MILITARY POWER AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R001400080008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 96
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 19, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

'may.
a
Army ,i.hrary
The Adjutant General's Office
3 ep~rtrq. tt ,o ..the Amy
,. ?
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~e19
This bibliographic examination of thought expressed in American and
foreign literature is presented in order to aid the professional soldier
in his many-sided tasks.
The problems facing the military today are of such magnitude and com-
plexity that-there is a need of recapitulating some of the fundamentals
of military power and national objectives.
The question is often raised as to the relationship`'between military
power and, national objectives and the overall military-and civilian
policy in a democracy. This collection of materials abstracted by
the research analysts of the Army Library endeavors to present the
literature that points up some of the elements and the factors which
affect these vital problems of national defense in the United States and
Europe. I
At this point it is fitting to state that this bibliography is not intended
as a syllabus to a course of study or a textbook on military science. The
main objective is to inform and arouse curiosity through a collection
of diversified literature.
Accordingly, some of the selected items are neither definitive nor en-
tirely authoritative, but were primarily included because certain parts
and chapters contain provocative ideas and constructive, relevant in-
formation.
The materials in this bibliography deal with three main areas which
are pertinent to the study of military power and national objectives,
and are arranged in three main chapters. However, similar themes
in many papers appear in one or more of these chapters because their
authors have stressed not one but several-aspects of military systems,
defense problems,* and national history.
For -the most part, the materials are limited to general studies deal-
ing with the United States, Great Britain, France, NATO, and the
U. S.S.R. The rise and fall of military systems in Asia, such as
those of Japan and Communist China, were not considered because of
limitations of time and personnel, although it is recognized that such
an examination would have added to the overall evaluation. Germany,
on the other hand,. was included for its historic value and for its 'de-
velopmental influence on military systems.
In general, only English language literature was included. However,
because of unavailability of English language materials on France,
some French `language literature has been added. '
ii;;~ 1111
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 This publication contains about 75.0 titles, selected from thousands ap-
pearing in periodical, book, and document literature, and are arranged
i subject
n_alphabetical order by title within mayor and subordinate sub~
groups.
Asmall number of materials has been included which is not in the hold-
ings of the Army Library. The following symbols were used, to precede
such titles in order to indicate their location:
lc Library of Congress
mh Office, Chief of Military History, Army
n Not available at time of listing
o Office of the originating agency
we National War College
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'B. Military y Doctrines And Operational Techniques . . . . .' . 14 1. Evolution....... .......?.?????.???? 14
2. Types Of Warfare ........ ........ . 18 3. Strategy ........................... 23
a. General Aspects . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 23
1 Historical Experience . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . 29
b. Germany - Historical Experience . . . .. . . . . . . 31
c. Great Britain .... . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . 34
. 37
d. NATO......... ..............
e. United States ...................... 42
f. U.S.S.R......................... 46
4. Tactics . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. 48
a. General Aspects ..? 48
b. Germany - Historical Examples . .. . ... .'. . 52 c. United States ................... ? ? . 53
d. U.S.S.R. 57
? 58
5. Logistics ..............
a. Miscellaneous Aspects ................. 58
United States . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 60
.63
C. Defense Establishments And,Military Organizations . . . . .
1. General Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . 63
. ?.
a~. Great Britain . . ..? . . . 64.
.
NATO .. 64
c United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
67
d. U.S.S.R. ......... ......... .
69
2. Evolution .......... .
a, General Aspects . . . . . .. . .. . 69
b France . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 70
,
c. Germany Historical Examples . . . . . .. . . . . . 70
d. Great Britain . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . 71
e United States . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 72
S.R. 73
f. U.S.S.R..........................
. S
3. Command And Staff . . . . .. . . . . . . 74
a. General Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ... 75
b. Germany - Historical , Examples . . . . 76
c? United States ? . . ? ? ? ? . .. . ? . . ? 77
U S.S.R. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
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CONTENTS
MILITARY POWER AND NATIONAL' OBJECTIVES
Page
I. MILITARY SYSTEMS: SOME ELEMENTS .. . ,.... . 1
A. Military Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ... ? ? . 1
1. France . . . . . . . .. . .. ... . . .... . . . . 1
2. Germany - Historical Examples . ?. . . ? . ? ? 1
3. Great Britain . . . . . '... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4
4. NATO ............. ....... ..... .
5
5. United States ... . . . . . . , . . . .
12
6. U.S.S.R...............................
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4. - Strength And Composition ..... ? ? ? ? ? ? ? '
a. General Aspects ...
c . . . . .
b. France ..:.............. .
Germany - Historical Examples ...
. .
..... .
d. Great Britain .......
e. NATO .. . .....................
I.. United States ... .. , . . ... . . ' . . . .
... .
U.S.S.R.....................
5. Missions ... .... . . .
a: United States . ? ? ' ? .
6. Manpower ... . ......... . .. .. ? . .
a. Miscellaneous Aspects ..... ? ? r . ? ? ? ? ? '
b. Procurement . ? _ ? . ? ? ? ? , ' ' ' ' ' '
c? Training And Education . . . . ? ? ? ? ? '
). Weapons And Weapons Systems: - Trends And Their Employment ... . ... . . . .. . . . ?
1. General Aspects . .. . .. . . .. .. . . . .
a. United States .. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. U.S.S.R........................
2. Conventional .... ... . . . . .. .. . . . . . .
3. Nuclear ....... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guided Missiles, Rockets, And Satellites . . . . . . ?
4. G
a. Miscellaneous Aspects . .. . . ... . . . . . ?
b. United States ?????????
c. U.S.S.R.......................
\ . .
~ATIONAL DEFENSE: SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
9. General Aspects . . .. ... . . . . . ..` . .
1. France .. . . ... . .. .. . . . . . .
2. Great -Britain . . . . . ,. . . . .. , .. . . . .
3...- United States . . .. ... . . .. . . . . ..? . . .
4 U.S.S.R................. .
B. Strategic . .. . .. . .... . . . .... . . . ... .
And Aspirations . . .. . . . .
1. National Policy
a. General"Aspects . ... . . . ? ? . ? , ? . ?
b. France . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .
c. Germany -.Historical Examples . . .. . . . . . .
d. Great Britain . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . ?. ? ?
e. NATO ......
f United States . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 Historical Examples . . . .. .. . . .
g. U.S.S.R.........................
2. Foreign Policy . . . . . ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ?
a. United States . . . . . . . ? ? , ?
b, U.S.S.R. . . . . .. ' . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
C. Political ' ... . . . . ?' ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ' ?
1. Geopolitics ? ? ? ? ..'
tic Politics
2. Domes ..
.. .. . . . . .. . . 150
'
As
ects
tar
l
M
il
Ci
.
p
y
i
i
-
v
3. a. United States, ... 151
154
b. Others ' ......... .
Economic. ..??????????""'???? 155
155
1. General Aspects .???????????'?,""'
2. Human Resources .?????.?"""????' 15?
160
3. National Resources . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
4, Mobilization Capability- . ............ 161 16~
a, United States ..... ~
~
b? Others ? ?? 16
16 ~
5. Science And Technology ...... ? ? ? ? ? ?
a. General Aspects ? . ? ? ........ .. 16
, 16E
b. United States ................ ? .
17(
c. U.,S. S, R. .... .... .
Sociological .......??????????? .
NATIONAL HISTOR IES ...... ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
A. General Aspects . .. . . . . . . . ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? '
B. Military Heritage . , . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ' ? ' ' ' ' '.
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ......... ? ? ? ? ?
2. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ?
3. U.S.S.R. ....... ....... ...... .
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AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, ANTIAIRCRAFT CRUISERS'OR''SUB=
MARINES. Porte-avions, croiseurs anti-aeriens ou sous-marins,, by
May 1955)
Camille Rougeron in Revue de Defense Nationale, v.11 (.r
614-622. In French.
This discussion of the effects of thermonuclear bombs on
surface ships concludes that the Navies' only chance of survival resides
in the employment of submarines for both military an&commercial
?
purposes.
ATOMIC WARFARE AND THE CAPTURE OF TERRAIN:'-La guerre
atomique et 1'occupation du terrain, by Gen. P: Gera`rdot, inRevue'de>
,
Defense Nationale v. 11 Apr 1955) 391-396., In French,'
Since in modern, warfare with atomic' and thermonuclear
weapons ground farces will no longer be able to win a decisive victory
and exploit victory through occupation, France must .depend primarily
,
on the Air Force for-national defense'and must concentrate her militaryi
.
and technical effort on that arm. f
+
THE AXIS GRAND STRATEGY, BLUEPRINTS; FOR, THE..TOTA~_L
WAR, compiled and edited by y Ladislas Farago.. New York,' 'Farrar
Rinehart 1942, 614
, P? t-
-
"This book attempts to give comprehensive answers by com
,
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.: UNITED,KIATGDOM'S? DEFENCE EFFORT, in An' Cosantoir, v. 16,
no.4 (Apr 1956) 163-170.
Shaping the British Army, Navy and Air Force to fit the re-
quirements of the nuclear age. -
WHAT SORT OF ARMY? by Lt. Col. L. H. Landon, in Journal of the
Royal Artillery, v.82, no. 3 (July 1955) 213-218.
To meet the needs of changed world conditions, Great Britain
requires a small, highly disciplined, highly, trained, fully equipped; war-
strength professional regular army, stationed partly in Germany and being
,partly available as air transportable formations within easy reach of West-
ern Europe. This Army must be ready for instant action, and must have
its reserves of equipment, ammunition, and men within immediate reach.
It must be ready to fight at any time with what it has with it, and without
relying on mobilization, reinforcement, or immediate supply., The air
transportable formations will constitute the strategic reserves in the hands
of the Supreme Commander in Western Europe. Great Britain also needs:
an air transport logistic corps - using helicopters and conventional air-
craft - to supply this Regular Army and be able to operate from dispersed
bases at considerable distance from the troops; a Civil Defense Army,
under military discipline, with military training as well as Civil Defense
training, in the United Kingdom; and a Colonial Service Army for periph-
eral wars - trained and equipped on conventional lines with conventional
weapons. This could be partially a National Service Army with regular
officers, partially an Army recruited in colonial territories, and the
Gurkha Brigade.
4. NATO
FOR ATOMIC DEFENSE; THE TACTICS, THE. WEAPONS AND THE
MEN, in Newsweek, v.45, no: 1 (3 Jan 1955) 27-31.
Recently the NATO Council had authorized `
the military com-
mand to plan on the assumption that it would use atomic weapons if the
Soviet Union would attack Western Europe. Evaluates the present capa-
bility of NATO Forces and US Armed Forces in Europe of striking at
.Soviet Forces, with atomic weapons. Types of atomic weapons available;
,
missions.in which they can be used; tactical considerations in their use;
manpower needed for these atomic weapons; and the strategic significance
of the fact that these atomic weapons are available for defense and are
ready on the firing line if the need for their use ever arises.
THE SHAPE OF WAR TO COME, by Marshal Arthur W. Tedder
in Air Pictorial, v.15,. no. 11 (Nov 1953) 322-324. '
The free world can prevent another war if it shows to the
would-be aggressor that real strength is available to deal with him. Such
?.-"9('?F R'M?=?:1 ,'... x...i. ~[a.. c.Y~v i^... . r..v u. ... .v a?.. .
real strength can be obtained only in a. strong bomber force and the West
must make the necessary provisions to obtain such a force. Passive de-
fensive measures cannot prevent aggression. If Russia cannot be deterred
from aggression and another war breaks out,' the bomber force will
be the
only weapon that can decisively hurt the Soviet Union. Russia is o erito
air attack but naval or land P
operations cannot defeat her. The West must
recognize the fact that large fleets, armies, and weaPj oris cannot be built'
and maintained indefinitely if the economy of the West is to remain un-
shattered. On the other hand, the war at sea, on land, .and in the air must
not be considered separately. The three must be united into one force it
does not mean that Britain should leave this element of military power to
the US alone. Britain must strive to obtain such a force of her own in
order to maintain her position as. a great power in world political military affairs.
and
5. United States
AIR POWER IS THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN WAR, by Adm. Arthur
Radford, in US Air Services, v.39, no. 11 (Nov 1954) 7-10.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discusses the part
played by air power in US national security. Air power may not win b
itself alone but n Y by
no major war can be won without it. It is important to
recognize the rapid increase in Soviet scientific, technological, and pro-
duction skills; their capabilities are shown by the rapidity with which they
developed their long-range jet bombers and atomic weapons. The US must
make ever effort to maintain a technological lead over the USSR.
