTED THAT THESE QUESTIONS BE
REFERRED TO THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE IN BRUSSELS, BUT
CITRON (FRG) ARGUED THAT THEY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED HERE
FIRST. BLANK (U.S.) CAUTIONED THAT, WHILE THE MINI-
CLUSTER COULD DEVELOP DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS TO BE USED IN
REPONSE TO EASTERN QUESTIONS, NATO MILITARY COMMANDERS
WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE WE COULD SAY ANYTHING
IN 3TOCKH0LM ON THE MODALITIES OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVA-
TION AND VERIFICATION OF FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR AND
NAVAL ACTIVITIES THAT WENT BEYOND SC.1. THE CAUCUS
DIRCCTED THE MINICLUSTER TO PROCEED WITH ITS STUDY BUT
THAT ONLY NEW DEFENSIVE AGRUlU+NTS WOULD OE USED NOW,
WHILE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ARISING FROM ITS CONSIDERATION
WOULD BE REFERRED TO BRUSSELS AND CAPITALS FOR FURTHER
STUDY. END
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKE~OLM 086411
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
- NOVEMBER 5-8, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 015
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE EIGHTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM
O0~4'E~iCE OPENED WITH HIGH EXPECTATIONS AND LOW THEATER.
WITH THE ADVENT OF A MORE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE AND
ON THE EVE OF THE U.S.-USSR SUM!lIT, MANY CONFERENCE
PARTICIPANTS HOLD HIGH EXPECTATIONS THAT THE EIGHTH ROUND
WILL LEAD TO DRAFTING BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THE
EAST, PLAYING TO THE PUBLIC -- AND NNA -- GALLERY,
DISPLAYED A THEATRICAL SI~W OF IMPATIENCE WITH THE LACK
OF PROGRESS TOWARD DRAFTING, ESPECIALLY ON NON-USE OF
FORCE AND PRESSED FOR THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL
AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM'S REGIME. MEANWHILE, THE
MUCH BALLYHOOED AND FREQUENTLY DELAYED CONFERENCE OPENING
OF THE NNA PACKAGE IS STILL STRUGGLING ON THE ROAD,
ESPECIALLY IN BELGRADE AND HELSINKI. THE WEST, IF NOT
TOTALLY SATISFIED WITH THE ALLIANCE'S OPENING WEEK
PERFORMANCES, SEEMS CONTENT TO USE THE E%PLORATORY PHASE
TO PROMOTE ITS PROPOSALS AND TO IMPROVE ITS ORGANIZATION.
END SUMMARY.
4. NATO: GOT A DATE? DURING THE INTERSESSIONAL BREAK,
SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY PROCED FOR WESTERN WEAKNESSES
ON THE QUESTION OF WLETHER THE CDE COULD SET ITS OWN
RF.SUl~TION DATE. HE FOUND NONE. ALL OUR ALLIES REPORTED
THAT TfII3Y HAD FIRMLY REWFFED SOVIET OVERTURES; THE
PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE OF THE CSCE ESTABLISH THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CSCE MOTHER AND THE CDE CHILD,
I.E., THE CDE CANNOT SET ITS OWN DATE FOR RESUMING WORK
AFTER VIENNA. FURTHERMORE, MOST NATO DELEGATIONS AGREE
THAT IT IS IN NATO'S SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL INTEREST TO
SUSPEND THE CDE WELL BEFORE THE VIENNA CONFERENCE. ONLY
CANADA, ON INSTRUCTIONS, WAVERED, ARGUING THAT A PURELY
TEZTUAL READING OF THE MANDATE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE
HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING DID NOT SUPPORT THIS VIEW.
THERE ALSO WAS GENERAL. AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO THAT THE
1986 CALENDAR SHOULD BE AGREED UPON THIS SESSION AND NOT
ON A SESSION-BY-SESSION BASIS AS SUGGESTED BY THE
CANADIANS. DURING CAUCUS DISCUSSION ON THE CALENDAR U.S.
DELEGATION STRESSED THAT WE STRONGLY FAVORED A "NATURAL"
CUTOFF DATE BEFORE THE VIENNA PREPCON IN SEPTEMBER AND
PREFERRED A REASONABLE BREAK BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE
NEXT ROUND, E.G. JANUARY 21.
5. THE EXPLORATORY PHASE: WHILE THE CAUCUS GENERALLY
(AND GENEROUSLY) GAVE WESTERN ACTORS FAVORABLE REVIEWS
FOR TREIR OPENING PERFORMANCES, BEHIND THE CURTAINS
CAUCUS CRITICS WERE MORE CURT-THAN KIND. L?D BY THE
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DUTCH, THESE CRITICS ARGUED THAT WE MUST COORDINATE OUR
PRESENTATIONS AND RESPONSES, PARTICULARLY ON THE NON-USE
OF FORCE AND ON NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND INSPECTION
OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO GROUND ACTIVITIES
UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE CAUCUS HAS RECOGNIZED
EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO FORCE THE ISSUE ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL
AND AIR ACTIVITIES (SEE PARA 9 OELOW) AND TABBED MILITARY
ADVISORS TO STUDY THE ISSUE. WE ARE NOT AS EYERCISED
ABOUT THE EARLY COURSE OF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AS ARE
SOME OF OOR ALLIES, WHO MAY HAVE ULTERIOR MOTIVES (THE
DUTCH, NORWEGIANS, DANES, AND GERMANS HAVE ALL STATED
THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SMOOTH THE TRANSITION INTO
DRAFTING LATER THIS ROUND). AFTER ALL, THIS WAS ONLY THE
FIRST WEEK OF THE EKPLORATORY PHASE, BY DEFINITION A TIME
OF TRIAL AND ERROR. THIS PHASE SI~ULD ALLOW THE ALLIANCE
AMPLE TIME TO PROMOTE ITS PROPOSALS AND TIGHTEN ITS
DISCIPLINE. OF COURSE, THE EAST ALREADY HAS DISCIPLINE
TO SPARE (AND, AS THE PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR ONCE NOTED,.
THE EAST EUROPEANS ENVY US OUR DIFFERENCES, NOT OUR
DISCIPLINE).
6. THE PLENARY: WHILE THE ALLIES MAY EQUIVOCATE IN
PRIVATE, THEY REMAIN FIRM ON SUBSTANCE IN PUBLIC. THE
FRG, FRANCE, AND NORWAY, WHATEVER THEIR TACTICAL
DID -- AND THEY ARE LEGION -- ALL FOCUSED ON KEY
UNRESOLVED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE CLOSER
ATTENTION BEFORE MOVING INTO DRAFTING. THESE ISSUES
INCLUDE: (1) THE OUT-0F-GARRISON CONCEPT; (2) THE USE
OF THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH FOR NOTIFICATION; (3) THE
PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION; AND (4) THE E7CCHANGE OF ANNUAL
FORECASTS. THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO HAl~IlKER HOME THESE
THE!!ES IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS. ON DRAFTING, THE
FRG AND NORWAY ARGUE FOR PROGRESS SOONER RATHER THAN
LATER, I.E., BEFORE CHRISTMAS, THE FRENCH CONTEND THAT
DRAFTING CANNOT BE CONJURED UP AS A MANIFESTATION OF
PROGRESS; RATHER, PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL
DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DRAFTING.
7. THE NNA: DOES IT PLAY IN HELSINKI (OR BELGRADE)?
THE MUCH BALLYHOOED AND FREQUENTLY DELAYED CONFERENCE
OPENING OF THE NNA PACKAGE IS STILL STRUGGLING ON THE
ROAD. WHEN WE LAST LEFT THE NNA TRAVELING SHOW AT THE
FALL OF THE SEVENTH ROUND CURTAIN IN OCTOBER, IT HAD
DEOUTED SUCCESSFULLY IN BERN, VIENNA, AND STOC1Qi0LM.
ONLY THE PREDICTABLY PUGNACIOUS AND SURPRISINGLY STUBBORN
AUDIENCES OF BELGRADE AND HELSINKI, RESPECTIVELY, HAD
WITHHELD THEIR ACCOLADES FOR THE PACKAGE. A FEW WEEKS
OF INTENSE OUT-0F-TOWN PRESSURE (INCLUDING FROM
WASHINGTON) AND SOME MINOR CHANGES IN THE SCRIPT (E.G.
MANEUVERS ARE NON MENTIONED IN THE SAME BREATH WITH
MOVE!lENTS) HAVE WON OVER THE FINNISH AUDIENCE. THE
YUGOSLAVS ARE A TOUGHER AUDIENCE TO PLEASE; THEY STILL
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INSIST ON DROPPING OR MODIFYING THE EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION SCENE, PARTICULARLY ITS LOCALE, I.E., NORMAL
PEACETIME. THUS, THE NNA THEATER IS STILL DARK. IF THE
TEMPERAMENTAL METHOD ACTOR, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC,
CAN BE SOOTHED, THE SHOW MAY OPEN ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15.
IF RIOT, THE NNA'S CAREFULLY CRAFTED CONSENSUS MAY
DISSOLVE INTO CACAPHONOUS SOLILOQUIES.
8. THE NNA ON NUF: IN ITS PRESENT INCARNATION (14
ELE!lQiTS) THE NNA NUF TEXT IS A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT
ON EARLIER DRAFTS WHICB HAD INCLUDED UP TO 35 SEPARATE
ELEMENTS. THE TEXT IMPLICITLY REJECTS THE AMBITIONS AND
DAIS APPROACH ADVOCATED OY THE CYPRIOTS AND
YUG03LAVS (I.E., A STOCKHOLM DECLARATION GIVING A
EUROPEAN DIMENSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE) AND, INSTEAD,
REFLECTS A MORE WESTERN ORIENTED APPROACH. MOST NATO
DELEGATIONS, UPON SEEING THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA
DOCUMENT, HAVE BREATHED WHAT AMOUNTS TO A COLLECTIVE
SIGH OF RELIEF. THE FIRST REACTION OF THE FRG REP WAS:
"WHERE DO WE SIGN?" AND THERE'S THE RUB. EVEN IF WE
WERE ABLE TO ACCEPT ALL THE NNA LANGUAGE -- AND WE'RE
NOT -- BY APPEARING T00 EAGER TO EMBRACE NNA DRAFT
LANGUAGE WE MAY GIVE IT THE KISS OF DEATH. THUS, FOR
BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, WE HAVE
RECOlfl~IENDED A CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE NNA NUF TEXT.
9. THE EAST: DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE EIGHTH
ROUND, EASTERN CONTORTIONISTS WORKED HARD TO CONVEY THE
IMPRESSION OF FLEXIBILITY WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONCESSIONS
IN SUBSTANCE. THE CLEAR TOP PRIORITY FOR THE EAST WAS
TO SELL ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE TO INCLUDE
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. TARING FULL
ADVANTAGE OF THE GREATER GIVE-AND-TAKE OF THE NEW WORKING
S'RUCTURE, EASTERN SPEAKERS GRILLED NATO ABOUT ITS
HANDLING OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN COMBINATION WITH
GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, I.E., THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH:
WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION ON THESE AIR AND NAVAL FORCES
WOULD BE EXCHANGED? HOW WOULD SUCH ACTIVITIES BE
OBSERVED AND VERIFIED? WHILE LESS CATEGORICAL THAN IN
THE PAST IN THEIR REJECTION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS,
EASTERN INTERVENTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE UNFAILINGLY
NEGATIVE; THEY CHARGED THAT THE WESTERN MEASURE WAS
DISCRIMINATORY AND DID NOT SATISFY THE CSCE'S
MUL?ILATERAL CHARACTER. THEY SUGGESTED AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH WHICH SHARED MUCH WITH THE AS YET UNTABLED NNA
APPROACH: MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH PRESUMABLY
WOULD PUT THE ONUS ON THE STATE REQUESTING THE INSPECTION
TO CONVINCE THE 34 OTHE~tS OF THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS
SUSPICIONS. BY EASTERN STANDARDS THEY FREELY DISCUSSED
ANNUAL FORECASTS -- ALCEIT WITH THE UBIQUITOUS EASTERN
CONDITION THAT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES BE INCLUDED.
10. FOLLOW THE LEADER: TAKING THEIR CUE FROM THE
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SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IN EACH WORKING GROUP, EASTERN
SPEAKERS FOLLOWED A DISCIPLINED, IF UNIMAGINATIVE,
PATTERN. THEY BARRAGED THE WESTERN KEYNOTE SPEAKER WITH
QUESTIONS, APPARENTLY HOPING THA?, THROWN OFF BALANCE,
H$ MIGHT MIS4PEAK. THE EAST SHOWED INCREASING IMPATIENCE
TO MOVE TO DRAFTING, ESPECIALLY IN AREAS OF SPECIAL
INTEREST TO THEM, SI~Qi AS NUF. FRUSTRATED BY THEIR
FAILURE TO CE? THE WEST TO LOCK HORNS ON NUF, THEY
URIDLED A? WE.4TERN INSISTENCE THAT THE NUF PRINCIPLE IS
NOT A CSBM AND ACCUSED NATO OF RENEGING ON THE OCTOBER
14 PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT. DESPITE THEIR ILL-CONCEALED
DISPLEASURE AT THE SUCCESSFUL WESTERN HOLDING ACTION ON
NUF, THE WARSAW PACT DID NOT RETALIATE IN OTHER WORKING
GROUPS DEALING WITH CSBM'S (THEY DID VENT THEIR FRUSTRA-
TION IN THE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS IN WORKING CROUP AB).
THIS QUASI-RESTRAINT ON TREIR PART MAY BE A SIGN THAT
THEIR FLEZIBILITY DOES NOT REFLECT A REAL SEARCH FOR
PROGRESS AT THIS POIN?, BUT RATHER A DESIRE TO STAY IN
THE NNA'S GOOD GRACES WHILE PAINTING THE WEST AS THE
SPOILERS AT STOCKHOLM. END
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UMiL'i.AS STOCKHOLM 08615
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, Ll/1.1~/85
L. CDE VIII - OLO
2. FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT AMBASSADOR ROBERT L.
BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, MADE TO THE CDE
TODAY, NOVEMBER LL. AMBASSADOR BARRY HAD JUST RETURNED
TO STOCKHOLM FRO!! WASHINGTON, WHERE HE MET WITH
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND
HAD HIS CONFIRMA?ION HEARINGS BEFORE TBE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,
I REGRET RETURNING A WEEK LATE FOR THIS ROUND, BUT I
USED MY TIME TO ADVANTAGE IN BRIEFING SENIOR
ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL FIGURES ON OUR
PROGRESS HERE. I RETURN WITH A STRONG SENSE OF WHAT MY
GOVERNMENT HOPES FOR FROM STOCKHOLM.
ON NOVEMBER 5 I MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, WITH VICE
PRESIDENT BUSH, CHIEF OF STAFF REGAN AND NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR MACFARLANE AND !!EMBERS OF HIS STAFF
PRESENT. A3 REPORTED BY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN, THE
PRESIDENT WELCOMED OUR ADOPTION OF A MORE INFORMAL
WORKING STRUCTURE DESIGNED TO OPEN MORE INTENSIVE AND
SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.
THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT LESS THAN A YEAR REMAINS
BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CSCE; THUS
THERE IS LITTLE TIME FOR US HERE IN STOCKHOLM TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON MEASURES WHICH WOULD ENHANCE SECURITY AS
WELL AS CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN EUROPE. IN THIS
CONNECTION, HE INSTRUCTED MY DELEGATION TO REDOUBLE ITS
EFFORTS, WORKING TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER SPONSORS OF
SC.L.
LAST THURSDAY I TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE IN CONNECTION WITH MY CONFIRMATION
IN THIS POST. I FOUND THE SENATORS SUPPORTIVE OF MY
EFFORTS HERE AND INTERESTED IN THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF
ALL ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS. THERE IS GROWING
ATTENTION TO THE APPROACHING VIENNA REVIEW MEETING,
WHICH WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF JUDGING HOW THE
REQUIREMENT FOR BALANCE AMONG THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT IS BEING CARRIED OUT AND DECIDING
WHETHER THE PROGRESS MADE HERE IN STOCKHOLM WARRANTS
CONTINUATION OF THE CDE IN ITS CURRENT PHASE OR IN A
NEW STAGE.
MY DELEGATION SHARES THE VIEW EXPRESSED ON NOVEMBER 5
BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY,
AMBASSADOR MIEVIK, THAT OUR "OVERRIDING NEED IS TO COME
TO GRIPS WITH THE UNRESOLVED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES BEFORE
US." THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WE HAVE NOW ENTERED WAS
ADOPTED BECAUSE IMIPORTANT QUESTIONS MUST BE ADDRESSED
BEFORE DRAFTING CAN BEGIN; WE~WILL NOT RESOLVE ALL
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DIFFERENCES, BUT WE MUST ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCUSSION AND DETERMINE MORE CLEARLY WHERE THE COMMON
GRDUND NBEDED FOR DRAFTING E%IST3 AND WHERE IT DOES NOT.
IN ONE PROMISING AREA, THE EAST APPEARS READY TO JOIN
IN NEGOTIATION OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST OR CALENDAR OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. DETAILS FOR THE CONTENT OF SUCH A
l+B:A3URE E%IST IN.lIEASURE 2 OF SC.L/AMPLIFIED. WE ASR
THE EAST TO COMMENT ON MEASURE 2 AND ALSO TO PROVIDE
SIMILARLY PRECISE DETAILS ABOUT THEIR OWN POSITION ON
AN ANNUAL E%CI~ANGE OF PLANS FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
IN THIS WAY, REAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE
COULD BEGIN. THIS IS ONE E%AMPLE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE
DISCUSSION WE LOOK FOR DURING THIS PHASE, THOUGH, OF
COURSE, PROGRESS IN THIS AREA ALONE WOULD NOT BE
SUFFICIENT.
IN THIS E%PLORATORY PHASE, AS THROUGHOUT THE
CONFERENCE, MY DELEGATION AND THE OTHER FIFTEEN
SPONSORS OF SC.L WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ALL
DELEGATIONS ABIDE BY THE INSTRUCTIONS UNDER WHICH THE
STOCCKI~iOLM CONFERENCE OPERATES. IN PARTICULAR, WE ARE
C0 THA? SOME DELEGATIONS CONTINUE TO STATE THAT
INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING
SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE ARE LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS FOR
NEGOTIATION IN THIS CONFERENCE. THEY ARE NOT. THE
MADRID MANDATE IS PERFECTLY CLEAR; I NEED NOT REPEAT
TBE ARGUl~1TS. OUR THIRTY-FIVE DELEGATIONS MUST FOLLOW
TBE RULE OF THE MANDATE; WE CANNOT CHANGE IT. OUR
DELEGATIONS DO NOT HAVE THAT POWER; ANY ATTEMPT TO
ASSUME THAT POWER WILL CAUSE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
TO FAIL.
MY DELEGATION IS NOT PREPARED TO CHANGE THE MANDATE AND
WILL NOT ACCEPT ATTEMPTS BY OTHERS TO DO S0. WE WILL
OBEY THE MANDATE IN EVERY PARTICULAR. FOR E%AMPLE, AS
STATED IN SC.L/AMPLIFIED, WE WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION
ABOUT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH MEET THE TWO
CRITERIA OF THE MANDATE FOR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING
SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE, THAT IS, ACTIVITIES WHICH
"AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART
OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE ." WITHIN THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ACCEPTED BY ALL AT MADRID, WE ARE
PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF HOW BEST TO DEAL
WITH ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA
AND AIR SPACE. WE ARE NOT PREPARED AND THE STOCIQiOLM
CONFERENCE IS NOT EMPOWERED TO GO BEYOND THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH.
I WOULD POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT, BASED ON THE
OUT-0F-GARRISON CONCEPT, THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WILL
AFFECT MANY MORE NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES THAN OTHER
APPROACHES, SINCE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH INVOLVES NO
THRESHOLD WHICH SUCH AN ACTIVITY MUST MEET-BEFORE IT IS
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INCLUDED IN A NOTIFICATION; AN ACTIVITY MUST ONLY
AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AND CONSTITUTE A PART OF AN
ACTIVITY IN EUROPE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. UNDER THE
TERMS OF MEASURE 3 OF SC.L/AMPLIFIED, ANY NAVAL OR AIR
ACTIVITY, REGARDLESS OF ITS SIZE, WHICH SUPPORTS AN
OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITY INVOLVING ONE HALF OR
!LORE OF A DIVISION'S COMBAT ELEMENTS WOULD BE COVERED
BY NOTIFICATION.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE FIRST MEETINGS IN THE ESPLORATORY
PHASE HAVE, BY AND LARGE, BEEN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE;
THEY PROVIDE A GOOD START. DURING THE PAST WEEK, WE
HAVE HEARD REFERENCES TO THE OCTOBER L4 AGREEMENT WHICH
TOOK US INTO THIS PHASE AND ALSO REFERENCES TO AN
ALLEGED AGREEMENT TO MOVE AHEAD IN ALL AREAS EQUALLY.
MY DELEGATION WILL, OF COURSE, ABIDE BY ALL AGREEMENTS
WE HAVE UNDERTAHEN, HERE, IN MADRID AND ELSEWHERE. WE
SHOULD BEAR IN MIND, HOWEt1ER, THAT OUR RESPONSIBILITY
IS NOT TO CONSTRUCT A COMPROMISE OF ARTIFICIAL SYMMETRY
GIVING ONE SIDE PART OF WHAT IT WANTS AND OTHERS PART
OF WHAT THEY WANT. OUR RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ENACT A
SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH, IN AMBASSADOR
CITRON'S FELICITOUS PHRASE, ESTABLISHES "A SYSTEM OF
COOPERATIVE SECURITY" FOR EUROPE.
SIMILARLY, OUR DELEGATIONS ARE NOT HERE TO ESTABLISH
OUTLINES OR PRINCIPLES, TO CLEAR AWAY THE UNDERBRUSH,
PERHAPS, SO THAT OTHERS MIGHT SOLVE THE REALLY TOUCH
GORE QUESTIONS. AS MY DISTINGUISHED DANISH COLLEAGUE,
AMBASSADOR MELLBIN, SAID MANY MONTHS AGO, WE HERE IN
THE STOCffiiOLM CONFERENCE HAVE OUR OWN VITALLY IMPORTANT
JOB Ta DO, AND WE MUST NOT WAIT FOR OTHERS TO DO IT FOR
US; THE RESPONSIBILITY REMAINS OURS TO ENACT A
SUBSTANTIVE, MILITARILY MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT WHICH WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE, SECURE AND OPEN EUROPE.
IF WE CANNOT DO THAT, WE CANNOT; AND THE VIENNA REVIEW
MEETING, NOT WE, MUST EVALUATE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT
FAILURE. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS
BY THE SHORT TIME REMAINING BEFORE VIENNA, WE
REMAIN COMMITTED TO A MEANINGFUL AND VERIFIABLE
AGREEMENT AND PLEDGE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE IT.
THANH YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08763
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 13, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7987, B) USNATO 6481
1. CDE VIII - 017
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY; THE CDE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSED THE
PENDING NNA PAPER (NOW EXPECTED TO BE TABLED ON
NOVEMBER 1S) AND DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD WELCOME IT IN
GENERAL TERMS, BUT THEN FOCUS ON QUESTIONS AND NEGATIVE
ELEMENTS TO AVOID GIVING IT THE "KISS OF DEATH" VIS-A-VIS
THE EAST. CAUCUS "WETS" PUSHED FOR A S?ART TO DRAFTING
BY THE LAST 2-3 WEEKS OF THIS ROUND, EITHER IN ALL GROUPS
(NORWAY OPTION) OR IN ONE OF NATO'S CHOOSING (FRG
OPTION). THE U.S., FRANCE, PORTUGAL, AND UR ALL OBJECTED
TO EITHER OPTION. BARRY (U.S.) NOTED THAT WE COULD NOT
SET A FIXED DATE FOR DRAFTING, BUT COULD. IDENTIFY GOALS
AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DRAFTING.
DISCUSSION OF THE 1986 CALENDAR FOCUSED ON THE QUESTION
OF AN ENDING DATE. BARRY (U.S.) DREW CONSIDERABLE
SUPPORT BY OBSERVING THAT THIS WAS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL
QUESTION AND ARGUING THAT A SEPTEMBER 19 DATE FOR
SUSPENDING ALL CDE ACTIVITIES WOULD BEST SERVE THE WEST'S
INTERESTS. DELWORTH (CANADA) CONTINUED TO STRESS THE
MORE THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT THAT THE CDE COULD NOT ADJOURN/
SUSPEND UNTIL THERE WAS A CONSENSUS TO DO S0, WHICH IiAY
NOT BE UNTIL NOVEMBER 4. (SEE PARR 7 FOR DELEGATION
COMMENT ON BRUSSELS DISCUSSION ON THE CALENDAR.) END
SUMMARY. ~~
4. THE NNA PAPER: CAUCUS DISCUSSION INITIALLY FOCUSED
ON THE STILL PENDING NNA PAPER (NOW LIKELY TO BE TABLED
AT THE NOVEMBER 15 PLENARY), AND HOW BEST TO HANDLE IT.
ALTHOUGH ITALY AND SPAIN SUGGESTED THAT WE EMBRACE
POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE NNA PAPER, MOST DELEGATIONS
AGREED WITH BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) THAT WE HAD TO AVOID
GIVING THE PAPER THE "RIBS OF DEATH" BY BEING OVERLY
ENTHUSIASTIC (COMMENT; WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO TARE THIS
APPROACH BY SEVERAL NNA INTERLOCUTORS, WHICH, TO TWIST
THE OLD RING CROSBY STANDARD, IS BASICALLY TO "ACCENTUATE
THE NEGATIVE AND ELIIiINATE THE POSITIVE." END COMMENT).
BUWALDA ALSO DREW SUPPOR? WHEN HE OBSERVED THAT THERE
WAS NOT MUCH WE COULD SAY ABOUT THE PAPER AT ALL UNTIL IT
HAD BEEN STUDIED BOTH IN STOCKHOLM AND IN CAPITALS. THE
CHAIR (DENMARK) OBTAINED A CONSENSUS THAT, FOR THE TIME
BEING, THE NATO CAUCUS MEMBERS WOULD WELCOME THE NNA
PAPER BUT CONFINE ITSELF ONLY TO VERY GENERAL POSITIVE
COMMENTS, WHILE FOCUSING ON CONCRETE CRITICISMS AND
CLARIFYING QUESTIONS. IT WAS FURTHEk AGREED THAT THE
RESPECTIVE MINI-CAUCUSES FOR EACH CLUSTER WOULD UNDERTAKE
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE PAPER.
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S. DRAFTING: INTERMINGLED WITH THE DISCUSSION OF THE
NNA PAPER, THE CAUCUS "WETS," LED BY MEVIR (NORWAY), TOOK
THE OCCASION TO PRESS YET AGAIN FOR A PASSAGE TO DRAFTING
IN ALL GROUPS DURING THE LAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS OF THIS
ROUND. THE FRG AND BELGIUK PLAYED A VARIATION OF THE
THEME BY SUGGESTING THAT WE BEGIN DRAFTING IN A GROUP OF
OUR CHOOSING (E.G. OBSERVATION OR NOTIFICATION) USING
SC.1/AMPLIFIED AS THE BASIC TEXT AND TRYING TO FIND
COMMON ELEMENTS THEREIN. MEVIR AND DELWORTH (CANADA),
WHILE EXPRESSING SYMPATHY WITH THIS IDEA IN THE ABSTRACT,
DOUBTED THAT THE EAST WOULD AGREE UNLESS WE SIMULTA-
NEOUSLY STARTED DRAFTING ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF).
BARRY (U.S.) REJECTED THE "WET" APPROACH, STATING THAT IT
WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SET A FIXED TIME WHEN DRAFTING SHOULD
BEGIN, RATHER (BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REFTEL)
HE OUTLINED A NUMBER OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE EXPLORATORY
PHASE AGAINST WHICH THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A TRANSITION
TO DRAFTING COULD BE BE MEASURED. THESE OBJECTIVES
INCLUDED CLARIFYING OUR POSITION ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES
-- E.G., NO REINTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE, NO INCLUSION
OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITES AND NO LINKAGE
BETWEEN PROGRESS ON NUF AND ON CSBM'S. MACRLEY (UK
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 13, 1985
DEPREP), CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE)
SUPPORTED THE U.S. POSITION, WITH CUTILEIRO OBSERVING
THAT IT WAS "PREMATURE" TO SPEAR OF DRAFTING AND
GASCHIGNARD SAYING THAT FRANCE IS PREPARED TO DRAFT "WHEN
WARRAN'~ED," BUT THAT IN ITS VIEW IMPORTANT POINTS WERE
BEING "EXTRACTED" FROM THE EAST IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE.
CITRON (FRG) OBSERVED THAT, WHILE WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO
TALK TOUGH BILATERALLY ABOUT THE EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT
NAVAL AND AIR, WE SHOULD NOT MARE EASTERN ACCEPTANCE A
PRECONDITION FOR DRAFTING IN STOCKHOLM BECAUSE THE
SOVIETS WOULD NEVER DROP IT IN AN EXPLORATORY PHASE.
MEVIR (NORWAY) ASKED BARRY WHETHER HE HAD MEANT THAT
NATO WOULD HAVE TO BE GAIN SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS FROM
THE EAST BEFORE DRAFTING COULD BEGIN. BARRY REPLIED THAT
HE HAD NOT SAID WE HAD TO WIN SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS IN
THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD CERTAINLY TRY
TO DO S0, BUT THAT WE SHOULD MARE EVERY EFFORT TO CLARIFY
OUR POSITIONS ON THE REY ISSUES ?0 AVOID COMPLICATIONS
DOWN THE LINE. DISCUSSION CLOSED WITH THE CHAIR CONCLUD-
ING THAT THERE WAS NO AGREED CONCEPT ON THE TRANSITION TO
DRAFTING.
6. 1986 CALENDAR: ALTHOUGH i:AUCUS CONSENSUS IS STILL
LACKING ON THE 1986 CALENDAR, THERE WAS DISCERNABLE MOVE-
MENT IN OUR DIRECTION, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF
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CANADA. BARRY (U.S.) ARGUED THAT THE IMPORTANT CALENDAR
QUESTION WAS THE ENDING DATE AND 'THAT IN CONSIDERING THIS
ISSUE OUR PRIMARY CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE WHAT BEST
SERVES NATO'S POLITICAL INTERESTS AND NOT SOME THEOLOGI-
CAL EXAMINATION OF THE MANDATE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE
HELSINKI PREPCON. HE CONTENDED THAT AN ENDING DATE PRIOR
TO THE VIENNA PREPCON WOULD PUT THE MOST PRESSURE ON THE
EAST TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON CSBM'S, WHILE
AT THE SAME TIME DEMONSTRATING THE PROPER SUBORDINATION
OF THE CDE TO THE FULL CSCE. BARRY ADDED THA?, IN HIS
CONCEPTION, WE SHOULD FINISH OUR NEGOTIATING WORK AROUND
THE FRENCH CUTOFF DATE OF JULY 18, WITH THE REMAINING
WEEKS TO BE USED FOR TOILETTAGE (I.E., TECHNICAL "CLEAN-
ING UP" OF THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION INTO THE SIX OFFICIAL
CSCE LANGUAGES). GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), WHILE STILL
PRESSING FOR JULY 18, INDICATED THAT HE COULD AGREE TO AN
OP?IONAL SESSION RUNNING TO SEPTEMBER 19 FOR TOILETTAGE,
iF THERE IS a CONSENSUS TO HOLD ONE. ALL OTHERS (WITH
THE EXCEPTION OF CANADA) SEEMED PREPARED TO ACCEPT
SEPTEMBER 19, A? LEAST AS THE ENDING DATE FOR SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS, BUT SOME (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, FRG) WERE
NOT CONVINCED THAT TOILETTAGE COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED IN
OCTOBER. DELWORTH (CANADA), HOWEVER, PERSISTING IN
TARING THE THEOLOGICAL VIEW, AND, ALTHOUGH AGREEING FROM
A POLITICAL VIEWPOINT WITH AN EARLY CUTOFF ? ARGUED THAT
THE RELEVANT TEXTS REQUIRED A CONSENSUS TO END OR SUSPEND
THE CONFERENCE WHICH HE FEARED WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO
OBTAIN FOR ANY DATE PRIOR T_0 NOVEMBER 4. HE ALSO
CONTENDED THAT SEPTEMBER 19 WAS NOT A NATURAL CUTOFF
DATE BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE VIENNA
PREPCON AND CDE. AT BEST, DELWORTH EXPECTED THAT WE
COULD AGREE NOW ON A SCHEDULE THROUGH SEPTEMBER 19 NOW,
BUT WOULD THEN CONTINUE ON A WEER-TO-WEER BASIS UNTIL A
CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN IS ACHIEVED. TARING ISSUE WITH THE
CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, GASCHIGNARD ARGUED THAT THE
CONFERENCE SETS ITS MEETING SCHEDULE BY CONSENSUS, AND
UNLESS THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO CONTINUE PAST SEPTEMBER 19
(OR JULY 18) THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER MEETINGS. GIVEN
THE CANADIAN POSITION, NO CAUCUS POSITION WAS ACHIEVED ON
A CUTOFF DATE. CAUCUS CONSENSUS DOES SEEM TO BE DEVELOP-
ING, HOWEVER, TO BEGIN THE NINTH SESSION ON JANUARY 21,
HOLDING A SINGLE SESSION OF 6-8 WEEKS BEFORE EASTER.
CANADA NOW APPEARS ISOLATED IN SUPPORTING A JANUARY 14
STARTING DATE AND TWO FOUR-WEER SESSIONS BEFORE EASTER.
7. COMMENT; RE USNATO 6481, WE AGREE THAT STOCKHOLM IS
THE PLACE TO RESOLVE THE CALENDAR ISSUE. OUR BO?TOM
LINE IS THAT THE AXE MUST FALL ON SEPTEMBER 19 AND THAT
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 13, 1985
ALL ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE CONSENSUS TO
CONTINUE, NOT CONSENSUS ?0 STOP. THANKS TO MISSIONARY
WORK IN CAPITALS AND BRUSSELS, WE BELIEVE WE CAN
ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL.
BARRY '
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08814
SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF
- FORCE (NUF)
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 4366, B) STOCKHOLM 4334
1. CDE VIII - 019
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A
DANISH REVISED WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF FORCE (SEE
PARR 6). WHILE IT IS AN IMPROVEMENT ON THE ORIGINAL
DANISH DRAFT, ITS FORK AND SOME OF ITS CONTENT WILL
CAUSE US PROBLEMS. OVER THE COMING WEEKS THE DELEGATION
WILL BE OFFERING SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THIS AND OTHER
DRAFTS ON NUF WITH A VIEW TOWARDS DEVELOPING U.S.
STRATEGY ON THE SUBJECT. END SUMMARY.
4. AT THE NATO CAUCUS OF NOVEMBER 13, DANISH AMBASSADOR
MELLBIN DISTRIBUTED THE FOLLOWING REVISED WORKING PAPER
ON NON-USE OF FORCE PREPARED BY THE DANISH FOREIGN
MINISTRY (SEE REFS A AND B FOR ORIGINAL WORKING PAPER).
THIS REVISED PAPER, ACCORDING TO THE DANISH AMBASSADOR,
TARES INTO ACCOUNT COMMENTS ON THE EARLIER DRAFT IN
STOCKHOLM AND AT THE BONN BRAINSTORMING SESSION. WHILE
THE DANES STATE THAT THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THIS
DRAFT "ONLY EXEMPLIFY POSSIBLE METHODS FOR SOLVING OUR
(NUF) PROBLEM," THEY CLEARLY REFLECT WHAT DENMARK COULD
ACCEPT IN A CONCLUDING DOCtTMENT.
5. IT SHOULD FIRS?' BE NO'!'ED THAT THE REVISED DRAFT IS
AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE JUNE 1985 DRAFT. FOR EXAMPLE,
IT HAS DELETED EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCE" AND
IMPLICI? REFERENCE TO THE BONN DECLARATION. NEVERTHE-
LESS, THE DRAFT, INTER ALIA, STILL IS DIVIDED IN A
PREAMUULAR AND AN OPERATIVE PART AND CONTAINS OUT-OF-
CONTEXT LANGUAGE FROM THE UN'S DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION
(RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX). WHILE THE REVISED PAPER HAS BEEN
WHITTLED DOWN TO THREE PAGES, IT STILL IS ALMOST AS LONG
AS, AND IN SOME CASES WORSE THAN, THE NNA TEXT ON NON-USE
OF FORCE (SEE SEPTEL). OTHERS, MOREOVER, ARE SOON TO
ENTER THE CROWDED NUF FIELD; THE CANADIANS HAVE ALREADY
CIRCULATED THEIR NUF PAPER IN WASHINGTON AND THE ITALIANS
TELL US THEY, T00, ARE ABOUT TO ENTER THE FRAY WITH A
LONG PAPER. FORTUNATELY -- AND SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY --
WORD OF EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THESE DRAFT TEXTS HAS NOT
LEAKED OUT BEYOND THE CAUCUS TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOW-
LEDGE. IN ADDITION, THE CAUCUS HAS MAINTAINED ADMIRABLE
UNITY IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS AROUND A MINIMALIST
NUF POSITION BASICALLY FORMULATED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION.
HOWEVER, SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE CLEARLY CHAMPING AT THE
BIT. OVER THE COMING WEEKS DELEGATION WILL BE OFFERING
SORE OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THE NNA WORKING PAPER AND OTHER
NUF DRAFTS WITH A VIEW TOWARDS DEVELOPING U.S. STRATEGY
ON THE SUBJECT. WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THE NNA, DANISH,
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6. BEGIN TEXT DANISH REVISED WORKING PAPER:
REVISED WORKING PAPER
CONSIDERATION OF THE CONTENTS OF SOME ELEMENTS FOR A
TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
IN A WORKING PAPER OF 10TH JUNE 1985, THE DANISH DELEGA-
TION PUT FORWARD SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EXPEDIENCY
OF ELABORATING, WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, A TEXT ON THE NON-
USE OF FORCE, AS A POSI?ION PAPER REFLEC?ING A CONSENSUS
VIEW IN THE ALLIANCE AND FOR POSSIBLE USE AS GUIDANCE TO
DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM WHEN THEY HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE
SOVIET PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLE NNA TEXTS ON THIS ISSUE IN
'THE WORKING GROUP CONCERNID.
