SOVIET BLOC AND NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE CSCE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) (CDE-IX & CDE-X) 28 JANUARY - 14 MARCH 1986 15 APRIL - 23 MAY 1986 VOLUME I

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-01168R000100040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 234
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Volume II
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-IX & CDE-X)
28 January - 14 March 1986
15 April - 23 May 1986
CR 86-11187
June 1986
Copy 3 4
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Volume II
Secret
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/ Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-IX & CDE-X)
28 January - 14 March 1986
15 April - 23 May 1986
Secret
CR 86-11187
June 1986
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 02110
SUBJECT: SOVIET CDE SPEECH 3/14/86
1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SPEECH BY SOVIET CDE
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY IN PLENARY 3/14/86.
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, LIKE ALL THE OTHER INTERNATIONAL
FORA, IS WOVEN INTO THE FABRIC OF INTERNAITONAL RELATIONS
AND IS AFFECTED BY IMPORTANT EVENTS THAT TAKE PLACE IN
THE WORLD. THE XXXII CONGRESS OF THE COPOAUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS AN EVENT OF HISTORIC AND
INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE, WHICH DEMONSTRATED VIVIDLY
THAT THE FOREIGN POLICY COURSE OF THE SOVIET UNION IS
AIMED AT PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING UNIVERSAL PEACE.
THE PARTY CONGRESS PROVIDED ANSWERS TO THE URGENT
PROBLEMS FACING MANKIND, THOSE OF WAR AND PEACE. NEVER
HAVE PEOPLE ENCOUNTERED SUCH DEADLY THREAT. AT THE
SAME TIME NEVER HAVE THE POSSIBILITIES TO PRESERVE AND
STRENGTHEN PEACE BEEN SO REAL. THE POTENTIAL OF PEACE
FORCES IS GROWING.
SAFE AND JUST PEACE REQUIRES COLLECTIVE EFFORTS OF ALL
STATES. IN THIS CONNECTION THE PARTY CONGRESS CALLED
ON BEHALF OF THE CPSU UPON ALL GOVERNMENTS TO COOPERATE
MORE CLOSELY AND PRODUCTIVELY TO GAIN SUCCESS IN THE
FIGHT AGAINST WAR, WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE AN HISTORIC
VICTORY OF ALL MANKIND, EVERY HUMAN BEING ON OUR PLANET.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN
THE PROGRAMME FOR PEACE AS LAID DOWN BY THE PARTY
CONGRESS. SECURITY ASSURANCE HAS ACQUIRED THE DIMENSIONS
OF A POLITICAL TASK THAT CAN BE SOLVED ONLY THROUGH A
TURN FROM CONFRONTATIONAL POLICIES OF STRENGTH TO
COOPERATION IN BUILDING DEPENDABLE AND EQUITABLE FOR
ALL STATES SECURITY, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ELABORATION
OF COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE SECURITY.
AND THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS CALLED UPON TO Do
PRECISELY THIS THING.
MR. CHAIRMAN, REVIEWING THE WORK DONE DURING THE PREVIOUS
YEAR ONE COULD, APPARENTLY, CONCLUDE THAT, ON THE WHOLE,
A POSITIVE, THOUGH SLOW, DYNAMIC HAS BEGUN AT THE
CONFERENCE. LAST OCTOBER THE CONFERENCE WAS ABLE TO
IDENTIFY THE RANGE OF TOPICS FOR DRAFTING AND POSSIBLE
INCLUSION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, THAT IS TO OUTLINE
THE SHAPE OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT. AFTER THAT WE MOVED
INTO THE STAGE OF CONSIDERING IN CONCRETE TERMS TEXTS
OF AGREEMENTS. AND, FINALLY, THIS SESSION SUCCEDED IN
AGREEING, PRELIMINARY, ON SOME FIRST LANGUAGE REGARDING
NON-USE OF FORCE, NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY
MANOEUVRES, EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, ETC.
ALTHOUGH THIS DEVELOPMENT 13, IN ITSELF, POSITIVE, ONE
CANNOT FAIL TO SEE THAT THINGS ARE MOVING TOO SLOWLY AT
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THE CONFERENCE, THAT LANGUAGE WHICH HAS BEEN DEFINED
CONCERNS ONLY SECONDARY, PERIPHERAL MATTERS AND THE
NEGOTIATING MACHINERY HAS NOT BEEN FULLY ENGAGED. IT
IS ONLY NATURAL, PARTICULARY WITH ANOTHER ROUND OF
NEGOTIATIONS IN VIEW, TO ASK A QUESTION, WHY IS THIS
CONTRADICTORY STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THE CONFERENCE?
THE SOVIET UNION, SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND MANY WEST-EAST
EUROPEAN STATES, NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED ABOVE ALL, HAVE
DONE A LOT TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS,
TO IMPART THEM A CONCRETE AND BUSINESS-LIKE CHARACTER.
AS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV STATED AT THE XXXII PARTY CONGRESS,
THE SOVIET UNION HAS UNDERTAKEN ACTIVE EFFORTS TO GIVE
A FRESHIMPETUS TO THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS.
WHAT HAS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
DONE IN CONCRETE TERMS FOR THIS PURPOSE?
FIRST, DURING THE SOVIET-FRENCH SUMMIT MEETING EARLY ON
OCTOBER 1985 MIKHAIL GORBACHEV EXPRESSED THE READINESS
OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF SOME STATES,
NEUTRAL ABOVE ALL, TO EXCHANGE MUTUALLY ANNUAL PLANS OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATIONS.
THIS STEP OPENED UP THE WAY FOR A BUSINESS-LIKE
CONSIDERATION
CAN BECCOME A SERIOUS SAFETY FUSE AGAINST OUTBREAK
THAT
OF MILITARY CONFLICT.
SECOND, IN THE STATEMENT BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
OF JANUARY 15 IT WAS PROPOSED THAT SINCE IT WAS NOT
POSSIBLE, FOR THE TIME BEING, TO SOLVE COMPREHENSIVELY
THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION REGARDING MAJOR LAND, NAVAL
AND AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES, THEN WHY NOT EXPLORE WAYS TO
SOLVE IT IN PARTS, TO AGREE NOW ON NOTIFICATION OF
MAJOR LAND AND AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES, POSTPONING THE
QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF
THE CONFERENCE. THIS PROPOSAL OPENS UP THE WAY TO THE
SOLUTION OF A MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUE, AT THE CONFERENCE.
THIRD, ON THE QUESTION OF THE LIMITATION OF THE SCALE
OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES, THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION STATED
AT THIS SESSION ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPROACH OF THE NEUTRAL AND
NONALIGNED COUNTRIES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH THE
SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES MUST NOT EXCEED FIVE TIMES
MORE THAN THE LEVEL OF NOTIFIABLE MANOEUVRES. THE
DELEGATION OF THE GDR ALSO TABLED A PROPOSAL ON THE
LIMITATION OF THE NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS AND AIR-BORNE
TROOPS INVOLVED IN THE MANOEUVRES AT THE LEVEL OF SEVEN
THOUSAND MEN.
DO NOT THESE PROPOSALS PAVE THE WAY TO ADOPTING ONE OF
THE MOST IMPORTANT CBM WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE SUSPICION
AND PREVENT MISINTERPRETATION OF ANOTHER SIDE'S
ACTIVITIES?
FOURTH, THE POLISH DELEGATION INTRODUCED BROAD PROPOSALS
ON THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE TO
SECRF.T
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ELABORATE CERTAIN AGREED LANGUAGE, INCLUDING ON THE
INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES.
ALL THIS MEANS GENUINE PRACTICAL CARE FOR AND NOT LIP
SERVICE TO THE CONFERENCE NOT MARKING TIME.
WE ALSO WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE TIPS BY THE NEUTRAL AND
NONALIGNED COUNTRIES WHICH LEAD TO THE ELABORATION OF
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ON THE QUESTIONS CONSIDERED
AT THE CONFERENCE. IN THIS REGARD IT WOULD SEEM THAT
SC.7 SUBMITTED BY THEM HAS A GREAT POTENTIAL FOR
FURTftR DEVELOPMENT AND CONCRETIZATION. THIS, IN
PARTICULAR, IS BORN OUT BY MANY CONCRETE PROVISIONS
INTRODUCED FOR DRAFTING BY THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED
COUNTRIES IN THE WORKING GROUPS.
UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED AN EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT
RESPONSE FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES. IT CONCERNS, IN THE
FIRST PLACE THE INITIATIVE BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV OF
JANUARY 15 REGARDING THE SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF
NOTIFICATIONS IN PARTS AND THE POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL
ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.
OBVIOUSLY, WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE MANY GOOD WORDS
PRONOUNCED AT THE CONFERENCE WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET
PROPOSAL. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN SUPPORTED
BY ACTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, BEYOND THE WALLS OF THIS
HALL STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN AND ARE BEING MADE THAT ARE
DESIGNED TO DISTORT THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET INITIATIVE,
TO PRESENT IT AS IF THE SOVIET UNION PRACTICALLY AGREED
TO REMOVE THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES FROM THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE ALTOGETHER. SUCH SUBSTITUTION AT
SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS 13 SIMPLY INAPPROPRIATE. IT WOULD
HARDLY GIVE ITS AUTHORS ANY PROPAGANDA DIVIDENDS BUT
RATHER CAN DO DAMAGE AND NOT A SMALL ONE, TO OUR
BUSINESS.
AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE IS IN A POSITION OF TAKE A DECISION
ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT
STAGE, IT WOULLD SEEM TO US THAT IT IS QUITE RESOLVABLE
IF ONE IS TO APPROACH IT WITHOUT BIAS.
THE MADRID MANDATE PROMPTS THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO
SEEK "TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES", THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE.
IN THIS CONNECTION IT STATES THAT THE DECISIONS TO BE
ADOPTED "WILL COME NTO FORCE IN THE FORMS AND ACCORDING
TO THE PROCEDURE TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE CONFERENCE".
PURSUANT TO THE DECISION OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING OF
NAVEMBER 11, 1983 WE SHOULD, OUTSELVES, MAKE "ARRANGEMENTS
FOR CONCLUDING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE." IT
FOLLOWS FROM HERE THAT THE CONFERENCE MAY DECIDE ON
POSTPONING NAVAL ACTIVITIES TILL THE NEXT STAGE IN THE
FORM THAT WILL BE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR THE OCCASION.
IN SO DOING, WE, OBVIOUSLY, DO NOT IMPINGE IN ANY WAY
ON THE PREROGATIVES OF THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
WHICH, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RESULTS REACHED AT THE
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FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, WILL CONSIDER WAYS AND
APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO
CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS FOR SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN
EUROPE, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SUPPLEMENTING THE
MADRID MANDATE FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.
I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE NEGOTIATORS WILL HAVE THE
POLITICAL WILL TO REACH SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, RECORDING
IT, NATURALLY, IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER, WHICH WOULD
FIT INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BASIC DOCUMENTS REFERRED
TO ABOVE. WHAT IS NEEDED HERE IS FLEXIBLITY, MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING AND, ABOVE ALL, THE DESIRE FOR PROGRESS
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.
AT THIS JUNCTURE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF NOTIFICATION IS,
APPARENTLY, THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM FACING THE
CONFERENCE. AS MANY WAY WELL RECALL, THE LAST SESSION
CAME UP LITERALLY AGAINST ITS SOLUTION. IN THIS SESSION,
TOO, ALL WORKING GROUPS APPROACHED A LINE WHERE IN
ORDER TO MOVE FURTHER FORWARD A CLEAR REPLY IS REQUIRED
AS TO WHAT TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE NOTIFIED.
SO IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN ANY CASE TO SHUN ITS SOLUTION,
TO SIT OUT OR HIDE BEHIND FORMALISTIC PRETEXTS.
LET US TAKE ANOTHER QUESTION - NON-USE OF FORCE.
ADVANCEMENT ON IT CAN BE QUALIFIED AS MORE THAN MODEST.
ONLY ONE FORMULA HAS BEEN AGREED, AND COMPLETELY
REPRODUCED FROM THE MADRID MANDATE AT THAT. NOT TOO
MUCH FOR THE TWO YEARS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
HOWEVER AT THE END OF THE SESSION NATO COUNTRIES BEGAN
TO SUBMIT THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING PAPER, RESORTING
TO THE ALREADY FAMILIAR METHOD OF INTRODUCING IT BY
PARTS. HOW ARE WE TO TAKE IT?
OBVIOUSLY, THE DETERMINATION OF POSITIONS, EVEN WITH A
TWO-YEAR DELAY, IS IN ITSELF USEFUL. BUT WHY IS THIS
EXTENDED INTRODUCTION OF THE PAPER FOR LONG MONTHS?
WHAT DOES IT MEAN? STEPPING ON THE BRAKES WHEN A SLOW
MOVEMENT FORWARD BEGAN?
INCIDENTALLY, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE CLARIFICATIONS GIVEN
BY THE AUTHORS OF THAT PAPER AT THE MEETINGS OF THE
WORKING GROUP THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE IN MIND EITHER TO
GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OR GIVE EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE
OF NON-USE OF FORCE, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE MILITARY
ASPECT. WELL, LET US HOPE THAT DURING THE INTERSESSION
THE AUTHORS OF THIS PROPOSAL WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY
TO CORRECT THIS OBVIOUS INCONSISTENCY WITH THE COURSE
AND OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
WE SHOULD SAY THAT NOT ALL IS RIGHT WITH THE DRAFTING
PROCESS ITSELF. ONE CAN HARDLY REGARD AS MANIFESTATION
OF THE FLEXIBILITY, CONSIDERATION FOR THE VIEWS AND
INTERESTS OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE
THE SITUATION WHETHER CERTAIN DELEGATIONS SIMPLY
INTRODUCE BY PARTS LANGUAGE REPRODUCED FROM THEIR OLD
PROPOSALS. THE ENTIRE CRAFT OF DIPLOMACY IS BEING
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REDUCED IN THIS CASE TO WORK WITH SCISSORS.
CERTAINLY, BRINGING TOGETHER THE POSITIONS OF THE 35
PARTICIPATING STATES IS NOT A SIMPLE MATTER. THERE MAY
BE OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES IN THE ELABORATION OF MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE FORMULAS. EXPERIENCE AND SKILL SHOULD BE
ACCUMULATED HERE, THE MORE SO AS CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-
BUILDING IS A NEW FIELD OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.
HOWEVER WE SHOULD SAY DIRECTLY THAT THERE ARE IMPEDIMENTS
AT THE CONFERENCE WHICH ARE OF AN ARTIFICIAL CHARACTER.
HOW DO WE VIEW THE TASKS AND PROSPECTS OF THE NEXT
ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE? WE BELIEVE
THAT OUR MAIN TASK IS TO GET DOWN BOLDLY AND WITH
DETERMINATION TO SOLVING THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AT
THE CONFERENCE. ONE SHOULD NOT ONLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM
OF THE SUBJECT OF NOTIFICAITON BUT, WITH ACCOUNT OF IT,
GET DOWN TO DEFINING PARAMETERS OF SUCH NOTIFICATION.
IT IS TIME TO MOVE FORWARD THE QUESTIONS OF CONSTRAINTS
AND NON-USE OF FORCE, SOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES EXISTING
IN INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. THESE ARE ALL REAL
PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY DISCUSSED AT THE
CONFERENCE AND THEY CANNOT BE IGNORED.
OBVIOUSLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO SPEED UP THE DRAFTING
PROCESS, TO SEEK ADDITIONAL WAYS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
IT THROUGH THE USE, FOR EXAMPLE, OF INFORMAL CONTACT
GROUPS TO SOLVE CERTAIN QUESTIONS.
AS THIS SESSION HAS SHOWN THERE EXIST QUITE A FEW
PROBLEMS IN THE WAY OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT. BUT WE
ARE NOT AMONG THOSE WHO PAINT THE PROSPECTS IN DARK
HUES DOOMING THE CONFERENCE TO FAILURE ALREADY TODAY.
DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES AND THE BRIEF TIME LEFT, THE
CONFERENCE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION
THIS YEAR BEFORE THE VIENNA MEETING BY ADOPTING A
SUBSTANTIVE AND MEANINGFUL DOCUMENT. WE NEED ONLY ROLL
UP OUR SLEEVES, NOT MARK TIME BUT PAVE THE WAY FOR AN
AGREEMENT, NOT SEEK UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES BUT TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE VIEWS AND INTERESTS OF OTHER CO-NEGOTIATORS.
THIS WILL SECURE A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE
CONFERENCE. END TEXT.
CURTIN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
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Unofficial translation
S T A T E M E N T
by Oleg A. GRIl1EV ZY,
Ambassador at Large,
Head of the USSR Delegation
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe
Stockholm, March 14, 1986
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Mr. Chairman,
The Stockholm conference, like all the other international
fora, is woven into the fabric of international relations and
is affected by important events that take place in the world.
The 33=1 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
was an event of historic and international significance, which
demonstrated vividly that the foreign policy course of the
Soviet Union is aimed at preserving and strengthening universal
peace.
The Party-Congress provided answers to the urgent problems
facing mankind, those of war and peace. Never have people
encountered such deadly threat. At the same time never have
the possibilities to preserve and strengthen peace been so
real. The potential of peace forces is growing.
Safe and just peace requires collective efforts of all
states. In this connection the Party Congress called on behalf
of the CPSU upon all governments to cooperate more closely
and productively to gain success in the fight against war,
which would constitute an historic victory of all mankind, ever::
human being on our planet.
International security occupies an important place in the
programme for peace as laid down by the Party Congress. Security
assurance has acquired the dimensions of a political task that
can be solved only through a turn from confrontational policies
of strength to cooperation in building dependable and equitable
for all states security, including through the elaboration of
comprehansive measures designed to enhance security.
And the Stockholm conference is called upon to do precisely thi:
thing.
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Mr. Chairman,
Reviewing the work done during the previous year one could,
apparently, conclude that,on the whole,a positive, though slow,
dynamic has begun at the Conference. Last October the Conference
was able to identify the range of topics for drafting and
possible inclusion in a concluding document, that is to outline
the shape of a future agreement. After that we moved into the
stage of considering in concrete terms texts of agreements.
And, finally, this session succeded in agreeing, preliminary,
on some first language regarding non-use of force, notification
of major military manoeuvres, exchanges of annual plans of
notifiable military activities, invitation of observers, etc.
Although this development is,in itself, positive, one canno-
fail to see that things are moving too slowly at the
Conference, that language which has been defined concerns
only secondary, peripheral matters and the negotiating machinery
has not been fully engaged. It is only natural, particularly
with another round of negotiations in view, to ask a question,
why is this contradictory state of affairs at the Conference?
The Soviet Union, socialist countries and many West--Europee:
states, neutral and nonaligned above all, have done a lot to
accelerate the pace of the negotiations, to impart them a
concrete and business-like character. As Mikhail Gorbachev
stated at the =11 Party Congress, the Soviet Union has
undertaken active efforts to give a fresh impetus to the
Stockholm negotiations.
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What has the Soviet Union and the socialist countries
done in concrete terms for this purpose?
FFirst, during the Soviet-French summit meeting early in
October in 1985 Milo Gorbachev expressed the readiness of
the Soviet Union to accept the idea of some states, neutral
above all, to exchange mutually annual plans of military
activities which are subject to notifications. This step opened
up the way for a business-like consideration and negotiation of
this. important measure that can become a serious safety fuse
against outbreak of military conflict.
Second, in the Statement by General Secretar Gorbachev of
January 15 it was proposed that since it was not possible,f or
the time being, to solve comprehensively the issue of notificatio:
regarding major land, naval and air force manoeuvres, then why
not explore ways to solve it in parts, to agree now on
notification of major land and air force manoeuvres, postponing
the question of naval activities until the next stage of the
Conference. This proposal opens up the way to the solution of .0
major outstanding issue * at the Conference.
Thir d, on the question of the limitation of the scale of
military manoeuvres, the Bulgarian delegation stated at this
session on behalf of the socialist countries their acceptance
of the approach of the neutral and nonaligued countries, in
accordance with which the scale of military manoeuvres must not
exceed five times more than the level of notifiable manoeuvres.
The delegation of the GDR also tabled a proposal on the
limitation of the number of amphibious and air-borne troops
involved in the manoeuvres at the level of seven thousand men.
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Do not these proposals pave the way to adopting one of the
most important CBM which would eliminate suspicion and prevent
misinterpretation of another side's activities?
Fourth, the Polish delegation introduced broad proposals on
the invitation of observers which . . made it possible to .
elaborate certain agreed language, including on the invitation
of observers form all participating States. All this means geauin
practical care for and not lip service to the Conference not
marking time.
We also welcome constructive steps by the neutral and
nonaligned countries which lead to the elaboration of mutually
acceptable agreements on the questions considered at the
Conference. In this relard it would seem that SC.7 submitted by
them has a great potential for further development and
concretization. This, in particular, is born out by many concrete
provisions introduced for drafting by the neutral and
nonaligned countries in the working groups.
Unfortunately, we have not received an equally significant
response from the NATO countries. It concerns, in the first placE
the initiative by Mikhail Gorbachev of January 15 regarding the
solution of the issue of notifications in parts and the
postponement of naval activities untill the next stage of the
Conference.
Obviously, we have taken note of the many good words
pronounced at the Conference with regard to the Soviet proposal.
Untortunatly, they have not been supported by actions. At the
same time, beyond the walls of this hall statements have been
and are being made that are designed to distort the essense of
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the Soviet initiative, to present it as if the Soviet Union
practically agreed to remove the question of naval activities
frim the negotiating table altmther. Such substitution at
serious negotiations is simply inappropriate. It would hardly
give its authors any propaganda dividends but rather.can do damp
gt
and not a small one, to our business.
As regards the question of whether the Stockholm Conference
is in a position of take a decision on the postponement of naval
activities untill the next stage, it would seem to us that it
is quite resolvable if one is to approach it without bias.
The Madrid mandate prompts the participating States to
seek "to uncertake, in stages$ the aim of the Conference. In
this connection it states that the decisions to be adopted "will
come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to
be agreed upon by the Conference". Pursuant to the decision of
the Preparatory Meeting of November 11, 1983 we should, ourselves
make "arrangements for coucluding the first stage of the Coafezen;
It follows from here that the Conference may decide on
postponing naval activities till the next stage in the form
that will be considered appropriate for the occasion.
In so doing, we, obviously, do not impinge in any way on
the prerogatives of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting which,
taking into account the results reached at the first stage of
the Conference, will consider ways and appropriate means for the
participating States to continue their efforts for security and
disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing
the Madrid mandate for the next stage of the Conference.
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I am confident that the negotiators . will have the politics.
will to reach such an understanding, recording it, naturally,
in an appropriate manner, which would fit into the framework of
the basic documents referred to above. What is needed here is
flexibility, mutual understanding and above all, the desire for
progress in the negotiations.
At this juncture the subject matter of notification is,
apparently, the most serious problem facing the Conference.
As many may well recall, the last session came up
literally against its solution. In this session, too, all workin
groups approached a line where in order to move further forward
a clear reply is required as to what types of military activities
will be notified. So it is impossible in any case to shun its
solution, to sit out or hide behind formalistic pretexts.
Let us take another question - non-usc of force. Advance=en-
on it can be qualified as more than modest. Only one formula has
been agreed, and completely reproduced from the Madrid mandate
at that. Not too much for the two years of the negotiations
However at the end of the session NATO countries began to
submit the non-use of force working paper, resorting to the
already familiar method of introducing it by parts. How are we
to take it?
Obviously, the determination of positions, even with a
two-year delay, is initself useful. But why is this
extended introduction of the paper for long months ? What
does it mean? Stepping on the brakes when a s1'V movement forward began?
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Incidentally, it is clear from the clarifications given by the
authors of that paper at the meetings of the working group that
they do not have in mind either to give concrete expression or
give effect to the principle of non-use of force, particularly
as regards the military aspect. Well, let us hope that during
the intersession the authors of this proposal will have an
opportunity to correct this obvious inconsistency with the coursf
and objectives of the negotiations.
We should say that not all is right with the drafting
process itself. One can hardly regard as manifestation of
flexibility, consideration for the views and interests of the
other participants in the Conference the situation where certain
delegations simply introduce by parts language reproduced from
their old proposals. The entire craft of diplomacy is
being reduced in this case to work with scissors.
Certainly, bringing together the positions of the
35 participating States is not a simple matter. There may be
objective dificulzies in the elaboration of mutually acceptable
formulas. Experience and skill should be accumulated here, the
more so as confidence-and security-building is a new field of
diplomatic negotiations. However we should say directly that
there are impediments at the Conference which are of an art_fici:
character.
How do we view the tasks and prospects of the next round
of negotiations in light of the above? Vie believe that our
maintasi is to get down boldly and with determination to solving
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the outstanding problems at the Conference. One should not only
solve the problem of the subject of notification but, with
account of it, get down to defining parameters of such notiticatu
It is time to move forward the questions of constraints and
non-use of force, solve the difficulties existing in information
and verification. These are all real problems which have been
repeatedly discussed at the Conference and they cannot be ignored
Obviously, it is necessary to speed up the drafting process,
to seek additional ways and possibilities for it through the use,
for example, of informal contact groups to solve certain que sti ms
As this session has shown there exist quite a few problems
the way of reaching an agreement. But we are not among tc.ose who
paint the prospects in dark hues dooming the Conference to
failure already today. Despite the difficulties and the brief
time left, the Conference has the potential for a successful
completion this yea_T before the Vienna meeting by adopting a
substantive and meaningful document. We need only roll up our
sleeves, not mark time but pave the way for an agreement, not
seek unilateral advantages but take into account the views and
interests of other co-negotiators. This will secure a successful
completion of the Conference.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01976
SUBJECT: NINTH ROUND WRAP-UP AND ASSESSMENT
1. CDE IX - 112
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT: THE WEST
ATTAINED ITS MINIMAL OBJECTIVE DURING THE NINTH ROUND:
DRAFTING HAS BEGUN IN ALL FIVE WORKING GROUPS. WE ARE
FAR FROM SATISFIED, HOWEVER. OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS
HAVE 30 FAR ONLY PRODUCED A FEW SPARSE SENTENCES, MANY
RECYCLED FROM THE MADRID MANDATE AND THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT. ON THE MARGINS, HOWEVER, THE EAST HAS AGREED THAT
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS SHOULD BE WELL BELOW THOSE SET
IN HELSINKI, THAT OBSERVERS SHOULD BE INVITED FROM ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES, AND THAT ANNUAL CALENDARS OF
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE EXCHANGED.
HOWEVER, LITTLE HEADWAY HAS BEEN MADE ON THE MOST
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES -- INSPECTION, INFORMATION,
NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS.
- THIS LACK OF PROGRESS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO BOTH
TRANSITORY AND FUNDAMENIAL FACTORS. THE COORDINATORS'
TENDENCY TO CONSULT FIRST WITH THEIR NNA COLLEAGUES AND
TO USE SC.7 AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING FALLS IN THE FORMER
CATEGORY, AS DOES THE WEST'S DIFFICULTY WITH ITS OWN
CUMBERSOME MACHINERY. OF MORE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN,
HOWEVER, HAS BEEN THE SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE
SERIOUSLY IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. PART OF THIS MAY BE
DUE TO AN INCREASINGLY APPARENT SPLIT BETWEEN THE
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SIDES OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION,
WHICH MAY TURN ON THE EMBRYONIC QUESTION: CAN MOSCOW
ACCEPT MORE THAN A MINI-PACKAGE? IF NOT, THE SOVIETS
MAY JUST BIDE THEIR TIME AND SAVE CONCESSIONS FOR THIS
SUMMER, ANTICIPATING THAT THE WEST WILL SETTLE FOR A
MINI-PACKAGE. THIS, OF COURSE, IS A RECIPE FOR
STALEMATE.
- THE NEXT ROUND IS CRUCIAL. TO AVOID AN EARLY
STALEMATE WE MUST BE ABLE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM OF GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS AND FUNCTIONALLY
RELATED AIR IN APRIL. THE SOVIETS MUST BE PREPARED TO
DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON THE CONFERENCE'S AGREEING TO
POSTPONE THE NAVAL ISSUE AND THE INCLUSION OF
TRANSFERS/TRANSITS. IF THAT HAPPENS WE HOPE THE
DRAFTING PROCESS WILL GAIN MOMENTUM. THE CHANCES ARE
ABOUT 50-50. END SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: AS IN THE OTHER WORKING GROUPS,
PROGRESS IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP WAS
MARGINAL. THE SOVIETS SAY NO FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE
PROGRESS ON NOTIFICATION WILL OCCUR UNTIL AGREEMENT IS
REACHED ON THE THRESHOLDS FOR ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION, I.E., ON WHAT TO DO WITH NAVAL AND AIR
SFrRFT
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ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS. BILATERALLY THE SOVIETS HAVE
SIGNALED THEIR ACCEPTANCE THAT AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE
ARE IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BUT THIS
DEVELOPMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN MANIFEST IN THE DRAFTING
GROUP DISCUSSIONS.
DURING THE NINTH ROUND, THE SOVIETS DRAGGED THEIR
FEET, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO PRESS FOR AN "ANSWER" TO THE
GORBACHEV STATEMENT OF JANUARY 15, WHICH PROPOSED
POSTPONING NEGOTIATIONS ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE
NEXT PHASE OF THE CDE. THE SOVIETS SAID FIRST PRIVATELY
AND THEN PUBLICLY THAT THEY WANTED THE CONFERENCE
SOMEHOW TO POSTPONE ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL AFTER
VIENNA. OUR REFUSAL TO CONSIDER SUCH A STEP ON
SUBSTANTIVE, PROCEDURAL, AND PRAGMATIC GROUNDS ANNOYED
THEM BUT THEY RECEIVED LITTLE SUPPORT FROM THE NNA OR
EVEN THEIR OWN GROUP. WE OFFERED THEM A WAY OUT IN
AMBASSADOR BARRY'S END OF ROUND SPEECH, WHICH NOTED THE
OBVIOUS FACT THAT ANY GOVAERNMENT CAN PROPOSE WHATEVER
IT LIKES IN A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA CDE AS LONG AS IT
FITS THE MANDATE BUT CITES ALL THE REASONS WHY STOCKHOLM
CAN'T TAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE. INITIAL COMMENTS
BY SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DELEGATIONS AFTER THE
FINAL PLENARY SUGGEST THAT THEY MAY CHOOSE THIS WAY OUT
OF A DILEMMA OF THEIR OWN MAKING. WE THINK THEY WILL
CONTINUE TO INSIST ON AGREEMENT ON WHAT KIND KOF AIR
ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED BEFORE PERMITTING PROGRESS
ON CSBM'S. WE CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT INDEPENDENT AIR
IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US, AND THE ALLIES GRUDGINGLY GO
ALONG WITH US. WE THINK THE EAST WILL AGREE TO A
FORMULA ON FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR BUT ONLY ONE WHICH
PROVIDES SOME DETAILED INFORMATION AT THE TIME OF
NOTIFICATION.
5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: ONLY
MINIMAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THESE ISSUES THIS
ROUND. THE SOVIETS HAVE BLOCKED ALL DRAFTING ON
INFORMATION BY RESORTING TO PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS. WE
ARE LOOKING INTO WAYS OF BREAKING THIS PROCEDURAL
DEADLOCK WHILE PRESSING OUR POSITION ON STATIC
INFORMATION; MEANWHILE THE NNA ARE GROWING IMPATIENT
WITH SOVIET BLOCKING TACTICS.
- ON VERIFICATION, ONE DRAFTING SUCCESS WAS SCORED
WITH AGREEMENT TO "NOTE" A TEXT DRAWN FROM MANDATE
LANGUAGE ON THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF
CSBM'S. THE EAST CONTINUES TO PLUG NTM'S AND
CONSULTATIONS BUT HINTS THAT THEY MAY AGREE TO SOMETHING
ALONG THE LINES OF THE NNA'S "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST"
PROPOSAL. WE KEEP SAYING THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US,
BUT OUR ALLIES SIGNAL SOFTNESS. OUR STRESS ON
INSPECTION HAS RESULTED IN A FORMAL EASTERN DENIAL THAT
SUCH INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED FOR CSBM'S.
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PRIVATELY, SOME EASTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE HINTED THAT
MOSCOW REALIZES THAT SOME FORM OF MANDATORY ON-SITE
INSPECTION MAY HAVE TO BE SWALLOWED IN THE END-GAME IF
IT REMAINS THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO AN AGREEMENT.
6. OBSERVATION: SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THIS,
PERHAPS BECAUSE IT 13 THE LEAST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE BEFORE
THE CONFERENCE. BUT THE EAST HAS BLOCKED ANY SERIOUS
DRAFTING ON-THE THE CORE ISSUES OF DURATION AND SCOPE OF
OBSERVATION UNTIL A DECISION HAS BEEN MADE ON THE
PARAMETERS FOR ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. THE MAJOR
SUBSTANTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROUND WAS THE EASTERN
AGREEMENT THAT INVITATIONS FOR OBSERVATION WILL BE SENT
TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. ONLY WILLING TO
SWALLOW HALF A LOAF ON OBLIGATORY INVITATION HOWEVER,
THEY SUBSEQUENTLY PROPOSED THAT EACH STATE ONLY BE
OBLIGED TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO A MAXIMUM OF FIVE
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES PER YEAR. BY ROUND'S END EASTERN
RELUCTANCE TO DRAFT EVEN ON THE MORE PERIPHERAL ISSUES
(E.G., COSTS) WAS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT, APPARENTLY AS
PART OF THEIR STRATEGY NOT TO LET PROGRESS ON CSBM'S
OUTPACE DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREAS MORE DEAR TO THEIR
HEARTS, SUCH AS NON-USE OF FORCE.
7. ANNUAL FORECASTS: AS A LARGELY NONCONTROVERSIAL
ISSUE, SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF COMMON GROUND REGARDING THE
CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR HAVE EMERGED. NEVERTHELESS,
DRAFTING WAS SURPRISINGLY DIFFICULT. THIS HAS BEEN DUE
PRIMARILY TO VARIOUS LINKAGES: IN THE PAST THE EAST HAS
PREVENTED PROGRESS ON THE CONTENT OF FORECASTS BY
LINKING IT WITH THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF WHAT ACTIVITIES
SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION (SEE PARA 4); AND
THERE WERE HINTS THAT BOTH THE NNA AND EAST WILL ATTEMPT
TO HOLD DRAFTING ON FORECASTS HOSTAGE TO DRAFTING ON
CONSTRAINTS.
8. CONSTRAINTS: THE LINES WERE DRAWN THIS ROUND WHEN
THE EAST CONTINUED ITS STRONG SUPPORT OF THE NNA
PROPOSAL FOR A CEILING ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY EXERCISES
OF FIVE TIMES THE NOTIFICATION LEVEL. THE NNA'S
ATTITUDE TOWARDS CONSTRAINTS WAVERED A LITTLE; THEY
LIKED THE CONCEPT OF CEILINGS, BUT RECOGNIZED THAT IT
WAS A NON-STARTER FOR THE WEST; CONSEQUENTLY, THEY
APPEARED TO BE MOVING TOWARD THE VIEW THAT THE ONLY
PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS IS ONE WHICH WOULD
ENHANCE THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF THE FORECAST -- A
VIEW WHICH THE EAST REJECTED. THE IRISH DELIVERED A
PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WHICH RECEIVED A
COOL RESPONSE PUBLICLY, BUT APPEALED TO SOME OF OUR
ALLIES PRIVATELY.
9. NON-USE OF FORCE: WHILE ONLY ONE CONSENSUS PHRASE
WAS REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S TEXTBOOK DURING THE
NINTH ROUND, THE CONTOURS OF A NUF SECTION ARE ALREADY
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EASILY DISCERNIBLE. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT AT
LEAST FOUR CORE ELEMENTS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN A NUF
TEXT: 1) THE LINK BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE REAFFIRMATION
OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE; 2) THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF;
3) THE INHERENT RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL
SELF-DEFENSE; AND 4) THE INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. CSCE PRINCIPLES
AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS,
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND TERRORISM HAVE
STRONG SUPPORT AMONG MOST NATO AND NNA DELEGATIONS. THE
EAST, OF COURSE, WOULD LIKE TO THROW ITS OWN PROPOSALS,
SUCH AS NON-FIRST-USE AND A NUF PROHIBITION IN SPACE,
INTO THE NUF LOTTERY; HOWEVER, THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY
ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (SC.6) HAS BEEN LARGELY
DISCREDITED AS A SERIOUS CONTENDER FOR DRAFTING. DURING
THE COMING ROUNDS, THEN, THE DIFFICULTY WILL NOT BE IN
SOLIDIFYING COMMON GROUND BUT IN NOT LETTING IT CONGEAL
TOO QUICKLY.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 02018
SUBJECT: CDE: END OF ROUND NINE ASSESSMENT ON POSSIBLE
SOVIET OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY AND TACTICS
1. CDE IX - 115.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. GENERAL SOVIET OBJECTIVES APPEAR TO BE
TWOFOLD: (1) A DROIT DE REGARD OVER THE EUROPEAN SECURITY
PROCESS WITH THE RELATED OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING CONTINUITY
IN THE CDE PROCESS; AND (2) MAXIMIZING THEIR OWN
POLITICAL AND MILITARY SECURITY POSITION WITHIN THIS
PROCESS. PRIMARY TACTICS ARE REFLECTED IN A DAMAGE-
LIMITING EXERCISE -- TO RECOUP THE HIGH PRICE PAID IN
EXTENDING THE ZONE OF APPLICTION OF CSBMS TO THE URALS,
AND TO STALL ON DRAFTING WHILE APPEARING TO BE POSTIVE,
AND FORTHCOMING BY MAKING SO-CALLED "CONCESSIONS" OR BY
PRESENTING NEW PROPOSALS, ALBEIT DEVOID OF ANY
SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANCE OR MOVEMENT FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE.
THESE EFFORTS SEEM TO BE AIMED AT SECURING A "MINI-
PACKAGE," ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MIGHT BE
PREPARED TO ACCEPT NO AGREEMENT AT ALL. EITHER SCENARIO
COULD POTENTIALLY BE PLAYED TO THEIR ADVANTAGE AT THE
CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN VIENNA. END SUMMARY.
4. SOVIET OBJECTIVES: THE SOVIETS HAVE TWO PRIMARY
OBJECTIVES: (1) THE LONGSTANDING OBJECTIVE OF DROIT DE
REGARD OVER THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS -- COUPLED WITH
A NEAR TERM OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING CONTINUITY IN THE CDE
PROCESS; (2) MAXIMIZING THEIR OWN POLITICAL AND MILITARY
POSITIONS WITHIN THIS PROCESS. THESE OBJECTIVES COMPLI-
MENT EACH OTHER SINCE CONTINUITY IN THE PROCESS WOULD
PROVIDE BOTH TIME AND THE FORUM TO CHIP AWAY PATIENTLY AT
WESTERN POSITIONS, THUS MAXIMIZING SOVIET POLITICAL AND
MILITARY SECURITY INTERESTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRICE
OF CONTINUITY MAY REQUIRE SOVIET COMPROMISES WHICH THEY
PERCEIVE AS ERODING THEIR SECURITY POSTURE, SUCH AS
MEASURES WHICH WOULD AFFECT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, SOVIET
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES ON SOVIET TERRITORY. AT MADRID,
BOTH FACTORS WERE PRESENT -- THEY GOT THE CDE SECURITY
FORUM BUT HAD TO PAY A BIG PRICE: THE MANDATE'S
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND THE EXTENSION OF THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION OF ANY AGREED CSBM'S TO THE URALS. THUS, AT
THE CDE, THEY ARE SEEKING TO REGAIN WHAT THEY LOST IN
MADRID WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, TRYING TO ENSURE
CONTINUITY IN THE PROCESS.
5. CONTINUITY. A KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER BOTH
OBJECTIVES CAN BE SERVED AT THE SAME TIME. TO DATE THE
WESTERN THREAT TO TURN ITS BACK ON A MINI-PACKAGE HAS
BEEN CREDIBLE AND WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THEY
WILL HAVE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN THE MILITARY FIELD AND
ON TRANSPARENCY IN ORDER TO SECURE U.S. AGREEMENT AND TO
ENSURE THAT THERE WILL BE A POST-VIENNA CDE. IN THE FACE
OF PROBABLE ALLIED PRESSURES FOR ANY AGREEMENT, EVEN A
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MINI-PACKAGE, THIS THREAT MAY GROW LESS CREDIBLE. IN
ADDITION, THE SOVIETS MAY BELIEVE THAT THEIR INFLUENCE IN
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS AND CSCE/CDE CONTINUITY CAN
BE ENSURED UNDER A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE SCENARIOS,
INCLUDING NO AGREEMENT.
6. SOVIET STRATEGY AND TACTICS. THUS, WHILE CONTINUITY
IS A SOVIET OBJECTIVE, IT IS NOT DOMINANT, BUT RATHER
SUBSUMED UNDER WHAT WE SEE HERE AS A TWO-PRONGED SOVIET
APPROACH: (1) ATTEMPTS TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES IN AS
POSITIVE A LIGHT AS POSSIBLE, AND (2) ATTEMPS TO MAXIMIZE
THEIR OWN MILITARY AND POLITICAL POSITION. BECAUSE THE
MANDATE REQUIRES A QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OVER THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE SOME MILITARY AND
POLITICAL SACRIFICE ON THE PART OF THE USSR, THIS IS
ESSENTIALLY A DAMAGE-LIMITING EXERCISE. THE KEY
COMPONENTS ARE: (1) ATTEMPTS TO REDRESS THE ZONE ISSUE
AND (2) NEGOTIATING SO AS TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECT OF ANY
AGREED CSBMS ON SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES, A COMPONENT
MANIFESTED THROUGH A SOVIET STALL ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
WHILE THEY MAINTAIN THE ILLUSION OF CONTRIBUTING TO
PROGRESS. AS NOTED, THE ACCEPTABLE OUTCOMES WOULD BE A
"MINI-PACKAGE" OR NO AGREEMENT; EITHER AT LITTLE OR NO
COST -- WITH PROBABLE CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS.
7. THE ZONE. THE SOVIET MILITARY CHAFES UNDER THE
AGREEMENT AT MADRID TO EXTEND THE ZONE TO THE URALS.
THEY ARE TRYING TO UNDO THE MANDATE AND SEE TWO
POSSIBILITIES -- EITHER IN STOCKHOLM OR BY SETTING THE
STAGE HERE FOR DOING SO IN VIENNA. THEIR OBJECTIVE IS
EITHER A RECIPROCAL EXTENSION OF THE ZONE TO THE WEST,
CAPTURING NAVAL FORCES AND FORCES BASED IN THE U.S., OR
TO OPERATIONALIZE THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE IN SUCH A
WAY AS TO REVERT BACK TO THE HFA DEFINITION. THEY HAVE,
IN FACT, BEEN PURSING BOTH OBJECTIVES SIMULTANEOUSLY HERE
IN STOCKHOLM IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, E.G.:
A. INITIAL EASTERN PROPOSALS -- PRIMARILY DECLARATORY --
SERVED TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION FROM CONCRETE CSBMS WHICH
COVER THE ZONE OF THE MANDATE.
B. LATER EASTERN PROPOSALS -- WGB.1-4 -- WHICH INCLUDED
PROPOSALS FOR NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR
ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS), WERE ALL
BASED UPON THE SAME OBJECTIVES -- EXTEND THE ZONE, CAPTURE
NAVAL AND U.S. HOME-BASED FORCES, AND DESTROY THE MANDATE
BY DESTROYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.
C. THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV STATEMENT -- AIMED AT
SECURING A PLACE FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A SUBSEQUENT
PHASE OF THE CDE. IT SETS THE STAGE FOR REDEFINING
THE MANDATE IN VIENNA.
D. PROPOSALS TABLED, OR MADE VERBALLY, THIS ROUND IN THE
FOUR CONCRETE CSBM WORKING GROUPS -- NOTIFICATION (TYPES
OF ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERED); INFORMATION, VERIFICATION
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AND COMMUNICATION (INFORMATION IN THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFI-
CATION); OBSERVATION; AND ANNUAL FORECASTS AND CONSTRAIN-
ING MEASURES (ON BOTH SUBJECTS) CONTAIN EITHER ONE OR
BOTH OF TWO NOTABLE FEATURES: (1) A REFERENCE TO THE
ZONE IN TERMS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE AND UNACCEPT-
ABLE TO US; AND/OR (2) AN EMPHASIS ON INDEPENDENT AIR
AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS (WHICH WE CAN ALSO READ AS
ATTEMPTING TO CAPTURE POINT OF ORIGIN, AND NOTIFICATION
OF U.S. TRANSITS). THE INTRODUCTION OF UNACCEPTABLE
LANGUAGE REFERRING TO THE ZONE RESULTED IN THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF A CONTACT GROUP TO FIND AN AGREED REFERENCE TO
THE ZONE. THE RESOLUTION OF THAT ISSUE -- AT LEAST FOR
NOV -- MEANS THAT THEY LOST THAT SKIRMISH. WE DOUBT THE
BATTLE IS OVER.
OTHER PROPOSALS, WHILE NOT EXPLICITLY CONTAINING THESE
FEATURES, COULD BE AIMED AT SERVING THE SAME PURPOSES.
THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A QUOTA OF FIVE ON THE NUMBER OF
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE OBSERVED MAY BE
AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT OBSERVATION OF ACTIVITIES IN THE
SOVIET INTERIOR -- THAT AREA COVERED BY THE EXTENSION
THE ZONE TO THE URALS. HUNGARY'S VERIFICATION
PROPOSAL ALSO SERVES TO PROTECT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN
THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION.
S. THE HOPED FOR EFFECT OF SOVIET STALLING TACTICS WILL
BE TO REACH THE FINAL SESSION WITH ONLY A FEW RELATIVELY
INSIGNIFICANT POINTS AGREED, RESULTING IN EITHER A "MINI-
PACKAGE" OR NO AGREEMENT. EXAMPLES:
A. THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL WAS TOUTED AS A
POSITIVE SOVIET MOVE -- A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION DESIGNED
TO BREAK THE IMPASSE AT THE CONFERENCE. THE POSITION
THAT NO PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE UNTIL ACCEPTANCE OF THIS
PROPOSAL BY THE U.S./WEST, AND THAT SOME KIND OF AN
AGREEMENT REGARDING THIS PROPOSED UNDERSTANDING BE
RECORDED IN SOME WAY -- MAY BE COUCHED TO JUSTIFY
BLOCKING PROGRESS.
B. PROPOSALS. THIS ROUND IN WORKING GROUPS. THE FACT
THAT PROPOSALS REFLECTING MODEST BUT NON-SUBSTANTIVE
MOVEMENT ARE FINALLY BEING TABLED BY THE EAST PLAYS INTO
THE POSITIVE IMAGE APPROACH.
-- MINOR CONCESSIONS ON THE OBSERVATION ISSUE, FOR
EXAMPLE, RECEIVED GREAT FANFARE. IN FACT, THE MAJOR
SO-CALLED "CONCESSION" -- THAT ALL PARTICIPATING STATES
SHOULD BE INVITED TO OBSERVE -- SIMPLY REFLECTED
ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY BECAUSE OF MANDATE REQUIREMENTS FOR
OBLIGATION AND EQUALITY. THEY HAVE NOT ACCEPTED, HOWEVER,
THAT ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE OBSERVED.
-- VERIFICATION LANGUAGE HAS BEEN TABLED AND IT HAS BEEN
WELCOMED. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPRECISE AND FRAGMENTARY. IT
SEEKS TO BUILD AN UNWIELDLY SYSTEM OF REQUESTS/
CLARIFICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS THAT, IN PRACTICE, WOULD
DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION. THE ONLY LANGUAGE
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"NOTED" TO DATE IN THIS GROUP IS MANDATE LANGUAGE.
HUNGARY, IN THE LAST WORKING GROUP MEETING, IMPLIED THAT
MORE ON VERIFICATION WAS COMING -- A STATEMENT CORROBORAT-
ED-BY THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR WHO, IN PRIVATE CONVERSA-
TIONS, HAS SAID THAT THE EAST WILL PRESENT'ADDITIONAL
VERIFICATION TEXT WHICH WILL GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF
MOVING TOWARD THE NNA APPROACH OF "OBSERVATION UPON
REQUEST." IT IS LIKELY, ONCE AGAIN, TO BE TOUTED AS YET
ANOTHER SOVIET CONCESSION IN ORDER TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD;
WE EXPECT THAT IT WILL NOT ENDORSE THE RIGHT TO INSPECTION
AND WILL INTRODUCE A SERIES OF PRELIMINARY STEPS TO BE
TAKEN BEFORE A REQUEST CAN BE MADE.
-- WHILE THEY HAVE TABLED A TEXT ON INFORMATION TO BE
INCLUDED IN THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION, THE INFORMATION
REQUESTED EITHER PRESENTS NO IMPROVEMENT OVER THAT
PROVIDED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OR
PURSUES SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN TERMS OF REDEFINING THE
ZONE AND DESTROYING THE MANDATE'S FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.
MOREOVER, BY SEEKING TO DISCUSS INFORMATION TO BE
INVOLVED IN A NOTIFICATION IN THE "INFORMATION, VERIFI-
CATION, COMMUNICATION" WORKING GROUP, THEY PURSUE THE
TWIN OBJECTIVES OF ELIMINATING ANY CONSIDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT INFORMATION ALONG THE LINES OF MEASURE
1/SC.1 AND OF LIMITING DISCUSSIONS ON VERIFICATION.
-- EARLY THIS ROUND, THE EAST MAXIMIZED PRESENTATION OF
A NEW PROPOSAL ON LIMITATIONS BY PRESENTING IT IN PLENARY.
THE SO-CALLED CHANGE IN POSITION WAS CAST IN TERMS SIMILAR
TO THOSE EMPLOYED BY THE NNA IN SC.7 -- THE LIMIT SHOULD
APPLY AT A LEVEL FIVE TIMES THE LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION.
LATER, THEY MADE AN ADDITIONAL PROPOSAL ON CEILINGS IN
THE WORKING GROUP. AS IT HAS BEEN MADE UNEQUIVOCALLY
CLEAR THAT THE WEST WILL NOT ACCEPT CEILINGS, SOVIET
MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION COSTS THEM NOTHING AND GIVES
THEM THE AURA OF FLEXIBILITY.
-- A BIG TO-DO WAS MADE FOLLOWING THE GORBACHEV
"CONCESSION" IN PARIS THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPTED THE
NOTION OF ANNUAL FORECAST/ CALENDARS. THEIR ACCEPTANCE
OF THIS PROPOSAL WAS INEVITABLE. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS NOT
CLEAR WHAT THEY ENVISAGE, ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT IT WILL NOT
CONTAIN THE LEVEL OF DETAIL EITHER WE OR THE NNA ARE
AFTER.
C. THE EAST HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET WHEN IT COMES TO
CONCRETE DRAFTING IN MOST OF THE WORKING GROUPS. THEY
GENERALLY INSIST ON DRAFTING BEHIND THE SCENES, USING THE
COORDINATOR AS A GO-BETWEEN, WHERE THEY CAN'T BE PUT ON
THE SPOT BY THE WEST. WHILE ALLOWING AN UNOBJECTIONABLE
SENTENCE OR TWO TO BE "NOTED," THEY HAVE NOT BEEN
RECEPTIVE TO DISCUSSING LANGUAGE ON MORE SIGNIFICANT
ISSUES, MUCH LESS ENGAGING IN THE GIVE AND TAKE AND
CREATIVE EXCHANGE REQUIRED BY DRAFTING.
9. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON CSCE. IF THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING
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A "MINI-PACKAGE" OUTCOME, IT COULD SERVE THEIR PURPOSE BY
DIVERTING PRESSURE FROM THEMSELVES ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS
ISSUES; A STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT COULD BE MARKETED AS BOTH A
GREAT CSCE AND SOVIET SUCCESS. BUT, IF THE SOVIETS ARE
REALLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT NO AGREEMENT HERE, THEY COULD
PROBABLY FIND A WAY TO USE SUCH AN OUTCOME TO THEIR
ADVANTAGE AS WELL -- IN BALANCING WESTERN ACCUSATIONS ON
SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST WHAT THEY WILL
CONTEND 13 WESTERN RESPONSIBILITY FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN
THE SECURITY BASKET.
NEXT ROUND
10. SOVIET TACTICS FOR THE NEXT ROUND WILL PROBABLY
FOLLOW THE FAMILIAR PATTERN: A PUBLIC "CONCESSION"
ANNOUNCEMENT AT THE BEGINNING FOLLOWED BY STONEWALLING
ON DRAFTING EXCUSED BY THE LACK OF A WESTERN COUNTER-
CONCESSION. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE POLISH FOREIGN
MINISTER WILL SPEAK TO THE OPENING PLENARY ON APRIL 15;
HE WILL TOUT WHATEVER THE WTO FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE
TO SAY ON CDE; PROBABLY A SLIGHT DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT
OF THEIR GROUND-FORCE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD (SAY TO
18,000) OR A MOVE TOWARDS THE NNA CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION.
11. THE SCENE HAS ALREADY BEEN SET FOR THE SUBSEQUENT
STONEWALLING. IN HIS END-OF-ROUND SPEECH GRENEVSKIY
WARNED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE
UNLESS THE WEST CAME TO TERMS ON AIR ACTIVITIES AND/OR
"AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE THE NAVAL ISSUE." WE SUSPECT
THEY WILL FALL OFF THE LATTER, SINCE EVEN THE OTHER
PACT DELEGATIONS RECOGNIZE IT IS A NON-STARTER. THE
BIG QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY WILL TAKE WHAT THE WEST
OFFERS ON FUNCTIONAL AIR AND PERMIT DRAFTING TO PROCEED
ON GROUND-FORCE CSBMS. IN PART, THIS WILL DEPEND ON
HOW SUCCESSFUL WE ARE IN OUR OWN PUBLIC RELATIONS AND
IN MAKING THEM TAKE THE BLAME FOR STALLING THE
CONFERENCE.
BARRY
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM01972
SUBJECT: CDE: VERIFICATION, WHERE WE STAND
1. CDE IX - 1114.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT BE THE LAST BRICK IN
THE EDIFICE OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IN STOCKHOLM,
DELEGATION BELIEVES ON-SITE VERIFICATION BY INSPECTORS IS
ATTAINABLE. INSPECTION AS THE SINE QUA NON FOR U.S.
ACCEPTANCE OF AN AGREEMENT IS KNOWN AND UNDERTOOD BY THE
CONFERENCE. THE NNA HAVE NOT SERVED TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BUT HAVE PURSUED THEIR OWN CONCEPTS
IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CREATE TACTICAL DISADVANTAGES FOR THE
WEST. AS A CONSEQUENCE THERE IS LITTLE REAL SUPPORT BY
ANYONE OTHER THAN THE U.S. DEL FOR THE DETAILS OF
INSPECTION AS SET FORTH IN SC.1. THE NNA APPROACH TO
VERIFICATION WAS CREATED TWO YEARS INTO THE CONFERENCE
AND REFLECTS NEGOTIATIONS TO THAT POINT. IT THEREFORE
CONTAINS THEIR CONCEPT OF WHAT THEY THINK THE EAST CAN
ACCEPT RATHER THAN WHAT WOULD ENSURE VERIFICATION.
ALLIES ARE DRAWN TO THE NNA CONCEPT BECAUSE OF ITS
NEGOTIBILITY, GLIMPSING IN IT A MEANS OF SATISFYING THE
U.S. REQUIREMENT FOR INSPECTION. SOME NNA HAVE EXPRESSED
WILLINGNESS TO BEEF UP THEIR PROPOSAL. THESE FACTORS
MAKE IT NECESSARY TO EVALUATE HOW WE PURSUE OUR
SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES MOST EFFECTIVELY. SEE PARA 12.
END SUMMARY.
4. DESPITE THE INABILITY TO DRAFT SIGNIFICANT LANGUAGE
ON VERIFICATION THUS FAR IN THE CDE, THE PERCEPTION
PERSISTS THAT A FINAL AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM WILL CODIFY
OUR ACCESS TO SOVIET TERRITORY TO THE URALS THROUGH SOME
FORM OF ONSITE INSPECTION. REGARDLESS OF A GENERAL LACK
OF CONFERENCE SUPPORT FOR AN INSPECTION REGIME AS RIGOROUS
AS THAT IN SC.1/A, THE DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY MADE
CLEAR THAT THIS IS A SINE QUA NON FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF
A FINAL DOCUMENT, IN FACT, WE HAVE STATED AT THE
CONFERENCE AND IN PUBLIC FORUMS OUR WILLINGNESS TO WALK
AWAY FROM STOCKHOLM WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT IF IT DOES NOT
PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION. SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE SOFTER ON
THIS ISSUE THAN WE, BUT ALL SUPPORT THE BASIC CONCEPT.
5. THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE ARE, HOWEVER, UNLIKE ANY
PREVIOUS CSCE MEETINGS BECAUSE THE NNA DO NOT PLAY
THEIR USUAL BRIDGING ROLE. RATHER, THEY CONTINUE TO PUSH
THEIR OWN CONCEPTS, UPON WHICH IT TOOK THEM TWO YEARS TO
AGREE. THIS HAS WORKED VERY MUCH TO THE TACTICAL
DISADVANTAGE OF THE WEST SINCE THE NNA, WHO SAY THEY ALSO
WANT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS, HAVE REJECTED
MANY OF THE CONCEPTS IN SC-1/A BOTH ON GROUNDS OF
SUBSTANCE AND OF TACTICS. ALMOST WITHOUT EFFORT, THE
SOVIETS HAVE OBTAINED NNA SUPPORT FOR REJECTING SOME
ASPECTS OF SC-1 AND MOVING TOWARD THE EASTERN VIEW -- NNA
EMPHASIS ON "REQUEST" AND NATO EMPHASIS ON "RIGHT"
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(VIS-A-VIS VERIFICATION) BEING A CASE IN POINT.
- -- ON TACTICS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NNA HAVE JUDGED THAT
THE WORD "INSPECTION" IS ANATHEMA TO THE SOVIETS AND HAVE
REFUSED TO ACCEPT ITS USE IN THE CONFERENCE, EVEN THOUGH
SOME WILL PRIVATELY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT "OBSERVATION ON
REQUEST" IS, FOR THEM, INSPECTION BY ANOTHER NAME.
- -- ON SUBSTANCE, THEY REJECT THE IDEA OF ANY QUOTA
AND ARGUE THAT VERIFICATION, E.G., OBSERVATION ON REQUEST,
CANNOT BE BASED ON A QUOTA SYSTEM BUT MUST BE AVAILABLE
TO ALL STATES WHENEVER A LEGITIMATE NEED ARISES. PART OF
THIS SUBSTANTIVE POSITION IS BASED UPON A CONCERN THAT A
QUOTA SYSTEM COULD BE EXHAUSTERD BY SOVIET FEINTS. THEY
ALSO SEE THE POSSIBILITY FOR ABUSE BY THE WEST AND HAVE
ANTICIPATED SOVIET SENSITIVITIES IN THIS REGARD.
- -- FURTHER, THE NNA SAY, AT LEAST, THAT THEY DO NOT
RECOGNIZE THE REQUIREMENT FOR RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH COULD
BE IMPOSED TO PRECLUDE VERIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES TAKING
PLACE IN THE FIELD BY GROUND FORCES AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL
LOCATIONS; THEY CONTEND THAT THIS IS A GIANT LOOPHOLE
WHICH UNDERMINES VERIFICATION. THEY ARGUE THAT THEIR TWO
DEVICES BETTER ACCOMPLISH THE REASONABLE OBJECTIVE OF
RESTRICTED AREA'S -- AVOIDANCE OF INSPECTION OF SENSITIVE
AREAS SUCH AS GARRISONS: FIRST, THE SUPREME NATIONAL
INTEREST CLAUSE AND SECOND, THE EXCLUSION OF "MOVEMENTS"
ARRANGED AT SHORT NOTICE (I.E., MOBILIZATION AND THE
MOVE TO GENERAL DEFENSE POSITIONS) FROM PRIOR NOTIFICATION
AND OBSERVATION, AS WELL AS OBSERVATION ON REQUEST.
THERE IS, HOWEVER, SOME INCONSISTENCY IN THEIR APPROACH,
INSOFAR AS THEY TOO, IN THEIR OWN DOCUMENT, ALLUDE TO
RESTRICTED AREAS -- SOME SAY THEY HAVE IN MIND
NARROW EXCEPTIONS (E.G., GARRISONS) WHILE THE YUGOSLAVS
THINK TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS COULD ALSO BE NECESSARY
-- WHICH WOULD ALSO BE EXCEPTED FROM "OBSERVATION UPON
REQUEST." (COMMENT: WE HAVE ARGUED THAT THIS APPROACH,
COUPLED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF REFUSING AN "OBSERVATION
UPON REQUEST" ON GROUNDS OF SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERESTS, CONTAINS NOT ONLY THE RESTRICTED AREA LOOPHOLE
THEY PERCEIVE TO EXIST IN SC.1/A, BUT THE ADDITIONAL
LOOPHOLE OF BEING ABLE TO REFUSE ANY INSPECTION. END
COMMENT)
6. WHILE THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE (GEN
TARTARNIKOV) HAS RESTRICTED HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT THEY
ARE STUDYING THE NNA APPROACH, HIS KGB COLLEAGUE (ROZANOV)
HAS SAID BILATERALLY THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY THE
SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT SOME FORM OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION.
OTHERS IN THE EASTERN GROUP, ESPECIALLY THE GDR AND
HUNGARY, HAVE BEEN MORE VOCAL IN THE CORRIDORS IN EXPRESS-
ING THE VIEW THAT "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" IS THE ANSWER
TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IN A FINAL AGREEMENT IN
STOCKHOLM. IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE EAST HAS DEFINED
VERIFICATION AS A FIVE OR SIX-STEP PROCESS: 1) USING NTMS
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS, 2) A REQUEST FOR
CLARIFYING INFORMATION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE EVIDENCE
UPON WHICH THE REQUEST WAS MADE, 3) THE STATE RECEIVING
THE REQUEST COULD RESPOND WITH AN APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION,
44) THE REQUESTING STATE MIGHT PROPOSE MULTI- OR BI-LATERAL
CONSULTATIONS, 5) IF NEEDED, ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, A
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION COULD BE CALLED INTO BEING AND
FINALLY 6) THE INTEREST OF VERIFICATION MIGHT BE SERVED
BY THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS. AND WE HAVE HEARD IN
RECENT DAYS THAT THE WTO VERIFICATION PROPOSAL TABLED IN
THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUP BY HUNGARY (ENCORPORATING
ELEMENTS 1, 2, 3, AND u OF THE AFOREMENTIONED FIVE OR
SIX-STEP PROCESS) WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED SOON TO BRING IT
CLOSER INTO LINE WITH THE SC.7 "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST"
APPROACH.
7. THE WEST HAS BEEN UNIFORMLY CRITICAL OF SOME ASPECTS
OF THE NNA APPROACH, MOST PARTICULARY, THE RIGHT OF
REFUSAL. SOME NNA (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND AND SWEDEN) ALSO
UNDERSTAND THAT THIS PROVISION IS A HUGE LOOPHOLE AND
AGREE THAT IT NEEDS TO BE TIGHTENED UP. THEY SAY THAT
THE SC-7 APPROACH IS ITSELF A COMPROMISE IN ORDER TO
REACH A COMMON POSITION BECAUSE YUGOSLAVIA AND FINLAND
OPPOSE ON-SITE VERIFICATION AS A WESTERN PREOCCUPATION.
SWITZERLAND HAS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD
BY ARGUING PUBLICALLY THAT REFUSAL OF INSPECTION ON THE
GROUNDS OF "SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST" COULD ONLY OCCUR
WHEN A NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY OR NATIONAL INTEGRITY WAS
BEING THREATENED AND BY THAT TIME ANY CSBM'S AGREEMENT
WOULD NO LONGER BE IN FORCE. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THEY
HAVE NOT STATED AS MUCH, THE SWISS ARGUMENT LEADS ONE TO
THE CONCLUSION THAT AUTOMATIC ABROGATION OF THE AGREEMENT
IS ENTAILED IN THEIR "SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST" CLAUSE.
END COMMENT) SWITZERLAND HAS ALSO ARGUED ITS CASE FOR
"AD HOC CONSULTATIONS" (THEIR IDEA OF A SALON DES
AMBASSADEURS) AS BEING A NECESSARY ADJUNCT TO THE CONCEPT
OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION SINCE SUCH CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE
CALLED INTO BEING IF A REQUEST WERE TO BE DENIED. THIS,
THEY SAY, WOULD ADD TO THE POLITICAL COST OF DENYING A
REQUEST FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION. (COMMENT: AT THIS
POINT, THE NNA TIE CONSULTATIONS MORE TO THE REFUSAL OF
AN INSPECTION, THAN TO THE REQUEST AS THE EAST DOES. END
COMMENT) SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE ROLE OF TIGHTENING UP THE
DENIAL LOOPHOLE IN THE NNA APPROACH HAS BEEN LEFT ALMOST
ENTIRELY TO THE SWISS.
8. SEVERAL ALLIES ARE NOW SAYING BOTH IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE THAT THEY SEE THE SC-7 APPROACH AS THE ONLY
POSSIBILITY FOR ACHIEVING ON-SITE VERIFICATION. THE
FRENCH MILREP, WHO IS RECOGNIZED AS BEING A "LOOSE
CANNON", HAS STATED IN A DRAFTING GROUP SESSION THAT
FRANCE HOPES A SOLUTION "ALONG THESE LINES" OBSERVATION
ON REQUEST CAN BE FOUND. FOR THIS HE WAS SEVERELY
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CENSORED BY THE REST OF THE WESTERN GROUP. NEVERTHELESS,
HE APPEARS TO BE EXPRESSING A FRENCH NATIONAL POSITION.
IN AN EARLIER MEETING OF NATO EXPERTS, HE STATED THAT
FRANCE WILL "NEVER" ALLOW THEIR FORCES TO BE "INSPECTED".
AND IN A CLUSTER CAUCUS, HE HAS REFERRED TO THE SC-1
INSPECTION PROPOSAL AS "CRAZY". THE NETHERLANDS MILREP,
FOR QUITE DIFFERENT REASONS, HAS STATED THAT THE HAGUE IS
LOOKING FAVORABLY AT THE NNA APPROACH. THE REAL KEEPERS
OF ORTHODOXY IN REGARD TO THE SC-1 APPROACH REMAIN, AS
USUAL, THE U.S., U.K., PORTUGAL, AND TURKEY WITH A LITTLE
HELP FROM BELGIUM. THE FRENCH APPROACH IS PARTICULARLY
TROUBLING SINCE THEY SEEM NOT CONSTRAINED BY A COMMON
ALLIANCE POSITION UNLESS IT HAPPENS TO COINCIDE WITH
THEIR OWN NATIONAL POSITION.
9. THE CURRENT FRENCH CONCEPT OF NOT INSISTING ON
RESTRICTED AREAS, APART FROM GARRISONS AND OTHER SENSITIVE
POINTS AS DESCRIBED IN SC-1, IS TIED TO THE IDEA OF A
THREE DAY DELAY IN CARRYING OUT AN INSPECTION. THAT IS
TANTAMOUNT TO NO INSPECTION AT ALL IN MANY CASES AND
FEEDS RIGHT INTO THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF CONSULTATIONS
BEFORE INSPECTIONS --SOMETHING WE HAVE SPENT A GREAT DEAL
OF TIME IN ARGUING AGAINST. THE GERMANS, ON THE OTHER
HAND, INSIST ON SOME KIND OF MECHANISM, I.E., RESTRICTED
AREAS, WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO IMPLEMENT DEPLOYMENTS
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT FORWARD DEFENSE WITHOUT HAVING
THESE DEPLOYMENTS, IN THEIR GENERAL DEFENSE POSITIONS,
SUBJECT TO INSPECTIONS.
10. ALTHOUGH WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM ALL SEEM
TO HAVE DOUBTS IN THIS REGARD, NATO DOCUMENT C-M(83)56
(REVISED) STATES IN PARA 5(F) THAT ONE OF THE
OBJECTIVES OF CSBMS IS: "TO FACILITATE POLITICAL
DECISIONS BY THE ALLIES ON MILITARY ACTIONS IN PERIODS
OF TENSION OR CRISIS. . ." MANY SEE THIS AS PLACING NATO
IN A CATCH-22 POSITION HAVING THE REQUIREMENT TO BE ABLE
TO IMPLEMENT DEFENSIVE MEASURES IN TIME OF CRISIS WHILE
AT THE SAME TIME HAVING THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENT TO HAVE
FUTURE CSBM'S FUNCTION AS CRISIS MANAGEMENT TOOLS. THE
SOLUTION MOST FREQUENTLY ARRIVED AT IS TO PUT GENERAL
DEFENSE POSITIONS IN RESTRICTED AREAS, OR AT LEAST
TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS, THEREBY ALLOWING THE SOVIETS
THE SAME POSSIBILITY AND SIMPLY ACCEPTING THE DEGRADATION
IN VERIFICATION.
11. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEGOTIATION IN STOCKHOLM OF
RESTRICTED AREAS FOR ALL THE RELEVANT CSCE STATES BASED
UPON ANY COMMON FORMULA WOULD SEEM TO BE A GARGANTUAN
TASK, ESPECIALLY ON TOP OF THE OBJECTIVE OF NEGOTIATING
AN EFFECTIVE MEASURE FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION.
CONTEMPLATING THIS IN LIGHT OF NATO'S INABILITY TO REACH
AGREEMENT, MAKES A NEGOTIATOR'S HEAD SPIN.
12. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? ANSWERING THIS QUESTION IS
NOT EASY, INDEED THERE MAY NOT BE ANY SINGLE ANSWER. IT
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IS9 HOWEVER, BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT INSPECTION,
AS DEVELOPED IN SC-1/A, IS A U.S. PREOCCUPATION SHARED IN
ITS REAL BY FEW OTHERS. THE FRG INTEREST IS IN SECURING
AN AGREEMENT WHICH LOCKS IN ATLANTIC TO THE URALS AS A
FUTURE ZONE FOR ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE, THE FRENCH ARE
ENIGMATIC -- AT BEST. OTHERS HAVE DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONS,
NOT ALWAYS EXPLICABLE. PARADOXICALLY, THE SWEDES AND
SWISS MAY BE AMONG THOSE WHO MOST WANT REAL VERIFICATION.