AIRPOWER MAKES SEA MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER, by Adm.
Robert B. Carney, in U. S. Air Service, v.39, no. 12 (Dec 1954) 7-8.
The US Navy's Chief of Naval Operations states that technologi-
,
.cal developments in aircraft and submarines increase the importance of
sea power in the present world situation, and that the US must keep pace
with the expanding naval forces of the USSR. The shipbuilding' program
,
of the Soviets; excellent cruisers of the SVERDLOV class are being built,
and the USSR efforts in this category exceed all of the cruiser building in
the world. Russia is also building large and seaworthy destroyers
that
are the equal of those of the Western Powers. '
ARMIES ARE HERE TO STAY, by'James D. Atkinson, in Army,
v. 7, no. 6 (Jan. 1957) 49-52. '
Warns against the'dan ers. of exclusive reliance on nuclear
weapons which leads to formalism and freezes thinking about warfare
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"into.as' rigid a mould as the Maginot Line mentality." Shows that
nuclear weapons have not eliminated the need for armies: "Armies
today`-'and'in future - are not obsolete. Instead they are in"a period.
of flux. From this present period of change will emerge 'armies as dif-
ferent from their World War II prototypes as the World War II soldier
was different from George Washington's Continentals. But whatever the
form of the content, ARMIES will remain,"
ARMS AND POLICY, 1939-1944, by Hoffman Nickerson. New York,
Putnam's, 1945. 356 p.
Background, decisions, and lessons of World War II.
ARMS VIGILANCE FOR PEACE, by Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, in
Ordnance, v.39, no. 209 (Mar-Apr 1955) 716-719.
US military policy in the atomic age must attempt to foster a
healthy and expanding national economy while maintaining sufficient military
strength to win any war that must be forced upon us.
BRIEFING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE. Washington, 1955. 197-352.
(84th Congress, 1st Session. House Armed Services Committee. Paper
No. 3.)
Statements and testimonies by the Secretaries of Defense, Air
Force, Navy, and Army and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force before a briefing of. the House Armed
Services Committee. The briefing concerned the military aspects of the
international situation, the military policies and programs of the Depart-
ment of Defense, .and force levels 'which the US should maintain.
THE CASE FOR NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS r
bY Lt, Col Edward
P.. Wynne, in Air Force, v. 40, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 78 plus.
Study Of te great wars in the past shows that as new weapons
are developed and placed in the military arsenal, the older weapons are
not scrapped. As the types of nuclear weapons increase and our nuclear
combat potential expands, we must employ this analysis capability to
keep a proper balance between the old and the new.
THE COLDEST COLD WAR, in Newsweek, v.44, no. 20 (15 Nov 1954
54-56'.,
The US and USSR p
. Programs of military construction and research
in the Arctic. The Soviets know mere about the Arctic .regions than the West
does and are publicizing their "new offensive on ';.'~oaoi'~i?,:_,.~..d~..,...n~:~....,, ~e:.- .~.- '-
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 rwirLL
LL~' 3~d i~`?w
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MILITAR.Y?FORCES AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVES, by Maj. Charles
M.'?Eergusson,. Jr.' ,.in Militar Review, .v.35, no. 7 (Oct f955) 12=29,?
=_..;.'Examines some:o the capabilities of military force (among
them: offensive war capability, defense. capability, deterrent capability,
commitment. capability, -military aid, organizational capabilities, admin-
istrative? capability, guerrilla: capability, and civil war capability) and
some 'of its limitations; and suggests implications for military policy based
upon these capabilities and limitations, The US can afford to develop and
maintain the military forces, both conventional and otherwise, that reason-
ably?contribute to the attainment of national objectives.
MILITARY NECESSITY VERSUS ECONOMY, by Capt. R. E. W.
Harrison, :in American Society of Naval Engineers, Journal, v. 67, no. 1
(Feb 1955)=75- -
History is replete with the wreckage of nations which have made
the fatal=error of underestimating enemy potential. Therefore, it would be
wise to evaluate (1) what the Armed Forces can achieve with their available
resources, :(2) what the Armed Forces should have in order to achieve
certain objectives; and (3) 'what the Armed Forces can obtain if time and
cost elements are considered. With these blueprints the case should be
presented to Congress so that Congress can act in common with those who
foresee "the day," the need for speed when that day comes, and above all,
the need for maximum "elbow room" for change and rapid type expansion
in the Armed Forces and their logistical supporters,
THE.MILITARY POLICY OF THE,UNITED STATES,_by Maj. Gen.
Emory.Upton. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1917. 494 P.
Deals with the military policies of all American military cam-
paigns from the Revolutionary War through the Civil War,
THE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WARFARE, by Edward Teller, in
Air Force, v.40, no. 1 (Jan 1957) 43-47.
"Is it proper now, or in the future, to use atomic weapons in
war?" With a discussion of nuclear warfare in both defense and in offense.
A 'NAVY SECOND TO NONE, by George T. Davis,., New York,
Harcourt Brace, 1940. 508 p.
Development of modern American naval policy. ' With bibliography.
THE NEW DIMENSION, in Time, v. 63, no. 6 (8 Feb 1954) 18-25,
The decision of the,JCS to base US strategy on atomic weapons
. . ,
and long-range, .,strategic air'power;.and `thefAir; Ford& as' it: ernergesin` '
its new role. -USAF's functional=ability y to;strike=enemYFair bases and wart".
potential in all parts of the world; post-war development and 'apabilities"
of SAC; and SAC's heavy training requirements in all-weather flying, nav-
igation, gunnery, radar deception, and bombing on target, The Air Force
is still weak in fundamental doctrine and is lacking large numbers of of-
ficers educated in military schools. A serious problem is the short tenure
of enlisted personnel as compared to:the long. training required for A'ir
Force specialties. Illustrations of:AF'aircraft: ', ?
NEXT WAR: LONG OR SHORT AND HOW READY IS'h,S. ?
U. S. News and World Report, v. 37, , no, 22 (26 Nov 1954) 71-73.
E. Wilson, indicate that he agrees"with those military=strategists'wlio
`
tha
hold that the next war will be brief, that air:power "will-be paramount,
the use of soldiers will be limited, and that the" need for' elaborate"in-
questions are being
dustrial mobilization will be reduced
However
,
.
, raised in Congress as to whether Mr. Wilson's,policies provide'enough
defense for the nation and whether US can be sure of a'short war`. Reduc-
tion in the Army budget since, June 1953 .as:compared to the Navy: and Air
Force budget, some of Mr. Wilson's achievements since he; became`.,,
SecretarY of Defense, and the relationship. of mutual. trust.,.and close
. ..x
friendship between the President and Mr. Wilson which shows that, the:.
President knows what the Secretary is doing ` and is backing ,hirii:''`.
THE ROLE OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES, by Brig. Gen. Janes-
Ferguson, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, no. 2 (Summer 1954)
29-4.1.
Reviews the lessons learned about tactical air forces in.World
War II and Korea; and evaluates othe role, the employment, and the com-
position of tactical air forces 'in view of the '.'riew look' military ? olicY - and
P.
the increase in sizes -and types of nuclear weapons. - ,
SEA POWER IN THE NEXT WAR, by A. E. Sokol, in'U. S:>? Naval_,
Institute Proceedin s, v.78, no. 5 (May 1952) 519-531.
Definition, nature, and function of sea -power in-warfare;'role
of sea power in World War II in foiling Germany's strategy based mainly:-:
,
on land and air operations; Korean War as a lesson of sea power's con-
,timed importance in any tYPa of warfare; limitations of air power in-
general and in operations against a land power (such as the Soviet,Union)
in particular; ? the role of logistics in modern warfare; and the part to be.
played by the US naval forces in the next war.`.No`arm of service :can~
win a war individual) because all of them are mutually supplementary,:
however, our best hope of winning a war against a country (strong on
land and in the air like Russia, is in exploiting to'the'utmost our only'
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The military policies of the US Secretary of Defense;'; Charles .
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t'1
~~ ~ey~aea
e:J~f4w`~v:
2Ex
i
~I
~~`ali`~.93e
distinctive;advantage" over her: our sea power, If we make our navy
stronger by, providing; it with large aircraft carriers, and if we employ
our sea power properly, it will give us the ultimate success and victory.
..THE SECURITY OF THE NATION; A STUDY OF CURRENT PROB-
LEMS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. Washington, Association'of the United
States Army, 1957. 29 p.
Views on some of the more important national defense issues
of the moment, and the Army's mission and contributing role in maintain-
ing the security of the United States, Among the subjects discussed:
current strategic concepts; mobility; and the Army's requirement for
guided missiles. Appended: The Key West Agreement; Functions of the
Armed_Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff l October 1953); Memorandum
of Understanding Relating to Army Organic Aviation (4. November 1952);
and Memorandum, from Secretary of Defense: Clarification of Roles and
Mis.sons (26 November 1956).
THE SINGLE-WEAPON FALLACY, by James D. Atkinson, in Army,
v.6, no. '1l (June 1956) 23.27.
Historical examples to show that in the past, defeat has always
come to those who became obsessed with a single weapon or strategy.
Fortunately, General Eisenhower's view of warfare holds that the US can
and must afford a readiness for all the likely types of war. War is waged
in three elements, but there is no separate land, air, or naval war. Un-
less all assets are efficiently combined and coordinated against a properly
selected, common objective, their maximum potential power cannot be
realized "
"SQUEEZE 'EM AN' BLAST 'EM" by Lt. Col. George B. Pickett '
,
Jr., in Militar Review, v.35, no. 6 (Sept 1955)56-60.
With the tempo of change in the atomic age we must change our
thinking and consider tactics, technique, and strategy as a continuing "oper-
ational process" where process 1954 is not the same as process 1955 but is
constantly being reviewed, revised, and adapted to keep , Pace with changes
in weapons,. national culture, political concepts, production means, and the
many other variables that affect both the delivery and use of weapons on a
battlefield and the willingness of the public to permit the use of those wea-
pons...
STRATEGY ANYONE? b Lt. Col. Anthon
Y y?L: Wermuth, in Army,
v. 6,no. ?11 (June 1956).?28-29. --?,
The capabilities of aircraft tremendous' as they
? are at the
present time, cannot hope to do more than extend or complement the ca pa-
10
~M-q~~~ ? 4
bilities of armies, and can never supplant them. There seems little logic
in assigning a land-launched, unmanned weapon?to any other .force`thanthe -;
Army, no matter what the range of the weapon may-be. _ -
THE SYMINGTON SUBCOMMITTEE'.S AIRPOWER FINDINGS, in
Air Force, v, 40, no. 2 (Feb 1957) .41-45.
Findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the subcom-
mittee on U. S. airpower forces in being, airpower forces for the future
and for limited war, airpower preparedness and fiscal policy, and air- "
power preparedness and an informed public opinion.
J
.'4".,?Yx"?1'-__ tt-" {tr et.;"< a.:,t T
iiS`;~f.~:'~c'~?,sL":..,,42. -'t~.^~.Y.,1$i~??' ,ee
TACTICS FOR ATOMIC WAR, by Col. George C. Reinhardt, in
Ordnance, v. 38, no, 204 (May-June 1954) 936-938.
The appearance of atomic missiles as tactical weapons dic-
tates revision of the conduct of tactical operations. Hence' we must
develop new type military organizations to be employed and to defend
against nuclear weapons on the battlefield or we may be incapable of-j
exploiting the scientific advantages we have gained: Recommended.or-
ganizational changes: (1) increase the proportion of armored divisions
to infantry divisions as fast as budgetary provisions will permit; (2)
introduce changes in the infantry setup so that it approaches armored
organization; (3) abolish the regiment, making infantry battalions as,
independent as their artillery and engineer counterparts; (4) squeeze-
some armored personnel carriers out of the budget for these battalions;
and (5) unify the division's combat-logistics elements along the lines of ?
armor's train command.
THE THREE WARS THAT FACE US, by Comdr, Albert T.. Church,
in U: S. Naval Institute Proceedi s, v. 82, no. 2 (Feb 1956 145-151.
Outlines three military situations - three wars - for which the
US needs plans: (1) all-out nuclear'war; '(2) non-atomic global war; and
(3) peripheral war characterized by successive hot spots in the cold war.
The difficulty of.determining the forces that will provide a reasonable se-
curity for each of the three possibilities. - ?