FOLLOWING DISCUSSION IN THE NATO CAUCUS IN STOCKHOLM AND
A DISCUSSION IN PRINCIPLE DURING THE INFORMAL BONN MEET-
ING OF HEADS OF CDE DELEGATIONS, WE FEEL ZT EXPEDIENT TO
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF
OFFER A REVISED VERSION OF OUR WORKING PAPER FOR RENEWED
CONSIDERATION BY ALLIES.
THIS REVISED VERSION SERVES THE SANE PURPOSE AS THE FIRST
ONE: IT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CLARIFYING THE POSITIONS OF
THE ALLIANCE WITH A VIEW TO DECIDING HOW TO PURSUE THE
ISSUE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
IT IS NOT SUGGESTED THAT THE TEXT SHOULD AT THIS STAGE BE
DISCUSSED WITH OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS REVISED
TEXT IS SEEN SOLELY AS A MEANS FOR THE ALLIANCE TO REFINE
ITS POSITIONS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE QUES?ION AND, IF
POSSIBLE, TO DISCUSS, ONE BY ONE, THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS
WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED IN A COMPROMISE TEXT, OR FOR THAT
MATTER, IN A WESTERN WORKING PAPER, TO BE TABLED AT THE
CONFERENCE AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT.
WE SHARE THE VIEW PUT FORWARD AT THE BONN MEETING THAT
THE ALLIES SHOULD NOW CONCENTRATE ON AGREEING ON A LIST
OF POSSIBLE ELEMENTS WHICH, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, OUGHT
TO BE INCLUDED IN A WESTERN POSITION PAPER.
WE HAVE RECONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE STRUC-
TURE OF SUCH A DOCUMENT AND HAVE COME OUT IN FAVOR OF
RETAINING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN a PREAMBULAR PART AND AN
OPERATIVE PART. THIS SERVES THE PRACTICAL PURPOSES OF
IDENTIFYING AND DISCUSSING ALL POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR
INCLUSION IN A TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. THIS DOES
NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT ALL THESE ELEMENTS SHOULD BE
RETAINED.
THE FORMA? OF THE PRESENT TEXT REPRESENTS ONE OF SEVERAL
POSSIBILITIES. THE TEX1` SHOULD THEREFORE BE TAKEN ONLY
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AS EXEMPLIFYING POSSIBLE METHODS FOR SOLVING OUR PROBLEM.
WE ARE NOT AMONG THOSE WHO WOULD FA-"7R AN EXPRESS
REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE V ON THE PEA :FUL SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES. IN ?HE MADRID DOCUMENT, THERE IS NO EXPRESS
REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE II AS SUCH, BUT ONLY TO "THE DUTY
OF STATES ?0 REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE."
AN EXPRESS REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE V COULD THEREFORE LEAD
TO GIVING EMPHASIS TO SOME OF THE PRINCIPLES AT THE
EXPENSE OF OTHERS, AND TO OPENING THE POSSIBILITY THAT
OTHER PRINCIPLES ARE BROUGHT INTO PLAY, WHICH, IN TURN,
COULD BLUR THE ALREADY COMPLICATED ISSUE OF THE NON-USE
OF FORCE.
BELOW FOLLOWS THE NEW DRAFT TEXT:
ELEMENTS FOR A TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE TO BE CONSIDERED,
AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE ALLIES WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING
THEIR POSI?IONS DURING THEIR INFORMAL CONTACTS AT THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
I. PREAMBULAR ELEMENTS
1) THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRM THEIR COMMON
ADHERENCE TO.THE TEN PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN THE DECLARA-
TION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPAT-
ING STATES CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE IN CON-
FORMITY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
2) THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION
TO RESPEC? AND APPLY EACH OF THESE PRINCIPLES IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS AND TO CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL
OTHER STATES IN THE SPIRIT OF THE SAID PRINCIPLES.
3) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE FURTHERMORE DETERMINED
TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG
THEM AND THUS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE
AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.
4) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THAT IN THE CONCLUD-
ING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING THEY
HAVE AGREED TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF
CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MARE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHEN-
ING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT,
SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES
TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS.
S) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO REINFORCE
THE RELEVANT COMMITMENTS IN THE FINAL ACT CONCERNING THIS
DUTY OF STATES.
II. OPERATIVE ELEMENTS
1) THE OPERATING STATES SOLEMNLY DECLARE THAT THEY WILL
REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR
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INTERNA?IONAL RELATIONS IN GENCRAL, FROM ANY ACTS CONSTI-
TUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR A DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF
FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STA?E OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCON-
SISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS
STIPULATED IN THE CHARTER AND WITH THE DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES.
2) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE RESOLVED THAT NO
CONSIDERATION OF WHATEVER NATURE, WHETHER POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, MILI?ARY OR OTHERWISE, MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE
TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED COMMITMENTS.
3) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE AGREED THA? THE USE OF
FORCE BY A PARTICIPATING STATE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
CHARTER OF T$E UNITED NATIONS AND THE COMMITMENTS OF THE
FINAL ACT WILL CONSTITUTE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
AGGRESSION.
4) THE PARTICIPA?ING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT A SET OF
CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
COMPRISING THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, ?HE
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THE
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ANb
THE VERIFICATION OF THESE MEASURES ARE PARTICULARLY WELL
SUITED TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE ABOVE
MENTIONED DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR
USr OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS.
5) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE THEREFORE DETERMINED TO
GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THAT DUTY OF STATES BY
ADOPTING THE FOLLOWING SET OF CONCRETE, MUTUALLY COIiPLE-
MENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTA?ION IN
EUROPE:
COMIiENTARY
THE ABOVE TEXT REFLECTS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DISCUSSION
SO FAR IN THE ALLIANCE ON THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF
FORCE. THE TEXT TARES INTO ACCOUNT TAE PREFERENCE OF
SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT WE SHOULD BASE OURSELVES ON
TEXTUAL ELEMENTS RATHER THAN ON A CONSOLIDATED TEXT. FOR
PRACTICAL PURPOSES, THE ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN DIVIDED INTO A
PREAMBULAR PART AND AN OPERATIVE PART. APPLYING THE
"BUILDING BLOCK"-METHOD FAVORED BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS,
IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION ON SOME
ELEMENTS AND LEAVE OUT OTHERS WHEN CONSIDERING THE
WESTERN APPROACH.
SEVERAL OPTIONS FOR EXPRESSING REAFFIRMATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE ARE STILL POSSIBLE, SUCH AS A CHAPTER OF THE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, A
PREAMBULAR TEXT, A CHAIRMAN'S S?ATEMENT OR A SEPARATE
DOCUMENT, PERHAPS DESIGNATED AS A DECLARATION.
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I. COMMENTS ON THE PREAMBULAR ELEMENTS
RE PARR I.1: IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL VIEW THAT
THERE IS NO NEED TO REAFFIRM THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF
NATIONS, NO REFERENCE TO A REAFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHTS
AND DUTICS OF STATES UNDER THE CHARTER IS RETAINED. THE
AIM OF THIS PARAGRAPH IS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT ANY TEXT
ON TEE NON-USE OF FORCE IS SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
VALIDITY AND CO-EQUAL STATUS OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF
TEE FINAL ACT DECALOGUE. ONLY A BACKGROUND REFERENCE IS
MADE TO THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
RE PARR I.2: THIS PARR CONTAINS A MORE SPECIFIC
REAFFIRMATION OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES. TEE AIM IS TO
STATE THAT EACH OF THE PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE APPLIED ERGA
OMNES AND COVERED IN ITS GLOBAL ASPEC?S. IN THIS WAY A
GENERAL CONTEXT IS ESTABLISHED, WITHIN WHICH THE NUF IS
PERCEIVED IN ITS PROPER PERSPECTIVE.
RE PARR I.3: BASED ON PARR 1 AND 2 OF THE PREAMBLE TO
THE CBM DOCUMENT OF THE FINAL ACT. THE AIM IS TO REFLECT
THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN THE FINAL, ACT AND THE PROSPECTIVE
RESULTS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
RE PARR I.4: BASED ON THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE
MADRID MEETING, MANDATE FOR TAE CDE. THE AIM IS TO
QUOTE TEE MANDATE AS SPECIFICALLY AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER
TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING AND RETAIN A STRICT
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONCEPT OF NON-USE OF FORCE.
RE PARR I.S: THIS PARR REFLEC'S THE UNDERLYING OBJECTIVE
OF REINFORCING THE ALREADY EXISTING NUF COMMITMENTS. IT
IS AIMED AT STATING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS OF
PARTICIPATING STATES TO REINFORCE THESE COMMITMENTS.
II. COMMEN?S ON THE OPERATIVE ELEMENTS
RE PARR II.1: THIS PARR IS INTENDED AS THE MAIN OPERA-
TIVE DECLARATION, RESTATING A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE
OF NON-USE OF FORCE PER SE AND IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. THE
TEXT REFLECTS, AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE, THE WORKING OF
PRINCIPLE II OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.
WE HAVE DULY TAKEN THE POINT THAT THE QUESTION OF THE USE
OR THREAT OF ARMED FORCE IS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF ,THE NUF
PRINCIPLE, AND HAVE, ACCORDINGLY, DELETED A SPECIFIC
REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCE." BUT IN THE MADRID IiANDATE
NUF IS DISCUSSED IN THE PARTICULAR CONTEXT OF CSBM'S
WHICH ARE MAINLY THOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY
MEASURES. WE SEE SOME DIFFICULTY IN OMITTING ANY
REFERENCE TO THE ASPECT OF ARMED FORCE, BECAUSE A LINK
BETWEEN THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND THE CSBM'S MUST BE
ESTABLISHED IN SOME WAY.
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THE CONCEPT, PUT FORWARD IN THE BONN DECLARATION, OF THE
OVERALL NON-FIRST USE OF WEAPONS AS OPPOSED TO THE NON-
FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NOT INCLUDED, BUT MIGHT
BE RESERVED FOR POSSIBLE USE AT A STAGE WHERE THE WARSAW
PACT COUNTRIES ONCE AGAIN WILL BE PUSHING THEIR IDEA OF
THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
RE PARA II.2: UASED ON THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX, AR? 5, PARA 1, ON THE
DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION. THE PARR HAS BEEN ADAPTED TO
REFLECT CLOSER THE WORDING OF THAT RESOLUTION.
RE PARA II.3: WE CONSIDER IT PREFERABLE TO INCLUDE A
REFERENCE TO AGGRESSION WHICH IS A PAR?ICULARLY IMPORTANT
ASPECT OF THE USE OF FORCE. THIS PARA IS AN ADAPTATION
OF THE TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
3314/XXIX, AR? 2, STILL TARING INTO ACCOUNT THE POLITICAL
NATURE OF CSCE COMMITMENTS. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE
WOULD BE A RISK INVOLVED IN INTRODUCING HERE THE
EXPRESSION "FIRST USE," AS IT COULD BE USED AS A LEVER BY
THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. ACCORDINGLY, THIS PARR IS
PHRASED SO AS TO AVOID ANY REFERENCE TO "FIRST USE" EVEN
THOUGH RESOLUTION 3314/XXIX CONTAINS SUCH A REFERENCE.
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: REVISED DANISH WORKING PAPER ON NON-USE OF
RE PARA II.4: THIS PARA IS INTENDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
ESTABLISHING A CLOSE LINK BETWEEN THE CONCRETE
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES PROPOSED IN
DOC SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND THE OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. THE TEXT RESTATES AS CLOSELY
AS POSSIBLE THE CONTENTS OF THE MANDATE FOR THE CDE IN
THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING.
RE PARA II.S: THIS PARR WHICH ALSO REFLECTS THE MADRID
MANDATE, IS INTENDED AS A PIVOTAL PARR, REFLECTING AND
ESTABLISHING THE INHERENT CONNECTION BETWEEN A TEXT ON
THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE AND THE CONCRETE CSBM'S TO BE
FURTHER DEVELOPED IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS OF E.G. A
PROSPECTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMCNT OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE. THE COLON IS INTENDED FOR LINKING THE NUF
PRINCIPLE, AS STATED ABOVE, TO THE CONCRETE CSBM'S AS A
GENERAL QUALIFICATION.
END TEXT.
BARRY
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08762
SUBJECT: USDEL CDE AMBASSADOR'S CHATHAM HOUSE PROGRAM
REF: CURTIN/ORLEY TELCONS
1. CDE VIII -020
2. AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD USDEL CDE, WILL
SPEAR A? CHATHAM HOUSE (LONDON) ON "THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND US-EUROPEAN SECURITY
RELATIONS" ON FEBRUARY 4, L986. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION AT THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES
INSTITUTE IS ALSO POSSIBLE. TRAVEL DETAILS WILL FOLLOW
SEPTEL. WE WILL REQUEST EMBASSY ASSISTANCE WITH GROUND
TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS.
3. FOLLOWING IS BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON AMBASSADOR
BARRY:
ROBERT L. BARRY WAS NAMED U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY- AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN
SEPTEMBER 1985. THE STOCKHOLM-BASED CONFERENCE, WHICH
INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES OF 33 EUROPEAN NA?IONS, THE
U.S. AND CANADA, WAS MANDATED BY THE MADRID REVIEW
CONFERENCE ON SECURI?Y AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE IN 1983
FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON MEASURES TO INCREASE
STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.
AMBASSADOR BARRY, A CAREER IiINISTER IN THE U.S. FOREIGN
SERVICE, WAS THE FIRST JOHN SLOAN DIC1iEY FELLOW IN
RESIDENCE AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE IN 1984-1985. HE WAS
ALSO DISTINGUISHED VISITOR AT THE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCED STUDY OF THE USSR AT COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY.
IN MORE THAN 20 YEARS IN THE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE,
AMBASSADOR BARRY HAS SPECIALIZED IN EAST-WEST RELA?IONS
AND UN AFFAIRS.
FROM 1981 UNTIL JULY 1984, HE WAS THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
BULGARIA. PRIOR TO THAT, HE WAS DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS WITH
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE FROM
1979-1981.
AMBASSADOR BARRY DEAL? WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE
ON ASSIGNMENTS AS VICE-CONSUL IN ZAGREB, YUGOSLAVIA
(1963-1965), SECOND SECRETARY A? THE U.S. EMBASSY IN
MOSCOW (1968-1970), AND DEPUTY PRINCIPAL OFFICER AT THE
U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN LENINGRAD (1971-1973). IN
WASHINGTON, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF SOVIET
AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1965-1967) AND AS
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THAT OFFICE (1975-1977). HE DIRECTED
U.S. BROADCASTING TO THE SOVIET UNION IN 1973-1975 AS
CHIEF OF THE USSR DIVISION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA.
AMBASSADOR BARRY SERVED AT THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN IN
1970-1971; HE WAS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF UN PGLITICAL
AFFAIRS IN WASHINGTON IN 1977-78 AND THEN DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE BUREAU OF
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS OF THE STATE
DEPARTMENT.
HE RECEIVED A BACHELOR'S DEGREE SUMMA CUM LAUDE FROM
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE IN 1956 AND AN K.A. DEGREE FROM
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY'S PROGRAM ON EAST CENTRAL EUROPE IN
1960. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE US ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE
AT GARMISCH-PARTENRIRCHEN, F.R.G., AND ATTENDED ORFORD
UNIVERSITY, ENGLAND. FROM 1957-1960 HE WAS AN OFFICER
IN THE U.S. NAVY ASSIGNED TO ATLANTIC FLEET DESTROYERS.
AMBASSADOR BARRY IS MARRIED TO THE FORMER MARGARET CRIM;
THEY HAVE TWO CHILDREN; THEIR HOME IS IN RINDGE, NEW
HAMPSHIRE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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CONF IDENTIAL STOCRHOLM08788
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOVEMBER 15, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 022
2. C - ENTIRE. TEXT
3. BEGIN .SUMMARY: AT THE NOVEMBER 15 PLENARY, CYPRUS
INTRODUCED THE ELABORATED POSITION PAPER (SC.7) OF THE
NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES. THE GDR, ITALY, AND
IRELAND WELCOMED THE TABLING OF SC.7. ROMANIA OUTLINED
ITS VIEWS ON CONSTRAIN? (LIMITATION) MEASURES AND
VERIFICATION. END SUMMARY.
4. READING FROM THE TEXT OF THE ELABORATED NNA PAPER
(SC.7), AMBASSADOR PAPADOPOULUS (CYPRUS) INTRODUCED THE
DOCUMENT ON BEHALF OF CYPRUS, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA,
SWEDEN, FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA, AND MALTA. HE STRESSED
THAT NOTHING IN THE FORMAT OF THE DOCUMENT -- INCLUDING
THE ORDER OF EACH SECTION -- INDICATES A PRIORITY OF
IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECTS INCLUDED. (FULL TEXT OF SC.7
SENT SEPTEL.)
5? THE GDR, ITALY, AND IRELAND WELCOMED THE DOCUMENT AS
A POSITIVE STEP IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. NONE OF
THE INITIAL REACTIONS TOUCHED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
DOCUMENT.
6. AMBASSADOR CETERCHI (ROMANIA) OUTLINED HIS DELEGA-
TION'S VIEWS ON CONSTRAINT (LIMITATION) MEASURES:
-- I? IS NECESSARY TO AGREE IN CDE TO LIMIT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN TERMS OF THE NUMERICP.L STRENGTH AND
DURATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES.
-- ACTIVITIES COVERED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDARS SHOULD
NOT EXCEED A CERTAIN NUMBER OF DIVISIONS AND NUMBERS OF
TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT.
-- ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED ON SHORT NOTICE NOT COVERED BY
THE ANNUAL- CALENDAR SHOULD BE LIMITED IN NUMBER OF
TROOPS, EQUIPMENT AND DIVISIONS TO A STRENGT$ OF ONE
HALF OF TBEIR RESPECTIVE PARAMETERS FOR ACTIVITIES
NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
-- THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED ANNUALLY SHOULD
BE LIMITED TO A NUMBER TO BE AGREED UPON.
-- MANEUVERS SHOULD NOT BE CONDUCTED CLOSE IN SPACE AND
TIME. RESTRAINT SHOULD BE SHOWN IN CONDUCTING MANEUVERS
CLOSE TO "NATIONAL FRONTIERS."
-- THE ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO ASSERTED THAT ADEQUATE
VERIFICATION MUST BE PROVIDED FOR EACH MEASURE AGREED
UPON. IN THIS CONTERT, VERIFICATION SHOULD CONSIST OF
SEVERAL ELEMENTS: 1) OBSERVATION TO VERIFY THE NON-
THLtEATENING NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY AND THE PARAMETERS
ESTABLISHED FOR THE ACTIVITY; 2) NATIONAL TECHNICAL
MEANS; 3) COMMUNICA?ION LINKS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMA-
TION, INCLUDING ESTABLISHMENT OF TELEX LINKS FOR .RAPID
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, AN EXCHANGE OF MILITARY DELEGATIONS,
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:.ND AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF REGULATIONS ON ACCRIDITID
MILITARY PERSONNEL; 4) PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATIONS; AND
S) "SPECIAL MISSIONS" TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS IN CASES OF
SERIOUS DOUBTS, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN CLEARID UP BY OTHER
KERNS.
7. AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO (ITALY) OUTLINED THE QUES?IONS
HE BELIEVES MUST BE RESOLVID IN EACH AREA OF NEGO?IATION
PRIOR TO THE START OF DRAFTING;
-- NOTIFICATION: THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EXCLUDES
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING
SEA AND AIR SPACE; THUS, REOPENING THIS QUESTION IS "YET
ANOTHER BURDEN" TO REACHING AGREEMENT. THE OUT-OF-
GARRISON AND STRUCTURAL PARAMETER PROPOSID BY THE WEST
REMAINS THE MOST SIIiPLE AND VIABLE APPROACH.
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOVEMBER 15, 1985
-- OBSERVATION: DEFINING ACTIVITIES WHICH MUST BE
NOTIFIID IS NOT RELEVANT TO DEFINE THE FEATURES OF AN
OBSERVATION REGI?iE. THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF OBSERVATION
AND THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION SHOULD NOT BE HELD
HOSTAGE TO WHAT ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED.
-- VERIFICATION: ON-SITE INSPECTION IS THE QUALITATIVE
LEAP FORWARD NECESSARY FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.
-- CONSTRAINING MEASURES: ANNUAL CALENDARS ENJOY A
BROAD CONSENSUS, AND SHOULD INCLUDE ALL ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. THEREFORE, THE STRUCTURE AND
FEATURES OF ANNUAL CALENDARS SHOULD BE DISCUSSID. OTHER
CONSTRAINTS WILL BE EXAMINID "IF BALANCID."
-- NUF REAFFIRMATION: A NUF REAFFIRMATION IS ONLY
VALID TO THE EXTENT IN THE CONTERT OF AGREEMENT ON
CONCRETE CSBM'S. THE EAST SHOULD GIVE UP ITS "PARALLEL
APPROACH" TO NEGOTIATION OF NUF AND CONCRETE CSBM'S.
BARRY
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C'0 N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08782
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
PROPOSAL IN PLENARY, NOVEMBER 1S, 1985 (SC.7)
REF: S?OCRHOLM 8083
1. CDE-VIII - 023.
2. (C) SUMMARY. THE LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT
HAS FINALLY COKE TO AN END FOR THE NNA WITH THE
?ABLING IN PLENARY ON NOVEMBER 1S OF A COMPREHENSIVE
PROPOSAL. REACHING AGREEMENT AMONGST THEMSELVES
HAS BEEN A STRUGGLE WHICH, NO DOUBT, HAS BEEN GOOD
PRACTICE FOR THE DAYS AHEAD AS THEY ARE CALLED UPON
TO EXPLAIN AND DEFEND THEIR PROPOSAL WHICH MAY
NOT BE EASY AS THEY MAY HAVE DIFFICULTY
SPEARING WITH ONE VOICE; THEY OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT THERE ARE STILL DIFFERENCES IN THE GROUP.
IN ORDER TO GET ALL BUT ONE ON BOARD (LIECHTENSTEIN
REP WAS NO? AVAILABLE FOR FINAL CONSULTATIONS),
THE PROPOSAL HAS CHANGED SOMEWHAT FROM THAT REPORTED,
IN GENERAL TERMS, AT THE END OF ROUND SEVEN (REF
A). CHANGES OF IN?EREST AND FULL ?EXT ARE PROVIDED
BELOW. MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS FOLLOWS SEPTEL.
END SUMMARY.
3. (C) LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT. AFTER MANY
MEETINGS -- DAY, NIGHT, WEEKENDS -- COUPLED WITH
THREATS AND CAJOLING, THE NNA ,FINALLY REACHED
AGREEMENT ON THEIR PACKAGE OF CSBMS LATE WEDNESDAY,
NOVEMBER 13 AND TABLED THE PROPOSAL IN PLENARY
NOVEMBER 15 (SEE PLENARY CABLE SEPTEL.) IT IS CO-
SPONSORED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRIA, CYPRUS,
FINLAND, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND,
AND YUGOSLAVIA. LIECHTENSTEIN WILL, NO DOUBT,
COME ON BOARD, BUT REP WAS UNAVAILABLE DURING FINAL
CONSULTATIONS. THE PAPER HAS UNDERGONE SOME CHANGES
SINCE U.S. DEL REPORTED ON ITS PROBABLE FRAMEWORK
A? THE END OF ROUND SEVEN (REF A). CHANGES OF NO?E
ARE INDICATED BELOW, ALONG WITH RATIONALE. THEY
HAD A DIFFICULT TIME REACHING AGREEMENT AND OPENLY
ACKNOWLEDGE THA? THEY HAVE JUST PAPERED OVER
DIFFERENCES ON SOME SENSITIVE ISSUES. WE HAVE
HEARD THAT THEY HAVE YET TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE
THE PROPOSAL IN WORKING GROUPS. IN THE NNA'S PRESS
CONFERENCE FOLLOWING THE PLENARY, NNA AMBASSADOR'S
FIELDED QUESTIONS ON ISSUES OF NATIONAL INTEREST,
AT TIMES INDICATING THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED WERE
NATIONAL VIEWS -- NOT A GROUP VIEW. U.S. DEL'S
ANALYSIS FOLLOWS SEPTEL.
4? (C) CHANGES OF NOTE.
--PROPOSAL NO LONGER SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES PROVISION
OF INFORMATION ON UNITS PARTICIPATING IN A MANEUVER
"BY ORGANIZATIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS," DUE
TO YUGOSLAV RELUCTANCE TO SPECIFY NORMAL PEACETIME
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LOCATIONS. INSTEAD, IN PARR 4.1 OF "GENERAL
INFORMATION" SUB-CHAPTER OF "PRIOR NOTIFICATION"
SECTION AND PARR 9 OF THE "ANNUAL CALENDAR" SECTION,
IT TRIES TO FINESSE THE PROBLEM BY CALLING FOR
PROVISION OF "ADDITIONAL RELEVAN? INFORMATION TO BE
DEFINED ON THE UNITS PARTICIPA?ING IN NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES."
--FOR THE SAME REASON, THE REFERENCES IN THE DOCUMENT
TO "PEACETIME LOCATIONS" OR "SPECIFIED NORMAL
PEACETIME LOCATIONS" HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO READ
SIMPLY "NORMAL LOCATIONS." (WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER,
THAT A DEAL WAS STRUCK AMONG THE NNA THAT ANY
WISHING TO DO SO COULD EXPRESS THEIR INTEREST IN
AND ASK FOR INFORMATION ON "PEACETIME LOCATIONS" AS
LONG AS NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE TERM
"NORMAL LOCATIONS" OR TO THE AFOREMENTIONED PARRS
4.1 OR 9.)
--THE DEFINITION OF MANEUVERS HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
REWORKED BECAUSE OF FINNISH INSISTENCE THAT THE
CONCEPT OF "MOVEMENTS" BE MAINTAINED ALONG WITH
"MANEUVERS," OSTENSIBLY TO PRESERVE CONCEPTS SET
OUT IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THUS, RATHER THAN
REFERRING TO "RELOCATION OF SUCH FORMATIONS" IN
TH$ CONTEXT OF A "COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISE," IT
NOW REFERS TO "MOVEMENTS OF SUCH FORMATIONS" (SEE
FIRST PARR OF "PRIOR NOTIFICATION" SECTION). THE
DEFINITION OF "MOVEMENTS" AS "RELOCATIONS" NOT IN
CONJUNC?ION WITH "COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES" HAS
BEEN DELETED.
-- IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE "DIVISION" DEFINITION
A? "2-5" VICE "3-5" UNITS (WHICH THE FINNS HAD FOUGHT
FOR), THE FOLLOWING TWO CHANGES WERE MADE:
1. THE TRIGGERING MECHANISM FOR NOTIFICATION HAS
BEEN SOMEWHAT REVISED. WHILE MAINTAINING THE
STRUCTURAL PARAMETER OF A DIVISION AS ONE OF THE
CRITERIA TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION, A SPECIFIC
REFERENCE TO A NUMERICAL PARAMETER HAS ALSO BEEN
INCLUDED AS ANOTHER ELEMENT TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION,
WITH USE OF THE CONJUNCTION "OR."
2. A "DIVISION" IS NOW DEFINED AS EITHER "A MOBILE
MILITARY UNIT, ETC." OR REPEAT OR "ANY OTHER GROUP OF
FORCES OF EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY."
--THE SECTION ENTITLED "NOTIFICATION" HAS BEEN
RETITLED TO SPECIFIY PRECISELY WHAT IT ADDRcSSES,
I.E. "NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED
OUT AT SHORT NOTICE."
371
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--THE CONSTRAINTS SECTION NOW COVERS "NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITES," RATHER THAN "NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
MANEUVERS." AS THiS WAS A LAS? MINUTE MALTESE
PROPOSAL, WE QUESTION WHEETHER THE INTENT OF THE
CHANGE WAS TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A VEHICLE BY WHICH
TO JUSTIFY INCLUSION AT A LATER DATE OF A CONSTRAINT
ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
--IN THE "NON-USE OF FORCE" SECTION AN ADDITIONAL
SENTENCE HAS BEEN ADDED, WE ASSUME BY MALTA, WHICH
REFERS TO THE "INTERRELATION BETWEEN SECURITY IN
EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN."
S. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF PROPOSAL.
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRIA,
CYPRUS, FINLAND, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN,
SWITZERLAND, YUGOSLAVIA.
THE ABOVE-MENTIONED STATES,
RENEWING THEIR COMMITMENT TO DOCUMENT CSCE/SC.3,
EXPRESSING THEIR WISH TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FURTHER
PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE,
SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING:
------------------------------
PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
-----------------------------
THE PARTICIPATING S?AYES WILL GIVE PRIOR NOTIFICATION
TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF MILITARY
MANOEUVRES, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, I.E.
- THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE
THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED BELOW OUTSIDE THEIR
NORMAL LOCATIONS IN COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES AND
- MOVEMENTS OF SUCH FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL BETWEEN THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS AND THE
EXERCISE AREAS AS WELL AS BETWEEN THE AREAS OF TAE
DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE EXERCISES.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARH, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
SUCH MANOUVRES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION,
WHENEVER THEY INVOLVE AT LEAST
- NUMERICAL TOTALS (S) - TO BE DEFINED - OF FORCES
PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY AS A WHOLE, EMPHASIZING
MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER OR
- ONE DIVISION OR EQUIVALENT FORMATION (ASTERISK 1) OR
(ASTERISK 1) FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAE AGREEMENT A
DIVISION OR EQUIVALENT FORMATION IS DEFINED AS
- A MOBILE MILITARY UNIT STRUCTURED, PERMANENTLY OR
TEMPORARILY, UNDER ONE COMMAND IN HEADQUARTERS,
COMBAT AND SUPPORT zLEMENTS OR
- ANY OTHER GROUP OF FORCES OR EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY
CONTAINING 2-S UNITS ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL WITH
372
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A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST X TROOPS AND Y TANKS/ARMOURED
FIGHTING VEHICLES/HELICOPTERS OR A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT
LEAST Z TANKS/ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES/HELICOPTERS.
(END ASTERISK 1)
- THREE AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE, AIR-MOBILE UNITS
ON BATTALION LEVEL OR COMBINATIONS THEREOF AND A
TOTAL NUMBER OF XX TROOPS OR A TOTAL NUMBER OF RX
TROOPS AND A TOTAL OF YY SQUARE METRES OF SHIPBORNE
LOADING CAPACITY.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING
STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THESE MANOEUVRES TARE
PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO BE GIVEN BY STATES
PARTICPATING IN THESE MANOEUVRES WHENEVER THEIR
PARTICIPATION REACHES NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN 42 DAYS OR MORE IN
ADVANCE OF THE START OF THESE MILITARY MANOEUVRES
IN A STANDARDIZED FORMAT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:
1. GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1. TYPE AND DESIGNATION OF THE ACTIVITY
1.2. MAIN PURPOSES
1.3. TIIiEFRAME OF THE ACTIVITY
1.4. AREA OF THE ACTIVITY
1.5. LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE
ACTIVI?Y
1.6. PARTICIPATING S?AYES
1.7. NUMBER AND TYPES OF PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS OR
EQUIVALENT FORMA?IONS OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES
1.8. NUMBER AND TYPES OF PARTICIPATING AMPHIBIOUS,
AIRBORNE AND AIR-MOBILE BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS
1.9. NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ACTIVITY AND THE NUMBER
OF TROOPS OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE
2. INFORMATION ON PARITICPATING UNITS
2.1. NUMBER, TYPES, AND, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, NAMES OF
UNITS OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE INVOLVED IN THE
ACTIVITY, DOWN TO AND INCLUDING
- BRIGADE AND/OR REGIMENT LEVEL; EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF
GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES
- BATTALION LEVEL IN CASE OF AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJEC?: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
AIR-MOBILE UNITS
2.2. NUMERICAL STRENGTH (MANPOWER) OF
- DIRECTING STAFF, INCLUDING UMPIRES
- EACH MAJuK UNIT
- DIVISIONAL LEVEL OR ABOVE
- BATTALION LEVEL IN CASE OF AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE
373
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AND AIR-MOBILE UNITS
2.3. NUMBER AND/OR TYPE OF THE FOLLOWING (ASTERISK 2):
- TANKS
- OTHER ARMOURED FIGH?ING VEHICLES
- RIVER CROSSING AND OTHER TYPES OF HEAVY ASSAULT
ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT
- LOGISTIC ASSAULT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
- SELFPROPELLED ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS
(MORE THAN 100 MM)
- OTHER ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (MORE
THAN 100 MM), AS WELL AS MOBILE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE
LAUNCHERS
- HEAVY LIVE AMMUNITION
- COMBAT AIRCRAFT
- COMBAT HELICOPTERS
- TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
- TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS
- NAVAL COMBATANTS
- LANDING CRAFTS
- AMPHIBIOUS. VESSELS, INCLUDING SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY
- AUxILIARY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS, INCLUDING SHIPBORNE
LOADING CAPACITY
(ASTERISK 2) LEVEL OF DETAIL TO BE DEFINED. (END
ASTERISK 2)
3. INFORMATION ON DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION
3.1. THE STARTING AND FINISHING DATES OF THE MOVEMENTS
OF FORCES INVOLVED, WHENEVER THEY REACH NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL, AS WELL AS THE PERIOD OF ABSENCE FROM THEIR
NORMAL LOCATIONS
3.2. DURATION OF EACH PHASE, TACTICAL PURPOSE AND
CORRESPONDING GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS, INCLUDING STAGING
AREAS, AND FINAL POSITIONS BEFORE RETURNING TO THEIR
NORMAL LOCATIONS
4. OTHER INFORMATION
4.1. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION TO BE DEFINED ON
THE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.
4.2. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES AND ADDITIONS TO THE ANNUAL
CALENDAR(ASTERISR 3) AS WELL AS REASONS FOR SUCH CHANGES
~4.3. RELATION TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
4.4. STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME
--------------------------
ANNUAL CALENDAR OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
-----------------------
THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL TRANSMIT TO ALL OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES THE CALENDAR OF THEIR MILITARY
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SECRET
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ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND PLANNED
FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR BEGINNING ON THE SUBSEQUENT
JANUARY 1ST. THIS ANNUAL CALENDAR WILL BE TRANSMITTED
EVERY YEAR, NO? LATER THAN OCTOBER 1ST, IN A STANDARD-
IZED FOR;iAT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING T_NFORMATION:
1. TYPE OF ACTIVITY
2. MAIN PURPOSES
3. TIMEFRAME OF THE ACTIVITY WITH ENVISAGED STARTING
AND FINISHING DATES
4. AREA OF THE ACTIVITY
S. LEVEL OF COIQiAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE
ACTIVITY
6. STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY
7. NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS OR
EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS OF GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES
8. NUMBER AND TYPES OF THE PARTICIPATING AMPHIBIOUS,
AIRBORNE AND AIR-MOBILE UNITS
9. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION TO BE DEFINED ON
THE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NO?IFIABLE ACTIVITIES
10. NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ACTIVITY IN TERMS OF
MANPOWER AS WELL AS THE NUMBER OF TROOPS OF EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE
(ASTERISK 3) SEE PAGE 6 ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL
(END ASTERISK 3)'
INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT
TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION
THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM
ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY MANOEUVRES
SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS SET OUT BELOW.
1. THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WILL BE EXTENDED
SIMULTANfiOUSLY WITH THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF THE
MILITARY ACTIVITY.
2. IN ADDITION TO THE BASIC INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY, GIVEN IN THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION, THE
INVITATION WILL SPECIFY
- STATE RESPONSIBILE FOR THE OBSERVATION PROGRAI4iE
- THE PERIOD OF OBSERVa?ION
- THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS INVITED PER PARTICIPA?ING STATE
- THE LANGUAGES USED IN INTERPRETATION AND TRANSLATION
DURING THE OBSERVATION.
THE DEADLINE FOR ACCEPTING THE INVITATION WILL BE 21 DAYS
BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION. IF NO REPLY IS
GIVEN IN TIME, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS
WILL BE SENT.
3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE SENT NOT LATER
THAN 14 DAYS BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION TO
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
375
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL,/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
THOSE STATES WHICH HAVE ACCEPTED THE INVITATION OR
WHICH REQUEST SUCH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. THE
INFORMA?ION WILL INCLUDE
- BASIC SITUATION AND ?LAIN PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY
- MAPS OF THE AREA OF ACTIVITY WITH A SCALE TO BE SPECIFIED
- GENERAL PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OBSERVERS
- AUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT FOR THE OBSERVERS
' GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME
4. AT LATEST WHEN THE OBSERVATION BEGINS INFORMATION
WILL BE GIVEN TO THE OBSERVERS ON THE
- DE?AILED OBSERVATION PROGRAMME
- DIRECTING STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OBSERVATION
- DETAILS OF PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.
S. THE OBSERVATION WILL COVER THE DURATION OF THE
ACTIVITY, AS NOTIFIED, WHENEVER IT REACHES THE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL, DURING PHASES TO BE DEFINED.
6. THE INVITATION WILL BE VALID FOR AT LEAST ONE
OBSERVER FROM EACH PARTICIPATING STATE; IN CASE OF
LARGER SCALE ACTIVITIES AT LEAST TWO OBSERVERS WILL BE
INVITED. IN THE CASE OF PARTICULARLY LARGE ACTIVITIES
AN EVER HIGHER NUMBER OF OBSERVERS COULD BE ENVISAGED.