AT THIS STAGE, DELEGATION BELIEVES IT POSSIBLE TO REACH A
RESULT WHICH WILL RESULT IN THE POSSIBILITY TO CONDUCT
INSPECTIONS. BUT THE LACK OF GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE
INSPECTION REGIME IN SC.1/A, THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE
RESTRICTED AREA DEBATE WILL POSE, AND GENERAL EASTERN
STRATEGY TO DELAY CQNFERENCE ATTENTION ON VERIFICATION
(OTHER THAN NTM), MEANS THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR US
TO REDIRECT OUR EFFORTS IN ORDER TO OBSTAIN OUR REAL
REQUIREMENTS. THE BEST APPROACH SEEMS TO BE TO REFASHION
THE NNA APPROACH SO THAT INSPECTION IS A RIGHT, KEED TO
CSBM'S IMPLEMENTATION, THAT CANNOT BE REFUSED WITHOUT
PLACING THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF CSBMS IN JEOPARDY ARE
OBTAINABLE BY EXPLOITING THE NNA APPROACH. DELEGATION
WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01973
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SERVICES AT CSCE MEETINGS
REF: A) 85 STOCKHOLM 870, B) 85 STOCKHOLM 7654
1. CDE IX - 113
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUE OF
RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SERVICES AT THE APRIL MEETING ON HUMAN
CONTACTS IN BERN AND AT THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING
SCHEDULED TO OPEN IN NOVEMBER 1986 ALREADY IS BEING
ADDRESSED BY THE LOCAL SECRETARIATS. BASED ON OUR
EXPERIENCE IN STOCKHOLM, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT
TO BREAK CSCE PRECEDENT AND THE SOVIET MONOPOLY ON
RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS HIRED BY CSCE SECRETARIATS. WE
URGE AMEMBASSIES BERN AND VIENNA TO RAISE THIS MATTER
WITH APPROPRIATE SWISS AND AUSTRIAN OFFICIALS. (TALKING
POINTS PROVIDED PARA 6.)
4. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUE OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
SERVICES AT THE APRIL MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS IN BERN
AND AT THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING ALREADY HAS BEEN
ADDRESSED. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO BREAK
CSCE PRECEDENT AND THE SOVIET MONOPOLY ON RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE EXPERTS HIRED BY CSCE SECRETARIATS.
5. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION WHICH THE SWEDISH EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY AF SILLEN PROVIDED US ON MARCH 14, THE SWISS
SECRETARIAT HAS HIRED A NON-SOVIET RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
EXPERT FOR THE RUSSIAN BOOTH IN BERN. WE THINK THAT
THIS IS A VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND URGE OUR EMBASSY
AND DELEGATION TO THE MEETING TO SUPPORT THE SWISS
SECRETARIAT'S DECISION.
6. AF SILLEN ALSO TOLD US THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE
PRESSURED THE AUSTRIAN SECRETARIAT TO FOLLOW CSCE
PRACTICE AND TO HIRE ONLY SOVIET-PROVIDED RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE STAFF FOR THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. WE
BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO LET THE SOVIETS
CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ALL OF THE SECRETARIAT'S RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE EXPERTS. WE URGE EMBASSY VIENNA TO DISCUSS
THIS MATTER WITH THE AUSTRIAN MFA DEPARTMENT IN CHARGE
OF ORGANIZING THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING, STRESSING THE
FOLLOWING POINTS:
-- IN CSCE MEETINGS ALL OF THE LANGUAGE EXPERTS, WITH
THE EXCEPTION OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS, HAVE
BEEN INDEPENDENT FREE-LANCERS WHO HAVE WORKED AS
TECHNICAL EXPERTS FOR THE NEUTRAL SECRETARIAT.
-- THE MOSCOW-BASED RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS PROVIDED
BY THE SOVIET MFA CLEARLY ARE NEITHER INDEPENDENT NOR
FREE-LANCERS. THEY ARE SOVIET GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND
AT STOCKHOLM THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WHEN
IT HAS BEEN ALL TOO CLEAR FOR WHOM THESE LANGUAGE
EXPERTS REALLY WORK (SEE REFTELS).
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AT THE CDE SOVIET ABUSES OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
BOOTH AND TRANSLATION SERVICES ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS
HAS SERIOUSLY HURT THE SECRETARIAT'S INDEPENDENCE AND
CREDIBILITY AS A NEUTRAL PARTY. FOR EXAMPLE:
-- DURING A PLENARY SESSION LAST YEAR, THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR'S INTERPRETER, WHO ALSO IS THE NUMBER TWO IN
THE SOVIET MFA'S LANGUAGE SERVICES DEPARTMENT, EDUARD
ZAYTSEV, KICKED THE REGULAR (SOVIET) INTERPRETER OUT OF
THE BOOTH SO THAT HE (ZAYTSEV) COULD INTERPRET A
STATEMENT DELIVERED BY THE U.S. DEPUTY, WHICH HE DID
VERY SARCASTICALLY.
-- WHEN THE WEST TABLED ITS PROPOSAL IN EARLY 1985,
THE SOVIET TRANSLATER WORKING IN THE SECRETARIAT, WHOSE
ENGLISH WAS NOT UP TO THE TASK AND WHO WAS VISIBLY
NOW
INTIMIDATED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTERPRETER, THE SOVIET
GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL INTERPRETER, PROVIDED DELEGATION HIS FIRST DRAFT. THE SOVIET DELEGATION,
INCLUDING THE MILITARY, WOULD STUDY IT AND WOULD THEN
PROVIDE THE SECRETARIAT TRANSLATOR WITH THE SOVIET
DELEGATION'S CLEARED TRANSLATION -- ALL OF THIS BEFORE
WE, THE SPONSORS, EVER SAW THE TRANSLATION. ALL OF THIS
BECAME CLEAR WHEN WE PROTESTED A NUMBER OF EGREGIOUS
MISTRANSLATIONS WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD DELIBERATELY
INTRODUCED TO GIVE THEMSELVES AMMUNITION. THE WORST
CASE OF THIS WAS THE TRANSLATION OF THE TERM "IN EXACT
GEOGRAPHIC TERMS" INTO RUSSIAN AS "GEOGRAPHICAL
COORDINATES." SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY USED THE
RUSSIAN VERSION IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE BBC THE
FOLLOWING DAY TO SUPPORT THE SOVIET CASE THAT THE WEST
WAS SEEKING TARGETING INFORMATION FOR ITS PERSHING-2'S
AND CRUISE MISSILES.
7. THE SOVIETS ROUTINELY TRY TO PORTRAY US AS THE
TROUBLEMAKERS IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARIAT.
WE POINT OUT THAT IT IS THEY WHO ARE ASKING FOR SPECIAL
PRIVILEGES. WHAT WE ARE SEEKING IS EQUAL TREATMENT:
RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS SHOULD BE HIRED ACCORDING
TO THE SAME CRITERIA AND FROM THE SAME FREE-LANCE SOURCES
AS THE OTHER LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS. IT IS THE SOVIETS WHO
ARE TRYING TO INTERFERE WITH THE NORMAL HIRING PRACTICE.
8. BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE IN STOCKHOLM, WE CAN PREDICT
THAT IF THE AUSTRIAN SECRETARIAT HIRES NON-SOVIET .
RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS, THE SOVIETS WILL COMPLAIN AT
THE VIENNA MEETING ABOUT THE "ARCHAIC" RUSSIAN USED BY
NON-SOVIET INTERPRETERS AND WILL TRY TO BULLY THE
SECRETARIAT INTO LETTING THEM GO. THIS, OF COURSE, IS
NO REASON FOR THE AUSTRIANS TO GIVE THE SOVIETS WHAT
THEY WANT. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED IN
STOCKHOLM. DURING THE FIRST CDE ROUND THE SWEDISH
SECRETARIAT HIRED A LOCAL RUSSIAN SPEAKER. THE LATTER
WAS SO HARSHLY CRITICIZED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR
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HIS "ARCHAIC RUSSIAN" ETC., THAT THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT
LET HIM GO AFTER ONE ROUND. (WE DID NOT HEAR ABOUT THIS
UNTIL MUCH LATER, WHEN A SERIES OF ABUSES BY THE SOVIET
DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH,AND TRANSLATION
SERVICES, CAUSED US TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION.)
9. WE HAVE WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE SECRETARIAT HERE IN
STOCKHOLM AND HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE RUSSIAN BOOTH IS
THE ONLY BOOTH WHICH DOES NOT RECRUIT INDEPENDENT FREE-
LANCE INTERPRETERS. THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT COMPETENT
FREE-LANCERS INTO RUSSIAN DO NOT EXIST. IN ORDER TO
DISPROVE THIS UNFOUNDED ASSERTION WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AND
CONTACTED RUSSIAN LANGUAGE FREE-LANCERS WHO HAVE BEEN
HIGHLY RATED BY PROFESSIONAL INTERPRETING ORGANIZATIONS.
WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THEY APPLY TO WORK AT THE CDE --
ONLY TO HAVE THEN TURNED DOWN BY THE SECRETARIAT FOR
VARIOUS VAGUE REASONS (THE REAL REASON: NOT-SO-VEILED
THREATS FROM THE SOVIET DELEGATION).
10. HOWEVER, OUR CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING HAS HAD A
BENEFICIAL EFFECT: RECENTLY THE SWEDISH EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY HIRED AN AUSTRIAN FREELANCER WHO IS AN
EXPERIENCED INTERPRETER INTO RUSSIAN. WHEN HE TOLD THE
SOVIETS THAT THEY SHOULD SEND ONE FEWER INTERPRETERS FOR
THE NEXT SESSION, THEY REACTED BY SENDING IN ONE OF
THEIR CDE AMBASSADORS (YEROFEYEV) TO ARGUE THAT THE
AUSTRIAN'S RUSSIAN WAS ARCHAIC, THAT HE HAD NO RECENT
EXPERIENCE IN THE BOOTH (UNTRUE) AND DID NOT KNOW THE
SPECIALIZED CDE VOCABULARY -- THE NORMAL LITANY OF
ARGUMENTS THE SOVIETS TROT OUT EACH TIME THEIR MONOPOLY
ON THE RUSSIAN BOOTH IS CHALLENGED. IN THE END THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY COMPROMISED AND AGREED THAT THE
SOVIETS COULD SEND THEIR NORMAL NUMBER OF INTERPRETERS
AND THAT THE AUSTRIAN WOULD STAY AS AN "ADVISOR." THE
SOVIETS DID NOT WANT HIM TO WORK IN THE BOOTH. WE ARE
PUSHING THE EXECUTARY SECRETARY TO INSIST THAT HE WORK
IN THE BOOTH. WHILE THIS IS LESS THAN A COMPLETE
VICTORY, IT IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
WHICH, WE THINK, SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UP IN FUTURE CSCE
MEETINGS. WE ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING ABOUT FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS IN BERN AND VIENNA ON THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
BOOTH AND TRANSLATION SERVICES.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01779
SUBJECT: KEY CDE ISSUES FOR INTERSESSION
REFS: A. STOCKHOLM LL49; B. STOCKHOLM L447;
C. STOCKHOLM L72L; D. STOCKHOLM L292;
E. STOCKHOLM L5L7; F. STOCKHOLM L720
L. CDE IX - 093
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF
OUR POSITION ON TWO ISSUES, THRESHOLDS AND TREATMENT OF
FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES, MUST BE COMPLETED
BEFORE CDE ROUND X STARTS ON APRIL L5. A THIRD ISSUE,
POSSIBLE ADDITION OF CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS TO MEASURE
TWO, WILL NEED TO BE SETTLED BY EARLY IN. THE ROUND. WE
REQUEST THAT THE WORK PROGRAM FOR THE CONSULTATIVE
PERIOD MARCH L7 - APRIL LL BE ARRANGED TO CONCENTRATE
ON THESE ISSUES. ACTION REQUEST PARA 9. END SUMMARY.
4. WITH TWELVE NEGOTIATING WEEKS REMAINING BEFORE JULY
L9, WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT AT WHICH RESOLUTION OF
THE KEY ISSUES HAS BECOME URGENT. USDEL BELIEVES THAT
THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR POSITIONS ON THRESHOLDS
AND ON FUNCTIONALLY-RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES MUST BE
WORKED OUT BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF ROUND X APRIL L5.
THOUGH SOMEWHAT LESS URGENT, THE ISSUE OF ADDING
CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS TO MEASURE TWO ALSO REQUIRES
PRIORITY ATTENTION BY WASHINGTON.
5. WE SEE THE NEED TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS BY JULY L9 ON
THE BULK OF A CDE FINAL DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO PUT
MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT ON-SITE
INSPECTION IN THE LAST ROUND IN AUGUST-SEPTEMBER. IN OUR
VIEW, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT CONCEDE ON-SITE INSPECTION,
THE MEASURE WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AS THE SINE QUA NON OF
AN ACCEPTABLE CSBM REGIME, UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE AND
THEN.ONLY IF THEY SEE IT AS THE FINAL BRICK REQUIRED TO
MAKE THE WHOLE EDIFICE STAND. U.S. NEGOTIATING
STRATEGY SHOULD, THEREFORE, AIM AT OVERCOMING AS MANY
OF THE KEY STUMBLING BLOCKS IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS
(I.E. THRESHOLDS, INFORMATION) PRIOR TO THE FINAL ROUND
AS POSSIBLE, WHILE MAINTAINING THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR
SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES. THE EAST, FOR ITS PART, IS
PURSUING A STRATEGY WHICH WOULD DELAY THE RESOLUTION OF
ALL THE KEY ISSUES UNTIL THE END-GAME; IN THIS WAY THEY
HOPE TO PUT SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE ON THE WEST TO MAKE
SEVERAL MAJOR CONCESSIONS AS THE END APPROACHES.
6. OUR SENSE OF URGENCY IS HEIGHTENED BY THE FACT THAT
IT WILL TAKE TIME TO BRING THE ALLIES ALONG ON WHATEVER
NEW POSITIONS WE COME UP WITH. ANY CHANGE IN OUR
POSITION ON THRESHOLDS WILL BE LOOKED AT WITH
PARTICULAR CARE, ESPECIALLY IN BONN. WE -- AND ALL OUR
ALLIES -- WANT TO AVOID PUTTING THESE ISSUES BACK INTO
THE NATO MACHINERY; BUT EVEN IF WE DEAL WITH THEM IN
STOCKHOLM IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE CAPITALS WEEKS TO
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REGISTER THEIR VIEWS. THESE WEEKS HAVE TO BE
SUBTRACTED FROM THE TWELVE REMAINING BEFORE JULY L9.
7. THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING THAT THEY WILL NOT DRAFT ON
THE MAJOR ISSUES OF NOTIFICATION, FORECASTING AND
OBSERVATION UNTIL THERE IS AGREEMENT ON HOW TO TREAT
AIR ACTIVITIES. WE BELIEVE THEY WILL SETTLE FOR
FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR, AND WE HAVE MADE IT AMPLY
CLEAR THAT INDEPENDENT AIR IS OUT. BUT BEFORE WE CAN
TEST THEM ON THIS WE WILL NEED A MORE REFINED POSITION
ON WHAT INFORMATION WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ON
FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR AND WHAT THE MODALITIES FOR
OBSERVATION WILL BE.
8. REFS A-C GIVE USDEL VIEWS CONCERNING THE
"DIVISION-EQUIVALENT" FORMULATION OF THE THRESHOLD FOR
FORECAST/NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. REFS D AND E GIVE USDEL VIEWS ON THE
TREATMENT OF AIR ACTIVITIES FUNCTIONALLY RELATED T0.
NOTIFIABLE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. REF F DESCRIBES
INITIAL USDEL THINKING ON ADDING CERTAIN ELEMENTS TO
THE ANNUAL FORECAST IN ORDER TO ENHANCE ITS
CONSTRAINING EFFECT.
9. ACTION: REQUEST PM/TMP ARRANGE A WORK PROGRAM FOR
THE CDE INTERSESSION MARCH L7 - APRIL LL WHICH WILL
FOCUS INTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON THESE ISSUES WITH THE
GOAL OF SETTLING AT LEAST THE FIRST TWO BY THE START OF
THE NEXT ROUND.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONF I DENT I A L STOCKHOLM01148
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS
1. CDE IX - 049.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: OSD MEMORANDUM OF 27 DEC 1985 SETS FORTH
SEVERAL CONCEPTS FOR POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS OF THE NATO
CSBMS PROPOSALS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. INCLUDED
WERE POSSIBILITIES FOR RAISING THE THRESHOLD AS WELL AS
ALTERING IT CONCEPTUALLY FROM ONE DIVISION TO THAT OF A
DIVISION-EQUIVALENT. AS DRAFTING INTENSIFIES IN
STOCKHOLM, USDEL BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT TO BEGIN TO LAY
THE GROUNDWORK FOR MOVING TO THE THRESHOLD CONCEPTS
OUTLINED IN THE OSD MEMO. SEE PARA 14 FOR ACTION
REQUESTED. END SUMMARY
4. MEASURE THREE OF SC-1 ESTABLISHES A THRESHOLD FOR
THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND ACTIVITIES -- AND THUS FOR
OBSERVATION AND ANNUAL FORECASTS -- OF ONE DIVISION'
OUT-OF-GARRISON. FURTHER DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES
A DIVISION OUT-OF-GARRISON OR EQUIVALENT FORMATION
INCLUDES THREE THRESHOLD ELEMENTS: ONE-HALF OR MORE OF
A DIVISION'S COMBAT ELEMENTS (I.E., REGIMENTS OR
BRIGADES), AT LEAST 6000 TROOPS, (X) MAIN BATTLE TANKS
OR (Y) ARMORED CARRIERS. A THRESHOLD AT THIS LEVEL
WOULD REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 70-100 NOTIFICATIONS PER
YEAR FROM THE WARSAW PACT AND APPROXIMATELY 60-80 FROM
NATO WITH CORRESPONDING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ANNUAL
FORECAST AND OBSERVATIONS. WE JUDGE THAT THE REQUIREMENT
TO OBSERVE AND ACCEPT OBSERVERS TO THIS LARGE NUMBER OF
EXERCISES WOULD BE EXCESSIVE.
5. AN EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT CONCERN, FROM USDEL'S PERSPEC-
TIVE, WOULD BE THE REQUIREMENT TO MONITOR A LARGE NUMBER
OF EASTERN EXERCISES FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES. WHILE
WE JUDGE THAT AN INSPECTOR'S TASK WOULD BE GREATLY
FACILITATED BY A LOW THRESHOLD (THE NEED TO ASCERTAIN
THE PRESENCE OF SIGNIFICANTLY FEWER TANKS AND OTHER
SIGNATURE ITEMS), THE BURDEN ON OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
RESOURCES TO MONITOR EFFECTIVELY FOR VERIFICATION
PURPOSES A LARGE NUMBER OF WHAT COULD BE JUDGED TO BE
MILITARILY INSIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT BE
WARRANTED.
6. INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE TURKISH DELEGATION HAVE
INDICATED THAT ANKARA CANNOT ACCEPT ANY INFORMATION
PROVISION WHICH WOULD DIVULGE THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE AND SUBORDINATION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES.
THUS, THEY ARE UNWILLING TO INDICATE THAT ANY TWO MAJOR
COMBAT ELEMENTS -- E.G., TWO BRIGADES -- ARE SUBORDINATE
TO A SPECIFIC COMMAND ENTITY, INCLUDING DIVISION. THIS
HAS BEEN A MAJOR (AND NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD) PROBLEM THE
TURKS HAVE HAD WITH MEASURE ONE AND, TO A LESSER DEGREE,
WITH MEASURE THREE.
7. ALTHOUGH FRENCH DIFFICULTIES WITH THRESHOLDS HAVE
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NOT SURFACED IN THE NEGOTIATION, WE UNDERSTAND THEY
OBJECT TO A DIVISIONAL THRESHOLD BY ITSELF BECAUSE OF
THE SMALL SIZE OF THEIR DIVISIONS. IN ADDITION., SEVERAL
PARTICIPATING STATES DO NOT HAVE DIVISIONS IN PEACETIME.
8. USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE CONCERNS INCURRED BY A LARGE
NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS, THE TURKISH DIFFICULTIES WITH
SUBORDINATION AND THE FACT THAT SOME GROUND FORCE
ESTABLISHMENTS HAVE NO DIVISIONS IN PEACETIME COULD BE
EFFECTIVELY DEALT WITH BY MOVING TO THE CONCEPT OF
DIVISION-EQUIVALENT. AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD NOT
CONSTITUTE A LARGE SUBSTANTIVE MOVE FROM OUR PRESENT
FOCUS ON THE DIVISION AS REGARDS THE SOVIET AND WTO
GROUND FORCES (A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FOR THE WTO
ESTABLISHED AS FOUR REGIMENTS IS NOT A GREAT DEAL
DIFFERENT THAN ONE-HALF OR MORE OF THE MAJOR COMBAT
ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS).
9. THIS APPROACH WOULD MEAN THAT A DIVISION-EQUIVALENT
WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH PARTICIPATING
STATE ALONG THE LINES SET FORTH IN THE OSD PAPER. WE
HAVE NOT BROACHED THIS IDEA WITH ANY DELEGATION OTHER
THAN THE TURKS, WHO VOICED NO PRELIMINARY OBJECTION,
BUT WE SEEM TO RECALL THAT THE FRENCH HAD EARLIER OPTED
FOR A NOT TOO DISSIMILAR APPROACH IN THE CBMS WORKING
GROUP AT EVERE WHEN THE PACKAGE WAS BEING PUT TOGETHER.
10. WE HAVE NOT YET COME FULLY TO GRIPS WITH THE
QUESTION OF NUMERICAL FIGURES FOR (X) TANKS AND (Y) AC'S
AS CURRENTLY SET FORTH IN SC-1. OUR INCLINATION IS TO
ADOPT THE 240 FIGURE FOR TANKS AS ALREADY AGREED AND
ACCEPTED IN NATO AND TO DROP ALTOGETHER THE (Y) FIGURE
FOR AC'S, UNLESS IT CAN BE REDUCED FROM THE CURRENT
LEVEL OF 615 TO SOMETHING WHICH CORRESPONDS MORE DIRECTLY
TO THE NUMBER EXPECTED TO BE INVOLVED IN A NORMAL WTO
EXERCISE AT THE DIVISION-EQUIVALENT LEVEL. (COMMENT: WE
EXPECT THE NNA NUMBERS FOR EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS, ONCE THEY
SURFACE, TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN WHAT WOULD
NORMALLY CORRESPOND TO TO&E FIGURES; WE SEE TACTICAL
ADVANTAGE TO LOWER FIGURES WHICH ALIGN US WITH THE NNA
AND SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGE TO LOWER FIGURES FOR THE
INSPECTION ASPECT OF VERIFICATION INSOFAR AS SUCH
FIGURES PROTECT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. END COMMENT)
11. THE BASIS OF THE NEW THRESHOLDS WOULD BE A DIVISION-
EQUIVALENT (E.G., FOUR REGIMENTS FOR THE WTO, THREE
BRIGADES FOR THE U.S. AND THE FRG) "NOT IN ANY GARRISON"
-- AS INDICATED IN THE OSD PAPER -- WITH THE CURRENT SC-1
FIGURE OF 6,000 TROOPS BEING CHANGED TO 12,000 TROOPS AND
THE (X) FIGURE FOR MAIN BATTLE TANKS BEING ESTABLISHED
AT 240. THE (Y) FIGURE FOR AC'S WILL NEED TO BE SIGNIFI-
CANTLY LOWER THAN 615 OR ELIMINATED ALTOGETHER.
12. IN OUR JUDGEMENT, THE CHANGE IN THRESHOLDS WE ARE
PROPOSING WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE OUR ABILITY
TO VERIFY A CSBM AGREEMENT. TO DO THAT, USING INSPECTORS,
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WE THINK IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH AN EQUIPMENT
THRESHOLD, E.G., TANKS, SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN THE
EQUIPMENT NUMBERS WHICH WOULD ACTUALLY PARTICIPATE IN A
ROUTINE WTO ACTIVITY. USDEL MEMBERS GAVE ACTIVE AND
POSITIVE CONSIDERATION TO RETAINING THE CURRENT
THRESHOLDS IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST, (BUT RAISING THE
NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION) AS MENTIONED IN THE OSD PAPER,
AND ESTABLISHING AN EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD OF 125 TANKS.
THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED INSPECTORS WITH A REASONABLE
TASK OF COUNTING ONLY A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER
OF TANKS EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE (RATHER THAN TO&E
FIGURES OR THE ACTUAL NUMBER PARTICIPATING) USING THE
HALF OR MORE OF MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS FORMULA CURRENTLY
IN SC-1. JCS REPS AND DIA REP ON DELEGATION FAVORED
THIS APPROACH. IN ADDITION, A LARGE NUMBER OF EXERCISES
ON AN ANNUAL CALENDAR WOULD ESTABLISH A PATTERN OF
ROUTINE MILITARY ACTIVITY. OTHERS THOUGHT THAT TWO
DIFFERENT THRESHOLDS, ONE FOR FORECASTS AND ONE FOR
NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION WOULD COMPLICATE THE MONITORING
PROBLEM AND CLUTTER UP THE ANNUAL FORECAST WITH A LOT OF
INSIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES THEREBY DEGRADING RATHER THAN
STRENGTHENING IT. ALL IN USDEL AGREE THAT NOTIFICATION
AND OBSERVATION SHOULD OCCUR AT A LEVEL COMMENSURATE
WITH A FULL DIVISION.
13. THE MOVE TO THE DIVISION-EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD COULD
ENHANCE OUR POSITION THAT INSPECTION IS NECESSARY FOR
FOR A CDE AGREEMENT SINCE ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE
INSPECTION WOULD HAVE TO EXCEED A LEVEL WHICH IS,
WITHIN THE CSCE CONTEXT, ARGUABLY MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT.
AND THE DESIGNATION OF THRESHOLDS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT
PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR THE ARGUMENT THAT ONE OF THE TASKS
TO BE CONDUCTED BY INSPECTORS, REGARDLESS OF ITS FEASI-
BILITY, WOULD BE TO COUNT MAIN BATTLE TANKS TAKING PART
IN THE ACTIVITY IN THE FIELD.
14. ACTION: REQUEST WASHINGTON APPROVAL TO BEGIN TO
LAY THE GROUNDWORK AMONG ALLIES TO PURSUE REVISION OF
THE THRESHOLD ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE. SINCE
NOTIFICATION LIES AT THE CORE OF THE NEGOTIATION HERE,
AND THRESHOLDS AT THE CENTER OF NOTIFICATION, WE REQUEST
A RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 01147
SUBJECT: THE CONTINUING SAGA OF NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLDS
REP: A. STOCKHOLM 1148, B. STOCKHOLM 1260
1. CDE IX - 073.
2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: DELEGATION UNDERSTANDS THAT WASHINGTON IS
IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH IDEA OF RAISING THE NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD (REP A), BUT IS CONCERNED OVER THE RELATIVE
UTILITY OF A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" OR A "ONE-HALF OR
MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS" FORMULATION. OBVIOUSLY
THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS IS NOT CLEAR CUT,
AND THE TURKISH RESPONSE TO U.S. CONSULTATIONS REGARDING
MEASURE ONE (REF B) DID LITTLE TO ILLUMINATE OUR
OPTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS OUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT
THAT A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT," RATHER THAN "ONE-HALF OR
MORE OF THE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS," IS THE THRESHOLD
WE SHOULD PURSUE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES FURTHER DETAIL
ABOUT WHY WE HAVE COME TO THIS CONCLUSION WHILE
ADDRESSING SOME SPECIAL CONCERNS WASHINGTON HAS RAISED.
ACTION REQUESTED IN PARA 9. END SUMMARY.
4. NEGOTIATING CONCERNS. THE CONCEPT OF "DIVISION
EQUIVALENT" WOULD ENGENDER A GREAT DEAL MORE SUPPORT
THAN "ONE-HALF OR MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS,"
ALTHOUGH THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THESE TWO FORMULATIONS
IS THE SAME. THE LATTER GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF GREATER
COMPLEXITY, WHEREAS "DIVISION EQUIVALENT," AS THE BASIS
FOR THE NNA APPROACH TO THRESHOLDS, ALREADY COMMANDS
SIGNIFICANT CREDIBILITY. EVENTUAL NATO SUPPORT FOR THE
NNA THRESHOLD MIGHT ALSO ALLOW US TO SET UP A TRADE FOR
THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, OR SOME
OTHER SUBSTANTIAL ITEM. IF NATO AND THE NNA CAN FORM A
UNITED FRONT, WE WILL PUT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE
EAST TO AGREE TO THIS TYPE OF APPROACH. IN ADDITION,
DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE VERIFIABILITY OF THE TWO
THRESHOLDS IS ROUGHLY THE SAME AND THAT, IN FACT, A
THRESHOLD BASED ON "ONE-HALF OR MORE OF THE MAJOR COMBAT
ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS" HAS A SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE
DRAWBACK.
5. STRUCTURAL PARAMETER VS. NUMERICAL PARAMETER.
DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD BASED ON
ONE-HALF OR MORE OF THE MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS OF TWO
DIVISIONS WOULD, IN PRACTICE, HAVE ONE SERIOUS FLAW.
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EXERCISES ASSOCIATED WITH AUTUMN
FORGE, NATO DOES NOT HAVE EXERCISES WHICH WOULD TRIGGER
THE STRUCTURAL PART OF THIS THRESHOLD (I.E., TWO
BRIGADES FROM ONE DIVISION AND TWO FROM ANOTHER
PARTICIPATING IN THE SAME EXERCISE). NATO ACTIVITIES
WOULD ONLY BE CAPTURED UNDER THE NUMERICAL PARAMETER OF
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THE THRESHOLD. THE ONE-HALF OR MORE OF TWO DIVISIONS
THRESHOLD WOULD, THEREFORE, EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE THE
STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AS THE BASIS FOR NOTIFICATION FOR
NATO ACTIVITIES. A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD WOULD
MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD
BECAUSE IT CORRESPONDS TO NATO EXERCISE PRACTICES.
6. TURKEY AND MEASURE ONE. DELEGATION BELIEVES THE
TURKS ARE QUITE SERIOUS ABOUT WHAT THEY WILL AND WILL
NOT PROVIDE IN THE WAY OF INFORMATION ON THEIR MILITARY
FORCES. AS DISCUSSED IN REF B, THE TURKS HAVE INDICATED
THAT, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THEY ARE ONLY WILLING
TO PROVIDE SUBORDINATION OF FORCES INVOLVED IN FORECAST
ACTIVITIES. THIS MEANS THAT REGARDLESS OF THE THRESHOLD
(ONE-HALF OR MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS OR DIVISION
EQUIVALENT) THERE MAY NOT BE A CONFERENCE-WIDE DATA BASE
THAT WILL MAKE PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS ABOUT NON-COMPLIANCE
MORE CONVINCING. (COMMENT: WE STILL HOPE TO BE ABLE TO
PERSUADE THE NNA TO INCLUDE SUBORDINATION OF FORCES IN
THE FORECAST AND NOTIFICATION. END COMMENT) THIS
PROBLEM IS NOT PARTICULARLY SERIOUS FROM A STRICTLY NATO
PERSPECTIVE SINCE NATO MAINTAINS A CLASSIFIED WARSAW
PACT ORDER OF BATTLE THAT ACCURATELY REFLECTS LOCATION
AND SUBORDINATION OF DIVISIONS AND REGIMENTS. OVER
TIME, STATIC INFORMATION ON DIVISIONS AND SUBORDINATION
OF REGIMENTS CONTAINED IN THE FORECAST COULD HELP
ESTABLISH AN UNCLASSIFIED DATA BASE THAT ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES COULD USE TO PUBLICALLY IDENTIFY
REGIMENTS DETECTED CONDUCTING NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES.
7. VERIFICATION. DELEGATION VIEW OF THE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS FOR A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD IS, AS
STATED IN REF A, THAT MONITORING WOULD BE NO MORE
DIFFICULT THAN WITH A ONE-HALF OR MORE OF TWO DIVISIONS
THRESHOLD BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF "NORMAL PEACETIME
LOCATION." IN EITHER CASE, THE ACTIVITY ITSELF WOULD BE
THE FOCUS OF OUR VERIFICATION EFFORTS. IN NEITHER CASE
WOULD WE INTEND TO EXAMINE GARRISONS FOR EVIDENCE OF
OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITY, I.E., EMPTY GARRISONS. THIS
WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY DEMANDING AND UNRELIABLE APPROACH
TO DETERMINING UNNOTIFIED OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES.
MAJOR ITEMS OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT ARE NORMALLY GARAGED AND
LEVELS OF ACTIVITY, AS REFLECTED IN IMAGERY, WOULD GIVE
NO CLEAR INDICATION OF LEVELS OF OCCUPANCY. MOST SOVIET
GROUND FORCES UNITS IN THE USSR, AND MOST NSWP GROUND
FORCES, ARE MANNED WELL BELOW THEIR INTENDED WARTIME
STRENGTHS. ACTIVITY PATTERNS WITHIN GARRISONS THEREFORE
WOULD TEND TO SUGGEST LESS THAN FULL OCCUPANCY. THE
BURDEN OF THE PROOF WOULD STILL BE TO FIND, MEASURE, AND
RECORD THE ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD. DELEGATION
BELIEVES, THEREFORE, THERE WOULD BE NO DEGRADATION OF
OUR MONITORING CAPABILITY BY MOVING TO A DIVISION
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EQUIVALENT VERSUS A ONE-HALF OR MORE OF TWO DIVISION
THRESHOLD.
8. COMPLEXITY OF "DIVISION EQUIVALENT." AS SET OUT IN
THE OSD PAPER, THE CONCEPT OF DIVISION EQUIVALENT RAISES
SEVERAL COMPLICATED ISSUES: RESTRICTED AREAS,
DEFINITION OF DIVISION EQUIVALENT, AND GEOGRAPHIC
BOUNDARIES. WE BELIEVE THE LATTER TWO CAN BE HANDLED IN
A RELATIVELY SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER.
-- RESTRICTED AREAS. THIS PROBLEM, OF COURSE, WILL
HAUNT US REGARDLESS OF THE THRESHOLD WE AGREE UPON. IT
IS THE DELEGATION ASSESSMENT THAT A RESTRICTED AREA
DEFINITION AS NARROW AS THAT ENVISAGED IN THE OSD PAPER
WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET AGREEMENT ON AT THE
CONFERENCE. THEREFORE, WE DO NOT WANT TO ABANDON THE
CURRENT OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT BASED ON "NORMAL
PEACETIME LOCATION" IN FAVOR OF ONE BASED ON A NARROW
DEFINITION OF RESTRICTED AREAS. FURTHERMORE, DELEGATION
BELIEVES THAT THE USE OF A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD
CAN BE CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING THE CURRENT CONCEPT
OF OUT-OF-GARRISON AND NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS. THE
RESTRICTED AREA PROBLEM AND THE TURKS UNWILLINGNESS TO
PROVIDE LOCATION FOR FORCES PARTICIPATING IN FORECAST
ACTIVITIES ALSO MAKE A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD OF ONE-HALF
OR MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS A PROBLEMATICAL
SOLUTION, WITHOUT OFFERING THE BENEFITS OF A DIVISION
EQUIVALENT.
-- DEFINITION OF DIVISION EQUIVALENT. DELEGATION
BELIEVES REQUIRING EACH COUNTRY TO DEFINE ITS OWN
DIVISION EQUIVALENT IS NOT AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK, ALTHOUGH
IT COULD RESULT IN A STAND-OFF WITH THE EAST REFUSING TO
DEFINE ACCURATELY A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATION (I.E.,
AS 4 REGIMENTS). AT THIS POINT WE ARE TRYING TO ASSESS
THE POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES OF THIS REQUIREMENT AS WELL
AS EXPLORE OTHER POSSIBLE MEANS OF HANDLING THE
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM.
-- GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES. AS EXPLAINED IN THE OSD
PAPER, A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD WOULD REQUIRE
SOME MECHANISM FOR EXCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT NATO
REGIMENTS FROM DIFFERENT DIVISIONS, FAR APART IN
LOCATION AND PURPOSE, WOULD BE CAPTURED UNDER THE
THRESHOLD. DELEGATION BELIEVES THE NEGOTIATION OF
AGREED GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES WOULD BE A DIFFICULT AND
DIVISIVE EXERCISE AND THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS THAT WE
MAINTAIN THE CONCEPT OF "A COMMON ACTIVITY UNDER A
SINGLE COMMAND." DELEGATION RECOGNIZES SOME POTENTIAL
DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN DEMONSTRATING "COMMON ACTIVITY
UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND" IN THE CASE OF NON-NOTIFIED
ACTIVITIES. DELEGATION BELIEVES IT HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT
NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES EXCEEDING AGREED THRESHOLDS
WOULD INVOLVE MILITARY UNITS IN THE SAME TRAINING AREAS
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SECRET
OR OPERATING CONTIGUOUSLY. PHYSICAL PROXIMITY WOULD, IN
AND OF ITSELF, MAKE THE DEMONSTRATION OF "COMMON
ACTIVITY" EASIER. FOR FORECAST OR NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES,
THE SUBORDINATION PROVIDED IN THE FORECAST MUST BE
SUFFICIENT TO MAKE THE CASE FOR "COMMON ACTIVITY UNDER A
SINGLE COMMAND" (I.E., REGIMENTS SUBORDINATE TO A
CERTAIN DIVISION, WILL, WHEN PARTICIPATING IN AN
ACTIVITY, BE ASSUMED TO BE PARTICIPATING UNDER THE
SINGLE COMMAND OF THAT DIVISION). FURTHERMORE, DESPITE
THE POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES,
THE CONCEPT OF "COMMON ACTIVITY" IS A BASIC AND
MILITARILY REASONABLE ONE. DELEGATION WOULD NOT WANT TO
ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH CONFERENCE SUPPORT FOR NOTIFYING
SMALL INDIVIDUAL AND INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES.
9. DELEGATION VIEW IS THAT WHILE NOT A PERFECT
SOLUTION, A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD HAS
SIGNIFICANT NEGOTIATING AND SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGES OVER
A THRESHOLD OF ONE-HALF OR MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO
DIVISIONS. DELEGATION BELIEVES IT CAN BE PURSUED WHILE
MAINTAINING THE CURRENT APPROACH TO OUT-OF-GARRISON AND
INFORMATION EXCHANGE, WITHOUT COMPLICATING OUR
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OR PLACING UNDUE CONFIDENCE IN
A SOLUTION TO THE RESTRICTED AREA ISSUE. DELEGATION
REQUESTS WASHINGTON AUTHORITY TO PROCEED WITH THE
EXPLORATION OF THE CONCEPT OF "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" WITH
KEY ALLIES.
HANSEN
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3 E C R E T STOCKHOLM 01721
SUBJECT: DIVISION-EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD
REF: STOCKHOLM 01447
1. CDE IX - 094
2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
3 SUMMARY: USDEL CDE BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE
SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES, BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE,
TO PURSUING A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" FORMULATION AS THE
BASIS FOR NOTIFICATION. THE FOLLOWING IS FURTHER
DELEGATION REASONING ON THIS ISSUE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED
THAT THIS CABLE DOES NOT PRESENT ALL DELEGATION
ARGUMENTS, BUT ONLY THE ESSENTIAL POINTS THAT WE BELIEVE
WILL FURTHER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS COMPLEX ISSUE AND
STIMULATE DISCUSSION NEEDED TO RESOLVE IT DURING THE
INTERSESSIONAL. END SUMMARY
4. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN USDEL MEMBERS AND WASHINGTON
INDICATED THAT THE DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON "DIVISION
EQUIVALENT" AS PRESENTED IN REFERENCE REQUIRE
ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION. AS NOTED IN REFERENCE, THE
DELEGATION WAS STILL DEBATING HOW TO HANDLE TWO KEY
ISSUES: HOW TO DEFINE 'DIVISION EQUIVALENT' AND WHERE TO
SET THE EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD. BOTH ISSUES HAVE NOW BEEN
FIRMED UP WITHIN THE DELEGATION, AND THE FOLLOWING
SHOULD PROVIDE THE NEEDED ELABORATION TO CLARIFY
DELEGATION THOUGHTS ON THESE ISSUES.
5. DEFINITION OF A DIVISION EQUIVALENT: THE CONCEPT OF
A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" HAS THE SAME OPERATIONAL IMPACT
AS "ONE- HALF OR MORE OF TWO DIVISION" SINCE ONE-HALF OR
MORE OF TWO SOVIET DIVISIONS IS 4 REGIMENTS, I.E., A
"DIVISION EQUIVALENT". THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES
TO USING A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" IN LIEU OF THE LATTER
FORMULATION. FIRST, IT PROVIDES ONE SIMPLE DEFINITION
OF A DIVISION THAT IS APPLICABLE TO ALL PARTICIPATING
STATES REGARDLESS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF
THEIR GROUND FORCES. THE MANDATE LANGUAGE ON EQUALITY OF
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AS WELL AS CSCE PRINCIPLES MAKES
SUCH A DEFINITION ALMOST A SINE QUA NON FOR ACCEPTANCE.
SECOND, IT PROVIDES NATO A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE
EAST BY ALLOWING NATO TO AGREE "RELUCTANTLY" TO A
COMPROMISE VERSION OF THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR A "DIVISION
EQUIVALENT". LASTLY, IT GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF WESTERN
FLEXIBILITY IN MOVING AWAY FROM THE 'ONE-HALF OR
MORE..." FORMULATION IN SC.1/A WHICH HAS NOT FOUND ANY
SUPPORT OUTSIDE NATO BECAUSE OF PERCEPTIONS THAT IT
RESULTS IN UNEQUAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. IT THUS
PROVIDES LANGUAGE THAT IS MORE ACCEPTABLE, AND HENCE
MORE NEGOTIABLE.
6. THE DELEGATION HAS DROPPED FROM SERIOUS
CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR EACH STATE TO
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PROVIDE ITS OWN DEFINITION OF ITS "DIVISION EQUIVALENT"
BY DECLARING THE NUMBER OF BRIGADES/REGIMENTS IT
CONTAINS. APART FROM THE NEGOTIATING DIFFICULTIES WE
FORESEE WITH THIS APPROACH, THE DELEGATION'S PRINCIPAL
CONCERN IS THAT IT WOULD ALLOW STATES TO CIRCUMVENT
NOTIFICATION BY CONDUCTING EXERCISES WITH LESS THAN THE
AGREED NUMBER OF BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, BUT WITH PERSONNEL
AND EQUIPMENT LEVELS THAT EXCEED ESTABLISHED
THRESHOLDS. LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/A
AND IN SC.7 PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
CIRCUMVENTION BY STIPULATING THAT ANY OTHER GROUP OF
FORCES NOT ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISION IS SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT EXCEEDS ESTABLISHED PERSONNEL
AND EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS. INCORPORATING SUCH A
PROVISION INTO THE DEFINITION OF A "DIVISION
EQUIVALENT", HOWEVER, WOULD NULLIFY THE RATIONALE BEHIND
THE DECLARATION OF INDIVIDUAL DIVISION EQUIVALENTS SINCE
THE BASIS FOR NOTIFICATION WOULD SWITCH FROM STRUCTURE
TO PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. EXAMPLE: IF THE U.S.
"DIVISION EQUIVALENT" WAS SET AT 3 BRIGADES AND THE
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD WAS 250 TANKS, THE U.S. WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO NOTIFY EXERCISES CONDUCTED AT LESS THAN ITS
DECLARED "DIVISION EQUIVALENT." IF THE EQUIPMENT
THRESHOLD WAS RAISED TO REFLECT ACCURATELY 3 U.S.
BRIGADES, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SET AT BETWEEN 290 AND 348
TANKS: SUCH A HIGH THRESHOLD, HOWEVER, WOULD PREVENT
NOTIFICATION OF A SOVIET "DIVISION EQUIVALENT"--4
REGIMENTS. THIS IS THE "CATCH 22" THAT RESULTS FROM
ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A BALANCE BETWEEN INHERENTLY
UNEQUAL STRUCTURES.
7. THE USDEL BELIEVES THAT TRYING TO ARTIFICIALLY
CREATE A STRUCTURAL BALANCE BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET
DIVISIONS WILL NOT ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. THE
DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE BEST APPROACH TO TAKE IN
DEFINING A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" IS TO ESTABLISH A
NUMERICAL BALANCE, NOT JUST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE
SOVIET UNION, BUT BETWEEN ALL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS.
THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO REFLECT ACCURATELY THE OVERALL
CAPABILITY, AND THUS THE THREAT POTENTIAL, OF THE FORCES
IN QUESTION. SOME MIGHT VIEW THIS APPROACH AS A MAJOR
DEVIATION FROM THE NATO POSITION ON THE PRIMACY OF THE
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD: IT IS NOT. IT SERVES TO
UNDERSCORE, NOT DIMINISH, THE IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURE BY
ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE, YET SIMPLE DEFINITION OF A
DIVISION; ONE THAT APPLIES TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES
AND RETAINS THE ADVANTAGES OF MONITORING STRUCTURE AS A
KEY INDICATOR OF COMPLIANCE. THIS IS IN ESSENCE WHAT WE
HAVE LONG BEEN STRIVING TO ACHIEVE IN THIS CONFERENCE.
USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION
STRENGTHENS ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A STRUCTURAL
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THRESHOLD, WHILE PROVIDING THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES
REQUIRED TO SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATE NOTIFICATION
PARAMETERS THAT PRESERVE OUR OBJECTIVES INTACT.
NOTIFIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES
A MILITARY LAND FORCE ACTIVITY, THAT IS,
ALL MILITARY EXERCIS ACTIVITY INVOLVING ONE OR
MORE GROUND FORCE DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS,
CARRYING OUT A COMMON MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE
ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, AWAY FROM THEIR
NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, INCLUDING THE MOVEMENT
OF TROOPS TO AND FROM THE EXERCISE AREA,
WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.
A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATION, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS
AGREEMENT, IS DEFINED AS A MILITARY GROUND FORCE
COMPOSED OF
MAJOR COMBAT UNITS ON THE BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL,
THAT IS, TANK, INFANTRY, MOTORIZED RIFLE, OR
AIRBORNE BRIGADES/REGIMENTS AND AT LEAST ONE
SUPPORTING ARTILLERY, ENGINEER OR HELICOPTER
ELEMENT, WITH
--AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF AT LEAST . . . COMBAT,
COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
TROOPS; OR WITH
--A TOTAL OF AT LEAST . . . TANKS.
EXERCISE IS DEFINED ACCORDING TO THE DEFINITION OF THE
RUSSIAN WORD UCHENIYE AS CONTAINED IN VOYENNY
ENTSIKLOPEDICHESHIY SLOVAR, DATED 1983.
THE USE OF THE PHRASE "MAJOR COMBAT UNITS", WITHOUT
REGARD TO NUMBER, COMPENSATES FOR STRUCTURAL VARIATION
AMONG DIVISIONS, WHILE INDICATING THAT AT LEAST 2
BRIGADES/REGIMENTS MUST BE AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL
PEACETIME LOCATIONS CARRYING OUT A COMMON MILITARY
ACTIVITY. THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS FORMULATION ARE
TWOFOLD. FIRST, IT PROVIDES A STRUCTURAL BALANCE AT THE
DIVISION LEVEL BY DEFINING "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" IN
TERMS COMMON TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES
(BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, PERSONNEL, AND EQUIPMENT). SECOND,
IT ELIMINATES THE NECESSITY OF AN ADDITIONAL PROVISION
FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF EXERCISES CONDUCTED WITH FORCES
NOT ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISION BY NOT SPECIFYING THAT
BRIGADES/REGIMENTS ARE SUBORDINATE TO A DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS. THIS FORMULATION, THEREFORE, COVERS ALL
CONTINGENCIES.
8. EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD: FOUR OBJECTIVES WERE
CONSIDERED BY THE USDEL IN SELECTING 250 TANKS AS THE
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD FOR A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT:" 1) THE
THRESHOLD MUST PRECLUDE THE NOTIFICATION OF U.S.
EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY AT LEAST 2 ARMOR BRIGADES, I.E.,
IT MUST BE GREATER THAN 232; 2) IT MUST CORRESPOND AS
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CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO A LEVEL OF EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN
A NATO AND WTO DIVISION IN ORDER TO REFLECT A "DIVISION
EQUIVALENT;" 3) IT MUST APPROXIMATE THE LEVEL OF
EQUIPMENT EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN SOVIET EXERCISES
CONDUCTED WITH ELEMENTS OF 2 DIVISIONS, I.E., 4
REGIMENTS; AND 4) IT MUST BE LOW ENOUGH TO PROVIDE
INSPECTORS A REALISTIC TARGET BY WHICH TO MEASURE
COMPLIANCE.
9. THE FIRST OBJECTIVE TO PROTECT U.S. ARMY
REQUIREMENTS WAS OF PARAMOUNT CONCERN, AND THE 250 TANK
THRESHOLD PRECLUDES NOTIFICATION OF 2 U.S. ARMOR
BRIGADES. THIS FIGURE ALSO REPRESENTS A CROSS SECTION
OF THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF TANKS IN A NATO AND WTO
MOTORIZED RIFLE/TANK DIVISION, THEREBY REFLECTING NOT
ONLY A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT," BUT THE NUMBER OF TANKS
EXPECTED IN EXERCISES CONDUCTED WITH 4 SOVIET
REGIMENTS. THE FINAL OBJECTIVE TO FACILITATE THE TASK
OF INSPECTORS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY ESTABLISHING A LOW
THRESHOLD FOR MONITORING COMPLIANCE.
BARRY
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CONFI DENT I A L STOCKHOLM01909
SUBJECT: FRG POSITION ON CDE THRESHOLDS
1. CDE IX - 106.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS, GENERAL SCHMIDBAUER, SENIOR
FRG MILREP AT CDE, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO US DEPUTY:
- -- THE FRG CANNOT BECOME A SPECIAL ARMS CONTROL ZONE
WITHIN THE CDE ZONE; NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS WHICH ARE
FINALLY AGREED MUST FIND SOME APPLICATION TO ALLIES
OUTSIDE THE FRG;
- -- THE SOVIETS MUST NOTIFY EXERCISES ON THEIR
TERRITORY IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CONFIRM THAT THE ZONE
EXTENDS TO THE URAL MOUNTAINS, I.E., SOVIET NOTIFICATIONS
MUST OCCUR IN AREAS BEYOND THE CURRENT HELSINKI 250
KILOMETER REQUIREMENT.
- -- FRG ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT IF THE NUMERICAL TOTALS
WERE CHANGED TO 10,000 TROOPS, THE WARSAW PACT WOULD HAVE
TO NOTIFY 25 EXERCISES, 11 OF WHICH WOULD BE IN THE USSR;
THERE WOULD BE, ACCORDING TO THEIR ANALYSIS, APPROX 17
NOTIFICATIONS ON FRG TERRITORY PLUS "SOME" OTHERS BY
OTHER NATO COUNTRIES.
- -- THE SAME ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT IF THE NUMERICAL
FIGURE WERE CHANGED TO 15,000, THE WARSAW PACT WOULD
NOTIFY ONLY FOUR EXERCISES ON SOVIET TERRITORY, NONE EAST
OF THE HELSINKI 250 KILOMETER STRIP; NATO NOTIFICATIONS
AT THIS LEVEL WOULD OCCUR ONLY ON FRG TERRITORY.
4. AMB. HANSEN INFORMED SCHMIDBAUER THAT WE BELIEVE THE
SOVIETS HAVE A REQUIREMENT TO EXERCISE THEIR DIVISIONS
ON A RELATIVELY REGULAR BASIS, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR
LOCATION, ACCORDING TO THEIR MANNING STATUS AND THAT
SHOULD ENSURE NOTIFICATIONS BEYOND THE 250 KILOMETER
STRIP. SCHMIDBAUER INDICATED BONN WOULD BE MOST
INTERESTED IN US ANALYSIS AS TO THE NUMBER AND LOCATION
OF SOVIET EXERCISES UNDER VARIOUS NUMERICAL THRESHOLDS.
5. REQUEST APPROPRIATE WASHINGTON AGENCIES EVALUATE THE
VIEWS EXPRESSED BY BONN IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTINUED
DEVELOPMENT OF A THRESHOLD FOR USE IN STOCKHOLM NEXT
SESSION.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 00636
1. CDE IX - 003
2. AS THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE (CDE) MOVES INTO ITS
FINAL STAGES AND ASSUMES HIGHER VISIBILITY, WE NEED
TO BE SURE WE ARE ALL SPEAKING ABOUT IT IN THE SAME
WAY IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN
POINTS USDEL CDE IS MAKING PUBLICLY ABOUT THE PURPOSE
OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME
IT SEEKS ESTABLISH. (NOTE THAT THESE POINTS
REPRESENT A SHIFT ON SOME POINTS FROM EARLIER
POSITIONS.)
3. -- THE CDE IS A NEGOTIATION AIMED AT RISK
REDUCTION AS OPPOSED TO ARMS REDUCTION, WHICH IS THE
PURPOSE OF OTHER, PERHAPS MORE TRADITIONAL ARMS
CONTROL TALKS; THE TWO TRACKS ARE MUTUALLY
COMPLEMENTARY AND PURSUIT OF BOTH IS A BASIC
OBJECTIVE OF US SECURITY POLICY;
-- SUCCESS IN CDE WILL MAKE THE MILITARY
SITUATION IN EUROPE MORE PREDICTABLE AND THUS MORE
STABLE BY ESTABLISHING A NORM FOR ACCEPTED, ROUTINE
MILITARY POSTURES AND ACTIVITIES ON THE CONTINENT;
-- IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO LOWERING THE BARRIERS
OF SUSPICION AND MISTRUST WHICH NOW DIVIDE EAST AND
WEST AND WILL, THUS, MAKE THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
LESS LIKELY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY
CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE;
-- IT WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT AND
POLITICALLY MUCH MORE COSTLY FOR ANY STATE TO USE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE THREAT OF FORCE FOR
POLITICAL INTIMIDATION (AS HAPPENED IN POLAND IN L98L
AND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN L968).
4. OUR STANDARD LANGUAGE ON CDE EMPHASIZES THE
FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:
-- ANY AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS ALLIES WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
MADRID MANDATE; IT WILL BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND
VERIFIABLE;
-- THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL PART
OF THE CSCE PROCESS BEGUN IN HELSINKI IN L975; THE
RESULTS IN STOCKHOLM WILL BE EVALUATED BY THE VIENNA
CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING (BEGINNING IN NOVEMBER, L986),
WHICH WILL ALSO EVALUATE PROGRESS IN ALL THE OTHER
PARTS OF THE OVERALL CSCE PROCESS, INCLUDING HUMAN
RIGHTS. MAINTAINING THE BALANCE AMONG ALL PARTS OF
CSCE WILL BE AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF THE US IN
VIENNA;
-- THROUGHOUT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, ALLIED
UNITY HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT ASSET IN THE NEGOTIATING
PROCESS; IT HAS BEEN A KEY FACTOR IN KEEPING CDE TO
ITS PROPER COURSE AS A CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO
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DEVELOPING CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES, AS OPPOSED TO
DECLARATORY MEASURES.
5. CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES IN RECENT
MONTHS HAVE PERSUADED US TO DROP A COUPLE. OF ELEMENTS
IN OUR PUBLIC POSITION WHICH HAVE NOT HELD UP TO THE
SCRUTINY OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THEY ARE:
-- SURPRISE ATTACK: OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE
KIND OF CSBM'S IN THE NATO PACKAGE IS LARGELY
IRRELEVANT TO THE PROBLEM OF SURPRISE ATTACK.
FURTHERMORE, CITING SURPRISE ATTACK AS A REASON FOR
CSBM'S WEAKENS OUR ARGUMENT AGAINST NUMERICAL
CONSTRAINTS, WHICH COULD BE SAID TO MAKE SURPRISE
ATTACK MORE D4FFICULT;
-- MISINTERPRETATION/MISCALCULATION: WE ARE
PERSUADED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT THE DANGERS OF FALSE
NEGATIVE INDICATORS ARE GREATER THAN THE DANGERS OF
FALSE POSITIVES. EMPHASIZING THE DANGER OF WAR
THROUGH MISCALCULATION COULD MAKE NATO MORE RELUCTANT
TO RESPOND TO WARNING INDICATORS AND MORE PRONE TO
INSIST ON "CONSULTATIONS" RATHER THAN DEFENSIVE
MILITARY STEPS AS A RESPONSE TO AMBIGUOUS SOVIET
MOVES.
6. IF WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE OTHER CENTRAL THEMES
TO SUGGEST, USDEL WOULD WELCOME THEM. OTHERWISE, USG
PUBLIC COMMENTS, STATEMENTS AND MATERIALS ON CDE
SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THIS LINE.
BARRY
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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 00901
SUBJECT: MEASURE ONE AND THE TURKISH PROBLEM
REF: A.) STOCKHOLM 00819; B.) ANKARA 01243
1. CDE IX - 032.
2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. USDEL CDE APPRECIATES AMERICAN EMBASSY ANKARA'S
QUICK RESPONSE (REF B) TO OUR SUGGESTIONS OUTLINED IN
REF A. WE RECOMMEND THAT EMBASSY ANKARA SHOULD HOLD OFF
ON APPROACHING THE TURKISH MFA UNTIL USDEL RECEIVES AN
INITIAL RESPONSE FROM THE TURKISH CDE DELEGATION IN
STOCKHOLM. (WE ARE UNSURE IF TURKISH DELEGATION, IN
FACT, HAS APPROACHED THE MFA ON THIS MATTER, SINCE THE
TGS AND MOD HAVE BEEN THE FOCAL POINTS OF DISCUSSION SO
FAR.)
4. USDEL CDE WILL INFORM AMERICAN EMBASSY ANKARA, AS
WELL AS ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, OF TURKISH
FEEDBACK TO OUR PROPOSALS IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF
THAT INFORMATION.
BARRY
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01260
SUBJECT: TURKISH RESPONSE ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE
REF: STOCKHOLM 00819
1. CDE IX - 057.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: DEPUTY HEAD OF TURKISH CDE DELEGATION MET
WITH MEMBERS OF USDEL TO PROVIDE OFFICIAL TURKISH
POSITION ON POSSIBLE WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE EXCHANGE
OF INFORMATION AS OUTLINED IN THE OSD PAPER OF 27
DECEMBER 1985 AS EXPLAINED TO HIM PREVIOUSLY BY USDEL.
TURKISH DEPUTY PROVIDED A PAPER WHICH EXPLAINS THAT
ANKARA IS WILLING TO: PROVIDE INFORMATION ON FORCES
INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES DOWN TO THE REGIMENT/
BRIGADE LEVEL; PROVIDE A LIST OR MAP TRACE OF ITS
RESTRICTED AREAS BASED UPON CONCEPT WHICH MAKES A GARRISON
TOWN SYNONOMOUS WITH RESTRICTED AREA; IDENTIFY WHAT
A DIVISIONEQUIVALENT WOULD BE IN THE TURKISH ARMY.
TURKS SEE A NEED TO PUSH FOR ACCEPTANCE OF MEASURE I WITH
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION DOWN TO DIVISION LEVEL ONLY.
END SUMMARY
4. IN RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS IN STOCKHOLM BETWEEN
USDEL MEMBERS (REF A) AND DEPUTY HEAD OF TURKISH CDE
DELEGATION BOLUKBASI, TURKISH AUTHORITIES HAVE AGREED
TO THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING THREE
PARAGRAPHS WHICH WERE GIVEN TO USDEL MEMBERS IN WRITING:
FIRST STEP:
- A. LISTS OF UNITS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ANNUAL
FORECASTS (MEASURE II) WITH SUBORDINATION INDICATED
DOWN TO BRIGADE/ REGIMENT LEVEL MAY BE PROVIDED.
INFORMATION ON LOCATIONS OF THESE UNITS WILL NOT BE
GIVEN, AS NOT REQUIRED BY THE NEW U.S. APPROACH.
- B. DESIGNATION OF EACH COUNTRY'S RESTRICTED AREAS
MAY BE PROVIDED. EVERY LOCATION, TOWN, CITY WHERE
THERE IS A GARRISON OF A MILITARY UNIT WILL BE CONSIDERED
A RESTRICTED AREA. THIS CAN BE DONE THROUGH EXCHANGING
MAPS MAPTRACES OR LISTS INCLUDING THE NAMES OF THE
TOWNS, CITIES.
SECOND STEP:
- A. DESIGNATION OF RESTRICTED AREAS (SAME AS
OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH "B" OF THE FIRST STEP.
- B. EACH COUNTRY WILL IDENTIFY WHAT IS A DIVISION-
EQUIVALENT FOR IT.
5. NOTING THAT THESE PROVISIONS WOULD APPLY REGARDLESS
OF WHICH OF THE TWO STEPS WERE ADOPTED, THE TURKISH
PAPER ALSO ADDRESSED THE CONTENT OF MEASURE ONE IN THE
FOLLOWING MANNER:
- A. INDEPENDENT INFORMATION CAN BE EXCHANGED AS
REQUIRED UNDER MEASURE I OF SC-1/AMPLIFIED ON
DESIGNATION, NORMAL HEADQUARTERS LOCATION AND COMPOSITION
OF GROUND FORCES DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF DIVISION.
- B. IF SIMILAR INFORMATION ON LAND-BASED AIR FORCES
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IS REQUIRED, WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUCH
INFORMATION ON WING/AIR REGIMENT FORMATIONS, PROVIDED
THAT THE TERM WING/AIR REGIMENT FORMATION IS QUALIFIED
AS INCLUDING AT LEAST TWO SQUADRONS OR COMPRISING AT
LEAST 40 AIRCRAFT.
6. BOLUKBASI CONFIRMED THAT EITHER APPROACH WAS
ACCEPTABLE TO ANKARA. (COMMENT: BOTH BOLUKBASI AND
AMBASSADOR OZGUL INDICATED TO U.S. DEPUTY THAT TURKISH
DEL AT NATO ARGUED AGAINST TURKISH ACCEPTANCE OF EITHER
APPROACH. END COMMENT) USDEL DID NOT ASK IF THE TWO
APPROACHES COULD BE COMBINED OR IF WE COULD CHOOSE
SELECTIVELY FROM THE FOUR PARAGRAPHS. BOLUKBASI CONFIRMED
THAT TURKISH WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE SUBORDINATION
APPLIED ONLY TO THOSE UNITS INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES WHICH
WOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE ANNUAL FORECAST; THEY WILL NOT
PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION DOWN TO BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL
ON ALL THEIR FORCES AS CALLED FOR IN MEASURE ONE.
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF MEASURE II, THEY WILL PROVIDE
INFORMATION WHICH INCLUDES ARMY, CORPS, DIVISION, AS
WELL AS BRIGADE AND REGIMENT.
7. IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS AFTER BOLUKBASI HAD
DELIVERED THE TURKISH PAPER, HE MADE THE FOLLOWING
POINTS:
- -- ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE MEASURE I ISSUE
SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE 16, I.E., THE NATO CAUCUS IN
STOCKHOLM. THIS SHOULD NOT BE ISSUE PURSUED FURTHER ON
A BILATERAL BASIS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND TURKISH
DELEGATIONS.
- -- IF ANY WESTERN DELEGATION IS OF THE VIEW THAT
A MORE FORTHCOMING TURKISH POSITION IS REQUIRED, THAT
DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN WITHIN THE
NATO CAUCUS.
- -- THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ARGUE FOR
MEASURE I AT THE DIVISION LEVEL. IF ANY CHANGE IS
CONTEMPLATED, THE TURKISH DELEGATION WOULD APPRECIATE
CONSULTATIONS IN ADVANCE.
8. BOLUKBASI, IN EXPLAINING THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAVE
NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE APPROACHES EXPLAINED IN PARA 4,
SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR IDENTIFYING
AND EXCHANGING LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS. NOTING THE
INABILITY OF THE IMS AT NATO TO REACH A COMMON POSITION
AFTER THREE YEARS OF DELIBERATIONS, HE QUESTIONED THE
ADVISABILITY OF TRYING TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A DIFFICULT
ISSUE AMONG 35 IN THE TWENTY OR SO WEEKS WHICH REMAIN. IN
HIS VIEW, ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS TO ENSURE THAT
RESTRICTED AREAS, AS DEFINED IN MEASURE 5, ARE NOT
LIABLE TO INSPECTION OR OBSERVATION AND TO MAKE SURE
THAT TRAINING AREAS CANNOT BE DESIGNATED AS RESTRICTED
AREAS.
9. FOR USMISSION USNATO: IN LIGHT OF PARA 6 AND 7
ADVISE NOT TO INITIATE ANY MEASURE ONE DISCUSSION WITH
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TURKISH OR ANY OTHER DEL WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH
USCDE DEL IN STOCKHOLM.
10. FOR WASHINGTON: WE DO NOT BELIEVE AN APPROACH TO THE
TURKS IN ANKARA ON THIS ISSUE IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C 0 N F I D ENT I A L STOCKHOLM 00974
SUBJECT: GRINEVSKY VISIT TO WASHINGTON
1. CDE IX-037 - CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON RETURNING TO STOCKHOLM, I TOLD SOVIET AMBASSADOR
GRINEVSKY THAT I WOULD LIKE TO FORMALIZE MY INVITATION
TO HIM TO VISIT WASHINGTON FOR CDE CONSULTATIONS DURING
THE MARCH-APRIL BREAK. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT
THE SOVIET REPLY WOULD COME FROM MOSCOW, BUT WOULD BE
POSITIVE.
3. HE SAID HE WAS IN OUR HANDS AS TO DATES AND PROGRAM.
GIVEN THE FACT THAT THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A MAC IN
BRUSSELS ON APRIL 11 AND A PRE-NAC CAUCUS APRIL 10, AND
THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN OCCASION FOR ME TO MEET WITH THE
PRESIDENT APRIL 7 OR 8, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT APRIL 3-4
MIGHT BE THE DATES TO SHOOT FOR. IF THIS IS AGREEABLE
TO WASHINGTON THE FORMAL PROPOSAL MIGHT BEST BE MADE IN
MOSCOW AND PARALLELED HERE.
4. I ASKED GRINEVSKY IF HE WANTED TO BRING ANYONE WITH
HIM BUT HE DID NOT RISE TO THE BAIT.
5. AS TO A PROGRAM, WE SUGGEST SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THAT
SET UP WHEN GRINEVSKY VISITED WASHINGTON IN 1984. WE
DO NOT HAVE THE RELEVANT TRAFFIC, BUT WE RECALL THAT HE
BACKED OUT OF MEETINGS WITH JCS AND OSD AT THE LAST
MOMENT (POSSIBLY BECAUSE SOVIETS ARE UNABLE TO
RECIPROCATE).
NEVERTHELESS WE THINK IT WORTHWHILE TO PROPOSE SUCH
MEETINGS THIS TIME, AS WELL AS MEETINGS WITH STATE,
NSC AND ACDA. WE SHOULD HOST A LUNCH IN THE DEPART-
MENT; PRESUMABLY SOVIET EMBASSY WILL HAVE A RECEPTION
AS WELL.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01678
SUBJECT: GRINEVSKY VISIT
REF: STATE 06.1341
1. CDE IX-092. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. GRINEVSKY SAYS THAT HE HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM MOSCOW
ABOUT HIS WASHINGTON VISIT BUT DATES OF APRIL 3 AND 4
LOOK GOOD TO HIM IN PRINCIPLE. HE WILL CONTACT MOSCOW
BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION AND TRY TO CONFIRM BEFORE
THE END OF THE SESSION ON MARCH 14.
3. MEANWHILE WE SUGGEST THAT DEPARTMENT GO AHEAD AND
BLOCK OUT A SCHEDULE ALONG THE LINES OF REFTEL. GRINEVSKY
SAID THAT THE LIST OF APPOINTMENTS SUGGESTED SOUNDED FINE
TO HIM.
4. AS WAS THE CASE IN 1984, WE SUGGEST THAT THE FIRST
MORNING SESSION BE A BARRY/GRINEVSKY BILATERAL. WE WOULD
ALSO SUGGEST A 7TH FLOOR LUNCH APRIL 3. BARRY WOULD PLAN
TO INVITE GRINEVSKY TO DINNER ON APRIL 4.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 01047
SUBJECT: ODINZOV REQUEST
REF: ROME 30L9
L. CDE IX - 040
2. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. WE WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET WITH ODINZOV TO DISCUSS
CDE AND ITS RELATION TO US POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE. WE
WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO ENGAGE IN SPECULATIVE
DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM ON BACKGROUND OR ANY OTHER BASIS.
IF ODINZOV WOULD LIKE TO VISIT ON THAT BASIS WE WOULD
WELCOME HIM HERE. PLEASE ADVISE.
BARRY
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C 0 N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01143
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF FINNISH EXERCISE
L. CDE IX - 047
2. C - REQUEST ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE. ON FINNISH
EXERCISE TAMMI 86 REPORTED IN JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY AS
HELD BETWEEN L7-22 JANUARY, L986. WAS THIS EXERCISE
NOTIFIED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT? DID U.S.
OBSERVERS ATTEND?
3. U - JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY 8 FEBRUARY REPORTED THAT
TAMMI 86 WAS FINLAND'S LARGEST MILITARY EXERCISE IN
OVER FORTY YEARS INVOLVING TWELVE THOUSAND MEN AND TWO
THOUSAND VEHICLES. ACCORDING TO JANE'S, MILITARY
ATTACHES FROM FIFTEEN COUNTRIES OBSERVED THE EXERCISE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 01227
SUBJECT: CDE COMMENTS ON COMPARISON OF MBFR ASSOCIATED
MEASURES AND CDE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-
BUILDING MEASURES
REF: MBFR VIENNA 131
1. CDE IX - 053
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: U.S. CDE DEL APPRECIATES USEFUL
COMPARISON OF WESTERN CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES (CSBM'S) AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES (AM'S)
PROVIDED REFTEL. WE BELIEVE THE SIMILARITY OF SEVERAL
OF THE MEASURES BEING NEGOTIATED IN STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA
INDICATES A NEED FOR INCREASED CONTACT BETWEEN OUR
DELEGATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, WE NOTE THAT THE "CSBM-7"
CALLING FOR A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION IDENTIFIED REFTEL
IS NOT PART OF THE AGREED NATO PACKAGE AND THAT THERE
ARE NO PLANS TO TABLE SUCH A MEASURE DURING THIS PHASE
OF THE CDE. WE HAVE ALSO MADE AN EFFORT TO HIGHLIGHT
SEVERAL OTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEM (AND OPPORTUNITY) AREAS
FOR CONSIDERATION, INCLUDING HOW THE RESPECTIVE MEASURES
DEAL WITH TRANSITS OF U.S. FORCES THROUGH THE ZONES OF
APPLICATION TO THIRD DESTINATIONS. USDEL HAS ALSO
IDENTIFIED A CONTACT PERSON FOR MBFR AND REQUESTS THAT
VIENNA IDENTIFY HIS COUNTERPART FOR CDE. END SUMMARY.