TIME FOR DECISION, by Lt. Commander Allan P. Slaff, 'in .13. S.'
Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, no. 8 (Aug 1956) 809-813. '
Points out that the Navy must face up to the facts. that the guided
missile is a distinct and important competitor of piloted naval; aircraft and
that some important and far reaching decisions regarding the requirements
of naval operating forces of the future, must be .made,. 'These decisions. will
?
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not;rule;out the:piloted aircraft and the aircraft carrier as a naval weapon,
but they will force a shift in emphasis away from piloted aircraft and the
aircraft carrier to the guided missile and the guided missile battleship.
C S.,
U'. S?.' AIR POWER TODAY, in Air University Quarterly Review, v, 8,
no.4 (Fall 1956) 61-78.
A' digest of the testimony by USAF commanders before the
Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services,
which in the spring of 1956 undertook a review of American air power,
especially the capability of USAF to deter aggression. The, testimony
revealed current key USAF Professional opinion, on mission capability.,
Includes description of how Soviet gains swell USAF requirements.
A VITAL ELEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL STRENGTHrby Wilber M.
Brucker, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 4 (July 1956) 3-7.
The military threat of aggression - by land, sea; and air - we
face today is-an-inclusive one and our ability to cope with it depends upon
the combined strength of the defense team, not on any one part of it.
WE MUST PUT WINGS ON THE INFANTRY, by John C. H. Lee, Jr.,
in Saturday Evening Post, v. 224, no.46 (17 May 1952) 42-43 plus.
- The numerical superiority of the USSR and her satellites can
be overcome by the mobility of airborne troops. Activities'of the Joint
Airborne Troop Board in creating entire airborne armies as compared to
the former concept of special parachute units. Tactical .possibilities of
vertical envelopment; the, potentialities of airborne warfare demonstrated
in. Korea; effectiveness of,helicopters, and other improvements in aerial
supply. History of. the Joint Airborne Troop Board and its present pro-
gram of developing transport aircraft, lighter equipment, and mobility
in logistics.
MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN THE. ARCTIC, in Institute for the
Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 1,
no. 8 (Nov 1954) 26-28'. In English.
The Soviet leaders realize that the northwestern Arctic regions
of th'e USSRrpresent a vulnerable sector in the Russian defense system.
Describes the various political and military measures that are being taken
to strengthen this sector.
-..~,~ ~~ta'awlU~' .'~+7."d'./%gS~?S`a1s~,`"~w~,'r~a ~.~~~3"i5;..ja{. jyryJ.'~~4,
MILITARY RECORD, OF ATOMIC HAPPENINGS.?,:195.5THEME;
"NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PLENTY"; 5 - THE PRESENT
SITUATION.
Knightsbridge, England, Aviation Studies Limited, Special Weapons
Study Unit, 1955. 33 p,
US and Allied strategic capability in air, naval, and, ground
warfare, and Russian preparations. In part the conclusions state: "In
the pattern of Russian preparations the-build-up points to evolution of
general purpose balanced forces... The Russian Army is the dynamic -:
factor in an form of all-out struggle, and with over 100
Y divisions at the
ready in Poland, East Germany and White Russia, the numerical superi-
ority that could soon be brought to bear is sufficient to be decisive on all
pre-atomic military calculations. 'The Reds believe that classic military
doctrine of land campaigning is still as valid as it ever was..`.''
THE SOVIET TRIAL BY ARMS; JUNE TO DECEMBER 19.41, -by.'
Raymond L. Garthoff, in Military Review, v.33, no. 3 (June 1953)23-31.,
The major causes o Soviet military reverses in the, second-
half of 1941, and the reasons behind German victories during the. period.
Hitler's plan for OPERATION BARBAROSSA; comparative strength of op-
posing forces; equipment used by the Soviets; Soviet ground and air losses,
and German casualties; weather during the period; and the shortcomings
of the Soviet military doctrine. The major factor in the early Soviet, re-
verses was insufficient planning and training for defense. However,
German surprise, obsolescent Soviet equipment, and general unprepared-
ness were also responsible for their early defeat on the ground. and in the
air.
THE THREAT: RUSSIA'S BOMBERS by William Green,, in RAF .
Flying Review, v. 10, no.6 (Mar 1955) 17-21,
An analysis of Russia's latest bombers and their operational;
potential across the North Pole. Because the Soviets have established
refuelling stops on the islands of Severnaya Zemlya and Frans Joseph
Land, as well as bases_on the Taimyr peninsula and the New Siberian
Islands, the new bombers of the Soviet Strategic Air Force (Aviatsiia .
Dal'nego Deistviia) can attack targets in North America despite the great
distance involved. The possibility of using drifting ice floes as refuelling,,
points has also been investigated by the Russians and.in-flight refuelling
techniques were perfected several years ago. Flying over the Arctic
wastes at 50, 000 feet and at high sub-sonic speeds the chances of a pro-
portion of the bombers reaching their targets in U are high. The question
is no longer, "when will the Russians develop modern strategic bombers?"
but "when will they possess them in sufficient numbers to constitute a
serious threat." The conception of Russia as a land, possessing"air forces
,
solely for the purpose of tactical support will soon be outdated."' Includes
description of the capabilities and characteristics of`Soviet Bombers`T' 'e
YP
39 BADGER, Type 3.7 BISON, Type 31, and Type 35,BOSUN,('desi nated .
(, g
so by NATO force's for identification purposes). ' V .
13'
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B:-Military Doctrines And Operational Techniques
r (-
1.a.. Evolution..
` THEART OF MODERN WARFARE, by Herman Foertsch. New
York, ?OskarJPiest, 1940. 273 p. (With an introduction by Maj. George
Fielding Eliot.)
'"Its (book's) greatest interest lies in its clear demonstration
of the evolution of modern German military thought from the..formalism
of the nineteenth century, which still to some extent constrained the
German officer corps during the World War (I). While steadily based on
the timeles`s:principles of-war, the book sweeps away any idea of set
rules in the. application thereof to the variant exigencies of battle. It
lays the greatest emphasis on the need for individual initiative on the
part even of the private: soldier, but more especially of the subordinate
`.
leader: 1t
ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES, by Lt. Col. F. 0. Miksche.
London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1955. 222 p.
Evolution of tactics and techniques during the two World Wars;
the importance of fire and movement; analytical review of the German
"Blitzkrieg" and of the Allied counter-blitz in World War II; and how tac-
tics and organization will be affected if tactical A-weapons are used in any
future war. The general pattern of the forces required by the West is al-
most the opposite of the "New Look" strategy, because as long as Russia
has the H-bomb 'and maintains large armies, we must stick to atomic wea-
pons and maintain an'army which is able to fight conventional as well as
atomic-typewars, as 'circumstances may dictate. " "
CHANGES IN MILITARY DOCTRINE, by Fred B. Waters. Fort
Belvoir; Va. Engineer School, 1949. 25 p. -
'A brief' review of the change that new weapons and concepts of
war have 'effected 'on-fundamental military doctrine.
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE, by Col. Robert C. Cassibry, in
Military 'Review, 'v. 36,, no. 2 (May \1956) 22=34.
The Command and General Staff College is specifically charged
,. ~
'o ment and revision of the tactical and logistical. doctrine for
with the"develP
14
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all of the combined arms and services, ' including tactical emPtoYmen't of ,
,.
atomic and future weapons., With chart 'show'ing the'' organization'for devel-
t
opmen
THE HERITAGE OF DOUHET bY'Bernard Brodie, in Air University
Quarter/ Review, v:6r no.2 (Summer 1953)64=69 plu.,y.
The influence exerted on air forces generally by. the Italian air
strategist, and evaluation of his doctrine in the light of World War II. ? .
Fundamentals of his basic theory. of" command:of-the.air";;soundness of. .
some of his ideas; and instances from World War U which proved him
wrong. The atomic bomb now gives his theories much support, and it is
remarkable that he could create a framework of strategic 'thought that fits
the atomic age.
A HISTORY OF MILITARY AF_FAIRS.IWWES.TERN SOCIETY, SIIVCE .
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY _ ed, by,Gordon B... Turner.. ' NewYork,
Harcourt, Brace and Co. , 1953: 776 p,
of the-problems which~a'
an understanding p
A study to provide
democratic society faces in preparing for and in waging total war. The
principal developments in the art of war from the cabinet wars of the
eighteenth century to the total war of the present; and the relationship be-
tween the nature of a military establishment and the political, ; social, and
economic character of the society of. which it'is` apart. Types of warfare,
and the evolution of strategy, tactics, weapons, and logistics ;area,also
=~
_ ...,,..
considered, however, not in the purely military nature but in their broad-
est aspect. Emphasis is placed upon: the political and administrative
problems incidental to raising and maintaining a'larg&military!establisli
ment in a democratic society; Proper employment of manpower in modern
war; and the role of the military in the formulation of foreign policy in
peace and war, among others. Some of the subjects examined are: the
eighteenth century military system in Europe and America; the French
Revolution; the American Civil War; Civil-Military relations during
World War I; coalition and global warfare during'World;War IL'and joint
, .
operations and politico-military relations; various lessons learned from
World War II, US contemporary Problems of military. defense, and ;civil
,.
and military elements o national security,,(including: national security;..
.
and military policy, the political objectives of, war;.. democratic; control; of
military Power; strategic implications of the North Atlantic Pact;' the. role
.
of the military in formulating the Japanese.Peace Treaty; the role of -Sea
Power in global warfare of the future; and the influence of Air-Power, upon
history). Maps. - ' ' ? ;
`
A HUNDRED YEARS OF WAR, by Cyril Falls.,; 'London;-,Duck, worth,
9 - r-,_.. r ~;.~?,...
1953
41
Record of military events from, the, time. of the Crimean War.,
with comments on practically every war;-. great,and small,.-;iathe.past.
hundred years.
,
? 15-
i
 i~.Y~4G'+3 Y1.
'
"1VIE1V IN ARMS, by Richard A. Preston and others. New York,
rae er 1956. 376 p.
General survey of the history of warfare, partieularly'the
interrelation of military techniques and social organization.
- ~,
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,? LANDINGOPERATIONS, by Alfred Vagts. Harrisburg, Pa.,
Military Service Publishing Company, 1946. 831 p.
om antiquity to
fr
olitics
t
MILITARY OPERATIONS by Lt. Gen. C. D. Eddleinan, in Arm'
Information Digest, v. 12, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 16-23.
New developments in firepower, mobility, and~communications step up the potential of military operations. The Deputy Chief of Staff for
,.
ilitar Operations, takes a look at the changes that are taking place in
M Y p-
US ArmY's'firepower, mobility, communications, tactical concepts, and organization to prepare it to the needs of future warfare.
THE NEW FACE OF WAR, by Hansen W. Baldwin, in Bulletin of the
Atomic,Scientists, v, 12, no.5 (May 1956) 153-158.
ng
n naval taccs;
meaning. New ways of usi ng ground forces; modifications i ti
the
h
anges in
progress in air tactics; and the strategy of US amidst the c
,.
art of war,
? PROPI~ET .OF AIR POWER, by Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby,
0, no. 2331 (4 May 1956) 342-343.
Aeroplane, v.9
in
-? Air power has exactly fulfilled the doctrine of Gen. Douhet
written 35'years ago. 'Highlights of his doctrine and its-effect on the
development of air power in US and other countries. -
.
REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE
EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOUR, by Brig. Gen. Beaufre, in Royal Armoured
Corps Journal, v. 8, no. 4 (Oct 1954) 173-177.
e.combination of heavy tanks, light tanks, and antiatomic
mechanized infantry designed for all phases o combat a`s the three main
trends in the 'evolution of French ideas in the field of armor,
ics, p ,
Strategy, psychology, tac
es in the art of war during the past 25 years and their
Cha
THE REVOLUTION IN WARFARE, by Liddell Hart. New'Haven,
Yale UniversitY , Press,- 1947, 125'p. -" The future is moulded by
-the past. The best promise for
the future lies in understand'
ing, and applying, the lessons of the past: For
that reason, in discussing the problems created by the; cuir'rent war; "more '
. ,
light may come from tracing the whole course of the revolution of warfare
than by dealing merely with the appearances of the moment. If we realize
how the conditions of this war have come, about, there may be some pros-
pect of averting a more deadly recurrence
A STUDY OF WAR, by Quincy Wright. Chicago, Uriiver5ity'of
Chicago Press, -1942. Vol. I, p. 1-678 Vol. II, p. 679-1552.