7. WHILE THE OBSERVERS ARE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE
STATE WHERE THE ACTIVITY TARES PLACE, THEIR PERSONS
AND PROPERTY, AS WELL AS THEIR LIVING QUARTERS, WILL
BE GRANTED THE SAKE PRIVILEGES AND IMKUNITIES AS
THOSE ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON`DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
8. THE INVITED STATE DECIDES WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY
AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS.
9. OBSERVERS FROM ALL PTHER PARTICIPATING STATES BEFORE THE START
OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH REGARD TO POSSI-
BILITIES TO SUPPLEMENT THE OBSERVATION PROGR.4I~SE IN
ORDER TO MEET PARTICULAR CONCERNS EXPRESSED.
16. THE INVITING STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN
THE AREA OF AC?IVITIES. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE
RELEVAN? INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE INVITING STATE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISION SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.
THE INVITING STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT
OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS
FORTIFICATIONS OR SIMILAR DEFENCE SITES.
17. OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OFPORTUNITY TO
COMI'iUNICATE WITH THEIR LASSIES AND/OR WITH THEIR
HOME AUTHORITIES.
18. THE INVITING STATE WILL COVER THE COSTS OF BOARD
AND LODGING DURING THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME.
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
CARRIED OUT AT SHOR NOTICE
376
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1. THE PAR?ICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO
ALL OTHER PAR?ICIPATING STATES OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES
AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHICH
ARE CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHENEVER THEY REACH
NOTIFABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2.
2. THE PARTICIPATING S?AYES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO
ALL OTHER PARTICIPA?ING STATES OF SUCH MILITARY
MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT IN CONJUNCTION WITH COMBA?-
RELATED EXERCISES, OF MILITARY FORMA?IONS AT OR ABOVE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO AND FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS/STAGING
AREAS, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHENEVER THEY REACH
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2.
3. NOTIFICA?ION WILL~BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPA?ING
STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THESE MANOEUVRES AND
MOVEMENTS ?ARE PLACE AS WELL AS BY THOSE STATES
CARRYING THEM OUT. NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO BE GIVEN
BY STATES PARTICIPATING IN THESE ?MANOEUVRES AND
MOVEMENTS WHENEVER THEIR PARTICIPA?ION REACHES
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
4. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO THE START OF THESE MANOEUVRES
AND MOVEMENTS IN A STANDARDIZED FORMAT CONTAINING
INFORMATION AS OUTLINED UNDER THE SECTION ON PRIOR
NOTIFICATION WITH EXCEPTIONS TO BE DEFINED.
S. T'HE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS
FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY
MANOEUVRES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHEN THE
DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL
EXCEEDS ... HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS TO BE
ELABORATED.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
COMMANDERS AND TROOPS
- TO BE BRIEFED ON UNIT LEVELS, TO BE DEFINED, BY
COMMANDERS OR MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFF
- TO BE PROVIDED WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING THEIR
APPROXIMATE POSITION, GEOGRAPHICALLY AND IN RELATION
TO UNITS REFERRED TO IN EARLIER BRIEFINGS.
THEY WILL BE PROVIDED WITH APPROPRIATE MEANS OF
TRANSPORTATION.
15. THE INVITING STATE WILL ALSO CONSIDER REQUESTS
MADE BY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES BEFORE THE START
OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH REGARD TO POSSI-
BILITIES TO SUPPLEMENT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME IN
377
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ORDER TO MEET PARTICULAR CONCERNS EXPRESSED.
16. THE INVITING STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN
THE AREA OF ACTIVITIES. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE
RELEVANT INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE INVITING STATE IN
ACCORDiMICE WITH THE PROVISION SET OU? IN THIS DOCUMENT.
THE INVI?ING STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT
OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS
FORTIFICATIONS OR SIMILAR DEFENCE SITES.
17. OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
COI~UNICATE WITH THEIR EMBASSIES AND/OR WITH THEIR
HOME AUTHORITIES.
18. THE INVITING STATE WILL COVER THE COSTS OF BOARD
AND LODGING DURING THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMlSE.
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
CARRIED OUT AT SHOR NOTICE
1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO
ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES
AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHICH
ARE CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHENEVER THEY REACH
NOTIFABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2.
2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION TO
ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF SUCH MILITARY
MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT IN CONJUNCTION WIT$ COMBAT-
RELATED EXERCISES, OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AT OR ABOVE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO AND FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS/STAGING
AREAS, COVERED BY THE MANDATE, WHENEVER THEY REACH
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AS DEFINED ON PAGE 2.
3. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING
STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THESE MANOEUVRES AND
MOVEMENTS TAKE PLACE AS {,TELL AS BY THOSE STATES
CARRYING THEM OUT. NOTIFICATION WILL ALSO BE GIVEN
BY STATES PARTICIPATING IN THESE MANOEUVRES AND
MOVEMENTS WHENEVER THEIR PARTICIPATION REACHES
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
4. NOTIFICA?ION WILL BE GIVEN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO THE START OF THESE MANOEUVRES
AND MOVEMENTS IN A STANDARDIZED FORMAT CONTAINING
INFORMATION AS OUTLINED UNDER THE SECTION ON PRIOR
NOTIFICATION WITH EXCEPTIONS TO BE DEFINED.
5. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS
FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY
MANOEUVRES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE, WHEN THE
DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY AT OR ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL
EXCEEDS ... HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS TO BE
ELABORATED.
------------------
CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
FROM USDEL CDE
378
SECRET
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GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING
CONSTRAINTS ON THE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES
REFERRED TO IN THIS SECTION.
2. NO INDIVIDUAL MILITARY MANOEUVRE WILL EXCEED FIVE
TIMES~TSE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AND ITS DURATION AT OR
ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL WILL NO? EXCEED 17 DAYS.
3. THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMI? ON THEIR OWN
TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICPATE IN MORE THAN A
TOTAL OF FIVE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY HANEUVRES PER
CALENDAR YEAR WHICH ARE OF A SItE LESS THAN TWO TIMES
THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL: MOREOVER, THE STATES WILL
NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT
OR PARTICIPATE (AS?FRISK 4) IN A TOTAL OF MORE THAN
ONE SUCH MANOEUVRE AT THE SAME TIME.
HOWEVER, IF SUCH MANOEUVRES ARE NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL
CALENDAR BY THE STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THEY TARE
PLACE AS WELL AS BY. THOSE STATES CARRYING THEM OUT,
THE TOTAL NUMBER PER CALENDAR YEAR AND THE NUMBER OF
SUCH MANOEUVRES TARING PLACE AT THE SANE TIME WILL
NOT BE RESTRICTED.
4. THE STA?ES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN
TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE (ASTERISK 4)
IN MORE THAN A TOTAL OF FIVE MILITARY MANOEUVRES PER
CALENDAR YEAR, WHICH ARE OF A SIZE OF TWO TIMES THE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL OR ABOVE. SUCH MANOEUVRES WILL BE
NOTIFIED ALREADY IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BY THE STATES
ON WHOSE TERRITORY THEY TARE PLACE AS WELL AS BY
THOSE STATES CARRYING ?HEM OUT.
THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY
NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE (ASTERISK 4) IN A TOTAL
OF MORE THAN TWO SUCH MANOEUVRES AT THE SAME TIME.
HOWEVER, ONCE A YEAR TWO SUCH MANOEUVRES MAY BE
COMBINED BUT NOT EXCEED A TOTAL OF SEVEN TIMES THE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
(ASTERISK 4) TO BE DEFINED. (END ASTERISK 4)
OBSERVA?ION UPON REQUEST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
A PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH CONSIDERS THAT ITS NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT STARE OR THAT THE CON?INUED
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT IS SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED
BECAUSE OF SPECIFIC CIRCUIiSTANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE
PRECEDING SECTIONS, WILL BE ENTITLED TO REQUEST TO
SEND OBSERVERS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ON VERY
SHORT NOTICE. THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE
STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITIES OR PRESUMED
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ACTIVITIES ARE CARRIED OUT. IT WILL DEFINE THE
REQUESTED OBSERVATION AREA AND CITE THE RELEVANT
MEASURES ON WHICH THE REQUEST IS BASED AS WELL AS
STA?E THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST.
THE STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL,
WITHIN TWELVE HOURS AFTER RECEIVING THE REQUEST,
INVITE THE REQUESTING STATE TO CARRY OUT THE
OBSERVATION. THE MODALITIES AND GUIDELINES FOR SUCH
OBSERVATION, INCLUDING EXCEPTIONS WHICH APPLY TO
RESTRICTED AREAS, WILL BE DEFINED.
IF OBSERVERS FROM A THIRD STATE TARE PART, THEY WILL
PARTICIPATE IN THE WHOLE OBSERVATION TOGETHER WITH
THE OBSERVERS FROM THE REQUESTING STATE, AND BE PROVIDED
WITH THE SAME FACILITIES.
AFTER A REQUESTED OBSERVATION HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT,
T$E REQUESTING STATE, THE INVITING STATE AS WELL AS
THE INVITED THIRD STATE, WILL EACH SUBMIT A REPORT TO
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES WITHIN ... HOURS UPON
COMPLETION OF THE OBSERVATION.
THE REQUEST AND THE ANSWER THERETO AS WELL AS THE
REPORTS ON THE OBSERVATION WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE FOLLOWING
SECTION.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION
AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THE MEASURES
TO BE ADOPTED
---------------------------------------
1. GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR COMMUNICATION
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL TRANSMIT ALL COMMUNICATIONS
FORESEEN IN THE PRECEDING SECTIONS TO ALL OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES.
SUCH COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE TRANSMITTED IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE MODALITIES FOR RAPID COMMUNICATIONS SET OUT
BELOW.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES CAN ALSO MARE USE OF THE
RAPID COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AND
REQUEST CLARIFICATION AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS
WELL AS IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE VIEWS CONCERNING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IN THE PRECEDING
SECTIONS.
2. MODALITIES FOR RAPID COMMUNICATIONS
IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE
TRANSMITTED WITHOUT DELAY AND AT ALL TIMES, THE
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL KEEP TELECOMMUNICATION
LINES ACCESSIBLE BETWEEN THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES
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OF THE PARTICIATING STATES FOR TRANSMITTING AND
RECEIVING PRINTED TEXT, CHARTS AND MAPS.
ACCESS TO ALL SUCH COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE RESTRICTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSCE PRACTICE.
CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHORT MEETINGS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES, IN RELATION TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IN THE PRECEDING
SECTIONS, SHOULD ALSO BE ENVISAGED.
SUCH MEETINGS COULD BE CONVENED
- ON AN AD HOC BASIS, AT THE REQUEST OF ANY PARTICI-
PATING STA?E, TO DEAL WITH EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS
- AT INTERVALS AND DATES TO BE DECIDED BY THE
PARTICIPATING STATES, TO PROCEED TO AN EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS ON THE ROUTINE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES
NON-USE OF FORCE
THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO
TAE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED
AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS,
AND TAUS TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY
AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY
CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
IN TAE WORLD AS A WHOLE. TREY ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF
TAE INTERRELATION BETWEEN SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A
WHOLE, AND SECURI?Y IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA.
ALL TAE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN TAE FINAL ACT ARE OF
PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, WILL ALL BE
EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING
INTERPRETED TARING INTO ACCOUNT TAE OTHERS. RESPECT
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - TAE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
FOR THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NORMAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE PROGRESS OF
CO-OPERATION AMONG TAE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL
FIELDS.
TAE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE CONSCIOUS OF TAE
COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY
ASPECTS OF SECURITY WITHIN TAE CSCE._
TREY STRESS THAT TAE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE
T$REA? OR USE OF FORCE IS A UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED
OBLIGATION IN INTERNA?IONAL LAW, BINDING ALL STATES,
AND THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH IT CONSEQUENTLY
CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
TREY REAFFIRM TIiEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPEC? THIS
PRINCIPLE, CONTAINED IN TAE FINAL ACT, SO AS ?0 ENSURE
THAT, AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, IT IS STRICTLY
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AND EFFECTIVELY OBSERVED. NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE
INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR
USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL
AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL,
' FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF
ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE FINAL
ACT, AND, ACCORDINGLY,
- FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE,. DIRECT OR INDIRECT,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY STATE TO RENOUNCE
THE FULL EXERCISE OF I?S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS,
REGARDLESS OF THIS STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT
THEY MAINTAIN WITH THIS STATE RELA?IONS OF ALLIANCE.
NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS
LEGAL.
?HE PARTICIPATING STATES S?RESS THEIR FIRM COMMITMENT
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS
AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO
REFRAIN FROM. THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. THEY
REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY
PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE EXISTING OR ARISING BETWEEN
THEM. THEY ALSO EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO
REINFORCE, IMPROVE AND DEVELOP THE METHODS AT THEZR
DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPU?ES.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THE UNIVERSAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS,
THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE
CSCE-PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS
AND CO-OPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT THEY WILL
REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES OR TO SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ACTIVITIES
DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME OF
ANOTHER PARTICIATING STATE. THEY EXPRESS THEIR
DETERMINATION TO TARE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE
PREVENTION AND SUPRESSION OF ACTS OF ?ERRORISM AND
WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING
THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE'
PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON T.~iEIR
TERRITORIES ILLEGAL AC?IVITIES OF PERSONS, GROU:?S AND
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCQ; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE - THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED TABLE
ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN
THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRQRISM.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY
DECLARE, THAT THEIR E%ISTING .INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS,
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT
DOCUMENT.
THEY CONFIRM ?HAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
UNDER T$E CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR
OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL
PREVAIL.
THE PAR?ICIPATING STATES ARE CONVINCED, THAT THE
SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THE EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE
LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EVERY PARTICIPATING
STATE REQUIRE DETERMINED EFFORTS BY ALL OF THEM TO
BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDEDICE, LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION,
STRENGTHEN SECURITY FOR ALL AND PROMOTE DISARMAMENT.
BY THEIR VERY NATURE CONCRETE CSBMS SERVE TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
SECRET
S T A T E M E N T
BY DR ~'vDRESTINOS N. ?APADOPOULOS
HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF CY?aUS TO THE STOCRHO],M
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- Ar'0 SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARN.A ~lr'A1T IN EUROPE
15 NOVEMBEQ 1985
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on behalf of the Delegations of Austria, Cyprus. Tinland, Malta,
San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia I have the honour
to present a proposal, the text of which is now beinc* circulated
by the Secretariat and which will later be distributed as
document CSCE/SC.7.
the above - mentioned countries renew their commitment to document
CSCE/SC.3 submitted on March 9th, 1984, in which they presented a
proposal which reflected their common view of the task of the
Conference during its first stage.
Since then the sponsors, during the work of the Conference in
plenary and in working group sessions, have commented and discussed
their ideas and concepts with the intention of presentinq,at an
appropriate moment, a more detailed version of their original
proposal, with a view to furthering the work of the Conference.
The proposal now being introduces contains the following sections:
The section on "Prior notificatl_cn of military activities"
foresees that prior notifi?atior will be given, 42 days in advance,
to all other participating States of military manoeuvres, covered
by the mandate, i.e.
- the engagement of military formations at or above the notifiable
level outside their normal locations in combat-related exercises
-~~ ~
and
- movements of such formations at or above the notifiable level
between their normal locations and the exercise areas as well as
between the areas of the different phases of the exercises.
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Such manoeuvres will be subject to prior notification,
whenever they involve at lea:.t
- numerical total(s) - to ba Eafined - of forces participating
in the activity as whop, em}-tasizinq mobility and firepower
or
- one division or equivalent formation or
- three amphibious, airborne; air-mobile units o:z battalion
level or combinations therao~ and s total number of xx troops
or a total number of xx troops and a total of yy square
metres of shipborne loading capacity.
sor the purpose of the agreement a division or e~~ivalent
formation is defined as
- a aobile military unit structured, permanently or temporarily,
under one command in headquarters, combat and su>>port elements
or
- any other group of forces of equivalent capability
containing T-S units on brigade/regiment level w~.th a total
number of at least x troops and y tanks/armoured fighting
vehicles/helicopters or a total number of at lea~:t z tanks/
armoured fighting vehicles helicopters.
Psior notification will be g'?ven in a standardized format
containing detailed informat~cn specified in our proposal.
!!r. Chairman,
I would like to draw atteati~~:, to the fact that these parameters
for prior notification also ~:onstitute the notifiable level
for all activities covered i:~ other sections of this proposal.
Mr. Chairman,
according to the subsequent section'"Annual caleniar of
military activities", the participating States wil emit
every year, not later than October 1st,- to all otter participating
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States the calendar of their military activities subject
to prior notification and planned for the next calendar year
beginning on the subsequent Januazy 1st. The annual calendars
will, in a standardized format, contain information as specified
in our proposal.
The next section deals with tht 'Invitation of observers to
military activities subject to prior notification". Ne propose
that the participating States invite observers from all other
participating States to militu y manoeuvres subject to prior
notification. The invitation will be extended simultaneously
with the prior notification.
This section contains detailed provisions on the information
to be gives to the observers as to the purpose, the basic
situation and the progress o! the activity. This information
and the working conditions laid down in the propo:al should
enable them to evaluate whether the activities are carried
out in conformity with the prior notification and whether they
are non-threatening in nature.
J-ccordiaq to the next section "Notification and observation
-~~~~~~
of military activities carried out at short notice" the
participating States will give notification of military manoeuvres,
which are carried out at short notice.
The participating States will also give notification of such
military movements which are not in conjunction with combat-
related exercises, of military formations at or above notifiable
level to sad from normal locations/staging areas, covered by
the mandate. whenever they read notifiable level.
Notification will be given at tae earliest possible opportunity
prior to the start of these manoeuvres and movements.
? 387
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The sponsors propose that the participating States invite
observers from all other participating States to military
manoeuvres carried out at short notice, when the duration
of the activity at oz above notifiable lwel axcads a
certain number of hours, in accordance with provisions to
be elaborated.
In the next section concerning "Constraints on certain
military activities" we propose that no individua litary
manoeuvre will exceed five times the notifiable le~~el and
that its duration at or above notifiable lwal will not exceed
17 days.
Furthermore, States will neither permit on Chair rnnz territory
nor carry out or participate in, more than a total isf five
notifiable military manoeuvres per calendar year wlsich are of
a siz? less than two times the' notifiable lwelf ex~raover,
the States will neither permit ~~n their own territory nor carry
out or participate in a total ~f more than one such manoeuvre
at the same time. However, if such manoeuvres are notified in
the annual calendar the total number per calendar bear and the
number of such manoeuvres taking place at the same time will
not be restricted.
The States will neither permit on their own territory nor
carry out or participate in more than a total of five military
manoeuvres per calendar year, which era of a size cf two times
the notifiable level or above. Such manoeuvres will be notified
already in the annual calendar. The 3tatas will neither permit
on their owns territory nor carry out or participate in a total
of more than two such manoeuvres at the same time. However,
once a year two such manoeuvres may be combined but not exceed
a total of seven times the notifiable level.
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The section "Observation upon raauest of militarv activities"
states the general condition: and outlines the aodalitiss
for a participating State to request to send, on very short
notice, observers to another ;~articipatinq State. J1s the
CSCE process takes place out3ide military alliances, the
requested State will in addition invite observers from a
third participating State wi?:h Mich it does not maintain
relations of military allian~:e. _
The request, and the answer thereto, as well as the reports
on the observation will be transmitted in accordance with
the procedures for rapid communications.
The section "!-rranaements for dealing with information,
notification and rapid exchange of views with regard to the
measures to be adopted" outlines the modalities for using
telecommunication lines between the par'ticipatinq States
for the rapid transmission of communications foreseen in
the preceding sections.
In the section on 'Consultative arrangements" the sponsors
propose that arrangements be envisaged for short meetings
of representatives of all the participating States, in
relation to the implementation of the measures contained
in the preceding sections. ?
- on an ad hoc basis, at the request of any participating
State, to deal with axceptio;~l situations
- at intervals and dates to ~a decided by the participating
States, to proceed to an excZange of views on the routine
implementation of the measures.
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The section on the "Non-use of force" contains an
elaboration on this principle.
=t is stressed that the principle of refraining from the
lbreat or use of force is a universally recognised o:oligation
is international law, binding all States, and that n~~n-
eompliance with it consequently constitutes a violation of
international law.
The sponsors are also convinced that the situation i? Europe
and the equ:1 respect for the 1e43timate security in~:erests
of every participating State regLire determined efforts by
all participating States to build mutual confidence, lessen
military confrontation, strengthen security for all ~md
promote disarmament.
Ne believe that by their very nature concrete CSBMs ~;erve
to give effect and expression to the duty of States i:o
refrain from the threat or use of force.
Likewise, we recall that the peaceful settlement of c.isputea
is an essential complement to the non-use of force.
Mr. Chairman. ..
this completes the presentation of the general contents of
our proposal. Sponsors will later individually take up various
questions in more detail.
Mr. Chairman,
the countries sponsoring this proposal also wish to stress
that nothing in its format, including the order of the
sections, is intended as indicat..aq any relative priority
or importance.
1111ow me to recall that our lirs~: proposal SC.3 advocates
that the negotiations in Stockho':m should aim at timely and
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.SECRET
substantial progress in order to provide the Vienna
CSCE Follow-up Meeting with sut~icient new elesents whoa
considering the question of supplementing the present
mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence-
and Security-building Measures and Disarmament In Europe
in order to deal also with disarmament.
It is our hope and wish that today's proposal contributes
to such progress and to the successful outcome of this
Conference.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08860
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEE?INGS,
NOVEMBER 11-15, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 29
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN CDE WORKING GROUPS FOR THE WEER
OF NOVEMBER 11-15 THE EAST CONCENTRATED ITS FIRE ON
ALLEGED WESTERN FOOTTHtAGGING IN DISCUSSING TE[: NON-USE
OF FORCE (NUF) AND ON THE INCLUSION OF INDEPE~dDEN? NAVAL
AND AIR ACTIVITIES. IN CONTRAST, NATO SPEAKERS FOCUSED
ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, SLICE[ AS THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH,
AND TRIED TO MINIKIZE DISCUSSION OF THE NAVAL AND AIR
ISSUE. THE NNA, ENTIRELY FOCUSED ON FINALIZI]tG ITS LONG
AWAITED PAPER, WAS SILENT ALL WEER. FOR THE ]'UTURE,
NATO WILL DEVELOP NEW ARGUMENTS BASED ON SC.1 TO PROMOTE
THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND
WILL ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE ALLIANCE COORDINA?ION FURTHER.
WE ANTICIPATE NO CHANGE IN EASTERN TACTICS. FIND SUMMARY.
4. EAST: IN CDE WORKING GROUP MEE?INGS FOR 7HE WEEK OF
NOVEMBER 11-15, THE EAST FOCUSED ON TWO MAJOR THEMES:
ALLEGED WESTERN FOOTDRAGGING IN DISCUSSING THE'NON-USE
OF FORCE (NUF); AND THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND
NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CSBM'S. GRINEVSRY (USSR) OPENED THE
FOOTDRAGGING THEME IN THE NOVEMBER 11 MEETING OF WORKING
GROUT' AB, AND THE SAME LINE WAS PURSUED IN THE NUF
CLUSTER AS THE SOVIETS TRIED TO PAIN? THE WEST AS
STALLING ON NUF, NOT LIVING UP TO TAE OCTOBER 14
GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT AND (WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO
TAE U.S.) ABANDONING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DUBLIN AND
STRASBOURG PLEDGES TO DISCUSS THE NON-USE OF FARCE
PRINCIPLE IN PARALLEL WITH CSBM'S. HOWEVER, AS THE WEER
DEVELOPED SOVIET STATEMENTS SEEMED TO REFLECT THAT TREY
WERE NOT SEEKING SIMPLE PARALLELISM, BUT DOUBL:: LINKAGE,
TYING PROGRESS ON NUF TO PROGRESS ON CSBM'S AN1) PROGRESS
ON CONCRETE CSBM'S TO THE INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL
AND AIR ACTIVITIES. THE EAST HAMMERED ON INDEPENDENT
NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN ALL WORKING GROUPS EXCEPT
NON-USE OF FORCE, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS IN "HE
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION GROUPS. THEIR OB.fECTIVE
WAS CLEARLY TO ELICIT SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIE;~ UNDER
THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WHICH THEY COULD THEN itSE TO
JUSTIFY SEPARATE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION CAF AIR AND
NAVAL ACTIVITIES WE[ETAER INDEPENDENT OR COMBINED WITH
GROUND ACTIVITIES.
S. THE EAST ALSO EMPLOYID THE THEME OF WESTERr
FOOTDRAGGING IN THE CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS WORKING
GROUP, ACCUSING THE WEST OF DISTORTING THE OCTOBER 14
GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT BY REJECTING CEILINGS. IN THE NUF
GROUP, THE VARIATION WAS THAT THE WEST HAD "VIOLATED"
THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT BY ENGAGING IN A PHILOSOPHICAL
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DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER NUF WAS A CSBM. THE
EAST TRIED -- UNSUCCESSFULLY -- TO MARE USE OF THE
STATEMENT BY FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER IN SUPPORT OF
"CONCRETIZATION" OF NUF TO DRAW THE FRG INTO DEFINING
SPECIFIC TYPES OF FORCE TO BE BANNED. ?HE FRG, HOWEVER,
WAS PREPARED FOR THE EASTERN ASSAULT AND EXPLAINED ?HAT
GENSCHER'S STATEMENT HAD REFERRED TO ?HE NEED FOR
CONCRETE CSBM'S, NO? FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PRINCIPLE. IN A WEAR ATTEMPT TO BUTTRESS THE EAST'S
CASE THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION IS A CSBM, HUNGARY ARGUED
THAT IT MET THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION OF THE MADRID
MANDATE SINCE NON-COMPLIANCE WOULD BE AN ILLEGAL ACT
AGAINST ANOTHER STATE OR GROUP OF S?AYES. IT DID NOT
TARE MUCH IMAGINATION TO SEE WHAT SOLUTION THIS EASTERN
ASSERTION HAS IN MIND: CONSULTATIONS WHICH A THREATENED
STATE COULD CONVOKE.
6. THE EAST CONTINUED TO INTERPRET THE GENTLEMEN'S
AGREEMENT AS LIMITING THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION TO
NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES AND TO REJECT NATO'S INFORMATION
MEASURE AS A SEPARATE MEASURE.
7. NATO: NATO TACTICS FOR THE WEER WERE TO FOCUS
DISCUSSION ON WESTERN PROPOSALS ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
SUCH AS THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION, AND
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
THE BASIC MODALITIES OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME (I.E., ALL
SHOULD UE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES), WHILE
TRYING TO AVOID ADDRESSING THE AIR AND NAVAL ISSUE. AS
THE LATTER OFTEN SEEMED TO BE THE ONLY ISSUE WHICH THE
SOVIETS WOULD SERIOUSLY ADDRESS, DISCUSSION WAS NOT
PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVE. WHERE AND WHEN NATO TACTICS
WORKED, THE ALLIANCE MET WITH SOME SUCCESS IN
DEMONSTRATING THAT THE EAST WAS NOT PREPARED TO
NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY EVEN ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, SUCH AS
THE CONTENT OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND THE OBLIGATORY
NATURE OF OBSERVATION. HOWEVER, WHEN THE EAST MANAGED
TO TURN THE DISCUSSION TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES,
ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE WAS SPOTTY AT BEST.
8. THE WEER STARTED OUT WELL IN THE NOVEMBER 12
NOTIFICATION GROUP WITH HANSEN (U.S.) AND OTHER NATO
SPEAKERS MAKING THE CASE THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE
NOTIFICATIONS OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH THAN IN THE CORRESPONDING WTO
PROPOSALS. OUT PROBLEMS DEVELOPED IN THE
INFORMATION/VERFICATION AND COMMMUNICATIONS CLUSTER AND
IN THE OBSERVATION GROUP WHEN THE FRENCH MILITARY
ADVISOR (MERIC) STATED FRANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS
WHAT INFORMATION NATO WOULD PROVIDE UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH AND ACCEPTED MORE LIBERAL OBSERVATION OF
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FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THE
FRENCH (WHO ARE CLEARLY OUT IN FRONT OF THE ALLIANCE ON
THIS ISSUE) WERE ROUNDLY CRITICIZED IN CAUCUS
POST-MORTEMS FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE ON THE NAV,~I. AND AIR
ISSUE, BUT THE SITUATION HAS BROUGHT A POTENT::ALLY
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM TO THE ALLIANCE'S ATTENTION-- NATO
IS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN ANY DETAIL INFOI:MATION TO
BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATION OR IN THE OBSERVATION
BRIEFING OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER TH1;
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.
9. THE WES? HAD MORE SUCCESS IN THE NUF GROUF WHERE,
UNDER SOVIET ATTACK FOR FOOTDRAGGING, SEEMINGLY
FORTHCOMING WESTERN RESPONSES SUPPORTING A NUF
REAFFIRMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A SET OF CSBM'S SEEMED
TO THROW THE EAST OFF BALANCE.
10. THE NNA: THE NNA, WHICH WAS IN THE FINAL THROES OF
PUTTING ITS LONG AWAITED PAPER INTO FINAL FORM, WAS
SILENT ALL WEER. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY OUR NNA
CONTAC?S, THAT THEY MAY BE NO MORE VOCAL THIS +iEER
(NOVEMBER 18-22), AS THE DELICATE INTERNAL COMPROMISES
REQUIRED TO GET FINAL APPROVAL OF THEIR PAPER 'TIGHT NOT
WITHSTAND A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THEIR VARI)US
PROPOSALS. IN LIGHT OF THIS WE HAVE BEEN ASRE:~ BY OUR
NNA FRIENDS NOT TO PROBE T00 DEEPLY T00 SOON I:~iTO THE
INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THEIR PAPER.
11. THE FUTURE; ANTICIPATING NO LETUP IN EASTERN
PRESSURE ON NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, THE NAT!) CAUCUS
HAS 'TASKED THE MINI-CAUCUSES FOR THE NOTIFICATON AND
OBSERVA?ION GROUPS 'TO PRODUCE NEW ARGUMENTS, B~-SED ON
SC.1, TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF THE FUNCTIONAL ~?PPROACH.
AS SEVERAL CAUCUS MEMBERS, LED BY FRANCE AND TF[E
NETHERLANDS, FEEL THAT SC.1 HAS TO BE FURTHER IiEVELOPED
IN THIS AREA, THE MINI-CAUCUSES WILL ALSO CONS]DER
POSSIBLE QUESTIONS TO BE POSED TO CAPITALS AND TO
BRUSSELS THAT WOULD GO BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN
SC.1. TURKEY, ON THE OTHER HAND, BELIEVES THAI FOR NOW
WE SHOULD STICK WITH SC. 1 AS TABLED AND THAT TO BE MORE
FORTHCOMING AT THIS TIME AMOUNTS TO A NET SOVIET GAIN
WITHOUT THEIR HAVING TO NEGOTIATE FOR IT OR TO OFFER A
QUID PRO QUO. IN THE INTERIM, THE ALLIANCE WILL
CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON OUR OWN PROPOSALS AND MAKE
EVERY EFFORT TO LIMIT DISCUSSION OF AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. ALSO, IN RESPONSE TO WIDESPREAD ALLIED
CRITICISM, INCREASED EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO COO:tDINATE
ALLIANCE INTERVENTIONS AND TO AVOID PROBLEMS EX:?ERIENCED
IN THE PAST WEER WHEN T00 MANY WESTERN SPEAKERS WANTED
THE FLOOR AND T00 OFTEN STRAYED OFF THE AGREED 'THEME,
CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EAST TO SEIZE THI:
AGENDA. ON NUF, THE WEST WILL CONCENTRATE ON D:[SCUSSING
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
394
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TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARR, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
A NUF REAFFIRMATION IN THE CONTEX? OF NEGOTIATION OF A
COMPLETE SET OF CSBM'S. SOME WESTERN DELEGATIONS (E.G.
ITALY, NETHERLANDS, DENMARK), HOWEVER, BELIEVE WE MUST
SOON GO BEYOND THIS MINIMALIST POSITION AND BEGIN TO
DISCUSS, AMONG OURSELVES AT FIRST, WHA? NUF LANGUAGE WE
COULD EVENTUALLY ACCEPT. WITH REGARD TO THE NNA PAPER,
IT IS NOW BEING STUDIED, AND, FOR THE TIME BEING, THE
WEST WILL CONFINE I?SELF TO CLARIFYING QUESTIONS
COMPARING THE PAPER WITH OUR OWN PROPOSAL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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C 0 N?F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08881
SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL
(SC. 7)
REF: STOCRHLM 08782
1. CDE VIII - 030.
2. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEX?.)
3. SUMMARY. THIS CABLE CONTAINS U.S. DEL CD.s'S
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF TAE RECENTLY TABLED
NNA PROPOSAL, SC.7, AS WELL AS INFORMATION ON NNA
ATTITUDES. THE TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF THE NUF 1~ORTION
OF THE NNA PAPER IS CONTAINED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.
4. A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME. REGRESSION itND
PURPOSEFUL AMBIGUITY. THE NNA ROSE DOES NOT ;iMELL
AS SWEET AS IT DID WHILE BUDDING. THIS IS TFT~;
INEVITABLE, HOWEVER UNFORTUNATE, OUTCOME OF NrfA
BARGAINING AMONG THEMSELVES IN ORDER TO SECURE; A
PROPOSAL ALL COULD ENDORSE, ALBEIT WITH VARYIrG
DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM. OF PARTICULAR NOTE IS THE
FACT THAT THE PROPOSAL IS BUILT AROUND A PURPCSEFUL
AMBIGUITY - IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT THE NNA ATTITUDE IS
TOWARDS THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (THE AMBIGUITY REFLECTS
A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THOSE WHO LIRE IT AND THOSE WHO
DON'T). THE PROPOSAL IS AMBIGUOUS ON THE QUES2ION
OF WHETHER INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES ARE
TO BE COVERED. THIS AMBIGUITY, OF COURSE, AFFECTS
TAE INTERPRETATION OF A VARIETY OF THE PROPOSALS
INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE. WHILE OPTICALLY EMPLOYING
TAE STRUCTURAL TffitESAOLD OF A DIVISION, A CLOS1'sR
READING REVEALS THAT TAE REAL OPERATIVE TARESHI)LD
APPEARS TO BE A NUMERICAL ONE, AS TROOP NUMBER;i ARE
A REY COMPONENT IN THE DIVISIONAL DEFINITION. ON
OBSERVATION THE NNA SAY THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS :~AOULD
BE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES -- BUT IT IS
UNCLEAR WHETHER THE ACTIVITY WILL BE OBSERVED FROM
? START TO FINISH.. IT CONTAINS A CONSTRAINT MEASURE
THAT IS UNBALANCED AND COULD~LIMIT NATO AND U.:.
MILITARY PRACTICES, BUT NOT THE WTO'S. THE VERIFICA-
TION MEASURE ("OBSERVATION BY REQUEST") CONTAINS A
RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND PROVIDES FOR THIRD (NNA) PARTY
PARTICIPATION IN ANY INSPEC?ION (OBSERVATION).
5. WHAT'S IN A NAME? TAE NNA HAVE INTENTIONALLY
REFRAINED FROM LABELING TAE VARIOUS PROVISIONS IN
SC.7 AS "MEASURES," IN ORDER TO AVOID WHAT TREY
PERCEIVED TO BE A TRAP SC.1 CO-SPONSORS HAVE FALLEN
INTO THROUGH USE OF THAT TERM. TAE MADRID MAND,~ITE
CALLS FOR MEASURES TO BE "PROVIDED WITH ADEQUAT:; FORMS
OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTEIIT."
IN THE VIEW OF ONE SWEDE, SC.1 SPONSORS HAVE BEEN UNABLE
TO DEMONSTRAzTE ADEQUATELY THAT EACH OF ITS MEASURES
MEETS THAT CRITERION. (IN A RECENT
WORKING GROUP A MEETING ON INFORMATION, VERIFIC~-TION,
396
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AND COMMUNICATION, THE USSR HAS QUESTIONED THE
VERIFIABILITY OF SC.1'S MEASURE 1 ON INFORMATION,
LAYING THE GROUNDS FOR REJECTING I? AS A DISCRETE
MEASURE.) THE NNA'S, ACCORDING TO THE SWEDE, REGARD
THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS IN SC.7 AS "ELEMENTS" OF THEIR
OVERALL PROPOSAL. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, HOW THEY
BELIEVE SC.7'S ELEMENTS CAN BE VERIFIED.