4. BECAUSE OF THE SURFACE SIMILARITY OF MANY WESTERN
PROPOSED AM'S AND CSBM'S, THEIR DISSIMILARITIES TEND TO
STAND IN SHARP FOCUS AND ARE LIKELY TO BE CLOSELY
SCRUTINIZED BY THE EAST BOTH HERE AND IN VIENNA.
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT MBFR AND CDE OPERATE ON VERY
DIFFERENT TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THAT IT WOULD BE BEST
TO MAINTAIN AS MUCH SUBSTANTIVE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO
FORA AS POSSIBLE, OUR EASTERN COUNTERPARTS ARE UNLIKELY
TO RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO PICK AND CHOOSE FROM WESTERN
AM'S AND CSBM'S WHAT IS MOST ADVANTAGEOUS (OR LEAST
DETRIMENTAL) TO THEIR INTERESTS. THIS COULD BECOME
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IF ONE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
OUTPACES THE OTHER AND BEGINS TO ESTABLISH PRECEDENT FOR
WHAT THE WEST (OR THE EAST) IS WILLING TO ACCEPT IN SUCH
AREAS AS INFORMATION EXCHANGE, NOTIFICATION,
VERIFICATION, ETC. OF COURSE, AREAS OF CONCERN FOR EACH
OF OUR DELEGATIONS WILL DIFFER DEPENDING ON THE COURSE
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR OWN PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVES,
BUT FROM THE STOCKHOLM PERSPECTIVE WE HAVE IDENTIFIED
BELOW SEVERAL POTENTIAL PROBLEMS, AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITY
AREAS, IN THE AM/CSBM OVERLAP.
5. CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION:
-- REFTEL REFERS TO A NATO AGREED "CSBM-7" CALLING FOR
A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION AND INDICATES THAT THIS
MEASURE IS BEING HELD FOR TABLING IN STOCKHOLM "AT THE
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TACTICALLY MOST ADVANTAGEOUS MOMENT." SUCH A
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION MEASURE OR "CSBM-7" WAS NOT
AGREED TO AS PART OF THE NATO PACKAGE AND THE ALLIANCE
HAS NO PLANS TO TABLE SUCH A MEASURE AT ANY TIME DURING
THIS PHASE OF THE CDE CONFERENCE. AN EMBRYONIC MEASURE
ALONG THESE LINES WAS CONSIDERED DURING THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE NATO CSBM PACKAGE, BUT WAS STILLBORN. SOME
ALLIES, E.G., THE FRG, ARE VERY SYMPATHETHIC TO THE
CONCEPT, BUT IT IS ANATHEMA TO THE FRENCH; WE ALSO
STRONGLY OPPOSE IT BECAUSE IT COULD TURN OUT TO BE A
SUBSTITUTE FOR VERIFICATION, COULD COMPLICATE NATO
CRISIS DECISION-MAKING, AND COULD ESTABLISH A SOVIET
DROIT DE REGARD OVER NATO SECURITY DECISIONS. USDEL IS
UNAWARE OF ANY ONGOING WORK IN BRUSSELS ON SUCH A
MEASURE. WE UNDERSTAND, OF COURSE, THAT IN THE CONTEXT
OF MBFR VERIFICATION THE TIME FACTOR IS NOT AS CRITICAL
AND A SHORT DELAY FOR CONSULTATIONS WOULD NOT HAVE AS
DAMAGING AN EFFECT ON THE THE ABILITY OF INSPECTORS TO
ASSESS COMPLIANCE.
6. INFORMATION EXCHANGE (CSBM-1 AND AM-6):
-- WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT AN EXCHANGE OF STATIC
INFORMATION OF FORCE STRUCTURE SERVES DIFFERENT PURPOSES
FOR MBFR AND CDE, PROGRESS IN VIENNA ON AM-6 COULD HAVE
A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE WESTERN POSITION IN STOCKHOLM.
INDICATIONS OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE STATIC
INFORMATION ALONG THE LINES OF AM-6 (I.E., INFORMATION
DISAGGREGATED DOWN TO THE BATTALION LEVEL) COULD PROVIDE
AN IMPETUS TO OUR EFFORTS TO REQUIRE A STATIC
INFORMATION EXCHANGE ALONG THE LINES OF OUR MEASURE 1
(I.E., INFORMATION DISAGGREGATED AT LEAST DOWN TO THE
DIVISION LEVEL). CONVERSELY, THE WESTERN DROPPING OF
PRIOR AGREED DATA IN THE DECEMBER PROPOSAL AT MBFR ALSO
COULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS IN STOCKHOLM. ALTHOUGH THE
SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET PICKED UP ON IT, THEY COULD USE
THAT DEVELOPMENT TO SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENTS AT CDE
AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DATA BASE.
7. ANNUAL FORECAST AND NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS
(CSBM'S 2-3, AND AM-2):
-- CSBM'S-2 AND -3 MAKE NO PROVISION FOR THE
NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENT EITHER INTO OR WITHIN THE CDE
ZONE, BUT SIMPLY FORECAST AND NOTIFY SUCH ACTIVITY WHEN
IT CONSTITUTES AN OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITY. THEREFORE,
SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE NOT NOTIFIED UNLESS AND UNTIL FORCES
ARRIVING FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE LEAVE THEIR ARRIVAL BASES
IN EUROPE TO ENGAGE IN A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY. THIS
APPROACH, AS NOTED REFTEL, ENABLES U.S. FORCES TRANSITING
THE CDE ZONE TO OTHER GEOGRAPHIC AREAS (E.G., MIDDLE
EAST) TO BE INSULATED FROM THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.
AM-2, ON THE OTHER HAND, DOES PROVIDE FOR BOTH THE ANNUAL
FORECAST AND 30-DAY PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF THE MOVEMENT
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BY ANY ONE PARTY INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OF ONE OR
MORE DIVISION FORMATIONS AND ANY AGGREGATE OF 25,000 OR
MORE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL WITHIN A CALENDAR MONTH.
-- A POTENTIAL PROBLEM ARISES FROM THIS SITUATION.
CSBM'S-2 AND -3 ARE CONSTRUCTED TO PROTECT TRANSITS OF
U.S. FORCES THROUGH EUROPE TO OTHER POINTS FROM THE
NOTIFICATION AND FORECAST REQUIREMENTS. AM-2 DOES NOT
SEEM TO PROVIDE ANY EXEMPTION FOR THE TRANSIT OF FORCES
AT OR ABOVE THE THRESHOLD THROUGH THE REDUCTION AREA.
AS A NUMBER OF U.S. TRANSITS THROUGH THE THE CDE ZONE
MIGHT ALSO TRANSIT THE REDUCTIONS AREA, THE REQUIREMENT
FOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS UNDER AM-2 COULD
EFFECTIVELY NEGATE OUR EFFORT TO PROTECT SUCH TRANSITS
IN A CDE AGREEMENT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY
CLARIFICATION MBFR DEL CAN PROVIDE ON THIS POINT IF OUR
INTERPRETATION OF THE WESTERN MBFR PROPOSAL IS MISTAKEN
OR ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THIS PROBLEM.
8. TIMEFRAME FOR NOTIFICATION (CSBM-3 AND AM-1):
-- THE CURRENT NATO POSITION IN STOCKHOLM CALLS FOR
ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES 45 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE START OF THE ACTIVITY VICE THE 30 DAYS
PROPOSED BY AM-1. AS 30 DAYS IS ALSO THE CURRENT
EASTERN PROPOSAL IN STOCKHOLM FOR NOTIFICATION, OUR MBFR
POSITION MIGHT BE USED AGAINST US HERE, PARTICULARLY AS
THIS MEASURE IS NOT AS SUSCEPTIBLE AS SOME OTHERS TO THE
ARGUMENT THAT IT IS AIMED AT DIFFERENT PURPOSES AND
OBJECTIVES.
9. VERIFICATION (CSBM-5 AND AM-4):
-- IN GENERAL, WE CAN FORESEE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE
PROSPECTS FOR OUR VERIFICATION MEASURE IN STOCKHOLM IF
PROGRESS IS MADE IN VIENNA ON THE MORE INTRUSIVE AND
STRINGENT PROVISIONS OF AM-4. CONVERSELY, HOWEVER,
SHOULD PROGRESS ON VERIFICATION AT CDE PRECEDE
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT MBFR, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED
BY EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO USE WHAT WE EXPECT TO BE THE LESS
INTRUSIVE PROVISIONS AGREED AT STOCKHOLM AS A LEVER TO
DILUTE AM-4'S INSPECTION MODALITIES.
10. MERGER OF MBFR AND CDE:
THE IDEA THAT MBFR AND CDE MIGHT BE MERGED WHEN CDE
ENTERS ITS DISARMAMENT PHASE HAS OCCASIONALLY COME UP
HERE IN STOCKHOLM. WE HAVE BAD-MOUTHED THE IDEA BECAUSE:
-- THIS WOULD REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE CDE ZONE AND
GIVE THE SOVIETS THE OPPORTUNITY TO RECOUP BREZHNEV'S
CONCESSION ON "EUROPE TO THE URALS."
-- WE DON'T WANT THE NNA IN THE MBFR GAME, BUT WE'LL
NEVER BE ABLE TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM CDE.
-- WE'RE NOT EAGER FOR CDE TO MOVE INTO A "DISARMAMENT
STAGE" IN ANY CASE.
A SECOND POSSIBILITY WHICH HAS SOMETIMES BEEN DISCUSSED
HERE IS THAT MBFR MIGHT BE INDEFINITELY RECESSED IF THE
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LATEST WESTERN OFFER IS REBUFFED. OUR REACTION HAS BEEN
THAT THIS WOULD CREATE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO DISCUSS
MBFR IN A CONTINUED CDE, WITH ALL THE ABOVE PROBLEMS.
11. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT INCREASED AND REGULAR CONTACT
BETWEEN OUR DELEGATIONS WILL BE NEEDED IN THE MONTHS
AHEAD, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF INTENSIFIED WORK IN BOTH
VIENNA AND STOCKHOLM. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE SUCH
CONTACT WE HAVE DESIGNATED EDWIN NOLAN AS THE
DELEGATION'S CONTACT PERSON FOR MBFR. WE REQUEST THAT
MBFR DEL IDENTIFY ITS POINT OF CONTACT FOR CDE SO THAT
WE CAN BEGIN A REGULAR DIALOGUE. WE BELIEVE THIS IS THE
BEST MEANS OF FACILITATING AN EXCHANGE OF IDEAS AND OF
CLARIFYING ISSUES AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AREAS SUCH AS
WE HAVE IDENTIFIED.
BARRY
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 01720
SUBJECT: MODIFYING NATO'S MEASURE TWO
REF: STOCKHOLM 01447
1. CDE IX - 054.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: DELEGATION HAS CONSIDERED VARIOUS
OPTIONS FOR MODIFYING MEASURE TWO, BASED ON OSD PAPER
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN WORKING GROUP A-3. DELEGATION
BELIEVES WE SHOULD DISCUSS WITH KEY ALLIES THE IDEA OF
PROPOSING ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS FOR NON-FORECAST
ACTIVITIES. WE ARE SEEKING WASHINGTON APPROVAL NOW OF
THIS APPROACH TO MODIFYING MEASURE TWO FOR USE IN THE
APPROPRIATE TACTICAL SITUATION. DELEGATION WOULD ALSO
APPRECIATE WASHINGTON VIEWS ON THE CONCEPT OF A CEILING
ON THE NUMBER OF ALERT ACTIVITIES. ACTION REQUIRED IN
PARA 8. END SUMMARY
4. DELEGATION BELIEVES MODIFYING MEASURE TWO BY
PROPOSING ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS FOR NOTIFIED BUT
NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES WOULD SERVE SEVERAL IMPORTANT
PURPOSES.
-- IT WOULD PROVIDE US TACTICAL LEVERAGE BY MAKING THE
ANNUAL CALENDAR MORE "CONSTRAINING" AND, THEREFORE,
DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THE IRISH PROPOSAL (SEPTEL).
-- IT WOULD ALSO STRENGTHEN THE LINK BETWEEN THE ANNUAL
FORECAST AND INSPECTION. DELEGATION CONTINUES TO STRESS
THE NEED FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION VIGOROUSLY AND WOULD
LIKE TO USE THE ANNUAL FORECAST TO REINFORCE OUR
POSITION THAT INSPECTION IS OUR SINE QUA NON.
-- DELEGATION ALSO SEES VALUE IN MAKING THE ANNUAL
FORECAST A MORE ACCURATE BASELINE OF MEANINGFUL MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN INCREASE THE
INCENTIVES TO USE THE ANNUAL FORECAST ACCURATELY, WE
WILL SUCCEED IN MAKING IT A SOURCE OF MORE CORRECT
INFORMATION REGARDING MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
5. IN OUR VIEW, THE RIGHT TO AN ADDITIONAL INSPECTION
WOULD BE GRANTED ANYTIME AN ACTIVITY WAS NOTIFIED BUT
NOT FORECAST. IN PRACTICE, THIS WOULD USUALLY MEAN
TARGETTING ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS ON ALERT ACTIVITIES.
AS IT IS ALERT ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE THE FOCUS OF
SUBSTANTIAL NNA CONCERN, BOTH IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING
SOME DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY AND PROVIDING SOME SORT OF
LIMITS ON THEM, WE BELIEVE A PROPOSAL TO SUBJECT ALERTS
TO ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS WOULD PROVE USEFUL IN
COUNTERING NNA ARGUMENTS THAT WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN
MAKING THE FORECAST MORE "CONSTRAINING." AT THE SAME
TIME, IT WOULD HIT THE NNA ON A POINT OF VULNERABILITY.
WE DO NOT FORESEE USING THIS PROVISION TO DEAL WITH
NON-NOTIFIED AND NON-FORECAST (I.E., SUSPECTED)
ACTIVITIES. THE EXISTING ACTIVE INSPECTION LIMIT OF TWO
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PER COUNTRY WOULD HAVE TO HANDLE THE NON-NOTIFIED/
NON-FORECAST PROBLEM AS WELL AS FORECAST ACTIVITIES.
6. ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS ARE OBVIOUSLY RESTRAINING,
AND WOULD ESTABLISH AN INCENTIVE TO COMPLY WITH THE
FORECAST, SO THAT IT COULD HAVE AN INHIBITING EFFECT ON
THE USE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
FORECAST BY COMPLICATING A NATION'S DECISION TO BREAK
OUT OF THE FORECAST. IN THIS WAY, A PENALTY INSPECTION
MIGHT ALSO COMPLICATE A STATE'S DECISION TO DEVELOP A
NON-FORECAST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN RESPONSE TO AN
UNEXPECTED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ANOTHER STATE; I.E.,
IT COULD HELP INHIBIT THE USE OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY FOR
POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. DELEGATION DOES NOT, OF COURSE,
INTEND TO SELL THIS MODIFICATION OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST
AS A CONSTRAINT PER SE, BUT, DEPENDING ON THE TACTICS
REQUIRED AT THE TIME, WOULD USE THIS AS A MEANS TO MAKE
THE CALENDAR MORE "CONSTRAINING."
7. DELEGATION WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REVIEW
OF ANOTHER POTENTIAL OPTION FOR INCREASING THE
"CONSTRAINING" EFFECT OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST. THE
CONCEPT OF AN OVERALL CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF, JCS AND USIA FOR INFO
ACTIVITIES NEITHER FORECAST NOR NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE HAS
BEEN PROPOSED IN TERMS OF A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL
ACTIVITIES FORECAST BY THE IRISH. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT,
THE NORMAL PATTERN OF NATO ALERT ACTIVITIES IS VERY
REGULAR; THEREFORE, THEORETICALLY A CEILING ON THE
NUMBER COULD HAVE NO PRACTICAL EFFECT ON NATO. MOST
IMPORTANTLY, UNLIKE A TWO-YEAR FORECAST REQUIREMENT FOR
LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITIES, A CEILING ON ALERTS DOES NOT
IMPLICITLY ENDORSE ARGUMENTS VIS-A-VIS LARGE-SCALE
ACTIVITIES AS THE THREAT TO EUROPE. IT IS ALSO
APPEALING BECAUSE IT WOULD, THEORETICALLY, AFFECT ALL
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. IT MIGHT EVEN PROVE
"CONSTRAINING" FOR THE EAST. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD
SERVE AS AN INCENTIVE TO USE THE FORECAST ACCURATELY.
DESPITE THE PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF SUCH A PROPOSAL IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT OUR CAPABILITY TO
MONITOR FOR EVIDENCE OF ALERTS IS VERY LIMITED.
MOREOVER, DELEGATION IS WARY OF ENGAGING IN THE
CONSTRAINTS DEBATE TO THIS DEGREE. DESPITE THESE
CONCERNS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON'S VIEWS OF THIS
TYPE OF "CONSTRAINT." (COMMENT: THIS APPEARS TO BE A
LIMIT ON ALERTS ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD PRIVATELY
THAT THE IRISH PROPOSAL FORESEES AN EXCEPTION CLAUSE FOR
ALERTS. IF SUCH A CLAUSE WERE INSTITUTED, THE IRISH
PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE NO AFFECT ON NATO BECAUSE WE WILL
FORECAST ALL OUR ACTIVITIES EXCEPT ALERTS. A LIMIT ON
ACTIVITIES NOT FORECAST, WITH AN EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE FOR
ALERTS, WOULD ACTUALLY BE TARGETTED AT THE USE OF
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MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. END COMMENT)
8. ACTION: REQUEST WASHINGTON APPROVAL FOR DELEGATION
TO DISCUSS THE "ADDITIONAL INSPECTION" MODIFICATION
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5 WITH KEY ALLIES WITH A VIEW
TOWARDS ESTABLISHING SUPPORT FOR THIS APPROACH. WE HOPE
THAT THESE CONSULTATIONS WILL HELP DELEGATION TO
FORMULATE AN AGREED USG APPROACH.
BARRY
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C O H F I DENTI A L STOCKHOLM01292
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT AIR ISSUE/VISITING ALLIES
1. CDE- IX - 61
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WITH SEVERAL INFLUENTIAL ALLIES
VISITING WASHINGTON IN THE NEXT WEEK, WE WOULD SUGGEST
DEPARTMENT USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFIRM U.S. POSITION
ON AN INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM. EAST IS EXERTING
CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON NATO TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON
AN INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM REGIME AS QUID PRO QUO FOR
GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 OFFER TO DEFER NAVAL ACTIVITIES
TO A LATER STAGE OF CDE; MOST ALLIES APPEAR TO BE
SOFTENING THEIR VIEWS AND HAVE PRIVATELY INDICATED
WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE THE ISSUE. END SUMMARY
4. THE SOVIETS ARE PUSHING THE VIEW THAT GORBACHEV'S
JANUARY 15 OFFER TO DEFER DISCUSSIONS OF NAVAL ACTIVITY
TO A LATER CDE STAGE IS A MAJOR CONCESSION WHICH THE
WEST MUST MATCH. AMB GRINEVSKY HAS ACTIVELY LOBBIED
NATO AMBASSADORS FOR SOME SORT OF WRITTEN PLEDGE TO
DISCUSS NAVAL AT A LATER STAGE; OUR COLLECTIVE RESPONSES
HAVE BEEN UNITED IN AFFIRMING THAT ONLY VIENNA CAN
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WILL BE OTHER CONFERENCES
AND WHAT WILL BE DISCUSSED.
5. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT DISCUSSIONS OF NAVAL ISSUES
WILL RECEDE INTO THE BACKGROUND; HOWEVER, THE QUID THE
EAST SEEKS IN RETURN IS AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE AN
INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM IN THIS STAGE OF CDE. WE HAVE TOLD
THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS THAT THE US WILL NEVER ACCEPT
INDEPENDENT AIR AS AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR THIS
CONFERENCE. ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, HOWEVER, IS NOT AS
FIRM ON THIS SUBJECT AS WE WOULD LIKE. THE FRENCH HAVE
SAID THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM,
ALTHOUGH THEY DENY ANY INTENTION TO PROPOSE ONE. THE
ITALIANS, LIKEWISE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE MORE
FORTHCOMING. TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE BRITISH AND FRG
HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE AS A POSSIBILITY THEY COULD
ENTERTAIN. THE SMALLER "WETS" - E.G. DENMARK,
NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, SPAIN - ALL COULD EASILY ACCEPT
INDEPENDENT AIR.
6. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS WE HAVE MADE WITH ALLIES HERE
EXPLAINING WHY WE REJECT AN INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM:
-- IT COULD NOT BE VERIFIED; EVEN A VERY INTRUSIVE
VERIFICATION SYSTEM WOULD FALL SHORT OF ANY REASONABLE
DEFINITION OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.
-- IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH SO
CAREFULLY PROTECTED BY THE WEST IN STOCKHOLM BY
REQUIRING NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES INDEPENDENTLY
OF NOTIFIABLE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY.
-- IT WOULD SET THE STAGE FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF
INDEPENDENT NAVAL EXERCISES AT A LATER DATE, GIVING
SUSTENANCE TO SOVIET POSITION THAT THE ISSUE WILL BE
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TAKEN UP IN SECOND STAGE OF CDE.
-- IT DEFLECTS ATTENTION FROM THE MAIN WESTERN
OBJECTIVE OF CDE, WHICH IS TO ESTABLISH CSBMS TO ENHANCE
CONFIDENCE ABOUT GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.
-- IT RAISES ANEW THE QUESTION OF NOTIFYING
NON-EUROPEAN TRANSITS AND EUROPEAN BOUND REINFORCEMENTS
BY AIRCRAFT THAT MIGHT PASS OVER THE TERRITORY REFERRED
TO AS THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.
-- IT WOULD REDUCE DEPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY FOR NATO
AIR ASSETS.
7. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE TO THE U.S., AND
OUR LACK OF FLEXIBILITY ON IT, REQUEST WASHINGTON
REINFORCE TO OUR VISITING FRENCH, UK AND FRG DELEGATIONS
THE FIRMNESS OF OUR POSITION ON INDEPENDENT AIR.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET
SUBJECT: MOVING THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS AWAY FROM
INDEPENDENT AIR
1. CDE - 078. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BOTH AMBASSADOR BARRY AND I ARE COMMITTED TO THE
POSITION THAT A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM WILL
NOT/NOT INCLUDE A CSBM DEALING WITH INDEPENDENT AIR
ACTIVITIES. THE DELEGATION IS COMPLETELY UNITED ON THIS
ISSUE. OUR JCS AND ACDA REPS HAVE DONE A YEOMAN'S JOB
IN AD HOC GROUPS HERE DESIGNED TO DEVELOP ARGUMENTS
AGAINST A CSBM DEALING WITH INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVTIES.
NEVERTHELESS, SEVERAL OF OUR ALLIES REMAINED UNCONVINCED
AND ARE EXPLORING VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE
ISSUE. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER DETAILS, BUT IT IS
CLEAR THERE IS SOME SOFTNESS ON INDEPENDENT AIR IN THE
WESTERN CAMP. WE EXPECT THE EAST TO ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT
THIS SOFTNESS, FOR SUBSTANTIVE AND POLITICAL REASONS,
E.G., TO EXACERBATE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN U.S. AND
ITS ALLIES.
3. IN OUR VIEW, THE 15 JAN GORBACHEV STATEMENT
EFFECTIVELY REMOVED INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES FROM
OUR AGENDA IN STOCKHOLM. CONTINUED EASTERN REFERENCE TO
THIS ISSUE IS FOR TACTICAL REASONS AS THE SOVIETS ARE
ATTEMPTING TO PARLAY THEIR "OFFER" TO DELAY A NAVAL CSBM
AS A "CONCESSION" WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A "REGISTERED"
AGREEMENT BY THE CONFERENCE TO DEAL WITH NAVAL
ACTIVITIES IN THE NEXT CDE PHASE AND A
COUNTER-CONCESSION FROM THE WEST ON INDEPENDENT AIR
ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE SOME CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET
TACTICS WILL HAVE EFFECT ON THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO
BELIEVE THAT INDEPENDENT AIR IS A LEGITIMATE SUBJECT FOR
STOCKHOLM BECAUSE THE MANDATE DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY
EXCLUDE THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES
WHICH TAKE PLACE OVER EUROPE. BECAUSE OF THE APPARENT
WILLINGNESS OF SOME TO MOVE DOWN THE ROAD THE SOVIETS
ARE SUGGESTING, WE SEE THE PROBLEM IN TACTICAL AS WELL
AS SUBSTANTIVE TERMS. THE ISSUE, THEN, REQUIRES DEFT
TACTICAL HANDLING BY THE DELEGATION BOTH AS REGARDS THE
SOVIETS AND SOME OF OUR ALLIES.
4. IN SPITE OF THE RECENTLY TABLED EASTERN LANGUAGE
DEALING WITH THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR MANEUVERS SEPTEL),
AMBASSADOR BARRY AND I BELIEVE THE KEY TO MEETING OUR
SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS, AS WELL AS OUR TACTICAL ONES, MAY
LIE IN THE PUBLIC SOVIET ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, REPEATED TO US
BILATERALLY, THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE AIR ACTIVITIES IN
EUROPE ARE FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO THE SUPPORT OF GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES. IN THE NEAR TERM, THEY WILL NOT
EXPLICITLY ACCEPT OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH AS APPLIED TO AIR ACTIVITIES SINCE THAT WOULD
SIGNAL AN ACCEPTANCE OF OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE
MANDATE AND FORECLOSE ANY FUTURE OPTION THEY MAY THINK
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THEY HAVE FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES. NEVERTHELESS, WE
BELIEVE THAT IF WE PLAY OUR CARDS RIGHT, THE SOVIETS
EVENTUALLY HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE FUNCTIONALISM AS THE ONLY
PRAGMATIC WAY TO DEAL WITH AIR ACTIVITIES.
5. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, WE MUST ATTEMPT TO DEPRIVE
THE SOVIETS OF THE TACTICAL LEVERAGE THEY PERCEIVE THEY
HAVE IN HANGING THE SHADOW OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES OVER THE
CONFERENCE. WE BELIEVE APPARENT SOVIET CONCERNS
VIZ-A-VIS THE LACK OF U.S. RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV CAN BE
USED TO ELIMINATE THIS LEVERAGE AND REINFORCE OUR
POSITION ON INDEPENDENT AIR. AMBASSADOR BARRY'S AND MY
INSTINCTS ARE THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS A
POLITICAL RESPONSE ON CDE TO WHAT THEY TERM A POLITICAL
MOVE BY GORBACHEV, AND, IN THE PROCESS, TO REMOVE THE
NAVAL ACTIVITIES SHADOW FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE
BELIEVE THIS POLITICAL RESPONSE COULD TAKE THE FORM OF
AN INSTRUCTED DEMARCHE TO GRINEVSKY WHICH WOULD
ACKNOWLEDGE THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT BUT MAKE NO
COMMITMENTS.
6. THE INSTRUCTED DEMARCHE MIGHT PICK UP ELEMENTS OF
THE JAN 15 STATEMENT WITH WHICH WE AGREE, E.G.,
- -- SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM IS POSSIBLE
- -- NO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES IN STOCKHOLM, SINCE SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD
BLOCK AGREEMENT.
7. IN ADDITION, SUCH A DEMARCHE MIGHT MAKE THE
FOLLOWING POINTS:
- -- THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST FOLLOW THE TERMS OF
ITS MANDATE, IT IS NOT EMPOWERED TO TAKE UP DISCUSSIONS
OR MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A
POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA PHASE OF THE CDE OR EVEN IF THERE
SHOULD BE A POST-VIENNA PHASE. THAT DECISION WILL BE
MADE BY THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE FOLLOW-UP
MEETING IN VIENNA.
- -- KEEPING IN MIND THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE AIR
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE ARE FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE
SOVIET DELEGATION THEIR IDEAS FOR REFLECTING THIS
FUNCTIONAL LINKAGE IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME.
8. THIS KIND OF APPROACH WOULD NOT COMMIT US TO
ANYTHING EXCEPT TO LISTEN. HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE
PROVIDED AN OFFICIAL U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIETS WHICH
POCKETS THE REMOVAL OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES. WE
WOULD NOT BE GIVING UP ANYTHING ON AIR ACTIVITIES BUT
WOULD, ONCE AGAIN, REAFFIRM THE FUNCTIONAL CONDITIONS
UNDER WHICH WE WILL DISCUSS SUCH ACTIVITIES. WE WOULD,
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OF COURSE, SHARE THIS RESPONSE WITH THE ALLIES. THE
FACT THAT WE WILL HAVE PROVIDED AN OFFICIAL U.S.
RESPONSE CAN BE USED TO REINFORCE OUR FIRM POSITION
AGAINST INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND THE NEED FOR A
UNITED ALLIANCE FRONT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS
WILL HAVE GOTTEN THE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT BOTH INDEPENDENT
AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARE OUT. AS A CONSEQUENCE,
THEY WILL BE UNABLE TO SUSTAIN THEIR PRESENT TACTIC OF
USING THE THREAT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO PRESSURE OUR
MORE PLIABLE ALLIES.
HANSEN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 00978
SUBJECT: SOVIETS EXPELLED FROM FRANCE TURN UP AT CDE,
PAPER CHARGES
1. (U) STOCKHOLM MORNING DAILY "SVENSKA DAGBLADET"
(SVD) (IND. CONS.) REPORTED IN A FRONT-PAGE STORY
FEBRUARY 10 THAT YURIY KRIVTSOV AND ANDREI ANDROSOV,
BOTH OF WHOM HAD BEEN DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA AND
EXPELLED FROM FRANCE IN APRIL 1983 FOR SPYING HAVE
BEEN IN SWEDEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE STOCKHOLM CDE
CONFERENCE. KRIVTSOV, 60, WORKED AS A TRANSLATOR FOR
THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT DURING THE FOURTH CDE
SESSION IN 1984, ACCORDING TO THE NEWSPAPER. "AN
INFORMED SOURCE" IS QUOTED AS SAYING KRIVTSOV THEN
RETURNED TO MOSCOW TO TAKE A HIGH POST FOR THE KGB,
IN WHICH HE HOLDS THE RANK OF GENERAL. ANDROSOV, 36,
IS IDENTIFIED AS THE SON OF STANISLAV ANDROSOV,
REPORTEDLY THE KGB RESIDENT AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
WASHINGTON. THE YOUNGER ANDROSOV WAS A MEMBER OF THE
SOVIET CDE DELEGATION DURING 1985 AND HAS BEEN SEEN
AT THE CURRENT SESSION.
2. (U) SWEDISH SECURITY POLICE (SAPO) CHIEF SVEN-AKE
HJALMROTH IS QUOTED IN THE SVD ARTICLE "WE ARE AWARE
THAT THESE TWO WERE EXPELLED FROM FRANCE FOR ILLEGAL
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY. WE HAVE INFORMED THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY. I WON'T COMMENT ON WHAT OTHER MEASURES WE MAY
HAVE TAKEN." CDE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JAN AF SILLEN TOLD
SVD THAT IT WAS NOT UP TO THE CONFERENCE TO PASS AN
OPINION ON THE MAKEUP OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. "IF
SWEDISH AUTHORITIES HAVE SOMETHING AGAINST THE PARTICI-
PANTS, THEY OUGHT TO DENY THEM ENTRY PERMISSION." AF
SILLEN DID NOT COMMENT ON THE FACT THAT KRIVTSOV WAS
EMPLOYED BY HIS SECRETARIAT. THE SWEDISH MFA REFUSED
TO COMMENT ON THE STORY. SVD SPECULATES THAT THE SPIES
WERE SENT TO STOCKHOLM BECAUSE THEY WERE "VERY CAPABLE
DIPLOMATS. A WELL-KNOWN FACT IN INTELLIGENCE CIRCLES
IS THAT THE LEADING SOVIET DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATORS ARE
CONNECTED TO THE KGB ITSELF."
3. (LOU) COMMENT: THE SWEDISH PRESS, AND "SVENSKA
DAGBLADET" IN PARTICULAR, HAVE REPEATEDLY TRIED TO
EXPOSE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES AND ACTIVITIES
IN SWEDEN. ALTHOUGH THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY
SPECIAL PURPOSE FOR THE TIMING OF THIS PARTICULAR
EXPOSE, SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND INTENTIONS TOWARD SWEDEN
HAVE BEEN GETTING CLOSE ATTENTION IN THE RUN-UP TO
OLOF PALME'S APRIL TRIP TO MOSCOW AND THE SWEDISH
5-YEAR DEFENSE COMMISSION'S REPORT LATER THIS SPRING.
NEWELL
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01344
SUBJECT: CDE DEPUTY TRAVEL TO BERLIN AND WARSAW
1. GDR AND POLISH REPS AT CDE HAVE FORMALLY EXTENDED
INVITATIONS TO US DEPUTY AMB HANSEN TO VISIT THEIR
RESPECTIVE CAPITOLS FOR CONSULTATIONS ON CDE/CSCE
DURING NEXT BREAK IN CDE NEGOTIATIONS. AMB BUEHRING
(GDR) HAS SUGGESTED AFTERNOON OF MONDAY, 24 MARCH,
FOR A MEETING WITH GDR OFFICIALS. AMB KONARSKI
(POLAND) HAS SUGGESTED EITHER WEDNESDAY, 26 MAR, OR
THURSDAY, 27 MARCH FOR MEETINGS IN WARSAW.
2. KONARSKI SAID THAT WHILE WARSAW WOULD WISH TO
DEVOTE MOST OF THE TIME TO CDE, THEY WOULD ALSO LIKE
TO TOUCH ON CSCE IN GENERAL. AMB HANSEN WOULD
APPRECIATE AS MUCH GUIDANCE AS POSSIBLE ON WASHINGTON
VIEWS CONCERNING VIENNA, REALIZING THAT SUCH VIEWS
MIGHT BE PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE.
3. FOR BERLIN: REQUEST CONFIRMATION OF MEETING DATES
WITH GDR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS FOR 24 MARCH. AMB
HANSEN WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY
USIS-TYPE ACTIVITIES EMBASSY BERLIN MIGHT WISH TO
ORGANIZE ON EITHER MONDAY OR TUESDAY AS TIME ALLOWS.
WILL FORWARD TRAVEL PLANS ETC. WHEN FIRM.
4. FOR WARSAW: ACCORDING TO KONARSKY, FOREIGN MINISTRY
OFFICIALS WILL PLAN FULL PROGRAM ONCE THEY HAVE CON-
FIRMATION OF VISIT THROUGH EMBASSY. FULL PROGRAM, AS
ENVISIONED BY KONARSKY WOULD INCLUDE ROUNDTABLE
DISCUSSIONS WITH POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS. REQUEST EMBASSY CONTACT APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS
TO MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.
BARRY
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 03012
SUBJECT: NATO CDE HEADS OF DELEGATION "BRAINSTORMING"
SESSION IN BRUSSELS, APRIL 13, 1986
1. CDE I - 09.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THERE WERE NO SURPRISES AT THE MEETING
OF NATO CDE HEADS OF DELEGATION APRIL 13 IN BRUSSELS.
THE CRITICALITY OF ROUND TEN WAS RECOGNIZED AS WELL AS
THE NEED FOR THE EAST TO MAKE A MOVE TO FACILITATE A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. FRANCE SAID IT WOULD "FREEZE"
DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUP ADDRESSING NON-USE OF
FORCE IF PROBLEMS WERE NOT RESOLVED IN OTHER WORKING
GROUPS. WHILE THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE WAS RECOGNIZED,
IT WAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE EFFORTS TO
SEEK A SUCCESSFUL. OUTCOME BY MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE
AND SEEKING SOLUTIONS THROUGH THE DRAFTING PROCESS AS THE
TIME FOR MAJOR, NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS HAS PAST. IT WAS
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE NNA SHOULD BE USED AS THE VEHICLE
FOR COMPROMISE PROPOSALS, INASMUCH AS THE EAST WILL NOT
ACCEPT ANYTHING PROPOSED BY THE WEST. THE WEST SHOULD BE
FLEXIBLE, BUT THERE WERE VARYING VIEWS ON THE SCOPE AND
TIMING OF SUCH FLEXIBILITY. IT WAS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED
THAT FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE EXERCISED WITH CAUTION.
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND RELATED THRESHOLDS AND
VERIFICATION WERE IDENTIFIED AS KEY ISSUES. SEVERAL
DELEGATIONS SUGGESTED THAT CDE SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT
ITEM ON THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN
MINISTERS IN HALIFAX. END SUMMARY.
4. CONFERENCE PROSPECTS. SPEAKERS AGREED THAT THIS
SESSION WAS CRITICIAL TO SUCCESS; TIME IS RUNNING OUT AND
THERE IS A SENSE OF URGENCY. THE EAST MUST MAKE A MOVE.
WHILE A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE
POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE, THEY AGREED THAT OUR KEY OBJECTIVE
WAS TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR SUCCESS AND TO ENSURE THAT WE
ARE SEEN TO BE DOING SO. ALL STATED OPPOSITION TO A
"MINI-PACKAGE" OUTCOME. RESOLUTION OF ISSUES RELATED TO
TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND RELATED PARAMETERS
AS WELL AS AGREEMENT TO VERIFICATION THROUGH ON-SITE
INSPECTION WERE IDENTIFIED AS KEY TO SUCCESS.
5. WESTERN STRATEGY AND TACTICS. NATO SHOULD MAINTAIN
THE INITIATIVE IT GAINED DURING THE LAST SESSION: THERE
IS WORK TO BE DONE; WE HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE
READY TO DO IT; THE BEST WAY IS TO DRAFT ON CONCRETE
MEASURES; TO THAT END, CERTAIN KEY ISSUES NEED TO BE
RESOLVED; WE HOPE OTHERS ARE READY TO JOIN US IN THIS
PROCESS. NATO COUNTRIES WILL EMPHASIZE THEIR READINESS
TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS.
WHILE FLEXIBILITY IN APPROACH WAS STRESSEb, THERE WAS NO
AGREEMENT ON HOW IT SHOULD BE MANISFESTED. SOME DELEGA-
TIONS (NORWAY, FOR ONE) SUGGESTED THAT SC.1 BE REVIEWED
IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS "NEGOTIATING FAT." IF
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SO, AREAS FOR COMPROMISE SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED IN THE CONFERENCE. ONLY THROUGH THIS
"GIVE AND TAKE," IT WAS ARGUED, WILL SUCCESS BE ACHIEVED.
OTHERS (INCLUDING UK, PORTUGUAL) ARGUED THAT TO COMPROMISE
NOW WOULD SIMPLY RESULT IN NATO GIVING AND THE EAST
TAKING, BY POCKETING COMPROMISES AND GIVING NOTHING IN
RETURN. U.S. (BARRY) POINTED OUT THAT WHAT FLEXIBILITY
WE HAVE SHOULD BE MANIFESTED DURING THE DRAFTING PROCESS
ITSELF; THE TIME FOR TABLING OF NEW, COMPROMISE PROPOSALS
BY THE WEST HAS PAST. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT FOR IDEAS
TO BE RECEIVED POSITIVELY BY THE EAST, THEY MUST APPEAR
TO HAVE COME FROM THE NNA; THUS, THE NNA MAY BE THE BEST
VEHICLE FOR EFFECTING NECESSARY COMPROMISES.
SUPPORT WAS VOICED FOR USING AVAILABLE PROCEDURAL
MECHANISMS TO FACILITATE PROGRESS, SUCH AS COFFEE/CONTACT
GROUPS. AT LEAST ONE DELEGATION, FRANCE, EXPRESSED SOME
RELUCTANCE TO CONDUCT SUBSTANTIVE WORK, AT LEAST ON A
REGULAR BASIS, OUTSIDE OF THE WORKING GROUP FRAMEWORK.
OTHERS AGREED THAT COFFEE GROUPS MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR
NEGOTIATION OF SPECIFIC, CONCRETE MEASURES, BUT SHOULD
NOT BE INDISCRIMINATELY ESTABLISHED.
6. SOVIET INTENTIONS. IT WAS NOTED THAT SCHEDULED INTER-
SESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY
WITH U.S., UK, FRANCE, FRG, AND SPAIN HAD BEEN CANCELLED.
FRANCE RECEIVED AMB. RAKHHANINOV IN HIS STEAD. THE
REASON FOR CANCELLATION WAS NOT CLEAR, NOR ARE SOVIET
INTENTIONS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IF THE
CONFERENCE IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL, THE EAST WILL HAVE TO
MAKE A MOVE THIS ROUND, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME DOUBT
THAT THEY WOULD. THEY COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, WITHHOLD COM-
PROMISE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES UNTIL VERY LATE IN THE GAME,
AND MAKE LAST MINUTE CONCESSIONS OF A MINOR NATURE AIMED
AT CONCLUSION OF A "MINI-PACKAGE." IRRESPECTIVE OF
INTENTIONS, IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO
ENSURE THAT ANY BLAME FOR LACK OF SUCCESS WILL FALL ON
THE WEST.
FRG AMB. CITRON SUGGESTED "PERSONALLY" THAT, IN THE EVENT
THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO STALL, COORDINATED HIGH-LEVEL
DEMARCHES MIGHT BE MADE TO STRESS OUR INTEREST AND GET
THEM TO MOVE. REACTIONS TO THIS SUGGESTION WERE POSTIVE
AND NEGATIVE, BUT IT WAS AGREED THAT NO DECISION NOW ON
SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION NEED BE TAKEN. AMB. BARRY NOTED
THAT IN THE COURSE OF CONTACTS ON DIFFERENT LEVELS WITH
THE USSR, THE U.S. PERIODICALLY RAISED THE SUBJECT OF CDE
IN ANY EVENT; U.S. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN HAD DONE SO
RECENTLY. HE ASSUMED OTHERS DID AS WELL. AMB. BARRY
THEN BRIEFED THE CONTENTS OF THE HARTMAN/SCHEVARDNADZE
EXCHANGE. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS SUGGESTED THAT CDE, IN
THE CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, SHOULD BE A MAJOR
AGENDA ITEM FOR DISCUSSION AT THE UPCOMING HALIFAX MEETING
OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS. FRANCE FELT THE NEGOTIATIONS
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SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN STOCKHOLM.
7. SUBSTANCE. U.S. (BARRY) INDENTIFIED THREE KEY AREAS
FOR REAL PROGRESS THIS ROUND.
-- NOTIFICATION. RESOLUTION OF ISSUES RELATED TO
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND THRESHOLDS IS A TOP PRIORITY
AND A KEY TO RESOLUTION OF MANY OTHER ISSUES. ALL AGREED.
WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE FOCUS IS ON GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES. BARRY INDICATED THAT COORDINATOR LIDGARD,
DURING INTERSESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS WITH U.S., HAD
DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF TABLING A COORDINATOR'S
PAPER COVERING THESE ISSUES WITH A FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES. WHILE THE PAPER LIDGARD HAD IN MIND WAS VERY
SIMILAR TO SC.7 PROPOSALS AND, AS SUCH, WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE
AS OUTLINED TO THE U.S., BARRY SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS
INCLINED TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO TABLE IT IN ORDER TO GET
THE DISCUSSION GOING AND FOCUS ON GROUND ACTIVITIES.
IT COULD BE AMENDED OR RE-WRITTEN AS NECESSARY, BUT AT
LEAST IT WOULD REQUIRE THE EAST TO CONCENTRATE ON GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES AND RELATED THRESHOLDS. UK, FRANCE,
AND FRG WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE LIDGARD APPROACH;
NONE WANTED PAPER TABLED AS IS. FRG SUGGESTED WEST
WORK WITH LIDGARD TO BRING PAPER CLOSER INTO LINE WITH
SC.1 APPROACH PRIOR TO ITS BEING TABLED.
-- ANNUAL FORECASTS. BARRY SUGGESTED THAT WAYS TO
ENHANCE THE CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS OF ANNUAL FORECASTS
BE EXAMINED, WITH A VIEW TO STAVING OFF CONSTRAINING
MEASURES. ONE SUCH POSSIBLITY, HE NOTED, WAS THE IDEA
OF ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS FOR NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES.
OTHERS SUGGESTED CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE IRISH PROPOSALS
MADE DURING ROUND NINE. THESE COMMENTS PROMPTED UK
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IT HAD NO FLEXBIITY ON
CONSTRAINTS.
-- VERIFICATION. BARRY REITERATED THAT ADEQUATE
VERIFICATION ENCORPORATING THE RIGHT TO ON-SITE
INSPECTION WAS ESSENTIAL; THIS WAS ENDORSED STRONGLY BY
OTHERS. ALL SEEMED TO SHARE THE VIEW THAT THIS WAS A
PROBLEM THAT WOULD/COULD NOT BE RESOLVED UNTIL VERY
LATE IN THE GAME. SPAIN STRESSED THAT ADEQUATE
VERIFICATION WAS NOT A "BARGAINING CHIP."
ON OTHER ISSUES, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WERE MADE:
--NON-USE OF FORCE. DURING INTERSESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS
WITH USSR CDE AMBASSADOR RAKHMANINOV, RAKHMANINOV SAID
THAT THE WESTERN MOVE ON NUF LAST ROUND HAD BEEN RECEIVED
POSTIVELY IN MOSCOW, BUT THEY MUST NOW WAIT FOR THE
TABLING OF THE COMPLETE TEXT. THE USSR WOULD HAVE NO
OBJECTIVE TO INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUCH
A TEXT IF ALL TEN HFA PRINCIPLES ARE ENUMERATED.
FRANCE STATED THAT IF THE DEADLOCK, DUE TO THE SOVIET
UNION, CONTINUED ON OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS NOTIFICATION
AND INFORMATION, IT WOULD "FREEZE" DRAFTING IN THE
WORKING GROUP ADDRESSING NUF. BOTH U.S. (BARRY) AND
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UK ECHOED THESE SENTIMENTS, AS DID SOME OTHERS. AMB.
BARRY ALSO SAID THAT ANY NUF TEXT MUST HAVE LANGUAGE ON
"HUMAN RIGHTS."
--INFORMATION. PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH INFORMATION
WAS RAISED. FRANCE SAID THAT DURING INTERSESSIONAL
CONSULTATIONS WITH SWITZERLAND, FRANCE SUGGESTED THAT
THERE BE SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT THE NOTIFICATION
GROUP ADDRESS ONLY INFORMATION RELATED TO THRESHOLDS
(SUCH AS NUMBER OF TROOPS, EQUIPMENT, ETC.) AND THAT THE
INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COIBIUNICATION GROUP ADDRESS
OTHER INFORMATION WITHOUT SPECIFICATION OF WHERE THIS
INFORMATION WOULD BE PLACED IN THE FINAL AGREEMENT.
8. ROLE OF THE NNA. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NNA SHOULD
BE ENCOURAGED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS, SO
LONG AS IT 13 CONSTRUCTIVE FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. U.S.
(BARRY) SUGGESTED THAT WE TRY TO WORK THROUGH THE NNA
DURING NEGOTIATIONS, INASMUCH AS THE EAST WILL NOT ACCEPT
NEW IDEAS OR COMPROMISES EMANATING DIRECTLY FROM THE WEST.
UK EXPRESSED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT THE NNA CAN BE
INFLUENCED SUFFICIENTLY IN OUR DIRECTION, NOTING THAT
THE LIDGARD NOTIFICATION LANGUAGE IS NOT SUITABLE. THE
NNA, HE NOTED, DID NOT RESOLVE THEIR DILEMMA LAST ROUND
-- THE NEED TO BE IMPARTIAL COORDINATORS DESPITE THEIR
DESIRE TO SUPPORT SC.7. NNA COORDINATORS SHOULD BE
ENCOURAGED TO BE MORE OBJECTIVE. U.S. AMB. BARRY SAID
THAT THE NNA'S SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM ATTEMPTING TO
COME UP WITH SOME KIND OF A "BRIDGE PROPOSAL" FOR TWO
REASONS: A "BRIDGE PROPOSAL" WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF
NEUTRALIZING THE NEUTRALS AND TAKE SOME OF THEM WHO ARE
MORE SUPPORTIVE OF THE WESTERN APPROACH OUT OF A
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE AND THE OUTCOME WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE
UNSATISFACTORY AS UNACCEPTABLE "PET"IDEAS WOULD STILL BE
THERE. FURTHERMORE IT COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN TIME TO
BE HELPFULIF, INDEED, IT WOLD BE HELPFUL AT ALL.
BARRY
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 02902
---CORRECTED COPY FOR E.O. LINE
ORIGINALLY PROCESSED AS 0568567.
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BARRY RETURNS TO STOCKHOLM AND
- RESUMES CHARGE
1. CDE X-04.
2. AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF U.S. DELEGATION
RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM 04/14/86, 9:00 P.M. AND RESUMED
CHARGE.
3. SESSION X OF THE CONFERENCE CONVENED APRIL 15 AND
WILL ADJOURN MAY 23, 1986.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 02983
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, APRIL 15, 1986
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 2902, B) STOCKHOLM 2936
1. CDE X - 007
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE APRIL 15 PLENARY, IN ADDITION
TO. EXCHANGES ON LIBYA (REFTELS), DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER
VAN DEN BROEK SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12, AND POLISH
FOREIGN MINISTER MARIAN ORZECHOWSKI OUTLINED THREE
CONDITIONS FOR CDE TO SUCCEED. END SUMMARY.
4. DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK MADE THE
FOLLOWING REMARKS ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12:
-- CDE MUST TAKE A "SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD" FROM THE
MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT (HFA). A "SO-CALLED
MINI-PACKAGE" IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH,
-- CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY CONCERNS TRANSCEND THE
MILITARY FIELD. BALANCE MUST BE STRUCK BETWEEN ALL
PRINCIPLES OF THE HFA. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE VIENNA
FOLLOW-UP MEETING MUST STRIVE FOR PROGRESS IN AREAS
"WHERE LITTLE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED;" JUSTICE MUST BE
DONE CONSIDERING RESULTS OF OTTAWA AND BERN. IT IS
IMPORTANT TO ACHIEVE RESULTS IN THE HUMAN CONTACTS
MEETING IN BERN.
THE MANDATE PROVIDES THE ONLY BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION,
ENSURING THAT RESULTS WILL BE CONCRETE, SUBSTANTIAL, WITH
ADEQUATE SCOPE.
-- CONVERGENCE IS STILL NEEDED ON ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
AN AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, INFORMATION MUST NOT BE
LIMITED TO INFORMATION ON NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.
-- WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED: EC-12 WELCOMES
GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL TO DEFER QUESTION OF
INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES. STOCKHOLM CANNOT, HOWEVER,
CHANGE THE CDE MANDATE (REFERRING TO ZONE, ADJOINING SEA
AREA AND AIR SPACE) NOR DECIDE ON THE AGENDA FOR SUBSE-
QUENT STAGES OF THE CONFERENCE.
-- DETAILED INFORMATION IS NECESSARY IN AN EXCHANGE OF
ANNUAL CALENDARS.
-- "ON-SITE INSPECTION" MUST BE PART OF A VERIFICATION
REGIME. GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL ENCOURAGES POSSIBILITY OF
ON-SITE INSPECTION AS PART OF A CDE AGREEMENT.
NUF: EC-12 IS PREPARED TO RENEW A COMMITMENT TO NUF
IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. CSBM'S
GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE AND ARE THUS
MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE REAFFIRMATION ITSELF.
(VAN DEN BROEK'S COMMENTS ON LIBYA ARE COVERED IN REF A.)
5. AFTER CRITICISM OF U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING AND OTHER
ASPECTS OF U.S. POLICY, POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MARIAN
ORZECHOWSKI ENDORSED WARSAW PACT CALL FOR NUCLEAR
WEAPONS-FREE ZONES IN THE BALKANS, NORDIC, AND CENTRAL
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EUROPEAN CORRIDOR. HE CHARACTERIZED GORBACHEV'S
JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL AS A "REAL, TANGIBLE PROGRAM" TO
IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND TO RESTRAIN THE ARMS
RACE. THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER INDIRECTLY CRITICIZED
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS POLAND IN THE COURSE OF WARNING OF
THE DANGERS IN ADDRESSING THE BALANCE OF THE HFA
PRINCIPLES; THE WEST'S CONCEPT OF THIS BALANCE COULD
"PARALYZE THE (HFA) PROCESS." TURNING SPECIFICALLY TO
CDE, ORZECHOWSKI OUTLINED THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS:
-- THREE CONDITIONS MUST BE MET FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO
SUCCEED: 1) PARTICIPANTS MUST REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONFERENCE OBJECTIVES; 2) PARTICI-
PANTS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF
ALL; AND 3) "PROGRESSIVE RAPPROCHEMENT" MUST BE ACHIEVED
THROUGH MUTUAL COMPROMISE. THE WEST HAS NOT RESPECTED
THESE CONDITIONS, EVIDENCED BY ITS LACK OF "NEW
PROPOSALS" IN THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE.
-- AGREEMENT IN SUBSTANCE SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE
JULY 18, SO THAT THE LAST SESSION (AUGUST 19 -
SEPTEMBER 19) COULD BE USED FOR "TECHNICAL WORK."
-- A CDE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE THE WHOLE OF EUROPE
FROM ATLANTIC TO URALS; BE MANDATORY FOR ALL MEASURES
ADOPTED; INCLUDE "NEW MEASURES," I.E., LIMITATIONS; AND
INCLUDE REDUCTION IN THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD FOR
MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
-- THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY.
THE CONFERENCE SHOULD RESUME ITS WORK AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE AFTER THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING.
(ORZECHOWSKI'S COMMENTS ON LIBYA ARE COVERED IN REF B.)
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 02904
SUBJECT: DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S CRITICISM OF U.S.
- ACTIONS IN LIBYA
1. CDE X - 002
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER ADDED TO HIS
PREPARED STATEMENT ON THE CDE ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12 A
CRITICISM OF U.S. ACTIONS IN LIBYA "IN HIS NATIONAL
CAPACITY." AMBASSADOR BARRY RESPONDED TO THIS, AS WELL
AS OTHER STATEMENTS CRITICIZING U.S. ACTIONS IN LIBYA.
(SEE SEPTEL FOR FULL ACCOUNT.) END SUMMARY.
4. AFTER AN UNEXCEPTIONABLE STATEMENT ON THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE DELIVERED ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK ADDED SOME REMARKS
IN HIS "NATIONAL CAPACITY" ON THE EVENTS IN LIBYA.
IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE PLENARY SESSION, DUTCH
AMBASSADOR BUWALDA SHOWED AMBASSADOR BARRY A COPY OF
THESE REMARKS WHICH, INTER ALIA, "DEPLORED" U.S. MILITARY
ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA. BARRY TOLD BUWALDA THAT HE
REGRETTED THAT THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER FELT COMPELLED
TO RAISE THIS ISSUE AND THAT HE (BARRY) WOULD HAVE TO
RESPOND. AFTER THIS BRIEF DISCUSSION, THE TEXT OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT WAS SLIGHTLY MODIFIED TO
CRITICIZE LIBYAN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM FIRST, AND THEN TO
DEPLORE U.S. ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST LIBYA (IN THE TEXT
WE WERE SHOWN THE ORDER WAS REVERSED). THE RELEVANT
PORTION OF VAN DEN BROEK'S STATEMENT AND BARRY'S
RESPONSE FOLLOWS.
5. BEGIN RELEVANT PORTION DUTCH STATEMENT:
"I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO MAKE SOME REMARKS IN MY NATIONAL
CAPACITY ON THE SUBJECT WHICH IS VERY MUCH ON OUR MINDS
TODAY.
"YESTERDAY THE 12 MET IN THE HAGUE TO DISCUSS THE
PROBLEMS OF TERRORISM AND THE RESULTING INCREASE OF
TENSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. ON THAT OCCASION, WE HAVE
AGREED ON CONCRETE MEASURES REGARDING STATES CLEARLY
IMPLICATED IN SUPPORTING TERRORISM, SUCH AS LIBYA. WE
ALSO UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT ON ALL SIDES,
AVOIDING FURTHER ESCALATION OF MILITARY TENSION IN THE
REGION IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A POLITICAL
SOLUTION.-
"I REGRET TO SAY THAT MY GOVERNMENT DEPLORES THE MILITARY
ACTION WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS FELT OBLIGATED TO
RESORT TO THIS MORNING.
"WE FERVENTLY HOPE THAT FURTHER MILITARY ACTION CAN BE
AVOIDED AND CALL UPON ALL PARTIES TO SHOW THE UTMOST
RESTRAINT.
"THIS WILL EVIDENTLY REQUIRE ERADICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
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TERRORISM WHICH HAS LED TO THE EVENTS OF LAST NIGHT. ON
THAT IMMEDIATE GOAL WE FEEL THAT ALL OF US SHOULD BE ABLE
TO AGREE AND SHOULD JOIN OUR EFFORTS."
END TEXT.
6. BEGIN RELEVANT PORTION U.S. STATEMENT:
"SOME OF THE CRITICISM WE HAVE HEARD TODAY HAS NO DOUBT
BEEN WELL MEANING; OTHERS HAVE SPOKEN IN HYPOCRITICAL
AND, I WOULD SAY, HOSTILE TERMS.
"WE WELCOME THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
YESTERDAY, BUT CANNOT HELP WONDERING WHETHER EARLIER AND
MORE FORCEFUL ACTIONS INVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
STEPS MIGHT HAVE HAD A GREATER EFFECT IN PERSUADING COL.
KHADHAFI TO DESIST FROM THE PLANS HE WAS MAKING AGAINST
NOT ONLY U.S. INTERESTS BUT AGAINST ALL THE COUNTRIES OF
THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL."
END TEXT.
7. AFTER THE PLENARY SESSION, A NUMBER OF EC-12
AMBASSADORS (FRG, FRANCE, ITALY, UK) TOLD AMBASSADOR
BARRY THAT THEY THOUGHT VAN DEN BROEK'S COMMENTS
"UNNECESSARY."
8. WHILE THE PLENARY WAS STILL IN SESSION, VAN DEN BROEK
GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS AND
EMPHASIZING THAT HE SPOKE ONLY AS THE DUTCH FOREIGN
MINISTER, HE REPEATED THAT THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT "DEPLORES
THIS ACTION" BY THE U.S. REFERRING AT LENGTH TO THE EC
STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY, VAN DEN BROKE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT
FEELS VERY STRONGLY ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. HE
REGRETTED THAT "THE U.S. WAS FORCED TO TAKE THIS ACTION
WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE NOT TAKE PLACE." HOWEVER MUCH THE
DUTCH GOVERNMENT "DEPLORES" THIS INCIDENT, IT WILL NOT
ALLOW IT TO DETRACT FROM DUTCH EFFORTS TO COMBAT
TERRORISM.
9. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS AFTER THE PLENARY, AMBASSADOR
BARRY OUTLINED THE MAIN POINTS OF HIS STATEMENT DURING
THE SESSION (REPORTED SEPTEL).
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 02936
SUBJECT: CDE OPENING PLENARY/CRITICISM OF U.S. ON LIBYA
REF: CDE 002
1. CDE X - 005
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT APRIL 15 CDE PLENARY, U.S.
MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA WAS CONDEMNED BY THE
NETHERLANDS (SEPTEL), SOVIET UNION, POLAND, GDR,
BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, AND MALTA. AMBASSADOR
BARRY DEFENDED U.S. RIGHT TO RETALIATE AGAINST LIBYAN
TERRORISM. HE WAS SUPPORTED BY THE UK AND FRG. END
SUMMARY.
4. POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MARIAN ORZECHOWSKI LED WARSAW
PACT ATTACK ON APRIL 14-15 U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST
LIBYA. ALLEGING THAT THE U.S. IS PURSUING A POLICY OF
MILITARY CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, HE "UNRESERVEDLY
CONDEMNED" U.S. "ACT OF STATE TERRORISM." HE CHARAC-
TERIZED IT AS "A FLAGRANT EXAMPLE OF A VIOLATION OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT."
5. BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR TODOROV CONDEMNED U.S. ACTIONS
AS A VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE
(NUF), ACHIEVED BY THE "LARGE-SCALE MANIFESTATION OF SEA
POWER." HE ADDED THAT IT IS AN ACT OF "VANDALISM"
REMINISCENT OF THE MIDDLE AGES; THE U.S., "QUITE LIGHT-
HEARTEDLY, IS USING MILITARY FORCE TO IMPRESS ITS WILL
ON OTHERS," THROUGH THE ATTACK ON "LIBYAN CITIES AND THE
PEACEFUL POPULATION." THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO
ALLEGED THAT THE U.S. ACTION WAS A "DELIBERATE VIOLATION"
OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND
VIOLATED LIBYAN SECURITY. FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR BARRY'S
REMARKS, WHICH INCLUDED REFERENCES TO BULGARIAN SUPPORT
FOR TERRORISM AND TO BULGARIA'S MISTREATMENT OF ITS
TURKISH MINORITY, TODOROV COMMENTED THAT BARRY HAD BEEN
HOSTILE TO BULGARIA THROUGHOUT HIS TOUR OF DUTY THERE.
HE SAID BARRY HAD FANNED ALLEGATIONS OF BULGARIAN
INVOLVEMENT IN PAPAL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, WHICH ROMAN
COURT HAD FOUND UNTRUE, AND PRESSED FALSE CLAIMS OF GOB
INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM AND DRUG SMUGGLING.
6. AMBASSADORS REZNIK (CSSR), BUHRING (GDR), AND SZIGETI
(HUNGARY) ALSO "UNRESERVEDLY CONDEMNED" U.S. MILITARY
ACTION. REZNIK CALLED IT AN "AGGRESSIVE POLICY," A
DELIBERATE BREACH OF UN PRINCIPLELS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW. BURRING, REFERRING TO THE WEST BERLIN TERRORIST
ATTACK, NOTED GDR REJECTION OF TERRORISM. HOWEVER, HE
CRITICIZED WEST BERLIN'S "DEFICIENCIES" IN COMBATING
TERRORISM. SZIGETI CONVEYED HUNGARY'S CONCERN FOR THE
"GRAVE SITUATION" ALLEGEDLY RISING FROM THE U.S. ACTION.
HE URGED U.S. "SELF-RESTRAINT" AND CALLED ON THE U.S. TO
IMMEDIATELY HALT MILITARY ACTIONS AND TO TAKE STEPS TO
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AVOID FURTHER CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
7. AFTER OTHER WARSAW PACT STATEMENTS AND FOLLOWING
AMBASSADOR BARRY'S REMARKS, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY
CONDEMNED THE U.S. ACTION:
-- IT WAS AN "UNJUSTIFIED ACT OF AGGRESSION," WHICH
RESULTED IN "BOMBARDMENT OF CIVILIAN AREAS" AND (TENS OF)
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.
-- U.S. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ACT IS "WEAK INDEED." IT
IS AN ATTEMPT TO LABEL AN "AGGRESSIVE ACT" AS CONCERN FOR
SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. INTERESTS. U.S. JUSTIFICA-
TION IS BASED ON "GROUNDLESS ACCUSATIONS" -- "LIES" --
OF LIBYAN TERRORISM. LIBYA HAS REPEATEDLY REJECTED THESE
ASSERTIONS.
-- U.S. ACTION IS INDICATIVE OF A TREND IN U.S. BEHAVIOR
WHICH THREATENS PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. U.S.-
LIBYAN ACTION IS AN EXAMPLE OF "U.S. INTERFERENCE," A
TREND SUPPORTED BY OTHER U.S. ACTIONS, E.G., PRESENCE OF
AN AMERICAN SQUADRON ON THE CRIMEAN SHORE, AND RECENT
U.S. NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. U.S. ACTION AGAINST LIBYA IS
"STRONGLY INTERLINKED" WITH CDE ISSUES, SUCH AS THE NON-
USE OF FORCE. ALSO "MILITARY AGGRESSION" DISRUPTS THE
ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE. THE U.S. ACTION IS AGAINST
"PROGRESS" IN ENHANCING PEACE AND SECURITY.
8. MALTESE AMBASSADOR GAUCI "DEPLORED THE RECENT TURN
OF EVENTS." HE CITED THE "EXTENSIVE DAMAGE AND HEAVY
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES" OF THE U.S. MILITARY ACTION. HE
ALLEGED THAT THE U.S. ACTION VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE HFA, "PARTICULARLY PRINCIPLES 2 AND 5" -- NUF AND
PSD (PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES). GAUCI STRESSED
THAT THE GOM HAD URGED THE U.S. TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS
WITH LIBYA; HE NOTED GOM "READINESS TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY
POSSIBLE TO OPEN THE WAY FOR A JUST, LASTING RESOLUTION."
FINALLY, HE WARNED THAT THE U.S. ACTION DEMONSTRATED THE
NECESSITY OF EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY TO
PROCEED "HAND-IN-HAND" VIS-A-VIS ADOPTION OF CSBM'S. IN
THIS CONTEXT, THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR INSISTED THAT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BE INCLUDED IN ANY CDE
AGREEMENT.
9. AMBASSADOR BARRY'S REPLY MADE FOLLOWING POINTS (FULL
TEXT SEPTEL):
-- HE CRITICIZED THE TONE OF "MORAL EQUIVALENCY"
EQUATING LIBYA'S ILLEGAL ACTS WITH THE U.S. RESPONSE TO
THOSE ACTS. LIBYA "HAS BEEN CONDUCTING A POLICY OF
UNBRIDLED TERRORISM, NOT ONLY IN THE PAST WEEKS, BUT THE
PAST SEVERAL YEARS." IN THIS CONTEXT HE QUESTIONED A
CONCEPT OF PEACE AND SECURITY WHICH FAILS TO TAKE LIBYAN
TERRORISM INTO ACCOUNT.
-- U.S. EVIDENCE CLEARLY LINKS LIBYA TO THE BOMBING IN
WEST BERLIN. QADHAFI SENT ORDERS TO THE SO-CALLED LIBYAN
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PEOPLE'S BUREAUS, INCLUDING THE OFFICE IN EAST BERLIN, TO
ATTACK U.S. CITIZENS AND FACILITIES. LIBYANS WITH
TERRORIST RECORDS WERE SEEN AND IDENTIFIED IN WEST BERLIN
BY U.S. AND WEST BERLIN SECURITY PERSONNEL. THE PEOPLE'S
BUREAU INFORMED TRIPOLI OF THE APRIL 15 ATTACK, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED TRIPOLI THAT THE ATTACK WAS
SUCCESSFUL AND COULD NOT BE TRACED.
-- THE SAME PATTERN OF LIBYAN TERRORISM HAS BEEN
IDENTIFIED ELSEWHERE. VARIOUS ACTIVITIES ARE/WERE BEING
PLANNED AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS. THESE PLANS
INCLUDED ATTACKS ON U.S. CITIZENS IN LATIN AMERICA,
AFRICA, EUROPE AND THE MIDEAST. IN TEN AFRICAN
COUNTRIES, LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAUS HAVE PLANNED ATTACKS
AND MOUNTED SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICANS. LIBYANS ARRIVED
IN ONE COUNTRY TO PLAN A BOMBING AND KIDNAPPING OF THE
U.S. AMBASSADOR. LIBYAN "DIPLOMATS" ARE CARRYING OUT
SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AND THEIR FAMILIES IN
LATIN AMERICA. LIBYAN AGENTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO
STRIKE AGAINST AMERICAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.
-- QADHAFI'S OWN COMMENTS ARE "PLAIN EVIDENCE" OF WHAT
HE IS DOING. QADHAFI'S OWN WORDS POSE A THREAT TO PEACE
AND SECURITY.
-- CRITICISM BY SOME OF THE U.S. ACTION IS HYPOCRITICAL
AND HOSTILE. ALTHOUGH MILITARY FORCE MUST BE A LAST
RESORT, IT IS PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE UNDER THE UN CHARTER
ONCE OTHER STEPS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. THE U.S. EXERCISED
ITS RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE BECAUSE OF THE "TERRORIST
POLICY OF THE QADHAFI REGIME." THUS ALLEGATIONS THAT THE
U.S. HAS VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN AND HFA ARE A
"GROSS MISINTERPRETATION" OF THE U.S. ACTION.
-- THE U.S. WELCOMES THE EC-12 DECISION YESTERDAY ON
TERRORISM BUT EARLIER, MORE FORCEFUL ACTIONS MIGHT HAVE
HAD A GREATER EFFECT IN DISSUADING QADHAFI FROM THESE
PLANS. THESE PLANS THREATEN U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN
COUNTRIES ALIKE. IT IS HYPOCRITICAL TO CONDEMN U.S.
ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM IF A COUNTRY IS OPPOSED
TO TERRORISM.
-- IN RESPONSE TO THE BULGARIAN CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
U.S. ACTION AS A RETURN TO THE MIDDLE AGES, BARRY
CRITICIZED BULGARIA'S SUPPORT OF "NOTORIOUS TERRORIST
GROUPS SUCH AS ABU NIDAL." U.S. DEMARCHES HAD NO VISIBLE
EFFECT ON THIS POLICY. A RETURN TO THE MIDDLE AGES MIGHT
ALSO APPLY TO GOB ACTIONS AGAINST THE ETHNIC TURKISH
MINORITY IN BULGARIA.
10. IN SHORT STATEMENTS, AMBASSADORS EDES (UK) AND
CITRON (FRG) LENT SUPPORT TO THE U.S. EDES POINTED OUT
THAT THE U.S. HAD "INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE" DIRECTLY
LINKING LIBYA WITH THE TERRORIST ATTACKS, OF WHICH THE
WEST BERLIN BOMBING IS ONLY THE MOST RECENT EXAMPLE.
THERE IS "EQUALLY INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE" OF WIDE-
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RANGING LIBYAN PLANS FOR FURTHER ATTACKS. THE BRITISH
AMBASSADOR ALSO STRESSED THAT THE U.S. HAS THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS IN A STATE WHOSE
AUTHORITIES ARE INSTIGATING AND ENCOURAGING TERRORISM.
FRG AMBASSADOR CITRON NOTED HIS SURPRISE AT THE NUMBER
OF HYPOCRITICAL STATEMENTS. HE STRESSED THAT THERE "ARE
REASONS" FOR THE U.S. ACTION, I.E., THE "MURDEROUS"
BERLIN BOMBING.
BARRY
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 02937
SUBJ: AMB. BARRY'S REMARKS AT CDE OPENING PLENARY
1. CDEI-03
2. MOST OF THE OPENING PLENARY OF CDE ROUND I TODAY
(04/15/86) WAS TAKEN UP WITH STATEMENTS (REPORTED
SEPTELS) ABOUT THE LIBYAN SITUATION, MOST OF THEM
CRITICAL OF THE U.S. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF
EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY,
HEAD, USDEL CDE, MADE IN RESPONSE:
BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN: I WAS GOING TO SAY HOW MUCH
I ENJOYED BEING BACK IN STOCKHOLM, BUT I'M NOT REALLY
SURE THAT'S THE CASE AFTER HEARING SOME OF THE COMMENTS
THAT I HEARD TODAY. ON THE LAST OCCASION WHEN WE
OPENED THE SESSION HERE IN STOCKHOLM AND COMMENTS WERE
MADE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND IN
PARTICULAR ABOUT THE SITUATION WITH LIBYA, I EXPRESSED
DEEP DOUBTS ABOUT THE TONE OF MORAL EQUIVALENCY WHICH
HAD CREPT INTO THE DISCUSSION. BY MORAL EQUIVALENCY, I
MEAN EQUATING AN ILLEGAL ACT WITH THE RESPONSE TO IT.