Volume I traces the history of warfare from hostilities among
animals, through primitive and historic civilizations, to modern 'times.
Volume II analyzes the causes of war and discusses the practical problem
of preventing war. .
TRADITION VERSUS PROGRESS, by Field Marshal Montgomery,
in Air Force, v.38, no, 11 (Nov 1955) 31-34 plus,
Because air power is the dominant factor in modern war, pro-
gress must give way to tradition in building-up an organization of the fight-
ing forces for maximum strength within limits of economic possibilities.
Air power must be released from its bondages and forged into one-mighty
weapon, and the air forces of the western alliance should be organized and
controlled as one single mighty weapon. Present organization of tactical
air forces and logistics should be recast completely; and. the services
should be brought more closely together even to the extent of combining
them into one service.
THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD SEA POWER, ed. by E. B.
Potter. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. , Prentice-Hall, 1955. 963 p.
A history of US and international sea power, developing six
main themes: (1) the influence of sea power upon history; (2) the ration-
ale of strategic decision, (3) the characteristics of successful leadership,
(4) the development of naval weapons, (5) the evolution of naval tactics,
and(6) the evolution of amphibious doctrine, Emphasis is. placed on the
,
problems posed in each period of history by new weapons and new condi-
tions, and on the solutions worked out for each by the navies of the world:
Among the chapters: the origins of Western sea power; the Seven Years'
War; the American Revolution; the Trafalgar Campaign 1805; the Ameri-
can Civil War; naval developments of the late 19th Century; the rise of
sea power in the Far East; the naval battles of World War I; doctrinal
evolution between World Wars; US and Allied naval battles and campaigns
of World War II; defeat of Germany and the dissolution of, the Japanese
Empire; -naval operations in the Korean War; and the political and mili-
17'
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Airborne; operations of Germans and Allies during World War
II; illustrating that airborne troops almost invariably captured their
ob-jective,and 'that'all the operations, no matter how well planned or care-
fully executed,a took a large toll of airborne troops. Due tq the-high cost
of maintaining such troops, only nations with great industries and huge
reserves of manpower can use them. The troops will be employed for
:- specialmissions, which are enumerated. Varied opinions by military
experts on. the value, future, and limitations of airborne troops are quoted,
THE INDECISIVENESS OF. MODERN WAR AND OTHER ESSAYS, by
J. Holland Rose; 'London, G. Bell and Sons 1927 20 - "
., 4 p,
The first two essays contrast the prolonged deadlock in the
North. Sea and on the Western Front in 1914-18 with wi what was -achieved by
the'weak, slow fleets and small professional armies of earlier times The
other essays 'deal with subjects bearing on national safety and expansion,
the balance'of power in the 'Mediterranean the ultimate dependence of
India on'sea power, `certain aspects of the careers of Na oleon and Nelson
the'well-being of~th P '
ng e?fleet in 1805, British acquisition of Malta, and finally,
the comparatively recent growth of the spirit of comradshiP at sea,
MACHINE WARFARE, by J. F. C. Fuller,
ss Washington, Infantry
Journal Pre, 1943
:. 257 p,
MISSIONS SAND ORGANIZATION
OF SUBMARINE FORCES. Missions
et organisation des forces sous-marines b Capt
by . A. Traonmilin, in
Revue Maritime, no, 110 (June 1955) 720-736, In French.
Combat missions of submarines du
.. ring the two World Wars;
various reconnaissance missions for which submarines can be used;
special missions such as the landi' of agents, commandos, and supplies;
and the ideal theoretical submarine command
- organization, Submarine
warfare can inflict heavy losses upon enemy shipping at the beginning of
hostilities. However, the submarine is still unable to: achieve system-
atic destruction of naval forces transport troops, and conquer bases and
territories. Therefore', submarine warfare must be integrated into the
general conduct of operations together with surface and air forces. These
conclusions will be subject to revision as soon as the
atomic erier fives su employment of
gy g? submarines: speed and s cruising range comparable
to those of urface ships, adequate weapons against all types of enem
forces, and a substantial trans ort y
p anon capacity, ?
PARA-_MILITARY WARFARE: THE
KING ?b Wi NATION'S SECURITY PLAN-
, y, , lliam R. Kintner, in Marine CorP s
tte, -. , Gazev35no, 3
(Mar 1951 46-48,
20
Lenin, the master strategist of the
Communist movement
,
has described has de c evolutionary type of , ,.
oriie?so?sk? warfare
the pled, as a m'elan at which Comm faist '
Sovieis=treat' ara- ge of war and olit'-
to consider p military warfare e s, The'factuh
"it in'our own as 'a prime:weapa' on``
s'
view strategy ,` From , a pure/ P e:point f ? .
, the military sh ? ~ould Instruct ` offices and , ;.Y men in defensive :point `of
instruments used ;
b "~~"~
1 y the' Soviets in t the e re. ? a
ogical' and guerrilla heir Para-militar '? q nd
warfare metho Y:warfare'psy sor
War II. should ~be - ds employed befog - y " ? '
Studied , since u e,arid,during ' Wor'1
military groups an J figment in theri h ' '?'.,, d ,
( and in the reciprocal g t uses `of it
of? conventional mil' con se uences regular
nary forces can q of the emplo ent
q ) only be ac ui ~
? The basic foundati q red, from lon ac=uaintance5hip warfare must be la foundations warfare must be for the g
id now, by men wh of of Para-b lis
involved, o are familiar Y
with the problems
PERIPHERAL? WARS b
Review by Brig, Gen, Pi 1'.M. Robin
ett, in Militar
v.35,. no,12 (Mar 1956 44-
47,
The politico-military histories of the Roman E
Germany, Soviet Union, Ja an m ire;?~Nazi~
p , and Great Brita' ~?
accompanied by little war in show that. containment
territory ~
s on the periphery'of enemy held ; is only a tactic and- Y d or dominated'?
tion not a form of warfare,
which cannot win a decision " It is a delaying:ac-
PRIZE ESSAY, 1957, A PHI
FARE' LOSOPHY FOR NAVAL ATOM
by Comdr. Malcolm W. Cale IC WAR:-
Proceedin s g in United States Naval. Institute
g , v.83
no
3 (Ma
1
57
,
.
r
9
249-28.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Washin ton , by Paul M. A. Linebar, er
g, Combat Forces Press 1954 g 2d ed.
Bas ~ 318 p, .
ed on the experiences of the-author who worked-fqr five
cal expert and as Army officer in'Amer.'
warfare facilities - at every level scan psycChiefs-'
of Staff lan ' from the Joint and, Combined ?
P rang phase down to the Chiefs
and histor of s ch preparation of spot leaflets. Definition
y P Y ological warfar?e,.pro a anda an'
organization for s cholo P g alysis 'and intelli-erica-
P y. gical warfare; plans and la g '
civilians; operations a ainst tr p ~~'~ operations_for
after g oops; and psychological warfar
World War,II. Appended: milit e. operations
Illustrations of th military psywar'operations l950-53'? _
e various types of propaganda.. With
THE SEA HERITAGE; A STUDY OF W
Frederic MARITIME WARFARE : b Ad
C. Dreyer, London, Museum Press y m'
The , 1955. 472 ,. ,.
first thirty-two chapters of this book cover'the author's
21
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career.;and,.e eriences-in the British Navy from
1891 through 'W,orld,War
IL.. Then'foUows
Addend
um Ch
t
I
,
ap
er
,. in which the author, starting with
a br' "~ `.`... ?
ief review of the 'ith ortan " p t events.and developments in naval warfare
up;.to the `eiid `of -
World'War I refl
t
h
ec
s on t
e various aspects of,-naval
during World War II - especially in the Pacific
ject's discussed.- - Among-the sub-
., the Battle of Jutland, 1916; rebuilding of British
' - and US
Naviesr.1933 =?1945 ? th
s :- the Merchant Navy in World War II; Pearl Harbor
some of th`e highlights of na ,and
.; f ,, ...., val operations in the Pacific. Photos and maps.
THE ?U. S. MARINES AND AMPHIBIOUS
ITS-PRAC WAR: ITS THEORY, AND
TICE IN THE PACIFIC, b Jeter A. Isel an
Princeton `Princeton and A. University Press, 1951. 636
:~ '. A study of the. Marine Corps' development of the doctrine of
P fighting in the period between the two Worl
applications of-the ' doc d Wars; and of the
trine in the Pacific. The events of the a
attacks ,are' . described,in detaH mphibious
th ~ - , but the emphasis is alwa s focussed
e, theory, of practice. The evolution y
ac
duri ?the of an amphibious doctrine is traced
ng . period.1901-1934, followed b a description
training methods during 1934-1942, and finally, the actual o
traced, beginning with Guadalcana perations are
1 and ending with Okinawa. Close
amination of earlier amphibious landi ex-
comings were not in doctrine, landings indicates that the chief short-
ne, but rather in the means for utti
existing doctrine into effect. Si P ng the
conce t. Significant changes made in the on in
p stemmed solely from technolo is g al
of new am' hibiou g a1 innovations--the introduction
A: s equipment such as the piques~included,the amphibian tractor. Better tech-
improvement in coordination of su orti
evolution of close air support, a pp ~ arms, the
ort, and the perfection of naval
p. After World War II, the Mari gun-fire sup-
with novel' devic Marine Corps began again to ex eri
es and ideas to improve old tech ' P nvent
mques?
? ? WAR -LIMITED ORUNLIMITED? by Air Marshal R
ower, v, 2, no. 2 (Jan 1955 100- obert Saundby,
102.
Historical examples show th
limited objective ha at wars fought in the ast f
J ve often been successful P or a
:limited objective have. se ,
if .wars having
seldom if ever succeeded in g an un-
a'world'situation more favorab the sense of creatin
the have le, than if, there had not b g
y always caused wide-spread een a war, T
and
h
fore, if we should destruction and loss of lif '
become involved in a e. There-
jective were the tom lete d war against Russia, and our
ob-
pestruction of Russian Po con
ditional surrender - we sh wer - possibl
because ould fail even if we Y unon -
such a, victory would be gained the eventual victo
worthless if in the tours rl
we brought about the destr a of the stru
Wester uction of almost ever gge
n standards of living based, r
22
WHO SAID IMPOSSIBLE? ..by-'Col; .Geor e
C
G
R
.
azette, .: v: 3 9, no. 1: g ?
einhardt , inMarin
(Jan 1955)10=16e -
mphibious
"'
`~ ?'
~
o
?
?
perations and
f
t
?
.
u
compatible as
ure atomic warfare "
' '
ar no
` in
military writers have
b
;su
combining the two
of ggested;-it'inay,be`
that b
types w
b
f
.
y
ar
are the US-will d
Basic
discover the, key to?victorY
considerations of an amphibious
.
operation which
atomic .
wea
pons of all types and at'th could employ, ., ,;
"
and
,
, e same time, :be?threatene ' - ' ~ .
Although tactics-and 1
ogistics for
th
such an operation those would differ'from'-" '
P ce
the'
,
mobility and flexibH
movement
and landing will not b
it3.- of amphibious,
,
e
radically changed. - .
3. Strate
a. General Aspects
THE ABC OF WAR b
M
y
aj. Gen. H.
Journal v W. Blakele
.3, no. 11 (June 1953)36- . Y, in Combat-Forces
41
.
Modern definition of the " ~~ ..
ci le principles of wa
p of the objective, the r, namely: the rin-
prin
r principle of simplicity, unit of c ,the
p inciple of the offensi Y ommand
ve, the principle of maneuver, the princi le of ma
the to the principle of economy principle of force, surprise, and
portance of y historical examples to e
these principles, emphasize the im-
THE ART OF WAR b A ' .. .' "
268 , Y Arthur Birnie. London, T. Nelson
P , 1942.
":..Amid all the
the changes in the material
soldier, des ite means em to ed" b, continual improvements in p Y Y
numbers, and transport, 'certain weapons, organization,
stand permanent princi les
out as applicable in ever ~~ P of the military art
the application of every circumstance.. , Specific cases s
bowing
these principles throughout the hi
tor
s
y
A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MI
Victor LITARY STRATEGY AND TA
C. Muller. Rondebosch Uni CTI by;
versity
f
'
o
; Cape Town, l951.