6. THE TIME HAS COME THE WALRUS SAID, TO SPEAR OF
MANY THINGS. SOME OF THE NNA WALRUSES, HOWEVER, INTEND
TO LET THE NNA PROPOSAL SPEAR FOR ITSELF. DESPITE
REPORTED ATTEMPTS BY SWEDISH AMB. LIDGARD TO ORGANIZE
A SYSTEMATIC PRESENTATION AND PROMOTION OF THE VARIOUS
SC.7 ELEMENTS BY DIFFERENT NNA MEMBERS IN THE RELEVANT
WORKING GROUPS, IT APPEARS THAT MANY OF THE OTHER
NNA'S WILL, FOR THE MOST PART, SIT QUIETLY AND SPEAR
ONLY WHEN SPOKEN T0. BECAUSE OF THE FRAGILE COMPROMISES
IN THE DOCUMENT, THERE IS CONCERN ON THE PART OF
SOME NNA THAT T00 MUCH TALK COULD RESULT IN OPEN --
AND PREMATURE -- SPLITS IN THEIR TENUOUS SOLIDARITY.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL,SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12355: DECL: OADR
'TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL
AND, BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES, SOME NNA DON'T WANT
OTHERS ?0 PUT THEIR OWN INTERPREPATION ON CERTAIN
ISSUES. SOME, HOWEVER, HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY INTEND
TO DISCUSS THE PACKAGE IN DETAIL. DIFFERENCES IN
APPROACH WERE OBVIOUS IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS THIS
WEER. ON NOTIFICATION, SWITZERLAND OBLIQUELY SUPPORTED
THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON" APPROACH, YUGOSLAVIA REJECTED
IT, AND SWEDEN SUPPORTED THE COMPROMISE APPROACH
REFLECTED IN SC.7. ON NUF, CYPRUS CONTINUED TO PUSH
THE "CDE DIMENSION"/MANISFESTATION OF FORCE, WHILE
AUSTRIA DELIVERED A LONG STATEMENT WITH A DECIDED
WESTERN TWIST. NONETHELESS, THEY WISH TO AVOID OPEN
SPLITS FOR THE TIME BEING. HOW LONG WILL THIS TENUOUS
SOLIDARITY HOLD ? -- ACCORDING TO ONE NNA DELEGATE
UNTIL IT BECOMES OBVIOUS THAT PARTICULAR APPROACHES
REFLECTED IN THEIR PROPOSAL HAVE BEEN REJECTED BY
WTO AND NATO.
7. PRELIMINARY U.S. CDE DELEGATION ANALYSIS AND
ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL, SC.7, FOLLOW.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
UNTIL THE MALTESE INSISTED ON A LAST-MINUTE CHANGE,
THIS HEADING READ "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY
MANEUVERS". THE DEFINITION WHICH THEN FOLLOWED (NOW
IN THE FIRST TWO TICS) WAS AN ATTEMPT BY THE NNA T0~
DEFINE "MANEUVERS" IN A WAY IDENTICAL TO THE WESTERN
.. 397
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"OUT-OF-GARRISON" CONCEPT. SOME NNA STILL SEIi THE
MEASURE IN THIS WAY. NEVERTHELESS, THE SUBST::TUTION
OF "ACTIVITIES" FOR "MANIIEVERS" IS A MOVE TOW~-RD THE
SOVIET POSITION, ALLOWING. AN INTERPRETATION WlIICH
COULD INCLUDE INDEPENDENT NAV_11. AND .AIR ACTIV]TIES.
THIS COULD ALSO IMPACT ON THE CONSTRAINTS MEA:~URE,
INASMUCH AS THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE WILL SE7' THE
PARAMETERS FOR THE CONSTRAINTS MEASURE.
MOREOVER, THE FINNS INSISTED ON SPLITTING THE DEFINITION
OF MILITARY MANEUVER INTO TWO TICS SO AS TO H]GHLIGHT
THE FACT T$AT MOVEMENTS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED DIFFERENT
THAN MANEUVERS.
BOTH THESE LAST MINUTE CHANGES, ACCEPTED BY THE NNA
GROUP IN THE INTERESTS OF GAINING CONSENSUS, COULD
BECOME AMMUNITION FOR THE EAST IN SUPPORTING ITS
CLAIMS THAT MILITARY ACTIVITY MEANS MORE THAN THE
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, i.E., MILITARY aCTiviTY ALSO
COVERS INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS
(TRANSFERS).
OTHER COMMENTS
-- THE NNA HAVE REFUSED TO TARE A STANCE ON THB
MEANING OF THE MANDATE; THEY ONLY NOTE THAT ML~ITARY
MANEUVERS COVERED BY THE MANDATE WILL BE COVER:s'D.
-- AS NOTED ABOVE, THE SEPARA?ION OF MANEUVER .AND
MOVEMENT INTO TWO SUBPARAS HIGHLIGHTS A DISTINi;TION
NOT FOUND IN SC-1'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT.
NEVERTHELESS, SOME NNA CLAIM THAT THE MOVEMENT OF
U.S. FORCES TO OR THROUGH EUROPE WILL NOT BE C~-PTURED
BECAUSE OF THE WAY ;THEY DESCRIBE THE NOTIFICATON.
THRESHOLD, I.E., THE DIVISION.
-- DESPITE ATTEMPTS TO INCLUDE A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD,
THE REAL OPERATIONAL THRESHOLD IN SC-7 IS STILI. A
NUMERICAL ONE, THE BOTTOM LINE BEING THEIR ATTF;2SPT
TO DEFINE A GROUP OF FORCES EQUIVALENT TO A DIVISION:
"2-S UNITS ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL WITH I.E.,
PLUS A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST X TROOPS AND Y
TANKS/ARMOURED FIGH?ING VEHICLES/HELICOPTERS OR REPEAT
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12336: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL
OR AT LEAST Z TANKS/ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES."
THIS ESTABLISHES TWO POSSIBLE THRESHOLDS, BOTH
NUMERICAL.
-- BOTH NUMERICAL THRESHOLDS INCLUDE EQUIPMENT. THE
VIEW AMONG SOME NNA WAS THAT THE EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD
FOR DEFINING A DIVISION WOULD EXCLUDE U.S. MOVEMENTS
(AND TRANSITS?} FROM THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREME;VT.
IT WAS ALSO DESLGNED TO EXCLUDE THE SWISS MOUNT.~IN
CORPS FROM CSBM OBLIGATIONS.
? ~ .398
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~ THE NNA PAVE DESCRIBED A DIVISION IN TERMS OF FROM
TWO TO FIVE REGIMENTS/BRIGADES TO ACCOUNT FOR THE
DIFFERENCE IN THE ORGANIZA?IONAL STRUCTURE OF DIFFERENT
STATES. THIS RAISES THE QUESTION OF HOW MANY OF A
DIVISION'S SUB-ELEMEN'!'S MUST BE OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL
LOCATIONS IN ORDER TO MEET THE THRESHOLD. BUT THIS
APPARENT GAP IN LOGIC IS COVERED BY THE NUMERICAL
THRESHOLD FOR TROOPS.
~ AS FUR?HER SOP TO THE FINNISH DELEGATION, THERE
IS A REFERENCE TO NUMERICAL TOTALS "TO BE DEFINED".
NEVER?$ELESS, IN THE VIEW OF SOME NNA DELEGATIONS,
THE NUMERICAL TOTALS MIGHT BE NUMBERS OF STRUCTURAL
UNITS; IN THIS VIEW, THE EKPHASIS ON MOBILITY AND
FIREPOWER JUS?IFIES SUCH AN APPROACH.
~ ?HE EMPHASIS ON "MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER," HOWEVER,
IS AMBIGUOUS AND COULD BE SEEN AS CORRESPONDING ONLY
TO THE ARMOUR/MECHANIZED INFANTRY ASPECTS OF SC.1'S
"MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS," AND DOESN'T SEEM TO CAPTURE
INFANTRY ELEMENTS.
-- FILLING IN THE BLANKS FOR THE VARIOUS NUMERICAL
?fIItESHOLDS IS JUDGED TO BE A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE
NNA POSITION SINCE THESE FIGURES WILL DETERMINE THE
SCOPE OF THE CONSTRAINT MEASURES THEY HAVE PROPOSED.
VARIOUS NNA'S HAVE ASKED OUR ADVICE ON WHAT THE
EQUIPMENT FIGURES SHOULD BE.
-- THE COKPROMISE ON THE WORDS "OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL
LOCA?IONS" VICE AN EARLIER FORMULATIO*T OF "SPECIFIED
NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION AREAS" WAS TO MEET YUGOSLAV
CONCERNS ABOUT IDENTIFYING PEACETIME LOCATIONS. THIS
LANGUAGE IS SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE AS ?0 CALL INTO QUESTION
WHAT THESE LOCATIONS ARE. NONETHELESS, THE NEW
? LANGUAGE, AS WITH THE OLD, WAS DESIGNED BY MOST OF
THE NNA TO SERVE AS THE EQUIVALENT OF "OUT-OF-GARRISON."
REFERENCE TO COMBAT-RELATED EXERCISES WAS TO EXCLUDE
SUCH AC?IVITIES AS HARVEST ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER
RELIEF WHERE THE EQUIPMENT PARAMETERS WOULD NOT
NORMALLY BE MET.
-- AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE UNITS ARE
LUKPED TOGETHER IN, KORE-OR-LESS, A SINGLE CATEGORY
WITH NOTIFICATION LEVELS AT A SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER
LEVEL FOR AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE UNITS THAN IN SC-1
WHICH USES THE OOG CONCEPT AND THUS MARES AMPHIBIOUS
ACTIVITIES THE ONLY UNIQUE CATEGORY.
-- AS SC-7 NOW READS, NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE A
CER?AIN CAPACITY FOR CARRYING TROOPS (SHIPBORNE
LOADING CAPACITY) COULD BECOME NOTIFIABLE WHETHER OR
NOT AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ASHORE IS CONTEMPLATED.
THIS IS THE SAME AS A REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY AN
INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITY.
-- UNDER ITEM 1.7, WE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO GIVE
INFORMATION ON THE NUKBER AND TYPES OF EQUIVALENT
399
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FORMATIONS OF NAVAL AND AIR FORCES.
~ ITEM 2.1 CALLS FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION
ON PARTICIPATING FORCES DOWN TO T$E REGIMENT/BRIGADE
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMEN? OF NNA PROPOSAL
LEVEL. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO PROVISION FOR AN EXCHANGE
OF INFORMATION AGAINST WHICH THIS COULD BE CHECKED.
SOME NNA BELIEVE PARA. 4.1 ALLOWS FOR THE EXC1i~WGE
OF NORMAL LOCATIONS SIMILAR TO THAT PROVIDED
IN MEASURE 1 OF SC-l, BUT 4.1 IS SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE
IN ORDER TO MEET YUGOSLAV CONCERNS ABOUT PROV[DING
INFORMATION ON ACTUAL LOCATIONS.
-- UNDER ITEM 2.1, HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE TO ;PROVIDE
INFORMATION ON PARTICIPATING NAVAL AND AIR FORCES AT
LEVELS EQUIVALENT TO REGIMENT/BRIGADE.
-- UNDER ITEM 2.3, WE WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE T]iE NUMBER
OF: COMBAT AIRCRAFT, COMBAT HELICOPTERS, TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT, TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS AND NAVAL COMl4ATANTS
AS WELL AS AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS .AND AUXILIARY T1;:ANSPORTS
(IDENTIFYING THEIR SHIPBORNE LOADING CAPACITY).
-- ITEM 3.1 FORESEES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE
STARTING AND FINISHING DATES OF THE MOVEMENTS OF
FORCES; PUTTING THIS UNDER THE HEADING OF MIL]TARY
ACTIVITIES WOULD SEEM TO INDh~ATE THAT SUCH MCVEMENTS
WOULD INCLUDE BOTH NAVAL AND AIR MOVEMENTS. MOREOVER,
IT CALLS.FOR PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE PERIOD OF
TIME ABSENT FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS WHICH, IN THE CASE
OF DUAL-BASED (LAND, AIR, OR NAVAL) FORCES, COULD
MEAN FROM THEIR BASES IN THE U.S. I? MIGHT ALSO BE
INTERPRETED AS A CALL FOR INFORMATION ON HOW LONG
NAVAL UNITS BASED OUTSIDE THE ZONE WILL BE AWAY FROM
BASES.
ANNUAL CALENDAR
----------------
THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH THIS PART OF SC-7 IS THAT
IT ALSO CALLS FOR THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF AIR .AND
NAVAL FORCES PARTICIPATING IN ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD
BE FORECAST ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. POINT 9 ALLOWS
THE PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, YET TI) BE
DEFINED, ON UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ~-CTIVITIES.
THIS IS SEEN BY SOME NNA AS BEING INFORMATION ~-NALOGOUS
TO THAT REQUIRED IN OUR MEASURE 1.
THERE ARE MANY COMMON POINTS BETWEEN OBSERVATIGN IN SC-7
AND IN SC-1. THE NNA, LIRE US, INSIST THAT ALL
? 400
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PARTICIPATING STA?ES BE INVITED ?0 ALL NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES. EVEN MORE THAN SC-1, SC-7 ASRS FOR THE
PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. IT DOES, HOWEVER,
HAVE ITS NEGATIVE, OR AT LEAST AMBIGUOUS, POINTS:
-- AE~.AUSE OF THE AMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE OF THE NNA TO
TAE FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION OF TAE MANDATE AND THE
SUBSEQUENT AMBIGUITY ABOUT WAA? ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE
NOTIFIED, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHICH ACTIVITIES WILL
BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION.
-~ SC-7 CALLS FOR OBSERVATION WHEN THE THRESHOLD
IS REACHED. THIS WOULD EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDE OBSERVATION
OF "MOBILIZATION" ACTIVITIES AS DEFINED IN SC.1.
(AND, WE UNDERSTAND, IS WHAT WAS INTENDED BY AT
LEAST THE SWISS AND SWEDISH DELEGATIONS). IT IS NOT
CLEAR WHETHER IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR OBSERVATION OF
TROOPS LEAVING THE GARRISON (OR NORMAL LOCATION) FOR
TAE EXERCISE AREA. TAE PROPOSAL DOES SEEM TO PROVIDE
FOR OBSERVATION OF TROOPS DEPARTING TAE ERERCISE
AREA, BUT NOT NECESSARILY FOR OBSERVATION OF THEIR
ACTUAL RETURN TO "GARRISON" OR "NORMAL LOCATIONS,"
ONLY FOR OBSERVATION OF "FINAL POSITIONS" BEFORE
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJEC?: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL
RETURNING ?0 THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS.
-- IN PARA. 6, THE NNA PROPOSAL SETS UP TAREE DIFFERENT
(UNDETERMINED) THRESHOLDS FOR OBSERVA?ION AND ASSIGNS
A DIFFERENT NUMBER OF OBSERVERS TO EACH. THE RATIONALE
IS UNCLEAR.
-- PARA. 14 CONTAINS TWO POTENTIAL PROBLEMS. THE SCOPE
OF OBSERVATION MAY NOT BE AS BROAD AS THA? PROVIDED FOR
IN SC.1 AS SC.7 PROVIDES ONLY FOR OBSERVATION OF THE
"MAIN ACTIVITIES." SC.1 PROVIDES FOR OBSERVERS "TO
VIEW DIRECTLY ALL FORMATIONS ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY,"
AND, IN THE CASE OF OU?-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITIES,
ALLOWS FOR OBSERVATION OF "ALL PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY
. IN THE ZONE BETWEEN THE GARRISON AND THE AREA OF
OUT OF GARRISON DEPLOYMENT." IN ADDITION, PARR 14
CALLS FOR TAE OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR UNITS
CARRYING OUT MAIN ACTIVITIES. EVEN IF ONLY READ AS
APPLYING TO OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES
UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, IT WOULD STILL CLASH
WITH OUR POSITION SINCE WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF
ALLOWING OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES
UNLESS THOSE ACTIVITIES ARE VISIBLE TO AN OBSERVER
ON LAND WHO IS WA?CHING GROUND ACTIVITY.
------------------------------------------------------
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVI?IES
CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE
401
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THIS SECTION DEALS WITH ACTIVITIES NOT LISTEI- ON THE
ANNUAL CALENDAR, E.G., ALERT ACTIVITIES. LIFE SC-1,
IT ALLOWS OBSERVATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES IF THEY
LAST LONGER THAN A CERTAIN NUMBER OF HOURS.
-- RATHER THAN PROVIDING NOTIFICATION SIMULTANEOUSLY
WZTH THE START OF THE ACTIVITY,~SC-7 CALLS FCR
NOTIFIGTION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT PRIOR
TO THEIR START.
-- BOTH MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS ARE INCLUDED.
HOWEVER, THE THRESHOLD CRITERIA FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION
SHOULD APPLY.
-- PARA. 2 IS SEEN BY SOME NNA AS A NON-CIRCU"iVENTION
PROVISION WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE CARRYING OUT OF A
MOVEMENT, NOT A MANEUVER, FOR PURPOSES OF IN?IMIDATION.
CONSTRAINTS ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
'- HERE, EVEN MORE THAN IN PRIOR NOTIFICAIION, THE
CHANGE FROM "MANEUVERS" TO "ACTIVITIES" MUST liE
REGARDED WI?H GREAT CAUTION BECAUSE IT INDICA"ES THE
POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRAINTS ON NAVAL AND AIR A(;TIVITIES.
THIS IS CERTAINLY WHAT SOME NNA'S (YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA)
WANT.
-- PARA. 2 ESTABLISHES A NUMERICAL CEILING ON MILITARY
MANEUVERS WHICH IS ESTABLISHED AT FIVE TIMES 7HE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL WERE TO BE 6000 TROOPS THEN THE CEILING WOULD
BE 30,000 TROOPS. THUS THE DESIRE TO GET MORE
NOTIFICATIONS THROUGH A LOWER T$ltESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION
CONFLICTS WITH THE REQUIREMENT FELT BY MOST STATES,
INCLUDING SOME NNA, TO BE ABLE TO EXERCISE AT
SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER LEVELS.
-- THIS ALSO LIMITS THE DURATION OF AN ACTIVITY TO
17 DAYS; THIS WOULD LIMIT A COMMANDER'S FLEXIBILITY
TO EXECUTE OPTIONS FOR WEATHER DELAYS, EQUIPMEQT
MALFUNCTIONS, ETC. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS 17 DAY
LIMITATION APPLIES TO THE EXERCISE OR THE POINT AT
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA P~;OPOSAL
WHICH THE THRESHOLD IS MET.
PARA. 3 STIPULATES THAT NO STATE MAY CONDUCT MORE
THAN FIVE ACTIVI?IES UP TO TWO TIMES THE NOTIF]ABLE
LEVEL (E.G. TWO DIVISIONS) WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN PRE-
NOTIFIED ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE PRACTICAL
EFFECT SEEMS TO BE TO LIMIT BOTH THE SIZE AND ZHE
NUMBER OF ALERT ACTIVITIES. POSSIBILITIES FOR ABUSE
ARE LIMITED BY THE STIPULATION THAT ONLY ONE OF
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THESE CAN BE CONDUCTED AT ANY TIRE.
-- PARA. 4 IS A SECOND CEILING IN THAT IT LIMITS
STA?ES TO FIVE MANEUVERS PER YEAR A? A LEVEL FROM
TWO TO FIVE ?IMES THE THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICA?ION
(E.G. FROM TWO TO FIVE DIVISIONS). SUCH aCTiviTIES
MUST HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
-- BUT, TWO MANEUVERS OF THIS SIZE MAY BE CONDUCTED
SIMULTANEOUSLY PROVIDED THE COMBINA?ION OF THE TWO
DOES NOT EXCEID SEVEN TIMES THE THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR
NOTIFICATION. THIS IS A CHANGE INSISTED UPON BY
SOME NNA WHO FELT THAT ALLOWING A TOTAL OF 10 TIMES
THE THRESHOLD (E.G. 10 DIVISIONS) TO BE OUTSIDE
NORMAL LOCATIONS AT ONCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A CONSTRAINT.
THE SWISS INSISTED THEY MUST BE ABLE TO EXERCISE SIX
DIVISIONS AT ONCE, HENCE THEY PURSUADED THE OTHER
NNA TO AGREE TO SEVEN TIMES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
-- IN SUM, NATO ARGUMENTS ON THE CONSTRAINTS POINT
WILL CENTER ON THE FACT THAT IT DOES NOT MEET OUR
CRITERION: EQUALITY OF EFFECT.
OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
ON SHOR? NOTICE
THIS IS THE VERIFICATION MEASURE IN SC.7. IT DIFFERS
SIGNIFICANTLY FROM MEASURE 5 OF SC-1. IT:
-- PROVIDES NO ROLE FOR NTM'S. THE NNA HAVE TAKEN A
CUE FPOM WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE A VULNERABILITY IN
SC-1. THEY HAVE WITNESSED THE SOVIT TACTIC OF
FAUL?ING OUR CASE FOR REQUESTING INSPECTIONS ON THE
GROUNDS THAT INSPECTIONS WOULD CONSISTUTE A BONUS
FOR STATES WITH A WIDE RANGE OF NTMS AN) PENALIZE
THOSE STATES WITHOUT.
-- PROVIDES FOR AN "OBSERVATION" REQUEST ONLY IF
STIFF CONDITIONS ARE MET -- THAT THE STATE MAKING
SUCH A REQUEST JUDGES THAT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERESTS ARE AT STARE OR IF IT JUDGES THAT THE
CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT IS SERIOUSLY
JEOPARDIZED.
-- CONTAINS AN ESCAPE CLAUSE ALLOWING THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE A REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION. THE ESCAPE CLAUSE
IS THE PRINCIPAL DEFICIENCY IN THE CONCEPT. IT ALLOWS
THE REFUSAL OF A REQUEST ON THE GROUNDS OF SUPREME
NA?IONAL INTEREST (WHATEVER THAT MAY MEAN). THESE
GROUNDS WOULD INVARIABLY BE SUBJECTIVE. THE NNA,
HOWEVER, HAVE CALCULATED THAT A REFUSAL WOULD CARRY
A POLITICAL PRICE SINCE THE STATE REFUSING WOULD
HAVE TO PROVIDE AN ELABORATION OF ITS REASONS FOR
REFUSING (ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD NOT DETER
THE WTO FROM INVOKING "SUPREME NATIONAL~INTEREST").
SOME NNA ANTICIPATE FEW REFUSALS SINCE REQUESTS FOR
OBSERVATION WOULD BE RESERVED FOR EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES.
403
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~ SETS NO QUOTAS FOR THE NUMBER OF REQUES?S FAR
OBSERVATION. NO QUOTAS ARE PROVIDED FOR SINCE THIS
WOULD AVOID A SITUATION WHERE A STATE, HAVING ::XHAUSTED
ITS, QUOTA, PERCEIVES A NEED TO REQUEST AN OBSERVATION.
THE NNAS APPARENTLY HAVE CONSIDERED SCENARIOS :[N
FROM USDEL CD?
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT; CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA P~:OPOSAL
WHICH STATES ARE INDUCED TO EXPEND THEIR RATIOrf OF
REQUESTS FOR SPURIOUS ACTIVITIES. SHOULD QUO?~,S
BE SE?, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ASSUMPTION THAT TEE
SPONSORS OF SC-1 CAN ACCEPT A LOW INSPECTION NUMBER
BECAUSE VARIOUS ALLIES CAN BE CALLED .UP TO CONT~UCT
INSPECTIONS ON BEHALF OF OTHERS.
-- CONTAINS A THIAD PARTY PROVISION, I.E., PARTICIPA-
TION OF THE NNA IN ANY OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST.
MEASURE S OF SC-1 SPECIFIES THAT THIRD PARTIES MAY BE
INCLUDED IN AN INSPECTION AT THE DISCRETION OF THE
INSPECTING STATE; THEY MAY BE ANY OTEIER PARTICIPATING
STATE, OTHER THAN THE INSPECTED STATE. BY CONTttAST,
SC-7 WOULD REQUIRE THE PAR?ICIPATION OF THIRD-PARTY,
NON-ALLIED, S?AYES. THIS WOULD ENSURE THE NNAS AN
ENHANCED ROLE IN THE VERIFICATION OF A CDE AGRE::MENT
SINCE THEY WOULD BE T'HE THIRD PAR?Y IN ANY NATO OR
WARSAW PACT REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION.
-- IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NNA HA'~E
ELIMINA?ED THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONSULTATIONS B1'sFORE
OBSERVATION BY REQUEST. MOREOVER, THE WORDING !)F
THEIR PROPSOAL STIPULATES THAT THE STATE RECEIV::NG
THE REQUEST WILL REPEAT WILL INVITE THE REQUESTNG
STATES TO CARRY OUT THE OBSERVATION, PROVIDING, OF
COURSE, THE "ESCAPE CLAUSE" IS NOT EXERCISED. 7'WO
REASONS FOR REQUESTING AN INSPECTION ARE GIVEN;
EITHER A STATE CONSIDERS ITS NATIONAL SECURITY ]NTERESTS
ARE AT STARE OR THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF 1HE
CSBMS REGIME IS SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. THE YUGOSLAVS
ATTEMPTED TO ELIMINATE THE SECOND CONDITION, BUT
WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.
-- AT THE END OF AN OBSERVATION BY REQUEST, THREE
REPORTS ARE REQUIRED; FROM THE OBSERVING STATE, THE
THIRD-PARTY STATE AND THE STATE WHICH WAS OBSERVED.
-------------------------------
ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH INFORMATION,
NOTIFICATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH RE3ARD
TO THE MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED.
THIS SECTION APPEARS NOT TO CONTAIN ANYTHING OF .~N
EXCEPTIONAL OR CONTROVERSIAL NATURE. INSTEAD OF
CALLING FOR DEDICATED COMMUNICATION LINKS, IT CFL~RGES
. - 404
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STATES TO BEEP TELECOMMUNICATION LINES ACCESSIBLE
INCLUDING FACILITIES FOR TRANSMITTING AND RECEIVING
CHARTS AND MAPS. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THIS SECTION
MAY NOW BE BETTER THAN SC.1.
A COMPROMISE HAS BEEN STRUCK BETWEEN THE SWISS CONCEPT
OF "SALON DES AMBASSADEURS" CONVENED ON AN AD HOC
BASIS (THE FIRST TICK) AND THE AUSTRIAN CONVICTION
THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT OUGHT TO HEFT AT INTERVALS
AND DATES ?0 BE DECIDED. THE SWISS HAVE WANTED TO
AVOID THE INSTITUTIONALIZA?ION OF SUCH A CONSULTATIVE
ARRANGEMENT WHILE THE AUSTRIANS APPEAR TO FAVOR
SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.
IT DOES EXCLUDE NUF CONSULTATIONS AND SEEMS TO AVOID
THE PITFALL OF USING CONSULTATIONS AS A PRELIMINARY
(OR SUBSTITU?E) FOR OBSERVATION ON REQUEST
(VERIFICATION).
NON-USE OF FORCE
ANALYSIS ON THE NUF SEC?ION OF THE NNA PAPER WILL
FOLLOW SEPTEL.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR USDEL SCC; USDEL CD; USDEL NST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NNA PROPOSAL
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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25X1
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08841
SUBJECT: CSCE/CDE: REGISTERING ALLIED CONSENSUS ON A
CUTOFF DATE
REF: (A) STATE 3S390S (B) STOCKHOLM 8763
1. CDE VIII-031 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS INDICATED IN REFTEL (B) I BELIEVE STOC1~Ei0LM,
NOT USNATO, IS THE PLACE TO~REACH CONSENSUS 011 THE
CLOSING AND SCHEDULE FOR CDE. THIS PROCESS I;3 UNDER-
WAY HERE AND A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION IS IN SII~IT.
ATTEMPTING TO RECORD CONSENSUS IN BOTH PLACES AT ONCE
WILL ONLY CONFUSE MATTERS.
3. THE NATO CAUCUS HERE WILL MEET TO DISCUSS THIS
ISSUE LATER TODAY. WE SUGGEST THAT USNATO HOLD OFF
ON MAKING THE POINTS IN REF (A) UNTIL IT RECE]VES OUR
REPORT OF THAT DISCUSSION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 08885
SUBJECT: ?EXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE
1. CDE VIII - 034
2. C - ENTIRE TERT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PRESENTS THE TEX? OF AND
USDEL COMMENTARY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) PORTION
OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED (NNA) DOCUMENT, SC.7,
FORMALLY TABLED AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON
NOVEMBER 15 ,. 1985. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NNA INTRODUCED THEIR LONG ANTICIPATED AND MUCH
DEBATED DRAFT PACKAGE A? FRIDAY'S (NOVEMBER 16) PLENARY.
THE FINAL SECTION OF THE 22-PAGE PACKAGE IS A 3-1/2 PAGE
NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT CONTAINING 15 SEPARATE ELEMENTS.
5. THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA PAPER IS A CONSIDERABLE
IMPROVEMENT OVER EARLIER DRAFTS WHICH INCLUDID UP TO 35
SEPARATE ELEMENTS. THE PRESENT TEXT IMPLICITLY REJECTS
THE AMBI?IOUs AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS APPROACH
ADVOCATED BY THE CYPRIOTS AND THE YUGOSLAVS, I.E., A
STOCKHOLM DECLARATION GIVING A EUROPEAN DIMENSION TO THE
NUF PRINCIPLE, AND, INSTEAD, REFLECTS A MORE WESTERN
APPROACH TO NUF. FOR ERAMPLE, THE DRAFT EMPHASIZES THE
PRIMACY OF UN CHARTER LANGUAGE (ARTICLE 103) AND THE
NECESSITY OF RAIN?AINING THE BALANCE OF THE TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
6. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NNA PACKAGE WAS ONE OF THE
WORST REP? SECRETS IN TOWN OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS.
AFTER SEEING SOME OF THE EARLIER LEAKED VERSIONS OF THE
NNA NUF TEXT, MOST NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE BREATHED A
COLLECTIVE SIGH OF RELIEF AT THE TEXT EVENTUALLY TABLED.
THE FIRST REAC?ION OF THE FRG REPRESENTATIVE WAS: "WHERE
DO WE SIGN?" AND THERE'S THE RUB. EVEN IF WE WERE ABLE
TO ACCEPT ALL THE NNA LANGUAGE -- AND WE'RE NOT -- BY
APPEARING T00 EAGER TO EMBRACE THE NNA DRAFT WE MAY GIVE
IT THE KISS OF DEATH. A WESTERN ENDORSED DOCUMENT WILL
BE REJECTED IPSO FACTO BY THE EAST AND EVEN SOME OF THE
NNA. THE NATO CAUCUS HAS BEEN DULY SENSITIZED TO THIS
FACT OF CONFERENCE POLITICS AND WILL REACT ACCORDINGLY.
FURTHERMORE, WHAT AT FIRST BLUSH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE
UNCONTENTIOUS AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED NUF LANGUAGE,
MIGHT NOT, UPON CLOSER READING, SERVE ALLIANCE INTERESTS
IN STOCKHOLM. THEREFORE, FOR BOTH TACTICAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, USDEL BELIEVES WE SHOULD TARE A
CAUTIOUS AND QUESTIONING APPROACH TO THE NNA NUF TEXT.
7. AS WITH ANY DOCUMENT CONCEIVED AND DESIGNED BY A
COMMITTEE -- IN THIS CASE A GROUP OF VERY INDEPENDENT
(READ: STUBBORN) NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED STATES RANGING
FROM SWITZERLAND TO YUGOSLAVIA TO MALTA -- THE NNA NUF
TEXT DEFIES CATEGORIZATION. IT IS A HODGEPODGE OF LEGAL
AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS LARGELY DRAWN FROM THE HELSINKI
407
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FINAL ACT. FORTUNATELY IT REPRESENTS BORE OF A LOWEST
COMMON DENOMINATOR APPROACH, I.E., ONLY ELEMENTS
ACCEPTABLE TO ALL OF THE NNA, THIAN THE EARLIEP CHRISTMAS
TREE APPROACH, I.E., CONTAINING EVERYBODY'S FAVORITE NUF
ORNAMENT. IN ADDITION, THE FINAL VERSION ELI?lINATED THE
EARLIER UP-FRONT REFERENCE TO THE FACT TEAT THE FOLLOWING
NUF LANGUAGE CONTAINED AN "INDICATIVE LOT OF ELEMENTS,"
THEREBY SUGGESTING THAT THT; NNA ELEMENTS WERE NOT
EXHAUSTIVE. THIS ORIGINAL REFERENCE WAS INTRODUCED BY
THE SWEDES, PRESUMABLY IN ANTICIPATION OF EASTERN
DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE "RESTRICTED" NATURE OF T.:iE NNA NUF
TEXT. FORTUNATELY, THE SWISS AND AUSTRIANS ST:ZONGLY
OBJECTED TO THE REFERENCE TO AN "INDICATIVE LI~iT OF
ELEMENTS" AND THE REFERENCE WAS DROPPED IN THE FINAL
VERSION. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, THE LENGTH
(THREE AND A HALF PAGES) AND DETAIL (THERE IS, FOR
EXAMPLE+ AN EXTENDED PARAGRAPH ON TERRORISM) O1' THE NNA
TEXT MIGHT INVITE ELABORATION RATHER THAN CONDENSATION.
LASTLY, IN ORDER TO BUY MALTA'S ACQUIESCENCE, 7TiE NNA
ACCEPTED AN UNFORTUNATE REFERENCE TO "SECURITY IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN" IN THE TEXT. GIVEN THE IMPORTAII'T ROLE
THE NUF TEXT (AS WELL AS THE WHOLE NNA PACKAGE) IS LIKELY
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE
TO PLAY IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS, IT IS INCUMBENT ON
THE ALLIANCE TO ESTABLISH A COMMON LINE ON THE 'ACRAGE.
WITH THIS IN MIND, WE OFFER SOME OF U.S. DELEGATION'S
INITIAL THOUGHTS ON THE NUF PORTION OF THE NNA :~CUMENT.
8. NUF SECTION OF THE NNA DOCUMENT (WITH USDEL
COMMENTS).
NON-USE OF FORCE - TEX? -
1) THE PARTICIPATING STATES
STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE
FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE
NEED FOR IMPROVED AND CONSISTENT
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS
PROVISIONS, AND THUS TO FURTHER
THE PROCESS OF INCREASING AND
DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN
EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. THEY
ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE INTER-
RELATION BETWEEN SECURITY IN
EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AND SECURITY
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA.
ANALYSIS
'THIS LANGUAGE IS BASED
ON SC.3 AND TFfE
HELSINKI FINAI, ACT. IT
INTRODUCES THE NEED FOR
"IMPROVED AND CONSIS-
TENT IMPLEMENTATION OF
ALL ITS (THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT) PROVISIONS."
SUCH LANGUAGE, PARTICU-
LARLY UP FRONT IN THE
NUF TEXT, CLEARLY BUT-
TRESSES THE WEST'S CASE
REGARDING THE :~1ECESSITY
OF IMPROVED IMI~LEMENTA-
TION OF THE HF,~.
FINALLY, IT IS UNFORTU-
NATE THAT THE 1~NA CHOSE
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2) ALL THE PRINCIPLES SET
FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT ARE OF
PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND,
ACCORDINGLY, WILL ALL BE
EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY
APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING
INTERPRETED TARING INTO
ACCOUNT THE OTHERS. RESPEC?
FOR THESE PRINCIPLES WILL
ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NORMAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS
AND THE PROGRESS OF COOPERATION
AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES
IN ALL FIELDS.
3) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE
CONSCIOUS OF THE COMPLEMENTARY
NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND
MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY
WITHIN THE CSCE.
TO APPEASE ?HE MALTESE
BY PLACING A REFERENCE
TO MEDITERRANEAN SECU-
RITY EARLY IN THE NUF
TEXT. THE SWISS CLAIM
THAT THIS REFERENCE WAS
THE LEAST HARMFUL OF
THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE.
ANOTHER OPTION, FOR
EXAMPLE, WAS TO PLACE
THIS REFERENCE IN THE
NOTIFICATION SECTION OF
THE TEXT. IN ANY CASE,
PUTTING THE REFERENCE
IN THE CONTEXT OF
"SECURITY IN EUROPE AS
A WHOLE" REINFORCES THE
MANDATE'S ZONE OF
APPLICATION, ACCORDING
TO THE SWISS.
THE FIRST SENTENCE OF
THIS PARR IS LIFTED
DIRECTLY FROM THE HFA
(AFTER THE "DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN PAR-
TICIPATING STATES") AND
REINFORCES OUR POINT
ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF
BALANCE BETWEEN ALL
PRINCIPLES OF THE HFA.
THIS LANGUAGE IS ALSO
LIFTED FROM THE HFA.
THE "COMPLEMENTARY
NATURE OF POLITICAL AND
MILITARY ASPECTS OF
SECURITY" REFERS TO THE
COMPLEMENTARITY AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL
TEN HFA PRINCIPLES AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE,
OASED ON OUR READING OF
THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
?AGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE
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OF HELSINKI. IT IS
NOT, AS TFI: EAST WILL
CLAIM, THAT BOTH POLI-
TICAL, I.E,, DECLARA-
TORY, AND MILITARY,
I.E., CSBM S, AGREE-
MENTS CAN ~ AFFECT
SECURITY IM EUROPE.
4)THEY STRESS THAT THE PRINCIPLE THIS SENTErCE REFLECTS
OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR THE JUS COCENS NATURE
USE OF FORCE IS A UNIVERSALLY OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE,
RECOGNIZED OBLIGATION IN INTER- I.E., THAT NUF IS A
'NATIONAL LAW, BINDING ALL STATES, UNIVERSAL NORM OF
AND THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH IT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUBSEQUENTLY CONSTITUTES A WHICH EXTENDS BEYOND
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. TREATY OBLIJATIONS.
S)THEY REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINA-
TION TO RESPECT THIS PRINCIPLE,
CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, SO
AS TO ENSURE THAT, AS A NORM OF
INTERNATIONAL LIFE, IT IS
STRICTLY AND EFFECTIVELY
OBSERVED. NO CONSIDERATION MAY
BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT
RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF
FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS
PRINCIPLE.
? ~ 410
SECRET
CYPRIOT DISP'7TE.
MORE, CANNOT BE ?
DIVORCED FROM THEIR
UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE ON
THE GREEK/TUtRISH/
WHO DETERMIrES NON-
COMPLIANCE? ANY
LANGUAGE SPONSORED BY
THE CYPRIOTS, FURTHER-
MIGHT WARRA!!T FURTHER
ANALYSIS. ~IHAT DOES
NON-COMPLIAPfCE WITH
THIS OBLIGATION ENTAIL?