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT TODAY WE HAVE GONE BEYOND MORAL
EQUIVALENCY AND STOOD THE ENTIRE PRINCIPLE ON ITS
HEAD. I WONDER, AS I LISTEN TO SOME OF THE COMMENTS
MADE TODAY, EXACTLY WHAT CONCEPT OF PEACE AND SECURITY
SOME PARTICIPATING STATES WHO HAVE SPOKEN TODAY MIGHT
HAVE. I DON'T THINK ANYBODY IN THIS HALL TODAY
SERIOUSLY DOUBTS THAT LIBYA HAS BEEN CONDUCTING A
POLICY OF UNBRIDLED TERRORISM, NOT ONLY IN THE PAST
WEEKS BUT OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. BUT I DIDN'T
HEAR ANYBODY TODAY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FIRST
SPEAKER, WHO EVEN MENTIONED THIS FACT.
WHAT EVIDENCE DO WE HAVE LINKING LIBYA WITH THE BOMBING
IN BERLIN THAT CAUSED US TO TAKE THE STEPS WE DID? WE
LEARNED IN LATE MARCH THAT COL. QADHAFI HAD SENT ORDERS
TO A NUMBER OF SO-CALLED PEOPLE'S BUREAUS INCLUDING
THAT IN EAST BERLIN TO ATTACK U.S. CITIZENS AND
FACILITIES. SUBSEQUENTLY, MEMBERS OF THE LIBYAN
PEOPLE'S BUREAU WITH RECORDS OF PREVIOUS TERRORIST
ACTIVITY WERE SEEN AND IDENTIFIED IN WEST BERLIN BY
U.S. AND WEST BERLIN SECURITY PERSONNEL. ON THE
EVENING OF APRIL 4, BERLIN TIME, WE LEARNED THAT THE
LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN EAST BERLIN INFORMED TRIPOLI
THAT AN ATTACK WOULD TAKE PLACE ON APRIL 5.
SUBSEQUENTLY, THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN EAST BERLIN
TOLD TRIPOLI THAT THE "OPERATION" HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL
AND THAT IT COULD NOT BE TRACED.
THE SAME PATTERN OF LIBYAN PLANNING TO ATTACK AMERICANS
AND OTHERS HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED ELSEWHERE, BUT FOR
VARIOUS REASONS THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER
"SUCCESSES." WE ALSO HAVE EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION
THAT FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF THIS KIND WERE AND ARE BEING
PLANNED TODAY. THESE ACTIVITIES ARE PLANNED AGAINST
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U.S. CITIZENS AND FACILITIES AND AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE,
THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA. IN AFRICA,
LIBYANS HAVE BEEN PLANNING ATTACKS AND CONDUCTING
SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. FACILITIES IN TEN COUNTRIES. LAST
WEEK, THREE LIBYAN AGENTS ARRIVED IN ONE AFRICAN STATE
TO SET UP THE BOMBING OF OUR EMBASSY CHANCERY AND THE
KIDNAPPING OF OUR AMBASSADOR. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE
LIBYANS HAVE PLANNED SEVERAL ATTACKS ON U.S. EMBASSIES
AND HAVE ENCOURAGED OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS THERE TO
CONDUCT SIMILAR ATTACKS. IN LATIN AMERICA, LIBYAN
DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AND
DEPENDENTS. LIBYA HAS DIRECTED ITS AGENTS TO STRIKE
AGAINST U.S. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, INCLUDING U.S.
INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIERS.
BUT, YOU DON'T HAVE TO GO TO THIS EVIDENCE TO BELIEVE
THAT COL. QADHAFI IS ENGAGED IN ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM. QADHAFI IS HIS OWN SMOKING GUN.
STATEMENTS WHICH HE MADE, INCLUDING REMARKS TO A
CONCLAVE OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS FROM ALL AROUND THE
WORLD, ARE PLAIN EVIDENCE OF WHAT HE IS DOING. AND IF
THIS IS NOT A THREAT TO SECURITY, I REALLY DON'T KNOW
WHAT 13.
SOME OF THE CRITICISM WE HAVE HEARD TODAY HAS BEEN NO
DOUBT WELL-MEANING. OTHERS HAVE SPOKEN IN HYPOCRITICAL
AND, I WOULD SAY, HOSTILE TERMS. I ASK YOU HONESTLY TO
THINK TO YOURSELVES ABOUT YOUR OWN OPPOSITION TO
TERRORISM AND HOW THAT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED. MILITARY
FORCE IS INDEED A LAST RESORT. IT IS PERFECTLY
LEGITIMATE UNDER THE UN CHARTER, BUT OTHER STEPS SHOULD
BE EXHAUSTED FIRST. LET ME ASK YOU TO THINK FOR
YOURSELVES OF YOUR STEPS TO DISCOURAGE THIS EXPRESSION
OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
I WAS INTERESTED IN THE COMMENTS OF MY FRIEND, THE
AMBASSADOR OF BULGARIA. I RECALL THE MANY APPROACHES
I MADE TO HIS GOVERNMENT WHEN I WAS ACCREDITED TO HIS
COUNTRY. BULGARIA SUPPORTED AND ASSISTED NOTORIOUS
TERRORIST GROUPS, SUCH AS THE ABU NIDAL GROUP, WHICH
TAKES TERRORIST ACTIONS NOT ONLY AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES BUT AGAINST THE PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION ITSELF. THE DEMARCHES HAD NO VISIBLE
EFFECT. AND WHEN BULGARIA SPOKE ABOUT THE UNITED
STATES CARRYING OUT POLICIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES, I
COULD NOT HELP THINKING OF THE POLICIES WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA IS CARRYING OUT AGAINST ITS
TURKISH MINORITY.
WHEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WARSAW PACT CONDEMN US
FOR LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM, I CANNOT
HELP THINKING ABOUT THEIR VOCAL EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT
FOR QADHAFI AND THE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF THAT
SUPPORT, SUCH AS THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY ADVISERS AND
SOPHISTICATED LONG-RANGE SA-5 MISSILES DESIGNED TO
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PROTECT A CLAIM WHICH THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT
THEMSELVES RECOGNIZE TO BE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW. SUCH STEPS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE
TERRORIST POLICIES OF THE QADHAFI REGIME.
MY GOVERNMENT CERTAINLY WELCOMES THE DECISIONS OF THE
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY YESTERDAY,
BUT WE CANNOT HELP WONDERING WHETHER EARLIER AND MORE
FORCEFUL ACTIONS INVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STEPS
MIGHT NOT HAVE HAD A GREATER EFFECT IN DISSUADING COL.
QADHAFI FROM THE PLANS THAT HE WAS MAKING TO THREATEN
NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES BUT ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE
MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL.
TO THOSE WHO SAY THAT WE HAVE VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES
OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, I THINK THIS IS A PERVERSE
MISINTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE FINAL ACT SAYS. AND
CERTAINLY IF YOU BELIEVE THAT DECISIONS MADE BY THIS
CONFERENCE WILL RESTRAIN A PARTICIPANT'S RIGHT TO SELF
DEFENSE, THEN I THINK WE ARE HEADED FOR DIFFICULT
SAILING AHEAD.
I HAD HOPED TO START THIS CONFERENCE ON A MORE
OPTIMISTIC NOTE. I HAD HOPED TO COME BACK TO A MORE
CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT, AND IN FACT I WANTED TO SUPPORT
SOMETHING THAT I SAW IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE WARSAW
PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING WHERE IT SPOKE OF THE
NEED TO ACCELERATE THE WORK OF THIS CONFERENCE. MY
GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT THIS IS AN ESSENTIAL TASK BEFORE
US. THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY IS ISSUING A STATEMENT ON
BEHALF OF PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH EMPHASIZES THAT THIS
WILL BE THE MOST CRITICAL SESSION TO DATE. WE BELIEVE
THAT IF SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IS MADE THERE WILL BE A
GOOD CHANCE OF ACHIEVING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH
WILL INCREASE OPENNESS AND MAKE THE MILITARY SITUATION
IN EUROPE MORE STABLE AND PREDICTABLE.
I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT "TO WORK WITH
OUR ALLIES, THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES AND THE
EAST TO FIND SOLUTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE CONFERENCE
MANDATE AND OUR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS." WE BELIEVE
THAT PROGRESS AT THIS POINT CAN ONLY BE REACHED THROUGH
THE DRAFTING PROCESS. AND WE ARE EAGER TO CONCENTRATE
ON A FEW KEY AREAS WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO SPEED UP THE
PROCESS. WE HOPE THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED EARLY
IN THIS ROUND ON THESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES. THESE THRESHOLDS MUST BE'VERIFIABLE
AND MUST RESULT IN EQUITABLE TREATMENT FOR ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CAN BE
ACHIEVED THROUGH STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL PARAMETERS AT
LEVELS SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THE 25,000 TROOP LEVEL OF
THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
WE CONTINUE TO GIVE IMPORTANCE TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
AS THE ONLY ADEQUATE MECHANISM FOR VERIFICATION OF
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDNG MEASURES WHICH WOULD
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BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE UNTIED STATES AND THE OTHER
CO-SPONSORS OF SC.1 ARE PREPARED TO DRAFT INTENSIVELY
NOW IN ALL SUBSTANTIVE AREAS WHERE CONSENSUS IS
POSSIBLE. I THINK IT WOULD BE FRUITLESS TO ENGAGE IN
ACCUSATIONS OF FOOTDRAGGING. I THINK IT IS EVIDENT TO
ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THIS CONFERENCE WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN
IN THE WORKING GROUPS TO SPEED THE DRAFTING PROCESS.
AS THE CONFERENCE RESUMES, WE WILL BE SEEKING THROUGH
THAT PROCESS TO IDENTIFY NEW AREAS OF CONSENSUS. WE
ARE DETERMINED THAT THIS CONFERENCE WILL NOT FAIL
THROUGH ANY LACK OF FLEXIBILITY, EFFORT OR COMMITMENT
ON OUR PART. WE ASK ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE
CONFERENCE TO JOIN US IN THIS COMMITMENT. IN THAT WAY,
I BELIEVE WE CAN SUCCEED IN OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ADOPT
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH CAN
MAKE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCING THE RISK OF
MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE.
THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT.
BARRY
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CONF I DENT I ALSTOCKHOLM03032
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT ON WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)
1. CDE X - 009
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE THE
FOLLOWING TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON APRIL 17.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE INVITED STATES MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY
AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS
PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE.
END TEXT.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03094
SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: SUGGESTED DEMARCHES
REF: STOCKHOLM 1910
1. CDE X - 013
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: TWO KEY POINTS BLOCK CONSENSUS ON A
WESTERN TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE: HOW TO REAFFIRM THE
NUF PRINCIPLE AND WHETHER TO INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS
LANGUAGE. PARAS 6 THROUGH 10 CONTAIN RECOMMENDED COURSE
OF ACTION AND SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NATO MINI-CLUSTER ON NON-USE OF FORCE IS
ATTEMPTING TO AGREE ON THE FINAL TWO ELEMENTS OF A
WESTERN NUF TEXT. (FYI: THE FIRST ELEMENT INTRODUCED
AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND DEALT WITH THE LINK BETWEEN
CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE; THE SECOND ELEMENT
CONTAINS THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF; AND THE THIRD ELEMENT
LISTS COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS.)
PORTIONS OF THE AGREED TEXT THEN WILL BE INTRODUCED AS
DEEMED TACTICALLY ADVISABLE, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
ALLIANCE STRATEGY OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM," I.E.,
CONTINGENT ON SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN OTHER WORKING
GROUPS. THUS, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE FIRST REACH
CONSENSUS ON THE WESTERN PAPER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN
ORDER TO ALLOW US TO CONTINUE OUR STRATEGY OF "FLEXIBLE
PARALLELISM." HOWEVER, AS ANTICIPATED IN REFTEL AND THE
MARCH MEMO ON NUF STRATEGY AND TACTICS, TWO KEY ISSUES
REMAIN UNRESOLVED: IN WHAT FORM TO REAFFIRM THE NUF
PRINCIPLE AND WHETHER TO INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE.
5. THE NUF PRINCIPLE: THE EC-12 CONTINUE TO INSIST ON
USING THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT PRINCIPLE 2 AS THE TAKEOFF
POINT FOR THE WESTERN POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE. THEY
ARGUE THAT BY QUOTING THE HFA PRINCIPLE IN TOTO, NATO,
THROUGH PREEMPTIVE INTRODUCTION OF "DEVELOPED" LANGUAGE
ON NUF, WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST AND SOME
OF THE NNA TO "DEVELOP" THE PRINCIPLE IN DIRECTIONS WHICH
ARE UNPALATABLE TO THE WEST. CONVERSELY, BY USING THE
MINIMALIST LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER, AS THE U.S. TEXT
DOES, WE ARE BEGGING OTHERS TO DEVELOP THE PRINCIPLE.
FINALLY, THEY ARGUE THAT WE CANNOT REJECT IN 1986 WHAT WE
ACCEPTED IN 1975, I.E., HFA LANGUAGE. THE U.S.POSITION
REFLECTS THE CONCISE, UNIVERSAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE
OF THE UN CHARTER. WE (TURKEY AND CANADA SUPPORT THE
U.S. POSITION) HAVE MADE SOME HEADWAY IN PERSUADING OUR
EC-12 ALLIES AT LEAST TO ACCEPT REFERENCE TO THE UN
CHARTER. HOWEVER, THEY STILL INSIST ON INCLUDING THE
VERBATIM TEXT OF HFA PRINCIPLE 2. (ON THE MARGINS OF THE
MEETINGS, THE FRENCH DELEGATION HAS TOLD US THEY SEE THE
LOGIC OF OUR POSITION AND WILL ASK PARIS IF IT COULD
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REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE 2 OF THE HFA, BUT NOT QUOTING IT
VERBATIM.) NEVERTHELESS, USDEL BELIEVES THAT DEMARCHES
WILL BE NEEDED IN EC-12 CAPITALS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE,
IN ORDER TO AGREE ON A FINAL WESTERN TEXT. IN THE NEAREST
FUTURE.
6. SUGGESTED DEMARCHE:
-- THE U.S. CONTINUES TO HAVE STRONG OBJECTIONS TO EC-12
INVOLVEMENT IN WHAT IS CLEARLY A SECURITY -- AND HENCE,
NATO -- ISSUE, I.E., CDE NEGOTIATIONS.
-- NEVERTHELESS, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING A COMMON
ALLIANCE POSITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WE HAVE
RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO USE THE "DUTCH" TEXT, I.E., EC-12
TEXT, AS A BASIS FOR ALLIED DISCUSSION IN FORMULATING A
NUF TEXT.
-- HOWEVER, ON THE CORE QUESTION OF HOW TO REAFFIRM THE
NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF, WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE U.S.
FORMULA BASED ON UN CHARTER LANGUAGE IS PREFERABLE.
-- UN CHARTER LANGUAGE IS UNIVERSAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS.
IT 13 FAR SUPERIOR TO HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE WHICH
CONTAINS COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS AND REFLECTS POTENTIALLY
DANGEROUS LANGUAGE, E.G., ON DIRECT AND INDIRECT USE OF
FORCE, MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, REPRISALS. (CLEARLY, IN
LIGHT OF THE EVENTS IN LIBYA, THIS LATTER POINT IS
PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE NOW; IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY
UNWISE -- AND UNNECESSARY -- TO BRING UP THIS QUESTION
GRATUITOUSLY IN A WESTERN DRAFT.)
7. EC-12 ARGUMENTS AND SUGGESTED RESPONSES:
-- ARGUMENT: THE NNA, INCLUDING SUCH NON-UN MEMBER
STATES AS SWITZERLAND, COULD NOT ACCEPT LANGUAGE BASED
ON THE UN CHARTER.
- SUGGESTED RESPONSE: THE NNA LANGUAGE IN SC.7 IS
VERY CLOSE TO THE U.S. TEXT AND IS BASED ON THE UN
CHARTER. THE NNA, INCLUDING THE SWISS, HAVE ACCEPTED
REFERENCES TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT.
-- ARGUMENT: BY QUOTING HFA PRINCIPLE II IN TOTO WE
PREVENT THE EAST AND SOME OF THE NNA FROM DEVELOPING THE
PRINCIPLE.
- SUGGESTED RESPONSE: THE EAST AND OTHERS WILL TRY TO
DEVELOP THE PRINCIPLE WHATEVER LANGUAGE WE INTRODUCE. UN
CHARTER LANGUAGE IS LESS PRONE TO DEVELOPMENT. IN ANY
CASE, WE CAN REFER TO PRINCIPLE II OF THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT IN OUR REAFFIRMATION.
-- ARGUMENT: WE CAN'T GO BACK NOW ON SOMETHING WE
AGREED TO IN 1975.
- SUGGESTED RESPONSE: NOBODY IS GOING BACK ON
ANYTHING. NATO SHOULD CHOOSE THE LANGUAGE THAT BEST
REFLECTS ITS VIEWS OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE, I.E., FROM
THE UN CHARTER. BESIDES THIS IS A NON-ISSUE, SINCE
NEITHER THE EAST NOR THE NNA HAVE CHOSEN TO USE THE HFA
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LANGUAGE AS THE BASIS FOR THEIR NUF REAFFIRMATIONS.
8. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EC-12 COULD ONLY AGREE TO VERY
TEPID LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BECAUSE OF STRONG ITALIAN
AND -- TO A LESSER DEGREE -- DANISH OBJECTIONS TO EVEN
INCLUDING A HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE IN A WESTERN NUF
SECTION. THE ITALIANS, WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI
REPORTEDLY PERSONALLY ENGAGED IN THE SUBJECT, ARGUE THAT
BY INTRODUCING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE CDE CONTEXT WE
PREJUDICE OUR ABILITY TO PREVENT THE EAST FROM BRINGING
UP INAPPROPRIATE SUBJECTS SUCH AS SOVIET DISARMAMENT
PROPOSALS IN OTHER CSCE FORA. ITALY'S EC-12 PARTNERS
HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET ROME TO AGREE EVEN TO LANGUAGE
SIMILAR TO THE NNA LANGUAGE OF SC.7. AMBASSADOR BARRY
HAS SCHEDULED CONSULTATIONS IN ROME ON APRIL 21; THE
RELATIONSHIP OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-USE OF FORCE IN
STOCKHOLM WILL BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.
9. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS:
-- HUMAN RIGHTS IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE WEST'S LARGER
CONCEPT OF SECURITY, WHICH INCLUDES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,
AND HUMANITARIAN, AS WELL AS PURELY MILITARY, MATTERS.
-- IN STOCKHOLM, WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN REDIRECTING
THE NUF AGENDA BY INTRODUCING THIS LARGER CONCEPT INTO
WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. REFERENCES TO HUMAN RIGHTS
WERE PART OF OUR MARCH 11 CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT INTRO-
DUCING THE WEST'S FIRST NUF ELEMENT.
-- ACCORDINGLY, THE EAST MAY BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS
ABOUT THE WISDOM OF A LENGTHY NUF TEXT. THIS IS IN OUR
INTEREST, SINCE WE WILL WANT CONCRETE CSBM'S TO REMAIN
THE OPERATIONAL AND OPTICAL HEART OF ANY STOCKHOLM
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
-- SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS A KEY TO BIPARTISAN
PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE CSCE PROCESS IN
GENERAL, AND THE CDE IN PARTICULAR. MUCH OF CONGRES-
SIONAL INTEREST IN THE CDE CENTERS ON HAVING THE LARGER
WESTERN CONCEPT OF SECURITY, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS,
REFLECTED IN STOCKHOLM DISCUSSIONS.
-- IN ANY CASE, THE NNA LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS MUCH
STRONGER THAN EC-12 LANGUAGE. THE NNA HAVE, IN EFFECT,
LEGITIMIZED THE INTRODUCTION OF NATO LANGUAGE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS. IT WOULD BE BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND TACTICALLY
UNWISE NOT TO PROPOSE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE THAT GOES
BEYOND THE NNA TEXT.
10. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS (TO THE ITALIAN ARGUMENT
THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BRING UP THEIR PET PEACE AND
DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS IN FUTURE BASKET 3 CSCE FORA IN
RESPONSE TO OUR INTRODUCTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CDE):
-- HUMAN RIGHTS DOES NOT ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS ON
CSBM'S, THE CORE OF THE MANDATE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE.
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-- HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCES WOULD ONLY BE INTRODUCED IN
NON-USE OF FORCE DISCUSSIONS. WE HAVE, IN FACT, ALREADY
INTRODUCED THIS CONCEPT IN DISCUSSIONS AND IT HAS BEEN
FURTHER LEGITIMIZED BY THE NNA DOCUMENT. THIS REFLECTS
THE GENERAL WESTERN APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE AND
SECURITY MATTERS.
-- REGARDLESS OF HOW WE HANDLE HUMAN RIGHTS HERE IN
STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIETS WILL PURSUE ONGOING ATTEMPTS TO
SUBVERT DISCUSSION IN OTHER CSCE FORA AS THEY SEE FIT.
-- NOT TO AGREE TO A HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF A NUF REAFFIRMATION WOULD COINCIDE WITH
MOSCOW'S CSCE GAME PLAN, I.E., SEPARATING AND ACTIVELY
PROMOTING THE SECURITY BASKET WHILE DOWNPLAYING THE HUMAN
RIGHTS/CONTACT BASKET.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03092
SUBJECT: TERRORISM AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE
REF: STOCKHOLM 1911
1. CDEX-014
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. TURKEY SUBMITTED THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH ON
TERRORISM TO THE NATO MINI-CLUSTER DISCUSSING A WESTERN
TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE. AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, USDEL
HAS ALREADY SUBMITTED TWO ALTERNATIVE AMENDMENTS ON
TERRORISM. THE TURKISH LANGUAGE IS BASED ON PORTIONS OF
THOSE TWO ALTERNATIVES.
BEGIN TEXT:
REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ON TERRORISM, THEY CONDEMN THE
VIOLENT ACTS OF TERRORISM WHICH REPRESENT THE USE OF
FORCE IN ITS MOST BRUTAL, PRIMITIVE AND DIRECT FASHION.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES REITERATE THEIR DETERMINATION
TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES, BOTH AT NATIONAL LEVEL AND
THROUGH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO PREVENT,
SUPPRESS AND ELIMINATE TERRORISM. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
COMBAT AGAINST ACTS OF TERRORISM, THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM
DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR
TO SUBVERSIVE OTHER ACTIVITIES AND THEY WILL TAKE ALL
APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION,
ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES,
INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS. TO THIS END, THEY EXPRESS
THEIR RESOLVE TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON
THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS
AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN
PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM. IN THIS CONTEXT,
THEY CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM
ACQUIESCING IN ACTIVITIES WITHIN THEIR TERRITORY
DIRECTED TOWARDS THE COMMISSION OF SUCH ACTS WHICH
INVOLVE A THREAT OF USE OF FORCE.
END TEXT.
HANSEN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03093
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, APRIL 14-18, 1986
1. CDEX-012
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBIVALENT SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN
STOCKHOLM MAY REFLECT A CERTAIN AMBIVALENCE IN MOSCOW.
ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIETS PROFESS TO WANT PROMPT
PROGRESS; ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CANCELLATION OF THE
VISIT OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY TO THE U.S. AND
CERTAIN EUROPEAN CAPITALS AND THE RETURN TO HARSH SOVIET
RHETORIC, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE RECENT EVENTS SUR-
ROUNDING LIBYA, BRING INTO QUESTION SOVIET SERIOUSNESS.
IF THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY,
THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO USE LIBYA AS A CONVENIENT PRETEXT
TO SHIFT THE BLAME FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE
CONFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES. THE EAST EUROPEANS, FOR
THEIR PART, DO NOT WANT A BREAKDOWN IN THE CONFERENCE.
WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES SHARE OUR GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT
TROUBLING SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND OUR GENERAL APPROACH TO
END GAME NEGOTIATIONS, I.E., NEGOTIATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL
PACKAGE OF CSBM'S, WHICH MUST INCLUDE INSPECTION, AND
REJECTION OF A MINI-PACKAGE. THE NNA SEEM EAGER FOR
PROGRESS BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE READY TO GIVE
UP ON THEIR PET ISSUES -- E.G., YUGOSLAVIA/CONSTRAINTS;
CYPRUS/NUF. IN THE WORKING GROUPS, SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING
PROGRESS HAS BEEN LIMITED AT BEST. END SUMMARY.
4. SOVIET BEHAVIOR: THE QUESTION WHICH HAS PREOCCUPIED
THE CONFERENCE SINCE THE TENTH SESSION OPENED IS: DO THE
SOVIETS REALLY WANT TO DO BUSINESS? THE SIGNALS ARE
MIXED. ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIETS PROFESS TO WANT
PROMPT PROGRESS. SOVIET LT-GENERAL MIKHAILOV TOLD
AMBASSADOR HANSEN AT A CONFERENCE IN SCOTLAND THAT THE
SOVIET CDE DELEGATION ENTERS THIS ROUND WITH NEW
INSTRUCTIONS. SOVIET DELEGATES IN THE OBSERVATION AND
VERIFICATION WORKING GROUPS HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY
FORTHCOMING -- OR AT LEAST PARTICIPATING CONSTRUCTIVELY
IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, GRINEVSKY'S
LAST-MINUTE, AND UNEXPLAINED, CANCELLATION OF HIS
WASHINGTON (AND PARIS, LONDON, BONN AND MADRID) VISIT IN
EARLY APRIL REFLECTED AT LEAST UNCERTAINTY IN MOSCOW
ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. ATTACKING THE U.S. FOR LIBYA WAS
TO BE EXPECTED AT THE OPENING PLENARY, BUT CONTINUED
ATTENTION TO THE ISSUE SUGGESTS A DESIRE TO EXPLOIT IT
FOR TACTICAL REASONS.
5. WHAT ARE THE RUSSIANS UP TO? AMBIVALENT SOVIET
BEHAVIOR IN STOCKHOLM MAY REFLECT A CERTAIN AMBIVALENCE
IN MOSCOW. ONE THEORY -- TO WHICH USDEL ATTACHES SOME
CREDENCE -- IS THAT THERE IS A SPLIT BETWEEN THE
POLITICAL (FOREIGN MINISTRY AND KGB) AND MILITARY
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(GENERAL STAFF) ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION WHICH MAY
REFLECT A SIMILAR DIVISION IN MOSCOW. SIGNS WERE THAT
AT THE OPENING OF THIS ROUND THE POLITICAL SIDE HAD THE
UPPER HAND. IN FACT, THE RECENT GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL
ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSAL IMPLIES THAT THEY ARE SEEKING
SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM. EVENTS SURROUNDING LIBYA, HOWEVER,
MAY HAVE CAUSED A SHIFT IN THE BALANCE TOWARD THE
MILITARY "HARD-LINERS." IN MOSCOW THIS WAS MANIFESTED BY
THE CANCELLATION OF THE SHULTZ-SCHEVARDNADZE MEETING. IN
STOCXHOLM, A RETURN TO HARSH SOVIET RHETORIC AFTER TWO
DAYS OF CALM MAY REFLECT NEW MARCHING ORDERS. IF THE
SOVIETS ARE NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY THEY WILL
ATTEMPT TO USE LIBYA AS A CONVENIENT PRETEXT TO SHIFT THE
BLAME FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE,CONFERENCE TO THE
UNITED STATES.
6. THE EUROPEANS: WHILE SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE AS OPAQUE
AS EVER, EAST EUROPEAN MOTIVES ARE CRYSTAL CLEAR. THEY
DO NOT WANT A BREAKDOWN IN THE CONFERENCE. AND THEY
SIGNAL THIS ALMOST FRANCTICALLY. WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES
SHARE OUR GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT TROUBLING SOVIET BEHAVIOR
AND OUR GENERAL APPROACH TO END GAME NEGOTIATIONS, I.E.,
NEGOTIATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL PACKAGE OF CSBM'S WHICH MUST
INCLUDE INSPECTION AND REJECTION OF A MINI-PACKAGE.
THERE HAS BEEN, MOREOVER, SOME PROGRESS AMONG THE KEY
CLOSE ALLIES ON COMING TO A COMMON POINT OF VIEW ON THE
THRESHOLDS ISSUE. THE NNA SEEM EAGER FOR PROGRESS BUT
THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE READY TO GIVE UP ON THEIR PET
ISSUES -- E.G., YUGOSLAVIA/CONSTRAINTS; CYPRUS/NUF.
7. NOTIFICATION: THE FIRST NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING (FRIDAY) HAD MIXED RESULTS. THE SOVIETS INSISTED
THAT AGREEMENT ON ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED MUST PRECEDE
WORD ON GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS. WHILE THEY WERE SILENT
ON THE NEED TO "AGREE TO DEFER" THE NAVAL ISSUE, THEY
ARGUED THAT TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED WERE
GROUND, AIR, AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES,
THEY NOTED, WOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES.
8. NON-USE OF FORCE: CONSENSUS IS NEAR ON COMMON NATO
LANGUAGE ON MOST ISSUES; HOWEVER, TWO KEY AND CONTENTIOUS
ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED: HOW TO REAFFIRM THE NUF
PRINCIPLE AND WHETHER TO INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE
(SEE SEPTEL FOR SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION).
IN THE WORKING GROUP, NO LANGUAGE WAS REGISTERED IN
CONFORMITY WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH OF "FLEXIBLE
PARALLELISM," I.E., THERE MUST BE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS
IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY
COMPARABLE PROGRESS ON NUF. THE FRENCH STATE FLATLY
THAT THEY WILL NOT EVEN CONSIDER ANY DRAFT LANGUAGE TO
REGISTER AMONG THE 16 UNTIL THERE IS MAJOR PROGRESS IN
THE OTHER WORKING GROUPS. THE SOVIETS THREATEN TO
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REVERSE THE LINKAGE AND TO REFUSE TO DRAFT ON CSBM'S
UNTIL THERE IS PROGRESS ON NUF. THE IMPASSE MAKES
WESTERN WETS HIGHLY NERVOUS.
9. VERIFICATION: WITH KGB GENERAL ROZANOV REPLACING
GENERAL TATARNIKOV, THE SOVIETS CAME BACK WITH SUBSTAN-
TIVE DRAFTING SUGGESTIONS ON VERIFICATION LANGUAGE WHICH
THE SWISS COORDINATOR (SCHENK) HAD SUBMITTED FOR
CONSIDERATION -- LANGUAGE DESIGNED TO ENSURE THE RIGHT
OF STATES TO CONDUCT A SPECIFIC KIND OF VERIFICATION, AS
YET UNAGREED, I.E., "ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS
DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE'S COMPLIANCE
WITH THE AGREED CSBM'S WILL BE ENTITLED TO . 11 THE
WEST, OF COURSE, WILL INSIST THAT "INSPECTION" BE
INSERTED WHERE THERE ARE NOW ELLIPSES. DISCUSSIONS ON
THIS POINT ARE PROCEEDING, WITH THE EAST TRYING TO ESTAB-
LISH THAT DOUBTS MUST BE WELL FOUNDED AND THAT EVEN THEN
THERE WOULD BE ALTERNATIVES TO INSPECTION/OBSERVATION ON
REQUEST (SUCH AS CONSULTATIONS). THE WEST IS RESISTING
STRONGLY.
INFORMATION: IN THE NATO CAUCUS THE FRENCH PROPOSED TO
DIVIDE INFORMATION SO THAT "DYNAMIC" INFORMATION (I.E.,
SC.1/AMPLIFIED, MEASURE 3, PARA F. SUBPARAS G, H, I)
WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE NOTIFICATION CLUSTER WHILE MORE
STATIC" INFORMATION (I.E., NATO'S MEASURE 1, BUT ALSO THE
REMAINDER OF PARA F OF MEASURE 3) WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN
THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION CLUSTER. ANOTHER
POSSIBILITY IS TO DISCUSS INFORMATION IN B-1 AND A
SUBORDINATE CONTACT GROUP. A THIRD IDEA IS TO CREATE A
NEW CONTACT GROUP, PROBABLY CHAIRED BY FINNISH AMBASSADOR
KAHILUOTO, TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE AND POSSIBLY
THE SUBSTANCE AS WELL. THE ANNUAL CALENDAR WOULD REMAIN
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF WORKING GROUP A-3, SO AS TO ENSURE
THAT THAT GROUP DOES NOT FOCUS SOLELY ON CONSTRAINTS.
10. OBSERVATION: THE OBSERVATION GROUP AGREED TO NOTE
IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK A SENTENCE PERMITTING THE
INVITED STATE TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WILL SEND MILITARY OR
CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. A CONTACT
GROUP WILL MEET SHORTLY TO CONSIDER WHAT TYPES OF OPTICAL
EQUIPMENT (E.G., BINOCULARS, CAMERAS) OBSERVERS WILL BE
ALLOWED TO USE. WE ANTICIPATE THAT DRAFTING PROGRESS
WILL CONTINUE IN THIS GROUP.
11. CONSTRAINTS: IN MARKED CONTRAST TO SOVIET WILLING-
NESS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS TO FOCUS ON AGENDA ITEMS,
THE SOVIETS OPENED THE CONSTRAINTS DISCUSSION IN THE
WORKING GROUP BY DELIVERING A PREPARED STATEMENT
CONDEMNING THE U.S. "ATTACK ON THE MEDITERRANEAN
SOVEREIGN COUNTRY OF LIBYA;" THE USSR ALSO SINGLED OUT
THE UK FOR SUPPORTING THE U.S. IN LIBYA. THE U.S.
CRITICIZED THE "INCREDIBLE HYPROCRISY" OF THE SOVIET
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UNION'S CHARGES IN THE LIGHT OF ITS INVASION AND
CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE UK ALSO
RESPONDED TO EASTERN CRITICISM. THE CHANGE IN SOVIET
BEHAVIOR AS THE WEEK PROGRESSED -- FROM RELATIVELY
BUSINESSLIKE IN THE NUF (TUESDAY) AND INFORMATION/
VERIFICATION (WEDNESDAY) WORKING GROUPS BEFORE MOSCOW'S
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANCELLATION OF THE SHULTZ-
SHEVARDNADZE MEETING TO STRIDENTLY POLEMICAL IN THE
THURSDAY MEETING ON CONSTRAINTS -- MAY BE THE RESULT OF
NEW INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW.
WE HAVE LEARNED THAT, MEANWHILE, THE NNA'S ARE SPLIT ON
HOW TO DEAL WITH CONSTRAINTS. WHEN SWEDEN TRIED THIS
WEEK TO DISTRIBUTE TO OTHER NNA'S A PAPER ON THE
CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS OF THE CALENDAR AS LAID OUT IN
SC.7, YUGOSLAVIA'S REACTION WAS SO VIOLENT THAT THE EVER
CAUTIOUS SWEDES BACKED DOWN. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE
EVIDENTLY DECIDED TO PRESS EVEN HARDER FOR CONSTRAINTS,
THOUGH OTHER NNA'S HAVE SAID THEY RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A
MOVE WILL NOT BE APPROVED.
12. ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE EAST'S OBSTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR
WAS ALSO EVIDENT WHEN IT FIRST REJECTED A UK SUGGESTION
THAT DISCUSSION OF FORECASTS BE POSTPONED UNTIL NEXT
WEEK (GIVEN THE LATE HOUR) AND THEN STUDIOUSLY IGNORED
WESTERN QUESTIONS.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 03091
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY OLEG A.GRINEVSKY, APRIL 21, 1986
1. CDEX-015
2. FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT MADE BY OLEG A.
GRINEVSKY, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE, HEAD OF THE USSR
DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY- BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,
IN STOCKHOLM ON APRIL 21, 1986. BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,
-- THE 11TH CONGRESS OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF
GERMANY (SEC) IS CONCLUDING ITS WORK. THIS SIGNIFICANT
EVENT PUT BERLIN IN THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION OF THE
NUMEROUS FRIENDS OF THE GDR, OF THE BROAD EUROPEAN AND
WORLD PUBLIC. PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE OCCUPIED A
GREAT PLACE AT THE CONGRESS.
-- THE REPORT OF THE SED CENTRAL COMMITTEE DELIVERED BY
ERICH HONECKER AND THE STATEMENT BY GENERAL SECRETARY
OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV PROVIDE
IMPORTANT ASSESSMENTS OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION AND REAL WAYS OUT OF THE EXISTING ACUTE
SITUATION.
-- DISREGARDING THE PRESSING INTERESTS AND ASPIRATIONS
OF ALL PEOPLES, CERTAIN QUARTERS HAVE TAKEN TO THE ROAD
OF ACTUALLY UNDERMINING THE GENEVA ACCORDS, THE ROAD OF
ACTIONS THAT ONLY FURTHER COMPLICATE THE ALREADY TENSE
SITUATION IN THE WORLD.
-- IT CONCERNS FIRST OF ALL THE SINISTER NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS IN NEVADA WHICH DESTROYED A UNIQUE CHANCE TO
GIVE THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT A REAL START. IT ALSO
CONCERNS THE IMPUDENT ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES
AGAINST LIBYA THAT IS FRAUGHT WITH THE DANGER OF A
SERIOUS WORSENING OF THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD. SUCH
ACTIONS DAMAGE DIRECTLY THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN BOTH THE
USSR AND THE USA AND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN GENERAL.
-- SET AGAINST A BROAD INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, SUCH
STEPS, WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE TASKS OF STRENGTHENING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY, CANNOT BE VIEWED AS ISOLATED
DEVELOPMENTS. THEY ALL ARE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE
GENERAL POLICY OF SOLVING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS BY
FORCE, OF STEPPING UP THE ARMS RACE.
-- AT THIS MOMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY NO ONE MAY DODGE
DISCHARGING ONE'S DUTY TO THE PRESENT AND SUCCEEDING
GENERATIONS. AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER
COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY ARE CONCERNED,
THEY HAVE ACTED AND WILL CONTINUE TO ACT BEING FULLY
AWARE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. IN BERLIN THE SOVIET
LEADER STATED WITH UTTER CERTAINTY THAT OUR PROPOSALS
FOR ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BRIDLING THE ARMS
RACE HOLD GOOD, AND IF THE GOVERNMENTS OF WESTERN
COUNTRIES ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF PEACE,
IT IS HIGH TIME THEY BEGAN MATCHING THEIR WORDS WITH
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DEEDS.
-- WE WOULD LIKE SPECIFICALLY TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF
THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TO THE
STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY, PARTICULARLY TO ITS
SECTION CONCERNING EUROPE, AS IT HAS DIRECT RELEVANCE
TO THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE, SECURITY AND
TO DISARMAMENT ON OUR CONTINENT.
-- TWO GROUPINGS OF FORCES, STRESSED M. GORBACHEV, EACH
THREE MILLION STRONG AND POSSESSING THE MOST ADVANCED
TANKS, MISSILES AND PLANES, LET ALONE SMALL ARMS OF ALL
TYPES, FACE EACH OTHER IN EUROPE. MOREOVER, WHAT IS
CALLED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ARE CONSTANTLY BEING
IMPROVED AND MADE MORE SOPHISTICATED AND POWERFUL,
THEIR EFFECTS BECOMING MORE AND MORE LIKE THOSE OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
-- THERE IS ANOTHER ASPECT TO THIS PROBLEM. WE ARE
TOLD THAT WESTERN EUROPE CANNOT GIVE UP NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, INCLUDING AMERICAN ONES, BECAUSE IN THIS CASE
IT WOULD ALLEGEDLY FEEL LESS SECURE IN THE FACE OF THE
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE WARSAW
TREATY ORGANIZATION.
-- WHAT DO WE THINK NECESSARY TO SAY IN THIS CONTEXT?
-- TO BEGIN WITH, THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
EUROPE WOULD CREATE A NEW SITUATION NOT ONLY FOR THE
WEST BUT ALSO FOR OURSELVES. WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT
INVASIONS OF OUR TERRITORY IN THE PRE-NUCLEAR AGE WERE
MOUNTED FROM THE WEST, AND MORE THAN ONCE.
-- FROM THE CAPITOL OF THE GDR THE SOVIET UNION APPEALS
TO ALL THE WEST EUROPEANS AND DECLARES: OUR COUNTRY
WILL NEVER AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BEGIN ARMED
OPERATIONS AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE UNLESS WE AND OUR
ALLIES BECOME TARGETS OF A NATO ATTACK.
-- OUR COUNTRY BACKS THIS POSITION WITH A NEW
INITIATIVE NOW APPLYING TO THE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS
AND ARMED FORCES. THE USSR SUGGESTS THAT AGREEMENT BE
REACHED ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN ALL THE COMPONENTS
OF THE LAND FORCES AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES OF THE
EUROPEAN STATES AND THE RELEVANT FORCES OF THE USA AND
CANADA DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. THE FORMATIONS AND UNITS TO
BE REDUCED SHOULD BE DISBANDED AND THEIR WEAPONRY
EITHER DESTROYED OR STORED IN NATIONAL TERRITORIES.
GEOGRAPHICALLY, REDUCTIONS, OBVIOUSLY, SHOULD COVER THE
ENTIRE EUROPEAN TERRITORY FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE
URALS. LONGER-RANGE AND BATTLE-FIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
COULD BE REDUCED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS.
-- THE QUESTION OF DEPENDABLE VERIFICATION AT EVERY
STAGE OF THIS PROCESS OFFERS ITSELF. BOTH NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS AND INTERNATIONAL FORMS OF
VERIFICATION, INCLUDING, IF NEED BE, ON-SITE
INSPECTION, ARE POSSIBLE.
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-- IN SHORT, THIS IS A SUBJECT FOR SERIOUS
NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FORMULATION
OF THE QUESTION IN A BROADER CONTEXT WILL MAKE IT
POSSIBLE TO CUT THE KNOT WHICH HAS BEEN GROWING TIGHTER
AT THE VIENNA TALKS OVER SO MANY YEARS NOW.
-- THERE ARE NO TRAPS IN THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET
UNION. IT EXTENDS AN OPEN HAND, NOT A FIST, TO THE
WEST. WE ARE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
AND TO THE LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE, TO OVERCOMING
TEE NEGATIVE TRENDS OF CONFRONTATION AND TO CREATING
CONFIDENCE AS AN INHERENT COMPONENT OF RELATIONS AMONG
STATES, INCLUDING THOSE IN EUROPE.
-- TEE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONSIDERS THAT IN THE PRESENT
SITUATION FRAUGHT WITH DANGERS TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE IT
IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE USE OF EVERY POSSIBILITY TO
CORRECT AND NORMALIZE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IN
THIS CONTEXT THE ENTIRE POTENTIAL OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE SHOULD NATURALLY BE UTILIZED.
-- MR. CHAIRMAN,
-- THIS SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE IS OF SPECIAL
IMPORTANCE. AND NOT ONLY BECAUSE TIME, AS THEY SAY IT,
13 RUNNING OUT ON IT. THE TENSE AND ACUTE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT
MEASURES BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HELP RESTORE CONFIDENCE
AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY ON OUR CONTINENT. THEREFORE IT
13 INCUMBENT ON THIS STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM
NEGOTIATIONS TO SEEK ENERGETICALLY SOLUTIONS TO THE
MAIN OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS OF THE CONFERENCE, TO MOVE
STEADILY ALONG THE ROAD OF NEGOTIATING A CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD BOTH GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND
EFFECT TO THE NON-USE-OF-FORCE PRINCIPLE AND INCLUDE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD.
-- THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE MADE
IMPORTANT STEPS TO REMOVE THE PILE-UPS THAT HAVE GROWN
AT THE CONFERENCE AND MAKE HEADWAY IN ITS WORK.
NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRIBUTION TO THIS END. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE YET TO
SEE ANY ACCOMMODATING MOVES ON THE PART OF SOME OTHER
NEGOTIATORS, ALTHOUGH WE HEAR SOMETIMES PRONOUNCEMENTS
ON THE NEED TO BREAK THE IMPASSE AT THE CONFERENCE.
FOSSILIZED PROPOSALS AND RELUCTANCE TO BUDGE IN
YEARS-LONG POSITIONS FORM THE MAIN OBSTACLES TO
NEGOTIATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS. I THINK
THAT THIS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL REVEAL WHETHER
WORDS ABOUT THE DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD ARE BACKED UP BY
PRACTICAL ACTIONS.
-- THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE OCCUPIES AN
IMPORTANT PLACE AT THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. GIVING
CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THIS PRINCIPLE
PROVIDES IN EFFECT A BASE FOR AND FILL WITH SUBSTANCE
ALL MILITARY MEASURES WE ARE NEGOTIATING, CONSOLIDATE
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THEM AND MAKE THEM CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-ORIENTED.
-- IT IS TIME TO ADDRESS SERIOUSLY ONE OF THE CENTRAL
ISSUES OF THE CONFERENCE - NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR
MILITARY MANOEUVRES. IN ORDER TO MOVE AHEAD IN IT, IT
IS ESSENTIAL TO IDENTIFY TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
THAT WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. THE KEY TO
SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM IS GIVEN IN THE JANUARY 15
SOVIET PROPOSAL. OUR PROPOSAL IS TO AGREE NOW ON
NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF GROUND AND AIR
FORCES, THE QUESTION OMOVEMENTS AVAND AL AACCTIVITIESOUNTTIL THE NEXT STAGE
OF THE CONFERENCE.
-- IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO FOCUS ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT
QUESTION AS THE LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY
MANOEUVRES. WE EXPECT THAT A REALISTIC APPROACH WILL
BE DEMONSTRATED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE WITH
ACCOUNT TAKEN OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR REDUCING THE RISK
OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE.
-- CERTAINLY, THERE ARE OTHER QUESTIONS AT THE
CONFERENCE THAT AWAIT SOLUTION, E.G. EXCHANGES OF
ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES,
INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, ETC. OBVIOUSLY, ALL
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MUST BE PROVIDED WITH
ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION.
-- WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHODS OF
DRAFTING ON THE ENTIRE RANGE OF QUESTIONS AS DEFINED IN
THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, 1985. WE NEED TO SEEK
CONCRETE RESULTS AT EACH AND EVERY WORKING GROUP
MEETING. IT WOULD BE THE GREATEST PRODIGALITY TO WASTE
OUR TIME ON ACADEMIC DISCUSSION LEADING AWAY FROM
DRAFTING. ONE SHOULD VALUE ONE'S OWN TIME AND ONE'S
CO-NEGOTIATORS' TIME.
-- MR. CHAIRMAN,
-- SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM, CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE
BY ADOPTING A SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT COULD
GIVE A FRESH IMPETUS TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CSCE PROCESS AND IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN GENERAL. IT WOULD ALSO ENSURE FAVOURABLE
PREREQUISITES FOR THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO
CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
POLITICAL CLIMATE AND REVIVAL OF DETENTE IN EUROPE AND
THE WORLD OVER.
HANSEN
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C O N F I DENT I A L STOCKHOLM 0 3114
SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP AB MEETING
1. CDEX-019
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE APRIL 21 WORKING GROUP AB
MEETING, CONVENED AT SOVIET REQUEST, THE U.S. AND SOVIET
UNION EXCHANGED STATEMENTS AND RIGHTS OF REPLY ON LIBYA,
AFGHANISTAN, AND CDE. YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA, AND CYPRUS
SPOKE CRITICALLY OF U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYAN
TERRORISM, INSISTING THAT CBM'S BE EXTENDED TO THE
MEDITERRANEAN. IN A WELL-ORCHESTRATED PERFORMANCE THE
SOVIETS ALSO RAISED GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL TO REDUCE
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY THE GDR,
POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, AND THE
FRG ALSO ENTERED THE FRAY ON TERRORISM AND U.S. ACTIONS
AGAINST LIBYA. END SUMMARY.
4. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CITED THE "SINISTER
NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN NEVADA" AND U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST
LIBYA AS EVIDENCE OF WORSENING U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND
EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL. THE REMAINDER OF HIS
PREPARED TEXT FOCUSED ON GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL TO REDUCE
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. (FULL TEXT SENT SEPTEL.)
5. AMBASSADOR HANSEN RESPONDED TO NONALIGNED AND SOVIET
CRITICISM OF U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA. IN THIS
CONTEXT HE RAISED SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AS
VIOLATIONS OF PRINCIPLES II, VI, AND VII OF THE FINAL
ACT AS WELL AS ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UN CHARTER, AND THEN
RETURNED TO THE CONCRETE CSBM-RELATED ISSUES BEFORE THE
CONFERENCE. (FULL TEXT SENT SEPTEL.)
6. TERRORISM/LIBYA:
A. IN A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT, SUPPORTED BY OTHER
NNA SPEAKERS, YUGOSLAVIA CONDEMNED U.S. ACTION AGAINST
LIBYA. AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC UNDERSCORED THE LINK BETWEEN
EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY, AND SUPPORTED
MALTA'S PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD. HE ALSO CONDEMNED "ALL
FORMS OF TERRORISM."
8. MALTA (GAUCI) ALLUDED TO ITS EFFORTS TO MEDIATE
BETWEEN LIBYA AND THE U.S. HE WARNED THAT MALTA'S
AMENDED PROPOSALS ON THE MEDITERRANEAN WERE THE LEAST IT
COULD ACCEPT TO JOIN CONSENSUS FOR AN AGREEMENT.
C. CYPRUS (PAPADOPOULOS) PROMISED TO PRESS THE
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY LINK IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE
WORKING GROUP.
D. ROMANIA NOTED ITS "DEEP CONCERN" FOR U.S. ACTION,
STRESSING IT WOULD "ACCEPT NO EXCUSES FOR THE USE OF
FORCE."
E. TURKEY (OZGUL) NOTED THE "SPECIAL IMPORTANCE" IT
ATTACHES TO COMBATING TERRORISM, WHICH HAS A "DIRECT
RELEVANCE" TO CDE, BUT DID NOT DIRECTLY REFER TO U.S.-
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LIBYAN ACTION.
- F. PORTUGAL (CUTILEIRO) "DEPLORED" THE "HYPOCRITICAL
PROPAGANDA" INTRODUCED BY THOSE RAISING LIBYA IN CDE AND
STRESSED THAT TERRORISM IS THE PRIMARY ISSUE -- "METHODS
TO DEAL WITH IT" ARE SECONDARY.
G. THE FRG (CITRON) CHASTISED THE SOVIETS FOR
RAISING LIBYA WHILE NOTING UN CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET
OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. REFERRING TO GORBACHEV'S
PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS -- "IDEAS FOR THE
FUTURE" -- THE FRG AMBASSADOR JOINED THE U.S. IN CALLING
FOR THE CONFERENCE TO GET DOWN TO THE BUSINESS AT HAND.
8. AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND) OUTLINED THREE ASPECTS
OF THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH
HAVE RELEVANCE FOR CDE: 1) NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT HAS NOW
BEEN "PROPERLY" SUPPLEMENTED WITH CONVENTIONAL DISARMA-
MENT; 2) THE PROPOSAL COVERS THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS,
IN LINE WITH CSCE PRACTICE; AND 3) IT OPENS NEW PROSPECTS
AFTER THIS CONFERENCE FOR THE DISARMAMENT STAGE.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 03095
SUBJECT: U.S. RESPONSE ON LIBYA IN WORKING GROUP AT
STOCKHOLM MEETING, 21 APRIL 86
1. CDE X - 16.
2. IN RESPONSE TO YUGOSLAVIAN, CYRIOT, AND SOVIET
INTERVENTIONS IN CDE WORKING GROUP AB, DEPUTY HEAD OF
U.S. DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR HANSEN, MADE THE FOLLOWING
REMARKS:
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,
THIS CONFERENCE HAS BUT ONE AGENDA, THE NEGOTIATION OF
A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-
BUILDING MEASURES. IT IS NOT OUR BUSINESS TO DEAL WITH
QUESTIONS RELATED THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
IN EUROPE, OR INDEED ANY FORCES, AT THIS STAGE OF OUR WORK.
DELEGATIONS AT THE CONFERENCE RECOGNIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THAT FACT. THUS, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THIS WORKING
GROUP, WHICH IS CONDUCTED AT THE SENIOR LEVELS OF EACH
DELEGATION, SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRODUCTIVELY USED BY
GIVING POLITICAL DIRECTION TO THE DIFFICULT TASK OF
DRAFTING CONCRETE LANGUAGE.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
INASMUCH AS WE ARE ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE
PROCESS, LET ME RETURN TO THE MADRID CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT AND QUOTE FROM THE SECTION ON PRINCIPLES:
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONDEMN TERRORISM,
- INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
- AS ENDANGERING OR TAKING INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES OR
- OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZING HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
- FREEDOMS, AND EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE
- RESOLUTE MEASURES TO COMBAT IT. THEY EXPRESS
- THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES
- FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF
- TERRORISM, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH
- INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INCLUDING BILATERAL AND
- MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, AND ACCORDINGLY TO
- BROADEN AND REINFORCE MUTUAL CO-OPERATION TO
- COMBAT SUCH ACTS.
TO THOSE WHO TODAY HAVE EXERCISED THE RIGHT TO CRITICIZE
IMPLICITLY OR EXPLICITLY, MY GOVERNMENT, A SIMPLE
QUESTION: WHAT HAVE YOU DONE TO IMPLEMENT THIS PART
OF THE AGREEMENT MADE AT MADRID? WHAT DEGREE OF
CO-OPERATION HAS EXISTED AMONG US IN COMBATING TERRORISM
EMANATING FROM LIBYA? WHAT RESOLUTE MEASURES HAVE
BEEN TAKEN?
SOME OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES HERE CONTINUED TO URGE
THAT WE USE THE CSCE PROCESS TO EXTEND THE PROVISIONS
OF THE FINAL ACT TO THE WHOLE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
AREA. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN ANY AREA IS A COOPERATIVE
AND RECIPROCAL EFFORT WHICH REQUIRES PEACEFUL INTENT.
LIBYA HAS MADE NO EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE PEACEFUL
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INTENT, NOR HAVE THE LIBYAN COLONEL SHOWN ANY DISPOSITION
TO COOPERATE ON AN INTERNATIONAL BASIS. SOME STATES
REPRESENTED HERE PARTICIPATE WITH LIBYA IN OTHER FORUMS
AND ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.
WHAT HAVE THESE STATES ACCOMPLISHED IN CURBING THE
SENSELESS AND INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE CARRIED OUT AS
LIBYAN STATE POLICY? VERY LITTLE THOSE WHO FOR ANY
REASON HAVE FAILED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE
LIBYAN COLONEL IN EFFORTS TO STOP TERRORISM HAVE NOT
LIVE UP TO THEIR MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OR TO THEIR
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS.
YET YOU WOULD ASK US TO PARTICIPATE IN GIVING A SENSE
OF LEGITIMACY TO A GOVERNMENT WHICH SHELTERS, ADVOCATES
AND CONDUCTS ACTS OF TERRORISM. WHILE WE WISH THE
PEOPLE OF LIBYA NO ILL, OUR ANSWER IS A RESOUNDING NO.
THE GROUND ON WHICH TERRORISM TAKES PLACE IS PREDOMINATELY
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE TARGET IN RECENT YEARS,
HOWEVER, HAS BEEN THE UNITED STATES, ITS CITIZENS,
ITS ENTERPRISES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES.
WE CRINGE AT AND ABHOR THE THOUGHT OF INNOCENT PEOPLE
DYING THROUGH ACTS OF VIOLENCE ANYWHERE, ANYTIME. BUT
INNOCENT CIVILIANS WERE NOT THE TARGETS IN THE ATTACK
ON LIBYA.
TERRORISM IS INDISCRIMINATE. WHO DIED IN THE AIRPORTS
AT VIENNA AND ROME? WHAT HAD THEY DONE TO REAP SUCH
VIOLANCE? WHO DIES WHEN AN AIRLINER IS BLOWN UP IN
MID-FLIGHT OR SHOT OUT OF THE SKY?
CONSIDER THE HORROR OF A GRANDMOTHER, A MOTHER AND A
CHILD AS THEY FALL THOUSANDS OF FEET TO CERTAIN DEATH
FROM AN AIRLINER WITH A HOLE BLOWN IN ITS SIDE THROUGH
WHICH THEY AND ANOTHER MAN (KILLED BY THE INITIAL
EXPLOSION) WERE SUCKED. ALL FOUR WERE AMERICAN CITIZENS,
ALL FOUR WERE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF TERRORISM. ONLY
THROUGH THE POWER OF A MIRACLE, WERE THE LIVES OF ALL
INNOCENT PASSENGERS ON THAT TWA AIRCRAFT SAVED.
IS IT NOT OUR COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO DEAL WITH
SUCH ATROCITIES? IS IT NOT PART OF THE AGREEMENTS WE
HAVE MADE IN THE CSCE PROCESS? MANY EXPERTS BELIEVE
IT IS JUST A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE TERRORISTS ACQUIRE
NUCLEAR DEVICES. WITH WHAT CHALLENGE WILL WE THEN BE
CONFRONTED? IN THAT CONNECTION, MY DELEGATION CAN
EXPRESS SOME SATISFACTION IN THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH
EXIST FOR TALKS BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS WHICH
WILL DEAL WITH THE REDUCTION OF RISK IN THE CURRENT
AND FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AS DESCRIBED IN
THE JOIN DECLARATION OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT.
BUT IF THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION TO ENGAGE IN MUTUAL
CO-OPERATION TO COMBAT TERRORISM IS NOT MET AND CITIZENS
OF THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO FALL VICTIM TO
TERRORIST ATROCITIES, THE GOVERNMENT MUST ENGAGE
ITSELF IN ACTIONS DIRECTED AT DEFENDING ITS CITIZENS.
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TO DO LESS WOULD ENCOURAGE CONTINUED AGGRESSION
AGAINST INNOCENT PEOPLE, INCLUDING CITIZENS OF THE
COUNTRIES REPRESENTED BY MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES
AROUND THIS TABLE. WE WILL MAKE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR
THAT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM IS NOT COST-FREE. THE
UNITED STATES WILL NOT TOLERATE TERRORISM AND WILL
COMBAT IT WITH THE MEANS JUDGED MOST APPROPRIATE.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
AT MADRID, WE AGREED THAT IN STOCKHOLM WE WOULD
INVOLVE OURSELVES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF A SET OF
MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY- BUILDING
MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY
CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. WE DID NOT AGREE TO EXPAND
OR OTHERWISE RE-WRITE ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UNITED ,
NATIONS CHARTER. THAT WOULD HAVE MEANT THE CLOSING
OF OUR CSCE EYES TO THE UNPROVOKED USE OF FORCE BY
THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE
NOT AS MUCH AS HARMED A SINGLE SOVIET CITIZEN.
DESPITE OUR CONTINUED CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET
INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, WHICH
HAS NOW LASTED FOR MORE THAN SIX YEARS, IN CONTRAVENTION
OF ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UN CHARTER AND PRINCIPLE II OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AS WELL AS ON PRINCIPLES VI AND VII,
PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE THE DECISION TO SHOW GOOD FAITH
BY ANNOUNCING OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE NON-USE
OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IN STOCKHOLM. THIS WAS AN ATTEMPT TO
DRAW THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES INTO NEGOTIATIONS
ON CONCRETE CSBMS. IT WAS AND IS OUR HOPE THAT BY
SHOWING FLEXIBILITY WE WOULD HAVE ADVANCED THE POSSI-
BILITY OF.ATTAINING A SUBSTANTIVE, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM ON A REGIONAL
BASIS. IT IS CLEAR, MOREOVER, THAT A REAFFIRMATION OF
THIS PRINCIPLE WILL FIND ITS PROPER PLACE IN A POSSIBLE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
I BEGAN TODAY BY EXPRESSING MY DELEGATION'S DISMAY AT
THOSE INTERVENTIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD US AWAY FROM THE
COMMON GROUND WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH DURING
MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. TIME MUST NOT
BE ALLLOWED TO SLIP AWAY FROM US OR TO BE UTILIZED
FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN FURTHERING OUR WORK IN DRAFTING
A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
IN A WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT POSTED ON APRIL 16TH,
PRESIDENT REAGAN NOTED HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE UNITED
STATES DELEGATION TO WORK WITH ALLIES, WITH THE NNA
STATES AND WITH THE EAST, INDEED WITH ALL PARTICIPANTS
IN THE CONFERENCE, TO FIND SOLUTIONS HERE WHICH ARE
CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE AND OUR SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS. HE SAID, AND I QUOTE:
- THE CONFERENCE MUST AGREE ON THE LEVEL AND TYPES
- OF MILITARY ACTIVITY THAT WILL BE COVERED IN THE
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CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. WE PLACE HIGH PRIORITY ON
AGREEING ON A THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION OF
GROUND FORCE AND COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES WHICH
CAN BE VERIFIED AND WHICH WILL RESULT IN EQUITABLE
TREATMENT FOR ALL 35 PARTICIPATING STATES.
WE WOULD NOTE THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT,
WE COULD CONSIDER THAT GROUND FORCES MIGHT ALSO
INCLUDE BOTH AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS. BUT IN
SO DOING, INDICATE OUR AGREEMENT THAT AMPHIBIOUS
ACTIVITIES COULD BE NOTIFIED AT A LEVEL SIGNIFICANTLY
LOWER THAN THE THRESHOLD FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF
GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.
COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES HAVE BECOME THE NORM FOR LARGER
EXERCISES IN EUROPE. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THE REQUIREMENT TO
NOTIFY SUCH EXERCISES IN THEIR ENTIRETY INCLUDING
PARTICIPATION BY THE DIFFERENT SERVICES AND BRANCHES
OF ARMS. IN THE CASE OF PARTICIPATION BY AIR FORCES,
WE COULD CONSIDER PROVIDING DETAILED INFORMATION ON
THE EXTENT AND TYPE OF THEIR ACTIVITY.
THE APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE WE HAVE ADOPTED WOULD
INCLUDE INFORMATION ON THE PARTICIPATION IN NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF GROUND FORCE FORMATIONS, UNITS
AND SUBUNITS WHICH ARE NOT PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN
EUROPE. FORTY-FIVE DAYS IN ADVANCE OF THE BEGINNING
OF A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY, ALL PARTICIPATING STATES
WOULD KNOW THAT SUCH TROOPS WOULD BE BROUGHT TO
EUROPE. AND, AT THE MOMENT THEY LEAVE THEIR ARRIVAL
BASE IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, (USUALLY
WITHIN 24 HOURS) THEY WOULD BE REGARDED, FOR PURPOSES
RELATED TO.CSBMS, THE SAME AS FORCES PERMANENTLY
STATIONED IN THE ZONE.
MY DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO DRAFT LANGUAGE WHICH
COVERS THE MOVEMENTS, WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBMS, OF TROOPS, UNIFORMED PERSONNEL OR YOUNG
PEOPLE ABOUT TO BE INDUCTED IN THE ARMED FORCES,
WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE ORGANIZED INTO MILITARY
FORMATIONS, UNITS OR SUBUNITS. WE ARE PREPARED TO
EXPLORE ALL QUESTIONS RELATING TO RAISING THE COMBAT
STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF FORCES EITHER IN BEING
OR WHICH CAN BE CREATED THROUGH MOBILIZATION.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE CAN BE NO
PRETEXT FOR NOT ENGAGING IN THE DRAFTING OF A SUBSTAN-
TIVE AGREEMENT. SINCE THERE IS NO REAL QUESTION
ABOUT WHICH TYPES OF ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED, IT
MAKES GOOD SENSE TO BEGIN WITH ESTABLISHING THE
THRESHOLD WHICH TRIGGERS THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES. WE ARE AT THE POINT IN THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS WHERE WE MUST DECIDE: EITHER WE DO OR WE DON'T.
THANK YOU. END TEXT. HANSEN
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM03198
SUBJECT: CDE: DEAD IN THE WATER
1. CDE 1-023 - CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: FOR THE MOMENT, NOTHING IS HAPPENING IN
STOCKHOLM. THE SOVIETS ARE STALLING, THE ALLIES ARE
TUGGING IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS AND THE NEUTRALS ARE
WRINGING THEIR HANDS BUT DOING LITTLE ELSE. AT THIS
RATE IT'S GOING TO BE VERY HARD TO GET THE TITANIC
MOVING AGAIN; THE BRITISH NEED SOME PRODDING (SEE PARA 7).
END SUMMARY.
3. SOVIET NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO MOSCOW
"FOR PERSONAL REASONS" ON APRIL 22, LEAVING THE EASTERN
NEGOTIATORS PEDALLING BACKWARDS IN MOST WORKING GROUPS.
THEY FREELY CONCEDE THAT NOTHING WILL HAPPEN UNTIL HE
RETURNS, "MAYBE NEXT WEEK". SPECULATION RUNS THAT HE IS:
-- GETTING READY TO REPLACE KARPOV OR KVITSINSKY
IN GENEVA
-- CONSULTING ON GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 INITIATIVE
-- TAKING PART IN A REVIEW OF SOVIET PLANS FOR
CDE IN THE LIGHT OF LIBYA.
4. IN A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BARRY BEFORE HE LEFT,
GRINEVSKY SEEMED READY TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS BUSINESS.
HE IMPLIED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE AIR ISSUE
ON THE BASIS OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND SETTLE FOR A
MINIMALIST FACE-SAVING FORMULA ON "DEFERRING" ASPECTS OF
THE NAVAL QUESTION. HE SUGGESTED FLEXIBILITY IN FINDING
WAYS TO SOLVE THE PROCEDURAL IMPASSE ON INFORMATION.
BUT EASTERN NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN HIDING BEHIND ALL THESE
PRETEXTS FOR NOT DRAFTING IN THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS,
AND CLEARLY THEY WON'T COME OUT UNTIL GRINEVSKY RETURNS
WITH NEW SIGNALS.
5. THE WESTERN TACTIC, AGREED UPON AT BRUSSELS, WAS TO
EXPOSE EASTERN STALLING BY HIGHLIGHTING KEY AREAS WHERE
WE WERE READY TO MOVE AHEAD BUT THEY WERE NOT. WE AGREED
THAT THE TOP PRIORITY FOR US SHOULD BE NEGOTIATING A
PARAMETER FOR NOTIFYING, OBSERVING AND FORECASTING GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES, AND WE BEGAN DISCUSSING OUR PREFERRED
SOLUTION WITH THE UK, FRANCE AND THE FRG. THINGS SEEMED
TO BE GOING SMOOTHLY UNTIL APRIL 23, WHEN UK AMBASSADOR
EDES THREW A BUCKET OF VERY COLD WATER ON THE WHOLE PRO-
CEEDING. HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LONDON EXPRESSED:
UNWILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO A "MAJOR CONCESSION"
WHICH CHANGES SC.1 AMPLIFIED WITHOUT WIDER DISCUSSION OF
THE ENTIRE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUD-
ING THE WESTERN "BOTTOM LINE" AND TACTICS.
READINESS TO GO ALONG WITH "SENSIBLE MOVES" IF
THERE WAS FURTHER CONSULTATION "INVOLVING CAPITALS".
-- A WARNING THAT "ANY SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE"
FROM SC.1 AMPLIFIED WOULD HAVE TO BE ELEVATED TO THE
MINISTERIAL LEVEL.
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-- THE CONVICTION THAT WESTERN "CONCESSIONS"
SHOULD COME "MUCH LATER".
-- SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF RAISING
THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS AND THE US FORMULA IN
PARTICULAR.
6. THE FRG AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS SHARE OUR VIEW THAT
WE NEED TO DECIDE THE THRESHOLD ISSUE NOW AND IN STOCK-
HOLM RATHER THAN IN CAPITALS. ALL MADE THE POINT THAT
THIS IS NOT A CONCESSION TO THE EAST BUT AN IMPROVEMENT
ON SC.1 FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF WESTERN SECURITY
INTERESTS. WHAT IS BEING DISCUSSED IS NOT A WESTERN
PROPOSAL BUT A BOTTOM LINE TO BE SHARED AMONG CLOSE
ALLIES SO THAT WE HAVE A SENSE OF DIRECTION IN THE NEGO-
TIATION. THE FRG AND FRANCE GENERALLY ACCEPT THE US
FORMULA, ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR
INCLUSION OF THEIR CONCEPT OF DIVISIONAL COMMAND POSTS.
THE UK AND FRG STILL BELIEVE 10,000 IS THE RIGHT NUMERICAL
THRESHOLD, AND WE HAVE SAID WE'RE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND
GOING ALONG, AT LEAST AT THE OUTSET. SOME EXPERT-LEVEL
REDRAFTING IS IN PROGRESS HERE. BUT WE CAN'T GO MUCH
FURTHER UNTIL THE BRITISH GET NEW INSTRUCTIONS, PARTICU-
LARLY ON THE LOCUS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. MEANWHILE
THE UK DELEGATION IS SIDETRACKING NATO EFFORTS TO GET A
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS GOING
IN WORKING GROUP B-1.
7. DETERMINED NEUTRAL COORDINATORS COULD BRING AT LEAST
THE ILLUSION OF ORDER OUT OF THIS CHAOS, BUT FOR THE
MOST PART THEY ARE WRINGING THEIR HANDS AND PLAYING UP
THEIR OWN GROUP'S CONCERNS, SUCH AS CONSTRAINTS AND NUF.
8. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUESTED:
UNTIL GRINEVSKY GETS BACK TO TOWN, WE WON'T KNOW
WHICH WAY THE SOVIETS WILL JUMP HERE. WE STILL THINK
THAT THEY NEED A SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM TO PROMOTE THE
GORBACHEV APRIL 18 INITIATIVE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUC-
TIONS. BUT THEY MAY DECIDE THAT BOTH MBFR AND CDE ARE
WORKING AGAINST THEIR INTEREST AND THAT BOTH SHOULD BE
TORPEDOED AND A NEW FORUM CREATED. IN ANY CASE, NATO
NEEDS TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT BY
TRYING TO MOVE AHEAD ON OUR ISSUES - E.G. GROUND FORCE
CSBMS.
TO DO THIS, WE NEED TO DEAL WITH UK OBJECTIONS,
WHICH ARISE MORE FROM AMBASSADOR EDE'S SENSE OF TACTICS
THAN FROM CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN LONDON. AMBASSADOR
HANSEN'S LONDON CONSULTATIONS BEFORE THIS ROUND DEMON-
STRATED THAT.