- -
47 ' International,
E lish-lap . p;
~ guage,biblio ra h?-of, book`''
strategy and. tactics, held g . P? Y son
S by the Central Librar
U
S
n
y
.. A. Military College Library, State, Libras tc' )
Johannesburg Public Y, Pre~ria;and,tlie":,..,
g Library. Achro
l
no
ogically Part I c th ithree
oversen. arts:
period prior to World :War I; Pa P'., -~
the two World Wars; a rt II, the period - ~.
and Pa
t I'
"
r
ld
II, Wor War II an
d after 4
. ,; ... .
23
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o CERTAIN ASPECTS OF BATTLE THEORY, by G. Gamow. Chevy
Chase 'Md, Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office,
1953...(ORO-T-23Q,) .
'Classical Lanchester. equations, which were written originally
to cover, the conflict between two stationary forces, are extended to- cover
the case of moving units and changing conditions of battle. This opens the
possibility of ?evaluating'the effectiveness of equipment and various tactics
by "fighting" model battles on automatic analog computets with conditions
and combinations varied through the feasible range; Hundreds of such
model battles Can be fought within a few hours,
CLAUSEWITZ AND DEMOCRACY'S MODERN WARS, by Lt, Col.
Edward M. Collins, in Military Affairs, v, 19, no. l (Spring 1955) 15-20,
Application o ausewitz concepts of war to modern wars of
democratic nations, with particular emphasis on the thesis that all wars
are fought for political reasons and that the military point of view must be
subordinated to the political. The records of World Wars I and II and the
Korean War indicate: that political aims have been sublimated to emo-
tional and military objectives; that democracies tend to make war in the
form described by Clausewitz as "struggles of life and death from pure
hatred"; and that recent wars even if militarily successful, produce un-
satisfactory political results. The need for military and political
leaders
to recognize the problem and to discover and apply measures to solve
Y it.
THE CONDUCT OF WAR: A BRIEF STUDY
PORTANT PRI OF ITS MOST IM-
NCIPLES AND FORMS, by Colmar, b
Kansas City, Mo., Hudson-Kimberly, 1896. 217 p. Tra anslated
German by 'Joseph T (T from
Y .Dickman. )
DECISIVE BATTLE: CONTINUOUS F
Bataille decisi ~ ? RONTS AND INTERVAL
ve: fronts continus et interval S'
Revue Militaire d' les, by Col. Ailleret i
Information, no. 236 10-25 July 1954) ) 28, In
Study of the pros and con
continuous fr s of defense by continuo
co -
onts, especially in atomic warfare that and
tinuous,fronts are no better suite , concluding that dison-
fr d to this type of'warfa
onts. The main problem is for, stra re than continuous
atomic wea on tegists to decide whe
pons permit the creation of Conte ' they or not
very. different-.forms fr nuous fronts, roba
from those of World War p bly in
problem 'will then rovide th I? The solution oft
p the answer .as to whet his
nation should be adapted to her'the defense of
a continuous defenses a
decisive battle, -
system or t a
, n initial
24
- -
I Declassified in
DEFENSE OF THE FREE WORLD, by Capt; B. H. Liddell Hart,
;
in Marine Corps Gazette, v.39, no. 9.(Sept' 1955) 36-41,
For the continued provision of the "great.deter.rent," a rela-
tively small number of super-performance `aircraft 'should suffice to en-.
sure the possibility of delivering enough H-bombs to destroy the vital`
,
centers of, any country. Thus a' great strategic bombing force of the; or-.
denary kind becomes obsolete and superfluous;, Strategis
.g
forces of high mobility and highly trained skill are needed, They .'should .
be airborne, so that they can be quickly switched anywhere an outbreak
occurs. They should be given ample tactical air support"of a suitable"
kind and means of air supply wherever it can be advantageous: They ,..
should be organized in small composite`combat teams, of 'a hand and.,
very flea~ible kind, so that they can grapple with 'guerrillas or strike ,
against larger invading bodies. Light armored fighting vehicles of high
cross-country maneuverability would be' a valuable form of equipment but not cumbrous 50-ton tanks. The helicopter should be developed to'
the fullest possible extent for such forces. With such a pattern the pros-
pects of quenching the new communist strategy of "small aggressions"
could be greatly increased.
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF WAR, by Gen. John E. ? Hull, in Army
Information Digest, v. 9, no.3 (Mar 1954) 3-7.
Basic considerations in planning and executing military strategy
and operations: (1) formulating and adhering to a sound strategic concept;
(2) understanding the objective; (3) anticipating the demands of the future;
(4) authority underlying command; (5) perfecting the organization for war;
(6) keeping continually informed; (7) considering the human element; and
(8) comprehending the means. Comments on each of these fundamentals.
LAND POWER AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER:by Hanson
W Baldwin in Arm Combat Forces Journal, v.6, no. 6 Jan 1956 ' 16-21.
The limitations o atomic weapons; the roles of land power in
limited war, in larger conflicts, and in atomic war; and the necessity for
,
our military planners to organize and maintain armed forces capable of
fighting any kind of war anywhere. No matter what his instruments and
weaPons it is. man, "with his feet in the mud, sweating, and,bleeding, "
who fights land wars with the objective of dispossessing other men from{
a particular area of earth, to control 'and dominate the battlefield - the
land itself.
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY; MILITARY THOUGHT FROM
ELLI TO HITLER by ' Edward M. Earle. Princeton;`Princeton '
MACHIAV i
,
University Press, 1943. 553 p. '
".. ,It is the purpose of this book... to explain the manner in'
which the strategy of modern war ha's developed, 'in the conviction that a'
knowledge of the best military thought will enable-Anglo-Saxon, readers to
comprehend the causes of war and the fundamental principles which"govern
the conduct of war.
25
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 ' I
j,
~P
s;
b
MILITARY DECISION AND
in?0 eraLL GAME THEORY, by 0. G. Maywood, J
bons Research Society of America r''
36 - 85, , Journal, v. 2, no.4 (Nov 1954
The' US military doctrine of decision
prescribes that a c (Estimate-of the Situation
commander select the c )
greatest promise of nurse of, action which offers the
success in view of the enemy's cabilities
him. This article analyzes of opposing
the Pa two battle decisions of World War
cific, the other in the European Theater), and develops an analo
ng military doctrine and the 'theory - gy
von Neumann- Current us doctrine is conservative, T Y
game theory permit analYsi he techniques of
via s of the risk involved if the com
tes from current doctrine-to base mander de-
his enem int his decision on his estimate of
y ends to do rather than on what
The idea of 'mixe , what his enemy is capable dng.
d strategies presents more difficulties but oie-
fu1, particular/ for command may use- decisions for sma Y
11 military organizations,
NAPOLEON AND MODERN WAR; HIS MILITARY MA
and annotated b MAXIMS, revised
by Conrad H. Lanza. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service, 158 P, t _
Comments on the 115 maxims used frequently b
by Napoleon,
THE NATURE OF MODERN WARFA
Oxford U ' RE, by Cyril Falls. New York
mversity Press, 1941. 101 p.
Contents: The Doctrine of Total War
Tactics of Defense ,The Mechanized Attack,
Notes on Mountain War, and Immutable
While author's aim is to thr Realities.
ow light upon modern land warfare th
aircraft in cooperation with round for , e role of
a consider g forces is also discussed, and .there i
ation of, the influence of sea power upon s
armies in the field.
ON FUTURE WARFAREb y Col
'1928 Y ? J. F. C. Fuller. London- Sif
Praed
,, 390 p. ton
Applies lesson f W
s
o orld War I to future warfare.
ON MARITIME STRATEGY by ' "
Naval In , Capt. J. C. Wylie, Jr, in U
stitute Proceedi s, v, 79, no. 5 '
(May 1953) 467-47'x. '- ~
"
maritime strategy is one in which the 'world s maritime
communications systems are exploited as the me
strength nia be applied main avenues by which
may to establish control over one'
strategy is a less inclusive term. A s enemies; naval
historical ?theory of maritime strategy;
example of its use by the British against om
the technological factor Napoleon; some of
s which complicate the use of this concept-at
26
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present; and our contemporary use of military power with respect ,to
maritime strategy. In the struggle between East and West, we are
placing our faith in a concept of strategy that is basically maritime,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR A CHART OF THE FUTURE, by Maj.
Lamar McFadden Prosser, in Armor, v, 63, no. 5 (Sept-Oct 1954) 16-19.
In order to remain ahead in the art and science of war, we
must take into account the probable effect of atomic weapons and integrate
our basic ideas with our proved methods, add certain assumptions, and
then develop new equipment, techniques, and tactics accordingly. The
precepts on which any exploring into the future must be based are: (1)
successful operations by large scale ground forces are not now possible
unless something approaching parity in the air is assured; (2) technical.
developments and weapons of unusual destructiveness have increasingly
forced ground troops to deploy, separate, and disperse; this dispersion
can no longer be considered a passive defensive measure but is now a
fundamental condition; (3) the capability of rapid movement must be built '
into every arm of the ground forces to make it possible to fight and move
in a dispersed manner or to concentrate; (4) each unit of the ground force
must be so designed as to permit the maximum flexibility in its employ-
ment; (5) commanders must be prepared to operate without definite de-
tailed orders but in conformance with a general overall plan; and (6)
dispersion, mobility, and flexibility must also apply to administrative
and logistical organizations. ,
7 r . L
PRINCIPLES OF SEA POWER, by Adm. Robert B. Carney, in U. S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, v.,81, no. 9 (Sept 1955) 967-985.
The former Chief of Naval Operations examines the pattern of
sea power and the place of sea power in national policy and strategy and
concludes that:. ".. until the seas dry up, man will be confronted with
problems' of achieving?his own crossing and denying the crossing of his.
enemy,' for nowhere in the future can be discerned any total substitute for .
~~
the great highways of the' seas.
importance of sound principles underlying the use ?of weapons. How Mahan 's doctrine can be appliedto-present US strategy,. ,.
PERIPHERAL STRATEGY -'MAHAN'S DOCTRINE TODAY, .by Capt.
John D. Hayes, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 79; no. l1 (Nov
1953 1185-1193. ,
The strategy of Alfred Thayer Mahan is still sound and appli-
cable today although new weapons and concepts must also be considered in 'strategic thinking. "Peripheral" should be substituted in the doctrine for
?maritimen or nsea power" because it is. more inclusive and more de-
scriptive scriPtive of the present world situation. The emphasis that has been placed on weapons in the post-World War II period tends toobscure the
,
438345 0-57-3
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THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR, by Marshal Ferdinand Foch. New York,
Holt, 1920. 351 p, (Translated from French by Hilaire Belloc,=
n Y )
.... Defines the principles of war; explains from what neces-
sities they arise, to what results they lead; how, being unchangeable, they
can be applied in practice, with the arms of today, to modern war, the new
features of which have so profound an effect,"
? RE-EXAMINE THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR b Ma'
by ~. James A. Huston,
in Military Review, v. 35, no. 2 (Feb 1956) 30-36.
It ough the principles of war are still sound, it is doubtful
whether they should be presented as unexceptionable principles, unalterable
marims,. and established axioms. Exceptions, modifications or- improve-.
nents ma Y .be found for every one of them. No idea should be too fantastic
or:too.unorthodox to be rejected without a fair hearing. Any milita
struction which cur military ro-
bs the development of bold imagination should be modi-
fied. That includes presentations of the principles of war.
.
THE REMAKING OF MODERN ARMIES by Liddell J. Murray, 1927. Y ll Hart. London,
y, 27. 315 p.
"The keynote of this book is MOBILITY - of m
organization, and, not least of movement, action,
thought. For mobility of thou ht im lies
originality in conception and surprise in execution, p
two essential qualities
have been the hallmark of the Great Ca tains
artists from the ? P ,distinguishing the
artisans of warfare.. .
USA COMMAND & GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FUTURE, KEEPS PACE WITH
by Maj. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr,
no.1'(Apr 1957 3-13 in Military Review, v.37,
The Commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff
College describes how. Leavenworth is orienting on the future w
taining:the sound experience of the a hale re-
?.leaders in p st to mold the minds of the Arm's
the direction of progress.' With chart y
of the College, an hart of the new or anizat>.o
n
g
and description of the 1957
-58 cu
rriculum,
+1 + ~, i
WAR IN THREE DIMENSI
ONS, by E. J. Kin stop-Mc
g Cloughry,
London, Jonathan Cape, 1949. 159
Th
'
e p
28
impact of air power upon the classi
cal principles of war,
ARE THE. LESSONS .OF,HISTOR;YNO:LONGER VALID?'.:by.Arthur:-
A. Ageton, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings,; v. 78,.no. 6 (June'-1952.
624-633.