MISCHIEVOUSLY INTRO-
DUCED BY THli CYPRIOTS,
HOWEVER, THi LAST
PORTION OF 'fHE PHRASE,
THIS SECTION IS AN
AMALGAM OF Hl'A AND
MADRID CONCLUDING DOCU-
MENT LANGUAGE. IT, AS
WELL AS THE PREVIOUS
SECTION, REFLECTS A
SLOPPY MIX OF' POLITICAL
AND LEGAL COIiCEPTS OF
NUF. FURTHERMORE, ITS
ASSERTION THAT "NO CON-
SIDERATION MAY BE
INVOKED" TO WARRANT THE
USE OR THREAT OF FORCE
IS UNCOMFORTABLY CATE-
GORICAL. THE NUF PRIN-
CIPLE CONTAINED IN THE
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6) THEY RECALL THE INHERENT
RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLEC-
TIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED
ATTACK OCCURS.
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
UN CHARTER (ARTICLE
2(4)) IS BALANCED, FOR
EXAMPLE, BY THE CHAPTER
VII AUTHORI?Y OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL TO
DETERMINE A BREACH OF
THE PEACE, E.G. AN ACT
VIOLATING THE PRIN-
CIPLE, INCLUDING
MEASURES TAKEN PURSUANT
TO ARTICLE 51 OF THE
CHARTER (INDIVIDUAL AND
COLLECTIVE SELF-
DEFENSE). THE PRIMACY
OF THE CHARTER'S PROVI-
SIONS, WHILE NOTED
LATER ON, IS NOT
DIRECTLY RELATED TO
THIS SECTION.
INTRODUCES ARTICLE 51
OF THE UN CHARTER INTO
THE CSCE CONTEXT.
SUBJECT: TEX? AND ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE
7) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL THIS SECTION, PARTIALLY
REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL AS WELL TAKEN FROM THE HFA,
AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELA- REPRESENTS WHAT IS LEFT
TIONS IN GENERAL,
-- FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF
FORCE AGAINST THE ?ERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPEN-
DENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY
OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED
NA'IONS AND WITH THE FINAL ACT,
AND, ACCORDINGLY,
-- FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF
FORCE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, FOR
THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY
STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL
EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN
RIGHTS,
REGARDLESS OF THE STATE'S
OF THE LONG (UP TO TEN
SEPARATE ELEMENTS) LIST
OF ELEMENTS OF THE
MANIFESTATION OF FORCE,
FIRST INTRODUCED BY THE
CYPRIOTS. THE SECTION
WAS THE CORE OF THE
EARLIER VERSIONS OF THE
NUF TEXT. WE CAN,
THEREFORE, BE THANKFUL
THAT THIS SECTION HAS
BEEN EMASCULATED. THE
SECTION IS NOT,HOWEVER,
IMPOTENT. BY DISCUSSING
"ANY MANIFESTATION OF
FORCE" IT OPENS THE
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, OR TEXT UP FOR DISCUSSION
CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF TYPES OF MANIFESTA-
OF WHE?HER OR NOT THEY MAIN?AIN TION OF FORCE, A DIS-
WITH THIS STATE RELATIONS OF CUSSION THE EAST WOULD
411
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8) NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR
ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM THE
THREA? OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE
RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
9) THE PARTICIPATING STATES
STRESS THEIR FIRM COMMITMENT
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS
CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT,
CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN
ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE
DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO
SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL
BEANS ANY DISPUTE EXISTING OR
ARISING BETWEEN THEM. THEY ALSO
EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO
REINFORCE, IMPROVE AND DEVELOP
THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL
FROM USDEL
412
SECRET
CERTAINLY i-ELCOME.
FURTHERMORE, WHAT DOES
"DIRECT OR INDIRECT"
MEAN IN THIS CONTEXT.
IF IT IS ALL-INCLUSIVE
OF TYPES OF THE USE OF
FORCE, IT IS UNNECES-
SARY; IF IT IS NOT, IT
INVITES SPECULATION AS
TO WHAT TYPES OF FORCE
ARE EXCLUDED AND,
THEREFORE, .PERMISSIBLE.
ON THE OTHFrt HAND, THE
EAST WILL CERTAINLY
HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH
THE FINAL S1iNTENCE OF
THIS SECTIOIi, WHICH
CLEARLY AND POINTEDLY
REJECTS THE BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE.
HFA LANGUAGE;, WHICH THE
CYPRIOTS WILL, NO
DOUBT, CLAY: IS PERTI-
NENT TO TURR.ISH "000U-
PATION" OF CYPRUS. IT
COULD ALSO, OF COURSE,
BE INTERPRETED AS RELA-
TING TO SOVIET POST-WAR
POLICY IN EASTERN
EUROPE, GENERALLY, AND
THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE,
SPECIFICALLY.
BASED ON THE PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT 0;~ DISPUTES
LANGUAGE IN THE HFA AND
MADRID CONCLUDING DOCU-
MENT WE WILL HAVE TO
LOOK AT THIS SECTION
MORE CAREFULLY TO
DETERMINE IF IT PREJUD-
ICES THE WEST'S POSI-
TION ON PSOD AS DEVE-
LOPED IN ATHENS FOR
FUTURE MEETINGS ON THIS
SUBJECT. THE SECTION,
FOR EXAMPLE, CALLS PSOD
"AN ESSENTIAL" ELF;M~NT
OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TEXT AND~ANALYSIS OF NNA NUF LANGUAGE
FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF AND, THEREFORE, LINKS
DISPUTES. NUF AND PSOD KORE
10l THE PARTICIPATING STATES
CO:YFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFI-
CA!iCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FU!iDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE
RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN
ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE
PR~~CESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL
PE~iCE AND SECURITY AS WELL AS
FO:R THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG
THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES.
FIRMLY ?HAN PREVIOUSLY.
THIS SECTION WAS
INCLUDED BECAUSE OF
STRONG SWISS INSISTENCE
(THE SWISS SAID THEY
WOULD NOT CO-SPONSOR
THE FULL NNA PACKAGE
WITHOUT A HUMAN RIGHTS
REFERENCE IN THE NUF
PORTION OF THE TEXT).
IT IS THE FIRST TIME,
IN OUR RECOLLECTION,
THAT HUMAN RIGHTS HAS
BEEN SO DIRECTLY AND
PROM~NEN?LY LINKED TO
SECURITY IN THE CSCE
CONTEXT. WHILE WE, OF
COURSE, MUST WELCOME
THIS LINKAGE, WE SHOULD
BE AWARE THA? THIS
CREATES A PRECEDENT FOR
ELEVATING THE STATUS OF
THE OTHER TEN HFA PRIN-
- CIPLES IN THE CDE
CONTEXT.
111 THE PARTICIPATING STATES IF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
CO'!TFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN REFERENCE BECAME KNOWN
FR )M DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSIS- AS "THE SWISS OBSES-
TA!iCE TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES SION," A TERRORISM
OR TO SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER REFERENCE (OR THE PRE-
ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VENTION THEREOF) WAS
VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME ADOPTED WITH EQUAL PAS-
OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE. SION BY THE YUGOSLAVS.
THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION ?HE YUGOSLAVS, OF
TO TARE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR COURSE, ARE MOST CON-
THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION CERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT
OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AND WILL OF CROATIAN EXILE
TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES ORGANIZATIONS. THE
IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE EARLIER LANGUAGE OF THE
TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR SECTION IS BORROWED
THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION FROM THE HFA AND THE
OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST LATTER FROIi THE MADRID
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING MEASURES CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES (P.34). GIVEN THE
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.7LbAl.1
ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS,
GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT
INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE
IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF
TERRORISM.
12) THE PARTICIPATING STATES
WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR
OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW. THEY DECLARE THAT THEIR
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMIT-
MENTS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT
DOCUMENT.
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: TEXT AND ANALYSIS OF
IMPORTANCE AND THE
LEGAL COMPLEXITIES
INVOLVED WITH THE
ISSUE, DEPA~T2iF.NT LEGAL
EXPERTS MAY W?NT TO
COMMENT ON PHIS
PASSAGE.
THE FIRST SlsNTENCE IS
LIFTED FROM ARTICLE X
OF THE HFA. THE SECOND
SEN?ENCE, HI)WEVER,
SEEMS TO ST~-ND ARTICLE
X LOGIC ON ::TS HEAD.
INSTEAD OF IfECLARING
THAT THE PR~:SENT DOCU-
MENT IS IN ('ONFORMITY
WITH INTERN~.TIONAL LAW,
THIS SECTIOr DECLARES
THAT "THEIR (THE PARTI-
CIPATING STA'TE'S)
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL
COMMITMENTS, RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS DO NOT CON-
FLICT WITH THE PRESENT
DOCUMENT." THUS, THIS
A PRIORI LOGIC SEEMS TO?
NNA NUF LANGUAG's
POSITIVELY P'tEJUDGE T'HE
COMMITMENTS ~JNDERTAKEN.
FURTHERMORE, WHAT DOES
"INTERNATION~~I. COMMIT-
MENTS" MEAN? UN CHAR-
TER? HFA? l1ILATERAL
AGREEMENTS? BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE?
THIS SECTION, BASED ON
THE HFA, REAI'FIRMS THE
PRIMACY OF T'1:E UN
CHARTER (ARTICLE 103).
WHILE WE CAN FULLY SUP-
PORT THE CONTENT, WE
MAY HAVE SOME QUESTIONS
ABOUT ITS PLACEMENT.
WHY IS IT NOT GIVEN A
PR1llE OF PLACE EARLY IN
THE NUF TEXT?
13) THEY CONFIRM THAT IN THE
EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS
UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTER-
NATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLI-
GATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL
PREVAIL.
. 414
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25X1
14) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE
CONVINCED THAT THE SITUATION
IN EUROPE AND THE EQUAL RESPECT
FOR THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY
INTERESTS OF EVERY PARTICIPATING
STATE REQUIRE DETERMINED EFFORTS
BY ALL OF THEM TO BUILD MUTUAL
CONFIDENCE, LESSEN MILITARY CON-
FRONTATION, STRENGTHEN SECURITY
FOR ALL AND PROMOTE DISARMAMENT.
1S) BY THEIR VERY NATURE CON-
CRETE CSBM'S SERVE TO GIVE
EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE
DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
THE PASSAGE REFLECTS AN
AMALGAM OF MADRID CON-
CLUDING DOCUHENT AND
SC.3 LANGUAGE AND CON-
TAINS A STRANGE MIX OF
POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME
POLITICAL CONCEPTS. IT
WAS INCLUDED AT THE
INSISTENCE OF THE
SWEDES AND THE YUGO-
SLAVS. DOES THE "SITU-
ATION IN EUROPE"
REQUIRE SPECIAL EFFORTS
TO "PROMOTE DISARMA-
MENT" AS THE SOVIETS
FREQUENTLY INSIST?
DOES THE CALL FOR THE
PARTICIPATING STATES TO
"PROMOTE DISARMAMENT"
PREJUDICE OUR POSITION
ABOUT A POSSIBLE SECOND
CDE STAGE? CAN DISARM-
AMENT, A MEANS TO AN
END, BE EQUATED WITH
BUILDING CONFIDENCE OR
STRENGTHENING SECURITY
AS THIS PASSAGE
SUGGESTS?
THIS FIRS? SENTENCE IS
A PARAPHRASE OF A MUCH
MORE COMPLETE AND, IN
OUR MIND, MORE EFFEC-
TIVE REFERENCE TO THE
LINKAGE OF NUF AND
CSBM'S CONTAINED IN
SC.3. NEVERTHELESS,
THIS LINKAGE, I.E., THE
NUF COMMITMENT IS A
FUNCTION OF THE CSBM'S
AGREED UPON, UNDER-
SCORES THE WESTERN
APPROACH TO THE
SUBJECT.
415
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SUGJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING, NOVEMBER 15, 1985
REF: STOCZEIOLM 8763
1. C~ VIII - 027
2. C -ENTIRE TEXT
BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NOVEMBER 15 SESSION OF THE ~c>~E
NATO CAUCUS FOCUSED ON THE ALLIANCE'S PERFORMANCE IN THE
INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS)
CRITICIZED FRANCE BOTH FOR INVITING EASTERN QUESTIONSi ON
THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR
ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND FOR STATING
THAT "ilE" (IMPLYING NATO) REJECT THE IDEA OF CEILINGSi AS
A MEASURE OF CONSTRAIN?. GASCHIGNARD.(FRANCE). F~WE1'ER.
WAS UNREPENTANT. TLERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THI
CAUCUS NEEDED TO GENERATE BETTER DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS ~)N
TAE BASIS OF SC.1. TO RESPOND TO EASTERN DEMANDS FOR
PlORE DETAILS ON NATO'S PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION AND
OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. HOWEVER, TAE CAUCUS SPLIT ON THE;
ISSUE OF ~R WE SHOULD DEVELOP POSITIONS THAT CA
BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN SC.1. TAE NETHERLANDS i,ED
THOSE ARGUING THAT WE HAD TO FILL IN TAE "BLANKS" ON
THIS ISSUE, WHILE THE U.S. AND TURKEY URGED A MORE
CAU'IOUS APPROACH. WITH REGARD TO THE NNA PAPER, THE
CAUCUS DECIDED TO LET THE NNA TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO
EXPLAIN IT IN THE WORKING GROUPS. THE NNA, HOWEVER,
FEAR SUCH AN EXERCISE COULD DESTROY THEIR TENUOUS
UNITY. END SUMMARY
4. INFORMAL WORKING GROUP PERFORMANCE: BUWALDA
(NETHERLANDS) OPENED BY APPEALING FOR BETTER ALLIANCE
COHESION AND AGAIN PRESSED STRONGLY FOR THE CAUCUS TO
DESIGNATE NATO TEAMS FOR EACH WORKING CLUSTER. HE
CRITICIZED "ONE DELEGATION" (FRANCE) FOR INVITING EASTERN
QUESTIONS ABOUT. THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF FUI~~C-
TIONALLY RELATED NAVAL, AND AIR ACTIVI1ff~S AND ZEROED Irt
ON THE FRENCH AGAIN FOR STATING THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE NC~T
CSBM'S AND FOR REJECTING THE IDEA OF CEILINGS ON MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. BUWALDA REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT THIS WAS
NOT THE ALLIANCE POSITION AND THAT DELEGATIONS WHICH FEEL
SEC$ ;
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THEY HAVE TO MAKE SUCH A POINT SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR
THAT THEY ARE DOING SO IN THEIR NATIONAL CAPACITY.
GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) WAS UNREPENTANT AND DEFLECTED
BUWALDA'S CRITICISM BY SIMPLY IGNORING THE NAVAL AND AIR
ISSUE (AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE FRENCH SEEM INTENT ON
PLAYING THEIR OWN HAND) AND NOTING THAT, IN THE ABSENCE
OF A NATO POSITION ON CONSTRAINTS, FRANCE HAD MADE THE
TACTICAL DECISION TO REJECT CEILINGS NOW, SO THAT ANY
ALLIANCE DECISION TO ACCEPT A CEILING LATER COULD BE MADE
TO APPEAR AS A CONCESSION. WHILE SUPPORTING BUWALDA'S
CALL FOR IMPROVED ALLIANCE COHESION, BARRY (U.S.) OFFERED
SOME SUPPORT TO GASCHIGNARD BY OBSCRVING THAT ON THE
CONSTRAINTS ISSUE THE CAUCUS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE
CONCLUSION THAT AN ACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINT CANNOT AND WILL
NOT BE FOUND. BUWALDA'S TEAM SUGGESTION WAS STUDIOUSLY
IGNORED BY ALL.'
5. AIR AND NAVAL: THE CAUCUS TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF
THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN TO PRESSURE NATO FOR MORE DETAILS
OF OUR PROPOSAL ON THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF
NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.
SOMC DELEGATIONS (NO'ABLY THE FRG, NETHERLANDS AND UK)
BELIEVE THAT WE ARE VULNERABLE ON THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OF
THE LACK OF DETAIL IN SC. 1. WHILE THERE WAS GENERAL
UNDERSTANDING THAT WE COULD NOT GO BEYOND THE LEVEL OF
DETAIL IN SC.1 WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS AND
BRUSSELS, THE CAUCUS SPLIT OVER WHETHER THIS WAS THE TIME
TO SECR SUCH INSTRUCTIONS. THE NETHERLANDS, SPAIN AND
FRANCE FELT THAT WE HAD TO FILL IN THE "BLANKS" IN SC.1
ON WHAT CAN AND CANNO' BE NOTIFIED UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH. THE U.S. AND TURKEY URGED MORE CAUTION. BARRY
(U.S.) CONTENDED THAT WE SHOULD RALLY OUR ARGUMENTS
AROUND SC.1 AND NOT BE EMBARRASSED iF WE HAVE TO BE
EVASIVE ON CERTAIN ISSUES. BOLUKBASI (TURKISH DEPREP)
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
STRONGLY ARGUED THAT GIVEN PRESENT SOVIET "ATTITUDES"
TOWARD SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF CSBM'S THIS WAS NOT THE TIME
TO CONSIDER IMPROVEMENTS OR AMENDMENTS TO SC.1. SUCH
CHANGES, HE SAID, SHOULD BE SAVED FOR THE END-GAME.
CITRON (FRG) OBSERVED THAT THERE WERE TWO TASKS WHICH
NEEDED TO BE PERFORMED; 1) ON THE BASIS OF SC.1, THE WEST
NEEDS TO IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE ARGUMENTS TO BEST
PROMOTE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (ALL AGREED); AND
2) QUESTIONS NEED TO BE DEVE:I.OPED ON STEPS GOING BEYOND
SC.1, WHICH THE CAUCUS COULD THEN DECIDE TO REFER TO
CAPITALS AND/OR BRUSSELS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO REFER
'MESS TWO QUESTIONS BACK TO THE RESPECTIVE NATO MINI-
CAUCUSES FOR THE OBSERVATION AND NOTIFICATION GROUPS,
WHICH WILL UNDERTAKE BOTH TASKS_AND REPORT TO-THE CAUCUS.
SECRET.
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6. NNA.PAPER: THE CAUCUS DISCUSSED THE NNA PAPER
BRIEFLY AND IN GENERAL CONFIRMED THE APPROACH DECIDED
UPON ON NOVEMBER 13 (REFTEL). THE ENTIRE NNA PACKAGE
WAS REFERRED FOR ANALYSIS TO THE RESPECTIVE NATO MINI-
CAUCUSES, AND IN THE MEANTIME IT WAS AGREED TO LET THE
NNA TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO EXPLAIN THEIR PAPER IN THE
WORKING GROUPS WHILE THE ALLIANCE LIMITS ITSELF TO NON-
LEADING, CLARIFYING QUESTIONS. (COMMENT; SINCE THE
NOVEMBER 15 CAUCUS MEETING, USDEL HAS LEARNED FROM NNA
CONTACTS THAT THE DELICATE BALANCE ENGINEERED AMONG TH:
PAPER'S FRACTIOUS SPONSORS MAY NOT WITHSTAND A DETAILS)
EXPLANATION. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY OUR NNA FRIENDS TO
ADDRESS NON-CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS TO THEM FOR THE TI14E
BEING AND TO AVOID PROBING T00 DEEPLY INTO THOSE AREAS OF
THE PAPER WHERE JERRY-BUILT COMPROMISES MAY NOT WITHSTAND
CLOSE INSPECTION. END COMMENT.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE --
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SUUJECT: CDE WRpp_Up AND ANALYSIS, NOVEMBER 11-~5 18
1. CDE VIII - 028 9 5
2? C - ENTIRE TEXT '
3. BEGIN SUMMARY; THE LONG AWAITED AND MUCH DELAYED
COMPREHENSIVE NNA WORKING DOCUMENT SC
THE LIGHT OF DAY ON NOVEMBER 15. THE BIRTHIOFLT~SNNA
BABY WAS BOTH PROTRACTED (IT WAS FIRST EXPECTED IN EARLY
OCTOBER) AND PAINFtJI, (COMPLICATIONS AROSE AS VARIOUS NNA
FATHERS DISCLAIMED PATERNITY).
THE HAPPY EVENT, WE HAVE AVOIDED DISPLAYING TOO ~CCHED
AFFECTION. THE EAST, MEANWHILE, CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT
PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATING A COMPLETE PACKAGE OF CSBM'S,
INCLUDING NATO'S PROPOSALS COVERING GROUND ACTIVITIES,
IS CONTINGENT ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF INDEPENDENT AIR
AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. FURTHERMORE, PROGRESS IN DRAFTING
CSBM'S IS CONTINGENT ON COMPARABLE PROGRESS IN DRAFTING
A ~' COMMITMENT'. THIS DOUBLE LINKAGE, OF COURSE, IS A
RECIPE FOR STALEMATE. END SUMMARY.
4. NEW LEADERSHIP/OLD FACES: WITH THE ADVENT OF A NEW
WORKING STRUCTURE MOST CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS EXPECTED
THE EIGHTH ROUND OF THE CDE TO YIELD SOME PROGRESS ON
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW, AFTERO
ALL, HAD ALTERED THE TONE, IF NOT THE SUBSTANCE, OF ITS
MESSAGE TO THE WEST. IN STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN
LESS POLEMIC AND MORE FORTHCOMING DURING THE SEVENTH
ROUND. HOWEVER, CONTRARY TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF SOME,
THE EAST HAS CHOSEN TO STALL ON SUBSTANCE: AND TO BLAME
THE WEST FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS. WHY THEN, ON THE EVE OF
THE U.S.-USSR SUMMIT, DID THE NEW LEADERSHIP CHOOSE TO
SHOW ITS OLD FACE IN STOCKHOLM?
5. A RECIPE E'OR STALEMATE: HOW MUCH OF THE SOVIET
APPROACH IS SUBSTANTIVE AND HOW MUCH IS TACTICAL IS
DIFFICULT TO FATHOM. SUBSTANTIVELY, THE SOVIETS HAVE
LITTLE NEW TO SAY ON WESTERN CSBM'S. AT THE SAME TIME,
THEY WOULD LIKE THE WEST TO ADDRESS THEIR PROPOSALS ON
NON-USF OF FORCC AND INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVI-
TIES. THESE TWO SUBJECTS ARE NOT UNRELATED, IN THE
SOVIET PERSPECTIVE. THE SOVIETS WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO
' 419
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SE
REDEFINE THE M ~ AND TO CAPTURE U.S. AIR 4ND
NAVAL ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE ZONE; FURTHERMORE, ,THEY WANT
TO MAKE NUE' THE CENTERPIECE OF ANY AGREEMENT COMING c)UT
OF STCXiKHOLM. THEY HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED ON BOTH C4U)ITS.
NEITHER NATO NOR THE NNA HAVE ACCEPTED THIS PECULIAR
EASTERN NOTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A SET OF ~JTUALLY
COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S. SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN UNABLE
RESORTED TO
T C'~ICAL~SUBTERFUGES TOTAMAKE ~Y EVE
ARGUES THAT PROGRESS IN NE IR POINTS. TME EAST NOW
OF CSBM'S, INCLUDING NATO' pTRIOTING A COMPLETE PACKAG:
ACTIVITIES, IS ONLY POSALS COVERING GROUND
TIONS ON INDEPENDE1YTPp R AND NAVAL ACTIgITI~E~ ~~~~IA'
)"BORE, PROGRESS IN DRAFTING CSBM'S IS CONTINGENT ON THE;R-
COMPARABLE PROGRCSS IN DRAFTING A N~
DOUBLE LINKAGE, OF COURSE, IS A RECIPE FORISTA F.MATE.IS
6? THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT; THE EAST POINTS TO THE
GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14 TO B
CASE. THIS AGREEMENT, THE EAST CLAIMS, CAIU~LS ARTS
PARALLEL PROGRESS TOWARD DRAFTING ON BOTH
THE WEST, BY NOT DISCUSSING THE SOVIET NUF p ppOSALC,SBBy'S.
ARGUING THAT ~,IHAS~NO'P FVLFI AND BY NfOT SUBMITTING ]TS
OWN NUF LANGUAGE LLED ITS PART OF THE
BARGAIN, ACCORDING^TO THE EAST. THE GENTLEMEN'S
AGREEMENT, OF COURSE, SAYS NOTLING OF THE SORT. IT
CALLS FOR "INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT
FIGURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCESS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE (IN
A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S"
~' AND CSBM'S) ? IN ANY CASE ~~T DRAFTING CAN
GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT WILL SERVEEUSAONLYRIFEIT ENABLES
US '0 MOVE AHEAD ON SUBSTANCE; IT WILL DO MORE HARM THAN
GOOD IF IT BECOMES A TOPIC OF SERIOUS DEBATE AND AN
EXCUSE FOR AVOIDING KEY ISSUES.
FROM USDEL
E.O.. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
7. CODOT HAS ARRIVED; THE EAST HAS SAID, IN EFFECT,
THAT ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES ARE PREMATURE, PARTICULARLY
IN LIGHT OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT AND IN ANTICIPATION OF THE
LONG AWAITED AND MUCH DELAYED NNA DOCUMENT. THE EAST WAS
NOT ALONE IN WAITING FOR GODOT. HOWEVER
BECKETT'S CLASSIC, GODOT HAS FINALLY ARRIVED INATHE FORM
OF A COMPREHENSIVE NNA WORKING DOCUMENT
PLENARY ON NOVEMBER 15. THE BIRTH OF THE NNA,BpgYBWAS I.Y
BOTH PROTRACTED AND PAINFUL. THE BABY WAS FIRST EXPECTEI)
IN EARLY OCTOBER BUT DUE Tp'CpypLICATIONS, THE DATE HAD
TO BE CHANCED ALMOST ON A WEEKLY BASIS. ONLY WHEN THE
CONGENITALLY OPTIMISTIC SiIEDISH AMBASSADOR LIDGARD, THE
CONFERENCE'S BEST REVERSE BAROMETER, BEGAN TO EXPRESS
DOUBTS LAST WEEK THAT THE NNA COULD GET THEIR ACT
TOGETHER DID WE SUSPECT THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
DOCUMENT WAS IMMINENT. AS WITH ANY DOCUMENT CONCErVEU
AND DESIGNED BY A COI~AlITTEE ( IN THIS CASF, AUSTRI.q, .
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CYPRUS, FINLAND, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN, SWITZEKL.AND,
YUGOSLAVIA, AND LIECHTENSTEIN), THE NNA PAPER DEFIES
CATEGORIZATION. IN ORDER TO GET ALL OF THE NNA ON
BOARD, THE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CHANGED SOMEWHAT FROM
EARLIER DRAFTS, E.G., REFERENCES IN THE DOCUMENT TO
"NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION" HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO "NORMAL
LOCATIONS" TO MOLLIFY THE YUGOSLAVS, AND THE DEFINITION
OF MANEWERS HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY REWORKED BECAUSE OF
FINNISH INSISTENCE THAT THE CONCEPT OF "MOVEMENTS" BE
MAINTAINED ALONG WITH "MANEUVERS." WHILE WE WILL
CERTAINLY NEED TIME TO STUDY THE NNA TEXT MORE
CAREFULLY, IT IS CLEAR THAT THESE ELEVENTH-HOUR CHANGES
TO THE PACKAGE DO NOTHING TO ASSIST WESTERN CSBM
CONCEPTS. (FULL ANALYSIS OF THE PAPER FOLLOWS SEPTEL.)
8. U.S. LINE. WHILE WE HAVE WELCOMED THE NNA DOCUMENT,
WE WILL AVOID EMBRACING IT T00 WARMLY, BOTH BECAUSE WE
HAVE CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES, E.G. ON
CONSTRAINTS AND CONSULTATIONS, AND BECAUSE A WARM WESTERN
EMBRACE COULD BECOME THE KISS OF DEATH IN A CONFERENCE
FULL OF JEALOUS SUITORS. WE HAVE SAID THAT THE PAPER IS
AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE, NECESSARILY, THE
SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS. IT IS NOT, IN OUR
VIEW, A COMPROMISE DOCUMENT, SINCE IT REFLECTS THE NNA'S
SOVEREIGN SECURITY INTERESTS; IT DOES NOT REPRESENT AN
ARBITRARY MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN
SECURITY INTERESTS.' OVER THE COMING WEEKS, BASED ON NNA
EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR OWN PAPER, WE WILL BE QUESTIONING
AND PROBING THE NNA. NATURALLY, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO DRAW
OUT THE NNA ON POSITIONS WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO
SC.1/AMPLIFIED. FOR THE TIME BEING, WE WILL?AVOID
NEURALGIC POINTS FOR THE NNA, E.C. NORMAL PEACETIME
LOCATIONS, MOVEMENT VS MANEUVERS, TO GIVE THEM TIME TO
GET THEIR OWN ACT TOGETHER. INTERESTINGLY, SOVIET
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, IN HIS FIRST COMMENTS ON THE PAPER,
HAS ALREADY REJECTED CERTAIN NNA CONCEPTS, SUCH AS
"OBSERVATION ON REQUEST."
9. TROUBLE SPOTS: SOME NATO CAUCUS MEMBERS HAVE
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ALLIANCE'S PERFORMANCE TO
DATC IN THE INFORMAL WORKING CROUPS. THE UNREPENTANT
FRENCH, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR
CRITICISM. THE DUTCH HAVE BEEN MOST EXPLICIT IN THEIR
CRITICISM. THE FRENCH, ACCORDING TO THE DUTCH, HAVE
DEPARTED FROM COMMON ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON A SERIES OF
ISSUES FROM NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND
ASR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO
CONSTRAINTS. THIS LACK OF ALLIANCE COHESION, IN THE
DUTCH VIEW, CALLS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A "TEAM DE
FILE" SYSTEM, I.E., COORDINATING TEAMS WHO WILL ALSO ACT
AS PRIMARY SPEAKERS IN EACH WORKING GROUP WITHIN NATU.
ct~nncNr
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WHILE WE COULD SUPPORT THE STATED DUTCH COAL, I.E.,
IMPROVED COORDINATION OF WORKING GROUP INTERVENTIONS, WE
CANNOT, AT THIS STAGE, SUPPORT THEIR RECOMMENDED MEAN:i TO
ACHIEVE THIS END. THE TEAM DE FILE SUGGESTION WAS
STUDIOUSLY IGNORED IN THE CAUCUS. OVER THE COMING WEEKS,
MOREOVER, WE WILL FACE ANOTHER PROBLEM: THE PROLIFERl--
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
TION OF DRAFT NUF TEXTS. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE ITAL7:ANS
AND THE FRENCH WILL SOON THROW THEIR NUF HATS INTO AN
ALREADY CROWDED NATO RING (DENMARK AND CANADA HAVE
ALREADY FLOATED NUF LANGUAGE WITHIN NATO AND THE SOVIETS,
ROMANIANS, AND NNA HAVE INTRODUCED TEXTS IN STOCKHOLM;.
FINALLY, EVERYBODY'S LEAST FAVORITE GADFLY HAS ALIGHTED
AGAIN. THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECUR]TY
MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, ACCORDING TO THE NEW MALTF;SE
AMBASSADOR, IF WE ARE TO REACH AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE "
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UNCLAS S?OCRHOLM 08824
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, 11/18/85
L. CDE VIII - 026
2. FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT AMBASSADOR ROBERT L.
BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, MADE TO THE CDE
TODAY, NOVEMBER L8.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
LAST WEER THE ATTENTION OF THIS CONFERENCE WAS DIRECTED
INWARD -- ON OUR NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COLLEAGUES AND
THE PROPOSALS WHICH THEY PRESENTED ON NOVEMBER LS. MY
DELEGATION WELCOMES THE INTRODUCTION OF CONFERENCE
DOCUMENT SC.7. WE RECOGNIZE THAT A VAST AMOUNT OF WORK
HAS GONE INTO IT AND THAT IT HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT TASR
TO NEGOTIATE COMMON POSITIONS ON REY NATIONAL SECURITY
QUESTIONS AMONG A GROUP OF COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERING
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND VARIED NATIONAL DEFENSE
PROBLEMS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RESULTING PROPOSALS
DO NOT REPRESENT AN EFFOR? TO DEFINE A MIDDLE GROUND
BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF EAST AND WEST, BUT RATHER AN
EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE SOVEREIGN INTERESTS OF THE
NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE MADRID MANDATE. MY DELEGATION WILL GIVE THE MOST
SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO ALL ASPECTS OF SC.7 IN THIS
CON?EXT.
WHILE NOT WISHING TO PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME OF OUR STUDY
OR ANTICIPATE THE EXPLANATIONS WHICH WE LOOK FORWARD TO
HEARING FROM SC.7'S CO-SPONSORS, I WANT TO SAY ?THAT I
STILL BELIEVE THA? SC.L/AMPLIFIED PROVIDES THE BEST
BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY SET OF CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE VERIFIABLE AND
HAVE REAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. BUT AS WE PURSUE OUR
EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND FOR AN EVENTUAL
AGREEMENT, WE WILL TARE FULL ACCOUN? OF SC.7 AS A
SERIOUS AND INDEPENDENT CONTRIBUTION TO OLTR WORR. IN
SC.L/AMPLIFIED AND SC.7, WE NOW HAVE TWO DETAILED,
FULLY DEVELOPED NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE
CONFERENCE.
THIS WEER, MR. CHAIRMAN, AT LEAST PART OF OUR ATTENTION
IS DIRECTED OUTWARDS -- ON GENEVA AND THE MEETINGS
BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV WHICH WILL BE TARING PLACE TOMORROW AND
WEDNESDAY. I WOULD LIRE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT WHAT
THE .UNITED STATES SEERS IN GENEVA AND HOW WE BELIEVE
THIS CAN AFFECT OUR WORK HERE.
PERSONALLY, I HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN EACH OF THE
US-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS SINCE L972 AT VARIOUS LEVELS
AND IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES. THEREFORE, I PERSONALLY SEE
THE GENEVA MEETING AS A RESUMPTION OF A PROCESS WHICH
HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED FOk 1V0 LONG. MY GOVERNMENT
REGRETTED THAT, IN VIENNA IN L979. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE
TO AGREE TO REGULARLY SCHEDULED SUMMIT MEETINGS AND A
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SECRE?
SERIES OF REGULAR MEET?NGS AT SUBORDINATE LEV):LS. AND
WE REGRETTED THAT EVENTS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS
SINCE THEN MADE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS THE EXCEP4ION
RATHER THAN THE RULE. SO IT IS OUR HOPE THAT GENEVA
WILL MARK THE RESUMPTION OF A PP.OCESS WHERE OvR LEADERS
CAN GRAPPLE WITH ISSUES AND TRY TO CLEAR THE ATMOSPHERE.
BUT AN AGREEMENT TO HOLD MORE MEE?INGS IS NOT ALL THAT
WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE ACHIEVED IN GENEVA. WE HOPE FOR
PROGRESS IN ALL FOUR AREAS ON THE US AGENDA: ARMS
CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL ISSUES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS.
ON ARMS CONTROL, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE
AGREEMENTS ON THE COMPLEX NUCLEAR ISSUES BEING
NEGOTIATED BY OUR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA. BUT 'iE HOPE
TO ACRIEVE SOME FURTHER CLOSURE OF US AND SOVI::T
POSITIONS, THUS EASING THE TASK OF OUR GENEVA
NEGOTIATORS. IN OTHER AREAS, INCLUDING THE STi)CRHOLM
CONFERENCE, WE HOPE TO FORGE A BETTER BASIS OF
UNDERSTANDING WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. L2356: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, LL/L8/85
OTHER NEGOTIATING FORUMS.
SINCE US AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUF;S ARE SO
FAR APART, AGREEMENT ON THEM WOULD SEEM BEYOND OUR .
GRASP. BUT DISCUSSION OF THESE QUESTIONS AT TFE
HIGHEST LEVEL, SUPPLEMENTING THE CONTINUING BILATERAL
DIALOG WE HAVE HAD IN RECENT MONTHS, CAN DO FOP OTHER
PARTS OF THE WORLD WHAT THIS CONFERENCE IS TRYING TO DO
FOR EUROPE -- REDUCE TENSIONS, MINIMIZE THE DANGERS OF
MISCALCULATION, AND FOSTER A CONTEXT OF RESTRAINT.
ON BILATERAL ISSUES, WE BELIEVE SOME IF NOT ALL OF THE
AGREEMENTS WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR MANY MONTIiS
WILL BE READY FOR SIGNATURE IN GENEVA. ADDRESSING THE
NATION BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR GENEVA, PRESIDENT
REAGAN SPOKE ELOQUENTLY ABOUT THE VALUE OF EXCHANGES OF
YOUNG PEOPLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS WHICH WOULD BE POSSIBLE
UNDER THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL EXCANGES
WHICH SEEMS READY FOR SIGNATURE.
AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RI~;IiTS IS,
REGRETTABLY, UNLIKELY; IT IS NOT EVEN AN AGREED AGENDA
ITEM. BUT THE QUESTION WILL SURELY BE DISCUSSED, AND
SOME HUMANITARIAN CASES REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN RE;iOLVED
IN THE PRE-SUMMIT PERIOD. NATURALLY, WE HOPE MIRE WILL
BE DONE.
MR. CHAIRMAN, US OBJECTIVES AT THE GENEVA ME]:TING
RESEMBLE IN SOME iiA1fS OUR GOALS HERE IN STOCKHOLM. IN
BOTH PLACES WE WANT TO REAFFIRM AND GIVE EFFECT AND
EXPRESSION TO T$E PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE THROUGH
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SPECIFIC, CONCRETE MEASURES AND AGREEMENTS. IN BOTH
PLACES WE WANT TO BUILD CONFIDENCE, RIDUCE SUSPICION
AND AVOID MISCALCULATION. COMPLIANCE, COMMUNICATION
AND COOPERATION ARE CENTRAL TO OUR POSITION IN GENEVA
AS WELL AS STOCKHOLM.