LONDON NEEDS TO BE PERSUADED THAT CDE IS NOT A
RUNAWAY ROGUE ELEPHANT WHICH NEEDS TO BE SLOWED DOWN
BUT A NEARLY IMMOVABLE OBJECT. THE END IS NOT NEAR; IT
IS NOW. A ROUND OF EXPERTS' CONSULTATIONS IN CAPITALS
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IS A HOPELESS IDEA WHICH WOULD DOOM US FOR THE REST OF
THE ROUND TO INACTION ON THE AREA OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO
THE WEST. IF THE UK-US CONSULTATIONS ARE STILL IN
PROGRESS IN WASHINGTON, WE SUGGEST RAISING THE ISSUE
-THERE; IF NOT, A DISCUSSION WITH TIMOTHY DAUNT IN LONDON
MIGHT BE IN ORDER.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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COHF I DENT I A L STOCKHOLM 03402
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK TEXT IN
- 8-2 (OBSERVATION)
1. CDE X - 033
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE THE
FOLLOWING THREE TEXTS IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON
APRIL 24. THE TEXTS WERE AGREED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
THEIR ORDER IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH TRANSPORTATION
TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND BACK. THIS
TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER THE CAPITAL
OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE
INVITATION, SO THAT OBSERVERS ARE IN POSITION BEFORE THE
START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM.
THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY.
THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03257
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, APRIL 21-25, 1986
1. CDE X - 028
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: DRAFTING PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM HAS
BEEN GLACIAL, AT BEST. ONLY THE OBSERVATION WORKING
GROUP COULD JUSTIFIABLY POINT TO ANY PROGRESS -- AND
THAT ON UNCONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS. ON THE KEY ISSUE OF
NO'IFICATION, MOVEMENT WAS RETROGRADE, NOT FORWARD. THE
SOVIE'S RETURNED TO SHOPWORN POSITIONS IN PUBLIC AND
PUSHED THEIR OWN BRAND OF SEQUENTIALISM, I.E., THERE CAN
BE NO DRAFTING ON ANY SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES UNTIL THE CONFERENCE AGREES
'0 THEIR AGENDA ON WHAT TYPES OF ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE
NOTIFIED. WHILE 'HE SOVIETS HAVE REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN
SERIOUS NEGO'IATION ON INFORMATION/VERIFICATION AND
ANNUAL CALENDARS, THEY HAVE ACCUSED THE WEST OF
FOOTDRAGGING ON CONSTRAINTS AND NON-USE OF FORCE. THUS,
PENDING THE RETURN OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY FROM
MOSCOW, THE EAST HAS ADOPTED A STALLING TACTIC WHILE
PREPARING THE GROUND FOR BLAMING THE WEST IF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD FAIL. INTERNALLY, NATO HAS
REACHED A FRAGILE CONSENSUS ON A WESTERN NUF TEXT WHICH
REFLECTS ALL MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. POSITION,
INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE
LANGUAGE. END SUMMARY.
4. ASSESSMENT: THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE IN A HOLDING
PATTERN AND, UNTIL THEY GET NEW MARCHING ORDERS, ANY
MOVEMENT WILL BE GLACIAL. IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE, SOVIET
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO MOSCOW "FOR PERSONAL
REASONS" ON APRIL 22. IN HIS ABSENCE WARSAW PACT
NEGOTIATORS PEDALED BACKWARD IN ALL OF THE WORKING
GROUPS EXCEPT NON-USE OF FORCE AND OBSERVATION. IN THE
WORKING GROUPS THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO PUSH THEIR BRAND
OF "SEQUENTIALISM," REFUSING TO ADDRESS SPECIFIC
NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS UNTIL THE ISSUE OF THE TYPES OF
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED IS RESOLVED; THEY USED THIS
PRECONDITION, ALONG WITH THEIR INSISTENCE ON DISCUSSING
THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN THE INFORMATION WORKING
GROUP, TO BLOCK PROGRESS ON OTHER ISSUES.
THE APRIL 25 PLENARY OFFERED FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT
THE EAST HAS ADOPTED A STALLING TACTIC AND IS PREPARING
THE GROUND FOR BLAMING THE WEST IF STOCKHOLM FAILS.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE SOVIET UNION (GENERAL TATARNIKOV)
SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE WEST AND PARTICULARLY THE U.S.
FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS BY REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE
TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. TATARNIKOV
STATED THAT THE WEST MUST AGREE TO NEGOTIATE ON
"INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES," NOT JUST AIR AS PART OF A
COMBINED ARMS EXERCISE. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT
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MEASURES MUST COVER F-111 AND BACKFIRE AIRCRAFT. FOR
THE FIRST TIME TATARNIKOV TALKED ABOUT SEPARATE
PARAMETERS FOR "INDEPENDENT" AMPHIBIOUS AND "INDEPENDENT"
AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES. (BEGIN COMMENT: FOLLOWING THE
U.S. ACTION AGAINST LIBYA, AMBASSADOR BARRY HAD TOLD
SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN
PREPARED TO NOTIFY SUCH INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES
BEFORE AND WERE EVEN LESS INCLINED TO DO SO NOW. IN A
SEPARATE CONVERSATION SOVIET DELEGATE YEROFEYEV IMPLIED
THAT FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR WOULD BE ENOUGH. END
COMMENT.) IN REPLY TO THE CZECH AND SOVIET STATEMENTS,
BARRY SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS INDEED PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE
ABOUT TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERED BUT THAT THAT
DISCUSSION SHOULD NOT HOLD UP NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER
ISSUES. (FULL TEXT SEPTEL.) WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO "WALK
AND CHEW GUM AT THE SAME TIME," HE ADDED. IN ANY CASE,
ANYONE WHO HAD ATTENDED WORKING GROUP MEETINGS DURING
THE PAST WEEK SHOULD BE WELL AWARE OF WHO WAS BLOCKING
PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM.
5. NOTIFICATION: WHATEVER MOVEMENT THERE WAS ON
NOTIFICATION WAS BACKWARD, NOT FORWARD. DISCUSSION HIT
AN ALL-TIME LOW IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP AS THE
EAST RETURNED TO SHOPWORN POSITIONS NOT HEARD SINCE LAST
YEAR. IN HIS DEFINITION OF THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO
BE NOTIFIED, SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV INCLUDED GROUND,
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIR FORCES, NAVAL COMPONENTS
AND ALL OTHER TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE WEST
FOCUSED ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS ON THE BASIS OF THE
COORDINATOR'S ORAL PROPOSAL OF THE PREVIOUS WEEK SEEKING
A DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. NATO'S
ABILITY TO SUPERIMPOSE ITS CONCEPTS ON THE COORDINATOR'S
PROPOSAL WAS HAMSTRUNG BY THE UK AMBASSADOR'S INSISTENCE
THAT NATO NOT SUGGEST CHANGES TO THE COORDINATOR'S
LANGUAGE. NNA EFFORTS TO BUILD COMMON GROUND AROUND THE
COORDINATOR'S PROPOSAL FELL ON DEAF EARS.
6. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE WEST MOVED CLOSER TO A
CONSENSUS TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE -- AT LEAST IN
STOCKHOLM. MOST OF OUR ALLIES NOW ACKNOWLEDGE, SOMEWHAT
BEGRUDGINGLY, THAT ANY NATO TEXT MUST CONTAIN LANGUAGE
REFLECTING THE LARGER WESTERN CONCEPT OF SECURITY,
INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS CONCEPT IS NOW EMBRACED IN
AN AD REFERENDUM NATO TEXT WHICH INCLUDES ALL MAJOR
ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT: HUMAN RIGHTS,
TERRORISM, VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE, EQUAL RIGHTS/EQUAL
DUTIES OF STATES, AS WELL AS ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE
LANGUAGE AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF AS CONTAINED IN
THE UN CHARTER. (SEE SEPTEL FOR TEXT AND ANALYSIS.)
THE FRENCH REMAINED STRANGELY SILENT THROUGHOUT THE
PROCESS OF DRAFTING THIS TEXT BUT THEIR PREFERRED ROLE
AS NATO'S GADFLY WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY ASSUMED BY THE
ITALIANS. IN THE END, THE ITALIAN DELEGATION ABSENTED
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THEMSELVES AT A CRUCIAL MOMENT SO THAT A WESTERN
CONSENSUS COULD BE REACHED ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. THUS, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER
ALL EC-12 CAPITALS, PARTICULARLY ROME AND PARIS, WILL BE
ABLE TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN TEXT DRAFTED IN STOCKHOLM.
MEANWHILE, THE NUF WORKING GROUP, AT WESTERN INSISTENCE,
FOCUSED ON THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE NATO TEXT, I.E.,
CSBM'S-NUF LINK, TABLED LAST ROUND. NO DRAFT LANGUAGE
WAS REGISTERED, HOWEVER. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE
EVER ANXIOUS NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) THAT ANY
FURTHER DRAFTING PROGRESS IS CONTINGENT ON AT LEAST
COMPARABLE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN THE OTHER WORKING
GROUPS.
7. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: INFORMAL
CORRIDOR CONTACTS CONTINUED THIS WEEK IN AN EFFORT TO
FIND A SOLUTION TO THE INFORMATION IMPASSE (NATO IS
CURRENTLY PROMOTING THE IDEA OF A B-1 CLUSTER SUBGROUP
TO DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN
THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION; A-2 "STATIC" INFORMATION
WOULD STAY WHERE IT IS.). HOWEVER, IN GRINEVSKY'S
ABSENCE, THE SOVIETS HAVE BLOCKED ANY FORWARD MOVEMENT.
BOTH EAST AND WEST AGAIN STAKED OUT WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS
IN THE WORKING GROUP ON WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION SHOULD
BE DISCUSSED IN THIS CLUSTER, I.E., STATIC OR DYNAMIC.
THE EAST PRESSED ITS POSITION BY TABLING PROPOSALS ON
THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION FOR AIR MANEUVERS AND TROOP
TRANSFERS BY AIR FORCES. THEY ALSO LABELED STATIC
INFORMATION AS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THIS PHASE OF THE
CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH A POSSIBLE TOPIC FOR INCLUSION IN A
DISARMAMENT PHASE. NATO WAS JOINED BY SWEDEN IN
COUNTERING THIS ARGUMENT.
THE VERIFICATION DISCUSSION AGAIN FOCUSED ON THE
COORDINATOR'S (SCHENK-SWITZERLAND) SUGGESTED LANGUAGE.
THROUGH PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF TEXTS, THE EAST
CONTINUED TO PRESS ITS CASE FOR ALTERNATIVES TO
INSPECTION OR OBSERVATION ON REQUEST. THE RIGHT TO
PURSUE A CERTAIN COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD THERE BE DOUBTS
CONCERNING COMPLIANCE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BEGRUDGINGLY
ACCEPTED, BUT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT SUCH
DOUBTS MUST BE WELL FOUNDED. WHILE THE WEST AND THE NNA
HAVE OBJECTED, ARGUING THAT ANY REQUIREMENT THAT DOUBTS
BE "PROVED" WOULD INFRINGE ON A STATE'S RIGHT TO CONDUCT
VERIFICATION AND WOULD UNNECESSARILY DELAY VERIFICATION
MEANS. SOVIET OBJECTIVES ARE CLEAR -- TO ENSURE THAT
TIMELY VERIFICATION IS VIRTUALLY AN IMPOSSIBILITY. THEY
ARE SEEKING FORMULATIONS WHICH COULD ALLOW THEM TO DELAY
OR DENY A REQUEST FOR VERIFICATION IF THEY FIND THE
REQUESTING STATE'S "DOUBTS" OR REASONS FOR THE REQUEST
NOT TO BE "WELL FOUNDED." THEY ARE ALSO SEEKING TO
ENSURE THAT CONSULTATIONS AS A VERIFICATION METHOD ARE
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NOT SQUEEZED OUT IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. WHILE THE
SOVIETS HAVE BECOME MORE WILLING '0 DISCUSS VERIFICATION
THIS ROUND, THEIR FLEXIBILITY HAS PROVEN TO BE MORE
COSMETIC THAN REAL. THE WEST, GENERALLY WITH GOOD
SUPPORT FROM THE NNA, CONTINUES TO RESIST SOVIET
AMENDMENTS.
8. OBSERVATION: DRAFTING PROGRESS CONTINUES ON
ADMINISTRATIVE, I.E., NONSUBSTANTIVE, ISSUES. LANGUAGE
WAS NOTED ON THE HOST STATE'S REPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE
TRANSPORTATION BOTH TO AND WITHIN THE OBSERVATION AREA
AND ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO GUIDE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. FURTHER PROGRESS IS ANTICIPATED
IN THESE NONCONTENTIOUS AREAS, WHILE THE CORE QUESTIONS
OF THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF OBSERVATION REMAIN ON THE BACK
BURNER. (BEGIN COMMENT: WE EXPECT THE EAST TO CONTINUE
TO ALLOW LANGUAGE TO BE NOTED IN B-2. THEIR "FLEXIBI-
LITY" AND "WILLINGNESS TO SHOW PROGRESS" IN THIS GROUP
ALLOWS THEM TO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE NOT STANDING IN THE
WAY OF PROGRESS. END COMMENT.) THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER,
PROVIDED A SIGN OF THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO FACILITATE
EFFECTIVE OBSERVATION WHEN, IN AN INFORMAL COFFEE GROUP,
THEY JOINED WITH THE YUGOSLAVS IN REJECTING A PROPOSAL
THAT OBSERVERS BE ALLOWED TO USE THEIR PERSONAL
BINOCULARS. CLEARLY, THE EAST PREFERS THAT OBSERVERS
SEE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE FROM AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE.
(BEGIN COMMENT: THE YUGOSLAV OBJECTION TOOK OTHERS,
INCLUDING THE FINNISH COORDINATOR, BY SURPRISE. THE
LATTER EXPRESSED HIS ANNOYANCE PRIVATELY TO U.K.
AMBASSADOR EDES AS WELL AS HIS CONCERN ABOUT POTENTIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS YUGOSLAV POSITION FOR THE NNA
POSITION OVERALL. END COMMENT.)
9. CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE WORKING GROUP WAS
PARALYZED AS THE EAST REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS
DISCUSSION OF TWO NATO TEXTS ENDORSING THE NNA CONCEPT
OF A STANDARDIZED FORMAT FOR THE ANNUAL FORECAST.
EASTERN FOOTDRAGGING BECOME EVEN MORE APPARENT WHEN AN
IRISH ATTEMPT AT COMPROMISE WAS MET BY SILENCE. THE
SOVIETS ALSO STALLED ON CONSTRAINTS, ACCUSING THE WEST
OF NOT NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY. IN WHAT MAY BE EVIDENCE
BOTH OF THE LACK OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS REGARDING
CONSTRAINTS AND OF A SOVIET REFUSAL TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE
IN OTHER CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS UNTIL THEIR PRECONDITION
FOR DRAFTING IS MET, I.E., THE ISSUE OF TYPES OF
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED IS RESOLVED, GENERAL TATARNIKOV
NO LONGER REPRESENTS THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS WORKING
GROUP. INSTEAD, THE SOVIET BENCH IS NOW BEING WARMED BY
TWO SOVIET SECOND-STRINGERS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 03397
SUBJECT: CDE: APRIL 29 MEETING WITH GRINEVSKY
1. SUMMARY: SOVIET CDE NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY SEEMS
EAGER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, BUT THE KEY ISSUE FOR HIM
IS AN AIR PARAMETER OF SOME SORT. HE SOUNDED FLEXIBLE
ON OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, BUT
WE HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO PROBE THE NEW SOVIET INSTRUC-
TIONS. MEANWHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE BROKEN THE LOGJAM ON
INFORMATION BY AGREEING TO DISCUSS INFORMATION CONTAINED
IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN WORKING GROUP B-1, A
MOVE WHICH OUR ALLIES ARE MAKING TOO MUCH OF. MEANWHILE,
THE BRITISH AND GERMANS ARE HAVING PROBLEMS WITH OUR
EFFORTS TO REACH A COMMON POSITION ON VARIOUS ISSUES.
END SUMMARY.
2. GRINEVSKY, ACCOMPANIED BY TATARNIKOV, INVITED BARRY
AND HANSEN TO LUNCH APRIL 29, FOLLOWING HIS APRIL 27
RETURN FROM MOSCOW. JUDGING BY HIS HOOD AND ACTIONS,
HE SEEMS TO BE UNDER NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO TRY TO MOVE
AHEAD. HIS CENTRAL PRIORITY IS AN AIR CSBM; HE IS
INSTRUCTED TO GET A SEPARATE THRESHOLD FOR REPORTING AIR
ACTIVITIES, BUT HE MAY SETTLE FOR LESS. JUDGING BY WHAT
HE AND TATARNIKOV SAID, THEIR THINKING ON THE CONTENT
OF AN AIR MEASURE IS NOT TOO FAR FROM OURS:
-- NUMBER (OR RANGE) OF SORTIES OR NUMBER OF PARTICIPA-
TING AIRCRAFT FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF AN EXERCISE
-- TYPES OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED
-- AREA AND DURATION OF ACTIVITY
-- PURPOSE OF EXERCISE
3. WHILE THEY WANT AN INDEPENDENT THRESHOLD FOR AIR,
THEY CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO DEPART
FROM THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT
THEY ARE THINKING OF A HIGH THRESHOLD, EXPRESSED IN
NUMBERS OF SORTIES OVER THE DURATION OF AN EXERCISE
WHICH WOULD CAPTURE THE AIR COMPONENT OF MAJOR GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES AND LARGE INDEPENDENT AIR EXERCISES -
E.G. AIR DEFENSE EXERCISES SUCH AS THE SOVIET GRANITE 86
AND WESTERN EXERCISES SUCH AS EMERALD FOREST OR CENTRAL
ENTERPRISE. WE MAY NOT HAVE HEARD THE LAST WORD ON
THIS; THEY HAVE HINTED THAT THEY MIGHT SETTLE FOR A SUB-
THRESHOLD WITHIN COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES - I.E. ONE
WHERE THE AIR COMPONENT OF A GROUND FORCE EXERCISE
WOULD BE NOTIFIED ONLY IF IT EXCEEDED A CERTAIN LEVEL.
MEANWHILE THE ALLIES AND THE NNA PRESS US TO BE MORE
FLEXIBLE ON INDEPENDENT AIR; WE HAVE BEEN VERY DIRECT
IN WARNING THEM THAT THEY WILL SABOTAGE THE CONFERENCE
IF THEY PERSUADE THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE AT ALL FLEXIBLE
ON THIS POINT.
4. GRINEVSKY SOUNDED FLEXIBLE ABOUT THE "SECONDARY"
ISSUES SUCH AS GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, MOVEMENTS AND
TRANSFERS AND DEFERRAL OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HE IMPLIED
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THAT EVEN VERIFICATION WOULD FALL INTO PLACE EVENTUALLY.
MORE INTERESTING WAS HIS TREATMENT OF HIS GENERAL STAFF
COLLEAGUE, GENERAL TATARNIKOV; GRINEVSKY NOW EVIDENTLY
HAS AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS MILITARY ISSUES AND IS PREPARED
TO DO SO WITH OR WITHOUT TATARNIKOV AT HIS SIDE.
5. GRINEVSKY'S FIRST ACT ON RETURNING WAS TO BREAK THE
PROCEDURAL LOGJAM (OF THEIR OWN MAKING) BY AGREEING TO
DISCUSS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFI-
CATION IN WORKING GROUP B-1, RATHER THAN INSISTING THAT
IT COULD ONLY BE DISCUSSED IN A-2. WE DON'T THINK THE
SOVIETS DESERVE MUCH CREDIT FOR THIS, SINCE THAT WAS THE
ORIGINAL PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, BUT OUR
ALLIES ARE TAKING THIS AS A MAJOR SIGN OF SOVIET GOOD
WILL.
6. WHILE URGING US TO BE FLEXIBLE ON TOPICS WHERE WE
HAVE SAID WE WILL NOT BE, OUR ALLIES CONTINUE TO BE
TOUGH WHERE WE ARE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE. DESK
OFFICERS IN BOTH BONN AND LONDON, OF ALL PLACES, VETOED
A TACTICAL MOVE AIMED AT SEIZING THE INITIATIVE IN THE
NOTIFICATION GROUP; THE FRG MOD IS HAVING TROUBLE WITH
THE CONCEPT OF NOTIFYING NUMBERS OF SORTIES. AND THE
UK CONTINUES TO OPPOSE ALMOST ANY DEPARTURE FROM SC.1
AT THIS STAGE ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE;
PARADOXICALLY THEY ARE LETTING IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY ARE
NOT BOTHERED BY SUCH CONCEPTS AS INDEPENDENT AIR OR
NOTIFYING MOVEMENTS
AND TRANSFERS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03410
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: NOTING OF VERIFICATION LANGUAGE
1. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE WAS NOTED IN COORDINATOR'S
NOTEBOOK IN THE VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP ON 30 APRIL:
BEGIN TEXT: ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS
DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE'S
COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBM'S WILL BE ALLOWED
TO . . . . THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS
. . . WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST.
END TEXT.
2. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE SAME CONCEPT, IN OUR
VIEW INSPECTION, WOULD EVENTUALLY REPLACE BOTH SETS OF
ELLIPSES.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03458
SUBJECT: GRINEVSKY FORMULA FOR DEFERRAL OF NAVAL
ACTIVITIES
REF: STOCKHOLM 1953
1. CDC X - 034
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON MAY 1 AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY
RETURNED TO THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL TO DEFER
NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO A FUTURE STAGE OF THE CDE. HE
INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AND SUGGESTED A FORMULATION.
REACTING TO BARRY'S INITIAL CRITICAL REACTION, GRINEVSKY
INDICATED THAT WHAT HE WANTED WAS A CONFERENCE
UNDERSTANDING ON THE ISSUE AND THAT HE WAS FLEXIBLE ON
THE WORDING OF A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT. WASHINGTON
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED PARA 11. END SUMMARY.
4. IN THE COURSE OF A MAY 1 DISCUSSION OF CDE ISSUES,
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO THE JANUARY 15
GORBACHEV PROPOSAL TO DEFER NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO A FUTURE
STAGE OF THE CDE. HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD
BE SATISFIED WITH A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AND SUGGESTED
THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION.
BEGIN TEXT:
PARTICIPATING STATES CAN RAISE IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS
SUBJECTS RELEVANT TO THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE,
INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
(DESCRIPTION OF THE ZONE ACCORDING TO THE MADRID
MANDATE.) ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, BALANCE
AND RECIPROCITY, EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY
INTERESTS OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-CUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,
THESE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WILL
COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA
AREA (ASTERISK) AND AIR SPACE. THEY WILL BE OF MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE AND POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL BE
PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH
CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.
AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA (ASTERISK) AND AIR
SPACE IS CONCERNED, THE MEASURES WILL BE APPLICABLE TO
THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES
TAKING PLACE THERE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT
SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF
ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS
REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH THEY WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY.
NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE MADE THROUGH THE
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AT THE CONFERENCE.
NOTHING IN THE DCFINITION OF THE ZONE GIVEN ABOVE WILL
DIMINISH OBLIGATIONS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN UNDER THC FINAL
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ACT. THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO
BE AGREED UPON AT THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO BE APPLICABLE
IN ALL AREAS COVERED BY ANY OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE
FINAL ACT RELATING-TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT. (END OF
DESCRIPTION OF THE ZONE ACCORDING TO THE MADRID MANDATE.)
SUCH QUESTIONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION.
FOOTNOTE: (ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NOTION OF
ADJOINING SEA AREA IS UNDERSTOOD TO REFER ALSO TO OCEAN
AREAS ADJOINING EUROPE.
END TEXT.
5. NOTING THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE A
DEFINITIVE VIEW, BARRY SAID THAT HE SAW SEVERAL POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS: FIRST, THE SOVIET FORMULA, BY SINGLING OUT
NAVAL ACTIVITIES, WOULD SET A PRECEDENT AND WOULD INVITE
OTHERS TO ADD OTHER ISSUES. SECOND, BY INCLUDING THE
MADRID MANDATE LANGUAGE, THE SOVIET FORMULA RAISED A
JURIDICAL PROBLEM: IT EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY THAT
SOMC OTHER MANDATE FORMULA MIGHT BE DECIDED IN VIENNA;
WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY WHAT A POST-VIENNA
MANDATE MIGHT LOOK LIKE. THIRD, HE DID NOT LIKE THE
FINAL SENTENCE; IT WENT TOO FAR IN TELLING PARTICIPANTS
IN A POSSIBLE FUTURE CONFERENCE WHAT THEY COULD OR
COULDN'T DISCUSS.
6. BARRY INDICATED THAT HE HAD ANOTHER MORE GENERAL
FORMULA IN MIND, BASED ON HIS MARCH 14 STATEMENT IN
PLENARY (REF), WHICH WOULD NOT SINGLE OUT INDIVIDUAL
ISSUES, BUT WOULD ENABLE A PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH WAS
NOT SATISFIED WITH THE WAY AN ISSUE HAD BEEN DECIDED (IN
STOCKHOLM) TO RAISE IT IN ANY FUTURE STAGE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE "AGREED MANDATE." THIS, BARRY POINTED, OUT
WOULD LEAVE THE ISSUE OF WHICH MANDATE -- MADRID'S OR
VIENNA'S -- OPEN.
7. GRINEVSKY CALLED BARRY'S IDEA "INTERESTING" AND SAID
THAT HE NEEDED TO THINK IT OVER. HE THEN RETURNED TO
HIS OWN FORMULA, ARGUING THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD
RAISE OTHER ISSUES ANYWAY, BUT THAT FOR THE MOMENT NAVAL
ACTIVITY WAS THE ONLY ISSUE RIPE FOR SUCH A LIST. HE
SAID THAT HIS CITATION OF MANDATE LANGUAGE WAS DESIGNED
TO AVOID DISPUTES ABOUT WHAT TYPES OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES
WERE BEING DEFERRED, I.E., FUNCTIONALLY-RELATED ONLY, OR
ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES. AT ONE POINT HE SAID THAT IN HIS
VIEW THE ONLY ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY
POSTPONED WAS NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
8. BARRY RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD BE EVEN HARDER FOR THE
U.S. TO AGREE TO THE POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ISSUES ALONE
AND REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A
GENERAL FORMULA ALONG THE LINES OF HIS PLENARY STATEMENT.
GRINEVSKY CONCEDED THAT BARRY MIGHT BE RIGHT AND SAID
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THAT HE WOULD THINK IT OVER.
9. BEGIN COMMENT: POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES WAS
NOT REPEAT NOT HIGH ON GRINEVSKY'S PRIORITY LIST OF
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES HE WANTED TO ADDRESS. HIS LOW KEY,
FLEXIBLE APPROACH INDICATED THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR A
FACE-SAVING WAY TO SATISFY THE SOVIET REQUIREMENT FOR A
PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AND THAT HE
WOULD NOT INSIST ON HIS FORMULA. FROM OUR POINT OF
VIEW, A VERY GENERAL CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT, WHICH IN NO
WAY WOULD PREJUDGE WHAT VIENNA COULD DISCUSS OR WHAT IT
COULD MANDATE FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE STAGE OF THE CDE,
MIGHT RESOLVE THIS CONTINUING SOURCE OF FRICTION, THUS
PERMITTING US TO FOCUS ON THE REAL SUBSTANCE OF THE
CONFERENCE, I.E., GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.
10. A FORMULA WHICH MIGHT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS WOULD
READ AS FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
PROPOSALS NOT RESOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE
VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, AS WELL AS ANY NEW
ISSUES, MAY BE INTRODUCED IN ANY POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA
CONTINUATION OR NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, PROVIDED
THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED MANDATE.
END TEXT.
11. REQUEST WASHINGTON'S COMMENTS ON FORMULA AND
INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 03496
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)
1. CDE X - 036
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE THE
FOLLOWING TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON MAY 1.
BEGIN TEXT:
THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS
OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION
SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST STATE, AND BACK.
END TEXT.
HARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM03515
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, APRIL 28 -
- MAY 2, 1986
1. CDE X - 037
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THE RETURN OF SOVIET
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HAS CREATED A MOOD OF OPTIMISM IN
THE CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS SAY HE HAS COME BACK BEARING
"NEW, MORE FLEXIBLE" INSTRUCTIONS. IN FACT, THE TONE OF
WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS HAS BEEN MORE CIVIL AND THE
EAST HAS BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING ON MARGINAL ISSUES. ON
THE KEY ISSUE OF INFORMATION THE SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGED --
AND OTHERS EAGERLY ACCEPTED -- THAT THE CONTENT OF
NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN THE NOTIFICATION
(B-1) WORKING GROUP. THE FOCUS OF CONFERENCE ATTENTION
IS NOW SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THE NOTIFICATION OF
INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT
THERE IS NO GIVE IN OUR POSITION BUT MOST OF OUR ALLIES
SEEM PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE ACTIVITIES IN AN EXPANDED
NOTIFICATION REGIME AND MAY HAVE SO HINTED TO THE EAST.
IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP, THE "ENEMY" IS
NOT IN THE EAST BUT WITHIN. ITALY CONTINUES ITS STUBBORN
REFUSAL TO AGREE TO ANY HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IN A
WESTERN TEXT, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY FREEZING THE SUBMISSION
OF ANY FURTHER WESTERN LANGUAGE ON NUF. THE "NEW" SOVIET
STANCE IS MAINLY COSMETIC: AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS CONTENT
OF NOTIFICATION IN B-1, INTRODUCTION OF A "NEW"
CONSTRAINT TO ADDRESS WESTERN CONCERNS ABOUT EQUAL IMPACT
AND ANOTHER POLITICAL SPEECH IN PLENARY PRAISING THE "NEW
PERSPECTIVE" GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 SPEECH GAVE TO CDE. IN
THE SAME PLENARY (MAY 2) THE GDR LAID DOWN THE EAST'S
DREAM PACKAGE: NUF, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND
LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS, THE EAST
CONTENDS, WOULD NOT BE A MINI-PACKAGE BUT A SUBSTANTIVE
RESULT (COMMENT: THIS MAY PRESAGE EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO
ENGINEER AN EVENTUAL TRADE-OFF BETWEEN CONSTRAINTS AND
INSPECTION. END COMMENT). IN THE PROCESS THE SOVIETS
HAVE REGAINED SOME OF THE GROUND THEY LOST LAST WEEK
WHILE THE CONFERENCE WAS WAITING FOR GRINEVSKY'S RETURN
FROM MOSCOW. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: FOLLOWING GRINEVSKY'S RETURN THE EAST
AGREED TO DISCUSS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN A NOTIFICATION
IN WORKING GROUP B-1 ON NOTIFICATION INSTEAD OF IN
WORKING GROUP A-2 ON INFORMATION. WHILE THERE WAS NO
INDICATION OF ANY EASTERN UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING OUR
CONCEPT OF "STATIC" (MEASURE 1) INFORMATION, MANY,
INCLUDING MOST OF OUR ALLIES, GREETED THIS MOVE AS AN
IMPORTANT SIGNAL. IN FACT THE SOVIETS ARE CLAIMING
CREDIT FOR REMOVING AN OBSTACLE WHICH THEY CREATED. IN
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THE MEETING ITSELF NO DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS MADE. AFTER
THE "DRAMATIC" EASTERN MOVE, DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE
COODRDINATOR'S "FOOD FOR THOUGHT", I.E.,.. A DEFINITION OF
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS HAS BEEN BOGGED
DOWN FOR SEVERAL WEEKS BY THE EAST'S (AND MALTA'S)
INSISTENCE THAT THE DEFINITION INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR
(AND NAVAL, IN MALTA'S CASE) ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS
MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS); THE WEST HAS PRESSED THE GROUP TO
FOCUS ON AREAS WHERE THERE IS SOME COMMON GROUND, I.E.,
ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND RELATED PARAMETERS. IN A
PRIVATE CONVERSATION THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAS EXPRESSED
WILLINGNESS, IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING PROGRESS ON
NOTIFICATION, TO DRAFT ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN
THE WORKING GROUP AND TO ADDRESS THE MORE CONTENTIOUS
ISSUES OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION
AND RELATED PARAMETERS MORE INFORMALLY IN COFFEE GROUPS.
5. NON-USE OF FORCE: WHILE THE WEST FIDDLED, ROME
BURNED: DURING THE WEEK NATO DELEGATIONS TRIED OUT
VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS FORMULATIONS TO GET ROME TO GO
ALONG WITH A FULL WESTERN NUF TEXT. NEVERTHELESS, ROME
CONTINUED ITS "PRINCIPLED" (READ STUBBORN) REFUSAL TO
CONSIDER ANY HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. WHEN THE ITALIANS
WERE REMINDED THAT THEIR OWN NUF DRAFT SUBMITTED FOR NATO
CONSIDERATION LAST YEAR INCLUDED STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS
LANGUAGE, THEY WERE SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK AND FINALLY
AGREED TO PROPOSE TO ROME A MARRIAGE OF THE EARLIER
ITALIAN LANGUAGE TO THE PROVISIONAL NATO TEXT. THE REST
OF THE WESTERN NUF TEXT CONTAINING ALL KEY U.S. ELEMENTS
HAS BEEN AGREED TO WITH SOME AMENDMENTS (INCLUDING
U.S.). IF NATO CAN AGREE ON HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, THE
REST OF THE NUF TEXT SHOULD FALL INTO PLACE, THEREBY
ALLOWING THE WEST TO PLAY ITS NUF CARDS IN THE WORKING
GROUP.
WHILE THE WEST FIDDLED, RAKHMANINOV BURNED: IN A STUDIED
DISPLAY OF INDIGNATION, THE SOVIET NUF REPRESENTATIVE
ACCUSED THE WEST IN PLENARY OF FOOTDRAGGING ON NUT,
THEREBY IMPEDING PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE. THE TESTY
NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL-AUSTRIA) IS ALSO IRRITATED BY
NATO'S INABILITY TO INTRODUCE AND, THEREFORE, DRAFT
LANGUAGE IN THE WORKING GROUP.
6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: THE EAST
DEMONSTRATED NEW BUT NONSUBSTANTIVE "FLEXIBILITY" BY
AGREEING TO A NONPREJUDICIAL PARAGRAPH ON VERIFICATION
INDICATING THAT STATES WITH DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE HAVE
CERTAIN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (REPORTED SEPTEL).
THE QUESTION OF WHAT THESE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
ARE (I.E, WHAT FORMS OF VERIFICATION WILL BE AVAILABLE)
WAS DEFERRED. THE SOVIETS DROPPED THEIR EARLIER
REQUIREMENT THAT A STATE MUST HAVE "GROUNDS" FOR DOUBTS,
ALTHOUGH THE TEXT ALSO NOTES THAT THE "REASONS" FOR A
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VERIFICATION REQUEST MUST BE STATED VICE THE REQUIREMENT
TO STATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN SC.1. THE GENERAL VIEW IN
STOCKHOLM IS THAT THE FORMS OF VERIFICATION TO BE AGREED
WILL CONTINUE TO BE A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE AND IS LIKELY TO
BE ONE OF THE LAST RESOLVED. THE EAST, HOWEVER, NOW
SEEMS PREPARED TO JOIN NATO AND THE NNA IN DRAFTING A
FRAMEWORK" TEXT FOR VERIFICATION.
NATO ALSO REEMPHASIZED ITS COMMITMENT TO MEASURE 1 THIS
WEEK BUT THE EAST REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN THE DISCUSSION.
NATO WILL NONETHELESS CONTINUE TO PROMOTE MEASURE 1 IN
THE A-2 GROUP BUT WE FEAR IT WILL CONTINUE TO BE A
MONOLOGUE. THE EAST IS CLEARLY NOT GOING TO DISCUSS
STATIC INFORMATION IN ANY VENUE AND THE NNA, WHICH DOES
NOT HAVE A SEPARATE INFORMATION MEASURE, SEEMS PREPARED
TO SHIFT DISCUSSION OF THE "STATIC" INFORMATION ELEMENTS
OF ITS PACKAGE TO OTHER GROUPS.
7. OBSERVATION: MAINTAINING A STEADY DRAFTING PACE ON
ADMINSTRATIVE MATTERS, THE WORKING GROUP AGREED TO NOTE
A SENTENCE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK THAT THE INVITED
STATE WILL PAY THE COST OF ITS OBSERVERS' TRANSPORTATION
TO AND FROM THE HOST STATE. MORE SUBSTANTIVELY, THE
SOVIETS REJECTED NATO, NNA AND IRISH ARGUMENTS THAT
OBSERVERS NEED TO BE PROVIDED WITH DETAILED ANNOTATED
MAPS. ONCE AGAIN, THE SOVIETS DEMONSTRATED THEIR
RELUCTANCE TO AGREE TO ANY MEASURES WHICH COULD ACTUALLY
ENHANCE AN OBSERVER'S ABILILITY TO ASSESS AN ACTIVITY
ACCURATELY.
8. CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE ATMOSPHERE WAS
BETTER IN THIS GROUP; EASTERN AND NNA CRITICISM OF THE
WEST'S REJECTION OF CEILINGS WAS SURPRISINGLY MUTED. THE
EAST (BULGARIA) INTRODUCED A PAPER LIMITING GROUND FORCE
MANEUVERS WHICH ARE TWO TIMES LARGER THAN THE NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL TO A TOTAL OF SIX PER YEAR. WHILE THIS REPRESENTS
THE FIRST EASTERN CONSTRAINT TEXT WHICH IS NOT A STRAIGHT
CEILING, IT IS CLEARLY PATTERNED ON THE NNA CONSTRAINT
AND DOES NOT MOVE IN THE WEST'S DIRECTION, I.E., THE
CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST. IN A
DISCUSSION OF THE IRISH TIME CONSTRAINT, THE SOVIET
GENERAL -- BACK IN THE SADDLE AFTER A WEEK'S ABSENCE
(WHICH HAD FUELED SPECULATION ABOUT A SHIFT IN THE SOVIET
ATTITUDE TOWARDS CONSTRAINTS/FORECASTS) -- APPEARED NOT
TO REJECT OUT OF HAND THE IDEA OF A TIME CONSTRAINT. THE
UK ELABORATED ON ITS REASONS FOR REJECTING A CEILING ON
ALERTS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03622
SUBJECT: SOVIET DEMARCHE TO NATO ALLIES ON CURRENT
- STATUS OF CDE NEGOTIATIONS
1. CDE X - 040
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS HAVE APPROACHED NORWAY,
THE UK, CANADA, THE NETHERLANDS, AND TURKEY TO EXPRESS
THEIR CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM.
THE SOVIET DEMARCHE, IN CAPITALS, STRESSED THAT A
MEANINGFUL CDE OUTCOME COULD LEAD TO A PHASE II CDE.
THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO TOUT THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV
OFFER TO AGREE TO NOTIFY GROUND AND AIR ACTIVITIES NOW,
WHILE EXPLICITLY POSTPONING NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO THE NEXT
PHASE AS THE KEY TO A SOLUTION. (COMMENT: WE ASSUME
SIMILAR DEMARCHES WERE MADE IN NNA CAPITALS. WASHINGTON
MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A U.S. APPROACH IN NNA AND WARSAW
PACT CAPITALS, OUTLINING THE U.S. VIEWS ON THE CDE AND
THE CDE'S FUTURE IN THE CSCE PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME
WASHINGTON SHOULD, AT THE MINIMUM, TOUCH BASE WITH NATO
ALLIES ON CDE ISSUES PRIOR TO THE NATO MINISTERIAL IN
HALIFAX. END COMMENT.) END SUMMARY.
4. AT THE CDE NATO CAUCUS MAY 7, AMBASSADOR MEVIK
(NORWAY) REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RECENTLY
APPROACHED THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO EXPRESS THEIR
CONCERN ABOUT THE SLOW PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN
STOCKHOLM. THE NETHERLANDS, TURKEY, CANADA AND THE UK
REPORTED THAT THEY HAD SIMILARLY BEEN APPROACHED IN
CAPITALS. MEVIK OUTLINED THE DEMARCHE MADE BY SOVIET
MINISTER COUNSELOR SMIRNOV ON APRIL 29. IN ADDITION TO
VOICING GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THE CONFERENCE, SMIRNOV'S
MAIN POINTS WERE THAT:
A MEANINGFUL RESULT IN STOCKHOLM WOULD CREATE THE
CONDITIONS FOR AN "EXTRA MANDATE" TO BE ADOPTED AT THE
VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING FOR A PHASE II CDE NEGOTIATION
WHERE DISARMAMENT ISSUES WOULD BE IN THE FOREGROUND.
THE MAIN PROBLEM IN CDE REMAINS THE ISSUE OF
NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE JANUARY 15
GORBACHEV OFFER SHOWED THE WAY TO A SOLUTION --
AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF LAND FORCES AND "AIR"
ACTIVITIES NOW AND POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES
UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE. (NOTE: MEVIK POINTED OUT THAT
SMIRNOV HAD SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO "AIR" ACTIVITIES,
NOT "INDEPENDENT" AIR ACTIVITIES.)
THE SOVIETS REGRET THAT THE WEST HAS MADE NO
CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL.
THE POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO THE NEXT
PHASE COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IF THERE IS SPECIFIC
AGREEMENT TO DO SO IN STOCKHOLM.
-- THE INCLUSION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IS
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ESSENTIAL TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM,
PARTICULARLY THE ELABORATION OF ITS MILITARY ASPECTS.
-- CONSTRAINTS WERE MENTIONED IN THE DEMARCHE, BUT ONLY
IN PASSING.
5. DEMARCHES MADE IN LONDON, OTTAWA, ANKARA AND THE
HAGUE WERE SIMILAR, ALTHOUGH BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) DID
NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR AN
AGREEMENT ON "INDEPENDENT" AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE HAGUE.
6. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO FIRM KNOWLEDGE, WE
ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS LIKELY HAVE MADE SIMILAR
APPROACHES IN NNA CAPITALS. SUCH A STEP WOULD BE
CONSISTENT WITH AN EMERGING EASTERN CAMPAIGN TO TRY TO
PLACE THE BLAME FOR SLOW PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM ON THE
WEST AND MORE SPECIFICALLY ON THE U.S. USDEL BELIEVES
WASHINGTON SHOULD CONSIDER AN APPROACH TO NNA AND WARSAW
PACT CAPITALS EXPRESSING OUR OWN VIEWS BOTH ON THE
CURRENT STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CDE'S FUTURE
WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS MORE GENERALLY. SUCH AN
APPROACH IN NATO CAPITALS MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN
ORDER TO AVOID ANY ALLIANCE MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT U.S.
POSITIONS ON KEY CDE ISSUES. AT A MINIMUM, WE BELIEVE
THAT GENERAL SOUNDINGS ON CDE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN NATO
PRIOR TO THE NATO MINISTERIAL IN HALIFAX SO THAT WE ARE
NOT BLIND-SIDED BY ANY SUDDEN SHIFTS IN ALLIED POSITIONS
ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR
ACTIVITIES. END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03626
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE "NOTED" IN VERIFICATION
WORKING GROUP, MAY 7, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 03410
1. CDE XI - 41.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED DURING THE MAY 7, 1986
MEETING OF WORKING GROUP A ON "INFORMATION, VERIFICATION,
AND COMMUNICATION" TO "NOTE" A FURTHER TEXT IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. THIS SENTENCE FOLLOWS
ON THE TWO SENTENCES PROVISIONALLY NOTED AT THE
APRIL 30 WORKING GROUP MEETING. TEXT IS:
BEGIN TEXT.
"THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH
A REQUEST WILL . . . WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF
TIME. (FULL STOP) . . . " END TEXT.
IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE USE OF ELLIPSES IN MID-
SENTENCE DID NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF ANY
DELEGATION CONCERNING WHAT SHOULD BE INSERTED
IN LIEU OF ELLIPSES.
4. COMMENT. THIS SENTENCE IS THE THIRD IN A
SERIES OF SENTENCES ORIGINALLY OFFERED BY COORDINATOR
SCHEME AS "FOOD FOR THOUGHT" AND ONE OF THE KEY
SENTENCES IN THE WESTERN APPROACH TO VERIFICATION
(REFTEL). THE FIRST OF THESE SENTENCES,
PROVISIONALLY NOTED ON APRIL 30, CONFIRMS THE RIGHT
TO CONDUCT SPECIFIC VERIFICATION -- THAT IS, IN OUR
VIEW, INSPECTION. THE SECOND SENTENCE ADDRESSES
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE EXERCISING THAT
RIGHT. THIS THIRD SENTENCE IS A LOGICAL FOLLOW-ON,
AND KEY, TO THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES INASMUCH AS IT
STATES THAT THE STATE RECEIVING A REQUEST HAS A
RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT, AND IN SHORT ORDER. IN OUR
VIEW, THAT ACTION IS TO ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST WITH
NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL. DURING DISCUSSION OF WHAT
MIGHT FIT INTO THE MID-SENTENCE ELLIPSES WEST AND
NNA BOTH ARGUED THAT IT HAD TO BE ACCEPTANCE OF THE
REQUEST. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE EAST ARGUED FOR A
LESS PRECISE TERM: "RESPOND," AND THE COMPROMISE
WAS TO SUBSTITUTE ELLIPSES FOR NOW. ELLIPSES AT
THE END OF THE SENTENCE INDICATE THAT MORE TEXT IS TO
FOLLOW. END COMMENT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03682
SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE UPDATE
REF: STATE 137812
1. CDE X - 046
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: NATO HAS AGREED ON A FULL WESTERN
TEXT WHICH, IN USDEL'S VIEW, REFLECTS ALL KEY U.S.
CONCEPTS AND MODIFICATIONS; ITALY IS STILL A HOLDOUT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS BUT HAS ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A HUMAN
RIGHTS PASSAGE IN THE TEXT (SEE PARA 7 FOR FULL TEXT
EXCEPT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS). ACCORDINGLY, ON MAY 6, NATO
TABLED ITS SECOND "COHERENT" BLOCK -- A TEXT ON THE
REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND COLLATERAL
CONSIDERATIONS. THE NATO TEXT WAS WELCOMED BY MOST
DELEGATIONS AND HAS CLEARED THE WAY FOR FURTHER DRAFTING
IN THIS WORKING GROUP. THE U.S. HAS LAID DOWN A MARKER
THAT WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, WE WILL
NOT AGREE TO ANY FURTHER TABLING OF TEXTS. END SUMMARY.
4. BACKGROUND. BASED ON REFTEL, USDEL PRESSED NATO TO
ACCEPT REMAINING U.S. MODIFICATIONS TO AD REFERENDUM
WESTERN NUF TEXT, PARTICULARLY THE KEY CHANGE NOTED IN
PARR 3 REFTEL (I.E., ELIMINATING THE WORDS "WHETHER
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR OTHERWISE" AND RETURNING
TO HFA.LANGUAGE). THE 16 ACCEPTED THIS CHANGE BUT NOT
ALL OTHER U.S. MODIFICATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, USDEL
BELIEVES THAT THE WESTERN TEXT, PENDING SATISFACTORY
RESOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, NOW REFLECTS ALL
VITAL U.S. CONCEPTS AND MODIFICATIONS. THEREFORE, BASED
ON SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS, THE
TEXT IS READY FOR TABLING (SEE PARA 7 FOR FULL TEXT).
NATO IS WELL AWARE THAT WITHOUT HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE,
WHICH MUST GO BEYOND THE NNA LANGUAGE, THE U.S. (AS WELL
AS FRANCE, UK, CANADA) WILL NOT ACCEPT THE TABLING OF
ANY MORE WESTERN LANGUAGE IN THE A-1 (NUF) WORKING
GROUP. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE REMAINDER OF THE TEXT
CONTAINS ELEMENTS WHICH ARE KEY TO VARIOUS ALLIES, E.G.,
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS (CANADA), TERRORISM (TURKEY), THE
PRESSURE WILL REMAIN ON ITALY TO RESOLVE THE HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUE SO WE CAN TABLE THE REST OF THE TEXT.
5. NUF DEVELOPMENTS (MAY 5-9): NATO REACHED AGREEMENT
ON MAY 5 ON A FULL NUF TEXT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
INCLUSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. ON TUESDAY (MAY 6),
AFTER PRESSURE FROM ALL OTHER NATO DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING
DEMARCHES BY THE EC-12 AND THE FRG IN ROME, ITALY AGREED
IN PRINCIPLE TO THE INCLUSION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE
IN THE WEST'S NUF TEXT. (WE ARE STILL HAMMERING OUT
LANGUAGE ON SUCH A HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE, WHICH MUST GO
BEYOND THE NNA LANGUAGE; SEPTEL FOLLOWS ON THIS SUBJECT.)
HAVING ACHIEVED ITALIAN AGREEMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS
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LANGUAGE IN PRINCIPLE, AT THE TUESDAY A-1 WORKING GROUP
MEETING THE U.S., SUPPORTED BY ITALY AND DENMARK, TABLED
NATO'S SECOND ELEMENT, NOW CHARACTERIZED AS ITS SECOND
"COHERENT BLOCK," THAT IS, THE NUF REAFFIRMATION ITSELF
AND COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS (SELF-DEFENSE, ANTI-
BREZHNEV DOCTRINE PROVISIONS, I.E., THE FIRST FIVE
PARAGRAPHS OF THE TEXT IN PARA 7). INTRODUCTION OF THIS
BLOCK OF LANGUAGE WAS WELCOMED IN THE WORKING GROUP BY
ALMOST ALL PARTICIPANTS, EVEN IN A MUTED FASHION, BY THE
SOVIET REP, WITH THE ONLY DISCORDANT NOTE STRUCK BY
POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI.
6. THE NNA COORDINATOR IS NOW TAKING INFORMAL SOUNDINGS
AS TO THE NEXT LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR DRAFTING. NATO IS
EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF DRAFTING IN THE AREAS OF
THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF AND THE LINK BETWEEN THE
PRINCIPLE AND CSBM'S. A CONTACT GROUP OF ALL INTERESTED
PARTIES WILL BE HELD ON MONDAY, MAY 12, TO IDENTIFY
APPROPRIATE SUBJECT(S). OF COURSE, DRAFTING IN THIS
WORKING GROUP CONTINUES TO BE PREDICATED UPON COMMEN-
SURATE PROGRESS IN THE OTHER (CSBM'S) WORKING GROUPS.
7. BEGIN WESTERN NUF TEXT (EXCEPT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS):
CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THEIR
OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL
AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY MANNER
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
ACCORDINGLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR
COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS
PRINCIPLE AS LAID DOWN IN PRINCIPLE II OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT.
NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT
RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
THIS PRINCIPLE. THEY RECALLED THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR
THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-
DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS.
THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF
FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING
STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE
OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS
FREEDOM AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY
TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.
THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH OTHER'S
TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR OTHER
DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISITION BY MEANS
OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM. NO SUCH
OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
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THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO
REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL
RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES,
IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH EACH
OTHER RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE, AS WELL AS IN THEIR
RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.
THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL THOUGH NOT
EXCLUSIVE FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION
OF PEACE AND SECURITY.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRMED THAT, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF
THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY
OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL.
THEY RECONFIRMED THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN
EQUALITY OF ALL STATES AND NOTE THAT ALL SOVEREIGN STATES
HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND EQUAL DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
TIM ARE FURTHER CONVINCED THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IS INDISPENSABLE FOR BUILDING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ONCE AGAIN EXPRESSED THEIR
CONCERN AT CONTINUING ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY CONDEMNED
TERRORISM AND EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE
MEASURES TO COMBAT IT. REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENTS
UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT, THEY EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE
EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF
ACTS OF TERRORISM, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMBAT
AGAINST ACTS OF TERRORISM, THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE
MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM
BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMIS-
SION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED
AGAINST OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.
THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES
OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE
AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED,
EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
OTHERS.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 03710
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS -
MAY 5-9, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 3626
1. CDE I - 048
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THERE IS GROWING
DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE WAY THE WORKING GROUPS ARE
WORKING -- OR, MORE PROPERLY, NOT WORKING. IN
PARTICULAR, THE NNA COORDINATORS AND THE NNA THEMSELVES
ARE COMING UNDER INCREASING CRITICISM FROM EAST AND
WEST. ACCORDINGLY, MUCH OF THE ACTION HAS BEGUN TO
SHIFT TO BEHIND-THE-SCENES CONTACTS, E.G., U.S.-SOVIET,
EAST-WEST. FOR EXAMPLE, BECAUSE THE SWEDISH
"NOTIFICATION" COORDINATOR FUMBLED THE CONTENTIOUS
SUBJECT OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED IN THE
WORKING GROUP, EASTERN AND WESTERN DELEGATIONS MET
WITHOUT A COORDINATOR TO ATTEMPT TO DRAFT. VERIFICATION
DRAFTING HAS BEEN POSSIBLE THROUGH THE COORDINATOR BUT
REAL PROGRESS REMAINS ELUSIVE. NO PROGRESS WAS
REGISTERED ON OBSERVATION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL
WEEKS AS THE GROUP BEGINS TO CONFRONT THE MORE
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. THE ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINTS
WORKING GROUP IS DEADLOCKED AS THE EAST REFUSED TO
ADDRESS ANNUAL FORECASTS AND THE WEST REMAINS FIRM IN
OPPOSING CONSTRAINING MEASURES. END SUMMARY AND
ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: PROGRESS ON DRAFTING IN THE WORKING
GROUPS CONTINUES TO BE BLOCKED BY THE IMPASSE ON TYPES
OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND HAS NOT BEEN HELPED BY
THE CLUMSY COORDINATOR. WHENEVER THE WEST TRIES TO
FOCUS DISCUSSION ON GROUND FORCE AND COMBINED ARMS
ACTIVITIES, THE EAST INSISTS ON TURNING TO THE
NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES; AND MALTA, AS REGULAR AS
CLOCKWORK, CHIMES IN, INSISTING THAT NAVAL ACTIVITIES BE
GIVEN EQUAL TIME. THE SWEDISH COORDINATOR HAS INSISTED
ON TRYING TO DRAFT ON THIS IMPOSSIBLE TOPIC. MOREOVER,
HE UNILATERALLY PROPOSED A COUNTERTEXT TO AN NNA/WESTERN
PROPOSAL WHICH STYMIED A GROWING MOVE TOWARD ACCEPTANCE
OF A COMPROMISE TEXT. THE COORDINATOR'S PRELIMINARY
PAPER ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION INCLUDED PROVISIONS
FOR DETAILED INFORMATION ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES
WHICH WOULD PLACE THE ONUS ON THOSE WHO WISH TO DELETE
RATHER THAN ADD ITEMS -- READ THE WEST. WE HAVE TOLD
LIDGARD THAT HIS PAPER WON'T FLY. ALL OF THIS LED THE
WESTERN NEGOTIATING TEAM TO REQUEST A MEETING WITH
EASTERN REPS TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT THE COORDINATOR. THE
FIRST OF SUCH MEETINGS SEEMED TO INDICATE AN EVOLUTION
OF THE SOVIET POSITION TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF THE BASIC
WESTERN APPROACH THAT ONLY FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR
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ACTIVITY IS TO BE NOTIFIED.
5. NON-USE OF FORCE: NATO HAS REACHED AGREEMENT ON A
FULL NUF TEXT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LANGUAGE. HOWEVER, AFTER PRESSURE FROM ALL-OTHER NATO
DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING DEMARCHES BY THE EC-12 AND THE
FRG IN ROME, ITALY AT LEAST AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A
HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE IN THE WEST'S NUF TEXT. WE ARE
STILL HAMMERING OUT LANGUAGE ON SUCH A PASSAGE WHICH GOES
BEYOND NNA HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE (OUR MINIMUM DEMAND).
BASED ON THIS TENTATIVE AGREEMENT ON A FULL TEXT (AND
THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE REST OF THE TEXT WILL NOT BE
TABLED UNTIL THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMBROGLIO IS RESOLVED),
THE WEST INTRODUCED ITS SECOND "COHERENT BLOCK" -- THE
NUF REAFFIRMATION AND COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS
THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AND ANTI-BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE LANGUAGE. INTRODUCTION OF THIS BLOCK WAS
WELCOMED IN THE WORKING GROUP BY ALMOST ALL CONFERENCE
PARTICIPANTS. WHILE THE SOVIETS ARE SURE TO HAVE
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE REFERENCES,
THEY WERE STUDIOUSLY NONCONFRONTATIONAL IN THE WORKING
GROUP. BASED ON THE "POSITIVE VIBRATIONS" IN THE WORKING
GROUP, THE NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) IS NOW
TAKING INFORMAL SOUNDINGS AS TO THE NEXT LIKELY CANDIDATE
FOR DRAFTING. THE WEST WILL PROPOSE THE CSBM'S-NUF LINK
AS THE LOGICAL CANDIDATE, SINCE BOTH NATO AND THE NNA
SHARE THE SAME APPROACH ON THE ISSUE, I.E., CSBM'S BY
THEIR VERY SCOPE AND NATURE GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO
THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF
FORCE. THE EAST, ON THE OTHER HAND, MAINTAINS THAT
AGREEING TO A NUF COMMITMENT IN STOCKHOLM JUSTIFIES
INCLUDING CONCRETE CSBM'S AS PART OF A CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT.
6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: THE WEST
SUCCEEDED IN ACHIEVING ITS TACTICAL OBJECTIVE OF
DEMONSTRATING THAT MEASURE 1 WAS ALIVE AND KICKING BY
DRAWING THE NNA AND A VERY RELUCTANT EAST BACK INTO THE
DISCUSSION. THE NNA (SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, MALTA), WHICH
HAD BEEN SILENT ON INFORMATION IN THIS GROUP LAST WEEK,
ENERGETICALLY ENGAGED ON THE ISSUE. SWITZERLAND, WHICH
REITERATED ITS SUPPORT FOR ELEMENTS OF MEASURE 1, AND
SWEDEN, WHICH INDICATED IT HAD "NO PROBLEMS WITH
MEASURE 1," WERE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. PROVOKED BY
AMBASSADOR HANSEN, THE EAST FELT COMPELLED TO ENGAGE
EVEN THOUGH THEY MADE NO POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION.
ON VERIFICATION, THE THIRD IN A SERIES OF SENTENCES
PROPOSED BY THE COORDINATOR (SCHENK-SWITZERLAND) WAS
AGREED FOR NOTATION, I.E., "THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH
HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL . WITHIN THE AGREED
PERIOD OF TIME. . . ." (REFTEL). AS DID THE FIRST TWO
SENTENCES IN THE SERIES, THIS ONE PUTS ANOTHER BONE ON
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THE VERIFICATION SKELETON. IN OUR VIEW THE FIRST SET OF
ELLIPSES SHOULD BE REPLACED WITH THE WORDS "ACCEDE TO
THE REQUEST" TO REFLECT THAT THERE MUST BE UNEQUIVOCAL
ACCEPTANCE OF A REQUEST. THE NNA JOINED IN SUPPORTING
THIS FORMULATION BECAUSE IT BELIEVES ACCEPTANCE SHOULD BE
THE NORM. THE EAST, HOWEVER, WOULD USE THE VAGUE TERM
"RESPOND," LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESPONSE
THAT IS LESS THAN AN ACCEPTANCE. THE SECOND SET OF
ELLIPSES SIMPLY MEANS THAT MORE TEXT IS TO COME. THE
EMERGING SKELETON SHOULD AID IN SPEEDING WORK WHEN, AND
IF, THE EAST SHOWS FLEXIBILITY ON INSPECTION.
7. OBSERVATION: FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL WEEKS NO
DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS MADE. THE EAST TABLED THREE
PROPOSALS DESIGNED MORE TO SLOW PROGRESS THAN TO IDENTIFY
COMMON GROUND. THE EAST LAID DOWN A FURTHER MARKER THAT
INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES MUST BE INCLUDED IN CSBM'S, BY
INTRODUCING A TEXT ON THE MODALITIES OF OBSERVATION OF
BOTH INDEPENDENT AND COMBINED AIR ACTIVITIES. WHILE THE
SPECIFIC MODALITIES OFFERED FOR OBSERVATION OF AIR IN
JOINT ACTIVITIES MIGHT PROVIDE SOME ROOM FOR LATER
DISCUSSION, NATO BASICALLY REJECTED THE PROPOSAL AS AN
EFFORT TO PREEMPT A DECISION IN B-1 ON THE TYPES OF
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. THE EAST ALSO PROPOSED THAT
THE INVITING STATE DETERMINE THE DURATION AND MODALITIES
OF OBSERVATION FOR EACH ACTIVITY, THUS PROVIDING ANOTHER
INDICATION OF ITS INTENTION TO CONTROL TIGHTLY OBSERVERS
ACTIVITIES AND, THEREBY, THEIR PERCEPTIONS. FOR THE
THIRD WEEK IN A ROW THE EAST AGAIN BLOCKED PROGRESS IN
AN INFORMAL COFFEE GROUP, THIS TIME ON THE PROVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES TO OBSERVERS.
8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: IT IS CLEAR TO ALL THAT THE EAST
IS BLOCKING PROGRESS ON DRAFTING ON ANNUAL FORECASTS.
THIS WEEK THE EAST REFUSED TO TRY TO REGISTER TEXT ON
THE CONTENT OF SUCH A FORECAST, SPECIFICALLY ON THE
DURATION OF A FORECAST ACTIVITY. WHILE SOME OF OUR
ALLIES SEE IN THIS FOOTDRAGGING LINKAGE WITH THE WEST'S
REJECTION OF EXISTING CONSTRAINTS PROPOSALS, IN OUR VIEW
IT REFLECTS EASTERN CONCERN THAT NOTHING PREJUDICE THEIR
POSITION ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION (B-1).
9. CONSTRAINTS: THERE WAS NO REAL PRESSURE ON THE WEST
FOR MOVEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS THIS WEEK. THE NNA WERE
CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR SILENCE -- EVEN THE YUGOSLAV
GODFATHER OF CONSTRAINTS DID NOT JOIN THE DISCUSSION.
SOVIET REPS GAVE TWO INTERESTING STATEMENTS: ONE
DISPARAGING IRISH IDEAS FOR CONSTRAINING THE CALENDAR,
AND THE OTHER BLAMING THE WEST FOR LACK OF PROGRESS ON
CONSTRAINTS AND PROVIDING DETAILED STATISTICS ON NATO
ACTIVITIES TO BOLSTER THEIR ARGUMENT ON THE NEED FOR A
CEILING ON THE SCALE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES. IN FRIDAY'S
PLENARY (MAY 9) THE SOVIETS ACCUSED THE U.S., UK, AND
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OTHERS OF BEING UNWILLING EVEN TO CONSIDER CONSTRAINTS.
SOME DELEGATIONS INTERPRETED THIS STATEMENT AS PREPARING
THE WAY FOR THE EAST EITHER TO DROP CONSTRAINTS OR, MORE
PROBABLY, TO TRY TO TRADE THEM FOR SOMETHING ELSE.
(BEGIN COMMENT: THE SOVIETS OFTEN SEEM TO USE THE
PLENARY TO MAKE POINTS TO REPORT TO MOSCOW THAT THEY
HAVE MADE THE GOOD EFFORT. END COMMENT.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 03816
SUBJECT: NATO AGREES ON HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE (ALMOST)
REF: STOCKHOLM 3259
. CDE X - 049
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON MAY 12, ROME RELUCTANTLY AGREED
TO HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED IN A WESTERN
NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT. THIS LANGUAGE GOES BEYOND THE
NNA HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE. ACCORDINGLY, ALL NATO
DELEGATIONS SEEMED TO HAVE REACHED CONSENSUS ON A FULL
NUF TEXT. HOWEVER, AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT FRANCE
SAID THAT IT "MIGHT" HAVE SOME MINOR MODIFICATIONS TO
SUGGEST ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM. STAY TUNED. END
SUMMARY.
4. AFTER PERSISTENT PRESSURE FROM ALL NATO DELEGATIONS,
INCLUDING DEMARCHES IN ROME BY THE EC-12 AND THE FRG, ON
MAY 6 ITALY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE INCLUSION OF A
HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE IN THE NATO NUF TEXT. THE ITALIANS
STILL ARGUED, HOWEVER, FOR A MINIMALIST TEXT WHICH PUT
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF
PRINCIPLE 7 (ON HUMAN RIGHTS) OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT;
MOREOVER, THEY MAINTAIN THAT THIS TEXT COULD NOT DEPART
SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE NNA LANGUAGE OF SC.7. WHILE A
NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF THE
ITALIAN APPROACH, THEY TRIED NEVERTHELESS TO FIND A WAY
TO ACCOMMODATE ROME. THE U.S. STATED THAT WE HAD NO
OBJECTION TO DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT; HOWEVER, WE LAID DOWN A
MARKER THAT ANY WESTERN TEXT, AT A MINIMUM, MUST GO
BEYOND THE NNA TEXT.
5. ON MAY 7, ITALY SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR-COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES. THESE PRINCIPLES
ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE
EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING
INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
"THEY RECALLED THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, SECURITY
AND JUSTICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE
FINAL ACT, WOULD BE ENHANCED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG THEMSELVES, AS AMONG ALL STATES,
OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AS WELL AS OF COOPERATION IN
HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS.
IN THIS CONTEXT THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM THE
RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE
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PROCESS AND FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY."
END TEXT.
6. WHILE SOME DELEGATIONS SAID THEY COULD GO ALONG WITH
THIS TEXT, THE U.S. AND OTHERS (E.G., UK, CANADA, TURKEY)
STRENUOUSLY OBJECTED, NOTING THAT THE THIRD PARAGRAPH,
THE CORE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SECTION, WAS A RETREAT FROM
THE NNA POSITION. IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THAT FURTHER
PROGRESS ON NON-USE OF FORCE, E.G., TABLING OF MORE NATO
LANGUAGE AND DRAFTING IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP, WAS
DEPENDENT ON ROME'S ACCEPTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE.
CONSEQUENTLY, ON MAY 12, PAOLO PUCCI DI BENISICHI, HEAD
OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CSCE DEPARTMENT, TRAVELED TO
STOCKHOLM TO DELIVER ROME'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS LANGUAGE WORKED OUT BY THE NATO NUF EXPERTS IN
STOC*HOLM. HE TERMED ITALY'S ACQUIESCENCE AS A "MAJOR
CONCESSION" IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ALLIED SOLIDARITY IN
STOCKHOLM.
7. CONSENSUS TEXT FOLLOWS:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, AND DECLARED
THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT THESE PRINCIPLES AND TO
PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE ALL
OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY
AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
"THEY RECALLED THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, SECURITY
AND JUSTICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE
FINAL ACT, WOULD BE ENHANCED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES, AS
AMONG ALL STATES, OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AS WELL AS OF
COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS.
"IN THIS CONTEXT THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS,
THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR PEACE
AND JUSTICE. THEY THUS STRESSED THE NECESSITY TO
PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, AS AN INDISPENSABLE COMPONENT OF
THE CSCE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY."
END TEXT.
8. THIS LANGUAGE CONTAINS ALL THE CONCEPTS CONTAINED IN
THE ORIGINALLY ADOPTED FORMULA (REFTEL): 1) THE
UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS; 2) THE LINK BETWEEN RESPECT FOR THESE RIGHTS
AND THE CSCE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY; 3) THE
NECESSITY TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE
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EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS; AND 4) THE COMMITMENT TO
RESPECT THESE PRINCIPLES, IRRESPECTIVE OF A STATE'S
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEM (SEE FIRST
PARAGRAPH ABOVE. FURTHERMORE, THE TEXT ADDS THE
COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT ALL ?ROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF
THE FINAL ACT, INCLUDING COOPERATION IN "HUMANITARIAN
AND OTHER FIELDS." THIS PASSAGE IS MARGINALLY STRONGER
THAN THE TEXT APPROVED BY WASHINGTON. IT INCLUDES ALL
ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE NNA TEXT (SC.7) PLUS POINTS 3
AND 4 ABOVE.
9. THEREFORE, DELEGATION JOINED CONSENSUS ON THE TEXT
CONTAINED IN PARA 7 ABOVE ON MAY 12. AT THAT POINT, IT
SEEMED THAT THE LAST PIECE OF THE WESTERN NUF PUZZLE HAD
FALLEN INTO PLACE. SADLY, THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.
FRANCE INTERJECTED THAT IT "MIGHT" HAVE SOME "MINOR"
MODIFICATIONS TO OFFER ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM
BEFORE MAY 15. (BEGIN COMMENT. FRENCH DELEGATION HAS
TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO DISSUADE PARIS
-- READ D'ABOVILLE - FROM INSISTING ON FURTHER CHANGES
IN THE TEXT. STAY TUNED. END COMMENT.)
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03838
SUBJECT: POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES
REF: A) STATE 146054, B) STOCKHOLM 3458
1. CDEI-051
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF
INSTRUCTIONS, U.S. CDE AMBASSADOR BARRY CONVEYED U.S.
FORMULA FOR A POSSIBLE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT TO RESOLVE
THE IMPASSE RESULTING FROM THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S
INSISTENCE THAT THE CONFERENCE FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGE
GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY REACTED BY
PROPOSING A NEW SOVIET FORMULA WHICH WAS A STEP BACKWARD
FROM EARLIER SOVIET LANGUAGE. BARRY SAID HE WOULD REPORT
THE NEW SOVIET LANGUAGE (SEE PARA 6), BUT DOUBTED IT
WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO WASHINGTON OR TO OUR ALLIES. HE
ALSO SUGGESTED TWO OTHER WAYS OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM:
THE "FRENCH SOLUTION" LISTING UNRESOLVED ISSUES, AND THE
"SWISS SOLUTION" -- A PRENEGOTIATED UNILATERAL STATEMENT.
SEE REQUEST FOR ACTION IN PARA 8. END SUMMARY.
4. ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS (REF A), U.S. CDE
AMBASSADOR BARRY ON MAY 13 SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING
FORMULATION TO SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE RESULTING FROM THE SOVIET
DELEGATION'S INSISTENCE THAT THE CONFERENCE FORMALLY
ACKNOWLEDGE GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE
NAVAL ACTIVITIES:
BEGIN TEXT:
PROPOSALS NOT RESOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE
VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, AS WELL AS ANY NEW
ISSUES, MAY BE INTRODUCED IN ANY POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA
CONTINUATION OR NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, PROVIDED
THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED MANDATE.
END TEXT.
5. BARRY CHARACTERIZED THIS LANGUAGE AS A FORMULA FOR
ACKNOWLEDGING GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO ANYONE'S POSITION ON THE MANDATE. HE
INDICATED THAT WHILE THE U.S. COULD ACCEPT THIS
FORMULATION, IT HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH OUR ALLIES.
HE ALSO SAID THAT THE U.S. COULD BUY THE FRENCH FORMULA
(WHICH STATES THAT THE "FOLLOWING PROPOSALS" WERE NOT
RESOLVED AT THE CONFERENCE AND THEN LISTS THEM BUT SAYS
NOTHING ABOUT HOW THEY MIGHT BE HANDLED IN THE FUTURE).
FINALLY, HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A THIRD ALTERNATIVE, A
PRENEGOTIATED UNILATERAL SOVIET STATEMENT RESERVING THE
RIGHT TO BRING UP THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES AT
ANY TIME. THIS WOULD BE SOMETHING LIKE THE SWISS
"RESERVATION" ON THE WORKING STRUCTURE.