Examples of naval actions:.in World War=II which' illustrate'the
effectiveness of the principles of warn of correct objective, .." security, =
of
fensive action, concentration, mobility, ,surprise, economy of force,"'co'.
operation, and simplicity... These principles are still?a guide'for future
military action, and the US should learn from history that control of the:
seas is necessary for our national securit : -
THE ART OF WAR b Sun Tzu, Harrisburg. "Militar` S'er"vice
Publishing Co., 1944. 99 p.
- '-
THE ART OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES, A.D. 378-155; by,
Charles William Chadwick Oman, rev. and ed, by John Beeler. Itliaca,
Cornell University Press, 1953. 176 p.
A revision of C. W. C. Oman's prize-winning essay published
in 1885.
THE BATTLES THAT CHANGED HISTORY by Fletcher Pratt.
Garden City N
Hanpver House 1958 348 r
Y
.
.,
sometimes-far-distant" results and policies rather than the importance:
of the immediate field.
THE DECISIVE WARS OF HISTORY, A STUDY IN STRATEGY; by.
B. H. Liddell Hart. London, Bell, 1929. 242 p.
A broad survey of war,, with the historical' effects' in a com-
prehensive series of cases, and with the logistical or psychological moves
'
'
which
led up to them.
c ~0 t.
'S OWN STORY OF THE WAR by Dwight D. Eisen
EISENHOWER
hoover. New York, Arco Publishing Co., 1946. 122 p.
The complete report by the Supreme European Commander
29
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 in the Second World War, The way in which they were employed "viol"ate
oftle_war.:in Europe, .in which the follow' are presented: summary of
operatioris:in Northwest Europe; planning and preparation; the assault;
establishment of the lodgement area; the?break-through; the Battle of the
:Falaise,'-Argentan Pocket; the advance to the Seine; the build-up and the
Allied :navies; the advance from the Seine to the German border; consoli-
?datibn-on the frontier;,the.Ardennes counteroffensive; plans for the 1945
;'campaign; operations to reach the Rhine; crossing the Rhine; the envel-
.
opment of the Ruhr: and the junction with the Russians; the final phase;
"and"surrender . Maps are included of the important operations.
A
d
V. ,.no. (11 lyov,195U) 5-6 plus.
stu
y of three battles the firstfhihd i
, o wc occurren
and the last in 1761. It is shown that the principles of war have not+~v
changed' basically in time and that forms of attack and defense have re-
mained practically the same. Morale then as now, is
one of the most
importarit.factors in war and what cannot be achieved by mere numbers
is secured by better traimng, and discipline.
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*11 ?
30
The Allied strategic air forces were not. Pr.oPerlY.eiPloYed
?n
OPERATION OVERLORD; DESIGN AND REALITY, by Albert
Norman. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Co., 1952. 230 p.
History of the planning and preparation for the invasion of
Western Europe, and of the staging of the operation from England in the
Summer of 1944. ' The strategic problem and the controversies on it; com-
mand organization for the invasion; assault on the Normand coast, ; fi -
i for the expansion of'the beachhead; breakout and encirclement of the
German forces in that area; and pursuit of the Germans to
the Seine River,
ROOTS OF STRATEGY, ed. by Maj. Thomas IL Phillips. Harris-
burg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Company, 1940. 448
A'" c p'
ollectibn of military classics Containing:
WAR? byS~ THE ART OF
.m Tzu, 500 B. C.; THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF THE
ROMANS, by Vegetius,, 390 A.]).; MY REVERIES ON T
b HE ART OF WAR,
by Marshal Maurice de Saxe, 1732; THE INSTRUCTION OF
THE GREAT FOR FREDERICK
HIS GENERALS, 1747; and THE MILITARY
MAXIMS
OF' NAPOLEON.
SEA, LAND, AND AIR STRATEGY,, b Sir Geor
J. Murra 1914 30 Y ge Aston. London,
y, 8 p.
Lectures delivered at the Staff College at '
years 1904-07, Camberley in the
1943 attacks and were directed. primarily at,assembly:plants. Notwith=
b. Germany - Historical Experience
torical account that the essence.,of strategy is the ."indirect;-approach"
The true aim of a strategist is to seek an advantageous 'strategic 'situation,,
,
and this is best achieved by dislocating the enemy!s balance'aind,takinthe;'
"
his-
Strategy of the decisive war ea
4 s from 490 B:? C: to 1945, the Brea
New York, Praeger, 1954, 420 p. :t.
STRATEGY; THE INDIRECT APPROACH, by B..H:' :Liddell^Har
witz;, and comments on present Russian and US strategies,
power to resist. The strengths and weaknesses of some of the great
, gen-
erals in the light of this thesis. The'strategy of Hitler; he gave a new
depth to the "indirect approach" and was successful until his strategy and
tactics degenerated into direct and expected moves. , Criticism of lause-
consolidates his physical and psychological balance and increases hIs'
line of least expectation
, in contrast, to move directly on an opponent.
WRONG TARGET. A STUDY OF THE USE OF STRATEGICAL
sec, l (Mar-Apr 1951) 471-478,.
POWER IN WORLD WAR II, by S. iL Shaw, in Ordnance, tv.'35 no:1
five of the generally accepted principles of war: objective, mobility, 3
mass, coordination, and economy of force. Proof of this is containeddn
the reports of the US Strategic Bombing Survey. A fair and objective,
study of the facts and figures related in the reports of the survey show
that the conclusions are supported by overwhelming evidence, Thehuge ;
expenditure of planes, men, and gasoline in order to drop" one: and a;half
y
ll
t
f b
ons o
mi
ion
ombs on German industry was misdirectedFar from
destroying the enemy's morale and reducing his war potental,~it s urged;
h
t
h
h
o ever-
im on
ig
er levels of production During th firsthalff 1944
..
,eo attacks on aircraft
lants
_
rained t
p
were
o twelve times
the scale of
doubled from December 1943 to, July 1944. It was the:attack;
on trans'
standing the heavy weight of these attacks, German, aircraft production-'
u
,portation, however, That was the decisive blow which com letel ydi's-
organized the German economy, The consequences, of the ?breakdown;in:r...;.
the transportation system were probably greater than any other single ; ?
factor in the final collapse of the economy. Had a strategic.;pattern'of,.
attack been developed and applied immediately, more rapid economic
results would undoubtedly have been secured. Using the available guided ?.
bombs a monthly., tonnage of only 1, 300 tons would have resulted in com:-
plete interdiction of Japan's railroads, Thus with or without atomic
bombs, strategic air force wields great power, although its incorrect
us.e causes waste or harmful results in the same measure as its . Power,
BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMAN MILITARY LITERATURE, by Maj.
31
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Gen, Heinrich A'schenbrandt..Washington, Department of the Army,
Office of the. Chief of Military History, 1953. 42 p, (.MS #P-150,) -
A former general describes briefly the major German works
on military science written prior to World War I and in the period between
the two'.World Wars.. The development of German military literature, and
its. influence on the. German Army. The basic ideas of such authors as
Clausewitz, Schlieffen, and the elder Moltke. A brief bibliography lists
only the German. military writings that are considered to be classics in
the field,
THE FATAL DECISIONS, ed, by Seymour Freldin and William.
Richardson, New York, William Sloane Associates, 1956. 302
P.
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN, by the General of the Air Force,
Werner Kreipe; THE BATTLE OF MOSCOW, by General Gunther
Blumentritt;?EL ALAMEIN, by General Fritz Bayerlein; STALINGRAD, by
ColoneLGeneral'Kurt Zeitzler; FRANCE, 1944, by Lt, General Bobo
Zimmerman; THE ARDENNES, by General Hasso Von Manteuffel. An in-
formed critique of failure in the boldest aggression of our times. Maps.
GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II, by Comdr. D. L.
Kauffman, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v, 80, no. 1 Jan 1954 ( ) 1-12.
Historical background of German naval strategy, and some of
the 'important plans and policies between 1937 and 1941 which influenced
the outcome of World War II. ? Hitler's lack of appreciation of the im ort-
ance of naval warfare; Admiral P
Raeder's background and excellent strate-
gic concepts; and the failure of his plans from lack of ships and lack
of
cooperation from the German air arm. 'The German naval war plan as it
was final/ put Thto operation, and h Y ow it violated the principles of war-
fare. The proposed amphibious assault against England and its cancella-
tion because Goering failed to win air supremacy over England. If Ger-
man naval strategy had been more offensive, and if British imports had
been selected 'as .the objective,
Great Britain might have been defeated.
THE GREAT ILLUSIONS OF 1939, 'b Capt
by . B. H. Liddell Hart, in
Military Review, v.36, no. 10 (Jan 1957) 3-11.
The 1939 downfall of both France and Poland was not the result
of a power imbalance, but can be directly attributed to reliance on. outmoded
concepts in the face of Germany's effective armor employment. A review
of the political and military factons which precipitated the 1939 defeats is
presented.
32
GUIDE TO FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES, 1945-54. .Head q United States Arm Europe, Historical Division, 1954: 253 p:~..,,
A catalog and index to the 'manuscripts produced under the
Foreign Military Studies Program of the Historical ?Division' Division; UR,
and of predecessor commands since 1945. Most of the manuscripts were
?
prepared by former high-ranking officers of the German Armed;Forces
Originally the mission of the Foreign Military tudies Program was only
to obtain information on enemy operations in the European Theater for
use in the preparation of an official history of the US Arm in World
II, In 19 Y War
46 the program was broadened to include the Mediterranean and
Russian theaters, In 1947 emphasis was placed on preparation of ? opera-
ti
l
ona
studies for use by US Alid t
rmy pannng anraining agencies
and
service schools. Many of the more .reden studies have analyzed the
German military experiences for their useful lessons. The guide con-
tains three indexes - by topic, by military unit and by author Most
entries include a short statement describing the contents and usefuln
of the ess
study. Appended: glossary of abbreviations and, foreign
terms
Charts: illustrate scope, status, and size of the various manuscripts
ser
ies give dates and physicl ltft '
,aocaions o wriing, translating,an
and
administrative activity 1945-1954; list studies`that have been or rdill',beA ,,
published as Department of the Army pamphlets; and list manuscripts pub-
lished in the EUCOM-USAREU P ` R Foreign Military Studies series.
HITLER AND THE GERMAN GENERALS, by Col, C. P. Stacey,
in Canadian Arm Journal,. v. 7, no, l (Apr 1953) 45-50.
Commentary on military memoirs published since World War
II by former German generals. These memoirs generally highlight
the
feud between Hitler and his generals and advance two theses: (1) the
German General Staff, far from being responsible for the outbreak of
World War II, was opposed to it; and (2) the military defeat of Germany
..'
was lar gely. due to Hitler's amateur strategy, and his disregard'ofro= ?
fessional advice P
Special attention is called to General Heinz, Guderian's.
PANZER LEADER as one of the.best sources on the war in
Russia.
HITLER' DEFEAT I
S N RUSSIA, by Gen. Wladyslaw Anders:. ;Chicago,
Henry Regnery, 1953. 267 p, ;
An analytical study of 'the causes of. Nazi. catastrophe. in.Russia
during World War II, The military and political reasons behind the defeat
of German Armies, which, after easy victories elsewhere in Europe, came
to a dead halt in Russia six months after they launched an all-out offensive
on the Soviet Union, German and Soviet strategies in the various ,.cam-
paigns; strength and types of forces employed by both sides; German poli-
cies in the occupied regions of USSR; treatment of'Soviet PW's; strength
and operations of anti- Soviet Russian Army units'which fought at the..side,
of Germans; Soviet, partisan warfare; extent of aid given by the-West to ;the
Soviets in military equipment; and the effects Produced?bY,West!s bombing..
. .. of the Reich on German military operations in Russia. Although, there
were other factors which contributed to German.defeats,and Russian vic-
' .?33
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U
tories; the main one can be found in the strategies of the High Command
of both countries. It was not so much Stalin's skill as a strategist-but
Hitler's stupidy as the Supreme Commander of German Forces that ended
in'their, overwhelming defeat. Includes a summary of the present strengths
and
weaknesses of the Soviet Union in which the author points out t
_ that
Russi'
a s'weaknesses are than her strengths 'and that
they will bear
fruit if capably exploited by Russia's opponents, Maps.
?