THERE IS NO DOUBT, THEN, THAT WHA2 HAPPENS IN THE
TALKS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV WILL BE RELEVANT_TO OUR WORK HERE. THE
COMPLEX MULTILATERAL ISSUES OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
ARE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO RESOLUTION IN BILATERAL
MEETINGS, HOWEVER ELEVATED; BUT, AS A SENIOR OFFICIAL
OF MY GOVERNMENT SAID LAST WEER, THE US SEEKS PROGRESS
AT THE SUMMIT WITH REGARD TO THE APPROACHES WHICH THE
US AND THE USSR WILL TAKE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE:
THIS COULD ACT AS A CATALYST FOR OUR WORK HERE AND HELP
TO ASSURE THAT WE MARE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ON THE
ISSUES TO MARE AN AGREEMENT POSSIBLE BEFORE TIME RUNS
OUT ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE NEXT SUMMER.
IT IS, OF COURSE, POSSIBLE THAT THE GENEVA MEETING WILL
NOT RESULT IN CLOSER APPROACHES ON OUR ISSUES HERE. MY
GOVERNMENT WOULD REGRET THIS, BUT IT WOULD IN NO SENSE
DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO A SUCCESSFUL
OUTCOME OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OR TO THE ENERGY WE
WILL DEVOTE TO ACHIEVING IT. MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE
DONE, NO ,MATTER WHAT THIS WEEK BRINGS. IT IS TIME FOR
US TO GET ON WITH IT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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CONF IDENTIAL STOCICHOLM08916
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 20, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 8839
1. CDE VIII - 03S
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS CONSIDERED A NEW
PROPOSAL FOR THE 1986 CALENDAR THAT WOULD SCHEDULE FOUR
SESSIONS WITH A JULY 18 ?ARCET DATE FOR COMPLETING A
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND AN ABSOLUTE CUTOFF DATE OF
SEPTEMBER 19. USDEL CAN SUPPORT THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF
THIS PROPOSAL AND ANTICIPATES A FAVORABLE CAUCUS
DECISION, ALT$OUGH CANADA CONTINUES TO ARGUE TxAT A
CONSENSUS WILL BE NEEDED TO ADJOURN PRIOR TO T3E
NOVEMBER 4 VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. THERE WILL BE A
SPECIAL CAUCUS SESSION TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE T;iE
QUESTION, PROBABLY NOVEMBER 25. WE T$INR A SA'T'ISFACTORY
SOLUTION IS WITHIN REACH. THE CAUCUS FURTHER DETERMINED
THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BEGIN TO ASR QUESTIONIi ON THE
NNA PAPER DESIGNED TO $IGHLIGHT PARALLELS BETWEEN THEIR
PROPOSALS (SC.7) AND SC.1. FOR T$E LONGER TERTi, THE
CAUCUS WILL CONSIDER TACTICS DESIGNED TO BREAK FRAGILE
NNA UNITY ON POINTS W$IC$ ARE NOT IN OUR INTER]iST. THE
UR AND PORTUGAL VOICED CONTINUED CONCERN ABOUT ALLIANCE
PERFORMANCE IN RESPONDING TO THE WARSAW PACT 0!f T$E
FUNCTIONAL APPROAC$ TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIE:~. THE
CAUCUS DISCUSSED WIT$OUT RESOLUTION T$E QUESTION OF THE
NUMBER OF NNA COORDINATORS TO BE EMPLOYED IN ?FfE WORRING
GROUPS. END SUMMARY.
4. 1986 CALENDAR; THE REY ISSUE REMAINS THE CUTOFF
DATE. A DRAFT PROPOSAL TO T$E CONFERENCE GRID GROUP ON
THE 1986 CALENDAR WAS TABLED AS A "COMPROMISE NON-PAPER"
BY T$E CANADIAN AND DUTC$ DEPREPS (OUR REPS ON THE GRID
GROUP) FOR CAUCUS CONSIDERATION. IT PROPOSES FOUR
SC$EDULED SESSIONS IN 1986 BEGINNING ON JANUARY 21. THE
T$IRD SESSION WOULD CONCLUDE JULY 18 (THE TARGET DATE FOR
COMPLETING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT), AT WHICH TIME THE
CONFERENCE COULD DECIDE BY CONSENSUS TO CONCLUDE, BUT A
FOURT$ SESSION IS PROPOSED FOR AUGUST 19 - SEPTEMBER 19,
IF NECESSARY "TO COMPLETE THE DRAFTING OF A CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT." IT NOTES THAT NO CDE MEETINGS WILL PARE PLACE
DURING THE VIENNA PREPCON OR MAIN REVIEW MEETIN~3S, AND
STATES THAT THIS DECISION CAN ONLY BE ALTERED Bi
CONSENSUS. USDEL SUPPOR?S THE THRUST OF THIS PROPOSAL
BUT WILL TRY TO AMEND IT SO THAT IT IS CLEAR TH,~T
EDITING SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY SEPTEMBER 19. TIiIS IS
ESSENTIALLY THE FRENC$ POSITION. CAUCUS CONSENSUS IS
BUILDING FOR T$E SEP?EMBER 19 CUTOFF. DELWORT$ (CANADA),
HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO EXAMINE THE ENTRAILS OF C:>CE
DOCUMENTS FOR THEOLOGICAL GUIDANCE AND HAS DETERMINED
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THAT THERE MUST BE A CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN OR SUSPEND THE
CONFERENCE, AND THUS, IN HIS VIEW, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO
WORK UNTIL NOVEMBER 4 (OR EVEN BEYOND). ALTHOUGH SOME
OTHERS (UR, PORTUGAL) DO NOT DISAGREE WITH DELWORTH'S
READING RF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, NO ONE IS LIKELY TO
SUPPORT HIM IN BLOCKING AN EMERGING CAUCUS CONSENSUS. IT
IS THE USDEL'S VIEW THAT WE CAN ENGINEER A FAVORABLE
CONCLUSION TO THIS DISCUSSION HERE IN STOCKHOLM. A
SPECIAL CAUCUS SESSION WILL DEAL EXLUSIVELY WITH THIS
TOPIC NEXT WEER.
S. DEALING WITH THE NNA: AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.)
OBSERVED ?HAT HIS NNA CONTACTS INDICATE THAT DETAILED
EXPLANATIONS OF THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) WILL NOT BE
FORTHCOMING FOR FEAR SUCH EXPLANATIONS MIGHT UNRAVEL THE
NNA'S POORLY WOVEN UNITY. BARRY ALSO REPORTED THAT NNA
REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ENCOURAGED THE WEST ACTIVELY TO
QUESTION THEIR PROPOSAL, WITH THE CAVEAT THAT NATO SHOULD
AVOID THOSE AREAS OF THE PAPER WHERE COMPROMISES AND
INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES MIGHT NOT .WITHSTAND CLOSE
SCRUTINY. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH BARRY'S
SUGGESTION THAT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WE SHOULD
DEVELOP QUES?IONS TO PUT TO THE NNA THAT HIGHLIGHT
PARALLELS BETWEEN THEIR PAPER AND SC.1, WHILE AVOIDING
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, NOVEMBER 20, 1985
THE NNA'S SORE POINTS. FOR THE LONGER TERM, HOWEVER,
THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR EDES'S (UR) SUGGESTION
THAT IT MAY BE IN OUR INTEREST TO BREAK NNA UNITY ON A
NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH WE DO NOT LIRE -- E.G., THEIR
VARIATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, THE DETAILS OF
THEIR NO?IFICATION AND OBSERVATION REGIMES AND THEIR NON-
USE OF FORCE (NUF) PROPOSAL. DELWORTH (CANADA) ADDED
THAT THE NNA'S HOUSE OF CARDS IS LIKELY TO FALL OF ITS
OWN ACCORD. (COMMENT: IN FACT, WE HAVE ALREADY HEARD
DIVERGENT VIEWS EXPRESSED ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE BY THE
CYPRIOT AND AUSTRIAN REPRESENTATIVE, AND SEVERAL
DIFFERENT SHADES OF THEIR POSITION ON INFORMATION FROM
AUSTRIA, SWEDEN AND FINLAND DELEGATIONS. END COMMENT.)
ONLY FRANCE WAS VOCAL IN OPPOSING THIS LINE AS
GASCHIGNARD CAUTIONED AGAINST EMBARRASSING THE NNA OR
REDUCING THEIR INFLUENCE, WHICH WE MAY NEED LATER.
HOWEVER, EVEN DELWORTH, WHO USUALLY "SWIMS" WITH THE
CAUCUS "WETS," SUPPORTED EDES ON THIS "GET TOUGH" TACTIC,
ALTHOUGH HE ALSO ADVOCATED A LONGER TERM STRA?EGY WHICH
WOULD USE OUR QUESTIONS ON THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF SC.7
AS A MEANS CF DISCOVERING CONSENSUS LANGUAGE. IN
RESPONSE TO THE LATER POINT, CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) ECHOED
AN EARLIER ITALIAN WARNING THAT WE HAVE TO AVOID GIVING
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ANY IMPRESSSION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTI~,TE ON THE
BASIS OF THE NNA PROPOSALS. FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF
EDES'S PROPOSAL WAS PUT INTO ABEYANCE UNTIL AF'~ER THE
CAUCUS HAS HEARD A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SC.'1 FROM THE
~.AUCUS MINI-CLUSTER COORDINATING GROUPS.
6. AIR AND NAVAL: THE CAUCUS CONTINUES TO A,WI-IT THE
MINI-CAUCUSES REPORT ON NEW ARGUMENTS TO BE US~~ IN
RESPONDING TO EASTERN QUESTION ON THE MODALITI~:S OF THE
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN REGARD TO THE NOTIFICATION AND
OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL. ACTIVITIES. THE IR AND
PORTUGAL WERE PARTICULARLY AGITATED ON THIS ISSUE. EDES
(UR) OBSERVED THAT NATO IS VULNERABLE AND NEED: TO
DEVELOP PLAUSIBLE ARGUPff.NTS FOR OUR POSITION, IN RESPONSE
TO THE EAST'S "REASONABLE QUESTIONS." HE ADDEL THAT OUR
PRESENT STANCE RUNS THE RISK OF LOSING THE ARGUMENT FOR
THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. (COMMENT: OF IRONIC INTEREST
WAS GASCHIGNARD'S (FRANCE) STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT
THINK WE HAD TO BE IN A HURRY TO DEVELOP ANSWERS FOR THE
EAST, WHEN, IN FACT, IT HAS BEEN HIS OWN MILITARY ADVISOR
WHO HAS BEEN ROUNDLY CRITICIZED FOR WELCOMING EASTERN
QUESTIONS ON THIS ISSUE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT TTiE FRENCH
DELEGATION RECENTLY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BEEP QUIET ON
THIS ISSUE. END COMMENT.)
7. COORDINATORS: THE CAUCUS CONSIDERED, INCON:LUSIVELY,
A HOST OF OPTIONS ON THE QUESTION Of HOW MANY NYA 000R-
DINATORS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN THE WORKING CLUSTERS. KEY
FACTORS CONSIDERED WEAE THAT: 1) THE NNA CAN A~;REE TO
TWO COORDINATORS (NATO'S CURRENT POSITION), ALTHOUGH THEY
WOULD PREFER FIVE; 2) IF ONLY TWO ARE EMPLOYED, THEY
WOULD LIKELY BE LOIBL (AUS?RIA) AND LIDGARD (SW]:DEN) WITH
RAHILUOTO (FINLAND) HELD IN RESERVE FOR LA?ER (PERHAPS
FOR WORKING GROUP AB); AND 3) THE EAST, ALTHOUG1i
APPARENTLY WILLING TO ACCEPT TWO COORDINATORS, i~OUL,D
PREFER TO HAVE FOUR, WITH ONE FOR EACH GROUP EX(:EPT
INFORMATION/VERIFICATION (A-2) WHICH WOULD BE SZBSUMED
UNDER OTHER CLUSTERS; THUS ACHIEVING THE SOVIET;' OBJEC-
TIVE OF ELIMINATING THOSE TOPICS AS INDEPENDENT MEASURES.
THE CAUCUS PREFERENCE CONTINUES TO BE FOR TWO 000RDIN-
ATORS (WHILE HOLDING OPEN THE OPTION OF MORE LATER), WITH
THE EXCEPTION OF BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) WHO IS S7VBBORNLY
INSISTING ON FIVE COORDINATORS BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY WORK
LOAD. THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO ARE MOST EAGER TC DRAFT
(NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, CANADA) ALSO PROPOSED, WITHOUT
ATTTtAC?ING MUCH SUPPORT, TT;AT COORDINATORS BE BROUGHT IN
BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION, I.E., IN EARLY DECEMBER.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN `
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 08980
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORIAL STATEMEN? IN CDE 11/22/85
1. CDE VIII - 037
2. FOLLOWING ARE THE REMARKS MADE BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT
L. BARRY. HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, TO THE CDE TOD.:Y,
NOVEMBER 22.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEER I WENT OUT ON A LIMB
SOMEWHAT AND TALKED ABOUT WHAT MIGH? BE ACHIEVED IN
GENEVA AND HOW THIS MIGHT AFFECT OUR WORK HERE. I
GUESS IT'S ONLY FAIR TO MEASURE MY EXPECTATIONS AGAINST
THE REALITY OF THE PAST FEW DiAYS. I WOULD HAVE TO SAY
THAT MY RATHER MODEST PLAN HAS BEEN OVER-FULFILLED.
THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS CAME IN THE
INTENSE, PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN
AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV,.OR THAT THERE WAS A
MEETING OF THE MINDS ON SUCH FUNDAMENTALS AS IDEOLOGY
AND NATIONAL PURPOSE. AS THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED
YESTERDAY IN GENEVA SAYS, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON
A NUMBER OF CRUCIAL ISSUES. BUT, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ
SAID BEFORE LEAVING GENEVA YESTERDAY, WE MAVE A PROCESS
UNDERWAY WHICH CAN LEAD TO A MORE STABLE AND
CONSTRUC?IVE RELATIONSHIP -- A "FRESH START" AS
PRESIDENT REAGAN PUT IT.
PROFESSIONAL COMMUNIQUE READERS LIRE OURSELVES DEVELOP
FAVORITE PASSAGES THEY PORE OVER. LET ME PICK OU? A
FEW FROM THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT WHICH SErM
PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO OUR WORK HERE.
FIRS?, THE TWO LEADERS "AGREED ABOUT THE NEED TO
IMPROVE US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION AS A WHOLE."
SECOND, THEY EXPRESSED A "STRONG DESIRE TO SEER COMMON
GROUND ON EXISTING PROBLEMS."
THIRD, "THEY EMPHASIZED THE IMPERATIVE OF PREVENTING
ANY WAR BETWEEN THEM, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL."
FOURTH, THEY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR CONFERENCE
HERE IN STOCKHOLM AND "STATED THEIR INTENTION TO
FACILITATE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPA?ING
STATES, AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE WORK
OF THE CONFERENCE." THERE ARE MANY OTHER IMPOR?ANT
POINTS MADE IN THE JOINT S?ATEMENT, BUT THESE FOUR SEEM
PAR?ICULARLY RELEVANT.
WHAT DO THESE STATEMENTS MEAN FOR US HERE? LET ME
BEGIN BY SAYING WHAT THEY DO NOT MEAN. PRESIDENT
REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAVE NOT ROBBED
US OF OUR MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD. THEY HAVE NOT TAKEN THE
SUBSTANCE OUT OF OUR HANDS AND RESOLVED OUR PROBLEMS
FOR US. INDEED, THEY COULD NOT; THIS IS A MULTILATERAL
FORUM WHF:kE ALL MUST CONTRIBUTE TO SOLD?IONS ON THE
BASIS OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY.
WHAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAVE
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SECRET
PROVIDID TO US -- AND TO OTHER BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATING FORUMS -- IS A POLITICAL
IMPULSE, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID -- PERHAPS A BIT OF
ELECTRIC SHOCK DESIGNID TO SERVE AS A CATALYST TO OUR
WORK. IN HIS REPORT LAST NIGLiT TO A JOINT SESSION OF
CONGRESS ON HIS RETURN FROM GENEVA, PRESIDENT REAGAN
SAID THAT THE TWO LEADERS MEANT ?0 GIVE A BOOST TO OUR
EFFORTS HERE IN S?OCRHOLM, AND TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN
VIENNA AND ELSEWHERE AS WELL. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH
WHAT HE TOLD ME BEFORE THE GENEVA MEETING; AS I SAID ON
NOVEMBER LL, THE PRESIDENT INSTRUCTID ME ON NOVEMBER 5
TO REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD
ENHANCE SECURITY AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN
EUROPE.
FROM USDEL CDE
USIA FOR P/PFE
E.O. L2356: DECL: N/A
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORIAL STATEMENT IN CDE 11/22/35
WE ALL KNOW WHAT THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD LOOK LII:E. IT
WILL EVOLVE FROM THE WORKING STRUCTURE; ZT WILI. INCLUDE
A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AS
WELL AS SPECIFIC, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFII)ENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. WE ALL ACCEPT THIS
HERE IN THIS ROOM.
WE ALSO KNOW HOW AN AGREEMENT MUST BE PRODUCID, IT
WILL BE THE RESULT OF STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO IDEP(TIFY
COMMON GROUND, NOT EFFORTS TO WIN DEBATING POIDfTS ON
AREAS IN WHICH WE DISAGREE. THIS MEANS SETTIN(~ ASIDE
AREAS WHERE THERE IS NO CONVERGENCE IN HOPES TEAT THE
MOMENTUM ACHIEVID IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS W]LL CARRY
US THROUGH SOME PAINFUL COMPROMISES. ABOVE ALI,,
PROGRESS REQUIRES THAT WE NOT REFIGHT PROCIDURAL
BATTLES OR ENGAGE IN THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES. WE DON'T
HAVE THE TIME ?0 IMITATE THE CHURCH COUNCILS OF THE
MIDDLE AGES.
MY DELEGATION IS READY TO PURSUE THIS APPROACH, AS ARE
THE OTHER SPONSORS OF SC 1. WE DON'T HAVE TIME FOR ANY
OTHER. WE ARE READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE DELEGATION
OF T$E SOVIET UNION AND WITH ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS HERE
IN THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA WHICH HAS EMERGED THIS WEER.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
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CONF IDENT IAL STOCRHOLM09110
SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMUNIQUE
REF: A) GUNDERSEN/$URTON TELCON NOVEMBER 26,
- B) STOCKHOLM 8979
1. CDE VIII - 044.
2. C - ENTIRE TERT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY CLAIMS
THAT THE WORD "BOTH" IS PRESENT IN THE RUSSIAN AND
ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSIONS OF THE CDE PORTION OF THE
GENEVA JOINT COMMUNIQUE. NEVERTHELESS, GRINEVSRY HAS
ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE USDEL'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE
COMMUNIQUE, I.E., IT IS A STATEMENT MEANT TO GIVE A
POSITIVE "POLITICAL SIGNAL" TO THE STOCKHOLM AND OTHER
NEGOTIATIONS AND, THEREFORE, THE CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT
INVOLVE ITSELF IN THEOLOGICAL DEBATES AS TO THE MEANING
OF SPECIFIC WORDS OR PHRASES. AC?ION REQUESTED IN
PARA 8. END SUMMARY.
4. IN A NOVEMBER 26 CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR BARRY
SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSRY CLAIMED THAT THE CDE PORTION
OF THE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE GENEVA JOINT COMMUNIQUE
INCLUDED THE WORD "BOTH" WHEN REFERRING TO CSBM'S AND
NUF, I.E., THEY REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR A
DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE /BOTH/ MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND GIVE
CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-USE OF FORCE." THE SOVIETS AND SOME OF THEIR ALLIES
IN CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALREADY P~.LUDED THE
UNOFFICIAL RUSSIAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE JOINT
COMMUNIQUE (PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA) WHICH INCLUDES THE
PHRASE "RAR TAR I" IN THE ABOVE SENTENCE, WHICH
ALSO CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO "BOTH AND" IN
ENGLISH. AS NOTED REF B, ADDING "BOTH" TO THE TEXT
GIVES EMPHASIS TO THE SOVIET APPROAC$ WHICH SEPARATES
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CSBM'S AND THE "CONCRETIZATION" OF
THE NUF PRINCIPLE. BARRY SAID OFFICIAL U.S. TEXT DID
NOT USE THIS WORDING AND THAT HE ASSUMED I? APPEARED
ONLY IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION AND WAS THUS NOT
AUTHENTIC. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD DOUBLE CHECK WITH
WASHINGTON IF GRINEVSRY WOULD CHECK WITH MOSCOW.
5. BASED ON REF TELCON, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT
THE WORD "BOTH" DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE ENGLISH VERSION
OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. FURTHERMORE, WE UNDERSTAND
THAT THE WORD "BOTH" WAS DROPPED BY U.S. AND SOVIET
NEGOTIATORS BY MUTUAL CONSENT IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
TEXT (THE WORKING LANGUAGE) DURING THE DISCUSSION IN
GENEVA OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. FINALLY, WE ARE
INFORMED THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS YET TO RECEIVE FROM THE
SOVIETS THEIR OFFICIAL RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF THE
ENGLISH TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE AND IS DISCUSSING
THIS WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE APPROPRIATE BILATERAL
CHANNELS.
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6. IN ANY CASE, IN S?OCICHOLM WE HAVE CONVEYED THE
STRONG MESSAGE TO GRINEVSRY AND OTHERS THAT THE JOINT
COMMUNIQUE IS A POLITICAL STATEMENT THAT, AS SECRETARY
SHULTZ NOTED, SHOULD SERVE AS "A POLITICAL IMPULSE" TO
OUR WORK HERE. IT IS AN AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO
IMPROVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, MOREOVER, AND S;30ULD SET
THE TONE FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE AND ELSEWHERE.
FINALLY, THE JOINT STATEMENT STRESSES THE MULT[LATERAL
NATURE OF THE CSCE PROCESS. THEREFORE, FOR US HERE IN
STOCKHOLM TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A THEOLOGICAL DEBATE
REGARDING THE MEANING OF SPECIFIC WORDS OR PHRASES OF
THE JOIN?, I.E., BILATERAL STATEMENT WOULD BE
INCONSISTENT WITH THE "SPIRIT OF GENEVA." FUR"HERMORE,
SUC$ A DEBATE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE; A STERILE
THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION MIGHT EVEN BE DESTRUCTIt~E, COMING
SO CLOSE ON THE HEELS OF AN IMPOR?ANT MEETING ~IHICH HAS
PROVIDED US WITH A "FRESH START" IN STOCKHOLM ~.ND
ELSEWHERE.
7. GRINEVSRY HAS AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH IN PRINCIPLE
AND HAS NOT PRESSED THE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH SOME OF' HIS
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMUNIQUE
EASTERN MINIONS, E.G. THE GDR AMBASSADOR, HAVE ALLUDED
TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE TO BUTTRESS THE
EASTERN APPROACH TO NUF.
8. ACTION REQUESTED: DELEGATION RECOMMENDS THAT THE
MATTER BE TAKEN UP WITH THE SOVIETS IF THEY PERSIST IN
USING THE UNOFFICIAL RUSSIAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE
TEXT, I.E., INCLUDING THE RUSSIAN TERM "RAR .I",
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONF IDENT IALSTOCRHOLM08979
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 22, 1985
1. CDE VIII - 038.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. PEGIN SUMMARY: THE NOVEMBER 22 PLENARY FEATURED
POSITIVE U.S. AND SOVIET CHARACTERIZA?IONS OF THE SUMMIT
MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV. MALTA, REPORTING ON THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED
MEETING OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS OF MEDITERRANEAN MEMBERS OF
THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, STRESSED ITS DESIRE TO MERGE
MEDITERRANEAN FORA WITH THE CSCE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.
4. DRAWING FROM THE U.S.-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT,
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPOR? TO CONGRESS, AND COMMENTS MADE
BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ, AMBASSADOR
BARRY STRESSED THAT THE SUMMIT IS, THE START OF A PROCESS
DESIGNED TO LEAD TO A MORE STABLE, CONSTRUCTIVE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS
CONTEXT, BARRY SAID THE SUMMIT PROVIDES A POLITICAL
IMPULSE -- A CATALYST -- TO THE WORK OF CDE. HE POINTED
OUT THA? SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS MUST BE RESOLVED IN
STOCKHOLM, BECAUSE CDE IS A MULTILATERAL FORUM IN WHICH
ALL STATES ENJOY SOVEREIGN EQUALITY. HE URGED
PARTICIPANTS TO SET ASIDE AREAS IN WHICH THERE IS NO
CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS, AND TO AVOID DEBILITATING
PROCEDURAL AND THEOLOGICAL DISPUTES. AMBASSADOR BARRY
PLEDGED TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIETS AND OTHER
DELEGATIONS -- IN THE "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" -- IN ORDER TO
PRODUCE A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. (FULL TEXT FOLLOWS
SEPTEL.)
5. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CHARACTERIZED THE SUMMIT AS
HAVING "EXCEEDING IMPORTANCE" TO IMPROVEMENT IN
U.S.-SOLIE? RELATIONS. HE CITED GORBACHEV'S NOVEMBER 21
PRESS CONFERENCE, THE PCC MEETING IN SOFIA, AND HE
REVIEWED SOVIET ARMS CONTROL "INITIATIVES" AS FURTHER
PROOF OF THE SOVIET INTENTION TO FIND NEW SOLUTIONS TO
PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. WHILE GRINEVSKY
ADMITTED THERE WERE "MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION" AND
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS WERE NOT SOLVED, HE NONETHELESS SAID
WORK WILL CONTINUE TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR QUOTED THE SECTION ON CDE IN THE JOINT
STATEMENT, AND NOTED SIMPLY THAT "THE TEXT SPEARS FOR
ITSELF."
6. BEGIN COMMEN?: WE HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET
DELEGATION WHAT IS SAID TO BE THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
VERSION OF THE JOINT COP4~SUNIQUE WHICH INCLUDES THE
PHRASE "RAK TAR I" IN THE SECOND SENTENCE, WHICH
CAN BE TT.ANSLATED INTO "BOTH AND" IN ENGLISH. THE
SENTENCE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH THUS READS: " .~. .
THEY REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD
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INCLUDE /BOTH/ MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLC CSBM'S /ANT/ GIVE
CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-USE OF FORCE." ADDING "BOTH" TO THE TEXT GIVES
EMPHASIS TO THE SOVIET APPROACH WHICH SEPARATES MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE CSBM'S AND THE "CONCRETIZATION" OF THE NUF
PRINCIPLE. ACCORDING TO SOVIET THINKING,
"CONCRETIZATION" MEANS DEVELOPMEN? AND ELABORATION OF
THE NUF PRINCIPLE. ACCORDINGLY, THE SOVIETS GAN BE
EXPECTED TO TRY TO EXPLOIT THEIR VERSION OF THE
COMMUNIQUE. WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THA? T.3E
COMMUNIQUE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AND THAT IT IS IN~;ONSISTENT
WITH THE "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" TO ENGAGE IN THEOLi)GICAL
DEBATES ON THE MEANING OF THE COMMUNIQUE LANGU,~GE.
7. AMBASSADOR GAUCI (MALTA) NOTED THAT MEDITERRANEAN
ECONOMIC EXPERTS OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT REI;ENTLY MET
IN VALETTA TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC PROPOSALS ON TR~-DE,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND RESEARCH; SPECIFIC RECOMME1fDATIONS
FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS RESULTED FROM THIS MEETING.
GAUCI ALSO STRESSED MALTA'S DESIRE TO MERGE MEDITERRANEAN
PROCESSES WITH EUROPEAN PROCESSES, IN THE CONTF;XT OF THE
MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE HELSINKI FINAL AC7'.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLK 09109
SUBJECT: CDE: "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" IN STOCKHOLM
1. CDE VIII-044 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEX?.
2. SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS ARE HIN?ING TO US THAT THEY
READ THE GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT AS A MA*iDATE TO RELEASE
THEIR STRANGLEHOLD ON MILITARY MEASURES IN CDE. THE
QUALIFICATIONS ARE THAT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WILL ONLY
COME AFTER COORDINATORS HAVE BEEN APPOINTED. THE CSBM-
NUF LINKAGE WILL REMAIN IN PLACE. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN
HOW THESE ATMOSPHERICS WILL TRANSLATE INTO REALITY.
END SUMMARY.
3. WE HAVE DEVOTED THE LAST FEW DAYS TO DETERMINING
HOW THE SOVIETS INTERPRET GENEVA AS A MANDATE FOR CDE.
OUR LINE, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, IS THAT THE GENEVA
JOIN? STATEMENT WAS INTENDED TO GIVE A POLITICAL IMPULSE
TO THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. OUR INTEN?ION IS NOT TO
ARGUE OVER INTERPRETA?IONS OF THE WORDING OF THE CDE
PARAGRAPH BU? TO GET ON WITH AN EFFORT TO FIND COMMON
GROUND ON CSBMS. IN AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN OUR HOLD
ON THE HIGH GROUND, WE HAVE PUBLICLY PLEDGED OUR READI-
NESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION (AND ALL
OTHERS) TO THIS END.
4. THE SOVIETS BEGAN TO RESPOND PRIVATELY IN A SERIES
OF BILATERAL CONTAG?S ON NOVEMBER 25/26. (BARRY/
GRINEVSRY, DASD FEITH/GRINEVSRY, DASD FEITH AND MEMBERS
OF US DEL/TATARNIROV, SOLOMENRO, ROZANOV ET AL., DASD
FEITH AND GDR AMBASSADOR BURRING) SEVERAL REY POINTS
EMERGED;.
-- GRINEVSRY SEEMS TO AGREE 'THAT WE SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC
ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE CDE PARAGRAPH IN THE
GENEVA JOINT STATEMENT AND ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE.
(BARRY/GRINEVSRY)
-- THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE
PREPARED TO SET ASIDE NAVAL (AND POSSIBLY AIR) ACTIVITIES
ISSUES AND MOVE AHEAD ON IDENTIFYING COMMON GROUND ON
CSBMS. GRINEVSRY TOLD BARRY THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO
PLACE NAVAL AND-AIR ISSUE IN BRACKETS AND DISCUSS CSBH
CONCEPTS WHERE THERE WAS COMMON GROUND. IN DISCUSSION
WITH FEITH, ROZANOV SUGGESTED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE US
POSI?ION ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND THAT THIS NEED NO? BE
AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS. AMBASSADOR
BURRING (GDR) IN A BILATERAL WITH FEITH ALSO HINTED AT
WTO SOFTNESS ON NAVAL ISSUE WHILE CLAIMING A SPECIAL GDR
INTERES? IN AIR ACTIVITIES OVER THE ZONE.
-- GRINEVSRY TOLD BARRY THAT THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED
IN RESUMING SUBSTANTIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
US HERE. THIS WAS TRIED BRIEFLY DURING ROUND 6 WHEN
THERE WERE MEETINGS BETWEEN US AND SOVIET MILITARY;
NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE CAME OF THIS. THE SUGGESTION IS
THA? SOME PROGRESS COULD NOW BE MADE PROVIDED THAT WE
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ARE PREPARED TO SAY A LITTLE ABOUT OUR VIEW CAN HOW NUF
SHOULD BE TREATED. GRINEVSRY SUGGESTED THE C~UT-OF-
GARRISON CONCEPT AS ONE WHERE BILATERAL PROGRESS COULD
BE !BADE SINCE "WE ARE BOTH SAYING THE SAME THING IN
DIFFERENT WORDS."
S. GRINEVSRY'S MAIN QUALIFIER IN ALL THIS WAS THAT
SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS COULD NOT BE MADE IN PUBLIC DEBATE
IN THE WORKING GROUPS. ONLY WHEN COORDINATORS HAD BEEN
APPOINTED AND POSITION SHIFTS COULD BE RECORDED PRIVATELY
WOULD THINGS BEGIN TO HAPPEN. BARRY'S MAIN QUALIFIER
WAS THAT THE WES? WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT COORDINATORS
WOULD STICK TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE OCTOBER 14 AGREEMENT
SETTING UP THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE; WE WOULD HAVE
TO BE SURE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS CHOSEN - AND THE NUMBER
CHOSEN - WOULD NOT PREJUDICE OUR PROPOSALS.
6. COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST HINT OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY
ON SUBS?ANCE WE HAVE SEEN SINCE AMBASSADOR G0~)DBY'S
DISCUSSION WITH GRINEVSRY IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER. PART OF
THIS IS NO DOUBT SIMPLY A REACTION ?0 THE EME1tGENCE OF
THE NNA PAPER AND THE FACT THAT THEY WERE AFRAID TO MARE
A MOVE UNTIL THE SUMMIT WAS OVER. BUT PART PLAY BE A
RESULT OF THE BOOST WE RECEIVED FROM THE GENES-A JOINT
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PAR, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: "SPIRIT OF GENEVA" IN STOCKHOLM
STATEMENT AND THE SUMMIT'S "FRESH STAR?." IT REMAINS TO
BE SEEN HOW THESE ATMOSPHERICS WILL TRANSLATE INTO
REALITY.
BARRY
-END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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Remarks
made by Ambassador v, ~, Gauci
in Plenary 22 November 1985
Mr. Chairman.
In October 2, 1984, the Maltese Delegation to the CDE
brought to the attention of al l? participants the positive
results and solemn undertakings agreed to by the Foreign
Ministers of all the Mediterranean members of the non-aligned
aiovement,~in the historic first meeting held in Valletta
on 10 and 11 September 1984. The text of the Valletta Declaration
was at that time made available to all, and hence I will
not repeat the details.
I am glad to be able to report today that a follow-up
meeting of economic experts has just been completed in Valletta
this month. while taking note of developments of interest
to the Mediterranean region that have occurred in the intervening
period - most notably the discussions held in this-forum
- the economic experts examined in depth proposals on economic
co-operation between themselves and with European countries
which could be further developed. and made specific recommendations
which will be taken up at Ministerial level at a subsequent
stage early next year. The proceedings of the Venice Seminar
on economic, scientific and cultural co-operation in the
~ a~M"'
Mediterranean were fully into account. The proposals concentrated
principally on trade, communications and research.
It wild therefore be noted. Mr. Chairman. that the decision
of the non-aligned countries to concert views and devise ?
joint activities for strengthening co-operation is gaining
strength and finding avenues for implementation. It is. as
we indicated previously, a process which parallels and derives
inspiration from the proceedings taking place in this forum
within the CSCE process, as defies ~ by the Mediterranean -
Chapter of the Helsinki Final Act. It is our earnest desire
-..-.. _.
that these processes will eventually merge. And our participation
here wi I 1 seek to bring thi s about . 437 SECR$T
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Mr. Chairman. I was glad to note the outcome of the
recent Geneva summit between the United States President
and the General Secretary of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, in so far as. it relates not only t~ the CDE meeting.
but also to all other aspects of bilateral arn~ international
relations. It is our sincere hope that the dialogue thus
having been restored. after its regrettable i:~terruption
for far too many precious years, will now herald a new spirit
of what I might perhaps call the "entente ess~antielle" -
the realisation that we all inhabit a small a~zd fragile planet,
and that we can only survive as long as we all pull in the
same direction towards disarmament, justice acid peace throughout
the world.
438
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09070
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
NOVEMBER 18-22, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 8860
1. CrE viii - 043
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SOVIET UNION CLEARLY WAS AWAITING
THE SUMMIT TO SEE WHICH WAY THE WIND WOULD BLOW IN
STOCKHOLM. MARKING TIME IN A NUMBER OF MEETINGS, 1TiE
EAST WAS LESS COMBATIVE THAN LAST WEER, ALTHOUGH IT
CONTINUED TO PUSH ITS TWO BASIC THEMES: 1) THE WEST IS
TO BLAME FOR FOOTDRAGGING IN STOCKHOLM AND 2) GROUND,
AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES MUST BE INCLUDED IN A CSBM'S
REGIME. AT THE SAME TIME NATO COORDINATED ITS STATEMENTS
MORE EFFECTIVELY IN THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS, ALTHOUGH
INDIVIDUALS OCCASIONALLY STRAYED OFF THE RESERVATION.
NOW FREE TO ELABORATE ON THEIR NEW PROPOSAL, THE NNA
EXPLAINED SC.7'S "INTERLINRAGES" AND IN SO DOING
DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION EMERGED. END SUMMARY.
THE EAST:
4. THE SUMMIT AND STOCKHOLM: IN CDE WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS DURING THE WEER OF NOVEMBER 11-15, THE USSR
CLEARLY WAS WAITING FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT TO
DETERMINE WHIC$ WAY THE WIND WOULD BLOW IN STOCKHOLM.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIETS WERE FAR LESS COMBATIVE THAN
THEY HAD BEEN THE WEEK HEFORE (REFTEL), ALTHOUGH THEY
PUSHED THE SAME THEMES: 1) THE WEST IS BLOCKING PROGRESS
IN STOCKHOLM AND 2) AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, IN ADDITION
TO GROUND ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE CSBM'S TO
BE AGREED IN STOCKHOLM. THEY TRIED TO HANG THE WEST BY
ITS OWN ROPE, REQUESTING SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR NAVAL
AND AIR ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH NOTIFIABLE
GROUND ACTIVITIES, IN OTHER WORDS UNDER THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH. THEY ALSO CRITICIZED SC.1'S OUT-OF-GARRISON
CONCEPT AND THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AS BEING NARROW
CONCEPTS BECAUSE THEY EXCLUDE AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
5. NUF: DISCUSSION WAS MORE HARMONIOUS IN THE NUF
MEETING THAN LAST WEER WHEN THE WEST WAS ACCUSED OF
VIOLATING THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT. SOVIET REP
RARHI7ANINOV IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED A U.S. STATEMENT (BY NOT
REJECTING IT ON THE SPOT) THAT THE USSR HAD ACCEPTED THE
NOTION THAT THE ADOPTION OF CONCRETE AND MANDATORY CSBM'S
WOULD MARE THE USE AND THREAT OF USE OF FORCE LESS
LIKELY. RARHZSANINOV CLEARLY WAS PLEASED BY THE FIRST
SUBSTANTIVE NATO (NETHERLANDS) EXPLORATION OF HIS OUTLINE
FOR A NUF AGREEMENT PRESENTED TO THE GROUP AT THE END OF
THE LAST ROUND.