6. GRINEVSKY RECOGNIZED THE U.S.' DESIRE TO TAKE THE
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SOVIET POSITION INTO CONSIDERATION AND SAID THAT HE
WOULD EXAMINE THE U.S. FORMULA. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT
THE U.S. FORMULATION SIMPLY STATED REALITY: EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE HAS THE RIGHT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS
TO RAISE ANY QUESTION WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE MANDATE.
HE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT INSTEAD:
BEGIN TEXT:
THE CHAIRMAN NOTED THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT ANY
DELEGATION MAY RAISE IN THE FUTURE ANY QUESTION
CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF
NAVAL ACTIVITIES OF PARTICIPATING STATES TAKING PLACE IN
THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA
AND AIR SPACE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT SECURITY
IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.
END TEXT.
T. BARRY SAID THAT HE WOULD SEND THIS FORMULA BACK TO
WASHINGTON BUT DOUBTED THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. HE
NOTED 1) IT SINGLES OUT NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND, BY PUTTING
TAI IN A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT, WOULD GIVE A NEW FORMAL
CHARACTER TO THEIR POSTPONEMENT; 2) IT INFRINGES ON OUR
INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE BY JUXTAPOSING THE WORDS
"NAVAL ACTIVITIES" AND THE SELECTIVE EXCERPT FROM THE
MANDATE. BARRY EVEN CHARACTERIZED THE NEW SOVIET
FORMULA AS A STEP BACK FROM THE PREVIOUS GRINEVSKY
PROPOSAL (REF B) AND FROM THE WAY IN WHICH THE ZONE WAS
DEFINED IN WORKING GROUP B-1. GRINEVSKY AGREED TO THINK
MORE ABOUT THIS SUBJECT.
8. BEGIN COMM": WE VIEW THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL MORE
AS AN EFFORT TO PROBE OUR RESOLVE THAN AS A SERIOUS
BARGAINING EFFORT AND WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH OUR
APPROACH. REQUEST WASHINGTON CONFIRMATION THAT THE NEW
GRINEVSKY FORMULA IS NOT ACCEPTABLE AND THAT WASHINGTON
COULD ACCEPT THE "FRENCH SOLUTION" OR A UNILATERAL
STATEMENT WHICH DID NOT DAMAGE OUR VIEW OF THE MANDATE.
BARRY
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CO NF I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03810
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN
WORKING GROUP ON NOTIFICATION
1. CDE X - 50.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE, TO SERVE AS CHAPEAU LANGUAGE
FOR THE SECTION IN WHICH MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE
NOTIFIED WILL BE DEFINED, WAS PROVISIONALLY NOTED DURING
THE MAY 13 MEETING OF WORKING GROUP B ON NOTIFICATION:
BEGIN TEXT.
"MILITARY ACTIVITIES . . . CONDUCTED IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED
BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED." END TEXT.
BARRY
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SECRET
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 03910
SUBJECT: CDE: SOVIET GLACIER BEGINS TO MOVE
1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN INTENSIVE BILATERAL CONTACTS
WITH THE US, FRANCE AND THE FRG OVER THE PAST TEN
DAYS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO EXPLORE SOLUTIONS TO
THE GROUND FORCE/AIR FORCE "NOTIFICATION" ISSUE. THE
ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES CAN BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS
OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE
NECESSARY TO EXEMPT AIR ACTIVITIES BELOW A CERTAIN
LEVEL FROM INCLUSION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION
GIVEN FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. ON THE GROUND
FORCE THRESHOLD, MOSCOW APPEARS RECEPTIVE TO THE
STRUCTURAL APPROACH BUT THEY STRONGLY INSIST ON A
NUMERICAL PARAMETER AND RESIST INCLUSION OF EQUIPMENT
IN A NOTIFICATION. THEY CONTINUE TO REJECT THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. THEY SAY THEIR BOTTOM LINE
ON THE NUMERICAL GROUND FORCE PARAMETER IS 15,000,
WHICH COULD REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF OBSERVATIONS OF
EXERCISES IN THE INTERIOR OF THE USSR. THE SOVIETS
MAY RECOGNIZE THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT AND ARE
BEGINNING TO CALCULATE THE PRICE OF AN AGREEMENT
WHICH WOULD ASSURE THE CONTINUITY OF THE CDE AFTER
VIENNA. END SUMMARY.
2. RIGHT AFTER HIS RETURN FROM "PRIVATE BUSINESS" IN
MOSCOW AT THE BEGINNING OF MAY, SOVIET CUE NEGOTIATOR
GRINEVSKY AND HIS GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE
GENERAL TATARNIKOV BEGAN SEEKING OUT US, THE GERMANS
AND THE FRENCH FOR INTENSIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
FOCUSING ON THE PLACE OF AIR ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM
REGIME. GRINEVSKY HAS ALSO DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF
FINDING A FORMULA FOR "DEFERRING" NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO
A CONTINUATION OF THE CDE, BUT HE SEEMS TO BE UNDER
NO PRESSURE FROM MOSCOW TO FIND A SOLUTION. THE
SOVIET POSITION ON AIR AND GROUND FORCE ISSUES HAS
EMERGED SLOWLY, BUT NOW WE THINK WE HAVE A PRETTY
GOOD PICTURE OF IT.
AIR ACTIVITIES
3. THE SOVIETS APPEAR WILLING TO ACCEPT THE
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EVENTUALLY WITHOUT IDENTIFYING IT
AS SUCH; IN FACT, THEY WANT TO MINIMIZE THE ACTUAL
AMOUNT OF INFORMATION GIVEN ON AIR ACTIVITIES.
-- THEY WANT AN AIR THRESHOLD OF 700 SORTIES OVER
THE DURATION OF AN EXERCISE, BUT THEY ARE AMBIGUOUS
AS TO WHAT SUCH A THRESHOLD WOULD MEAN. AT A
MINIMUM, THEY WANT TO EXEMPT ALL FUNCTIONALLY RELATED
AIR BELOW A CERTAIN LEVEL FROM INCLUSION IN A
NOTIFICATION. THEIR IDEAL WOULD BE A VERY HIGH AIR
THRESHOLD AS A COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT PARAMETER, BUT
THEY PROBABLY WOULD ACCEPT A SEPARATE THRESHOLD FOR
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INCLUSION OF AIR IN A GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION.
-- THEIR APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO ADOPT THE
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR ACTIVITIES IS CONDITIONED
BY THE FACT THAT THEY DON'T WANT THEIR EXERCISES
INVOLVING STRATEGIC AVIATION INCLUDED IN
NOTIFICATION. THEY CLAIM THEY CHOSE THE HIGH FIGURE
OF 700 BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT CATCH EXERCISES OF THIS
SORT OR "ROUTINE" AIR TRAINING EXERCISES. ON BEING
TOLD THAT THIS WAS NOT CORRECT, THEY HAVE ALSO
CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF EXEMPTIONS FOR AIR
DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC EXERCISES. BUT THEY CONTINUE
TO INSIST ON AN AIR PARAMETER.
4. WE HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS, WHICH THE
SOVIETS HAVE SAID THEY WILL STUDY:
-- WE WON'T CONSIDER AN INDEPENDENT AIR PARAMETER AS
A TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION.
-- WE DON'T CONSIDER A THRESHOLD BELOW WHICH
FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR WOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM
INCLUSION IN A NOTIFICATION NECESSARY; NEARLY ALL
MAJOR GROUND FORCE EXERCISES ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE
LEVEL WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT AIR COMPONENTS.
-- THEIR FIGURE OF 700 IS TOO HIGH IN ANY CASE
BECAUSE IT WOULD EXEMPT MOST AIR ACTIVITIES FROM
INCLUSION IN NOTIFICATION; WE DON'T WANT SYMBOLIC
ARMS CONTROL.
5. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL SETTLE
FOR FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR (WITHOUT CALLING IT
THAT) WHERE INFORMATION ON AIR WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT
BE PROVIDED BELOW A CERTAIN THRESHOLD; WE UNDERSTAND
WASHINGTON IS ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF SUCH A CONCEPT.
GROUND FORCES
6. AS DISCUSSIONS HAVE PROCEEDED ON THE AIR ISSUE,
THE SOVIETS HAVE BECOME MORE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE
GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD.
-- THEY PREFER A SIMPLE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD AS A
TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING THE "STRUCTURAL"
ELEMENT AS PART OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE
CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION; HOWEVER KNOWING A SIMPLE
NUMERICAL THRESHOLD IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US, THEY ARE
PROBABLY PREPARED TO INCLUDE A STRUCTURAL ELEMENT IN
THE TRIGGER FORMULATION.
-- THEIR "BOTTOM LINE" NUMERICAL THRESHOLD IS
15,000, THEY SAY. WE THINK THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WOULD
LET THEM GO LOWER.
-- THEY ARE TRYING DESPERATELY TO AVOID OBSERVATION
OF SOVIET "NATIONAL" (NON-PACT) EXERCISES IN THE
SOVIET HEARTLAND, I.E., ONE OF NATO'S OWN BOTTOM LINE
OBJECTIVES; THEY MAY EVENTUALLY TRY TO PUSH A
SPLIT-LEVEL NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLD.
-- THEY ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO A SEPARATE EQUIPMENT
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THRESHOLD, CLAIMING THAT ITS EFFECT WOULD BE
INEQUITABLE.
-- THEY ARE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON
CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT, THE NNA
FORMULA ON BEING AWAY FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS. THEY
ARE WILLING TO ADD OTHER ACTIVITIES TO THEIR LIST OF
"MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS" BUT WILL "NEVER" ACCEPT THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT PROVIDE
INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF GARRISONS OR
DESIGNATION OF UNITS IN THEM.
7. WE REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT OUR "DIVISION EQUIVALENT"
FORMULATION MIGHT HELP SOLVE SOME OF THE ABOVE
PROBLEMS. THE SUSPICIOUS SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO SEE
ITS MERITS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HOWEVER, EVEN IF A
NEUTRAL "PARENT" CAN BE FOUND TO SPONSOR IT.
DRAFTING
8. WITH EFFORTS UNDERWAY BEHIND THE SCENES, THE
SOVIETS SEEM READY TO EASE THEIR BRAKES ON THE
DRAFTING PROCESS ON CSBMS. SINCE THEY SHARE OUR
DESPAIR OVER THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF MOST COORDINA-
TORS, THEY HAVE AGREED TO HELP PREPARE THE WAY FOR
DRAFTING BY PRIVATE CONTACTS WITHOUT NEUTRAL "HELP".
EVEN IF THIS TACTIC WORKS, THERE ISN'T ENOUGH TIME TO
PRODUCE MUCH BEFORE THE ROUND ENDS MAY 23.
9. WE CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO DISCUSS
VERIFICATION MODALITIES; THEY CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON
NTMS, "CONSULTATIONS" AND "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST".
WE OFFER NO GIVE: WE ARE SERIOUS IN THREATENING TO
WALK AWAY FROM AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT A SOLID
INSPECTION PROVISION. FURTHER, WE NOTE THAT, TO BE
MEANINGFUL, THE INSPECTION PROVISION MUST BE TIED TO
THE PROPER NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD.
COMMENT
10. WHAT IS SIGNIFICANT IN ALL THIS IS THAT THE
SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO FIND OUT WHAT
THE PRICE OF AN AGREEMENT HERE IS, AND THEY SEEM
READY TO PAY SOMETHING FOR CDE CONTINUITY. THIS MAY
RELATE TO THEIR NEW INTEREST IN CDE PHASE II
DISARMAMENT. IF SO, THERE IS NO REASON NOT TO POCKET
WHAT WE CAN WHILE MAKING NO COMMITMENT ABOUT THE
FUTURE.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03961
SUBJECT: EASTERN LANGUAGE IN WORKING GROUP A-3
- (ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINTS)
1. CDE X - 059
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BULGARIA TABLED THE FOLLOWING LONG-AWAITED EASTERN
LANGUAGE ON THE CONTENT OF ANNUAL PLANS IN THE MEETING
OF WORKING GROUP A-3 ON MAY 15.
BEGIN TEXT:
IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL
LIST ITS NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY
AND WILL PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON EACH
ACTIVITY:
-- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY, INCLUDING ITS
DESIGNATION, IF ANY;
-- GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE ACTIVITY;
-- THE PERIOD OF TIME WITHIN WHICH THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY IS ENVISAGED TO TAKE PLACE;
-- APPROXIMATE DURATION OF THE PLANNED ACTIVITY;
-- NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY;
-- THE TENTATIVE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF TROOPS OR THE
APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS
INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE COMPONENTS OF OTHER TYPES OF
ARMED FORCES;
-- AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
-- INITIAL AND TERMINAL POINTS OF MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS)
WHEN THEY ARE EFFECTED IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBM'S, AS WELL AS THE TERMINAL POINT WHEN THE MOVEMENT
(TRANSFER) IS EFFECTED INTO THE ZONE AND THE INITIAL
POINT WHEN THE MOVEMENT (TRANSFER) IS EFFECTED OUT OF IT.
END TEXT.
BARRY
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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 04017
SUBJ: CDE: EASTERN TRIAL BALLOON ON DROPPING STATIC
INFORMATION AND CONSTRAINTS
1. CDEK-61
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY. THE EAST GERMANS, BULGARIANS AND
HUNGARIANS ARE QUIETLY SUGGESTING A "DEAL" WHEREBY THE
EAST WOULD DROP ITS SUPPORT FOR CONSTRAINTS IF THE WEST
WOULD DROP STATIC INFORMATION (MEASURE I). MOST NATO
DELEGATIONS LIKE THE IDEA, BUT THE BRITISH ARE
ADAMANTLY OPPOSED AND WANT US TO HOLD ON TO MEASURE I
UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE; ALTHOUGH THIS "DEAL" DOES NOT
HAVE MUCH FOR US, HOLDING OUT FOR A LAST MINUTE TRADE
MAY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE INFORMATION WE NEED
IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION OR FORECASTING. END
SUMMARY.
4. MANY WESTERN OBSERVERS ASSUMED THAT THE MAY 9 SOVIET
PLENARY STATEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS SPELLED THE END OF
SOVIET SUPPORT FOR SUCH MEASURES. SINCE THEN, A NUMBER
OF WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS (NOT THE SOVIETS) HAVE
SUGGESTED A "DEAL" WHEREBY THE WEST WOULD ABANDON
STATIC INFORMATION (SC-1 MEASURE I) AND THE EAST WOULD
DROP ITS SUPPORT FOR CONSTRAINTS. THE EASTERNERS HAVE
CLAIMED UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THEY COULD PRODUCE
THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUCH A "DEAL," BUT WHAT WE ARE
HEARING IS CLEARLY AN AUTHORIZED TRIAL BALLOON.
5. IN THE NATO CAUCUS, THE FRENCH, BELIEVING MEASURE I
IS LOSING VALIDITY AS A BARGAINING CHIP, HAVE ALREADY
PROPOSED TRADING IT OFF, A PROPOSAL WHICH NO ONE
SUPPORTED AT THE TIME. THE IDEA HAS GAINED GROUND
RECENTLY, HOWEVER; THE FRG, FRANCE, ITALY AND OTHERS
HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED BY THE EAST AND PROBABLY
SOUNDED INTERESTED. THE UK DELEGATION IS ADAMENTLY
OPPOSED; ALTHOUGH THEY PRIVATELY ACKKNOWLEGE THAT
MEASURE I IS UNATTAINABLE, THEY SAY THAT "LONDON" WOULD
NEVER DO A DEAL UNTIL THE LAST ROUND. IN FACT, WE
THINK THIS STEMS MORE FROM UK HEAD OF DELEGATION EDES'
SENSE OF TACTICS THAN FROM LONDON'S INSTRUCTIONS.
6. WE ARE NO MORE WORRIED THAT CONSTRAINTS WILL BE
DRAFTED OVER OUR OPPOSITION THAN THE EAST IS WORRIED
THAT STATIC INFORMATION WILL SNEAK INTO A CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT WITHOUT THEIR AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THERE
ARE A FEW VALID REASONS FOR DISPOSING OF BOTH ISSUES
EARLY NEXT ROUND RATHER THAN LATER:
-- "PROTECTING" MEASURE I MEANS THAT WE CANNOT TRY TO
INCORPORATE CERTAIN KINDS OF INFORMATION IN TEXTS ON
NOTIFICATION AND CALENDARS; WE CANNOT EVEN PROBE WHAT
THE EAST MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ON SUBORDINATION
AND LOCATION OF UNITS. IF WE LET THIS GO UNTIL THE
LAST MINUTE, THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF STATIC INFORMATION
WILL GO UNRESOLVED FOR LACK OF TIME.
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-- KEEPING CONSTRAINTS IN PLAY UNTIL THE END USES UP
SCARCE CONFERENCE TIME WHICH COULD BE DEVOTED TO OTHER
ISSUES SUCH AS INSPECTION OR NOTIFICATION.
-- WHILE WE SEE NO POSSIBILITY THAT CONSTRAINTS WILL
CREEP INTO LANGUAGE BEING DRAFTED IN THE WORK GROUPS,
THE DANGER WILL ALWAYS EXIST THAT, UNLESS CONSTRAINTS
ARE PUT OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE THEN, THE NNA WILL
ATTEMPT TO SNEAK THEM INTO ANY LAST MINUTE DEAL THEY
MAY TRY TO MAKE.
-- THE UK DELEGATION'S LAST-MINUTE STRATEGY, ON THIS
ISSUE AS ON OTHERS, IGNORES THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME
OF THE LAST ROUND THEY WILL BE IN THE EC PRESIDENCY,
WHICH WILL EFFECTIVELY EMASCULATE THEM AS NEGOTIATORS;
BY AUGUST 19 WE WILL BE LEFT ALONE HOLDING THE BAG, AND
THE BRITS IN THEIR COMMUNITY HAT WILL LIKELY BE URGING
US TO LET GO OF IT.
6. IN SPITE OF THE ADVANTAGES NOTED ABOVE, AN
INFORMATION-CONSTRAINTS "DEAL" IS NOT WITNOUT COSTS:
-- WE ARE NOT IN THE POSITION OF NEEDING TO TRADE
ANYTHING TO THE EAST IN EXCHANGE FOR CONSTRAINTS; THEY
SEEM TO HAVE ABANDONED THAT SHIP ALREADY AS AN
ACHIEVABLE OBJECTIVE AND ARE STAYING WITH IT ONLY TO
HAVE ANOTHER STICK TO USE AGAINST NATO;
-- THE REAL SUPPORTERS OF CONSTRAINTS ARE THE NNA, WHO
WILL TRY TO GET US TO PAY SOMETHING FOR GIVING THEM UP
REGARDLESS OF PREVIOUS EAST-WEST DEALS. MEASURE I
COULD, THEREFORE, BE USEFUL WITH THE NNA, IF NOT THE
EAST, LATER ON IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.
-- FINALLY, IF OUR GOAL IS TO GET AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
OUT OF MEASURE I INTO MEASURES II AND III, OUR TACTIC
MAY BE LESS TRANSPARENT, AND PERHAPS THEREFORE MORE
SUCCESSFUL, IF MEASURE I REMAINS ON THE TABLE EVEN AS
WE TRY TO INSERT VARIOUS PROVISIONS FROM IT INTO THE
OTHER TWO MEASURES. THE UK DELEGATION WOULD PROBABLY
OPPOSE THIS TACK, TOO, BUT PERHAPS NOT AS VIGOROUSLY.
7. WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL WANT TO CONSIDER THE
INFORMATION-CONSTRAINTS ISSUE, AS WELL AS THE UK
TACTIC, DURING THE BREAK BETWEEN ROUNDS.
BARRY
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 03928
SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMB. BARRY SPEECH IN CDE, 5/16/86
1. CDE IX - 055
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH WHICH
AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION
TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, GAVE IN PLENARY ON
FRIDAY, MAY 16.
BEGIN TEXT: AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND AND THE
BEGINNING OF THIS ONE, THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
AT LEAST ONE THEME: SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN DRAFTING
WAS ESSENTIAL IN THIS CRITICAL ROUND. WE HAVE NOT MADE
SUCH PROGRESS; INDEED, VERY LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE HAS
BEEN DRAFTED. THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE LOOMS LARGER
OVER THE CONFERENCE DESPITE INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO SOLVE
PROBLEMS, BEHIND THE SCENES AS WELL AS IN WORKING
GROUPS THEMSELVES. IT IS OPEN TO QUESTION WHETHER
THERE REMAINS ENOUGH TIME TO DRAFT AN AGREEMENT EVEN IF
ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES ARE SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED SOON.
AS WE KNOW ALL TOO WELL, DRAFTING IS A SLOW PROCESS.
-- THE REASON WE HAVE DRAFTED SO LITTLE DURING THIS
ROUND IS THAT SEQUENTIALISM HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON THE
CONFERENCE BY THE EAST. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD, IN EFFECT,
THAT UNLESS WE ACCEPT THEIR VERSION OF THE TYPES OF
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED, NOTHING ELSE OF SUBSTANCE
CAN BE DRAFTED ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES. THIS HAS BEEN EVIDENT IN EACH OF THE
RELEVANT WORKING GROUPS IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS. THIS IS
WHY WE WILL RECESS IN A WEEK WITH SO LITTLE
ACCOMPLISHED.
-- BEHIND THE ISSUE OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE
NOTIFIED LURKS THE ISSUE OF WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A
MINIMALIST OUTCOME FOR THIS CONFERENCE -- A SO-CALLED
"MINI-PACKAGE" -- AND THE ISSUE OF WHO WANTS ONE. EAST
AND WEST SAY THEY DO NOT; LET US EXAMINE THE PROPOSALS
EACH HAS MADE TO SEE WHOSE ARGUMENTS THE FACTS SUPPORT.
-- WE OBVIOUSLY SHOULD TAKE AS A BASELINE FOR OUR
MEASUREMENT THE MADRID MANDATE, WHICH TELLS US TO
NEGOTIATE A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT, POLITICALLY BINDING AND PROVIDED WITH
ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION. IN OTHER WORDS, WE ARE
EXPECTED TO HAVE SOME REAL BEEF BETWEEN OUR HAMBURGER
ROLLS.
-- WHERE'S THE BEEF IN THE PROPOSALS BEFORE THIS
CONFERENCE? LET'S HAVE A LOOK.
-- IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE MORE YOU KNOW ABOUT
THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF OTHERS ON A ROUTINE BASIS,
THE GREATER IS THE POSSIBILITY FOR ENHANCING CONFIDENCE
AND SECURITY. INFORMATION ABOUT FORCE STRUCTURES
PROVIDES A GOOD YARDSTICK AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE ANY
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DEVIATIONS FROM THE NORM. THE SAME APPLIES TO MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OR POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE.
IF YOU KNOW WHAT THE GENERAL PICTURE IS, WHAT THE
STATUS QUO IS AT ANY GIVEN TIME, YOU WILL BE BETTER
ABLE TO PUT ANY SUCH ACTIVITIES IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE.
WESTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDE FOR AN EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY UNITS -- INFORMATION THAT IS
CRUCIAL IF FORECASTING, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND
VERIFICATION ARE TO BE MEANINGFUL. SUCH INFORMATION
WOULD NOT ONLY ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OTHER
MEASURES WE WILL AGREE UPON, BUT WOULD ALSO ENHANCE
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BY PROVIDING A MORE
COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE OF MILITARY STRUCTURE AND
ACTIVITY IN EUROPE. BUT WHERE'S THE BEEF IN THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS? WHILE WILLING TO PROVIDE CERTAIN
INFORMATION IN THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION, THE WARSAW
PACT REMAINS UNWILLING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION OF A MORE
GENERAL NATURE THAT WOULD MAKE THE "DYNAMIC"
INFORMATION TRULY MEANINGFUL. SOME HAVE EVEN GONE SO
FAR AS TO ARGUE, ON OCCASION, THAT THE KIND OF
INFORMATION WE ARE SEEKING WOULD AMOUNT TO "LEGALIZED
ESPIONAGE." THIS APPROACH, MR. CHAIRMAN, DESTROYS
CONFIDENCE AND ENSURES THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
OTHER IMPORTANT MEASURES UNDER NEGOTIATION HERE WILL BE
MINIMAL.
-- CONCERNING THE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES,
MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO CAPTURE A
SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EUROPE --
FOCUSING, AS MANDATED, ON THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT POSE
THE GREATEST THREAT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE -- GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITIES AND COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES, THAT IS
GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES IN COMBINATION WITH AIR OR
NAVAL COMPONENTS. WE HAVE ALSO PROPOSED THAT
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AND MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES BE
NOTIFIED. AND THE THRESHOLDS WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD,
IN FACT, CAPTURE RELEVANT MILITARY ACTIVITY AND
REPRESENT A QUANTUM LEAP OVER THE THRESHOLDS PROVIDED
FOR IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. BUT, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE
THRESHOLDS PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT FOR LAND
ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT RESULT IN ANY MORE NOTIFICATIONS
AT ALL. WHAT KIND OF AN IMPROVEMENT WOULD THIS
REPRESENT? HOW MUCH MORE WILL WE LEARN ABOUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE? AND HOW MUCH WOULD THIS
CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY?
ZERO. NO BEEF AT ALL.
-- WE HAVE HEARD A LOT ABOUT THE WESTERN POSITION ON
MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF LATE. UNDER OUR APPROACH,
WE WOULD NOTIFY THE PARTICIPATION OF US-BASED UNITS IN
A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY 45 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF
THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THEIR ARRIVAL POINT IF THEY MEET
THE CRITERION OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE; THAT MEANS,
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WHEN THEY REACH NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AND WHEN THEY PICK Up
THEIR EQUIPMENT. REMEMBER, NO MILITARY FORCE CAN HAVE
A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE SECURITY OF EUROPE UNLESS
IT HAS ITS EQUIPMENT.
-- LET'S DISCUSS AIR ACTIVITIES. WHERE AIR FORCES
OPERATE IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY, OUR
APPROACH WOULD PROVIDE FOR INFORMATION ON SUCH AIR
SUPPORT. WE HAVE INDICATED OUR READINESS TO PROVIDE
VERY DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE RANGE OF SORTIES TO BE
FLOWN, THE CATEGORIES OF AIRCRAFT, NATURE OF MISSION
AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF OPERATION.
-- WE CONTINUE TO REJECT COVERAGE OF AIR ACTIVITY WHICH
IS NOT IN CONJUNCTION WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY, AS
THE TYPES OF ACTIVITY AND THE ALTITUDES AT WHICH SUCH
ACTIVITY IS CONDUCTED MAKE VERIFICATION UNMANAGEABLE.
BUT SINCE 90 OF MILITARY AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE IS
IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND ACTIVITIES, THERE IS A LOT
OF BEEF IN OUR APPROACH. IN CONTRAST, THE WARSAW PACT
HAS PROPOSED NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES
WITH SUCH HIGH THRESHOLDS THAT, IN PRACTICE, HARDLY ANY
USEFUL AND VERIFIABLE INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED
ABOUT AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE -- WHETHER COMBINED OR,
AS THE EAST SEEKS, INDEPENDENT. WHERE'S THE BEEF? I
CAN'T FIND IT. IT APPEARS, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THE
OBJECTIVE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS IS ACTUALLY TO AVOID
PROVIDING INFORMATION ON AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. WE
WOULD NOT HAVE A BETTER PICTURE ABOUT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE; CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY WOULD NOT
BE ENHANCED. ANOTHER ZERO FOR SUBSTANCE.
-- ON OBSERVATION, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE AGREED THAT
ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INVITED TO OBSERVE
NOTIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN OUR APPROACH, A LARGE
NUMBER OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE OBSERVED. THIS
ENHANCES CONFIDENCE. BUT WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE
WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ON OBSERVATION? THEY HAVE
COUNTERED WITH A SUGGESTION THAT WOULD SEVERELY
RESTRICT THE NUMBER OF NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES TO BE
OBSERVED AND, IN ADDITION, SEEK TO LIMIT THE
OBSERVATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES TO A SMALL PORTION OF
THE OVERALL ACTIVITY. CONTRIBUTION TO CONFIDENCE --
MINIMAL AT BEST. NO BEEF HERE.
-- AND, MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR MANDATE REQUIRES THAT ANY
AGREEMENT HERE BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE. I ASK YOU --
CAN MEASURES BE VERIFIED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS AND
CLARIFICATIONS? WESTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDE EVERY
PARTICIPATING STATE WITH THE RIGHT TO MONITOR
COMPLIANCE, AND PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO
THROUGH ON-SITE INSPECTION. AT THE SAME TIME, IT
PROTECTS AGAINST ABUSE. THE PROPOSAL OFFERED BY THE
WARSAW PACT DOES NOT EVEN COME CLOSE TO MEETING THE
MANDATE CRITERIA OF ADEQUATE VERIFIABILITY. BEEF
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FACTOR - ZERO.
-- FINALLY, LET ME MENTION THE TOPIC OF CONSTRAINTS, OR
MORE PRECISELY LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES. I
ADMIT THAT THERE'S NO WESTERN BEEF HERE. WE HAVE NOT
BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY LIMITATION WHICH WOULD NOT
HAVE A DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON US, GIVEN THE
GEOGRAPHIC AND PRACTICAL REALITIES OF THE WESTERN
SECURITY POSITION. WHAT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO REALIZE IS
THAT THERE IS NO BEEF IN THE EASTERN POSITION, EITHER;
A LITTLE CAREFUL MULTIPLICATION INDICATES THAT THEY ARE
SUPPORTING CONSTRAINTS THAT DON'T CONSTRAIN,
LIMITATIONS WHICH DO NOT LIMIT. IN FACT, WHEN THE
SUBJECT TURNS TO PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD REALLY CONSTRAIN
ALL EQUALLY, SUCH AS STRENGTHENING THE ANNUAL FORECAST
MEASURE, THE EAST IS CURIOUSLY RETICENT.
-- MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE TRIED TO ESTABLISH WHERE THE
BEEFLESS MINI-PACKAGE REALLY IS IN THE CONFERENCE. LET
ME SUGGEST WHY. DURING OUR MAY 2 PLENARY I WAS
SURPRISED TO HEAR THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CRITICIZE A PASSAGE FROM
A SPEECH WHICH I HAD MADE IN ROME TO THE EFFECT THAT
THIS CONFERENCE OUGHT TO CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED
OPENNESS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND THE BREAKING DOWN OF
THE ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS WHICH DIVIDE EUROPE. THE
IMPLICATION OF HIS WORDS WAS THAT THE EAST IS OPPOSED
TO OPENNESS AND WANTS TO KEEP THE BARRIERS IN PLACE.
IF 30, WE PROBABLY AREN'T GOING TO GET AN AGREEMENT
HERE. FURTHERMORE, THE BASIC PREMISES OF THE ENTIRE
CSCE PROCESS, OF WHICH THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS AN
INTEGRAL PART, ARE OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION.
-- MR. CHAIRMAN, MY DELEGATION HAS NOT WRITTEN OFF THE
CHANCES FOR SUCCESS HERE EVEN THOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THEY
ARE SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED. THERE IS MORE AT STAKE HERE
THAN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THEMSELVES AND THE
RELUCTANCE WE WOULD ALL HAVE TO WASTE THE MANY MONTHS
OF INTENSIVE EFFORT WE HAVE ALREADY INVESTED IN A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT WOULD
CAST A SHADOW OVER THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE
AND THE CSCE PROCESS, AS WELL AS THE PROSPECTS FOR
SUCCESS IN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
EFFORTS ELSEWHERE. THERE IS SEEMING AGREEMENT ABOUT
THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE ARE SUPPOSED TO TRANSLATE INTO
REALITY, EVEN THAT CONCERNING ON-SITE INSPECTION. I
IS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE, IF VERY DIFFICULT, TO CODIFY
A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT REFLECTING THESE PRINCIPLES IN
THE VERY FEW WEEKS WHICH REMAIN TO US. BUT IT SHOULD
BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT FOR THE U.S., A PURELY
SYMBOLIC BEEFLESS MINI-PACKAGE IS OUT OF THE QUESTION,
AND LAST-MINUTE MINI-PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO PRODUCE SUCH
A RESULT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03962
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS - MAY 12-16, 1986
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3947, B) STOCKHOLM 3928
1. CDE X - 058
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WHILE DRAFTING WENT SOMEWHAT BETTER
IN THE KEY NOTIFICATION GROUP THIS WEEK, THE EAST
APPEARS TO BE CONTINUING ITS TACTIC OF DELAYING SIGNIFI-
CANT DRAFTING PROGRESS. MOSCOW'S OBJECTIVE APPEARS TO
BE TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS UNTIL THE END GAME WHEN
OUR ALLIES WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE TO AGREE TO A MINI-
PACKAGE. WE INTENTIONALLY CLOSED THE WEEK ON A DOWNBEAT
NOTE, REJECTING ANY MINI-PACKAGE AND EXPRESSING
PESSIMISM OVER CONFERENCE PROSPECTS IN ORDER TO EXERT
PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO SPEED UP THE DRAFTING OF
CSBM'S. WE PUSHED THIS APPROACH EARLIER IN NATO
CAUCUSES AND FOR THE TIME BEING, IT APPEARS TO ENJOY
SOME SUPPORT. AFTER A WEEK OF INTENSIVE BEHIND-THE-
SCENES NEGOTIATIONS, NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE DRAFTED A NEW
COMPROMISE FORMULATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. END SUMMARY.
4. ASSESSMENT: THE EAST APPEARS TO BE CONTINUING ITS
TACTIC OF DELAYING DRAFTING PROGRESS IN THE KEY
NOTIFICATION GROUP ON THE MOST IMPORTANT, AND,
THEREFORE, MOST CONTROVERSIAL, ISSUES, I.E., TYPES OF
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND PARAMETERS. THE SOVIET
OBJECTIVE (SEE REF A FOR A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS)
APPEARS TO BE TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS UNTIL THE
END GAME WHEN OUR ALLIES WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE TO
AGREE TO A MINI-PACKAGE. IN THIS WAY THE SOVIETS WILL
KILL TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE: THEY WILL AVOID HAVING
TO ACCEPT UNPALATABLE WESTERN MEASURES, SUCH AS ON-SITE
INSPECTION AND STATIC INFORMATION AS AN INDEPENDENT
MEASURE, AND WILL HAVE WON THE (MINIMALIST) AGREEMENT
NEEDED TO JUSTIFY CONTINUATION OF THE CDE PROCESS (AND
POSSIBLY INTEGRATION OF THE APRIL 18 GORBACHEV
CONVENTIONAL ARMS PROPOSAL INTO A CDE PHASE II).
IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT ON MAY 16 (REF B), AMBASSADOR
BARRY INTENTIONALLY CLOSED THE WEEK ON A DOWNBEAT NOTE,
REJECTING SUCH A MINI-PACKAGE AND EXPRESSING PESSIMISM
OVER CONFERENCE PROSPECTS. WE PUSHED THIS APPROACH
EARLIER IN NATO CAUCUSES AND FOR THE TIME BEING, IT
APPEARS TO ENJOY SOME SUPPORT. FOR THEIR PART, THE
SOVIETS, WHILE DELAYING ON DRAFTING, HAVE CAST ABOUT IN
THEIR PRIVATE CONTACTS FOR WAYS TO RESOLVE THE
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AT NOT TOO HIGH A COST TO THEM.
WHILE THE ALLIES PRESENT A UNIFIED FACE TO THE OUTSIDE,
THEY REMAIN INTERNALLY DIVIDED ON TACTICS.
5. NOTIFICATION: DRAFTING WENT SOMEWHAT BETTER THIS
WEEK. CHAPEAU LANGUAGE INTRODUCING A DEFINITION OF
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MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED, WHICH HAD BEEN
PRECOOKED IN A SERIES OF PRIVATE MEETINGS AND IN COFFEE
GROUP MEETINGS WAS NOTED: "MILITARY ACTIVITIES . .
CONDUCTED IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S AT OR
ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED." THE
WORKING GROUP -- AT THE WEST'S INSISTENCE -- CONTINUED
TO FOCUS ITS DISCUSSION ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES UNDER
THE GUISE OF A DISCUSSION OF COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES.
THE EAST TRIED TO SHIFT ATTENTION TO AIR ACTIVITIES AND
TRANSFERS; MALTA TRIED TO REDEFINE COMBINED ARMS
ACTIVITIES AS ANY COMBINATION OF GROUND, NAVAL, AND/OR
AIR FORCES.
AFTER THE EAST TABLED DRAFT LANGUAGE ON THE NOTIFICATION
OF LAND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND TRANSFERS IN THREE
SEPARATE PARAGRAPHS, THE WEST OUTMANEUVERED THEM BY
REDRAFTING THE FIRST EASTERN PARAGRAPH ON THE SPOT TO
MOVE CLOSER TO THE DESIRED DEFINITION AND THRESHOLD.
THE REDRAFTED LANGUAGE READ: THE ENGAGEMENT OF LAND
FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A MILITARY
ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS
CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO A COMMON PLAN UNDER A SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION
WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS OR AIRBORNE
COMPONENTS. IN THIS CONTEXT THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR
AND/OR NAVAL COMPONENTS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE
NOTIFICATION."
BEGIN COMMENT: THE ADDITION OF "SINGLE OPERATIONAL
COMMAND" HAS BEEN THE PRICE DEMANDED BY THE UK, FRG AND
FRANCE FOR ACCEPTING THE U.S. APPROACH TO THRESHOLDS.
THE UK AND THE FRG ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF THEIR FORCES EXERCISING SIMULTANEOUSLY,
BUT INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH OTHER, IN THE TRAINING AREAS
CONTAINED IN THE LUNEBURGER HEIDE. THE FRENCH HAD
WANTED TO GO EVEN FURTHER AND INSIST THAT HEADQUARTERS
HAD TO BE IN THE FIELD. END COMMENT.
DISCUSSION OF THE ABOVE LANGUAGE WAS FRUITFUL AND, EVEN
THOUGH AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED, IT HAS BECOME THE
BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, WE ARE
STILL A LONG WAY FROM AGREEMENT, SINCE WE MUST GET RID
OF "COMMON PLAN" AND THE EAST STILL INSISTS THAT WE
CONCURRENTLY SEPARATE LANGUAGE ON AIR FORCE EXERCISES.
6. NON-USE OF FORCE: ON MAY 12, THE NATO ALLIES
APPROACHED CONSENSUS ON A WESTERN NUF TEXT; ON MAY 13,
THEY ACHIEVED IT; ON MAY 14 THEY LOST IT; ON MAY 15
THEY QUARRELED; AND ON MAY 16 THEY ACHIEVED IT AGAIN.
MERCIFULLY, THE WEEK ENDED ON THIS UPBEAT NOTE. WHEN
ROME RELUCTANTLY AGREED EARLY IN THE WEEK ON A STRONG
REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS, IT SEEMED THE WEST WAS WELL
POSITIONED, BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND TACTICALLY, TO DRAFT
ON NON-USE OF FORCE. HOWEVER, AFTER A CONSENSUS SEEMED
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TO HAVE BEEN REACHED, PARIS INTRODUCED "MINOR
MODIFICATIONS" TO THE TEXT; THE CHANGES WERE, IN FACT,
MAJOR AND SUBSTANTIVE AND WATERED DOWN THE HUMAN RIGHTS
TEXT. ALL THE ALLIES REJECTED THESE AMENDMENTS AS
HAVING COME TOO LATE AND AS HAVING DESTROYED A
CAREFULLY CRAFTED NATO COMPROMISE. ON FRIDAY, PARIS
INDICATED THAT IT COULD -- ON SECOND THOUGHT -- ACCEPT
THE ORIGINAL HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT -- WITH MINOR AND
NONSUBSTANTIVE MODIFICATIONS. ONCE AGAIN, NATO SEEMS
TO HAVE A CONSENSUS NUF TEXT. STAY TUNED.
MEANWHILE, BASED ON WHAT PROVED TO BE A MOMENTARILY
FAULTY ASSUMPTION OF AGREEMENT ON A FULL WESTERN TEXT,
NATO ENTERED INTO COFFEE GROUP NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
CSBM'S-NUF LINK AND THE NUF REAFFIRMATION ITSELF. THE
GROUP IS APPROACHING AGREEMENT ON LINKAGE LANGUAGE
WHICH REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH: THE ADOPTED CSBM'S
(AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION) GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO
THE NUF PRINCIPLE. PENDING FINAL RESOLUTION OF WESTERN
INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES ON A NUF TEXT, WE SHOULD BE ABLE
TO NOTE THE SENTENCE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON
TUESDAY. THE NUF REAFFIRMATION IS SOMEWHAT MORE
PROBLEMATICAL. UNTIL LAST WEEK, WORKING GROUP
DISCUSSIONS WERE BUSINESSLIKE -- ALMOST CORDIAL.
7. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: NATO AND THE NNA
CONTINUED EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A VERIFICATION SKELETON IN
THE WORKING GROUP WITH THE NNA'S INTRODUCTION OF A FIRST
SENTENCE ON VERIFICATION MODALITIES: "THE REQUEST WILL
BE ADDRESSED TO THE STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE
ACTIVITIES OR PRESUMED ACTIVITIES ARE CARRIED OUT".
THIS FORMULATION MAKES A USEFUL REFERENCE TO "TERRITORY"
AND ALSO TO NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES. IT ALSO RECOGNIZES
THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER ONE'S OWN TERRITORY
AND OBVIATES THE NEED TO DETERMINE THE NATIONALITIES OF
FORCES ENGAGED IN AN ACTIVITY. PERHAPS FOR THESE
REASONS THE EAST RESISTED THE WORD "TERRITORY,"
INSISTING THAT THE REQUEST BE ADDRESSED ONLY TO THE
STATE CONDUCTING THE ACTIVITIES IN QUESTION. MALTA,
SUPPORTED BY THE EAST, ALSO ARGUED AGAINST TERRITORY
BECAUSE ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR
SPACE DO NOT TAKE PLACE ON ANYONE'S TERRITORY. WE
SURMISE THAT THE EAST'S REAL PROBLEM IS THAT THEY
PERCEIVE THE REFERENCE TO "TERRITORY" TO BE A LEAD INTO
ON-SITE INSPECTION. THOUGH THE DISCUSSION WAS USEFUL,
SPONTANEOUS CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE NNA AND IRISH WERE
UNHELPFUL AND NO TEXT WAS AGREED. AS WE MOVE INTO THE
SUBJECT OF MODALITIES, DRAFTING WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY
DIFFICULT; THE EAST WILL RESIST DRAFTING ON MODALITIES
FOR INSPECTION, INSISTING INSTEAD THAT THEIR CONCEPT OF
VERIFICATION, I.E., NTM'S, CONSULTATIONS, OBSERVATION
ON REQUEST, BE EXPLORED.
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IN ORDER TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR THE VERIFICATION
DISCUSSION, THE WEST AGREED TO DROP INFORMATION FROM
THIS WEEK'S AGENDA. NEXT WEEK WE WILL RETURN TO
INFORMATION AS WELL AS CONTINUE THE VERIFICATION
DISCUSSION.
8. OBSERVATION: ALTHOUGH NO TEXT WAS NOTED THIS WEEK,
THE EAST MADE A POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT MOVE TOWARD THE
NNA POSITION ON DURATION OF OBSERVATION BY TABLING A
TEXT STATING THAT OBSERVATION OF "THE NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITY" WOULD BEGIN "WHENEVER IT REACHES THE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL" (AN APPROACH WHICH ALSO HAS
CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT WITHIN THE NATO CLUSTER CAUCUS).
PLAYING OFF THE SAME TEXT, THE WEST PRESSED FOR OUR
INTERPRETATION THAT THE PHRASE "THE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY"
MEANT OBSERVATION OF ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.
ALTHOUGH TATARNIKOV (USSR) REFUSED TO ACCEPT OUR
INTERPRETATION, HE ALSO AVOIDED DIMISSING THIS CONCEPT
OUT OF HAND -- A POSSIBLE SHIFT FROM THE EAST'S EARLIER
POSITION THAT ONLY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
SHOULD BE MANDATORY EACH YEAR. THE EAST ALSO TABLED A
TEXT ON OBSERVATION OF TRANSFERS OF TROOPS AND COMBAT
AIRCRAFT "IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S." WHILE
THE TEXT IS FOR THE MOST PART UNACCEPTABLE AS IT NOW
STANDS, THE EAST MAY HAVE BEEN HINTING AT A WILLINGNESS
TO EXEMPT TRANSFERS "INTO" THE ZONE. ON A MORE NEGATIVE
NOTE, THE EAST TORPEDOED ANOTHER COFFEE GROUP, THIS TIME
ON THE MODALITIES FOR THE OBSERVATION OF AIR ACTIVITY,
BY INSISTING ON SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSING INDEPENDENT AIR
ACTIVITIES RATHER THAN AIR ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL.
9. ANNUAL FORECASTS: AMID MUCH FANFARE, BULGARIA
TABLED THE EAST'S LONG-AWAITED PROPOSAL ON ANNUAL PLANS
(BEING SENT SEPTEL). THE CONTENT SECTION INCLUDES MOST
OF THE GENERAL ELEMENTS IN THE WESTERN AND NNA PROPOSALS
AS WELL AS AN UNDESIRABLE ITEM ON TRANSFERS. SUBSEQUENT
DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE INTRODUCTORY PHRASE, WHERE THE
WEST AND SWITZERLAND FOCUSED ON WHAT IS MISSING:
CALENDAR YEAR QUARTERS AND STANDARDIZED FORMAT. IN
FACT, ON THE LATTER POINT THE BULGARIAN FORMULA IS A
STEP BACKWARD FROM THE ANALAGOUS EASTERN FORMULATION IN
THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION: THE CHAPEAU FOR THE
FORECAST MERELY CALLS ON STATES TO "PROVIDE THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY."
10. CONSTRAINTS: IN A STERILE EAST-WEST EXCHANGE, THE
EAST EN MASSE ATTACKED THE WEST FOR ITS "STEREOTYPICAL,
CONSERVATIVE" THINKING ON CONSTRAINTS. THE U.S.
COUNTERED BY ASKING HOW MANY EXERCISES IN THE MADRID
ZONE (I.E., BEYOND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT 250-KILOMETER
LIMIT IN THE THE USSR) WOULD BE REPORTED GIVEN THE
PROVISIONS OF THE NEWEST EASTERN CONSTRAINT. THE EAST
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04124
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY
1. CDE - 072.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE-HAY 23 PLENARY ENDING THE
10TH SESSION OF CDE, WESTERN (U.S., ITALY, FRANCE),
NNA (YUGOSLAVIA) AND SOVIET STATEMENTS FOCUSSED ON
THE LACK OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT.
(FULL TEXT OF STATEMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVE STENY
BOYER AND GRINEVSKY (USSR) SENT SEPTEL.) U.S. DEPUTY
HANSEN ACCUSED THE SOVIETS OF BLOCKING DRAFTING IN
HIS REPLY TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT. CIARRAPICO
(ITALY) AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) OFFERED VIEWPOINTS
ON WHAT MUST BE DONE TO REACH AGREEMENT BY SEPTEMBER
19. ON BEHALF OF THE NNA, BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA)
STATED THAT A MINI-PACKAGE WAS AN UNACCEPTABLE
OUTCOME FOR THE CONFERENCE; HE WARNED THAT WE ARE
HEADED FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME UNLESS MORE FLEXIBILITY IS
DISPLAYED. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR HANSEN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS IN HIS
REPLY TO SOVIET ACCUSATIONS THAT THE U.S. IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN CDE:
-- AS THE MANDATE STIPULATES, THE CDE IS AN INTEGRAL
PART OF THE OVERALL CSCE PROCESS WHICH INCLUDES
OTTAWA, BUDAPEST AND BERN; REPRESENTATIVE BOYER MADE
THIS POINT AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
-- WHEREAS NATO INTRODUCED A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF
CSBM'S EARLY IN THE CONFERENCE, TODAY FOR THE FIRST
TIME THE EAST HAS PROPOSED PARAMETERS FOR "CONCRETE
CSBMS."
-- DRAFTING HAS ALSO BEEN DELAYED BY THE EAST'S
INSISTENCE ON PRECONDITIONS FOR DRAFTING. FIRST, THE
EAST INSISTED ON PARALLELISM, I.E., CONCRETE MEASURES
MUST BE DRAFTED PARALLEL TO PROGRESS IN NON-USE OF
FORCE (NUF). THEN, THE EAST ADOPTED A "SEQUENTIAL"
APPROACH VIS-A-VIS DRAFTING; I.E., THE WEST MUST
AGREE TO THE EASTERN POSITION ON AIR ACTIVITIES
BEFORE DRAFTING CAN PROCEED. THIS, HANSEN SAID, WAS
NOT, TO USE GRINEVSKY'S WORDS, "THE LANGUAGE OF
NEGOTIATION."
-- THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR
ACTIVITIES EXCLUDES 90 PERCENT OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND
IS NOT COMPREHENSIVE. THE 10 PERCENT THE SOVIETS ARE
WILLING TO NOTIFY INCLUDES INDEPENDENT AIR
ACTIVITIES, PRIMARILY NON-THREATENING AIR DEFENSE
EXERCISES. MOREOVER, THESE ACTIVITIES ARE
UNVERIFIABLE WITHOUT AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF
INTRUSIVENESS. THE WEST, IN CONTRAST, PROPOSED THAT
AIR ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT COMBINED WITH LAND
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ACTIVITIES BE COVERED BY AN AGREEMENT. THIS IS A
MUCH MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH.
-- THE "NEW" SOVIET THRESHOLD OF 18,000 TROOPS FOR
LAND ACTIVITIES "IGNORES" NATO AND NNA PROPOSALS FOR
LOWER, MORE SIGNIFICANT THRESHOLDS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE
SOVIET PROPOSAL IS THREE TIMES THE NATO THRESHOLD.
-- IN THE LAST THREE DAYS OF DRAFTING THIS SESSION,
THE WEST EXTENDED ITS HAND TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF
WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED (IN 8-1). THE
EAST REJECTED THE HAND, DEMANDING THE WHOLE ARM.
-- SOVIET EFFORTS TO SEPARATE THE U.S. AND CANADA
FROM THEIR EUROPEAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES "WILL NOT
WORK."
5. ON BEHALF OF THE NNA, AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC
(YUGOSLAVIA) STRESSED THAT A MINI-PACKAGE WOULD NOT
BE AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME TO CDE. HE URGED ALL
(IMPLYING EAST AND WEST) TO "LEAVE ENTRENCHED
POSITIONS" AND NOT TO WAIT UNTIL THE END TO MAKE
NECESSARY CONCESSIONS. HE WARNED AGAINST "PLAYING
THE TIME FACTOR," CALLING IT A "DANGEROUS ILLUSION"
WHICH WOULD INEVITABLE LEAD TO FAILURE.
6. IN A CONCILIATORY SPEECH, AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD
(FRANCE) ARGUED THAT "EVERYONE MADE SIGNIFICANT
GESTURES" TO SOLVE THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES.
ALTHOUGH HE "WELCOMED" SOVIET ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT
NOTIFICATION IS THE "CENTRAL ISSUE," HE REJECTED
SOVIET ACCUSATIONS OF WESTERN "IMMOBILITY" ON THAT
ISSUE.
7. AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO (ITALY) REVIEWED PROGRESS
IN EACH WORKING GROUP AND WHAT MUST YET BE
ACCOMPLISHED. HE STRESSED NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON
ON-SITE INSPECTION IN PARTICULAR. HE IMPLIED CUE
WILL HAVE WORK TO DO AFTER VIENNA REGARDLESS OF
RESULTS ACHIEVED BEFORE THE REVIEW.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 04121
SUBJECT: TEXT OF CSCE CO-CHAIRMAN STENY H. HOYER'S
SPEECH TO CDE, 5/23/86
1. CDE IX - 65
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH THE HONORABLE
STENY H. HOVER, CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, GAVE TO CDE IN
STOCKHOLM TODAY, FRIDAY, MAY 23.
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN, IT IS BOTH AN HONOR AND A PLEASURE TO
ADDRESS THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
EUROPE, I AM ON MY WAY TO BERN, SWITZERLAND, TO ATTEND
THE CLOSING OF ANOTHER FORUM IN THE CSCE PROCESS -- THE
EXPERTS' MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS. STOCKHOLM AND BERN
ARE REMINDERS OF THE DIVERSITY OF THE CSCE PROCESS,
ENCOMPASSING SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL,
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS THE FREE FLOW
OF PEOPLE, INFORMATION AND IDEAS. THIS DIVERSITY IS
FOUNDED ON A DELICATE BALANCE ESTABLISHED BY THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, A BALANCE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE
INTEGRITY AND VITALITY OF THE PROCESS AS A WHOLE.
THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CONGRESS, AS WELL
AS THE ADMINISTRATION, ARE COMMITTED TO THE CSCE PROCESS
BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO FURTHER
TER FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH OUR OWN NATION WAS
FOUNDED: FREEDOM AND SECURITY, PROSPERITY -- MATERIAL
AND SPIRITUAL -- AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF EACH
INDIVIDUAL. WE INHERITED THESE PRINCIPLES FROM EUROPE
MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED YEARS AGO. TWICE IN THIS CENTURY
AMERICANS HAVE SHED THEIR BLOOD TO DEFEND THEM IN
EUROPE. WE CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN EFFORTS TO
MAINTAIN AND ADVANCE THIS SHARED HERITAGE. PROMINENT
AMONG THESE EFFORTS IS THE CSCE. AND WE ARE VERY
CONCERNED ABOUT ITS HEALTH AND FUTURE. RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS MAKE US QUESTION WHETHER THE FORMAL
MECHANISMS OF THE PROCESS ARE WORKING. WE ARE CONCERNED
BY THE APPARENT UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY OF SOME
STATES TO PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY AND MAKE THE
PROCESS WORK. OUR EXPERIENCE IN OTTAWA, BUDAPEST, AND
SO FAR IN BERN LEADS US TO QUESTION WHETHER THE EAST IS
SERIOUSLY COMMITTED TO COOPERATION AND A BETTER, MORE
OPEN, RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST.
IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT MUTUAL TRUST TO DEVELOP
WHILE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT REMAINS
SELECTIVE AND UNEVEN. CONFIDENCE IS THREATENED WHEN
SIGNATORIES DISREGARD THEIR COMMITMENTS. WHEN
CONFRONTED WITH THE CURRENT RECORD OF OFTEN BLATANT
DISREGARD FOR HELSINKI PLEDGES IN MANY AREAS OF THE
FINAL ACT, THE U.S. PUBLIC AND ITS CONGRESS REBARD THE
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CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE FINAL ACT AS BEING SERIOUSLY
JEOPARDIZED. TRUST CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED ON THE BASIS OF
CONCRETE, BALANCED PROGRESS IN ALL SECTIONS OF THE FINAL
ACT, WHICH MEANS IN REALITY CONCRETE ACTIONS BY ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR
COMMITMENTS.
TO THIS END, DR. ANDREI SAXHAROV, WHO EMBODIES BOTH THE
TECHNOLOGICAL GENIUS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE
HIGHEST EXPRESSION OF MORAL CONSCIENCE, ONCE WROTE:
-- "IT 13 WRONG TO ACCEPT THE CONTENTION... THAT THE
PURSUIT OF PEACE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT ARE
MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. NO MATTER HOW IMPORTANT ARMS
CONTROL DISCUSSIONS ARE, THEY CAN PRODUCE DECISIVE
RESULTS ONLY WHEN THEY ARE JOINED TO THE RESOLUTION OF
BROADER AND MORE COMPLICATED PROBLEMS OF MILITARY-
POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATIONS INCLUDING
QUESTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE FREEDOM TO EXCHANGE
INFORMATION AT HOME AND ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS,
THE FREEDOM TO MOVE AT HOME AND TO TRAVEL OR EMIGRATE
ABROAD, ALL RANK AS PREREQUISITES OF INTERNATIONAL
TRUST, BASIC TO THE PROCESS OF DIMINISHING HOSTILITY."
ALTHOUGH AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS, THE
STOCXHOLM CONFERENCE HAS ITS OWN UNIQUE AND IMPORTANT
OBJECTIVE, ADOPTING CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WILL HELP REDUCE THE
RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. THE COURSE OF
MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD THAT
OBJECTIVE SET AT MADRID HAS NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. MANY
MONTHS WERE LOST BEFORE THE EAST DECIDED TO JOIN THE
OTHERS IN DISCUSSING CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES, THE
PURPOSE FOR WHICH THIS CONFERENCE WAS ESTABLISHED. WE
CANNOT FORGET THAT THREE YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDED
THIS CONFERENCE. THEY ESTABLISHED ITS TERMS OF
REFERENCE TO WHICH WE RIGOROUSLY ADHERE AND EXPECT NO
LESS OF OTHERS.
BY JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, ALL SEEMED TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE
NEED FOR INTENSE AND ACCELERATED NEGOTIATION ON MEASURES
FOR EXCHANGING MILITARY INFORMATION, FORECASTING,
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND
VERIFICATION. BUT DRAFTING ON REAL SUBSTANCE STILL HAS
NOT BEGUN. IF THE EAST WERE TRULY SERIOUS ABOUT THIS
CONFERENCE, IT WOULD JOIN THE WEST AND THE NEUTRAL AND
NON-ALIGNED STATES IN DRAFTING MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
MEASURES WHICH WOULD HAVE A REAL IMPACT ON THE MILITARY
SITUATION IN EUROPE. THE EAST HAS REFUSED TO TAKE THIS
NECESSARY STEP. THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING THE
CONGRESS, IS CONCERNED BY THE RESULTANT STAGNATION OF
THE CONFERENCE.
YET, THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT EXISTS. DETAILS FOR
CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES HAVE
EMERGED FROM DISCUSSIONS OVER THE MONTHS, AND A GOOD
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SENSE OF THE FINAL COMPLEX OF MEASURES HAS BEEN APPARENT
FOR SOME TIME. THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR ANY
ACCEPTABLE MEASURES HAVE BEEN CRYSTAL CLEAR ALL ALONG
BECAUSE THEY ARE SPELLED OUT IN THE FOUR CRITERIA OF THE
MADRID MANDATE.
FIRST, ALL MEASURES MUST BE POLITICALLY BINDING; WE MUST
OVERCOME THE GAPING LOOPHOLE IN COMPLIANCE FOUND IN THE
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. SECOND, THE
MEASURES MUST BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT; THEY MUST AVOID
COSMETIC POLITICAL GESTURES AND GENUINELY CONTRIBUTE TO
GREATER STABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION.
THIRD, THEY MUST APPLY TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.
FINALLY, ALL MEASURES MUST BE VERIFIABLE AND ACCOMPANIED
BY MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THE TASK OF THIS CONFERENCE
IS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AS WELL AS ENHANCE SECURITY.
IDEALLY, CONFIDENCE COULD DEPEND ON TRUST, AND SEPARATE,
ADEQUATE MEANS OF VERIFICATION WOULD NOT BE NEEDED. BUT
WE DO NOT LIVE IN AN IDEAL WORLD. NOT ALL STATES ACCEPT
THE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS; NOT ALL READILY SHARE
INFORMATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ABOUT
ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS WHICH MAY AFFECT THEM AND THEIR
PEOPLE. VERIFICATION, THUS, BECOMES NECESSARY TO ASSURE
THAT THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN WILL BE IMPLEMENTED.
ON ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY, WHERE THE WELL-BEING OF
OUR PEOPLE IS DIRECTLY AT STAKE, WE CANNOT DEPEND ON THE
GOOD WILL OF OTHERS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION NEEDED TO
CLEAR UP DOUBTS AND AMBIGUITIES AND VERIFY COMPLIANCE
WITH COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN. PRACTICAL, MANDATORY
MECHANISMS SUCH AS ON-SITE GROUND INSPECTION ARE
REQUIRED. ADOPTING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM WITHOUT THIS
VERIFICATION PROVISION WOULD NOT FULFILL THE TERMS OF
THE MADRID MANDATE AND WOULD BE WORSE THAN ADOPTING NO
MEASURES AT ALL.
THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A POSITIVE
RESULT HERE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 19. BUT WORK CANNOT
PROGRESS WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS.
IF, AFTER NEARLY THREE YEARS OF MEETINGS, THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE FAILS TO PRODUCE A SUBSTANTIAL SET OF
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, THE LESSONS
THE UNITED STATES WILL DRAW ARE SERIOUS AND VERY
SOBERING. WE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THE EAST,
REGARDLESS OF ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, SUGGESTIONS AND
HINTS, IS NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO ARRANGEMENTS WITH
THE WEST WHICH REQUIRE EVEN THE MOST MODEST DEGREE OF
OPENNESS AND COOPERATION. CONTRARY TO PUBLIC
STATEMENTS, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED
THAT IT WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION AS
A MEANS OF VERIFICATION. WE WOULD ALSO CONCLUDE THAT
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES ARE TOO
DEMANDING FROM THE EASTERN PERSPECTIVE TO BE SERIOUSLY
DISCUSSED AND NEGOTIATED.
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THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE IS IMPORTANT, BUT THAT
WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED IF WE ACCEPT ONLY COSMETIC
AGREEMENTS. THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE DEPENDS
FIRST OF ALL ON ENACTING SOUND MEASURES AND THEN THE
REAL TEST WOULD COME WITH THEIR IMPLEM ENT ATION AND THEIR
SUBSEQUENT EFFECTIVENESS AS INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
FOR REDUCING MILITARY CONFRONTATION.
MR. CHAIRMAN, WITH STOCKHOLM, BERN, BUDAPEST, OTTAWA AND
OTHERS, WE MAY HAVE A TENDENCY TO THINK OF THE CSCE
PROCESS AS A SERIES OF MEETINGS. WE MUST AVOID SUCH A
LIMITED VIEW. THE CSCE PROCESS IS NOT A STRING OF
NEGOTIATING TABLES -- BUT A UNIQUE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH
THE COMPLEX WEB OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS MAY BE DISCUSSED
AND FURTHERED. THE GOAL OF STOCKHOLM FINALLY IS TO
REDUCE THE PROBABILITIES OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION
ARISING THROUGH MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION.
THAT CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH CONCRETE MEASURES --
THROUGH ACTIONS. SUCH ACTIONS TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE
ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, CAN LEAD TO LASTING PEACE ON THE
EUROPEAN CONTINENT. A HUNDRED FINAL DOCUMENTS WILL MEAN
NOTHING IF INDIVIDUALS STILL CANNOT EXERCISE THEIR
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, EXPRESSION AND MOVEMENT. THAT IS
THE ESSENCE OF HELSINKI. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IF
FULLY IMPLEMENTED, WILL BE JUDGED AS ONE OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT MILESTONES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO SEE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
SUCCEED. WE ALSO WANT TO SEE THE CSCE PROCESS CONTINUE,
REVITALIZED, AFTER THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. THAT
MEETING WILL EVALUATE THE CSCE PROCESS NOT IN TERMS OF
MEETINGS CONCLUDED BUT IN TERMS OF THE ACTIONS THOSE
MEETINGS WERE HELD TO ADDRESS AND OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES
OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WHICH THOSE ACTIONS WERE MEANT
TO ADVANCE. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
HANSEN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04122
SUBJECT: TEXT OF SOVIET CDE PLENARY SPEECH 5/23/86
1. CDE IX - 66
2. (C) FOLLOWING IS THE PREPARED TEXT OF THE SPEECH BY .
SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINEVSKY TO CDE PLENARY
TODAY, FRIDAY, MAY 23. BEFORE BEGINNING THE PREPARED
REMARKS, GRINEVSKY ATTACKED REPRESENTATIVE STENY HOYER,
CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, WHO HAD SPOKEN EARLIER (TEXT SENT
SEPTEL), FOR INTRODUCING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES INTO CDE,
WHERE, GRINEVSKY CONTENDED, THEY DO NOT BELONG. AFTER
GRINEVSKY SPOKE, U.S. DEPUTY AMBASSADOR LYNN HANSEN
EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF REPLY TO REFUTE THE MAIN POINTS
IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT (SEE SEPTEL).
3. U - BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE CONFERENCE IS MOVING NOW INTO THE
CONCLUDING PHASE OF ITS WORK. NATURALLY, THIS PLACES
ALL ITS PARTICIPANTS UNDER SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY. WE
HAVE LITTLE TIME LEFT AND MUCH, EVEN VERY MUCH, REMAINS
TO BE DONE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE OUGHT TO ACT
MORE ENERGETICALLY WITHOUT LOSING TIME AND PRESS FORWARD
PERSISTENTLY.
I BELIEVE THAT A DISSERVICE IS DONE TO THE CONFERENCE BY
THOSE WHO ATTEMPT TO CALL INTO QUESTION THE VERY
POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING POSITIVE RESULTS IN STOCKHOLM,
WHO ATTEMPT TO STEER MATTERS TO CONFRONTATION RATHER
THAN TO COOPERATION IN NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
AGREEMENTS. ISN'T IT LIKE TOLLING THE KNELL FOR THE
CONFERENCE?
OBVIOUSLY, WE ARE FAR FROM LOOKING AT THE AFFAIRS IN
STOCKHOLM THROUGH PINK GLASSES OR CLOSING OUR EYES TO
THE DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES THAT WE ARE YET TO
OVERCOME ON OUR WAY TO COMPLETING THE CONFERENCE.
THOSE WHO HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THIS SESSION CANNOT FAIL
TO SEE THAT INTENSIVE WORK HAS BEEN GOING ON IN DRAFTING
GROUPS. COORDINATORS AND NEGOTIATORS HAVE TOILED
RELENTLESSLY WITHOUT COUNTING TIME TO ACHIEVE RESULTS.
IN OUR VIEW, INTERESTING AND USEFUL WORK HAS BEEN DONE
IN THE GROUP DEALING WITH NOTIFICATION WHICH HAS
MANAGED, SEEMINGLY, TO ADDRESS THE VERY CRUX OF THE
MATTER. WE, ON OUR PART, WISH THIS GROUP AND ITS
COORDINATOR, DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR LIDGARD, SUCCESS
IN MOVING FORWARD. USEFUL WORK HAS ALSO BEEN DONE IN
THE GROUP ON OBSERVATION; SOME MOVEMENT, ALBEIT TIMID,
HAS BEGUN IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE GROUP.
HOWEVER, WE SHOULD STATE WITH ALL FRANKNESS THAT
DRAFTING HAS BEEN EXTREMELY SLOW. LANGUAGE AGREED SO
FAR CONCERNS ONLY PERIPHERAL, SECONDARY QUESTIONS.
WHAT IS REQUIRED THEN TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS AT THE
CONFERENCE, TO IMPART IT A MORE BUSINESS-LIKE PACE? IT
WOULD SEEM THAT THE REQUIREMENT HERE IS THAT ALL
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PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE PURSUE MORE ENERGETICALLY
AND BOLDLY SOLUTIONS TO UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS AND SEEK
APPROACHES TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS.
WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT THIS VERY ATTITUDE TO OUR
BUSINESS PREVAILS AMONG MANY WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.
LIKE IN OTHER CSCE FORA, THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED
COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN PLAYING A POSITIVE ROLE. THERE IS A
FEELING THAT FRANCE, ITALY, SPAIN AND OTHER WESTERN
COUNTRIES ARE IN FAVOUR OF A POSITIVE CONCLUSION OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN CONSISTENT IN PURSUING
THEIR FIRM LINE OF ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS. IT IS
IMPOSSIBLE TO NAME A SINGLE THEME DEFINED IN THE
AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, 1985, WHERE THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE NOT MADE CONSTRUCTIVE
PROPOSALS. EVERYONE HAS STILL FRESH MEMORIES OF THE
MAJOR INITIATIVES SET FORTH BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP,
WHICH ENABLED THE CONFERENCE TO GAIN MOMENTUM.
WHILE ON HIS VISIT TO PARIS EARLY IN OCTOBER, 1985,
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV EXPRESSED READINESS OF THE SOVIET
UNION TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A NUMBER OF STATES, NEUTRAL
IN THE FIRST PLACE, REGARDING MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL
PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS STEP MADE
IT POSSIBLE TO START A BUSINESS-LIKE CONSIDERATION OF
THIS IMPORTANT MEASURE WHICH CAN BECOME A SERIOUS SAFETY"
FUSE AGAINST A MILITARY CONFLICT IN EUROPE.
ON JANUARY 15, THE SOVIET UNION MADE A PROPOSAL TO AGREE
NOW ON NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF LAND AND AIR
FORCES AND TO POSTPONE THE ISSUE OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES
UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. THAT PROPOSAL
PAVED THE WAY TO SOLVING THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE
CONFERENCE.
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE INTRODUCED FAR-REACHING AND
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENTS IN
SUCH AREAS AS NON-USE OF FORCE, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS,
AND LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES. WE,
ON OUR PART, ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THIS WAY
IN THE BELIEF THAT OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ACT
LIKEWISE.
MR. CHAIRMAN, IF WE ANALYZE THE STATUS AT THE CONFERENCE
WE COULD MAKE A CONCLUSION THAT TODAY A LOT HINGES ON
THE PROBLEM OF NOTIFICATION. TIME HAS COME FINALLY TO
IDENTIFY SERIOUSLY TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES,
ADDRESS NOTIFICATION OF MANOEUVRES OF LAND AND AIR
FORCES, MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF FORCES, START
NEGOTIATING SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR THEM, AND WORK ON
INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION.
IN ORDER TO GIVE AN IMPETUS TO SUCH BUSINESS-LIKE
DISCUSSIONS AND PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE WE WOULD LIKE
TODAY TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS:
FIRST. TO NOTIFY MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES
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CONDUCTED INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY
POSSIBLE AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE COMPONENTS,
IF THEY INVOLVE 18,000 TROOPS AND MORE. IN SO DOING,
THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS ENGAGED IN THE MANOEUVRES WOULD
BE REPORTED.
SECOND. TO NOTIFY MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES, WHENEVER
DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE MANOEUVRES 700 OR MORE
SORTIES ARE FLOWN OR MORE THAN 350 COMBAT AIRCRAFT ARE
ENGAGED IN THE MANOEUVRES.
THIS IS THE WAY -- THROUGH MAKING CONCRETE PROPOSALS AND
SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS -- THAT SHOULD
GUIDE, IN OUR VIEW, ALL THOSE WHO SINCERELY WISH TO
CONCLUDE THE FIRST STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
WITH POSITIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS.
UNFORTUNATELY, THERE HAVE BEEN, SO FAR, NO STEPS ON THE
PART OF THE U.S. AND ITS CLOSEST ALLIES TO MEET
COMPROMISE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS.