THROUGH RUSSIAN EYES, in Nom, v. 60, no. 9 (Sept 1955) 281-
283 plus.
The article is based on a Soviet study of Germany's sea
strategy of World War II.. The study, SOME ACCOUNTS OF CRUISER
OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN FLEET FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF
THE SECOND WORLD WAR, bY"Capt. L. M. Eremsev, rreviews the
staff doctrine of the Nazi Navy and the prewar planning of the German
Fleet and examines the actions of the war in which the German cruisers
were involved. An analogy is drawn between the German prewar and
World War II na val programs and the program pursued by the Soviet
Navy,
c. Great Britain
AIR POWER AND SEA POWER, by Air Marshal Robert Saundb in
Air,Pictorial v. 16, no.2 Feb 195 y'
(Feb 1954) 34-36. ,
Defines the present. roles, of sea and air power in the defense
of Britain; and examines the contributions which sea and air power
should
make in'safeguarding seaborne' supplies and trade and i
? in denying the 'Sea
to an enemy.' This ability to use the sea depends prhnaril y on
the capa-
city to gain and hold the mastery of the air, not only over the sea bu
the whole thea Y but over
ter of war :. a task which belongs primarily to the-bomb
force. While air power is the Y the-bomber
first line of British defense, the Navy is
still responsible for convoy ? escort and antisubmarine warfare? The
Navy should control and operate all escort and antisubmarine vessels, all
ship-borne aircraft, and the ships in which they are trans
Y ported.
''4 1
AIR POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE RO
R,? Bric YA.L NAVY, by F /Lt.
kwood in Air Power
, v.1, no. 3 (Spring 1954) 289-292:
The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet of Pearl Harbor demon-
concentrated fleets are vulnerable to air attack
and that only
aircraft can give adequate protection from it. Atom bomb trials indicate
that the conception of large- fleets must end and naval strategy and tactic
must be planned on the action of small units d
be Small and fast t shi s should
built for the British Navy, P
.34
AIR POWER AND THE FUTURE OF WAR, b Marshal Sir John'
Slessor in Y
Royal United. Service Institution Journal, v.99; no,'595(Aug
.
1954) 343-3 , , .. - ,
The influence of the air weapon on the ossibilitie
P s of 'a future
war between the USSR and the West. It seems unlikely that any nation-
. r
would begin a war that would lead .to 'the, destruction of both sides; but we .
must expect the Soviets to continue to cause local' conflicts. If a total war`
does come, atomic air power will be employed immediately. Preparations
which Great Britain should-make for this eventuality.
1956, 709 p,
RAF) has seen and helped direct it,
war, ii it snoula start.
COMMONWEALTH AIR STRATEGY,, by John W. R. Taylor, in Flight,
v.68, no. 2431 (26 Aug 1955) 313-316.
A review of commitments, forces and deployment. The strate
gY
depends principally upon the use of air power and hinges on the Western phi-
losophy that the deterrent power of USAF SAC and RAF Bomber Command
might avert a major war. That deterrent is also the only hope of. winning the
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIR POLICY
AND STRATEGY, by Capt. Norman Macmillan, in Aeronautics v. 31 no. 2
(Sept 1954) 57-65. '
The development of US and British air arms since World War I
and a comparison of their present policies and strategies. British strategic,
policy does not exhibit a full recognition of air power, but is still over-
shadowed by the concept of a powerful navy based
on battleship's.. ,.Aerial, ,
operations against ships during World War II demonstrated that, air.. ower,
is superior to sea power; and n l,
no nation can expect to be strong in all arms, ? ?
British air policy should be altered so that. RAF can make full us
e of the, .
mobility of the airplane. -
GREAT BRITAIN'S NAVY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, by J. P. L.
Thomas, in Crowsnest, v. 7, no. 6 (Apr 1955) 7-8.
TT e~Firt Lord of the Admiralty states: "whatever the scope
of a future war and .whatever the nature of the weapons used, the task of
the Navy will still be to control the seas, to assure the safe passage of
supplies and to support the other armed forces," Air power at sea is-not,
something which replaces the Navy, but is the instrument by which the
35
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THE CENTRAL BLUE, by Marshal John Slessor. London, Casell
Forty-year history of airpower as the author (Marshal of the
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Navy today so, largely exercises its a ' -
se power. The aircraft today is
both the striking power of the Fleet (largely replacing the 15-inch gun of
the battleship) and the eyes of the Fleet (largely replacing the cruiser`in
this respect). Dismissing nuclear war as improbable (mutually suicidal)
he sees,a continuation of uneasy peace punctured with military act
such as took lace in K action's
today
P orea anndochina,. The fleet Britain needs is one. required to meet her world-wide commitments in support of the
Commonwealth interests and trade in such local wars as may occur'dur
-
ing the uneasy peace, and such ships and aircraf
that t as are necessary to en-
sure .Britain can play her part in NATO as a deterrent to nuc
and in retaliation i Lear war
if the deterrent fails.
THE HIGH LEVEL CONDUCT AND DIRECTION OF WORLD
b Lt. Gen I WAR II,
by an Jacob, in Royal United Service Institution Journal.101
no. 6.03 (Aug 1956 364-375. Y '
The manner in which the war was conducted the
the future in light of , present and
our experience then, some of the principles that
must underlie any successful organization for conducting war, how the
British applied those principles in the past, nationally and international/
with the allies, and how the can be applied in Y
Y the future,
THE NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY b Ad
William Rich , Y Adm. Herbert
mond. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 19
Histor of the principal History strategy of naval warfare as by English ministers and kings from the time War s of the Tudors to'the Spanish
s, 1718, and 1725. Bibliography.
ANEW ORDER OF
PRIORITIES, in Economisi;'(26 Feb 1955j' 723-
724 plus, These comments on the Defence .
White Paper relate to the
strategy: to,prepare for a fantastically destructive
tionas the be war of very short dura-
st means of ensuring that it will not happen; pared 'to fight eri heral limited wars over the next five or ten
a new atomic situation emerges e. , the adve years until
( g nt of a ballistic roc
meet this strategy Britain must establish a strict adherence to the orde
to obtain maximum security out of the resourc r
will be a cost/ es available in Britain. It
y matter, but Britain is a world power and s
her responsibilities. Buildin he cannot avoid
Building a deterrent to a nuclear war is f
than fighting a conventional one, ar better
POLICY AND WEAPONS IN THE NUCLEAR A
London .Fabian GE, by Michael Stewart,
Society, 1955. 25 p. (Fabian Tract
No. 296.)
11
The author is a a member of Parliament and was Under- '
Secretary for War 1947-1951. Following a discussion of the effe'c
t of the
H-bomb on warfare and the conduct of foreign he outlines
for th policy, a plan
the defense of Britain and the role to be played by his country's Army,
Navy, and Air Force, .
POLICY, GRAND STRATEGY, AND PRINCIPLES, in Royal United
Service Institution Journal, v. 100, no. 600 (Nov 1955) 550-556,
Study o war, especially in Gt. Britain, since 19th centur
and how the stud of war influenced y'
Y military policy, strategy, and prm-,
ciples,
PRINCIPLES OF BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT, by Ian Jacob, in
Foreign Affairs, v. 29, no. 2 (Jan 1951) 219-228.
Up to 1914, Britain's strength resided in her navy, in her
economic resources, and in the ability to take as much or as little of a
continental war as she chose, World War I saw the end of limited land
engagements and the steady maintenance of sea power. After World War
I, Britain's horizon in defense matters was forcibly widened beyond
Continental Europe by the rise of Japan, World War II saw the proximity
of the main defense center to the European mainland and its' vulnerabilit
to severe bombardment Y
and the difficulty of concentrating potential
strength at a distance from the main center. Since World War II, British
strategic thinking has again undergone a change due to the rise of the
USSR, to constitutional changes within the Commonwealth, and to the
advance of Asia to a position of primary importance. The United King-
dom, now carrying the main defense burden of the Empire, must now
act in union with the other nations in the Atlantic Treaty, and its military
policy must aim at security for the United Kingdom, maintenance of free
communication throughout the world, the securit of the Middle E
_ Y , ast and
Africa, the destruction of Communism; and the contribution of force to
secure respect for the decisions of the United Nations.
d. NATO
EAST VERSUS WEST, by Giffard Martel, London, Museum Press,
1952. 220 p.'
The political and military aspects of the Cold War are dis-
cussed by a British General who is' a specialist in armored warfare. The
military lessons that should have been.l'earned from World War II: Great
Britain should concentrate on the development of its Air 'Force, 'nava1.
37
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strength, _ and armored divisions. The Russian Armed Forces during
World,War II are judged from his experience as head of a military mis-
sion to. the USSR during the war and from conferences with the R ussian
General Staff. Plans of the Western Powers to defend Europe against
communist aggression and, the military forces necessary to implement
them; and communism in China and Korea, and the part of Asia in world
affairs of the future.
THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE, by Drew Middleton. New
York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952. 313 p.
The progress made by the US and other NATO powers toward
the defense of Europe, alid the forces against which they would fight in a
future emergency. Endurance and courage of the individual Russian
soldier, and organization of the Russian Army. The armed forces now
at the disposal of NATO; state of training and alertness of the US Seventh
Army in Germany; attitudes and fighting capabilities of Great Britain and
France; defense problems of the remainder of Europe; and possible
courses of action if war breaks out.
DEFENCE OF THE WEST; SOME RIDDLES OF WAR AND PEACE
by Liddell Hart. London, Cassell, 1950. 390 p.
".... This book deals with the immediate problems of an
effective 'Defense of the West' and some basic problems of the human
search for security against 'aggression... .
DOES THE WEST POSSESS A DOCTRINE OF WAR? b Ma'. Gen.
Emile Wanty, in Military Review, v.34, no. 12 (Mar 1955) 93 J
3-102.
The present Western defense system is of nebulous character.
There could result from it: a disassociation of the alliances, with each
of the contracting parties assuming his liberty to act alone and to hasten
to his destruction; a regroupment of the,peoples of the Western
World
into at least two associations; 'or a, decisive tightening of the existing
bonds transposing to a worldwide scale what it has been possible to
realize on the Atlantic level. The defense of Western civilization -
on all free nation de
pends s agreeing instead of following individually their
own' particular and divergent interests. T Y
To provide raped and effective
intervention at whatever point of the globe this may he necessary would
require: () a entirely clear, mutual understanding, not
interests of each coun only the
try but also of the various national mentalities;
(2) a modus vivendi in the form of a
general program; (3) an exact and
complete definition of the purposes of a strictly defensive con-
servatory aimi Y nsive and con-
y ng.at peace through general Prosperity;
com-
mon pooling of economic and fina (4) ncial means for ameliorating the li
conditions of the least favored elements of th ving
tion and re the free world; (5) determina-
spect of the zones of interest of the
principal signatories or
'?:4,.u..s?w+.v..ieLY=4..??. -wrw+y+nLV~4
the exercise of an influence in common in certain sectors; (6) the' defining
of a stable strategy of policy accepted b all; (7) preparation arat'
Y , () p p ion and pursuit
of a single military strategy on a world scale; (8) close coordina ti on tion of
ground, naval, and air forces permanently stationed in each:of.the large,.
essential strategic zones; and (9) the () a reconstitution of coordinated general
reserves through an effort at economy in the utilization of means. -
an (Trans
lated d digested from REVUE G); BALE BELLE - Belgium: - 15 A
1954, Aug
IF ATOMIC WAR BROKE OUT TOMORROW? in Interavia v
no. 8 500-531.
' 9'
(1954) A series of articles on various aspects of an atomic, the war be-
tween USSR and the NATO countries. The vulnerability y of cities an
militar units to and
the hydrogen bomb; the ''atomic sensitivity" of the US
and Western?Europe; the organization, location and equipment
of the air
forces available to NATO; the mission and capabilities
of the USAF Stra-
tegic Air Command; the comparative performance of US and
Soviet stra-
tegic bombers; strength and organization of the USSR Air Force
is known of its strategic bombers; the facilities and operation of US-
Canadian air defense; the possibility of atomic attack
Y from submarines;
the training provided for NATO pilots and air crews 'Traini Command; and the contributions to aeronautical research made
by NATO's Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development.