6. ROMANIA'S "DECLARATION:" ROMANIA SUBMITTED DETAILED
CONTENTS OF A NUF "DECLARATION, AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF
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TEE FUTURE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT." ACCORDING TO :tOMANIA,
THE DECLARATION WOULD CONSIST OF FOUR "BUILDING BLOCKS,"
THREE OF WHICH .CONSIST OF EASTERN-STYLE DECLARATORY
' LANGUAGE, WHILE THE FOURTH WOULD CONTAIN CSBM'S TO BE
AGREED UPON.
7. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: THE EAST YET AGA:[N WAS
MUTE ON THE SUBJECT OF INFORMATION. AS LONG AS THE
MEETING FOCUSED ON INFORMATION, THE GDR CHAIRMArr WAS
NOTICEABLY ANXIOUS TO GAVEL THE MEETING CLOSED. THE
EAST CAME TO LIFE, HOWEVER, WHEN NATO TURNED THI:
DISCUSSION TO VERIFICATION. THE SOVIET UNION CIAIMED
THAT THE WESTERN POSITION ON INSPECTIONS HAD CRINGED:
INSTEAD OF BEING RESERVED FOR EXCEPTIONAL CASES AS
PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, INSPECTION NOW WAS "ROUTIIiE."
(BEGIN COMMENT: THIS S?ATEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED
TO HIGHLIGHT THE WEST'S ISOLATION ON THIS ISSUE IN LIGHT
OF A SWEDISH STATEMENT ON THE ROLE OF "OBSERVATION BY
REQUEST" (SEE PARR 11 BELOW). END COMMENT.) THE
SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS ALSO REJECTED THE DUTCH
"ULTIMATUM" THAT WITHOUT ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
INSPECTION THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT.
NA?0:
8. ON AND OFF THE RESERVATION: THE WESTERN ALL;[ANCE HAS
HELD TOGETHER~AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED UNDER THE NEW
DEMANDS OF THE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. NATO SPEAKERS
HAVE FOCUSED ON SC.1'S CENTRAL CONCEPTS -- THE 0()G CON=
CEPT AND THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER -- AND HAVE STI;ESSED
THAT SC.1 PROVISIONS WOULD RESULT IN A GREATER NZfMBER OF
NOTIFIED AC?IVITIES THAN WOULD THE WTO'S PROPOSALS.
HOWEVER, THERE INEVITABLY HAVE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN
INDIVIDUALS HAVE STRAYED OFF THE RESERVATION -- A.S WHEN
THE FRENCH MILREP CALLED VERIFICATION A "POLITICAL"
MEASURE AND WHEN THE DUTCH MILREP SAID THAT THERE WOULD
BE NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT ADEQUATE INSPECTION (THE MANDATE
CALLS FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION). MOREOVER, A NUMBER OF
NATO DELEGATIONS ARE CALLING FOR BETTER ARGUMENTS IN
FAVOR OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND AGAINST INCLUSION
OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM'S
REGIME. AND FINALLY, WITH YET ANOTHER (ROMANIAN) NUF
TEXT ON THE TABLE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE MORE TROUBLE
HOLDING BACK THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO ARE EAGER TO DRAFT
NATO NUF LANGUAGE.
THE NNA:
'l. INTERLINRAGES AND DIFFERENCES: NNA SPEAKERS ;iTRESSED
THE "INTERLINICAGES" AMONG DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF S1;.7,
E.G. THE USE OF THE SAME PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICAT:[ON,
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OBSERVATION AND CONSTRAINTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: WE HAD
HEARD BEFORE THE NNA TABLED THEIR PAPER THAT THEY
REALIZED THAT THESE INTERLINKAGES WOULD POSE PROBLEMS FOR
THEM WHEN THEY TRIED TO BREAK THEIR PACKAGE UP FOR
DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUPS. END COMMENT.) IN
ADDITION, NOW FREE TO DISCUSS THEIR PROPOSAL, DIFFERENCES
WITHIN THE NNA GROUP QUICKLY SURFACED. WHILE THE CYPRIOT
AMBASSADOR CONTINUED TO PUSH FOR HIS CDE/CSCE DIMENSION
(THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE), AUSTRIA DELIVERED AN IMPOR-
TANT STATEMENT ON NUF WHICH SHARED FAR MORE WI?H THE
WEST'S STATED POSITION THAN WITH THOSE OF THE EAST OR OF
HIS CYPRIOT COLLEAGUE.
10. COMMON GROUND ON OBSERVATION: NNA SPEAKERS (SWEDEN
AND FINLAND) ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN
PRINCIPLE THAT EVERY NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY SHOULD BE
OBSERVED, ON THE PURPOSES OF OBSERVATION AND ON THE
OBLIGATION TO INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING
STATES. THE USSR WAS QUICK TO DISABUSE ALL OF THE NOTION
TEAT COMMON GROUND EXISTED ON THESE PRINCIPLES, INSISTING
THAT NOTHING COULD BE DECIDED UNTIL THE REAL QUESTION OF
PRINCIPLE -- WHAT WOULD BE OBSERVED -- HAD BEEN RESOLVED.
11. OBSERVATION BY INVITATION VS. OBSERVA?ION BY
REQUEST: THE NNA BLURRED THE DISTINCTION WHICH THE WEST
HAS SOUGHT TO PRESERVE BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION
BY CALLING OBSERVATION THE "PRINCIPAL FORM OF VERIFICA-
TION;" FINLAND NOTED THAT OBSERVATION WOULD BE THE
PRINCIPAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION FOR SMALL STATES WITHOUT
NTK'S. ACCORDING TO NNA THINKING, INSPECTIONS, OR
"OBSERVATIONS BY REQUEST" AS THEY PREFER TO CALL THEM,
WOULD BE USED AS A LAST RESORT FOR SUSPECTED UNNOTIFIED
ACTIVITIES.
12. INFORMATION: AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND CALLED FOR A
MUCH BROADER EXCHANGE OF INFORMA?ION THAN WOULD OCCUR IN
THE NARROWEST CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. THE LATTER ARGUED
THAT THE EXCHANGE OF BOTH STATIC AND DYNAMIC INFORMATION
IS IMPORTAN? MILITARILY, ESPECIALLY FOR STATES WITHOUT
NTM'S. THE SWISS MILREP NOTED THAT IT WOULD EQUALIZE THE
ABILITY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE AND PUSHED FOR THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATION.
13. ANNUAL FORECASTS VS. CALENDARS: SWEDEN SPARRED A
PROCEDURAL DEBATE OVER THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREE-
FROM USDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS,
MENT ON INFORMAL STRUCTURE BY REFUSING TO ANSWER AN FRG
QUESTION REGARDING THE NNA'S ANNUAL CALENDAR PROPOSAL IN
THE MEETING ON CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS. (BEGIN FYI:
THE NNA LONG HAVE INSISTED THAT THEIR ANNUAL CALENDAR IS
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25X1
PART OF THEIR SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION AND, THUS, SHOULD BE
DISCUSSED IN THE NOTIFICATION MEETING. END FYI.) THE
U.S. TRIED TO SUPPORT THE FRG BY SHOWING THAT 18E SUB-
STANCE OF THE NATO AND NNA CALENDAR PROPOSALS IS NEARLY
IDENTICAL AND DOES NOT MERIT SABOTAGING THE GEYTLEMEN'S
AGREEMENT. A NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES PRIVATELY W~~RRY THAT
UNLESS AGREEMENT IS REACHED TO DISCUSS DIFFERE~dT CALENDAR
PROPOSALS IN THE SAKE MEETING, THIS WILL PRESEI~iT PROBLEMS
WHEN WE MOVE TO DRAFTING AND WILL SET A DANGEROUS PRECE-
DENT WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD UTILIZE IN THE FUTURE TO
MOVE DISCUSSION OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATI01~ TO THE
NOTIFICATION MEETING.
14. THE MALTESE MARKER; MALTA LAID A CLEAR Mi~RKER BOTH
IN THE JOINT WORKING GROUP (AB) AND IN THE PLE1(ARY MEE?-
ING TEAT AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM WOULD HAVE "0 INCLUDE
THE "MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION" OF EUROPEAN SECUI:ITY. THE
MALTESE AMBASSADOR INSISTED THA? GROUND, AIR Al!tD NAVAL
ACTIVITIES BE CONSIDERED EQUALLY AND CALLED THl; MALTESE
PROPOSAL (SC.S) "A SUPPLEMENT TO SC.3 -- OR SC,7,"
INDICATING THAT WE WILL BE HEARING MORE IN THE FUTURE
ABOUT MALTA'S MEDITERRANEAN PROPOSALS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09066
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
- NOVEMBER 18-22, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 8881, B) STOCKHOLM 8789
1. CDE VIII - 042
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) MOVED ONTO
CENTER STAGE STOCKHOLM TO LESS THAN A ROUSING RECEPTION.
THE PURPOSEFUL AMBIGUITIES AND AWKWARD COMPROMISES
CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSAL ALREADY HAVE BEGUN TO UNRAVEL
UNDER CLOSER SCRUTINY. NATO HAS BEGUN TO QUESTION SC.7
ACTIVELY IF GINGERLY WHILE STILL FOCUSING ITS EFFORTS
ON PROMOTING THE WESTERN PACKAGE. THE EAST HAS LARGELY
STAYED CLEAR OF T$E NNA PROPOSAL WHILE DEVELOPING ITS
OWN TWISTS ON SUCH WESTERN CONCEPTS AS THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH. END SUMMARY.
4. NATO: AFTER DEVOTING T00 MANY HOURS TO GRANDILOQUENT
IF UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF NATO TACTICS AND PROCEDURES.
IN THE WORKING GROUPS, THE CAUCUS ULTIMATELY DECIDED TO
LEAVE MOST TACTICAL DECISIONS TO THE INDIVIDUAL NATO
MINI-CLUSTERS. ACCORDINGLY, THE MINI-CLUSTERS HAVE
DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED THEIR OWN APPROACHES.
REGARDING THE NNA PROPOSAL, THE WEST HAS BEGUN TO
QUESTION SC.7 ACTIVELY BUT GINGERLY, WITH A VIEW TOWARDS
HIGHLIGHTING PARALLELS BETWEEN SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND ASPECTS
OF THE NNA PAPER. IN WORKING GROUP B, NATO SPEAKERS ARE
BEGINNING TO IDENTIFY AREAS OF COMMON GROUND. AT THE
SAME. TIKE, NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE TRIED TO AVOID GIVING
ANY IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PREPARED ?0 NEGOTIATE ON THE
BASIS OF SC.7. ON NUF, WHERE, ABSENT A FORkAI. NATO
PROPOSAL, NO COMMON GROUND CAN BE IDENTIFIED, THE WEST
HAS TRIED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE NUF COMKITMENT. ALONG THESE
LINES, THE WEST WAS ABLE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO AC~NOW-
LEDGE AT THE LAST WORKING GROUP THAT THE ADOPTION OF A
SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONCRETE AND MANDATORY
CSBM'S WOULD MAKE THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE LESS LIKELY.
S. WHILE THE MINI-CLUSTERS WRESTLED WITH THE PROSAIC
ISSUES OF WORKING GROUP TACTICS, THE CAUCUS TACKLED THE
COSMIC ISSUES, E.G. WHEN TO START AND STOP WORKING IN
1986. THESE SEEMINGLY FRIVgLOUS PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS,
HOWEVER, DO HAVE LONG-TERM SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS.
WHO SHOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, DETERKINE THE UL?IMATE FATE OF
THE CDE -- STOCKHOLM OR VIENNA? THERE SEEMS TO BE A
CONSENSUS IN THE CAUCUS THAT IT MUST BE VIENNA. A
"COMPROMISE NON-PAPER" WAS FLOATED IN THE CAUCUS WHICH
CALLS FOIL FOUR SCHEDULED SESSIONS IN 1986, BEGINNING
JANUARY 21. THE THIRD SESSION WOULD CONCLUDE JULY 18
(THE TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETING A CONCLUDING DOCUKENT),
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25X1
AT WHICH TIME THE CONFERENCE COULD DECIDE BY :ONSENSUS
TO CONCLUDE, BUT A FOURTH SESSION IS PROPOSED FOR AUGUST
19 - SEPTEMBER 19, IF NECESSARY "TO COMPLETE 'fHE DRAFTING
OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT." THE PAPER NOTES TiAT NO CDE
MEETINGS WILL TARE PLACE DURING THE VIENNA PRI:PCON OR
MAIN REVIEW MEETING AND STATES THAT THIS DECI'iION CAN
ONLY BE ALTERED BY CONSENSUS. WE SUPPORT THE THRUST OF
THIS PROPOSAL, AND CAUCUS CONSENSUS SEEMS TO 13E BUILDING
FOR THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE. HOWEVER, Cr~NADIAN
AMBASSADOR DELWORTH CONTINUES TO EXAMINE THE 1~iTRAILS OF
CSCE DOCUMENTS FOR THEOLOGICAL GUIDANCE AND HIS
DETERMINED THAT THERE MUST BE A CONSENSUS TO ~-DJOURN OR
SUSPEND THE CONFERENCE AND THUS, IN HIS VIEW, WE MUST BE
PREPARED TO WORK UNTIL NOVEMBER 4 (OR EVEN BE~'OND).
6. TAE CAUCUS WAS ALSO UNABLE TO ESTABLISH A COMMON LINE
ON THE QUESTION OF HOW MANY NNA COORDINATORS :;HOULD BE
EMPLOYED IN THE WORKING CLUSTERS. THIS QUEST]ON, IN OUR
VIEW, IS NOT AS PRESSING AS THE CALENDAR ISSUE. THE
CAUCUS PREFERENCE CONTINUES TO BE FOR TWO COORDINATORS
(WHILE HOLDING OPEN THE OPTION FOR MORE LATER). NEITHER
THE NNA NOR THE EAST APPEARS WILLING TO LAY THEIR CARDS
ON THE TABLE AND PREFERS TO HAVE NATO PUT IN THE OPENING
FROM USDEL
E'. 0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,
BID. THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO MOVE
INTO DRAFTING (NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, CANADA), ACCORDINGLY,
ARE THE MOST ANXIOUS TO SOLVE THIS ISSUE, PREFERABLY
BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION. WE ARE IN NO SUCH HURRY.
7. NNA: THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) DRAFTED WITH SUCH
PAINSTAKING IMPRECISION, IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO 1JNRAVEL
UNDER EVEN THE MOST GENTLE QUESTIONING FROM TH1: WEST.
ON NUF, AUSTRIA AND CYPRUS CLASHED OVER HOW BE;iT TO
REAFFIRM THE NUF COMMITMENT; THE AUSTRIANS WAN" A SHORT
UNAMBIGUOUS REAFFIRMATION BASED ON THE UN CHAR"ER; THE
CYPRIOTS, AN ELABORATION OF THE MANIFESTATION t)F FORCE
IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT. ON INFORMATION, AUST)>e of the three
component elements can be artifically excluded from our calculations,
if we want 'ab initio' to devise a comprehensive, rational regime.
Even though some individual countries may lay great~ar or lesser
emphasis on one or other of the component elements ~~f its own armed
services, and on those of others, the common factor again emerges
that the armed services form an intergrated and inter-related whole,
and cover the land, sea and air-spaces comprising acid surrounding
Europe.
This, Plr. Chairman, is not a mere whim, or a dogged
insistence on logic. It is also a highly significant. factor of our
work here in Stockholm. Since the signature of the Flelsinki Final
Act, the ground Forces situation is Central Europe teas more or less
remained static, perhaps with an overall slight reduction in man-
power terms. A proposal for a further reduction is ~~oon to be tabled
at the MHFR talks right now. Hy contrast, activities in the internal
and external maritime spaces of Europe have increased both in number
and in scope; thQy have in fact increased significantly in the 1980's.
There has also been a rise in reported violations of air space.
The sea and air spaces ad3oining Europe are gaining in importance
for many reasons.
These developments are considered likely to continue.
The exercises by one side attract substantial reconnaissance from
others. Since we are enjoined to propose confidence-building measures
which are militarily significant, surely we cannot overlook what
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is actually Happening on Europe's doorstep, while considering only
the activities within Europe's courtyard.
i might add that most analysts see less danger of a
crisis arising within Europe itself. It is the more volatile periphery
of Europe where the greatest danger lies, and where consequently
the major efforts at confidence-building should be concentrated.
A start was in fact considered necessary thlvugh a bilateral agreement
to prevent accidents at sea. Hut that by itself is not enough.
Many have stressed the need for clarity in our terms.
i agree completely that our final product should be understood in
the same terms by all participants. -- by the man-in-the-street,
in fact. we therefore owe it to ourselves to start from the very
beginning with a rational and comprehensive approach. Surely, in
such an exercise, we cannot afford to turn facts, logic, geography
and history upside down, if we wish to set off on to a good start.
No mandate can ride roughshod over realities. Sensibly t_he Madrid
mandate does not attempt to do so. It explicitly recognises the
obvious.
After having made this general statement, I do not
wish to repeat arguments already adduced. Like all others, I sense
that the time for that is behind us, that our respective positions
should by now be known and understood, and that we should henceforth
enter the phase of negotiation, with all open and accommodating
determination to succeed.
It is precisely for this reason that my delegation
devoted precious priority time to the negotiations within the NNA
group so as to produce SC7. we consider it a basic and comprehensive
document covering all aspects of our work under our mandate. It
is precisely because we recognise the linkage and direct relevance
of the various recommended measure of information, notification,
observation, verification and constraints that we have favoured
the continuity provided by the comprehensive structure of SC7. It
is our understanding that all aspects of our work can thus be covered
under this umbrella approach, and that an informal arrangement for
better co-ordination of our discussions will now add a new impetus
to our work.
As I indicated in my previous statement, it is now
501
time to consider adequate numerical and structural paramenters for
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-b-
all types of military activities, in the knowledge that even military
activities which may for purposes of. convenience be described as
indpendent cannot be disassQ~iated functionally from their unitary
state control. ~n other words, the functional element is always
present, irrespective of which arm of the services moves first,
and of the time-frame involved. There is no inherent cor~t'adiction
between .the temporarily independent and the fum=tionally-linked
-- the link is permanent, structural and real -- two sides of the
same coin. In any case. since our entire planet can now be criss-
crossed in less than thirty-six hours, the rele~~ance of the time-
factor has practically disappeared.
The "out of normal location" conce>>t in SC7 consequently
covers all contingent components of the armed sc:rvices, including
of necessity point-to-point transportation of military personnel
within the European zone of application, especi~~lly those in close
proximity to the territory of participating states. The ultimate
objective is after all to reduce, not to preser~~e~r even to increase--
the risk of confrontation. so much prevalent in the present situation.
we should also ai^ to respect, not disregard, genuine security pre-
occupations.
Like others, I sense that a.number of encouraging signs
are finally emerging. we should now apply our collective skills
to devising parameters which meet the demands of expressed concerns,
and of factual realities. At the appropriate time we will ourselves
make some modest suggestions.
One aspect in particular deserves t~ be fully explored
to its maximum potential. As I indicated previously, surface naval
activities provide a unique scope for a qualitative advance in our
work. The numbers of units involved, though numerous and large in
themselves, are small in comparison to the other branches of the
armed services. They can easily all be seen and :individual units
distinguished from one another-even by Lhe legenciary man-in-the
street. They can also be counted and observed wi1:h reaonable and
reassuring accuracy. Their movements and foruiatic-ns can be monitored
constantly by independent and non-intrusive survE~illance. Quite
often -- as others have rightly pointed out, their excercises are
reported in the press.
It is thus relatively uncomplicated to pro~?ide prior
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to eliminate apprehension, to reduce the chance of miscalculation
and the risk of accident, to turn naval "war games" into a real
exercise of confidence-building. we can therefore in this case quite
.,~
easily wake virtue out of necessity. and give an early and welcome
boost to the process of confidence-building, in an effective, relatively
uncomplicated wanner.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to apologise if
I have taken up somewhat .more time than I had intended, but you
will appriciate that, as we enter a ?ore intensive phase in our
work, it is important that our perspectives should be clear.
we feel the legitimate necessity of sounding our particular
concern at the unacceptably high level of armed confrontation in .
the Mediterranean, which. as we have explained in the past. is a
direct result of European security concerns. The massive naval deployment
in the Mediterranean is not an independent phenomenon, but a direct
result of its geo-strategic-connection-with the mainland; it is
an immutable feature of Europe's past, present and future history.
The message therefore clearly reads both ways -- security cannot
be reduced in Europe, unless it is equally reflected in the Mediterranean
and vice-versa.
we are prepared to leave to others the role of protagonists
in the defence of the logic of confidence-building measures on the
European land mass. Our main concern lies in Europe's adjoining
sea -- Europe's window to its closest neighbours. Without that window,
Europe cannot breathe. And. as we all know, to breathe is to live.
That therefore is a question of survival.
And since, as has rightly been pointed out, our final
outcome will be a first step, but still an investment for the future,
let us endeavour to give to our product the added benefit of inspiring
and generating confidence within a wider audience, to those who
have at least as much interest in lessening tension and increasing
confidence as we do, so that parallel regional processes will comple ment
and strengthen each other to mutual benefit. we all stand to gain
from this approach, as surely as we will falter if we do not follow
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REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS '~ .
SBCAET
CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
S T A T E M E N T
BY DR ANDRESTINOS N. PAPADOPOULOS
HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF CYPRUS TO THE ST(iCKHOLM'
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BU]LDING
MEASURES AND DISARMA,NENT IN EUROPE
6 DECEMBER 1985
S04
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Mr. Chairman,
It augurs well, at this stage of our Conference, that the point statement,
issued on 21 November 1985, at the end of the Geneva meeting between
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbatchev, contains a paragraph on
our Conference. We welcome this statement and wish to underline "the intention
of the two sides to facilitate, together with the other participating States,
an early and successful conclusion of the Conference". Our expectation is
that the great importance they attach to the Stockholm Conference and their
expressed intention to facilitate our work will soon be translated into
practical terms, so as to reach tangible results, the soonest possible.
To this end, my delegation would like to see, before the end of this
session, the continuation of our work under co-ordinators and a smooth
transition towards drafting.
The ,joint statement, further reaffirms "the need for a document which
would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures
and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of the non-use of
force". It is expected, therefore, that this document would cover both
the CSBMs and the non-use of force. My delegation is in favour of one
concluding document, but it prefers to see a separate section on the non-use
of force. This textual arrangement accommodates not only those who give
a narrow interpretation to the Madrid mandate, but also those who believe,
as my delegation does, that a solemn declaration on the non-use of force
should, as a political text, have a separate identity. After all, the
,joint statement puts on an equal footing CSBMs and non-use of force. In
our view the non-use of force is this Conferenr_e'a political theme par
excellence, a theme which found its rightful place in the gentlemen's
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a~'eement of 14 October 1985, because the participating States are conscious
of the complementary nature of the political and military as?ects of security
within the CSCE context, a reality we cannot escape from.
The point statement indicates that the concludin; document would
give concrete expression and effect to the principle ~f the non-use of force.
What better concrete expression of the principle could one have than a.Z
all-embracing, solemn declaration which through the l:.nkage to "sufficiently
incisive measures", to use the words of Ambassador Cii-rrapico, would give
effect to the principle of the non-use of force, within the CSCE context? This
same linkage was highlighted on 29 November 1985 by S1:ate Secretary
Dr Mdreas Meyer-Landrut of the Federal Republic of Germany, who
underlined that his Government's main objective is to reinforce the
prohibition of force "by seeking agreement on substantive and militarily
significant confidence-and security-building measures that effectively
limit the possibilities of using force". 'Such an agreement", he stressed,
"would lend greater emphasis, effect and credibility t~ the validity of this
fundamental principle".
Here, at the Conference, the discussion of this issue benefitted from
many contributions. There are arguments, put forward cluring this session,
which I would like to address today. The distinguished representative of
France, in his statement of 5 November 1985, referring to the remarks of
his delegation about what should not be accepted, mentioned inter alia
"le fait de privil~gier 1'un des dix principes du Dbcalogue en n~gligeant
lour interd~pendance". The answer to this argument lies in the mandate,
which singles out the principle of the non-use of force because of its
relevance to our task, and enunciates that concrete actions should be
undertaken so as to give effect and expression to the d+3ty of States to
refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations. As far
as the interdependence of the non-use of force
principle with the other principles
of the Decalogue is concerned, a close study of documen~; SC.7 shows that
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this point was not neglected and .hat at least six out of the tan principles
are referred to therein, a i'act whioh attracted the attention of the French
delegation at one of our informal meetings.
Ambassador Gaschignard, implicitly referring to a Cypriot argument,
further stated "on nous r~p~te que la CDE ne saurais se limiter ~ recopier
un principe et qu'il conviendrait done de le d6velopper, de lui donner 'une
dimension CDE ou CSCE "' and offered the following comments: "Nous ne pouvons
actuellement que r~pondre premi~rement, que nous ne repartirons pas a z6ro;
depuis dix ans 1'Acte final existe et fait pantie de notre experience commune.
Nous n'allons pas le rer~diger. Deuxi~mement, en tout tat de cause, le
principe de non-recours ~ la force ne peut que demeurer identique a lui-meme
sans alteration. Troisi~mement, la reaffirmation du principe de non-recours
n'a de sens que si elle vient couronner un resultat substantiel sun le plan
des mesures concrdtes."
These comments call for the following remarks: The fart that the
U.N. Charter had already existed for thirty years when the Final Act was
drafted did not inhibit our representatives in Helsinki from elaborating
on the principle of the non-use of force and further clarifying its
meaning. A close student of the Helsinki process, Dr. Sizoo, in his
talking points of 24 September 1985 also reached the conclusion that
"the Final Act represents already an elaboration of what might be drawn
from relevant UN texts in the CSCE context with respect to the non-use of
force principle". I had the opportunity to put forward legal arguments in
that respect in my statement of 28 June 1985 and I would not like to repeat
them. I only want to reaffirm that if, 40 years after the adoption of
the Charter of the United Nations, we try to give to the principle of
the non-use of force its CDE dimension, we are not rewriting the principle;
the principle is there and what we are trying to do is to adapt it to our
needs and use it for the purpose of confidence-and security-building.
The distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Grinevsky, in
his statement of 11 November 1985 aptly pointdd out that "the UN Charter
or the Final Act, for all their significance, have not eYha~isted and
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cannot exhaust all the ways and forms of the manifeat~ition of the non-use
of force principle because life does not stand still. Therefore, it is
incumbent on us to determine, taking into account, th~~ topical requirements
of the European reality, which of these forma and way:s are moat suitable
at present for elaborating a mutually acceptable agreement on the non-use
of force".
Moreover, the fact that the Final Act is part of our common
experience invites simple questions: What are the lea sons of this experience,
are we satisfied with the way the principle of the nor.-use of force has
ao far been implemented, if not, how can we make it mcre effective? The
answers to these questions suggest that we should look at it from various
angles so as to get as much enlightenment as we can, because we agree that
the principle is "identical to itself", or, to put it as the British
delegation wants it, that the principle is not to be reinvented. What we
propose is to use it for our purpose and act in accordance with the Biblical
teaching that "No one lights a lamp and puts it in a c311ar, but rather on
the lamp-stand so that those who enter may see the ligzt".
My last remark concerns the contention that the reaffirmation of the
principle of the non-use of force would have a meaning only if it crowned
a substantial result in the field of concrete measures.. We sincerely look
forward to achieving this substantial result, i.e. mea:cures which would
have, among other qualities, a discouraging effect on F~11 those who do not .
consider it as their duty to refrain from the threat o:~ use of force -
but we would like to hear what exactly it is that we a:~e reaffirming. The
distinghished representative of Italy, Ambassador Ciar:~apico, in his
statement of 15 November 1985 expresses a similar idea, but makes a step
forward when he says that "It would be more useful and productive to
evaluate the constituting elements of the reaffirmation of the non-use
of force i n a context that takes into account the prcgress we could
gradually achieve in the field of concrete measures, to which such a
principle must be linked". In an_effort to set in motion a meaningful and
result-oriented dialogue,.~re have invited answers to the questions why __
we reaffirm, what we reaffirm, within what context and for what purpose.
It is high time to have some reaction to these question:;.
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Aa to how best to reafffirm the principle of the non-use of
force, a question put by Ambassador Mevik in his statement of
5 November 1985, Cyprus, along with the other Neutral and Non-Aligned
participating States has proposed in Document SC.7 a set of ideas which
we believe give an appropriate answer to the question.
A close study of SC.7 reveals that what lies in the background
is the overriding concern to maintair. international peace and security.
Within this context is seen the commitment to the Final Act - of course
no merely academic commitment, for the need is stressed for improved and
consistent implementation of all its pro~isiens. Experience so far has
proved that what we need is implementation and respect for all the
principles set forth in the Final Act, an attitude which would certainly
encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress
of co-operation among the participating States in all fields and consequently
make the use of force unlikely.
The principle of the non-use of force is considered as a universally
recognized obligation of international law, a norm of international life
which should be stricly and effectively observed. Hence, no consideration may
be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in
contravention of this principle. The expression "no consideration" excludes
any legal permissiveness and intends to cover all possible motivations, whether
political, economic, military or other. Non-compliance with the principle,
with only one exception - the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence in cane of an armed attack - constitutes a violation of international
law. This violation entails a series of consequences, political, legal,
moral and other, which are squarely assumed by the culprit. Any advantage,
such as territorial occupation or acquisition, resulting from resort to the
threat or use of force, is illegal and will not be recognised by the
international community as legal, since "ex injuria non jus oritur".
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In enunciating and reaffirming the principle of the ron-use of force
as contained in the Final Act, SC.7 takes a small step further concerning
the aspect of manifestation of force - it specifies the Qanifeatation of
force as direct or indirect. My delegation had the opportunity in the
past to suggest exploration of this aspect of the concept of the non-use of
forge. Since the drafters of the Helsinki Final Act, in their search for
clarity, thought it advisable to specify the use of force as direct or
indirect, my delegation sees no reason why we should not do the acme with
the threat of force and mention its concretR and direct exoreaaion, namely
t>be manifestation of force, since our purpose is to cover all acts which
constitute use of force - from the threat or manifestaticn to the actual
use of force. If in theory at least, manifestations of force could be
taken as threats because of their intimidating character, there are cases
in practice where the element of escalation is clearly discernible, leading
from a simple and veiled threat to a concrete and overt rtsnifeatation of force.
Against Chia background, the reference in SC.7 to direct or indirect
manifestation of force is a positive contribution to the search for clarity.
In my statement of 28 June 1985, in an effort to ~.hrcw more light on
the concept of the non-use of force I addressed such questions as how the
use of force is manifested, what is to be protected and what duties it
imposes. That analysis demonstrated that the principle of the non-use of
force is the expression of several principles contained in the decalogue
of the Helsinki Final Act. SC.7 particularly refers inter alia to peaceful
settlement of disputes, human rights and fundamental freedoms and fulfilment
in good faith of obligations under international law.
The CDE dimension to the principle of the non-use of force is given
by SC.7 th*ough the reference to "the complementary nature of the political
and military aspects of security within the CSCE" and to the fact that
"by their very nature concrete CSHMs serve to give effect and expression
to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force". It is
evident that our determination to promote by all means_the increased
effectiveness of the principle of the non-use of force implies positive,
intensive and determined actions. And here comes the linkage of the
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principle to the measures, as the fulfilment of this duty require th+
adoption of concrete CSBMs, militarily significant, politically binding
and verifiable. It is expected that these measures will have a
discouraging effect on all those who do not consider it as their duty to
refrain from the threat of use of force and will act as operational
barriers against the violation of this duty.
Progress in the process of confidence- and security-building would
certainly contribute towards the effectiveness of the principle through
the adoption of additional measures, designed to reduce the risk of military
confrontation in Europe, strengthen security for all and promote
disarmament. Equal respect for the legitimate security interests of every
pa^ticipating State requires determined efforts in this direction. Within
the context of the desire to promote by all means the effectiveness of the
principle of the non-use of force we might even explore the possibility
of adopting such supportive measures as deemed appropriate, which by their
positive nature would further contribute towards confidence- and security-
building.
So much for the non-use of force. I would like now to revert to a
question which preoccupies us all. This is the lack of progress in the
Conference. Two weeks before the end of the session we are still in the
exploratory phase. At one stage it was argued that it was necessary to
have an N + N paper. SC.7 is there, and the comments so far made about
its contribution to our deliberations are encouraging. What we need now
is to continue our informal work under co-ordinators who will steer us to
the drafting stage as rapidly as possible. As I said earlier, we need
such a decision urgently so as to have at least the co-ordinators for
the last week of this session. This would greatly help our work next year.
Another decision which we must take before we leave is the one
concerning the work programme for 1986. It is, I believe, a shared view
that we cannot afford procedural discussion on thta issue in the coming
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y~aa, M rgweewewa rgouid de ~eaekei st #hia ?esaiea ~ rA as~eearat ter
a full programme not allowing our precious time to be wasted. Such an
agreement should provide for the completion of our work before the
preparatory meeting of the Vienna follow-up, as small dele~ationa like
mine would find it difficult to follow two meetings simultaneously. Under
the circumstances my delegation prefers to have as an adjournment date
for this Conference the 19th September 1986, hoping that before the end
of the summer common determination and political pragmatism would secure
a global agreement here in Stockholm.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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USSR PLENARY STATEMENT
DELIVERED DY GEN TATARFJIKOV, DEC 6, 1985
COMRADE CHAIRFAAFJ,
?ODAY WE WOULD LIKE ?O .EXPRESS SEVERAL IDEAS ON THE ISSUE
OF NOTIFICA?ION OF LARGE SCALE EXERCISES OF ARMED FORCES. THE
HANDA?E HAS CLEAR AND PRECISE PROVISIONS ON ?NAT SCORE. PERMIT
ME ?0 QUOTE ?HEM AND I ASK YOU IN ADVAtJCE TO FORGIVE THIS LONG
QUO?ATION:
"ON ?HE OASIS OF ECiUALITY OF RIGtJTS, CiALANCE AND
RECIPROCITY, E4UAL RESPECT FOR TFtE SECURITY IN?CRCSTS OF ALL
CSCE PARTICIPATING S?AYES, ANO OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OOLIGATIOtJS
CONCERNING CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-DUILDING MEASURES AND
DISARMAMEN? ItJ EUROPE, THESE COtFIDENCE- AFJD SECURITY-t3UILDIFJG
MEASURES WILL COVER ?HE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE
ADJOINING SEA AREA (AS?FRISK OMITTED iN TIIE RUSSIAN ORIGINAL)
AfJD AIR SPACE. THEY WILL DE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND
POLZ?ICALLY OINDING AWD WILL DE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORt4S OF
VERIFICATi0tJ WHICFI CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTEtJT.
AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA (ASTERISK OMITTED IN TIIE
RUSSIAN ORIGINAL) AND AIR SPACE IS CONCERNED, TFIE MEASURES 41ILL
DE APPLICADLE TO TFIE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE
PARTICIPATING STA?ES TAKING PLACE TFIERE WHEtJEVER THESE
ACTIVITIES AFFECT SECURITY ItJ EUROPE AS WELL AS COtJSTITUTE A
PAR? OF ACTIVITIES ?AKItJG PLACE WIITFIIFJ TIIE WFIOLE OF EUROPE AS
REFERRED TO AOOVE, WIIICII THEY WILL AGREE TO tJOTIFY. NECESSARY
SPECIFICATIONS WILL OE MADE THROUGH THE tJEGOTIATIOtJS OtJ THE
CONFIDENCE- At:O SECURITY-DUILDING MEASURES AT THE COtJFEREtJCE."
WE FIRMLY AND CONSISTEtJTLY .4OFIERE TO THESE PROVISIONS AND
WE DO NOT IN?END TO CHANGE ANY?FIIWG IIJ TIIE MANDATE. THERE IS
NO MENTIOtJ IN 7HE MANDATE TO ?IIE EFFECT TItAT OtJLY GROJtJD FORCE
ACTIVITY IS COVERED DY COtJFIDEtJCE-DUILDING MEASURES. IT
FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT TFIE COtJFIDEIJCC-OUILDItJG MEASURES WHICH
iT IS INCUt4DEtJT UPOtJ US TO ADOPT MUST OC CXTEtJDED TO ALL
MILITARY ACTIVITY, NOT JUST TO GROUND FORCE EXERCISES.
HOWEVER, A NUt4DER OF DELEGATIONS ARC STILL TRYIFJG TO READ
TIIE MAFJDATE SO THAT THE COPJCEPT OF "MILITARY ACTIVITY" IS
REPLACED DY TFIE CONCEPT OF "LAtJD ACTIVITY". THE tgATTER F1AS
DEEM PURSUED TO THE POItJT OF CMAKItJG) STATEMENTS WHICtI ARE
SIMILAR TO THIS: "AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITY IS tJOT COVERED DY
CONFIDENCE-DUILDING MEASURES SItJCE IT IS OUTSIDE THE MANDATE OF
?IIE CONFERENCE."
IF WE USE TFIE WORDS OF DISTItJ(lUISiIED HEAD OF DCLEGATIOt1
AMOASSADOR DCLWOR?H, THEFJ ONE CAN ALSO ASK THE QUCSTIOtJ: IS
THIS "AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE NEW DEFINITIONS TO DASIC COtJCEPTIOtJS
AtJD TERMINOLOGY?" OUT PERHAPS THIS IS BEItJG DONE IN ORDCR TO
REPLACE SUDS?AtJTIVE tJEGOTIA?IOtJS ON TFIE GIVEtJ ISSUE WITH T11E
DEVLOPMENT OF A FRUITLCSS DISCUSSION ON THE ItJTERPRETATION OF
TIIE MAJJDAT~?