THEY AVOID SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS FACING THE CONFERENCE
AND PREFER TO STAY ENTRENCHED IN THEIR OLD, MOSS-COVERED
POSITIONS. WHAT IS MORE, THEY TORPEDOED ANY MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING THAT SEEMED TO HAVE TAKEN SHAPE MORE THAN
ONCE. AND THE U.S. DELEGATION MADE A STEP BACKWARDS AND
REFUSED TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS WHICH IT HAD AGREED TO
EARLIER AND EVEN MADE ITSELF. THIS FRIVOLOUS PLAYING AT
NEGOTIATIONS WAS PLAYED VIRTUALLY IN ALL WORKING GROUPS.
IN ESSENCE, THIS IS NOTHING ELSE BUT A CREATION OF
ARTIFICIAL DEADLOCKS AT THE CONFERENCE, A DESIRE TO
TIGHTEN STILL MORE THE KNOT OF DIFFERENCES RATHGR THAN A
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS. IT IS THIS
APPROACH THAT CREATES DIFFICULTIES, SLOWS DOWN WORK, AND
LEADS TO FOOT DRAGGING. AS A RESULT, A TRULY COMPLEX
SITUATION HAS EVOLVED AT THE CONFERENCE.
MR. CHAIRMAN, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYONE
THAT THERE CAN BE NO FINAL AGREEMENT BASED ON ONE
SCENARIO ONLY AND PROPOSED BY ONE COUNTRY ONLY. WE NEED
A COMMON PLATFORM GEARED TO A CONCRETE RESULT.
THE EUROPEANS MASTERED ENOUGH POLITICAL REALISM AND
WISDOM TO CONCLUDE THE MADRID MEETING BY A SUBSTANTIVE
RESULT. THEY WERE ABLE TO OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES AND
DIFFERENCES FOR THE SAKE OF ONE FUNDAMENTAL THING - THE
PRESERVATION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE HELSINKI
PROCESS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION WHICH MEETS THEIR
VITAL LONG-TERM INTERESTS.
EUROPE, WHICH POSSESSES THE NECESSARY HISTORICAL
EXPERIENCE, CAN SAY ITS WORD THAT WILL CARRY WEIGHT IN
STOCKHOLM, TOO, AND SHOW AN EXAMPLE OF SOLVING THE
PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING. BY
MENTIONING EUROPE WE DO NOT INTEND IN ANY WAY TO
DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION IN
THIS REGARD OF THE U.S. AND CANADA WHICH SIGNED THE
HELSINKI ACT.
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PROCEEDING FROM SUCH HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, THE SOVIET
UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES STAND FOR CONSISTENT
COMPLIANCE WITH ALL PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT IN
ORDER TO IMPROVE ONCE AGAIN THE CLIMATE IN EUROPE, TO
ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE AS AN INTEGRAL COMPONENT OF
RELATIONS AMONG STATES, AND TO BUILD DEPENDABLE
SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT.
BASED ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESSING TASKS OF
EUROPEAN POLITICS IT IS PARAMOUNT TO CONCLUDE THE FIRST
STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WITH POSITIVE
RESULTS. POSSIBILITIES EXIST FOR IT AND THEY ARE QUITE
REAL, GIVEN THE MUTUAL DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT.
HOWEVER, BY ALL APPEARANCES, THIS IS WHAT SOME OF OUR
WESTERN COUNTERPARTS ARE LACKING YET. OTHERWISE IT IS
DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN SKIDDING IN THE WORK OF THE
CONFERENCE. BUT SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN STOCKHOLM
CONSTITUTES IN THE CURRENT SITUATION A TOUCHSTONE OF
THE READINESS TO SEEK IN DEEDS RATHER THAN IN WORDS THE
REDUCTION OF MILITARY DANGER ON OUR CONTINENT, TO
ACTUALLY BUILD CONFIDENCE. THIS IS NECESSARY BOTH BY
ITSELF AND FOR THE NEXT CSCE MEETING IN VIENNA SO AS TO
ENABLE IT TO TAKE A DECISION ON THE SECOND PHASE OF THE
CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
ACCORDINGLY, A FRESH IMPETUS WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS IN ALL ITS
DIMENSIONS.
HANSEN
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 04127
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, MAY 19-23, 1986
1. CDE I - 067
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: AT THE END OF LAST
ROUND AND THE BEGINNING OF THIS, THERE WAS GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON AT LEAST ONE THEME: SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS
IN DRAFTING WAS ESSENTIAL DURING THIS ROUND. WE HAVE
NOT MADE SUCH PROGRESS; INDEED, VERY LITTLE OF SIGNIFI-
CANCE HAS BEEN DRAFTED. WITH ONLY TEN NEGOTIATING WEEKS
LEFT, THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE LOOMS LARGE OVER THE
CONFERENCE.
WHO IS TO BLAME? AT THE MOMENT, THE SOVIETS ARE THE
CULPRITS. THEY HAVE CLEARLY DELAYED DRAFTING PROGRESS
ON THE KEY ISSUES, PARTICULARLY ON THE TYPES OF
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. BUT CHANCES ARE THAT THE
DESIRE FOR AGREEMENT WILL CAUSE EVEN OUR CLOSE ALLIES TO
BLAME US FOR OUR "TOUGH" POSITION AS THE NEXT ROUND MOVES
ON. FOR EXAMPLE, IN INTERNAL NATO DISCUSSIONS ONLY THE
U.S., ALONG WITH THE UK, REMAINS INSISTENT THAT ON-SITE
INSPECTION QUA VERIFICATION MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. FRANCE, IN FACT, CANNOT EVEN ACCEPT
NATO'S VERIFICATION MEASURE AS IT NOW STANDS. ACCORD-
INGLY, THERE IS A DANGER THAT MANY OF OUR ALLIES WILL BE
PREPARED TO JOIN THEIR ALREADY ANXIOUS NNA COLLEAGUES IN
ACCEPTING SOME FORM OF FACE-SAVING "MINI-PACKAGE" IN
SEPTEMBER. THE EAST EUROPEANS ARE ALSO GETTING NERVOUS
BUT FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. SOVIET LACK OF FLEXIBILITY
THIS ROUND COMBINED WITH OUR REPEATED INSISTENCE THAT WE
WILL NOT ACCEPT A LAST-MINUTE "MINI-PACKAGE" HAS MADE
THEM REALIZE THAT THERE JUST MIGHT NOT BE A SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY AND
ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: INASMUCH AS NOTIFICATION IS THE KEY
ISSUE IN DEVELOPING A FINAL DOCUMENT IN CDE, THIS SESSION
WITNESSED AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY IN THE DESIGNATED
WORKING GROUP, ITS SUBORDINATE CONTACT GROUP, ON THE
MARGINS AND IN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. THE CONFERENCE
AT LARGE FOCUSED ON ESTABLISHING A DEFINITION FOR NOTIFI-
ABLE ACTIVITIES WHILE THE USDEL ALSO WORKED BEHIND THE
SCENES TO DEVELOP CONSENSUS ON THE APPROPRIATE THRESHOLD.
NONE OF THESE EFFORTS HAS BEEN AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS.
WE CONSIDER THAT SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FOR A COMMON
APPROACH TO THRESHOLDS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH KEY
DELEGATIONS ALTHOUGH AN ALLIED CONSENSUS DOES NOT EXIST
ON THE ISSUE OF "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND". ON THE
OTHER HAND, DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUPS HAS GENERALLY
BEEN THWARTED THROUGH A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, E.G.,
EASTERN INSISTENCE ON THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT
AIR ACTIVITY, MALTESE INTERFERENCE (WHICH AT THIS STAGE
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13 MORE OF AN ANNOYANCE THAN A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK) IN
THE FLOW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY ITS INSISTENCE ON HAVING
ITS MEDITERRANEAN CONCERNS REFLECTED, AND THE CLUMSINESS
OF THE COORDINATOR WHICH ENCUMBERS RATHER THAN
FACILITATES THE DRAFTING PROCESS.
THE ENHANCED FOCUS ON DRAFTING ON NOTIFICATION RAISED
EXPECTATIONS BY MID-ROUND WHEN DRAFTING ON THE NOTIFICA-
TION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES GOT UNDERWAY. AT THE
SAME TIME, BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET
DELEGATION AND DIFFERENT WESTERN DELEGATIONS RAISED
HOPES THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND TO THE PROBLEM
CAUSED BY SOVIET PROCCUPATION WITH THE NOTIFICATION OF
AIR ACTIVITIES. LIKE A CRESCENDO IN A SOUSA MARCH, HOPES
INTENSIFIED THAT A NOTIFICATION TEXT COULD BE NOTED WHICH
PRESERVED THE SUBORDINATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES TO THE
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY. THESE HOPES WERE
SHATTERED IN THE LAST WEEK OF THE SESSION AS THE SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVE, GENERAL TATARNIKOV, CONTINUED BANGING THE
INDEPENDENT AIR DRUM, EVEN REJECTING THE POSSIBILITY OF
WORKING ON THE BASIS OF AN EASTERN PROPOSAL. THIS
DISCORDANT NOTE RESULTED IN A CACOPHONY OF SOUNDS FROM
ALL DIRECTIONS, EFFECTIVELY CANCELING THE WHOLE SHOW
UNTIL THE CONFERENCE RESUMES IN JUNE. THE ONLY TEXT
NOTED THIS ROUND WAS A "CHAPEAU" LER HN NCE TO THE
SECTION CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO
BE NOTIFIED.
5. NON-USE OF FORCE: ONLY ONE PASSAGE WAS REGISTERED
THIS ROUND: THE LINK BETWEEN CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THE
REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. THIS LANGUAGE WHICH
STATES THAT THE "ADOPTION" AND "IMPLEMENTATION" OF CSBM'S
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE" GIVES "EFFECT
AND EXPRESSION" TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE REFLECTS THE WESTERN
APPROACH. WHILE DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS MINIMAL IN THE
TENTH SESSION (AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, GIVEN THE SLOW
PACE IN MOST OTHER GROUPS), THIS WAS DUE MORE TO
DEBILITATING DISUNITY THAN TO DELIBERATE DECISIONS ON THE
PART OF NATO. THE ALLIANCE WAS OFTEN ITS OWN WORST ENEMY
AS IT WRESTLED WITH THE VEXING PROBLEMS OF HOW TO
REAFFIRM THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND WHETHER TO INCLUDE HUMAN
RIGHTS LANGUAGE IN THE WESTERN NUF TEXT. WITHOUT
INTERNAL AGREEMENT ON THESE SUBJECTS, THE WEST WAS UNABLE
TO INTRODUCE ANY OF THE REMAINDER OF ITS NUF LANGUAGE OR
TO ENGAGE IN ANY SERIOUS DRAFTING. BY MID-ROUND,
HOWEVER, WE WERE ABLE TO PERSUADE EC-12 DELEGATIONS TO
DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON A NUF REAFFIRMATION WHICH
INCLUDED REFERENCES TO PROHIBITIONS ON "RIGHTS OF
REPRISAL" AND OTHER "MANIFESTATIONS" OF FORCE.
IRONICALLY, HUMAN RIGHTS BECAME THE FINAL BETE NOIRE OF
THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AS FIRST ROME AND THEN PARIS
OBJECTED TO STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IN A WESTERN
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TEXT. ONLY AFTER MUCH INTERNAL AGONIZING -- AND
STRATEGIC DEMARCHES -- DID THE ALLIANCE FINALLY AGREE TO
A HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE WHICH GOES BEYOND THE NNA TEXT.
NATO THEN TABLED ITS SECOND "COHERENT BLOCK" WHICH
CONTAINED THE NUF REAFFIRMATION AND COLLATERAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS INCLUDING ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE.
THE WEST NOW PLANS TO INTRODUCE THE REST OF THE WESTERN
TEXT, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, EARLY NEXT ROUND.
THUS, AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY UNITED WEST IS NOW
COMFORTABLY POISED TO DRAFT AT WHATEVER PACE DEEMED
TACTICALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY APPROPRIATE NEXT ROUND.
6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: THE ALLIANCE CONTINUED TO
PROMOTE MEASURE 1 ENERGETICALLY THROUGHOUT THE ROUND WITH
GENERALLY SOLID SUPPORT ON THE NEED FOR "STATIC"
INFORMATION FROM THE NNA (PARTICULARLY SWITZERLAND,
SWEDEN, AND MALTA). THE EAST, HOWEVER, REFUSED TO BITE,
AND AFTER THEIR SO-CALLED CONCESSION TO DISCUSS THE
INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION
IN WORKING GROUP B-1 (NOTIFICATION), WOULDN'T ENGAGE ON
INFORMATION AT ALL UNLESS SPECIFICALLY PROVOKED. WHEN
PROVOKED THEY INSISTED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO PROVIDE
INFORMATION -- INCLUDING STATIC INFORMATION -- AND
POINTED, WITH NO COMMITMENTS, TO SC.7'S HANDLING OF
INFORMATION. THE RESULT -- NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON
STATIC INFORMATION THIS ROUND. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE
FUTURE NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY: THE FRENCH HAVE
ALREADY PROPOSED IN CAUCUS THAT NATO CONSIDER TRADING OFF
MEASURE 1 FOR AN APPROPRIATE EASTERN CONCESSION; GDR
AMBASSADOR BUHRING HAS FLOATED A TRIAL BALLOON OF A
MEASURE 1/CONSTRAINTS TRADE-OFF; AND CAUCUS SENTIMENT IS
GROWING FOR SOME ACTION ALONG THESE LINES SO AS TO ALLOW
SUFFICIENT TIME TO NEGOTIATE SOME STATIC INFORMATION
EXCHANGE INTO OTHER MEASURES AS ENVISAGED BY THE NNA.
WHATEVER THE FUTURE OF MEASURE 1, HOWEVER, SUBSTANTIVE
PROGRESS ON INFORMATION IN THIS WORKING GROUP WILL BE AN
UPHILL BATTLE AT BEST, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE.
ON VERIFICATION, EASTERN NONSUBSTANTIVE FLEXIBILITY
CONTRIBUTED TO SOME DRAFTING PROGRESS ON A VERIFICATION
"SKELETON" WHICH TREATS THE KEY ISSUES (E.G., FORM OF
VERIFICATION, TIMELINESS OF RESPONSE ETC.) BY USE OF
ELLIPSES, LEAVING SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS FOR LATER. THREE
SENTENCES WERE NOTED DEALING WITH IMPORTANT ELEMENTS FROM
OUR PERSPECTIVE: THE RIGHTS OF STATES TO BE ALLOWED TO
CONDUCT SOME FORM OF VERIFICATION (INSPECTION, IN OUR
VIEW); THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE RECEIVING SUCH A
REQUEST; AND TIMELINESS. THE EAST WAS LESS WILLING TO
DRAFT ON THE MODALITIES OF VERIFICATION, APPARENTLY
FEARING THAT SUCH MODALITIES WOULD BE TAILORED TO
INSPECTION AND NOT TO THEIR CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION,
I.E., NTM'S, CONSULTATIONS AND, PERHAPS, SOME FORM OF
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OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST. WHILE PROGRESS ON KEY VERIFI-
CATION ISSUES REMAINED ELUSIVE, THE DEVELOPING SKELETON
DOES MARK SOME MEASURE OF SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS, INASMUCH
AS IT CONFIRMS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATES
CONCERNING VERIFICATION AND SHOULD FACILITATE WORK WHEN,
AND IF, THE SOVIETS SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON INSPECTION.
FOR THE NEAR TERM, HOWEVER, THE MOST PRESSING ISSUE MAY
BE ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT. THE FRENCH, IN PARTICULAR,
BROADLY HINTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP
THAT SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF OBSERVATION UPON
REQUEST MAY BE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION. (THEY HAVE
REITERATED TO US BILATERALLY THEIR POSITION THAT 72
HOURS MUST ELAPSE BETWEEN AN INSPECTION REQUEST AND THE
ARRIVAL OF A TEAM; THIS TAKES MUCH VALUE OUT OF THE
MEASURE.) IN INTERNAL NATO DISCUSSIONS THE DUTCH HAVE
NOT HESITATED TO VOICE SIMILAR VIEWS. BY SEPTEMBER
SEVERAL OTHERS MAY NOT BE WITH US ON THE INSPECTION
ISSUE. IN AN EFFORT TO REMOVE ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE
SERIOUSNESS OF OUR P03ITION AND TO BOLSTER ALLIANCE
RE30LVE WE ARE NOW REEMPHASIZING TO THE ALLIES, AS WELL
AS THE EAST AND NNA, THAT INSPECTION WILL REMAIN THE
SINE QUA NON FOR THE UNITED STATES IN STOCKHOLM.
7. OBSERVATION: DRAFTING PROGRESS CONTINUED ON THE
"HOUSEKEEPING" ISSUES OF OBSERVATION (E.G., TRANSPORTA-
TION OF OBSERVERS) DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE ROUND,
BUT LATER BOGGED DOWN AS A RESULT OF MORE COMPLEX ISSUES
BEING DISCUSSED AND THE GENERAL SOVIET TACTIC OF DELAYING
SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING. THE EAST TORPEDOED A SERIES OF
INFORMAL COFFEE GROUP ON MAPS AND BINOCULARS AND
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES FOR OBSERVERS, CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATING THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF ACTUALLY
HELPING OBSERVERS MAKE AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF AN
ACTIVITY. NEAR THE ROUND'S END, HOWEVER, THE EAST DID
SHOW SOME APPARENT FLEXIBITY ON THE QUESTION OF DURATION
OF OBSERVATION BY ADOPTING THE NNA'S POSITION THAT
OBSERVATION SHOULD BEGIN ONCE THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD
IS REACHED. ALSO, WHEN NATO PRESSED THE CASE THAT ALL
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE OBSERVED, THE EAST,
UNLIKE IN THE PAST, STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED REJECTING THAT
POSITION OUT OF HAND. OVERALL, WHILE PROGRESS HAS SLOWED
IN B-2, THERE REMAIN SEVERAL AREAS RIPE FOR DRAFTING NEXT
ROUND AND THE EAST IS SHOWING LESS RIGIDITY IN THIS GROUP
THAN ELSEWHERE. HOWEVER, THERE ARE DEFINITE LIMITS
PLACED ON SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE
THRESHOLD QUESTION IN B-1. NATO CONTINUES TO WORK WELL
TOGETHER, ALTHOUGH THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME ALLIES TO
DEPART FROM THE LETTER OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED COULD MAKE IT
DIFFICULT TO FIND ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS AS DRAFTING
PROGRESSES.
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8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE EAST BLOCKED DRAFTING ON
ANNUAL FORECASTS UNTIL THE FINAL WEEK OF THE ROUND.
WHILE SOME CDE PARTICIPANTS LINKED SOVIET OBSTRUCTIVE
BEHAVIOR ON FORECASTS TO WESTERN TOUGHNESS ON
CONSTRAINTS, IN OUR VIEW, THE MORE LIKELY LINKAGE WAS
BETWEEN FORECASTS AND NOTIFICATION. AS LONG AS THE CORE
ISSUE OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED REMAINED
UNRESOLVED, THE SOVIETS DID NOT WANT TO AGREE TO ANYTHING
ANYWHERE ELSE WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE THEIR POSITION.
FIRST, THEY REJECTED A STANDARDIZED FORMAT FOR FORECASTS;
THEN THEY REFUSED TO TRY TO DRAFT TEXT ON THE CONTENT OF
THE FORECAST, SPECIFICALLY, ON THE DURATION OF A FORECAST
ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, DURING THE FINAL TWO WEEKS OF THE
ROUND -- FOLLOWING GRINEVSKY'S RETURN TO STOCKHOLM FROM
MOSCOW REPORTEDLY WITH NEW, MORE FLEXIBLE INSTRUCTIONS
-- THE EASTERN POSITION LOOSENED UP SOMEWHAT. BULGARIA
TABLED THE LONG-AWAITED EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR AN "ANNUAL
PLAN," THE CONTENT OF WHICH INCLUDED MOST OF THE ELEMENTS
OF WESTERN AND NNA PROPOSALS, ALTHOUGH IN MORE GENERAL
TERMS. FURTHERMORE, THE BULGARIAN PROPOSAL INCLUDED A
PROVISION ON TRANSFERS. IN BEHIND THE SCENES MEETINGS
DURING THE FINAL WEEK, THE EAST WAS EAGER TO NOTE
SOMETHING ON ANNUAL FORECASTS AND THE INTRODUCTORY
SENTENCE TO THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR WAS NEGOTIATED:
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION
ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING
MODEL:." THE LATTER PHRASE, ALTHOUGH NOT OUR PREFERRED
STANDARDIZED FORMAT," IS A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT OVER
THE PARALLEL LANGUAGE IN B-1 (NOTIFICATION), "AGREED
FORM OF CONTENT." THIS WAS THE ONLY LANGUAGE NOTED IN
THIS GROUP THIS ROUND, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NARROWING THE
GAPS REGARDING THE FIRST TWO ELEMENTS OF THE CONTENT OF
THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.
9. CONSTRAINTS: THERE WAS NO REAL PRESSURE ON THE WEST
THIS ROUND TO DRAFT ON CONSTRAINTS ALTHOUGH THE EAST DID
USE THEIR LATE "FORTHCOMINGNESS" ON THE CALENDAR TO TRY
TO TURN UP THE HEAT ON CONSTRAINTS. THROUGHOUT THE ROUND
THE SOVIETS EXPLOITED CONSTRAINTS TACTICALLY RATHER THAN
SERIOUSLY TRYING TO DRAFT LANGUAGE. DURING THE FIRST
WEEK, THEY USED THE CONSTRAINTS MEETING TO DELIVER A
POLEMICAL ATTACK ON THE U.S. FOR ITS ATTACK ON LIBYA.
LATER, THEY FOCUSED THEIR EFFORTS ON BLAMING THE WEST FOR
BLOCKING PROGRESS ON CONSTRAINTS, REPEATEDLY ACCUSING THE
U.S. AND THE U.K. OF BEING UNWILLING SERIOUSLY TO
CONSIDER CONSTRAINTS. MANY INTERPRETED THESE ATTACKS AS
THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S LAST-DITCH EFFORT TO PUSH
CONSTRAINTS BEFORE DROPPING THEM. AT ABOUT THE SAME
TIME THE GDR AMBASSADOR (BUHRING) INFORMALLY SOUNDED
NATO DELEGATES' REACTIONS TO THE IDEA OF A TRADE OFF:
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CONSTRAINTS FOR MEASURE ONE.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE EAST CONTINUED TO COURT THE NNA,
TABLING AN NNA-INSPIRED CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL LIMITING
GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS WHICH ARE TWO TIMES GREATER THAN
THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO A TOTAL OF SIX PER YEAR. THE
NNA, INTERNALLY SPLIT ON HOW TO APPROACH CONSTRAINTS,
WERE SURPRISINGLY PASSIVE THIS ROUND. EARLY IN THE
ROUND SOME (E.G., THE SWEDES) WANTED TO EXPLORE THE
CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF THE CALENDAR AND THEY CONTINUE
TO PURSUE THIS APPROACH PRIVATELY; HOWEVER, OTHERS
(YUGOSLAVIA) FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT NNA LOYALTY TO "TRUE"
CONSTRAINTS. THE RESULT WAS LITTLE NNA AGITATION ON THE
ISSUE AND NO NNA PRESSURE ON NATO. THE IRISH "TIME
CONSTRAINT" (ONE EXAJIPLE OF THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF
THE FORECAST) APPEARS TO BE GAINING SUPPORT AMONG THE
NNA, WHILE THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH CRITICAL, HAVE NOT
REJECTED IT OUT OF HAND. SOME WITHIN NATO INCREASINGLY
VIEW "TIME CONSTRAINTS" AS PROVIDING US A WAY OUT OF THE
CONSTRAINTS "DILEMMA." OTHERS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS AS
YET NO TACTICAL BENEFIT TO BE DERIVED FROM NATO SUPPORT
FOR SUCH AN IDEA. ALL AGREE THAT, SUBSTANTIVELY
SPEAKING, AS LONG AS OUR ALERT LOOPHOLE REMAINS LARGE
ENOUGH TO DRIVE SOVIET TANKS THROUGH, THE IRISH IDEAS
WILL NOT INHIBIT THE SOVIET USE OF FORCE FOR
INTIMIDATION.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 04133
SUBJECT: CDE: USSR NOTIFICATION PROPOSAL, MAY 23, 1986
1. CDE X - 69.
2. LOU - ENTIRE TEXT.
SEPTEL), USSR
3DNTEXMAY 23 T SEPTEL) (REPORTED
NOTED THAT
AMB. GRINEVSKY (FULL
"A LOT HINGES ON NOTIFICATION," AND THAT THE TIME
HAS COME TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES SERIOUSLY.
IN THAT CONTEXT, HE MADE A NEW PROPOSAL, AS FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT.
"FIRST. TO NOTIFY MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES
CONDUCTED INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH
ANY POSSIBLE AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE
COMPONENTS, IF THEY INVOLVE 18,000 TROOPS AND MORE.
IN SO DOING THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS ENGAGED IN THE
MANOEUVRES WOULD BE REPORTED.
SECOND. TO NOTIFY MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES, WHENEVER
DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE MANOEUVRES 700 AND MORE
SORTIES ARE FLOWN OR MORE THAN 350 COMBAT AIRCRAFT ARE
ENGAGED IN THE MANOEUVRES."
END TEXT.
4. IN RESPONDING TO THE USSR STATEMENT, U.S.
AMBASSADOR HANSEN SAID, INTER ALIA, THE U.S.
WOULD STUDY THIS PROPOSAL. NONETHELESS, HANSEN
NOTED THAT THE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD PROPOSED BY
THE USSR WAS NOT ONLY THREE TIMES THE LEVEL
PROPOSED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED, BUT THAT THE USSR
PROPOSAL ALSO IGNORED NNA PROPOSALS.
FURTHER, IT STICKS TO A CONCEPT (NUMERICAL
PARAMETERS TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION) WHICH IS
CLEARLY OUTMODED AND UNACCEPTABLE TO MOST
DELEGATIONS. AS FOR THE PROPOSED PARAMETERS FOR
NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES, HANSEN OBSERVED
THAT THE ONLY TYPE OF ACTIVITY THAT WOULD BE
CAPTURED WOULD BE THE TEN PERCENT OF
AIR ACTIVITY IN EUROPE NOT COMBINED WITH GROUND
FORCE ACTIVITY, I.E. INDEPENDENT AIR. IT WOULD NOT
CAPTURE ANY OF THE REMAINING 90 PERCENT OF AIR
ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE -- ACTIVITY THAT IS COMBINED
WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY, WHEREAS OTHER APPROACHES
(SC.1) WOULD PROVIDE FOR SUCH INFORMATION.
HANSEN
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CONF IDENT I ALSTOCKHOLM04126
SUBJECT: CDE: CODEL HOYER MEETING WITH SOVIET CDE
- AMBASSADOR, MAY 23,'1986
1. CDE X - 070
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE COURSE OF A ONE-AND-A-HALF
HOUR PRIVATE MEETING WITH CONGRESSMEN STENY HOYER AND
JOHN PORTER ON MAY 23, 1986, SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR
GRINEVSKY GAVE A SURPRISINGLY UPBEAT ASSESSMENT OF THE
CHANCES FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM. THIS
CABLE REPORTS SEVERAL POINTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE
CDE. END SUMMARY.
4. IN THE COURSE OF A ONE-AND-A-HALF HOUR PRIVATE
MEETING WITH CONGRESSMEN STENY HOYER AND JOHN PORTER ON
MAY 23, 1986, SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY GAVE A
SURPRISINGLY UPBEAT ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANCES FOR A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM. HE SAID THAT HE SAW NO
GREAT DIVERGENCIES ON SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT
REPORT TO MOSCOW THAT THERE WAS A "REAL DESIRE" ON THE
PART OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF
THE GENERAL APPROACH OF SOME TO WORLD AFFAIRS AND THE
CSCE PROCESS AS A WHOLE. HE FURTHER DEFINED THIS
APPROACH BY SOME AS INVOLVING THE LINKAGE OF THE
DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS SO THAT IF ONE
FAILED, E.G., THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING, THEN
PROGRESS IN ANOTHER, E.G., AT STOCKHOLM, WOULD LEAD TO
AN IMBALANCE IN THE PROCESS.
5. CONGRESSMAN HOYER SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN GREAT
OPTIMISM IN THE U.S. REGARDING U.S.-USSR RELATIONS DUE
TO THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUMMIT AND POSITIVE
SUMMIT ATMOSPHERICS. HOWEVER, HE HAD BEEN DISCOURAGED
IN HIS MEETING WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATE IN OTTAWA AND
ASKED GRINEVSKY WHY THE TWO SIDES ARE SO FAR APART ON
THE "SMALL ISSUE" OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION. HOYER NOTED
THAT IN HELSINKI ALL SIGNATORY STATES HAD SIGNED A
DOCUMENT CONTAINING PROVISIONS ACCORDING TO WHICH THEY
WOULD ACCORD MINIMUM RIGHTS TO THEIR CITIZENS, BUT THAT
THE U.S. STILL FOUND GREAT RESTRICTION IN THE SOVIET
IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROVISIONS.
6. TURNING TO ANOTHER SUBJECT, GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE
SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT VERIFICATION IN PRINCIPLE, BUT
SAID THAT THOSE WHO FOLLOWED THE ISSUE ALWAYS REFERRED
TO "ADEQUATE VERIFICATION -- IT IS OUR BIBLE." HE SAID
THAT STOCKHOLM CSBM'S ARE STILL BEING NEGOTIATED AND
THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NATURE OF THESE CSBM'S
REQUIRED INSPECTION. THE KIND OF ACTIVITY BEING
NEGOTIATED IN STOCKHOLM, I.E., NOTIFICATION OF GROUND
FORCES, ACCORDING TO THE NATO APPROACH, DOES NOT CALL
FOR INSPECTION BECAUSE THE U.S. ALREADY KNOWS EVERYTHING
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FROM ITS NTM'S. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY OF "INSPECTION FOR THE SAKE OF INSPECTION,"
BUT THAT HE DOUBTED IT WAS POSSIBLE AT THE PRESENT TIME;
MORE CONFIDENCE WAS NEEDED FIRST.
7. THIS CABLE WAS NOT CLEARED WITH CONGRESSMEN HOYER
AND PORTER.
HANSEN
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SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 03947
SUBJECT: WESTERN STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR THE CLOSING
- PHASE OF CDE
1. CDE X - 054
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: USDEL BELIEVES THAT, TO ACHIEVE THE
MINIMALIST AGREEMENT NEEDED FOR CONTINUITY IN CDE, SOVIET
CDE STRATEGY WILL BE TO CONTINUE DELAYING SUBSTANTIVE
DRAFTING WHILE BUILDING POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE WEST TO
ACCEPT AN ELEVENTH-HOUR MINI-PACKAGE. TO COUNTER THIS,
THE U.S. MUST TOUGHEN NATO TO IMPRESS UPON BOTH THE EAST
AND NNA THAT WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT A PACKAGE WHICH DOES
NOT INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, INSPECTION WITH NO RIGHT OF
REFUSAL, AND TO PRESSURE THE EAST TO BRING THEIR APPARENT
FLEXIBILITY BEHIND THE SCENES TO THE FORE IN THE
CONFERENCE. WE ARE ASSUMING A POSTURE OF PESSIMISM OVER
CONFERENCE PROSPECTS AND INDICATING THAT IF SUBSTANTIVE
DRAFTING IN ALL AREAS IS NOT ACCELERATED EARLY IN
ROUND XI AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE ACHIEVABLE.
WHILE NOT ALL ALLIED DELEGATIONS ARE LIKELY TO JOIN US
IN PROCLAIMING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A "SYMBOLIC"
AGREEMENT, WE CAN EXPECT GOOD NEAR-TERM SUPPORT FOR A
FIRM LINE AGAINST A MINI-PACKAGE AND FOR THE NECESSITY
OF INSPECTION. WHETHER THE CENTER WILL HOLD THROUGH THE
FINAL HOUR IS MORE QUESTIONABLE. OUR TACTICAL PROBLEM
IS COMPOUNDED BY THE UK, WHICH (WHILE AGREEING WITH OUR
SHORT-RANGE TACTICS) MAY BE PLAYING INTO EASTERN HANDS
BY HOLDING TO THE VIEW THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS NEED
NOT START UNTIL THE LAST ROUND. SEE PARA 6 FOR ACTION
REQUESTED. END SUMMARY.
4. EASTERN STRATEGY: AS CDE ROUND X ENDS, THE EAST IS
CARRYING ITS TACTIC OF DELAY INTO THE END GAME. CLEARLY,
THE EASTERN OBJECTIVE IN STOCKHOLM IS TO ACHIEVE A
"MODEST" AGREEMENT (READ A "MINI-PACKAGE" CONTAINING
NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR, AND NON-
USE OF FORCE, BUT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT STATIC INFORMATION
AND WITHOUT ON-SITE INSPECTION) WHICH WOULD ENSURE
CONTINUITY OF THE CDE PROCESS AFTER VIENNA, IDEALLY IN
THE FORM OF A CDE PHASE II MANDATE LINKED TO THE APRIL 18
GORBACHEV INITIATIVE. TO ACHIEVE THIS, IN ROUND XI THEY
PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING FOR
AS LONG AS POSSIBLE WHILE BLAMING THE WEST FOR "FOOT-
DRAGGING." THUS, THEY SEEK TO BUILD POLITICAL PRESSURE
ON NATO STATES TO ACCEPT A MINIMAL OUTCOME IN SEPTEMBER.
SIMPLY PUT, THE EAST IS ATTEMPTING TO SET UP THE WEST
FOR A MINI-PACKAGE OR, AT THE MINIMUM, TO TAKE THE RAP
FOR A FAILURE. THIS ROUND, THE SOVIETS DEADLOCKED THE
CONFERENCE ON THE NOTIFICATION ISSUE BY INSISTING THAT,
AS A PRECONDITION TO DRAFTING ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS,
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PARAMETERS BE IDENTIFIED WHICH WOULD CAPTURE INDEPENDENT
AIR ACTIVITIES, ALBEIT AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL. COMPLEMENT-
ING THIS EFFORT, THEY HAVE BEGUN A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN
BOTH WITHIN THE CONFERENCE AND IN THE PRESS OF BLAMING
THE WEST FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN ALL WORKING GROUPS. IN
RECENT DAYS THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY
BE PREPARED TO RESOLVE THE AIR QUESTION IN A MANNER
CONSISTENT WITH THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND ALSO TO
ACCEPT A NONPREJUDICIAL FORMULATION ON THE DEFERMENT OF
INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THIS "FORTHCOMINGNESS" IS
ONLY PART OF A SLIDING DEFENSE, HOWEVER, AND WE FULLY
EXPECT THAT NEW BARRIERS WILL EMERGE IN THE NEXT ROUND
AS THEIR MINIMALIST STRATEGY CONTINUES.
5. THE U.S. RESPONSE: IN OUR VIEW, THE RECENT GORBACHEV
INITIATIVE AND EARLIER SIGNS OF RENEWED SOVIET INTEREST
IN A PHASE II CDE OFFER US POTENTIAL LEVERAGE TO COUNTER
THIS SOVIET STRATEGY AS WELL AS TO PRESS OUR CASE WITH
THE NNA AND OUR ALLIES. WE ARE ASKING HOW ONE CAN EXPECT
TO GO INTO A MUCH MORE COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATION
INVOLVING GENUINE ARMS REDUCTION WHEN WE ARE APPARENTLY
UNABLE TO REACH FAR LESS AMBITIOUS GOALS HERE; WE ARE
PRESSING THE CASE THAT THE SOVIETS NOW BELIEVE THEY NEED
AN AGREEMENT; AND WE ARE DOWNPLAYING THE CHANCES FOR A
SUBSTANTIVE RESULT IN STOCKHOLM AND MAKING ABUNDANTLY
CLEAR TO ALL THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT UNDER ANY
CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO A MINI-PACKAGE, I.E., ANY PACKAGE
WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN, INTER ALIA, ON-SITE INSPECTION AS
A RIGHT. WE STRESS THAT ROUND X WAS A "CRITICAL"
SESSION, BUT THAT NO SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING WAS ACCOMP-
LISHED BECAUSE OF EASTERN INTRANSIGENCE. FOR THERE TO BE
ANY POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING AN ACCEPTABLE RESULT,
SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING MUST PROGRESS RAPIDLY IN ALL GROUPS
EARLY IN ROUND XI. IN USDEL'S VIEW, THIS APPROACH
CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE CONFERENCE, IN BILATERAL
CONTACTS, AND IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORTS OFFERS THE BEST
CHANCE TO BUILD PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO SERIOUSLY
DRAFT IN THE NEXT ROUND. WE SHOULD ALSO PRESS THE
SOVIETS BILATERALLY TO TRANSLATE THEIR APPARENT
FLEXIBILITY IN PRIVATE INTO GENUINE FLEXIBILITY WHERE IT
COUNTS, I.E., DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUPS. ALTHOUGH
WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT FORCING AN EARLY SHOW OF THE
EASTERN HAND, WE BELIEVE SUCH A COURSE WOULD AT LEAST
ALLOW THE WEST TO BUILD ITS CASE THAT THE EAST IS AT
FAULT FOR THE FAILURE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
6. ALLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS: FOR THE NEAR TERM (THROUGH
THE END OF THE ROUND) THERE IS GENERAL CAUCUS SUPPORT FOR
OUR SUGGESTED TACTICS AND AT LEAST THE FRG AND UK WILL BE
PREPARED TO SUPPORT OUR VIEW IN THE FINAL PLENARY.
LONGER TERM SUPPORT FOR OUR STRATEGY INTO ROUND XI,
HOWEVER, IS MORE PROBLEMATICAL. FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL
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REASONS, MANY ALLIED DELEGATIONS ARE LOATH TO EVEN HINT
PUBLICLY THAT WE MIGHT NOT ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT, AND THEY
ARE OVERLY ENCOURAGED BY RECENT SOVIET HINTS OF
FLEXIBILITY. THE FRENCH, ON THE OTHER HAND, SAY THEY
ARE PREPARED TO BRAND THE CONFERENCE A FAILURE IF THE
MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT ARE NOT DECIDED BY THE
END OF ROUND XI. THE UK (STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY CANADA),
WHILE SUPPORTIVE OF OUR POSTURE OF PESSIMISM, HAS YET TO
AGREE WITH US THAT SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING MUST ACCELERATE
NEXT ROUND, AND THEY CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THE WEST CAN
WREST BIGGER CONCESSIONS FROM THE SOVIETS BY HOLDING
RELIGIOUSLY TO SC.1 UNTIL THE FINAL ROUND. THE TROUBLE
WITH THIS ARGUMENT IS THAT THE TOUGH GUYS WILL BE LITTLE
IN EVIDENCE AT THE END. THE BRITISH, AS HOLDERS OF THE
EC PRESIDENCY, WILL BE NEUTRALIZED. THE FRENCH, WHO
HAVE ALWAYS BEEN "WET" ON KEY QUESTIONS SUCH AS
INSPECTION, WILL BE PREPARED FOR A MINI-PACKAGE AS A
GESTURE TO KOHL. THE CANADIANS ARE CONFIDENT ABOUT THE
END GAME BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO REAL SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS.
AS A RESULT WE WILL BE LEFT HOLDING THE BAG ALONE -- A
NO-WIN SITUATION FOR US. ALSO, THE LONGER SUBSTANTIVE
PROGRESS 13 BLOCKED, THE MORE THE SWEDES (AS HOSTS) WILL
BE TEMPTED TO TRY TO "RESCUE" THE CONFERENCE WITH A
PRE-FINAL ROUND BRIDGING PROPOSAL WHICH THEY MAY, IN
FACT, ALL READY BE DRAFTING.
T. WE HAVE FOUR TASKS BEFORE US: 1) ALTHOUGH THERE MAY
BE SOME MOVEMENT DEVELOPING IN THE BRITISH POSITION, WE
MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS THE UK AND CANADA TO SUPPORT
SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING NOW AS THE ONLY POSSIBLE ROUTE TO A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME; 2) WE MUST BEGIN TO EXPRESS IN THE
CONFERENCE, BILATERALLY AND IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS OUR
ASSESSMENT OF THE POOR PROSPECTS FOR THE CONFERENCE'S
SUCCESS AND THE REASONS FOR THEM, AND TO STRESS THAT FOR
THERE TO BE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING
MUST ACCELERATE SHARPLY; 3) WE MUST CONTINUE TO IMPRESS
UPON ALLIES AND THE EAST ALIKE THAT WE WILL NOT AGREE TO
A MINI-PACKAGE, THAT INSPECTION IS AND WILL REMAIN OUR
SINE QUA NON AND THAT SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING MUST BEGIN
NOW; AND 4) WHILE AVOIDING ANY IMPLIED COMMITMENT TO
CONTINUITY IN CDE, WE NEED TO STRESS THAT CONTINUATION
OF THE CONFERENCE AFTER VIENNA SEEMS TO US IMPOSSIBLE IF
STOCKHOLM FAILS.
8. WE PROVIDE THESE THOUGHTS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE
RUNUP TO THE HALIFAX NATO MINISTERIAL AND THE WARSAW
PACT PCC SUMMIT WHICH WILL FORM THE BACKDROP FOR THE
BEGINNING OF THE NEXT CDE ROUND ON JUNE 10.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03259
SUBJECT: WESTERN NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3094, B) STOCKHOLM 1911,
- C) STATE 31397
1. CDE X - 030
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE REMAINDER OF
THE WESTERN NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT (THE FIRST ELEMENT,
THE CSBM'S-NUF LINK, HAS ALREADY BEEN TABLED) AS DRAFTED
BY NATO DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM. THE DRAFT CONTAINS
ALL THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT,
INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, ANTI-TERRORISM, ANTI-BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE, AND VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE LANGUAGE. THE
REFERENCE TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE, MOREOVER, IS CLOSER TO
THE U.S. (UN CHARTER) THAN THE EC-12 APPROACH (HELSINKI
FINAL ACT). ACTION REQUESTED IN PARA T. END SUMMARY.
4. NATO DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM HAVE REACHED AD
REFERENDUM AGREEMENT ON A WESTERN TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF
FORCE (SEE PARA 8 FOR FULL TEXT). USDEL BELIEVES THE
DRAFT REFLECTS ALL KEY ELEMENTS IN THE U.S. NUF TEXT
CONTAINED IN REF B, E.G., LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
ANTI-TERRORISM, VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE AND EQUAL
RIGHTS/EQUAL DUTIES OF STATES. THESE CONCEPTS WERE NOT
INCLUDED IN THE EC-12 NUF TEXT (REF B). IN ADDITION,
THIS NATO DRAFT CONTAINS LANGUAGE ON THE NUF PRINCIPLE
'SELF (TAKEN FROM THE UN CHARTER) AND ANTI-BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE LANGUAGE CLOSER TO 'HE U.S. THAN THE EC-12
APPROACH. IN SHORT, THE DRAFT REFLECTS THE BROADER
WESTERN CONCEPT OF SECURITY, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS.
5. AS WITH ANY DOCUMENT DESIGNED BY A COMMITTEE, THIS
NUF TEXT IS FAR FROM PERFECT. FOR EXAMPLE, DELEGATION
PRESSED FOR A MORE EXTENSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS SECTION.
HOWEVER, GIVEN THE FACT THAT EC-12 TEXT DID NOT CONTAIN
WHAT WOULD BE TERMED HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, EVEN GETTING
AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE WAS EXCEPTION-
ALLY DIFFICULT. EVEN AFTER AMBASSADOR BARRY'S LOBBYING
IN ROME, THE ITALIANS WERE UNBENDING. HOWEVER, AT THE
LAST MOMENT, THEY ABSENTED THEMSELVES FROM THE DRAFTING
EXERCISE, SO A CONSENSUS COULD BE REACHED ON HUMAN
RIGHTS LANGUAGE. AS AGREED, THE HUMAN RIGHTS PARAGRAPH
INCLUDES, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE CSCE CONTEXT, THE
LINKAGE BETWEEN THE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WHILE
THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT FALLS FAR SHORT OF WHAT DELEGATION
WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SEEN, IT GOES BEYOND THE NNA TEXT.
MOREOVER, NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF
INTRODUCING MORE WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IF THE
TACTICAL SITUATION SHOULD WARRANT, E.G., AS A COUNTER-
POINT IF THE EAST PUSHES ITS NO-FIRST-USE LANGUAGE.
WHILE THE ORDERING OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE TEXT IS
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SOMEWHAT HAPHAZARD, SINCE THE TEXT WILL BE INTRODUCED IN
A PIECEMEAL (OR BLOCK) FASHION, THE ORDER CAN BE
CORRECTED DURING NEGOTIATIONS DEPENDING ON THE FORM OF A
NUF SECTION IN A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
6. ALL NATO DELEGATIONS AGREED TO REPORT THIS
UNBRACKETED TEXT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS FOR
COMMENT BY APRIL 30. THE TEXT REPRESENTS A FRAGILE
COMPROMISE, PARTICULARLY FOR EC-12 MEMBERS, SINCE IT
GOES WELL BEYOND THEIR COMMON TEXT TABLED IN THE NATO
CAUCUS ON FEBRUARY 26. NEVERTHELESS, ALL DELEGATIONS,
EXCEPT ITALY, SAID THEY WOULD RECOMMEND TO THEIR
CAPITALS THAT THE TEXT BE ACCEPTED AS DRAFTED.
(THEREFORE, FOR THE TIME BEING, DEPARTMENT SHOULD HOLD
OFF ON DEMARCHES REQUESTED IN REF A). WHETHER THE TEXT
COMES THROUGH UNSCATHED IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. THE
NORMALLY OBSTREPEROUS FRENCH, THE MAIN AUTHORS OF THE
EC-12 TEXT, WERE STRANGELY SILENT DURING THE DRAFTING OF
THIS TEXT. THE ITALIANS WILL ONLY SAY THEY WILL REPORT
TO ROME THAT THIS TEXT RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF ALL
DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING THEIR COMMUNITY PARTNERS.
WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM, MOREOVER, SEEM MORE
INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE BROADER U.S. APPROACH TO NUF
THAN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. WHEN AND IF THIS
LANGUAGE IS ADOPTED AS 'HE FORMAL WESTERN NUF TEXT, NATO
WILL DETERMINE HOW BEST TO USE IT IN STOCKHOLM, I.E., TO
BE INTRODUCED IN A PIECEMEAL (OR BLOCK) APPROACH
CONTINGENT UPON PROGRESS IN CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS.
7. ACTION REQUESTED: DELEGATION BELIEVES TEXT IS FULLY
CONSISTENT WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF C. WE
HAVE DISCOURAGED OTHERS FROM FIDDLING WITH THE TEXT.
ANY COMMENTS SHOULD BE RECEIVED BY WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30.
8. BEGIN TEXT:
-- CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THEIR
OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL
AS IN THEIR INTERNA'IONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY MANNER
INCONSIS'ENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
ACCORDINGLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR
COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS
PRINCIPLE AS LAID DOWN IN PRINCIPLE 2 OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT.
(N.B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE U.S. POSITION IN FAVOR OF
USING MINIMALIST UN CHARTER LANGUAGE TO REAFFIRM THE NUF
PRINCIPLE, THE FIRST SENTENCE IS BASED ON ARTICLE 2(4)
OF THE UN CHARTER (UNC) WITH THE ADDITION OF "IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS" TO PUT IT IN THE CSCE CONTEXT. THE
SECOND SENTENCE WAS ADDED IN PLACE OF A VERBATIM QUOTE
OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT'S (HFA) PRINCIPLE 2, P.78,
PR POSED IN THE EC-12 TEXT).
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-- NO CONSIDERA'ION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN BE INVOKED TO
JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT
USE OF FORCE.
THEY RECALL THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT
OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED
ATTACK OCCURS.
(N.B. THE FIRS' SENTENCE IS BASED ON U.S. LANGUAGE
ELABORATING 'HE HFA'S PRINCIPLE 2, PARA 1, P.78. THE
SECOND SENTENCE IS BASED ON ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNC. THE
TEXT ENSURES THAT THESE TWO ELEMENTS ARE LINKED)
-- THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF
FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING
STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE
OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS
FREEDOM AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY
TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.
(N.B. THE FIRST PART OF THE SENTENCE IS BASED ON HFA'S
PRINCIPLE 2, PARA 3, P.79; THE SECOND PART IS BASED ON
HFA'S PRINCIPLE 1, PARA 1, P.78.)
-- THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH OTHER'S
TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR OTHER
DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISITION BY MEANS
OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM. NO SUCH
OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
(N.B. BASED ON HFA'S PRINCIPLE u, PARA 3, P.79. THE
TURKS SAY THEY ACCEPT THIS LANGUAGE, WHICH COULD BE USED
AGAINST THEM BY CYPRUS AND GREECE.)
-- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMI'MENT
TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR
MUTUAL RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING
STATES, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN
WITH EACH O'HER RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE, AS WELL AS IN
THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.
(N.B. NEW ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE; SAME IDEA IS
CONTAINED IN NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7), EC-12, AND U.S. TEXTS.)
-- THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL, THOUGH NOT
EXCLUSIVE, FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION
OF PEACE AND SECURITY.
(N.B. THE ORIGINAL EC-12 TEXT ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES (PSD) IS STRENGTHENED WITH THE ADDITION OF AN
AMENDMENT ("BOTH . . . SECURITY."); THE SECOND PART IS
TAKEN FROM HFA SECTION ENTITLED "MATTERS RELATED TO
GIVING EFFECT TO CERTAIN OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES, P.BU.)
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-- IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT IN
THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL.
(N.B. BASED ON ARTICLE 103 OF THE UNC.)
-- THEY CONFIRM THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN
EQUALITY OF ALL STATES AND NOTE THAT ALL SOVEREIGN
STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND EQUAL DUTIES WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
(N.B. U.S. LANGUAGE BASED ON THE HFA'S PRINCIPLE 1,
PARA 2, P.78.)
-- THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT EFFECTIVE FORMS OF
VERIFICATION ENSURING STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS ARE INDISPENSABLE
FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.
(N.B. BASED ON U.S. LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION AND
COMPLIANCE.)
THEY STRESSED THE NECESSITY TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE
EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THEY FURTHER REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT
FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND
WELL-BEING NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS
AMONG ALL STATES. IT IS THUS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR
THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.
(N.B. THE FIRST SENTENCE IS BASED ON U.S. LANGUAGE; THE
SECOND SENTENCE IS BASED ON 'HE HFA'S PRINCIPLE 7, PARA
5 (P.80); AND THE THIRD SENTENCE IS TAKEN FROM THE NNA
PROPOSAL (SC.7).)
(N.B. THE TEXT WHICH FOLLOWS IS EC-12 HUMAN RIGHTS
TEXT. IT IS WEAKER THAN NNA LANGUAGE IN SC.7.)
-- THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE
CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND
SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL
PEOPLES.
-- THE PARTICIPATING STATES ONCE AGAIN EXPRESSED THEIR
CONCERN AT THE CONTINUING ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY
CONDEMN TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE
MEASURES TO COMBAT IT. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION
TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND
SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL
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LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE COMBAT AGAINST ACTS OF TERRORISM, THEY
WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE
PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.
(N.B. FIRST SENTENCE IS NEW; THE SECOND AND THIRD
SENTENCES ARE SOMEWHAT ABBREVIATED VERSIONS OF THE
MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT'S (MCD) PRINCIPLES SECTION,
PARAS 4 AND 5.)
-- THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY
SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND
UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.
(N.B. BASED ON THE HFA, THE FIRST PARAGRAPH FOLLOWING
THE TEN PRINCIPLES, P.82.)
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03905
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH ON WESTERN NON-USE OF
FORCE TEXT
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3816, B) STOCKHOLM 3094
1. CDE X - 053
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN REF A, THE FRENCH
SUBMITTED "MODIFICATIONS" TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS PORTION OF
THE WESTERN NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT. THE FRENCH MAINTAIN
THESE MODIFICATIONS ARE MERELY DRAFTING CHANGES. THEY
ARE NOT; THE CHANGES ARE MAJOR AND THEY ARE SUBSTANTIVE.
THEREFORE, IN DELEGATION'S VIEW, OUR DIFFERENCES ARE
IRRECONCILABLE. ALL OTHER NATO DELEGATIONS ALSO SHARE
THIS VIEW. THESE LAST-MINUTE CHANGES HAVE RESULTED IN A
MAJOR IMPASSE WITHIN NATO AND POTENTIALLY AT THE
CONFERENCE, WHICH COULD REDOUND TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE
SOVIET UNION. THE ONLY SOLUTION IS FOR THE FRENCH TO
BACK DOWN FROM THEIR SUGGESTED CHANGES IMMEDIATELY.
ACCORDINGLY, DELEGATION REQUESTS THAT DEPARTMENT USE THE
VISIT OF FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER RAIMOND, POLITICAL
DIRECTOR MOREL, AND HIS MAIN DISARMAMENT ADVISORS TO
WASHINGTON TODAY, MAY 16 OR OVER THE WEEKEND, TO DELIVER
A DEMARCHE CONTAINING THE POINTS IN PARA 7 BELOW. END
SUMMARY.
4. BACKGROUND. ON MAY 12, ROME RELUCTANTLY AGREED ON
HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED IN A WESTERN NUF
TEXT. ACCORDINGLY ALL NATO DELEGATIONS SEEMED TO HAVE
REACHED CONSENSUS ON A FULL NUF TEXT. HOWEVER, AT THE
LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT FRANCE SAID IT MIGHT HAVE SOME
MINOR DRAFTING MODIFICATIONS TO SUGGEST ON HUMAN RIGHTS.
ON MAY 13, THE FRENCH DELEGATION TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT
IT WAS DISCUSSING THESE MODIFICATIONS WITH PARIS,
IMPLYING THAT THE DELEGATION WASN'T HAPPY WITH THE
CHANGES AND WAS TRYING TO PERSUADE PARIS TO DROP THEM.
ON MAY 14, THE FRENCH DELEGATION TOLD US THEY HAD BEEN
OVERRULED AND THAT PARIS, AT THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL
OF THE QUAI D'ORSAY, HAD DECIDED TO GO FORWARD WITH ITS
SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS. ON MAY 15, FRANCE SUBMITTED THESE
CHANGES; THEY ARE MAJOR AND THEY ARE SUBSTANTIVE. IN
SHORT, THEY WEAKEN THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT AND THUS MAKE
IT UNACCEPTABLE TO IS. THE FRENCH WOULD SUBSTITUTE THE
FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS FOR PARAS 2 AND 3 OF THE AD REF
NATO TEXT (SEE REF A).
-- FOR PARA 2 REF A SUBSTITUTE:
EITHER:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES EXPRESS THE CONVICTION THAT
RESPECT FOR THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENCOURAGE THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE
PROGRESS OF COOPERATION AMONG THEM IN ALL FIELDS."
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OR:
"THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE
CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND
SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL
PEOPLES."
-- FOR PARA 3 REF A SUBSTITUTE:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THE UNIVERSAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS,
RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE PEACE,
JUSTICE AND WELL-BEING NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG,
THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES."
5. THE FRENCH USED THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY
THEIR POSITION:
-- ON PARA 2, THE AD REF NATO TEXT COULD MAKE
IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEPENDENT ON
IMPLEMENTATION IN OTHER FIELDS, ESPECIALLY ON ECONOMIC
COOPERATION.
-- ON PARA 3, IT IS DANGEROUS TO LINK HUMAN RIGHTS TO
THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION BECAUSE THE LINKAGE
COULD BE REVERSED BY THE SOVIET UNION, I.E., IN THE CASE
OF THE WORSENING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION
THE SOVIETS COULD USE THIS AS A JUSTIFICATION TO REPRESS
HUMAN RIGHTS.
-- THE FRENCH WOULD PREFER TO RETURN TO AND NOT GO
BEYOND THE AGREED LANGUAGE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
(BOTH TEXTS THE FRENCH HAVE INTRODUCED COME FROM THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT.) FURTHERMORE, THE FRENCH ARGUED
THAT STOCKHOLM IS NOT THE BEST PLACE TO DEVELOP THE
HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE.
6. WHILE SOME DELEGATIONS HAD SYMPATHY IN SUBSTANCE
WITH THE FRENCH MINIMALIST POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
E.G., ITALY, THERE WAS A STRONG AND UNANIMOUS SENSE THAT
IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO TAMPER WITH THE CAREFULLY
CRAFTED COMPROMISE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT AT THIS LATE DATE.
FURTHERMORE, THIS UNEXPECTED IMPASSE HAS MAJOR
IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED SOLIDARITY AND DRAFTING PROGRESS
IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF. WITHOUT FULL AGREEMENT ON A
NATO NUF TEXT THERE CAN BE NO MORE DRAFTING PROGRESS IN
THE NUF WORKING GROUP EVEN IF WE CAN AGREE TO LANGUAGE
WHICH SERVES OUR INTERESTS. (THE NUF WORKING GROUP MEETS
FOR THE LAST TIME THIS ROUND ON TUESDAY, MAY 20.) THE
EAST IS SURE TO -- AND HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO -- USE THIS
IMPASSE TO BLAME THE WEST FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN
THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE. IN ADDITION, THESE
LAST-MINUTE FRENCH OBJECTIONS FIT INTO A DISTURBING AND
RECURRING PATTERN. EVEN PARIS'S CLOSEST EC-12 ALLIES
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ARE RUNNING OUT OF PATIENCE WITH FRENCH OBDURACY.
7. THEREFORE DELEGATION RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON USE
THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR
MOREL AND HIS CLOSEST DISARMAMENT ADVISORS (E.G.,
D'ABOVILLE) TODAY, MAY 16 AND OVER THE WEEKEND, TO
IMPRESS UPON THE FRENCH THAT THEY MUST DROP THESE
MODIFICATIONS IMMEDIATELY. DELEGATION SUGGESTS THAT
DEPARTMENT USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS (SEE REF B
IF MORE TALKING POINTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ARE NEEDED):
-- THE WESTERN NUF TEXT WAS ONLY AGREED UPON AFTER THE
MOST DELICATE AND ARDUOUS NEGOTIATIONS. AS PARIS IS
PROBABLY AWARE, WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE SEEN
STRONGER HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. HOWEVER, WE AGREED TO
ACCEPT THE FULL WESTERN NUF TEXT IN THE INTERESTS OF
MAINTAINING WESTERN SOLIDARITY AND OF ADVANCING DRAFTING
IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
-- ALL NATO DELEGATIONS BELIEVED WE HAD FULL AGREEMENT
ON THIS TEXT ON MONDAY, MAY 12. PARIS HAD BEEN FULLY
AWARE OF THE BASIC CONTENTS OF THE TEXT FOR MANY WEEKS.
THEREFORE THERE CAN BE NO EXCUSE FOR THE LATE SERIES OF
MAJOR AND SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS AFTER ALL OTHER NATO
MEMBERS THOUGHT THAT WE HAD CONSENSUS ON THE TEXT.
-- PARIS, IN THE GUISE OF INTRODUCING AMENDMENTS, IN
FACT, HAS RETURNED TO ITS EARLIER HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT, A
TEXT WHICH WAS REJECTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY ALL
OTHER ALLIES. THIS ATTEMPT BY PARIS TO HAVE ITS CAKE
AND EAT IT TOO IS UNACCEPTABLE. (A NUMBER OF ALLIES
HAVE ACCUSED THE FRENCH OF REINTRODUCING THEIR TEXT AT
THIS JUNCTURE FOR TACTICAL, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, REASONS.)
-- IN ADDITION TO THESE PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS WE ALSO
HAVE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH
SUGGESTIONS:
- 1) PARIS'S SUGGESTION ON THE SECOND PARAGRAPH
ELIMINATES REFERENCES TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT. THESE REFERENCES WERE NEEDED TO GET ROME'S
ACCEPTANCE OF THE TEXT. THE TEXT DOES NOT, CONTRARY TO
PARIS'S ASSERTION, LINK PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS TO
PROGRESS IN OTHER FIELDS.
- 2) PARIS'S SUGGESTION TO ELIMINATE THE FINAL SENTENCE
CONTAINED IN THE NNA DRAFT AND IS THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP
BEYOND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
FOR US. IF WE ELIMINATE THIS SENTENCE WE WILL NOT ONLY
HAVE A TEXT WHICH IS POLITICALLY UNSUSTAINABLE, I.E., IT
IS WEAKER THAN THE NNA TEXT, WE WILL ALSO HAVE, IN
EFFECT, SOLD OUT THOSE NNA SUCH AS THE SWISS WHO HAD
FOUGHT SO STRENUOUSLY TO HAVE HUMAN RIGHTS REFLECTED IN
THE NNA NUF TEXT.
- 3) PARIS'S ARGUMENT THAT LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS
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A JUSTIFICATION FOR REPRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNALLY
IS IRRELEVANT. THE FRENCH, AS MUCH AS ANYONE, KNOW THAT
THE STATE IS A COLD-HEARTED BEAST," AS DE GAULLE ONCE
SAID. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIETS HAVE AND WILL REPRESS
HUMAN RIGHTS REGARDLESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
SITUATION AND REGARDLESS OF CDE AGREED LANGUAGE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03683
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD
REP: STATE 115080
1. CDE X - 43
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY. PER REFERENCED GUIDANCE, USDEL HAS BEEN
CONDUCTING NON-STOP CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRG, U.K.
AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS ON THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLDS. AS A RESULT OF THE CONTACTS WE HAVE AN
AMENDED VERSION THAT IS PROVISIONALLY ACCEPTABLE TO
ALL. CHANGES ARE REFLECTED PARENTHETICALLY IN THE
AMENDED VERSION OF THE THRESHOLD PAPER AND ARE
EXPLAINED IN PARA 5. GUIDANCE REQUESTED, PARA 6. END
SUMMARY.
4. BEGIN TEXT.
STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AT THE DIVISION LEVEL
(AMALGAMATION OF SC. 1/A AND SC.7)
A MILITARY LAND ACTIVITY, THAT IS,
- ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY (1) INVOLVING ONE OR MORE
GROUND FORCE DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS, CARRYING
OUT A COMMON MILITARY ACTIVITY UNDER A SINGLE
OPERATIONAL COMMAND, (2) AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL
PEACETIME LOCATIONS, IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR
CSBM3,
WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.
A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATION, FOR THE PURPOSE OF
THIS AGREEMENT, IS DEFINED AS A MILITARY GROUND FORCE
COMPOSED OF
- MAJOR COMBAT UNITS ON THE BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL,
THAT IS, TANK, INFANTRY, MOTORIZED RIFLE, AIRMOBILE (3)
OR AIRBORNE BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, OR EQUIVALENT SIZE
FORMATIONS (4) WITH
- AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF AT LEAST...COMBAT, COMBAT
SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TROOPS; OR
- A TOTAL OF AT LEAST . . . MAIN BATTLE (5) TANKS.
THE PARTICIPATION OF A GROUND FORCE DIVISION EQUIVALENT
FORMATION THAT IS NORMALLY STATIONED OUTSIDE THE ZONE,
IN A MILITARY LAND ACTIVITY CONDUCTED WITHIN THE ZONE
OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS WILL BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION WHEN PERSONNEL DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL BASE
WITHIN THE ZONE.
MILITARY ACTIVITY (6) IS DEFINED AS:
(7) ANY ACTIVITY OF GROUND FORCES IN TRAINING AREAS, OR
ON ANY TERRAIN OUTSIDE NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, WITH
THE EXCEPTIONS OF DISASTER RELIEF, AGRICULTURAL WORK,
AND SPORTING ACTIVITIES. END TEXT.
5. CHANGES MADE TO THE ORIGINAL FORMULATION TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE CONCERNS OF OUR ALLIES. PROVIDED BELOW IS
AN EXPLANATION OF THE CHANGES KEYED TO THE ITEM
LOCATION IN THE TEXT IN PARA 4, ABOVE.
-- A. (1) THE U.K. AND THE FRG WANTED TO DROP THE
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FORMULATION OF "MILITARY EXERCISE ACTIVITY." THEY
FELT THAT THE "MILITARY EXERCISE ACTIVITY" FORMULATION
WAS TOO RESTRICTIVE. THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE
FORMULATION CURRENTLY REFLECTED, "MILITARY ACTIVITY,"
CAPTURED EVERYTHING THAT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT
WOULD CAPTURE.
-- B. (2) BECAUSE OF U.K., FRG AND FRENCH CONCERNS, WE
REINTRODUCED THE "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND"
FORMULATION.
-- C. (4) THE U.K. BELIEVED THAT THE FORMULATION
CALLING FOR THE SUPPORTING ELEMENT WAS NOT NECESSARY
AND COULD BE A KEY CIRCUMVENTION POINT FOR THE EAST TO
USE WHEN FORMATIONS ARE NOT ORGANIZED INTO DIVISIONS.
ALTHOUGH THE "EQUIVALENT FORMATION" CONCEPT WAS
INCLUDED THE U.K. INSISTED THAT WE DROP THE SUPPORT
ELEMENT SO THAT IT COULD NOT BE USED FOR CIRCUMVENTION.
WE AGREE WITH THIS CONCERN ABOUT CIRCUMVENTION AND
BELIEVE THE CHANGE IN THE NUMERICAL FORMULATIONS WILL
ENSURE NOTIFICATION AT THE PROPER LEVEL. WE DO NOT
REQUIRE THE INCLUSION OF THE SUPPORT ELEMENT TO TRIGGER
NOTIFICATION.
-- E. (3) AIRMOBILE WAS ADDED TO REFLECT THAT IT IS
NOT TO BE TREATED IN THE SAME WAY AS AMPHIBIOUS. THE
NNA WOULD LIKE SPECIAL PARAMETERS, SIMILAR TO
AMPHIBIOUS PARAMETERS, FOR BOTH AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE
DIVISIONS.
-- D. (5) ALL DELEGATIONS ASKED THAT WE REINTRODUCE,
FROM SCI/A, THE TERMINOLOGY "MAIN BATTLE TANKS."
-- E. (6) SAME AS IN (1).
-- F. (7) THIS FORMULATION IS A U.K. AND FRG
AMALGAMATION. THIS LANGUAGE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT 2 YEARS
OF COMMENTS BY THE NNAS AND THE EAST ON THE ISSUE OF
EXCEPTIONS TO THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. THE GENERAL
FEELING IS THAT THIS FORMULATION IS IN FACT A FAIRLY
CLOSE RESTATEMENT OF OUT-OF-GARRISON. THERE IS A
DANGER IN THAT ONCE YOU START ENUMERATING EXCEPTIONS
YOU OPEN THE DOOR FOR MORE TO BE PRESENTED, BUT THE
U.K. DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE WORDING PROVIDED WILL
ADEQUATELY TAKE CARE OF ALL OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN
RAISED THUS FAR.
6. WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE OUR CONSULTATIONS HERE AS
WE WORK TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE OF THESE IDEAS IN THE
CONFERENCE. REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON DETERMINE THE
ACCEPTABILITY OF THE CHANGES INTRODUCED BY
COB 15 MAY 86. DELEGATION MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT THIS
FORMULATION IS ACCEPTABLE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 03163
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS INITIATIVE AND THE
CDE -- A PR POSAL FOR CDE PHASE II?
REF: STOCKHOLM 3114
1. CDE X - 020
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
K3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS ARE ALREADY ENGAGED 9N A
FULL COURT PRESS TO PROMOTE THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AMONG
CDE DELEGATES (REFTEL). INITIAL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE
PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO MANIFEST ITSELF IN A CONCERTED
SOVIET EFFORT AT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO
RENEGOTIATE THE MANDATE FOR A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF THE CDE
TO INCLUDE DISARMAMENT ISSUES. FROM STOCKHOLM IT ALSO
APPEARS THAT A SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO MERGE MBFR INTO CDE AY
BE IN THE WIND. WHILE USDEL CDE WILL REACT CAUTIOUSLY TO
THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, THERE MAY BE SOME POSSIBILITY FOR
INCREASED WESTERN NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE HERE, SINCE MANY
VIEW A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM AS BEING ESSENTIAL
TO EASTERN EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE CONFERENCE'S MANDATE AT
VIENNA. END SUMMARY.
4. IN USDEL'S VIEW THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL HAS IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATION AND POTENTIAL LONG-
TERM EFFECTS ON U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN EUROPE. OUR
ATTENTION HAS BEEN DRAWN PARTICULARLY TO THE CONVENTIONAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS IN "THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN TERRITORY FROM
THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS," WHICH IS THE ZONE OF APPLICA-
TION FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AS AGREED UPON IN
MADRID, ALBEIT NOT AS CONCISELY DEFINED AS IN THE MADRID
MANDATE. WE ALSO FOUND THE REFERENCE TO THIS PROPOSAL AS
A MEANS OF "CUTTING THE KNOT WHICH HAS BEEN GROWING
TIGHTER AT THE VIENNA TALKS" OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN
LIGHT OF EARLIER SOUNDINGS THE SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN WITH
THE FRENCH, IN PARTICULAR, ABOUT THE POSSIBLE MERGING OF
MBFR INTO CDE. THUS IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE
SOVIETS MAY WELL PURSUE A BROADER FORUM (I.E., THE CDE)
TO DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT BY SEEKING AN
EXPANDED MANDATE FOR A RESUMED CDE CONFERENCE TO INCLUDE
DISARMAMENT ISSUES. WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS, AFTER
THEIR INTERVENTION IN WORKING GROUP AB ON APRIL 21,
BEGAN CANVASSING THE NNA TO ASSESS THEIR ATTITUDES ABOUT
THE GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS INITIATIVE. GIVEN THE
CLOSE CONNECTION GORBACHEV MADE BETWEEN THIS NEW INITIA-
TIVE AND THE DEADLOCK AT MBFR, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED
TO FIND THE SOVIETS TESTING THE WATERS IN THE COMING
MONTHS FOR A POSSIBLE MERGER OF MBFR INTO CDE.
5. IN OUR VIEW, THE LATEST GORBACHEV PROPAGANDA
INITIATIVE IS A NO-COST PROPOSAL FOR THE SOVIETS. IT
ENABLES THEM TO SCORE PROPAGANDA POINTS IN THE BROADER
ARMS CONTROL SCENE, WHILE SACRIFICING NOTHING OF
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SUBSTANCE. IN FACT, THE HINT OF MOVING CONVENTIONAL
DISARMAMENT ISSUES INTO THE BROADER CSCE ENVIRONMENT
CONFIRMS THE LACK OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS ABOUT THIS ISSUE.
IF THEY WERE SERIOUS THEY WOULD, OF COURSE, SEE THE
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF NEGOTIATING A DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENT IN THE LARGER FORUM. IN TERMS OF THE CONVEN-
TIONAL BALANCE, THEY OBVIOUSLY STAND TO BENEFIT FROM
EXTENDING THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FROM THE MBFR GUIDE-
LINES AREA -- WHERE THEY MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT CONVEN-
TIONAL ARMS ADVANTAGE -- TO THE CDE ZONE, WHERE THAT
DISPARITY IS NEGLIGIBLE.