WE THINK THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO DEAL WITH THIS NOu
TFIA? WE HAVE ENTERED TFIE PHASE OF tJEGOTIATIOtJS OFJ SPECIFIC
ISSUES.
?HEREFORE, LET'S MOVE FROM GEtJERALITIES DACK TO THC
DOCUMENTS ON ?HE NEGOTIATING TADLE. DEVELOPING TFIE FINAL ACT
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AND IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THC MANDATE OF '~'HE CONFERENCE, WE
HAVE PROPOSED THAT CONFIDENCE-DUILDING MEASURES COVER NOT ONLY
GROUND FORCE EXERCISES, DUT ALSO AIR AND pAVAI, EXERCISES, THAT
IS, ?HE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. AS A RESULT OF
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MEASURE DYNAMIC, t9trLTI-PURPOSE
SERVICES OF TFIE ARMED FORCES, HEAVILY E4UIPPEO WITH MODERti
WEAPONS, SUCH AS ?IIE AIR FORCE AtJO NAVY, WHICH REPRESENT A
SIGNIFICAtJT THREAT TO EUROPE, WOULD BE PLACED UNDER CONTROL.
OUR PROPOSALS ARE MILL?ARILY SIGINIFICAIJT Aq0 REPRESENT A
oUALITATIVE STEP FORWARD FOR CONFIDENCE-DUILDIFJG MEASURES AS
COMPARED WITFt THE FIELSINKI FINAL ACT.
WHAT HAVE WE HEARD FROM OUR PARTNERS OtJ T o
AMDASSADOR DARRY SAID ?HE FOLLOWING ON OC?ODERI18SCOREY
GOVERNMENT AND, I ASSUME, THC GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES
CANNOT ACCEPT EMPTY FORMULA?IONS PROMISIFJG SECURITY FOR OUR
PEOPLES, DUT DOING NOTHING TO SATISFY THESE PROMISES." W{IqT
CAtJ ONE REPLY TO ?ttA?? WE COMPLETELY AGREE WI'~H SUCFI AN
ASSESSMENT.
IF WE ARE TALKItJG ABOUT EMPTY FORMULA?IONS,, WE REALLY CAN
A?TRIBUTE TO THEM NOTIFICATION OF ONLY OUT-OF-l;ARRISON ACTIVITY
OF ONLY GROUND FORCES. SUCFI tOTIFICATION REALLY WOULD NOT
SAFEGUARD ?HE SECURITY FOR OUR PEOPLES ABOUT WFIICFF At~DASSADOR
DARRY SPOKE.
WIiAT ARE T{IE COAUTHORS OF SC.1 CALLING ON l S TO DO? TO
KEEP IN ?FFE FIELD OF VISION ONLY ONE ASPECT OF MILITARY
ACTIVITY FROM THE WHOLE TRIAD -- GROUND FORCES, W11ICH, DY TFIE
WAY, TODAY ARE ALREADY COVERED DY COtJFIDENCE-DIJILDItIG MEASURES
AIJD NEED ONLY FUR?HER DEVELOPt1EtJ?. THIS IS JUS WFIAT
PROPOSING. pU? T WE ARE
AT THE SAME TIME IN ACCORDANCE WITH TILE MAtJDATE
WE MUST PUT INTO OPERATION.,p0DIFI0NAL MEASURES WHICH ARE OF A
MORE SIGtJIFICANT CHARACTER, WHICH COYER MILITARY ACTIVITY DOTH
IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND IN ?
AIR SPACE. OUT HE ADJOINING SEA AREAS (SIC) AND
rSS
IS TO MOVE AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY, COORDINATORS MUS'.' BE
ENCOURAGED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE ON THE BASIS 0!'
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITS! ALL DELEGATIONS. TAltLING
OF NEW TEXTS BY INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS IN WORKIN(~ GROUE'
MEETINGS STRIKES ME AS A TACTIC WHICH WILL HINDEE;, NOT
ADVANCE, OUR WORK. AND SINCE WORKING GROUP SESSIONS
AND INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY
IMPORTANT AS THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS INTENSIFIES, I
SUGGEST THAT WE CONSIDER WAYS OF PROVIDING MORE 'LIME
FOR THIS BY INTRODUCING MORE FLEXIBILITY INTO OUF
WEEKLY PROGRAMS.
L2. MR. CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER LEADERS OF
THE WESTERN ALLIANCE HAVE FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED OUR
DESIRE FOR MORE RAPID PROGRESS IN THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NORTH
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE REITERATED THIS COMMITMENT IN TEIEIR
COMMUNIQUE OF DECEMBER L2-L3, WHICH CONFIRMED THAT THE
ALLIANCE IS "ACTIVELY WORKING FOR AN EARLY AGREEMENT,
CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. THIS WOULD E;KBODY
A SUBSTANTIAL SET OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFI)ENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, COVERING THE WHOLE; OF
EUROPE, AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT Ti) THE
EXISTING DUTY OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO REFR~~IN
FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE."
L3. IT MUST ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, AS THE NA"0
MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE REMINDS US, THE STOCKHO[M
CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS.
WHEN THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING CONVENES NEsXT FF~LL,
ITS TASK WILL BE NOT ONLY TO EVALUATE PROGRESS IN
STOCKHOLM BUT ALSO TO CONSIDER THE OUTCOME OF THE
OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM, THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL E'ORUM
AND THE BERN MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS, AS WELL A: THE
PERFORMANCE .OF PARTICIPATING STATES IN FULFILLING ALL
OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
THIS REQUIREMENT FOR BALANCE, SPECIFIED IN THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, IS
FOUNDED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE PROCESS OF BUILDING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY MUST BE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL --
THAT IS, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND
HUMANITARIAN, AS WELL AS MILITARY
L4. HERE IN STOCKHOLM WE HAVE'-AN OPPORTUNITY TO MA{E A
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UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO THAT BROADER OBJECTIVE AND HELP
LOWER THE BARRIERS WHICH NOW DIVIDE EUROPE EAST FROM
WEST. TO DO S0, WE MUST PROCEED NOW PURPOSEFULLY AND
EXPEDITIOUSLY TO PUT FIRMLY IN PLACE MEASURES WHICH
WILL HAVE AN EFFECTIVE AND POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE
REALITIES OF THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION. I
BELIEVE WE WOULD DO WELL TO HEED THE ADVICE OF THE
AMERICAN MAN OF LETTERS OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, WHO
SAID: "I FIND THE GREAT THING IN THIS WORLD IS NOT SO
MUCH WHERE WE STAND, AS IN WHAT DIRECTION WE ARE
MOVING: TO REACH THE PORT OF HEAVEN, WE MUST SAIL
SOMETIMES WITH THE WIND AND SOMETIMES AGAINST IT -- BUT
WE MUST SAIL, AND NOT DRIFT, NOR LIE AT ANCHOR." THE
TIME FOR STANDING IS OVER; IF WE ARE TO REACH OUR GOAL,
THE TIME FOR MOVING HAS ARRIVED. OUR DIRECTION IS
CLEAR, AND MY DELEGATION, FOR ONE, IS COMMITTED TO
PURSUING IT.
L5. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09767
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS: THE 198b CALENDAR
REF: STOCKHOLM 9680
1. CDE VIII - 087
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CONFERENCE REACHED AGREEMENT
DECEMBER 19 ON A COMPLETE WORKING CALENDAR FOR 1986
WHICH CONTAINS FOUR SESSIONS AND AN ADJOURNMENT DATE OE'
SEPTEMBER 19 (SEE REFTEL FOR TEXT). IN ORDER TO SECURE
SOVIET AGREEMENT THE TEXT ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT THIS
PROCEDURAL FACT CAN BE CHANGED BY A CONSENSUS AND
IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ADJOURNMENT DATE DOES
NOT TERMINATE CDE WHOSE ULTIMATE FATE CAN ONLY BE DECIDED
BY THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. NATO WAS ABLE TI) MOVE
TOWARD THIS AGREEMENT ONLY AFTER FRANCE FINALLY JOINED A
CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO SUPPORT THE NNA CALENDAR PROPOSAL, IF
THE EAST AND NNA WOULD ACCEPT AS A TITLE OF THE SCHEDULE
"COMPLETE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986, INCLUDING THE AD.rOURN-
MENT DATE."
4. ON DECEMBER 13, THE FRENCH DELEGATION FINAC,I.Y JOTNE'~
IN A CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON A NATO POSITION ON THIw 1~8b
CALENDAR. THE FRENCH ACCEPTANCE CAME AFTER INTf.N:E:
BEHIND-THE-SCENES CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN GASCHtGNA~L~
(FRANCE), BARRY (U.S., AND CAUCUS CHAIRMAN OF' THE: DAYj
AND OTHER KEY CAUCUS MEMBERS. PRINCIPAL E[..h.ME:N'1'ti OE' THE.
COMPROMISE WERE THAT THE FRENCH WOULD ACCEPT THE:
SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF DATE, FOUR SESSIONS AND THE NNA
PROPOSED DATES FOR ALL FOUR SESSIONS IF THE NNA AND EAST
FIRST ACCEPTED AS THE TITLE OF THE SCHEDULE.' "FULL +~ORK
PROGAM FOR 1986, INCLUDING THE ADJOURNMENT DATE." IN
FRANCE'S VIEW, EASTERN AND NNA ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PIT[.E
WOULD SATISFY THE FRENCH REQUIREMENT FOR AGREEMENT ON
THE PRINCIPLE OF A CUTOFF. THIS COMPROMISE WAS NO'('
ARRIVED AT EASILY AND EVEN THREATENED TO COLLAPSE OVER
THE DETAILS OF HOW NATO REPS TO A COFFEE GROUP SH01![.D
PRESENT THE. ALLIANCE'S POSITION (E.C., TABLE A FUL1.
PAPER, DISCUSS ONLY THE TITLE FIRST WITHOUT A PAPER,
TABLE A PAPER BRACKETING THE OPENING DATE OF THE FOURTH
SESSION, ETC.). FORTUNATELY, BARRY (U.S.), WHO HAIi
ACTED AS HONEST BROKER BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE REST OF
THE CAUCUS ON THIS ISSUE, WAS IN THE CHAIR AND CON1iINCED
ALL THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED. THE CAUCUS
MANDATED BARRY (U.S.), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) AND
DELWORTH (CANADA) TO PRESENT THE NATO PROPOSAL TO NNA
AND EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES.
S. IN THE DECEMBER 17 COFFEE GROUP MEETING, THE EAST
WAS NONCOMMITAL IN RESPONSE TO THE NATO PROPOSAL, HUT
VOICED TWO QUESTIONS: 1) DID-NATO'S PROPOSALS~FOR A
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SEPTEMBER 19 ADJOURNMENT DATE MEAN THAT THE CONFERENCE
COULD NOT BE EXTENDED EVEN IF WE WERE ONLY A FEW WORKING
DAYS AWAY FROM AN AGREEMENT?; AND 2) WAS NATO REALLY
TRYING TO STOP CDE ALTOGETHER ON SEPTEMBER 19 (RATHER
THAN LEAVING THAT DECISION THE THE VIENNA REVIEW
MEETING)? EASTERN REPS DUTIFULLY BUT UNENTHUSIASTICALLY
MADE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO SCHEDULE ONLY THE FIRST.TWO
SESSIONS OF 1986 ((X>MrlENT: EASTERN CONTACTS HAD ALREADY
BEEN UNUSUALLY CANDID IN INDICATING STRONG NON-SOVIET
EASTERN SUPPORT FOR A FULL CALENDAR. END COMMENT.)
GIVEN THE SHORT TIME REMAINING TO REACH A DECISION ON
THIS ISSUE, BARRY (U.S.) CRAFTED A PROPOSAL FOR NEW
LANGUAGE TO ANSWER EASTERN CONCERNS AND PERSONALLY
WORKED WITH GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) AND GRINEVSKY
(USSR) TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS PALATABLE TO THE KEY
PROTAGONISTS. BARRY PROPOSED INSERTING THREE SENTENCES
IN THE TEXT OF THE CALENDAR AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD:
1) ACKNOWLEGE THAT THE COMPLETE WORK PROGRAM WOULD
COMPRISE FOUR SESSIONS; 2) IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE
FATE OF CDE IS IN THE HANDS OE VIENNA AND NOT STOCKHOLM;
AND 3) ACKNOWLEDGE THE PROCEDURAL FACT THAT THE
CONFERENCE COULD CHANGE THE WORK PROGRAM AT ANYTIME IF
THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO DO S0. ON DE:CEM$F:H 18, THE NATO
CAUCUS ACCEPTED BARRY'S PROPOSAC WITH SOMA MINOR
MODIFICATIONS. ONCE AGAIN IN ORDbk T~.) "GKE~Sr. THE
SKIDS" FOR THE NEXT COFFEE GRUUr MEETING, BAitRY
CONTACTED GRINEVSKY BILATERAL[..Y . GR T Nf.:VSK Y I NU I CATEf ~
THAT, WITH THE NEW LANGUAGE PROPOSE; BY THE: ALi.iANCE, HE,
BELIEVED HE COULD NOW ACCEE+T (SUBJECr TO MOSCOW'S
CONCURRENCE) A FULL 1986 CALENDAR INCLUDING AN ADJOURN-
MENT DATE OF SEPTEMBER 19 AND FOUR SESSIONS (SEF REFTEC.
FOR FULL TEXT). IN THE COFFEE GROUP MEETING OF
DECEMBER 18, THE NNA QUICKLY ACCEPTED THE NATO PROPOSAL.
EASTERN REPS INDICATED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL
ON DECEMBER 19. AT EASTERN BEHEST SOME MINOR DATE
CHANGES TO THE ORIGINAL NNA PROPOSAL WERE AGREED TO (KEY
CHANGE MOVES THE 1986 START DATE BACK TO JANUARY 28).
THE FULL CALENDAR WAS FORMALLY ADOPTED BY THE DECEMBER 20
PLENARY. COMMENT: USDEL BELIEVES THAT 1986 CALENDAR
ADOPTED FULLY PROTECTS OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF A
COMPLETE SCHEDULE, A CLEAR ADJOURNMENT DATE, AND NO
OVERLAP WITH THE VIENNA PREPCON ON MAIN MEETINGS. WHILE
FRENCH TACTICS WERE POTENTIALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, THE
ALLIANCE WAS FORTUNATE IN THAT THIS TIME, AT LEAST, THEY
COST US NO SUBSTANTIVE PRICE. END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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25X1
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKIiOLM 09680
SUBJECT: CDE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986
1. CDE VIII - 81
2. C- ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS TEIE TEXT OF TAE DECISION OF TEE CONFERENCE
ON THE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986. THIS DECISION EAS BEEN
APPROVED BY NATO AND THE NNA. THE EAST BELIEVE THAT THEY
WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IT, BUT THE SOVIETS NEED TO GET
SPECIFIC APPROVAL FROM MOSCOW. FINAL AGREEMENT IS
EXPECTED MIDDAY TOMORROW (12/19), IN WATCH CASE THE
DECISION WILL BE ADOPTED BY TAE PLENARY FRIDAY (12/20).
4. BEGIN TEXT: COMPLETE WORK pROGRplQiE FOR 1936, INCLUDING
THE ADJOURNl~NT DATE
THE COMPLETE WORK PROGRA~Q~E FOR 1986 WILL COMPaISE FOUR
SESSIONS.
IT IS AGREE THAT THE 19TH SEPTEMBER, TAE LAST 1~1Y OF THE
FOURTH SESSION, WILL BE TAE DATE ON WHICH TAE ;;TOCRHOLM
CONFERENCE WILL ADJOURN, TARING INTO ACCOUNT T]iE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF TAE PL-DRID
CONFERENCE AND THE DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY
TAE WORK PROGRAPQiE FOR 1986 M
AY BE MODIF
IED B
Y CONSENSUS
ANNEX:
.
FIRST SESSION:
JANUARY 28
TO MARCH 1
4
7 WEEKS
SECOND SESSION:
APRIL 15,
TO MAY 23
6 WEEKS
THIRD SESSION:
JUNE 10
TO JULY 18
6 WEEKS
FOURTH SESSION:
AUGUS? 19
TO SEPT 19
5 WEEKS
TOTAL 24 WORKING WEEKS
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDE
NTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 09770
SUBJECT: EIGHTH SESSION, TWO YEARS OF CDE
1. CDE VIII - 090.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: THE ENO OF THE EIGHTH SESSION OF CDE ALSO
MARKED TWO YEARS OF PREPARATORY NEGOTIATION IN WHICH
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND POSITIONS HAVE BEEN REPETITIVELY
AIRED. TO THE CASUAL OBSERVER IT COULD APPEAR THAT
THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT
THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE FEW MAJOR CONCESSIONS, IT IS
EpUALLY TRUE THAT THEIR POSITION IN THIS MULTI-LATERAL.
FORUM DOES NOT ENJOY MUCH CREDIBILITY, EVEN AMONG
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT. THE OUTLINES OF WHAT
IS POSSIBLE IN TERMS OF A FINAL AGREEMENT HAVE EMERGED
THIS SESSION IN CLEARER THAN EVER TERMS. WHILE THE
SOVIET POSITION ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES DOES NOT
ENJOY GREAT CREDIBILITY OR SUPPORT IN THE CONFERENCE,
IT WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE DISCOMFORT AMONG SOME PARTICI-
PANTS. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR POSITION IS AN ISOLATED
ONE WHICH THE CONFERENCE IN GENERAL ACKNOWLEDGES WILL
REMAIN ISOLATED AND THEREFORE UNTENABLE. WITH THE
ADVENT OF THE EXPANDED AND MORE DETAILED NNA PROPOSAL,
IT HAS BECOME MORE EVIDENT THAT MOST WESTERN CONCEPTS
HAVE WON GENERAL APPROBATION. ALTHOUGH MUCH WORK REMAINS
TO BE DONE, THERE SEEMS TO BE GROWING SUPPORT FOR SOME
FORM OF INSPECTION. THE: TWO AREA:i WHERE: WE APPEAR TO
BE MOST AT ODDS WITH THE SENSE OF THE CONP'ERENCF ARE
1) THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON THE STRUCI'URf.' AND
ORGANIZATION OF GROUND FORCES AND LAND-BASED AIR FORCE'S
AS A SEPARATE MEASURE DISTINCT FROM OTHER NOT1F'ICA'tION
MEASURES AND 2) CONSTRAINTS. WHILE wE ANTIrrPATE PRES-
SURE TO PRESENT IN WRITTEN FOEtM A WESTERN POSITION ON
THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE,
THE CONFERENCE HAS MOVED SUBSTANTIVELY TOWARD THE
MINIMALIST POSITION WE ADVOCATE. WESTERN COHESION AND
PERFORMANCE IN THE WORKING GROUPS HAS CONTTNUED TO
IMPROVE IN PREPAR TION FOR THE INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS
EXPECTED IN THE COMING YEAR. MAJOR PROCEDURE PROBLEMS
HAVE FOUND ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION; NNA COORDINATORS
HAVE BEEN INSTALLED AND THE WORK CALENDAR FOR 1986 HAS
BEEN ADOPTED COMPLETE WITH A COMMITMENT TO ADJOURN THE
THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
- -- ALTHOUGH LITTLE OPTIMISM REMAINS THAT A
SEPARATE MEASURE ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WILL
WIN CONSENSUS IN A FINAL DOCUMENT, THE CONFERENCE
APPEARS TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROVISION OF DETAILED INFORMATION
MUST BE AN INTEGRAL ASPECT OF ANY CSBMS REGIME.
- -- THE CONFERENCE HAS ACCEPTED AN EXCHANGE OF
ANNUAL PLANS OR FORECASTS OF 'NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES IN
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THE FORMAT OF AN ANNUAL CALENDAR.
-- ALTHOUGH IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PUSH T1{ROUGH
THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT EXACTLY AS IT APPEARi IN
THE WESTERN PACKAGE, THERE IS REASON T'0 BELIEVE '.'HAT
THE BASIC CONCEPT CAN WIN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT THRt)UGH
DEFINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE E,WAY
FROM NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS .IN THE: ZONE. THE:
SOVIETS, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE ACKNOWI,EDGEU THIS :ESSION
THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO NOTIFY ALL EXERCISE ACTIVITIES
WHICH EXCEED AN AGREED THRESHOLD.
-- A COMBINATION THRESHOLD STRESSING STRUCTURE
BUT INCLUDING NUMERICAL TOTALS FOR EQUIPMENT AND tkc~0l`~S
SEEMS TO BE WITHIN REACH, ALTHOUGH THERE IS ST[L[. SOME'
CONFUSION ABOUT WHICH ELEMENT OF ELEMENTS OF A CO~NBINED
THRESHOLD WOULD ACTUALLY TRIGGER A NOTIFICATION A;JD
THUS BE THE ELEMENT WHICH WOULD BE THE BASIS OF TI{E
MONITORING AND VERIFICATION TASK.
- THE SOVIETS HAVE INFORMED THE USDEL
BILATERALLY THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT A SEPARATE THRESHOLD
FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS~ACTIVITIES. TE(IS
WOULD SEEM T'0 PREPARE THE WAY PROGRESS IN THIS AREA,
BUT THIS ISSUE IS STILL CLOUDED BY THE ISSUE OF NC 1' [ h' Y I Iv::;
NAVAL ACTIVITIES (SEE BELOW).
- MUCH COMMON GROUND EXISTS IN THE' CUNE~E:HENGF. ON
THE QUESTION OF INVITING OBSERVERS TG N:~1 1 r ~ Afil.E:
ACTIVITES. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIE'I:y HAVE' BF.E;N SLJW
IN ACKNOWLEDGING THE REQUIREMENT TU [N~ l lr. ALI. OB.~~'tt.'E:k~
AND THE NNA (AS WELL AS SOME ALL IE.S) 1 MPAR~; MORE: V :;R I F' l -
CATION POTENTIAL TO OBSERVATION THAN WE WOULU WISH.
-- WITH REGARD T'0 VERIFICATION, THE SOVIETS
CONTINUE TO VERBALLY EXPRESS THEIR REJECTION OF ON~?SITF:
INSPECTION. YET, OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT
CAMP ARE FAR LESS CATEGORICAL. THIS SESSION DTD N()T
SEE AS MUCH DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN THE
WORKING CROUPS AS WE MIGHT HAVE WISHED. SOVIET ATTE;MFTS
TO EXPLOIT PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS T'0 DENEGRATE THE'
IMPORTANCE OF AN INDEPENDENT INFORMATION EXCHANGE
ENGENDERED A GREATER EMPHASIS BY TT{E WEST ON MEASUFE's
ONE. NEVERTHELESS, THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ISSUE HAS
BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE NNA COUPLED WITT{ CONSISTENT
WESTERN INSISTANCE THAT ON-SITE INSPECTION MUST BE
PART OF A FINAL OUTCOME GIVES RISE: TO CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM.
THE EIGHTH SESSION SAW REMARKABLE LITTLE DISCUSSION
ABOUT THE PLACE OF NTM IN THE: VERIFICATION PROCESS,
DESPITE SOVIET EFFORTS T'0 ASSIGN THEM A MAJOR ROLE.
- -- AS USUAL, TTiE ROMANIANS HAVE BEEN THE CONST~I,NT
CHAMPION OF COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION. THE NNiI
HAVE HARDLY MENTIONED THIS ASPECT OF SC-7 AND THE WEST
HAS SUCCESSFULLY SKIRTED EVEN DISCUSSING, ITS OWN IDEAS
FOR DEDICATED COMMUNICATION LINKS TO BE USED IN CON1~tEC-
TION WITH CSBMS IMPLEMENTATION. THE U.S. ~IEND~ FRANCE; .
596 ~
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HAVE BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT IN KEEPING THIS QUESTION
OFF THE DISCUSSION AGENDA. IT HAS BEEN INFREQUENTLY
RAISED BY THE SOVIETS AND THEIR CLOSEST FRIENDS, BUT
INDICATIONS REMAIN THAT THE PACT SEES CONSULTATIONS AS
A PRELUDE TO ANY POSSIBLE INSPECTIONS.
- -- ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT OUT OF THE WOODS, THE WEST
MAY HAVE HAD ITS GREATEST SUCCESS STORY IN DEALING
WITH THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE. WITH
THE USDEL PLAYING A STRONG ROLE AMONG THE ALLIES AND
TAKING A SOMEWHAT LOWER PROFILE IN THE ACTUA[. WORK[NG
GROUP, EVEN THE "WETS" HAVE BEEN TOUGH IN ADHERRINC TO
COORDINATED POSITIONS. THE SOVIETS HAVE SEEN UNIMAGINA-
TIVE AND INFFFFCTIVF IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PRY A NUE'
TEXT FROM THE WESTERN GROUP. AT THE SAME TIME, THE
WORKING GROUP HAS VIRTUALLY IGNORED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL,
SC-6. AND, DESPITE UNHELPFUL UTTERANCES BY THE CYPRIOT,
THE: SOVIETS GENERALLY EVALUATE THE NNA POSITION AS
BEING CLOSER TO THE WEST AND, NOT WISHING TO ALIENTATE~
THE NNA, HAVE BEEN AT A LOSS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE
NUF LANGUAGE IN SC-7.
- -- DESPITE THE CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN
SC-7, NOT EVEN THE EAST HAS BEEN QUICK TO SING ITS
VIRTUES. AMONG THE NNA, YUGOSLAVIA REMAINS MOST ADAMANT
THAT REAL LIMITATIONS OR CEILINGS MUST BE AGREED 'dITH
A CORRESPONDING REJECTION OF WESTERN INSISIENCE :nAT
THE ANNUAL FORECAST WILL HAVE A CONS1'NATNINt; EFE'ECT.
NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS THE YUGOSLAVIAN WHG S~: Y[ Y SUI;GF ~Tb.D
THAT THE ANNUAL CALENDAR COULD SERVE AS A CON~ih.AIN~
IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY
(CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF SC-1'S MEASURE TWv') 1ii~T
AN UNLIMITED NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES NOT ANNOUNCF:I) ON THE;
ANNUAL CALENDAR COULD BE HELD AT SHORT NOTICF'.
5. DESPITE DISPARATE INDICATIONS DURING THIS SF.~~[UN
THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BACK AWAY FROM THEIR UNTENABit?
POSITION ON THE NOTIFICATIONS OF INDEPENDENT AIR ANG
NAVAL ACTIVITIES, GENERAL TATARNSKOV SEEMED DETERMINEn
TO MAKE THIS THE ISSUE UPON WHICH PROGRESS DEPENDED IN
EACH OF THE WORKING GROUP SESSIONS. THUS, IT MATTERED
LITTLE WHICH OF THE WESTERN CSBMS PROPOSALS THE DISCUS-
SION FOCUSSED UPON, TARTARNIKOV FOUND A WAY TO INJECT
NAVAL AND AIR. HIS INSISTENCE THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES
IN BOTH EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR
SPACE MUST BE COVERED SEEMED TO INTENSIFY TOWARD THE
END OF THE SESSION. SOME CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS SAW
SOVIET FOCUS ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AS AN INDICATION
OF A WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE, AND EVENTUALLY ADOPT, THE
WESTERN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. USDEL, HOWEVER, EXPOSED
THE SOVIET TACTIC AS AN ATTEMPT TO TURN THE E'UNCTIONAL
APPROACH INTO A RUBBER BAND SO EXPANDABLE THAT IT
COULD BE USED TO JUSTIFY ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUDING
INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITES FN A NOTIFICATf~N REGIME
597 r
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THEREBY DESTROYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.
6. ALTFIOUCH GENERAL TATARNIKOV OCCUPIES A PREDOMINANT
POSITION IN THE EASTERN GROUP, THERE APPEARS TO BE
DIFFERENT NUANCES IN THE EASTERN POSITION. ROZANOV,
WIE] HAD BEEN ASSUMED TO BE THE NOMINAI DEPUTY, ciAS
FREQUENTLY APPEARED MORE CONCILIATORY IN PUBLIC AND
GENTLY CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY IN PRIVATE. HE HAS
APPEALED TO USDEL FOR A GREATER ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY
TME "POLITIKI" (POLITICAL DEi.EGATES) BECAUSE THIsY ARE
MORE SKILLED IN THE ART OF COMPROMISE. OTHER K1sY
EASTERN PLAYERS (IF THERE ARE ANY), E.G. KONARSI:Y OF
POLAND AND BUEHRING OF THE GDR, ARE ALMOST FRAM: IN
EXPRESSING THEIR THEIR UNDERSTANDING IN PRIVATE THAT
THE MANDATE EXCLUDES INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR
ACTIVITIES. THEY URGE GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET
SECURITY INTERESTS AND POLITICAL PRESTIGE AND CALL FOR
WESTERN COMPROMISES ON OTHER ISSUES.
NATO
7. AT THE END OF THE EIGHTH SESSION, MEMBERS OF THE
NATO CAUCUS CAN STILL BE CATEGORIZED ALONG FAMILIAR
LINES. THE "WETS" ARE EAGER TO ACCEPT ANYTHING THAT
GIVES THE ALLUSION OF PROGRESS, OFTEN MlITHOUT DUE
RECOGNITION TO THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENr,E.S. THIS TAxE:S
OUR PATIENCE AND DIDACTIC SKILLS AS WE MU ~'~ REPEATEDLY
ADO A LTTTL,E STARCH WHILE ASSIST INi~ IN DIi~ ING OUT THE
WETS. NEVERTHELESS, NORMAL CAUCUS DIVISIONS --E4SILY
OBSERVABLE IN THE DREARY AND OFTEN JUVENILE DEBATES OF
THE NATO CAUCUS-- HAVE NOT SURFACED IN THE PUBL[C
SESSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE. APART FROM THE PECUI.IARTIES
OF THE FRENCH, WHO DO NOT BELONG TO THE "WET" CA14P,
THERE HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY FEW PUBLIC DEVIATIONS FROM
COMMON POSITIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS.
8. ONE OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THIS SESSION THEREFORE
HAS BEEN A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE WAY THE ALLIES
HAVE COORDINATED THEIR EFFORTS AND STRENGTHENED "'HEIR
INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCES IN THE WORKING GROUPS. i~ITH
THE EXCEPTION OF THE VOLATILE FRENCH MILITARY REF',
WESTERN EXPERTS HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE REQUIREMENT E'OR
UNIFIED TACTICS IN ARGUING A UNIFIED POSITION ON SUB-
STANIVE POINTS. JCS REPS HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE 1N
MANAGING THE MORE ADVENTURESOME AMONG THE MILITARY
GROUP. WHILE SUCH ALLIES HAVE BEEN KEPT ON A SHCRT
LEASH IN PUBLIC, THERE STILL REMAIN SOME BASIC
DIFFERENCES ON SUBSTANCE WHICH WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED
ATTENTION. THE ITALIANS AND THE FRENCH MILREP, FOR
EXAMPLE, ARE UNCONVINCED ABOUT THE TACTICAL WISDOM OF
NATO'S SUBSTANTIVE POSITION ON THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION
TO BE SUPPLIED ON NAVAL AND AIR ELEMENTS NOTIFIED AS
PART OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND THEY URGE GREATER
FLEXIBILITY ON WHAT IS TO BE OBSERVED. THE NETHERi.ANDS,
IN PARTICULAR, IS CONVINCED'THAT THE WEST'~LL?HAJE TO
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BE IN A POSITION TO ACCEPT SOME LIMITATIONS MEASURE;
WE EXPECT THEM TO PUSH THIS VIEW AMONG OTHER LIKE-MINDED
AND A? EVERE. AND, NOT SUPRISINGLY, SEVERAL ALLIES ARE
MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE ON THE NUF ISSUE THAN WE THINK
NECESSARY OR ADVISABLE AT THIS POINT.
OTHER ISSUES
9. 1986 WORK PROGRAM: WHILE THE EXPERTS WERE TOTAI.t.Y
OCCUPIED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONFERENCE, MUCH OF
THE AMBASSADORS' TIME WAS OCCUPIED WITH PROCEDURAL
ISSUES. FOR MOST OF THE SESSION, THE ALLIANCE WRESTLF(~
WITH THE 198b CDE CALENDAR ISSUE WITH A POSITIVE SOLUTION
BEING ACHIEVED IN THE WANING MOMENTS. FOR WELL OVER A
MONTH, THE FRENCH BLOCKED ANY NATO CALENDAR PROPOSAL
WHILE TOUTING THEIR POSITION, PUBLICALLY ANNOUNCED BY
MITTERAND, THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST ADJOURN
BY JULY 18, 1986. USDEL SUPPORTED THIS POSITION AS
LONG AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN CAUCUS AGREEMENT
TO AN ABSOLUTE ADJOURNMENT BEFORE THE PREPCON FOR THE
VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. ONLY IN THE FINAL WEEK DID
THE FRENCH FINALLY COME AROUND AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO
OBTAIN A COMMON ALLIED COMMITMENT TO A COMPLETE CALENDAR
FOR 1986 WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A UA'I'>r, FOR ADJOURNING THE
CONIr'ERENCE. AFTER INITIAL HESITATION BY THE USSR ANU
MALTA, WHO OPTED FOR AN ESSENTIALLY OPEN-ENDED t98b
CALENDAR, THE FINAL PLENARY OF THE; YEAR ALOE?'rr:~~ A WOKt~.
PROGRAM FOR 1986 WHICH PROVIDES FOR FOUR SF,S.SION~ ANt~
SETS SEP 19, AS THE FINAL DAY OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THt
CDE FOR 1986.
10. COORDINATORS: AS THE EXPLORATORY PHASE OE INFORMAL
WORKING GROUPS --WHOSE CHAIRMANSHIP WAS ROTATED AMONG
ALL DELEGATIONS-- PROCEEDED, CONFERENCE SUPPORT GREW
FOR INSTALLING NNA COORDINATORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
NORMAL CSCE PRACTICE. AT U.S. PROMPTING, THE NATO
GROUP PROPOSED THAT ONLY TWO COORDINATORS (ONE EACH
FOR WORKING GROUP-A AND WORKING GROUP-8) BE AGREED
INITIALLY. THE NNA REJECTED THIS APPROACH AS WELL AS
A SUBSEQUENT SUGGESTION THAT THE TWO COORDINATORS
MIGHT BE SUPPLEMENTED BY FIVE ADDITIONAL ASSISTANTS.
THE NNA COUNTER PROPOSAL TOOK THE STARCH OUT OF WESTERN
ARGUMENTS FOR ONLY TWO COORDINATORS WHEN THEY SUGGESTED
THAT SWITZERLAND PROVIDE COORDINATORS FOR TWO OF THE
SUB-GROUPS ESTABLISHED BY A 14 OCTOBER "GENTLEMAN'S
AGREEMENT", ONE DEALING WITH INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/
COMMUNICATION AND THE OTHER WITH ANNUAL FORECASTS AND
OTHER CONSTRAINING MEASURES. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR
WOULD COORDINATE THE NOTIFICATION GROUP, THE FINNISH
AMBASSADOR THE OBSERVATION GROUP, AND THE AUSTRIAN
THE GROUP DEALING WITH NUF. AFTER DETERMINING THAT
1) THE APPOINTMENT OF COORDINATORS IS NOT SYNONYMOUS
WITH DRAFTING, 2) THAT SC-7 WOULD NOT SERVE AS THE
BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS, 3) THAT ENGLISH WOULD BE THE
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LANGUAGE USED WHEN DRAFTING BEGINS AND 4) THAT :YO ONE
INDIVIDUAL WOULD COORDINATE MORE THAN ONE GROUP THE
NNA PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTED. DURING THE ONE WEEK fN
WHICH THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED, NNA COORDINATORS
PLAYED A GENERALLY MODEST ROLE WITH PROCEEDINGS HARDLY
DIFFERENT THAN UNDER A ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP.
11. DRAFTING: THE CONFERENCE IS POISED FOR DR~,FTING.
COORDINATORS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED, INFORMAL MECHANISMS
ARE IN PLACE AND THE LINE HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CRAWN
DEFINING THE SUBSTANCE ON WHICH DRAFTING WILL OCCUR.
HOWEVER, THE SNAIL'S PACE OF THF. CONFERENCE COUPLED
WITH THE PECULIARITIES OF "DRAFTING" IN C'SCE MIGHT
MEAN THAT WEEKS COULD CO BY BEFORE ANY TEXT aCTUA[[Y
BEGINS TO TAKE SHAPE. NEVERTHELESS, DRAFTING (HO'~IEVfrR
I? IS DEFINED) IS THE NEXT STEP OF THE CONFERENCES' AND
ITS FURTHER POSTPONEMENT CAN NO LONGER BE IN THE
ITS OF THE WESTERN POSITION.
12. RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION: MOSCOW SUi~PLIED
~~ IN ~E LANGUAGE BOOTH HAVE CONTINUEII TO BF
~~ RESPONSIVE TO TAE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SOVIET DELE-
GA?ION THAN TO TAOSE OF THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT.
DURING TAE LAST WEEa OF THE SESSION THIS PRACTICE
BECAME A CONFERENCE ISSUE AS THEY INSISTED ON USING
THE RUSSIAN WORD FOR "LIMITATIONS" WHEN INTERPRE'T[N~
THE ENGLISH WORD "CONSTRAINTS". DESPITE USDEL FE'f Oft" ~
TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO WHAT WE
CONSIDER A SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM, THE SOVIET DELF,GAC[t~N
HAS TO DATE BEEN RELUCTANT TO COOPERATE WITH EITty?F+
TAE USDEL OR THE SECRETARIAT. WE NOTE THAT T1{E
INTERPRETATION/TRANSLATION PROBLEM CAN BE EXPE;CTE:I) TO
CONTINUE AND WILL IN THE FUTURE REQUIRE SIGNIFICA!(1'
EXPERTISE AND CONSTANT VIGILANCE TO PROTECT WESTERN
SUBSTANTIVE INTERES'iS.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30 :CIA-RDP92-011688000100060001-9