6. THE GORBACHEV OFFER WAS FORESHADOWED TO US DURING A
UK-USSR SECURITY SEMINAR IN EDINBURGH APRIL 14-15, WHERE
CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER VIXTOR LYNNIK WENT OUT OF
HIS WAY TO CONVEY TO U.S. CDE DEPREP, AMBASSADOR HANSEN,
SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS THE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS
QUESTION AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF A
CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IN EUROPE. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN
GIVEN SOME INDICATION OF THE POSSIBLE SOVIET COURSE OF
ACTION IN RECENT BILATERAL CONTACTS. MOST NOTABLY,
SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, AFTER A LONG PERIOD OF
SEEMING TO ACCEPT THAT THE CDE WOULD NOT BE READY TO MOVE
DIRECTLY TO A DISARMAMENT PHASE, EXPRESSED TO AMBASSADOR
BARRY HIS RENEWED INTEREST IN WORKING TO EXPAND ANY NEW
MANDATE NEGOTIATED AT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
TO ENCOMPASS DISARMAMENT ISSUES.
7. USDEL WILL TAKE A CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE NEW
GORBACHEV INITIATIVE AND TO RENEWED SOVIET INTEREST IN A
PHASE II CDE CONFERENCE DEALING WITH DISARMAMENT. IT
CONTINUES TO BE OUR POSITION THAT EVEN A SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF CDE WOULD NOT WARRANT A
MOVE TO A DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATION AND THAT, IN ANY EVENT,
CDE IS NOT THE PROPER FORUM TO ADDRESS DISARMAMENT IN THE
PRESENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE. WE WILL ALSO
REMAIN ALERT TO ANY CONCERTED SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO MERGE
MBFR INTO CDE AS WE WILL WANT TO KEEP THE SOVIETS' FEET
TO THE FIRE IN MBFR WHERE THE LATEST WESTERN PROPOSAL
HAS CLEARLY PUT THEM ON THE DEFENSIVE. HOWEVER, IF THE
GORBACHEV PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO MOVE CONVENTIONAL
DISARMAMENT INTO THE BROADER FORUM OF CDE IT COULD RESULT
IN INCREASED SOVIET INTEREST IN A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN
STOCKHOLM, SINCE THERE IS CURRENTLY A WIDELY HELD VIEW
THAT WITHOUT SUCCESS HERE THERE WOULD BE NO CHANCE OF
BROADENING THE MANDATE TO INCLUDE DISARMAMENT AT VIENNA.
THIS COULD PROVIDE THE U.S. AND NATO WITH INCREASED
NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE AS WE MOVE INTO THE END GAME IN
STOCKHOLM. IN PREPARING ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSES IT
SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PROPOSAL MAY BE
DIFFICULT FOR SOME TO REJECT CATEGORICALLY. WE NOTE A
LUKEWARM RESPONSE ON THE PART OF THE FRG. AND THE
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POSSIBILITY OF ADDRESSING DISARMAMENT ISSUES IN THE CDE
IS ALREADY ENSHRINED IN THE MADRID MANDATE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 03316
SUBJECT: HANDLING THE GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS
REDUCTION INITIATIVE
REF: (A) STATE 131155, (B) MOSCOW 7144 (C) STATE
131553
1. CDE X-031 - CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION
INITIATIVE IS PURE PROPAGANDA, BUT IT WOULD BE A
MISTAKE IN TERMS OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT TO DISMISS IT
AS SUCH. ITS LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES ARE POLITICAL
RATHER THAN MILITARY: TO APPEAR FORTHCOMING AND
CONSTRUCTIVE ON ARMS CONTROL/SECURITY ISSUES OF
IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO WESTERN EUROPEANS AND TO FURTHER
THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING A PAN-EUROPEAN
SECURITY FORUM INDEPENDENT FROM CSCE. WHAT IS NEEDED
IS A U.S. PUBLIC RESPONSE WHICH ALLOWS US TO GAIN THE
HIGH GROUND WITH THE WESTERN EUROPEANS. AT THE SAME
TIME WE SEE ADVANTAGES IN TAKING UP THE SOVIET OFFER
OF A BILATERAL DIALOGUE IN PART BECAUSE IT CAN HELP US
IN MBFR AND CDE.
3. DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE GORBACHEV
PROPOSAL (REF C) PROVIDE FOR AN INTERIM POSTURE OF
NEITHER REJECTING NOR ACCEPTING IT. OVER THE LONGER
TERM, WE FAVOR A MAJOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY RESPONSE WITH
THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:
-- STRENGTHEN ALLIED UNITY ON ARMS
CONTROL/SECURITY ISSUES BY SEIZING THE PUBLIC
INITIATIVE;
-- USE THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL TO GAIN INCREASED
LEVERAGE IN CDE AND MBFR WHILE GUARDING AGAINST A NEW
EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM - CDE II - SEPARATE FROM CSCE;
-- UNDERLINE THE VALUE OF FUTURE CSBMS AS MEANS
OF PREVENTING SURPRISE/CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WHILE
REDUCTIONS PROGRESS;
-- FOCUS ATTENTION ON THOSE ELEMENTS OF SOVIET
FORCE STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD MAKE A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK
ON THE WEST POSSIBLE;
-- TO SET THE GOAL OF REMOVING SOVIET TROOPS FROM
EASTERN EUROPE AND THINNING THEM OUT IN THE WESTERN
USSR.
4. IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THOSE OBJECTIVES, WE SHOULD
RESPOND IN GENERAL TERMS TO WHAT IS A VERY GENERAL
PROPOSAL AND NOT GET BOGGED DOWN IN DETAILS. SUCH A
RESPONSE WOULD STRESS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
A. WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT GORBACHEV RECOGNIZES
THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS MUST ACCOMPANY
NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ARE
A NECESSARY PART OF THE PROCESS, AS SOVIET SPOKESMEN
HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED.
B. IN MBFR AND CDE, THE EAST HAS A CHANCE TO JOIN
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HE WEST IN FIRST STEPS IN WHAT WILL HAVE TO BE A
GRADUAL PROCESS. IN VIENNA, WE HAVE A CHANCE TO BEGIN
BALANCED REDUCTIONS AND START THE PROCESS OF VERIFYING
NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS. IN STOCKHOLM, WE HAVE A
CHANCE TO ESTABLISH NEW MANDATORY CSBMS TO MAKE THE
EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION MORE PREDICTABLE AND
STABLE. MBFR AND CDE ARE TESTS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS;
CDE WILL ADJOURN SEPTEMBER 19.
C. GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS LOOK BEYOND THESE
IMMEDIATE TASKS, AND WE ARE WILLING TO EXPLORE MORE
AMBITIOUS CONCEPTS. CHANGING THE STRUCTURE OF
CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE SO THAT CONVENTIONAL
ATTACK IS NO LONGER AN OPTION IS VERY MUCH IN WESTERN
INTEREST. THIS WOULD REQUIRE ACHIEVING BALANCE IN
FORCES ON THE CENTRAL FRONT AND MORE DEMANDING
VERIFICATION MEASURES AND OTHER CSBMS TO SUBSTANTIALLY
REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENTIONAL SURPRISE ATTACK.
D. WE AGREE THAT SUCH MEASURES SHOULD COVER ALL
OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. BUT OUR
IMMEDIATE CONCERN MUST BE WITH THE CENTRAL FRONT WHERE
THE. CURRENT IMBALANCE IS GREATEST AND INHERENTLY
DESTABILIZING.
E. WE FAVOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN FORCE LEVELS
IN EUROPE. TO THAT END, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO
WITHDRAW ITS GROUND TROOPS TO THE CONTINENTAL U.S. IF
THE SOVIETS WITHDREW THEIR TROOPS FROM EASTERN
EUROPE. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE CONCOMITANT
LIMITATIONS AND CSBMS AFFECTING SOVIET TROOPS IN THE
ZONE TO THE URALS. (U.S. ARMAMENTS WOULD REMAIN IN
EUROPE AS A FORM OF COMPENSATION FOR NATO'S
GEOGRAPHICAL DISADVANTAGE.)
F. JUST AS THE U.S. SEEKS BALANCE IN NUCLEAR
FORCES ON A GLOBAL BASIS, WE BELIEVE CONVENTIONAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS ULTIMATELY MUST BE ACHIEVED ON A
GLOBAL RATHER THAN REGIONAL BASIS.
5. AT THIS STAGE IN THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION, WE DON'T
THINK WE SHOULD BE ANY MORE SPECIFIC THAN THE SOVIETS
IN DISCUSSING WHERE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE
PLACE. WE SHOULD STRESS THAT WE HAVE TWO PERFECTLY
GOOD FORUMS IN EXISTENCE - CDE AND MBFR - AND THE
SOVIETS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO USE THEIR PROPOSALS
TO ESCAPE FROM THOSE.
6. IN PARALLEL WITH OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, WE THINK
THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES IN TAKING UP THE SOVIET
SUGGESTION OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE GORBACHEV
INITIATIVE (REF B.). A CENTRAL PURPOSE WOULD BE TO
GAIN MORE LEVERAGE OVER MBFR AND CDE, CONVINCING
MOSCOW THAT THERE IS A CHANCE FOR THE GORBACHEV
INITIATIVE ONLY IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED IN BOTH THESE
FORUMS. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIETS NEED TO UNDERSTAND
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THAT WE WILL NOT JOIN A MINI-PACKAGE IN STOCKHOLM AND
THAT FAILURE IN STAGE I OF A CDE WOULD NOT ONLY
PREVENT VIENNA FROM AGREEING ON A DISARMAMENT PHASE
BUT ALSO MAKE THE CONTINUATION OF THE CSBM STAGE
PROBLEMATICAL. WE ARE PLEASED TO SEE THAT THIS
MESSAGE IS GETTING THROUGH (REF B, PARA 8).
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03684
SUBJECT: THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE AND CDE -
THREE WEEKS LATER
REF: STATE 145765
1. CDE X - 047
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: EASTERN HANDLING OF THE GORBACHEV
CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY
LOW-KEY AT CDE. SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR (GRINEVSKY) HAS
PROVIDED NO ELABORATION OF THE PROPOSAL'S INTENDED FORUM
(CDE, MBFR, OR A NEW FORUM), WHILE OTHER EASTERN CONTACTS
HAVE VARIOUSLY SUPPORTED JUST ABOUT ANY INTERPRETATION,
MOST RECENTLY SUBSUMING MBFR INTO A CUE PHASE II. WE
ANTICIPATE THE INITIATIVE WILL BE USED TO BOLSTER THE NEW
SOVIET CAMPAIGN FOR A PHASE II CDE AT THE VIENNA
FOLLOW-UP MEETING REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME HERE. IN OUR
VIEW THE CURRENT LOW-KEY APPROACH IS BEING TAKEN DUE BOTH
TO INTERNAL CONFUSION AND TO AVOID ATTRACTING ATTENTION
TO THE LEVERAGE WE COULD EXERT ON THE EAST FOR A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME HERE. END SUMMARY.
4. USDEL BELIEVES THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF SOVIET
HANDLING OF THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE SHOULD COMPLEMENT
RESPONSES TO REFTEL RECEIVED FROM NATO CAPITALS. IN
THIS MESSAGE AND PREVIOUS WE HAVE ANALYZED THE PROPOSAL
PRIMARILY FROM THE CDE PERSPECTIVE AND HAVE LEFT BROADER
VIEWS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENT REACTIONS FOR EMBASSIES TO
ASSESS IN CAPITALS. WE CAN NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT TO DATE,
THE PROPOSAL HAS HAD LITTLE EFFECT ON ALLIED DELEGATIONS'
THINKING ABOUT WESTERN CDE PROPOSALS CURRENTLY ON THE
TABLE.
5. FOLLOWING INITIAL, ALBEIT VAGUE, EASTERN BALLYHOOING,
GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE
HAS BEEN GIVEN A SURPRISINGLY LOW PROFILE BY EASTERN
DELEGATES IN STOCKHOLM. PREVIOUS GORBACHEV ARMS CONTROL
INITIATIVES, PARTICULARLY HIS JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS, WERE
AGGRESSIVELY TOUTED BY THE EAST BOTH IN FORMAL WORKING
GROUPS AND IN INFORMAL CONTACTS. BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO
FIND ANY EASTERNERS HERE WHO ARE PREPARED TO VOLUNTEER
SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON THIS LATEST OFFERING. IN
CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.), SOVIET
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HAS MADE NO EFFORT TO TALK UP THE
APRIL 18 INITIATIVE IN THE CDE CONTEXT AND HAS DESCRIBED
IT AS AN "IDEA," NOT A PROPOSAL. SOVIET EMBASSIES IN
CAPITALS, NOT THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION, HE SAID, WOULD
BE CONSULTING ON HOW THE "IDEA" COULD BE DEVELOPED.
GRINEVSKY TOLD AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) THAT MOSCOW HAS
NOT DECIDED WHAT FORUM (CDE, MBFR, OR A NEW EUROPEAN
SECURITY BODY) THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE TARGETED AT,
ALTHOUGH HE MUSED THAT IT IS PERHAPS BETTER SUITED FOR
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NATO/WARSAW PACT DISCUSSIONS IN THE FIRST STAGE. AT THE
SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE HAS BEGUN TALKING UP THE NEED FOR
A CDE STAGE II WITH AN EXPANDED MANDATE PROVIDING FOR
DISARMAMENT TO BE ADDED TO CSBM'S AFTER VIENNA.
6. OTHER EASTERN STATEMENTS AND CONTACTS HAVE BEEN
CONTRADICTORY. FOR INSTANCE, IN A RECENT PLENARY
STATEMENT, GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING OBSERVED THAT THE
PROPOSAL GAVE A "NEW PERSPECTIVE" TO CDE, WHILE A MEMBER
OF THE BULGARIAN CDE SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS CLEARLY
AIMED AT AN EXPANDED MBFR NEGOTIATION. OVER THE PAST
TWO DAYS, TWO NON-SOVIET EASTERN DELEGATES HAVE
SPECULATED ON A FOUR-STEP SCENARIO FOR THE INITIATIVE
WHICH THEY CLAIMED TO HAVE DEDUCED FROM THE LIMITED
INFORMATION THE SOVIETS HAVE VOLUNTEERED: 1) A
SYMBOLIC" AGREEMENT AT MBFR WHICH WOULD OPEN THE DOOR
TO PHASE OUT THAT NEGOTIATION; 2) A "MODEST" RESULT IN
STOCKHOLM; 3) MERGER OF MBFR ISSUES INTO CDE PHASE II;
4) CDE PHASE II TO BE A TWO-TIERED PROCESS -- BLOC-TO-
BLOC AND ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES. ONE CONTACT EVEN
MUSED THAT THE OPENING EASTERN OFFER IN PHASE II COULD
BE A 30 TO 50 PER CENT BLOC-TO-BLOC CUT IN CONVENTIONAL
ARMAMENTS.
7. THERE IS A DEGREE OF GENUINE EASTERN UNCERTAINTY
ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE PROPOSAL WHICH CONFIRMS
GRINEVSKY'S EARLIER OBSERVATION TO BARRY THAT GORBACHEV
WAS "OUT IN FRONT" OF THE SOVIET BUREACRACY ON THIS. WE
ANTICIPATE THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM,
THE SOVIETS WILL PUSH FOR A PHASE II CDE, I.E.,
DISARMAMENT PHASE, AT VIENNA AND THAT THE GORBACHEV
INITIATIVE WILL BE A CENTRAL PART OF THEIR CAMPAIGN. WE
SUSPECT THAT THEIR CURRENT TACK IN STOCKHOLM IS PRIMARILY
DESIGNED TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE THAT GORBACHEV'S
INITIATIVE HAS PUT THE SOVIETS UNDER PRESSURE FOR A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME HERE AS A NECESSARY PRELUDE TO CDE
PHASE II, PRESSURE WHICH THEY FEAR THE WEST MIGHT TRY TO
EXPLOIT TO GAIN ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE ON SUCH
ISSUES AS INSPECTION. THUS EASTERN STRATEGY IN STOCKHOLM
WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO DOWNPLAY THE CDE DIMENSION OF
THE INITIATIVE WHILE SEEKING TO MANEUVER THE WEST INTO A
MINI-PACKAGE THAT WOULD PROVIDE SOMETHING THE SOVIETS
COULD SELL AS A "POSITIVE" OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. PERHAPS
SIGNALING EASTERN STRATEGY, GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING HAS
ALREADY PROVIDED IN PLENARY AN INDICATION OF THE TYPE OF
MINI-PACKAGE THE EAST WOULD TRY TO BILL IN VIENNA AS A
"SUBSTANTIVE" CDE RESULT -- NON-USE OF FORCE,
NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03063
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS, EDINBURGH CONVERSATIONS
1. CONFIDENTIAL, ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: BY VIRTUE OF HIS AFFILIATION WITH THE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH AS A POST-DOCTORAL FELLOW, CDE
DEPUTY, AMBASSADOR HANSEN, PARTICIPATED FOR THE FOURTH
STRAIGHT YEAR IN UK-USSR DISCUSSIONS ON SECURITY ISSUES
NOMINALLY TITLED "SURVIVAL IN THE NUCLEAR AGE." THE
AGENDA FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WAS TAKEN FROM THE GENEVA
SUMMIT JOINT DECLARATION. RISK REDUCTION CENTERS WERE
DISCUSSED WITH SOVIETS EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE
THE BASIC IDEA BUT BEING SKEPTICAL REGARDING THE
PRACTICAL UTILITY OF THE CONCEPT AS THEY UNDERSTAND
IT. SDI DISCUSSIONS FROM THE SOVIET SIDE CONCENTRATED
ON THE PREVENTION OF "SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS" RATHER THAN
ON STOPPING RESEARCH. ZERO-INF OPTION FOR EUROPE,
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM AND NEED TO ADDRESS.
CONVENTIONAL FORCE ARMS CONTROL WERE OTHER ISSUES
STRESSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. END SUMMARY
3. SOVIET PARTICIPANTS:
VIXTOR LYNNIK (CENTRAL COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL
DEPARTMENT) GENERAL-LIEUTENANT MILSHTEYN (USA AND
CANADA INSTITUTE) GENERAL-LIEUTENANT MIKHAYLOV
(CHERVOV'S DEPUTY IN GENERAL STAFF DISARMAMENT
AFFAIRS)
G. YANAYEV, (USSR-GREAT BRITAIN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY)
A. MASKO, (USSR-GREAT BRITAIN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY)
G. FEDOSOV, (SOVIET EMBASSY, LONDON)
A. LIKHOTAL, (DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY, MOSCOW)
4. GENERAL SOVIET THEMES
- THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA MUST BE RECREATED; THIS IS ONLY
POSSIBLE THROUGH AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONTROL AND
REDUCE ARMS. REGIONAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARE
PERIPHERAL ISSUES WHICH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO IMPINGE
UPON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMS CONTROL. A MORITORIUM ON
NUCLEAR TESTING COULD HAVE BEEN THE FIRST STEP IN
HALTING THE ARMS RACE; THE FAILURE TO CONLUDE AN AGREE-
MENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN GOES AGAINST THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. IT WOULD BE FOOLISH AND
ILLOGICAL TO SEND SOVIET SCIENTISTS TO MONITOR U.S.
NUCLEAR TESTS ON SITE SINCE SUCH AN ACT WOULD MAKE
TESTING A LEGITIMATE ACT. TIME IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR,
SOON IT WILL BE TOO LATE TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN ARMS
CONTROL SINCE THE ARMS RACE HAS ITS OWN LOGIC. SOLUTIONS
TO CURRENT DIFFICULTIES DO NOT LIE IN THE MILITARY
SPHERE BUT IN NEW POLITICAL THINKING. THIS NEW POLITICAL
THINKING RECOGNIZES THE LINKS BETWEEN THE MILITARY, THE
ECONOMIC AND THE HUMANITARIAN FACTORS IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL ARENA. THERE WILL BE NO ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT
VERIFICATION (PROVERKA) BUT NO VERIFICATION WITHOUT
ARMS CONTROL. THE LEVELS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION,
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BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL, MUST BE REDUCED.
DETERRENCE REMAINS AN UNACCEPTABLE DOCTRINE TO THE
SOVIET MILITARY; IT IS LIKE WEARING A BULLET-PROOF VEST
FILLED WITH DYNAMITE.
5. RISK REDUCTION CENTERS
LYNNIK (WHO IS SAID TO BE A PROTEGE OF PRAVDA'S VIKTOR
AFANASIYEV AND WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE DRAFTED GORBACHEV'S
LATEST SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET) SAID THAT THE
SOVIET UNION BELIEVED THE GENERAL IDEA TO BE "VERY
WORTH WHILE". IT MIGHT HAVE SOME VALUE IN DEALING WITH
SUCH ISSUES AS NUCLEAR TERRORISM, BUT IT CANNOT .BECOME
A SUBSTITUTE FOR DEALING WITH BASIC ISSUES,
CONTROL. INDICATING "SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S.
POLITICAL SYSTEM", HE SAID THAT THE GENERAL IDEA WAS
HARMLESS FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW AND EVEN MORE
HARMLESS TO THE MILITARY BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
ON U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS.
MILSHTEYN CONCLUDED THAT RISK REDUCTION MIGHT BE OKAY
BUT EXPRESSED GREAT DOUBT ABOUT THEIR REAL IMPACT
NOTING THAT ALL U.S. SUGGESTIONS FALL SHORT OF PRACTICAL
STEPS TO LIMIT ARMS. HE INDICATED THAT U.S. AND SOVIET
EXPERTS WOULD BE MEETING TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE BUT THAT
BEFORE PROGRESS ON RISK REDUCTION WOULD BE POSSIBLE,
THERE MUST BE CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE AREA OF ARMS
CONTROL.
MIKHAYLOV SAID THAT RISK REDUCTION IS A PERIPHERAL ISSUE
WITH WHICH WOULD YIELD NO PRACTICAL RESULTS AND NO REAL
ADVANTAGES. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS ARE GIVING IT
CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. PRIVATELY, MIKHAYLOV INDICATED
THAT THE GENERAL STAFF VIEWS RISK REDUCTION CENTERS AS
ALLOWING CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE U.S. TO BE UTILIZED
FOR DISINFORMATION.
6. SDI
SOVIETS EXPECTED TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE ON THIS ISSUE
BUT WERE FRUSTRATED WHEN PROFESSOR RICHARD THOMAS OF
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY BROKE HIS PREVIOUS SILENCE AND
LAUNCHED HIS OWN OFFENSIVE BY PROVIDING A DETAILED
ACCOUNT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS VIEWED
THROUGH THE EYES OF AN AMERICAN SCIENTIST. HE OUTLINED
THE SOVIET MILITARY'S VIEWS ON THE CREATION OF A SPACE
THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (STVD), THE DIVISION OF
AIR DEFENSE FORCES INTO ANTI-AIR, ANTI-SATELLITE, AND
ANTI-SPACE FORCES. HE THEN CITED SOVIET SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRARED SENSOR
SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD NEED TO DETECT INFRA-RED WAVE OUT
TO 500 MICRONS WHICH CLEARLY INDICATED A REQUIREMENT TO
SENSE BODIES IN SPACE. HANSEN FOLLOWED WITH SOVIET
ARGUMENTS CONDEMING DETERRENCE AS A PRINCIPLE AND
SOVIET FOCUS ON DEFENSE AS THE EMBODIMENT OF DETERRENCE
CONTRASTING SOVIET VIEWS WITH U.S. THEORIES ON MUTUAL
VULNERABILITY.
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NILSHTEYN COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT THE STARTING POINT
FOR SDI WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 23 MARCH 1983 STATEMENT.
ANY OTHER APPROACH WOULD LEAD TO MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS.
WHAT IS AT STAKE IS THE PREVENTION OF SPACE STRIKE
WEAPONS. (COMMENT: AT NO TIME DID MILSTEYN SPEAK OF
PREVENTING SDI, THE FOCUS WAS ON PREVENTING "SPACE
STRIKE WEAPONS". END COMM) WHEN PRESSED FOR A
DEFINITION OF SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS, MILSHTEYN HEDGED
BUT NOTED IT WAS IT PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT ANY NUCLEAR
OR CONVENTIONAL MEANS USED TO STRIKE TARGETS EITHER IN
SPACE OR ON THE GROUND FROM SPACE; THIS INCLUDED ANTI-
SATELLITE SYSTEMS. THE QUESTION OF DETERMINING THE
RELATION OF OFFENSE TO DEFENSE HAS A HISTORY REACHING
BACK TO 1972 AND THE GLASBORO MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT
JOHNSON-AND KOSYGIN AND THE SIGNING OF THE ABM TREATY.
REFUSING TO ADDRESS THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, MILSHTEYN
ARGUED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE
WOULD VIOLATE THE ABM TREATY. MOREOVER, THE WHOLE IDEA
OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE WAS A DANGEROUS ILLUSION. NO SYSTEM,
INCLUDING THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM, COULD PROVIDE ANY REAL
PROTECTION. PRESSED ON THE QUESTION OF RESEARCH,
MILSHTEYN STATED THAT FIELD TESTING OF SDI COMPONENTS
WENT BEYOND WHAT WAS ALLOWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ABM
TREATY. FINALLY, RESIGNED TO THE FACT THAT THE U.S.
WAS NOT GOING TO STOP ITS SDI PROGRAM, MILSHTEYN TOOK A
SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT VIEW THAN THAT OF GENERAL MIKHAYLOV
IN STATING THAT ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS MUST CONTINUE
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SDI.
MIKHLAYLOV STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION
HAS NO SDI-TYPE PROGRAM AND HAS NO PLANS FOR DEVELOPING
SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
CONDUCTING RESEARCH INTO NEW TECHNOLOGIES AS AN EXAMPLE
HE LISTED THE USE OF LASERS IN MEDICINE, LASER-LOCATION
DEVICES, AND FOR THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY. SOVIET
LABORATORIES, HE CLAIMED, WERE OPEN TO INSPECTION. THE
DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS, MIKHAYLOV CLAIMED,
WOULD MAKE THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IMPOSSIBLE
SINCE THE USSR MUST ENSURE ITS CAPABILITY FOR AN ANSWER-
ING STRIKE. RESPONDING TO A THOMAS QUESTION, MIKHAYLOV
IDENTIFIED THE FACILITY AT SARY SHAGAN AS AN EXPERIMENTAL
STATION EXPLORING THE POSSIBLE USE OF LASERS TO LOCATE
OBJECTS IN SPACE.
7. OTHER ISSUES
INF. SOVIETS CLEARLY WANTED A STATEMENT IN THE
COMMUNIQUE WHICH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ZERO-INF IN
EUROPE. THE FINAL LANGUAGE READ "A VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT
ON AMERICAN AND SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES
COULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP AS WOULD A SIMILAR AGREEMENT
ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS."
CDE. GREAT STRESS WAS PLACED ON OBTAINING AGREEMENT
TO THE IDEA THAT "THE ADOPTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL CONCLUDING
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DOCUMENT AT STOCKHOLM WAS VIEWED BY THE PARTICIPANTS AS A
NECESSARY PRELIMINARY FOR TAKING ADDITIONAL DECISIONS
RELATING TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AT THE VIENNA REVIEW
CONFERENCE."
CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THE INITIAL SOVIET DRAFT
COMMUNIQUE, BROUGHT FROM MOSCOW, CONTAINED A LONG AND
RAMBLING SECTION ON THE NEED TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMS WHICH WAS PERCEIVED BY MANY TO BE A
ROADBLOCK TO REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS. IT MADE SO
LITTLE SENSE TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM
THAT IT WAS PARED DOWN ONLY TO SAY: "IT WAS RECOGNIZED
THAT IT 13 IMPORTANT IN THE VIENNA TALKS TO REACH
EQUITABLE AND VERIFICABLE AGREEMENTS CONCERNING THE
LEVELS OF MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WITHOUT
ENDANGERING ANY STATE'S SECURITY." (COMMENT: LYNNIK,
IN PARTICULAR APPEARED ANXIOUS TO CONVEY TO HANSEN
SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS THE CONVENTIONAL QUESTION
AND PERCEPTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE. END COMMENT)
- NEW POLITICAL THINKING. MILSTEYN AND MIKHAYLOV DID
NOT ENGAGE MUCH ON THIS QUESTION, BUT LYNNIK AND OTHERS
SOUGHT TO PROMOTE THIS IDEA AS THE BASIS FOR DEALING
WITH ALL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03062
SUBJECT: CDE: USDEPUTY BILATERALS
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ON THE MARGINS OF THE EDINBURGH CONVERSA-
TIONS (SEPTEL) AMBASSADOR HANSEN DISCUSSED CDE WITH
GENERAL-LIEUTENANT KONSTANTIN MIKHAYLOV, WHO WAS THE
SOVIET MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE AT THE MADRID CSCE
REVIEW MEETING AND IS CURRENTLY A DEPUTY TO GENERAL
'COLONEL CHERVOV IN THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF. MIKHAYLOV
APPEARED TO INDICATE A GENERAL SOVIET DESIRE TO REACH
AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM, SLIGHT IRRITATION AT THE 15
JANUARY 86 GORBACHHEV STATEMENT AS IT PERTAINED TO CDE,
AND SOVIET MILITARY INTEREST IN LIMITATIONS IN THE CDE.
IN STOCKHOLM, HANSEN ALSO MET WITH HUNGARIAN DEPUTY WHO
WAS SENT ON A FISHING MISSION BY "BIG BROTHER" AND
REPORTED MOVE OF HUNGARIAN VICE-MINISTER TO NEW YORK
AND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. END SUMMARY
GENERAL MIKHAYLOV:
3. GENERAL MIKHAYLOV SOUGHT OUT DISCUSSION WITH US CDE
DEPT HANSEN ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF CUE NEGOTIATIONS.
HE SAID THAT SITUATION IN STOCKHOLM WAS NOT VERY CLEAR
AND THE SOVIETS HAD DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING WHY
PROGRESS WAS SO DIFFICULT. AT MADRID, HE NOTED, DRAFTING
APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN EASIER. TWICE, MIKHAYLOV SAID
THAT "MIKHAIL SERGEYEyICH" GORBACHEV HAD TAKEN A BROAD
STEP IN SHOWING WILLINGESS TO DISCUSS NAVAL ISSUES IN
THE FUTURE SESSION OF THE CDE. THIS CONSTITUTED A
"CRUCIAL ISSUE TO US" WHICH MUST FIND A SOLUTION IN THE
FUTURE. (COMMENT: MIKHAYLOV DID NOT INDICATE ANY
REQUIREMENT TO RECORD AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS NAVAL ISSUES
IN A FUTURE ITERATION OF CDE. END COMM)
E4. IT WAS IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY IN RESPECT TO RECENT
EVENTS (READ LIBYA), TO DEAL WITH INDEPENDENT AIR
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. BUT IN THAT REGARD, THE SOVIETS
RECOGNIZED THAT THEY ARE SPEAKING OF AIR FORCES BASED
IN EUROPE AND THAT SUCH FORCES FUNCTION ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY
IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY. THIS SHOULD CAUSE
NO PROBLEM, HE CONCLUDED.
5. MIKHAYLOV INQUIRED WHAT WERE THE U.S. REQUIREMENTS
IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION, WERE WE AFTER MORE INFORMATION
OR NEW FORMS OF INFORMATION? HANSEN REPLIED THAT WE
WERE AFTER MORE INFORMATION THAN HAD HITHERTOFORE BEEN
EXCHANGED UNDER THE TERMS OF FINAL ACT NOTIFICATION AS
WELL AS A NEW FORM, I.E., THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY
INFORMATION AS OUTLINED IN OUR MEASURE ONE. THE GENERAL
REPLIED THAT MEASURE ONE WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM, BUT
THAT MEASURE TWO, THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS, DID
REPRESENT A NEW FORM OF INFORMATION.
6. SOLUTION OF THE THRESHOLD FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF
GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS SHOULD NOT POSE GREAT PROBLEMS,
MIKHAYLOV ASSERTED, THIS COULD BE FOUND ON THE BASIS OF
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THE SOVIET PROPOSAL 20,000 TROOPS AND THE U.S. IDEA
OF A DIVISION. THE WESTERN POSITION ON VERIFICATION
CAUSED HIM TO BREATHE UNEVENLY, MIKHAYLOV SAID. WHAT
DID THE WEST WANT, THE ABILITY TO CHECK ON UNNOTIFIED
ACTIVITIES OR ON INCORRECT INFORMATION? HANSEN REPLIED
THAT THE RIGHT TO INSPECT QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WAS
AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF AN OUTCOME
IN STOCKHOLM. AT THIS POINT MIKHAYLOV ONLY TOOK
NOTES. HE POINTED TO THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING ASPECTS
OF INVITING OBSERVERS "IN THE FORMS OF HELSINKI" AND
DOING THIS AT LOWER THRESHOLDS AS A SIGNIFICANT MOVE
FORWARD BY THE SOVIET UNION. HE INSISTED THAT THE
SOVIET UNION SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERS TO ANY AGREEMENT IT
MAKES. MIKHAYLOV SHOOK HIS HEAD WHEN INFORMED THAT NATO
WILL NOT ACCEPT CONSTRAINTS/LIMITATIONS AS PART OF AN
OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM. HE SAID THIS ISSUE IS OF GREAT
INTEREST TO THE SOVIET UNION.
7. HE NOTED THAT WE WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY AMBASSADOR
GRINYEVSKY DID NOT COME TO WASHINGTON AFTER THE NEXT
SESSION IN STOCKHOLM BEGINS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE
SOVIET DELEGATION NOW HAS ITS INSTRUCTIONS AND WILL DO
EVERYTHING TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT POSSIBLE. SEVERAL
TIMES DURING THE DISCUSSION, MIKHAYLOV NOTED THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE NNA'S IN MAKING AN AGREEMENT POSSIBLE
AND URGED HANSEN TO PLACE PRESSURE ON THE NNA GROUP TO
BECOME MORE ACTIVE.
HUNGARIAN CDE DEPUTY
8. DR. ISTVAN KORMENDY, THE ACTIVIST HUNGARIAN DEPUTY,
TOLD HANSEN HE HAD BEEN DISPATCHED, TO HIS SURPRISE, BY
"BIG BROTHER" TO ASK A BASIC QUESTION OF THE AMERICAN
DELEGATION, SPECIFICALLY OF AMB. HANSEN. (COMMENT: BIG
BROTHER TURNED OUT TO BE ROZANOV, THE SENIOR KGB MAN ON
THE SOVIET DELEGATION. WHILE THIS ACCOUNTS FOR THE
APPROACH TO HANSEN, IT IS ALSO CURIOUS SINCE BEFORE THE
LAST BREAK, ROZANOV'S STAR HAD BEEN SINKING AND HE HAD
STRUGGLED TO KEEP ANY PROFILE AT ALL. END COMMENT)
THE QUESTION WAS: DOES THE AMERICAN DELEGATION WANT AN
AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM? IF SO, A MINI-PACKAGE OR A
SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. HANSEN EXPRESSED SURPISE AT THE
QUESTION SINCE WE HAD MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT
WE HAD NO INTEREST IN A MINI-PACKAGE AND INSISTED THAT
AN AGREEMENT MUST BE SIGNIFICANT IN MILITARY TERMS AS
WELL AS INCLUDE INSPECTION.
9. KORMENDY THEN REPORTED THAT DURING THE LAST BREAK
FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEVARDNADZE HAD CALLED "SENIOR
MEMBERS" OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTO HIS OFFICE AND
HAD EACH, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AMB. GRINYEVSKY (WHO
WAS NONETHELESS PRESENT), GIVE HIS EVALUATION OF THE
STATE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. KORMENDY REFUSED TO
INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT THE "SENIOR MEMBERS" INCLUDED
THE KGB AND MILITARY ELEMENTS. (COMMENT: ALMOST
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CERTAINLY, AMBASSADORS RACHMANINOV AND YEREFEYEV WERE
INCLUDED. END COMMENT) KORMENDY DID CONFIRM THAT FROM
THE VANTAGE POINT OF THE NON-SOVIET WTO DELEGATIONS,
THE SOVIET DELEGATION DID NOT SEEM TO RECEIVE ITS
INSTRUCTIONS FROM A SINGLE SOURCE. BUT, HE EMPHASIZED,
THE WEST OUGHT TO PAY MOST ATTENTION TO THE POLITICAL
SIDE OF THE HOUSE.
10. FINALLY, KORMENDY WAS EAGER THAT IT BE KNOWN IN
WASHINGTON THAT VICE-MINISTER F. ESZTERGALYOS WAS BEING
TRANSFERRED TO NEW YORK TO MAKE WAY FOR A MEMBER OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO HAVE A JOB IN BUDAPEST. THE
HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCE
OF THE HUNGARIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND THEREFORE,
4CCORDING TO KORMENDY, ESZTERGALYOS WILL TURN OVER HIS
N.Y. DUTIES TO A DEPUTY AND WILL FOCUS HIS EFFORTS ON
U.S./HUNGARIAN RELATIONS. KORMENDY TOOK PAINS TO
EXPLAIN THE INTIMATE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ESZTERGALYOS AND DOBRYININ WHICH CAN BE TRACED BACK TO
THEIR JOINT TIME IN WASHINGTON.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONF I DENT I A LSTOCKHOLM03681
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN LANGUAGE IN CSCE FORA
REF: A) 85 STOCKHOLM 9697, B) 85 STOCKHOLM 870
1. CDE X - 045
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: SWEDISH CDE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
HIRED AN INDEPENDENT, I.E., NON-SOVIET, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
EXPERT FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME THIS ROUND.
DELEGATION BELIEVES WE SHOULD USE THIS PRECEDENT TO
BREAK THE SOVIET STRANGLE HOLD ON THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
BOOTH IN OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA, INCLUDING THE VIENNA
REVIEW CONFERENCE. ACTION REQUESTED PARA 8. END
SUMMARY.
4. AS NOTED IN REFTELS,. RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TRANSLATORS
AND INTERPRETERS HAVE CAUSED RECURRING PROBLEMS AT THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. INDEPENDENT LANGUAGE-QUALIFIED
CIVIL SERVANTS ARE HIRED BY THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT FOR
ALL CSCE LANGUAGES, EXCEPT RUSSIAN. THE SOVIET FOREIGN
MINISTRY INSISTS THAT IT PROVIDE THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
EXPERTS TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE (AS WELL AS TO MOST
OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES). IN THE PAST THE
SWEDISH SECRETARIAT HAS ACQUIESCED TO SOVIET DEMANDS.
5. THIS SESSION, AFTER NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS BY THE U.S.
AND OTHER DELEGATIONS, AND OVER THE STRONG PROTESTS OF
THE SOVIET DELEGATION, THE SECRETARIAT HIRED FOR TWO
WEEKS AN INDEPENDENT RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERT, SERGE
SAMARINE, A VIENNA-BASED CIVIL SERVANT WHO HOLDS AN
IRISH PASSPORT. SAMARINE WORKED THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
BOOTH AT THE CONFERENCE FOR ONE WEEK.
6. AFTER THE SOVIETS THREATENED THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT
WITH A FORMAL DEMARCHE, THE CONFERENCE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY (AF SILLEN) DECIDED NOT TO FIGHT THE MATTER
AND TOOK SAMARINE OUT OF THE LANGUAGE BOOTH. THE
SOVIETS USED THEIR USUAL LITANY OF ARGUMENTS, INCLUDING
THAT SAMARINE SPOKE "ARCHAIC" RUSSIAN. (COMMENT: THE
SOVIETS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED PRIVATELY THAT SAMARIN IS A
FAR BETTER INTERPRETER/TRANSLATOR THAN THE TWO YOUNG
SOVIET-SUPPLIED LANGUAGE EXPERTS CURRENTLY IN STOCKHOLM.
END COMMENT.) AF SILLEN SAYS THAT SINCE HE HAD ALREADY
ESTABLISHED THE PRECEDENT OF HIRING INDEPENDENT RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE EXPERTS, HE DECIDED NOT TO PRESS THE ISSUE
FURTHER WITH THE SOVIETS.
7. BEGIN COMMENT. WE WISH AF SILLEN HAD NOT YIELDED TO
SOVIET PRESSURE. NEVERTHELESS, WE GIVE HIM CREDIT FOR
BREACHING AN IMPORTANT BARRIER. THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE, AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS, HAS
HIRED AND USED A NON-SOVIET RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERT.
END COMMENT.
8. ACTION REQUESTED BY DEPARTMENT.
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-- ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE SECRETARIAT OF THE BERN HUMAN
CONTACTS EXPERT MEETING IS USING, AS PROMISED, NON-SOVIET
RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS.
-- FOLLOW UP WITH THE SECRETARIAT OF THE VIENNA REVIEW
CONFERENCE, CITING THE STOCKHOLM (AND PERHAPS BERN)
PRECEDENT TO DEMONSTRATE OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN HAVING
NON-SOVIET RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS AT THE VIENNA
REVLON.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENT I A L STOCKHOLM 03950
SUBJECT: PROPOSED WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE
1. CDE X - 057
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT:
3. THE FOLLOWING HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE WAS WORKED OUT
BY THE NATO NUF EXPERTS AFTER LONG AND PAINSTAKING
NEGOTIATIONS. ALL STOCKHOLM NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE
RECOMMENDED THAT THIS TEXT BE ACCEPTED BY THEIR
RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. THE SILENCE PROCEDURE WILL EXPIRE
OOB TUESDAY, MAY 20.
4. BEGIN TEXT:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN
PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND
DECLARED THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT THESE
PRINCIPLES AND TO PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE, IRRESPECTIVE
OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THESE
PRINCIPLES ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND
ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED,
EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
OTHERS.
THEY RECALLED THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, SECURITY
AND JUSTICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WOULD BE ENHANCED BY COOPERATION IN
ALL FIELDS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.
IN THIS CONTEXT THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS,
THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR PEACE
AND JUSTICE. THEY THUS STRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO
RESPECT AND TO PUT INTO PRACTICE THEIR COMMITMENT TO
THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS,
WHICH IS AN INDISPENSABLE COMPONENT OF THE CSCE
PROCESS, AND OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AS
WELL AS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES.
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04048
SUBJ: GONZALEZ VISIT TO MOSCOW
REFS: A. MOSCOW 08550; B. FBIS LD191714 MOSCOW TASS ENGLISH
1642; C. FBIS LD191814 MOSCOW TASS ENGLSIH 1714
1. CDE X - 64
2. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ADDING TO MOSCOW'S ANALYSIS OF RYZHICOV'S DINNER SPEECH
FOR GONZALEZ (REF A), WE NOTE THAT TASS ISSUED A CORRECTION
WHICH BLURS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN GORBACHEV'S APRIL 15
PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS AND A POSSIBLE
CDE STAGE II. THE ORIGINAL, IN USING GORBACHEV'S FORMU-
LATION "THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS FROM THE
ATLANTIC TO THE URALS" TO DEFINE THE OBJECTIVE OF A CDE II
COMING OUT OF VIENNA, CLEARLY IMPLIES THAT GORBACHEV WAS
REFERRING TO CDE AS THE ARENA FOR APPLICATION OF HIS
PROPOSAL. IN DROPPING THE EXACT GEOGRAPHICAL FORUMLATION,
THE REVISION WEAKENS THE LINK BETWEEN CDE AND THE GORBACHEV
PROPOSAL.
4. IN OUR VIEW, TASS'S REVISION OF RYZHKOV'S SPEECH
REVEALS SOVIET UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THE
GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AND HOW TO PLAY ITS RELATIONSHIP TO CDE.
THE PASSAGE IN EITHER VERSION DOES, HOWEVER, STRONGLY
REINFORCE THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE LOOKING FOR A
CDE II AND WILL MAKE IT THEIR MAIN ORDER OF BUSINESS IN
VIENNA. THIS IS THE MESSAGE WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FROM
FHE EAST IN THE CORRIDORS HERE. WE AGREE WITH MOSCOW THAT
WE WILL BE HEARING INCREASINGLY MORE ABOUT CDE II AS THE
ENDGAME HERE IN STOCKHOLM PROGRESSES. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04040
SUBJ: PROPOSED WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON CDE
1. CDE X - 62
2. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT
3. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT FOR SUGGESTED WHITE HOUSE
STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED AT START OF NEXT CDE ROUND,
JUNE 10. REQUEST TEXT BE CLEARED WITH WASHINGTON
AGENCIES AS APPROPRIATE.
BEGIN TEXT: THE ADMINISTRATION IS INCREASINGLY
CONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE
ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE), WHICH RESUMES JUNE 10.
THE CONFERENCE, WHICH HAS BEEN MEETING IN STOCKHOLM
SINCE JANUARY 1984, IS CHARGED WITH ENACTING CONCRETE,
VERIFIABLE MEASURES DESIGNED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THEREBY REDUCE THE RISK OF
MILITARY CONFRONTATION.
AS PART OF THE BROADER CSCE PROCESS, SUCCESS IN CDE
SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN IMPROVED EAST-WEST
RELATIONSHIP AND HELP TO LOWER THE ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS
WHICH DIVIDE EAST FROM WEST IN EUROPE. THE UNITED
STATES IS COMMITTED TO THIS OBJECTIVE.
THE PRESIDENT HAS ALWAYS ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO
THE CDE; HE IS CONCERNED THAT, WITH ONLY TEN
NEGOTIATING WEEKS REMAINING BEFORE THE CONFERENCE
ADJOURNS, THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS ARE DIMINISHING
RAPIDLY AND THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY CDE MAY BE
LOST. THE PREVIOUS ROUND, WHICH WE AND OUR ALLIES, AS
WELL AS NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES, BELIEVED WAS
CRITICAL, WAS WASTED BECAUSE OF EASTERN RELUCTANCE TO
ENGAGE IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. UPON RESUMPTION OF
THE TALKS, THE FIRST TASK OF AN INTENSIFIED DRAFTING
EFFORT MUST BE TO DECIDE ON THE LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE
AND COMBINED ARMS EXERCISES TO BE NOTIFIED. WESTERN
PROPOSALS PROVIDE EXTENSIVE INFORMATION ON THE LAND
AND AIR COMPONENTS OF SUCH EXERCISES, AND IT IS TIME
TO END THIS IMPASSE NOW.
THE UNITED STATES SEEKS SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN
CONVENTIONAL ARMS AS WELL AS ESTABLISHMENT OF REAL
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE.
THESE OBJECTIVES CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IN EXISTING
NEGOTIATIONS: MBFR IN VIENNA AND CDE IN STOCKHOLM,
WHERE REALISTIC WESTERN PROPOSALS ARE NOW ON THE
TABLE. THE INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE
JUDGED BY ITS ACTIONS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS RATHER
THAN BY GENERALITIES CONTAINED IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS.
THE PRESIDENT HAS INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR ROBERT L.
BARRY, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION IN STOCKHOLM, TO
PRESS FOR MEANINGFUL PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE DURING
THE NEXT ROUND AND TO REPORT BACK WHEN THE ROUND ENDS
IN JULY. END TEXT.
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Unofficial translation
S T A T E 1 E N T
by Oleg A. GRINEVSKY,
Ambassador at Large,
Head of the USSR Delegation
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe
Stockholm, April 21, 1986
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Mr. Chairman,
The 11th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party
of Germany (SED~Yconcluding its work. This significant event put
Berlin in the focus of attention of the numerous friends of the
GDR, of the broad European and world public. Problems of war
and peace occupied a great place at the Congress.
The report of the SED Central Committee delivered by Lich
Honecker and the statement by General Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev provide important assessments
of the current international situation and real ways out of the
existing acute situation.
peoples,
Disregarding the pressing interests and aspirations of a=? /
certain quarters have taken to the road of actually undermining
the Geneva accords, the road of actions that only further
complicate the already tense situation in the world.
It concerns first of all the sinister nuclear explosions in
Nevada which destroyed a unique chance to give the process of
disarmament a real start. It also concerns the impudent action
taken by the United States against Libya that is fraught with the
danger of a seriuos worsening of the situation in the world.
Such actions damage directly the dialogue between both the USSR
and the USA and between East and West in general.
Set against a broad international context, such steps, which
are contrary to the tasks of strenthening confidence and serutiry,
cannot be viewed as isolated developments. They all are
manifestations of the general policy of solving international
problems by force, of stepping up the arms race.
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At this moment of responsibility no one may dodge discharging
one's duty to the present and succeeding generations. As far as
the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist
community are concerned, they have acted and will continue to
act being fully aware of their responsibility. In Berlin the
Soviet leader stated with utter certainty that our proposals for
eliminating nuclear weapons and bridling the arms race hold good,
and if the governments of Western countries are really concerned
about the fate of peace, it is high time they began matching
their words with deeds.
We would like specifically to draw the attention of the
participants in the Stockholm Conference to the statement by the
General Secretary, particulary to its section concerning Europe,
as it has direct relevance to the task of strengthening confidence,
security and to disarmament on our continent.
Two groupings of forces, stressed MI.Gorbachev, each three
million strong and possessing the most advanced tanks, missiles
and planes, let alone small arms of all types, face each other in
Europe. Moreover, what is called conventional weapons are
constantly being improved and made more sophisticated and powe:ui,
their effects becoming more and more like those of weapons of
mass destruction.
There is another aspect to this problem. We are told that
Western Europe cannot give up nuclear weapons, including American
ones, because in this case it would allegedly feel less secure in
the face of the conventional armed forces and armaments of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization.
What do we think necessary to say in this context?
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3?
To begin with, the elimination of nuclear weapons in,irope
would create a new situation not only for the West but also for
ourselves. We should not forget that invasions of our territory
in the pre-nuclear age were mounted from the West, and more than
once.
From the capital of the GDR the Soviet Union appeals to all to
West R ropeans and declares: our country will never and under no
circumstances begin armed operations against Western Europe unless
we and our allies become targets of a NATO attack.
Our country backs this position with a new initiative now
applying to the conventional armaments and armed forces. The USSR
suggests that agreement be reached on substantial reductions in
all the components of the land forces and tactical air forces of
the European states and the relevant forces of the USA and Canada
deployed in Europe. The formations and units to be reduced should
be disbanded and their weaponry either destroyed or stored in
national territories. Geographically, reductions, obviously,
should cover the entire European territory from the Atlantic to
the Urals. Longer-range and battle-field nuclear weapons could be
reduced simultaneously with conventional weapons.
The question of dependable verification at every stage of
this process offers itself. Both national technical means and
international forms of verification, including, if need be,
on-site inspection, are possible.
In short, this is a subject for serious negotiations. ';re
believe that the formulation of the question in a broader context-
will make it possible to out the knot which has been growing
tighter at the Vienna talks over so many years now.
414
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There are no traps in the policy of the Soviet Union. It
extends an open hard, not a fist to the West. We are lcok
for ways to mutual understanding and to the limitation of the
arms race, to overcoming the negative trends of confrontation
and to creating confidence as an inherent component of relations
among states, including those in Europe.
The Soviet leadership considers that in the present
situation fraught with dangers to the cause of peace it is
important to make use of every possibility to correct and
normalize the international situation. In this context the en~i_e
potential of the Stockholm Conference should naturally be utiiicec.
Lr? Chairman,.
This session or the Conference is of special importance.
And not only because time, as they say it, is running out on it.
The tense and acute international situation makes it im;erati7e
that measures be taken which would help restore continence and
strengthen security on our continent. Therefore it is i=cunbent
on this stage of the Stockholm negotiations to seek energeticall
solutions to the main outstanding problems of the Conference, to
move steadily along the road of negotiating a concluding docunent
which would both give concrete expression and effect to the
non-use-of-force principle and include confidence-building
measures in the military field.
The Soviet Union and socialist countries have made ;portzrt
steps to remove the pile-ups that have grown at the Conference
and make headway in its work. Neutral and nonaligned countries
make a substantial contribution to this and. Unfortunately, we
are yet to see any accomodating moves on the part of some other
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negotiators, although we hear sometimes pronouncements on the
used to break the impasse at the Conference. Fossilized proposals
and reluctance to budge in years-long positions torn the gain
vostacles to negotiation of mutually acceptable agreements.
I think that this round of negotiations will reveal whether words
about the desire to move ahead are backed up by pactical actions.
The question of non-use of force occupies an important place
at the Stockholm negotiations. Giving concrete expression and
effect to this principle provides in effect a base for and fill
with substance all military measures we are negotiating, cor_sol__at
them and make them confidence-and security-oriented.
It is time to address seriously one of the central issues of
the Conference -notification of major military manoeuvres. In
order to move ahead in it, it is'essential to identify tyres of
military activities that will be subject to notification. Mie
key to solution of the problem is given in the January 15 Soviet
proposal. Our proposal is to agree now on notification of maor
manoeuvres of ground and air forces, movements and transfers of
troops and postpone the question of naval activities until the
next stage of the Conference.
It is also necessary to focus on such an important question
as the limitation of the scale of military man oeuvres. 7'e eXpect
that a realistic approach will be demonstrated to the cons derat_cn
of this issue with account taken of its significance for reducing
the risk of military confrontation in Europe.
Certainly, therre
other questions at the Conference that
await solution, e.g. exchanges of annual plans of notifiable
military activities, invitation of observers, etc. Obviously,
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all confidence-bu{?di g measures must be provided wilt, aaec.ate
forms of verification.
We are in ravour of the most effective methods of drarti g
on the entire range of questions as defined in the Agreement
of October 14, 1985. We used to seek concrete results at each a
every working group meeting. It would be the greatest prodigality
to waste our time on academic discussion leading away from
drafting. One should value one's own time and one's co-negotiators'
time.
Mr. Chairman,
Success in Stockholm, conclusion of the Conference by ado. t:.:_.
a substantive concluding document could give a fresh impetus to
the further development of the CSCE process and improvement of
international relations in general. It would also ensure
favourable prerequisites for the Vienna follow-up meeting to
contribute significantly to the improvement of the political
climate and revival of detente in Europe and the world over.
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DELEGATION OF THE S. F. R. OF YUGOSLAVIA
TO
T1E CONTERE 4CE ON CONFIDENCE - AND SECURITY - RUU.DENG MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
by Mr. Alexander Bozovid, Head of the Delegation of
Yugoslavia, on terrorism, April 28, 1986, in the work-
ing group A+B
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Speaking in this working group on two earlier occasions - on
December 16 last year and last week - I have stated that our stand on
terrorism is crystal-clear and consistent: Yugoslavia condemns with-
out any reservations all - and I repeat all - forms of terrorism and
fully respects and implements its international obligations in prevent-
ing and combating acts of terrorism. Our territory has never been used
for the preparation of subversive and terrorist acts and has never been
a sanctuary for terrorists. I leave it to my colleagues to assess their
own country's role and actions or lack of actions in this respect. But
let me, Mr. Chairman, acknowledge with appreciation the courage
with which the United States Vice-Pre sident's Task Force on Combat-
ing Terrorism recognized that "the United States itself is sometimes
used as a safe-heaven for terrorists" .
Our resolute stand against terrorism stems also from the fact
that our country - its citizens, property and interests - were so fre-
quently in the past the object of terrorist and subversive activities,
in most cases organized on and executed from the territories of a num-
ber of Participating States. Post-war history offers numerous examples
of ruthless and internationally conspired attacks on our diplomatic and
other missions, assaults on our Ambassadors and other official repre-
sentatives, incursions of armed terrorist groups into our territory,
planting of bombs in check-rooms at railway stations and other public
places, and so on. Physical assaults and beatings of Yugoslav work-
ers employed abroad, threats and blackmail for the purpose of extort-
ing money, are frequently practised. Resistance to such acts are
labelled and punished as disruption of public order, but acts that are
opposed are neither proven nor punished. Countries whose hospitality
these conspiratorial elements enjoyed and still enjoy, have frequently
failed to take effective action to prevent anti-Yugoslav subversive and
terrorist activities and to have the perpetrators of subversive and
terrorist acting against Yugoslavia and its citizens duly punished.
Subversive and terrorism oriented groups and organizations
are still active, and they are in some countries even patronized by
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some members of Parliaments who, in their turn, are rewarded for ser-
vices rendered with the titles of "honorary Croats" . Aspects of pri-
vate life of terrorists recruited from within those organizations have
been given on television and in mass media, a publicity that intends
to make heros out of them and that amounts to an open invitation to
all those who wish to come into the limelight to commit terrorist
crimes. Furthermore, mass media are placed at the disposal of sub-
versive and terrorist organizations and widely used for recruiting
followers.
Some of the subversive and terrorist oriented groups and or-
ganizations in different Participating States may lately have changed
their names with a view to make themselves more acceptable or at
least less subject to criticism or actions by the competent authori-
ties of the host countries and to fit within the wide and wild inter-
pretations of democracy and its functioning. Be that as it may, the
'fact remains that they all stem from the Nazi-Fascist organizations
that during the last war fought together with the occupiers of their
own countries against their own proples, or from those that had later
been created in order to continue, on the some basis, their criminal
activities. In 1956 Ante Pavelid, former Ustashi leader and head of
the so-called "Independent State of Croatia", created the "Croatian
Liberation Movement". One of the offsprings of that organization is
the "Croatian Peoples Resistance", whose newspaper "Resistance" ,
published in some of the Participating States, openly made appeals
for terrorism in the following terms: "Our platform is clear; Yugo-
slavia in any form must be destroyed. Destroy it by working with
Russians and the Americans, with the Communists, with the non-
Communists and the anti-Communists, destroy it together with any-
one destroying it. Destroy it with the dialectics of words and dyna-
mite but destroy it unconditionally . . . " . As I said, this appeal has
been printed and reprinted, published and republished in some of
the Participating States. The only change that was brought into this
text, in order to appease the conscience of legally minded legisla-
tions, was to omit the word "dynamite", the rest, however, remain-
ed the same.
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Mr. Chairman,
Terrorism is not a "matter of taste" . It cannot one day be
called "senseless acts of violence" and the other "disagreement with
the order and state of affairs" in the countries of the origin of terror-
ists. Terrorism cannot be condemned In one region and be treated as
potential strategic reserve in the other. There is no difference, con-
sequence-wise, between state sponsored and semi-officially or pri-
vately sponsored terrorism or actions that are taken under the bene-
volent attitude towards activities that are only half a step apart from
terrorism and easily transformed into criminal acts.
Terrorism must never be ideologized along the lines of the
main political divisions of the post-war world. Such an ideologiza-
tion has been used and misused for destructive political ends. Re-
vanchist, fascist, neo-Nazi and anti-Communist terrorism have
nothing to do with the democratic organization and ideals of Western
democratic societies. On the other hand, the so-called radical, re-
volutionary terrorism has nothing to do with the aspirations and ideas
of the socialist world, just as so-called anti-colonial, emancipatory
terrorism has nothing to do with the strivings and goals of peoples
fighting for national and social liberation.
Recent events have reminded us all that, taking different
forms and inspired by different motives, terrorism does not spare any
country, any social political system or any region of the world. No-
body is any more immune to subversion and terrorism. It is highly
regrettable that some of the Participating States had to learn that the
hard way and at the cost of tremendous sometimes irreplaceable losses.
We do hope that we all have drawn appropriate lessons and that now,
that the increased awareness on the need to take joint actions to pre-
vent terrorism is evident, we will finally all be ready to come to
grips with the problem itself as well as with the generators of terror-
ism and with its underlying causes. President Reagan has rightly
stated in a report to the US Congress on April 26, 1984, that we
should treat terrorism as a crime against the international community
but also endeavour to eliminate the causes of frustration and dispair
that nurtures and steers up terrorism.
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This Delegation shares the opinion that the Stockholm Confer-
ence has to single out terrorism as a threat to cooperation, peace and
security in Europe and to focus on effective measures to preventing it.
Within our efforts to elaborate on the principle of the non-use of force
or threat of force, we should undertake to take all necessary measures
to prevent preparations being carried out on our respective territories
for the execution of acts of subversion and terrorism, including mea-
sures banning the conduct on our respective territories of unlawful
activity by persons, groups or organizations which advocate, call for,
encourage, instigate, organize or engage in subversive and terrorist
activities endangering human lives and sovereignty and territorial
integrity of other countries. Let me, in this context, draw your atten-
tion to the dangers inherent in an interpretation of democracy and
democratic institutions such as freedom of organization, freedom of
expression and freedom of the press in a way that amounts to invita-
tion and that is understood by those who engage in subversive and
terrorist activities as a green light to carry on with their criminal acts.
"Terrorists deliberately manufacture sensations to capture maximum
media attention - a ploy that often takes advantage of press freedom.
Such activity, it is stated in the report of the US Vice-President's
Task Force on Combating Terrorism,. "can be offset by close commu-
nication between media and government".
The joint proposal of the neutral and non-aligned countries
submitted under SC. 7 contains some provisions on preventing subver-
sive activities and terrorism. At the time of the elaboration of those
provisions they were considered as being the best basis for adopting
a text that would command the consensus of all of us. However, in
the light of recent events those provisions, I believe, clearly need
further elaboration.
I also agree that the Stockholm decisions focusing on effec-
tive means of preventing terrorism would not, of course, resolve the
problem and that a broader approach is needed. With this in mind
we have very carefully studied the recommendations of the United
States Vice-President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, some of
which in our opinion merit further consideration. The Task Force
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considers that international cooperation is crucial to long-term deterr-
ence of terrorism and that it can be achieved through multilateral and
bilateral agreements. While progress in achieving multilateral agree-
ments has been slow, efforts should, in the opinion of the Task Force,
c ontinue to reach an agreement to show that many nations are committed
to fighting terrorism as an international crime against society. To this
I would like to add that each Participating State should, within their
own legal system, take effective steps to prevent subversive and ter-
rorist activities on their territories first. We should, in other words,
start by cleaning our own back-yards first, or at least along with our
efforts to prevent terrorism in other countries and regions.
As I have earlier stated the Task Force recognizes that the
United States itself is sometimes used as a safe-heaven for terrorists
and finds that "present extradition treaties with other countries pre-
clude the turning-over of fugatives wanted for "political offences"
which is an obvious loophole for terrorists" . The Task Force also re-
commends that the information on terrorist activities between govern-
ments should be exchanged as such exchanges "with like-minded
nations" and international law enforcement organizations have been
highly useful and should therefore be expanded. The only comment
I have with regard to this recommendation is to ask why such an ex-
change of information should be limited to like-minded nations alone.
Mr. Chairman,
The Follow-up Meeting in Vienna, in November this year,
should in our view provide for an elaborated consideration of the pro-
blem of terrorism by convening a special meeting of all Participating
States that should, among other, elaborate a regional agreement on
prevention of subversive and terrorist activities. That agreement
should in our view include the obligation of the Participating States
to respect and fulfil their international obligations and to bring their
national legislations in accordance with the provisions of interna-
tional legal and political instruments to which they are or may become
parties. The Follow-up Meeting in Vienna should also call on Parti-
cipating States to revise the existing or conclude new bilateral
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agreements that would provide for the punishment and extradition of
persons found guilty to have committed subversive or terrorist acti-
vity. Such efforts have of course to be translated into a broader in-
ternational action and agreements to combat and prevent terrorism.
Mr. Chairman,
At our last meeting of this group, the representative of the
United States, Ambassador Lynn Hansen, asked what have the non-
aligned countries done to prevent terrorism. A fair question merits
an honest answer. The non-aligned countries have in the past taken
a number of actions and made a number of proposals within the United
Nations organization to prevent and combat subversive and terrorist
activities. A number of international instruments, recommendations
and resolutions on terrorism have been adopted, but unfortunately
not respected and implemented by all member states. The non-
aligned countries have also taken a number of actions with a view
to eradicate the underlying causes of terrorism, but their efforts met
with opposition, and were not successful. So, the question is not
only what have they done but why have they not succeeded.
At the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of
the Non-Aligned Movement, that was recently held in New Delhi,
the following text on international terrorism was adopted:
"The Ministers expressed their deep concern at the world-
wide escalation of acts of terrorism, including state terrorism in all
its forms, which endanger or take innocent human lives, jeopardize
fundamental freedoms and have an increasingly deleterious effect on
international relations and may jeopardize the very territorial integrity
and security of states. They condemned all terrorist activities,
whether perpetrated by individuals, groups or states, and resolved
to counter them by every legal means possible. They called upon all
states to fulfil their obligations under international law to refrain
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist
acts in other states or acquiescing in activities within their territo-
ries directed towards the commission of such acts."
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 ILLEGIB
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Unofficial translation
S T A T E L E N T
by Oleg A. GRE VSKT,
Ambassador at Large,
Head of the USSR Delegation
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe
Stockholm, May 23, 1986
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Mr. Chairman,
The Conference is moving now into the concluding phase
of its work. Naturally, this places all its participants
under serious responsibility. We have little time left and
much, even very much, remains to be done. Under these
circumstances we ought to act more energetically without
losing time and press forward persistently.
I believe that a. disservice is done to the Conference
by those who attempt to call into question the very possibility
of achieving positive results in Stockholm, who attempt to
steer matters to confrontation rather than to cooperation in
negotiating mutually acceptable agreements. Isn't it like
tolling the knell for the Conference?
Obviously, we are far Zrom'looking at the affairs in
Stockholm through pink glasses or closing our eyes to
the difficulties and obstacles that we are yet to overcome
on our way to completing the Conference.
Those who have followed closely this session cannot fail
to see that intensive work has been going on in drafting
groups. Coordinators and negotiators have toiled relentlessly
without counting time to achieve results. In our view,
interesting and useful work has been done in the group dealing
with notification which has managed, seemingly, to address
the very crux of the matter. We, on our part, wish this group
and its coordinator, distinguished Ambassador Lidgard, success
in moving forward. Useful work has also been done in the group
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on observation; some movement, albeit timid, has begun in
the non-use of force group.
However we should state with all frankness that drafting
has been extremely slow. Language agreed so far concerns only
peripheral, secondary questions.
What is required then to accelerate progress at the
Conference, to impart it a more business-like pace? It would
seem that the requirement here is that all participants in
the Conference pursue more energetically and boldly solutions
to unresolved problems and seek approaches to mutually
acceptable agreements.
We note with satisfaction that this very attitude to
our business prevails among many West-European countries.
Like in other CSCE fora. . the neutral and nonaligned countries
have been playing a positive role. There is a reeling that
France, Italy, Spain and other Western countries are in
favour of a positive conclusion of the Stockholm Conference.
The socialist countries have been consistent in plimlIng fir
firm line of achieving substantive results. It is impossible
to name a single theme defined in the Agreement of October
14, 1985, where the Soviet Union and the socialist countries
have not made constructive proposals. Everyone has still
fresh memories of the major initiatives set forth by the
Soviet leadership, which enabled the Conference to gain
momentum.
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While on his visit to Paris early in October, 1985,
Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the readiness of the Soviet
Union to accept the idea of a number of states, neutral in
the first place, regarding mutual exchanges of annual plans
of notifiable military activities. This step made it possible
to start a business-like consideration of this important
measure which can become a serious safety fuse against a
military conflict in Europe.
On January 15, the Soviet Union made a proposal to
agree now on notification of major manoeuvres of land and
air forces and to postpone the issue of naval activities
untill the ne2tstage of the Conference. That proposal paved
the way to solving the basic problems of the Conference.
The socialist countries have introduced far-reaching
and specific proposals designed to achieve agreements in
such areas as non-use of force, invitation of observers,
and limitation of the scale of military manoeuvres. Vie, on
our part, are prepared to continue to follow this way in the
belief that other participating States will act likewise.
Mr. Chairman,
' If we analyze the status at the Conference we
could make a conclusion that today a lot hinges on the
problem of notification. Time has come finally to identify
seriously types of notifiable activities, address notification
of manoeuvres of land and air forces, movements (transfers)
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1+0
of forces, start negotiating specific parameters for them,
and work on information in the context of notification.
In order to give an impetus to such business-like
discussions and progress at the Conference we would like
today to make the following proposals.
First. To notify major manoeuvres of land forces
conducted independently or in combination with any possible
air, naval, amphibious and airborne components, if they
involve 18,000 troops and more. In so doing the number of
divisions engaged in the manoeuvres would be reported.
Second. To notify manoeuvres of air forces, whenever
during the entire period of the manoeuvres 700 and more
sorties are flown or more than 350 combat aircraft are
engaged in the manoeuvres.
This is the way - through making concrete proposals
and seeking solutions to unresolved problems - that should
guide, in our view, all those who sincerely wish to conclude
the first stage of the Stockholm Conference with positive
and substantive results.
Unfortunately, there have been, so far, no steps on
the part of the US and its closest allies to meet compromise
proposals advanced by other participants. They avoid solutions
to problems facing the Conference and prefer to stay
entrenched in their old, moss-covered positions. What is
more, they torpedoed any mutual understanding that seemed
to have taken shape more than once. And the US delegation
made a step backwards and refused to accept proposals which
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it had agreed to earlier and even made itself. This
frivolous playing at negotiations was played virtually in
all working groups.
In essence, this is nothing else but a creation of
artificial deadlocks at the Conference, a desire to
tighten still more the knot of differences rather than a
search for solutions to unresolved problems. It is this
approach that creates difficulties, slows down work, and
leads to foot dragging. As a result, a truly complex
situation has evolved at the Conference.
Mr. Chairman,
I believe that it is clear to everyone that there can
be no final agreement based on one scenario only and
proposed by one country.-only. We need a common platform
geared to a concrete result.
The Europeans mastered enough political realism and
wisdom to conclude the Madrid Meeting by a substantive
result. They were able to overcome difficulties and
differences for the sake of one fundamental thing the
preservation and further development of the Helsinki
process of security and cooperation which meets their vital
long-term interests.
Europe which possesses the necessary historical
experience can say its word that will carry weight in
Stockholm too, show an example of solving the problem of
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confidence and security building. By-mentioning Europe we
do not intend in any way to downplay the significance of
a possible contribution in this regard of the US and Canada
which signed the Helsinki Act.
Proceeding from such historical perspective, the Soviet
Union and the socialist countries stand for consistent
compliance with all provisions of the Final Act in order
to improve once again the climate in Europe, to establish
confidence as an integral component of relations among
states, and to build dependable security on the continent.
Based on the requirements of the pressing tasks of
European politics it is paramount to conclude the first
stage of the Stockholm Conference with positive results.
Possibilities exist for it and they are quite real, given
the mutual desire to achieve agreement. However, by all
appearances, this is what some of our Western counterparts
are lacking yet. Otherwise it is difficult to explain
skidding in the work of the Conference. But success or
failure in Stockholm constitute in the current situation
a touchstone of the readiness to seek in deeds rather than
in words the reduction of military danger on our continent,
to actually build conf idence.This is necessary both by
itself and for the next CSCE meeting in Vienna so as to
enable it to take a decision on the second phase of the
Conference devoted to disarmament in Europe. Accordingly,
a fresh impetus would be given to the development of the
Helsinki process in all its dimensions.
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Secret
Secret
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