A LOOK THROUGH A WINDOW AT WORLD WAR III by Field
Marshal Montgomery, in Royal United Service Institution Journal v. 99
no. 596 (Nov 1954) 507-523. '
The strategy and organization which the NATO nations must
prepare to win a future war against the East. The dominant factor in
next war will be air the
power, and command of the air; weapon must be cen-
tralized on the highest level. The day of the large warship on the, surface
of the sea is over because of the range and weapons of tho
The ? derv aircraft.
Western Powers require: (1) bigger air forces; (2) sma
more ' ' , () leer and
immediately-ready armies with great strategical and tactical
mobility; (3) smaller
Y, () navies; and (4) organization of the fighting services
based on more atomic power and less manpower.
.THE NAVY'S ROLE IN A LIMITED WAR: KOREA CLEAR EXAMPLE
OF THE VALUE OF SEA POWER TODAY, in Crowsnest, v.8, no. 6 (Apr
1956 25-2 The question has been raised as to whether sea power would be
equally effective in an atomic global war. First Lord of the Admiralty,
Viscount Cilcennin has stated that whether we invest more heavily in a
naval power for war purposes hinges in whether we envisage that a future
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 U
[L
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full-scale war would last beyond the stages of all-out thermo-nuclear ex-
. .
changes. - After the first stunning blows would fall, the navies alone might
remain undamaged and able to carry on the battle. "As things 'stand today,
if the navies lose control of the seas the Western Alliance would have to
go.out of business."
N. A. T. 0. AND ATOMIC STRATEGY; in Interavia, v. 9, no. 7 (1954)
415-446.
The entire issue is devoted to various aspects of air power in
atomic warfare, and the preparations of the NATO nations for adequate
defense in case of attack.. Quotations from NATO's commanders and air
force 'chief s of several countries on the changes in air arms as a result
of the adoption of nuclear weapons; the. organization of NATO and SHAPE
and the personnel who occupy the major commands in them; photographs
and brief descriptions of military aircraft of 'the member countries; and
the ,effectsof nuclear' weapons. Present and possible future methods of
adapting airplanes and aircraft carriers to atomic warfare such as per-
mitting dispersal by eliminating airfields through the use of vertic
off fi ter.s and b designing take-
off double-decker carriers. Considerations in
designing and producing short-life aircraft" which could be constructed
simply and quickly if nuclear weapons had destroyed the important
air-
craft factories of a country on the defensive.
OCEAN STRATEGY WITH AUSTRALIA AS A BASE, by Norman
Macmillan, in Aircraft, v. 30, no. 8 (May 1952) 16-19 plus.
- If there is a war with Russia it will be a global war and the
free nations will have to pursue an ocean strategy to protect their ship-
ping and life-lines of supply from Soviet submarines and aircraft. Actions
in Korea, Indo-China, and Malaya reveal the communist strategy to gain
control of the South Pacific and Indian Oceans and disrupt both the supply
lines ari and sources of supply, available to the Western Powers in the= coun-
tries of South Pacific. The NATO powers would have to defend the
Atlantic, while the US would have to defend the Pacific; and Australia
if provided with the means, could become a base in the battle against
Soviet submarines operating in the Indian Ocean in an attempt to destro
the supply lines to Africa and Europe. Suggests that th Y
the US provide
Australia with B-29's which are now kept in mothball storage, and
that
practical tests be made_to determine whether or not the bomber would
meet the requirements for patrol missions over the vast spaces of the
Indian Ocean.
THE'PERIPHERAL STRATEGY IN THE FACE OF THE, ATOMIC
BOMB. La strategie peripherique devant la bombe atomique, b Gen.
P. E: Jac uot. Paris Gallimard 195 Y
q 5? 230 p. In French.
40
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A French general questions the wisdom- of peripheral defense
by the Western Powers, presenting arguments to show that `it"would favor
the aggressor, and makes the following suggestions on how Western de-
fense should be organized: (1) the land powers should defend their own
territories with resolution, using new forms of fortifications the weapons
of which are remote-controlled; and (2) the maritime powers should
provide a ready force organized as air brigades with mobile bases to
conduct airborne operations behind the enemy lines.
REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE INDOCHINESE
WAR. Reflexions strategiques sur la guerre d'Indochine,: by Gen. L. M.
Chassin, in Revue de Defense Nationale, v..10 Dec 1954 507-522. In .
French.
The Indochinese War suggests general reflections on the.
grand strategy of the. Western Powers. The principal of these reflections
is that the atomic bomb reduces the risk of war. Therefore the high level
policy of the West should be to avoid war and to await the development of
disagreement in the enemy camp (between Russia and.Communist China). :
On the other hand, the atomic bomb increases the risk of local ,.conflicts, .
in regions where the Western Powers still hold key positions; To sur-?' _
vive, the latter must win such conflicts quickly, utilizing their scientific
and technical superiority. If France wants to maintain her position
among the great powers and preserve the French Union, she must not
only possess the new weapons but must also adapt her army to their use.
Above all France must possess a modern offensive air force:
STRATEGY FOR THE WEST, by John Slessor. New York, W.
Morrow, 1954. 180 p.
Suggestions on how to assure the security of Western Europe
against Russian aggression through reliance on atomic air power; how to
establish unity with freedom in Germany and how to safeguard against
renewed German military domination; and how'these aims might be
achieved without giving reasonable grounds for Russian fears.
WESTERN DEFENSE PLANNING, by Capt. B. H. Liddell'Hart, in
Military Review, v.36, no..3 (June 1956) 3-10.
The H-bomb is a weak-deterrent to small aggression. Its
primary drawback is that if it-does not succeed as a deterrent, and if it
is put into action, it automatically entails suicide for Western?civilization.'
WHAT WOULD THE WORLD BE WITHOUT NATO? by Col. John E.
Kelly, in Army, v. 7, no.1 (Aug 1956) 31-34.
41
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full-scale war '
would last beyond the stages of all-out thermo-nuclear ex-
changes.. :?After the first stunning blows would fall, the navies alone might
remain undamaged and able to carry on the battle. "As things stand today,
if the navies lose control' of the seas the Western Alliance Would-have to
go out of business."
N. A. T. 0. AND ATOMIC STRATEGY, in Interavia v. 9 no. 7 (1954)
1 )
415-446
.
The entire issue is devoted to various as ects of air
p ower in
atomic warfare and th P
e preparations of the NATO nations for adequate
defense in case of. attack. Quotations from NATO's commanders and air
force chiefs of several countries
on the changes in air arms as a result
of the' adoption of nuclear weapons; the organization 'of
and the NATO and SHAPE
and who :occupy the major commands in them; "s photographs
and brief decriPti??: ons of military aircraft of the member countries; and
the effects of:nuclear weapons. Present Sand Pos
ada ti '? ? sable future methods of
p ng airplanes and aircraft carriers to atomic warfare such a
mittin ' dispersal by eliminating as p
off fighters Y g airfields through the use of vertical take-
off 'and"by designing double-decker carriers.
designing and 'short Considerations in
producing -life aircraft? which could be constructed
simply' and quickly if nuclear weapons had destroyed the important
air-
craft factories of a country on the defensive.
OCEAN STRATEGY WITH AUSTRALIA AS A BASE, by Norman
Macmillan, in Aircraft Y
., , v.30, no.8 (May 1952) 16-19 plus.
If there is a war with Russia it will be a global war and the
free nations will have to pursue an ocean strategy to protect their ship-
ping and life-lines lines of supply from Soviet submarines and aircraft. Action
in Korea; Indo-China, and Malaya reveal the s
communist strategy to gain
control of the. South Pacific and Indian Oceans and disrupt both the supply
lines and sources of supply available to the. Western Powers in the coun-
tries of South Pacific. The NATO Powers would
have to defend the
Atlantic, 'while the US would have to defend the Pacific; and Australia
,
if provided with the means, could'become a base in the battle against
Soviet submarines operating in the Indian Oc
in an attempt to_destro
the su 1 g Ocean
pp y lines to Africa and Europe. , Suggests that the U Y
Australia with B- ' S provide
29 s which are now kept in mothball storage,
practical tests be made to determine whether or not the .bomber would
meet the requirements for patrol missions over the va
Indian Ocean. st spaces of the
- THE PERIPHERAL STRATEGY IN THE FACE OF THE ATOMIC
BOMB. La strategie peripherique devant la bombe at
P. E.'?Jac uot. Paris Galli o by Gen.
q , ward, 1955? 230 p. In French. .
40
A French general questions the. wisdom. of era hera
by. the Western P P 1 defense ..
Powers, presenting arguments 'to show that it would favor
the aggressor, and makes the following suggestions on how Western de-
fense should be organized: (1) the land powers should
defend their own
territories with resolution, using new forms?of fortifications the we
of which are remote-controlled; and weapons
(2) the maritime, powers should
provide a ready force organized as air brigades with m
conduct mobile bases to
airborne operations behind the enemy lines.
REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE INDOCHINESE
WAR Reflexions strategiques sur la guerre d'Indochine by Gen. Chassin in .,
Y . L. M.
Revue de Defense Nationale, v. 10 (Dec 1954 507-522. In
French, ,
The Indochinese 'War suggests general reflections, on the
grand strategy of the Western Powers. The principal of these reflections
is that the atomic bomb reduces the risk of war. Therefore the high level
policy of the West should be to avoid war and to await the development of
disagreement in the enemy camp (between Russia and,Communist China).
On the other hand, the atomic bomb, increases the risk of, local, conflicts ? .
in regions where the Western Powers still hold key positions.- ?
y A . To. sur-, .
vive, the latter must win such conflicts quickly, utilizing their scientific
and technical superiority. If France wants to maintain her
position
among the great powers and preserve the French Union, she must not
only possess the new weapons but must also adapt her army to their use.
Above all France must possess a modern offensive air force.
STRATEGY FOR THE WEST, by John Slessor. New?York, W.
Morrow, 1954. 180 p.
Suggestions on how to assure the security of Western Europe
against Russian aggression through reliance on atomic air power; how to
establish unity with freedom in Germany and how to safeguard against.
renewed German military domination; and how these aims might be
achieved without-giving reasonable grounds for Russian fears.
F
WESTERN DEFENSE PLANNING, by.Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, in
Military Review, v. 36, no...3 (June 1956) 3-10.
.The H-bomb is a' weak deterrent to small aggression.
Its
primary drawback is that if it does not succeed as a deterrent, and if it
is put into action, it automatically entails suicide for Western civilization.
WHAT WOULD THE WORLD BE WITHOUT NATO? b..Col. John E.
Kelly, in Army, v. , no. l (Aug 1956) 31-34, -.
?
41
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;~i'I
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P'
i.a,~ d?w, r~'',~..i- ?'! ..:~:f::Ct+vuulurYjA S'
The author is Chief of Staff of the US Element of the Standing
Group; of NATO. He provides an answer to those who question the_NATO's
validity in the Atomic Age and who wonder if there is need for NATO in
view of the, so-called thermonuclear stalemate. - .
e.. United States
AIR DOCTRINE: THEATER AIR OPERATIONS: Washington,
Department of the Air Force, 1954. 27 AFM 1-3.
P ( )
Stresses the unity of air action and the implicit coordination
of theater air forces with other air forces directly engaged in attack
against the heartland of an enemy nation. Presents the doctrine pertinent
to the employment of air forces as an entity in a theater of operations and
their role in' accomplishing the theater mission. Written from the per-
spective oVthe entire theater and with the objective in mind of coordinating
and correlating the employment of theater air forces with the employment
of all other theater forces.
THE BRIDGES AT SINANJU AND YONGMIDONG, in Air University
Quarter/ Review, v.7, no. 1 (Spring 1954) 15-34.
The new concept of occupation and control of enemy territory
by air forces is illustrated by the air envelopment and neutralization by
UN air forces of a critically sensitive and heavily defended communication
corridor across the Chongchon in North Korea. This 'air action proved a
mighty new instrument of military force and persuasive pressure available
to theater commanders. It could be .decisively employed in a combined
air-ground- offensive strategy where isolation of the battlefield is followed
by ground offensive, or it could be employed in its new' concept - as sole
decisive pressure in the, attainment of theater objectives.
EISENHOWER t5 SIX GREAT DECISIONS, by Gen, Walter Bedell
Smith. New York, Longmans, 1956. 237 p.
-
Lists, describes, and approves six major decisions made
bete
wen
A FORMULA FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING, by Brig. . Gen. L
)
Hopwood in Air Universrt ' Y g Lloyd
y Quarterly Review, V. 8, no, 3 (Summer 1956
2133. ,
42
Soviet imprecation of the free world may diminish, but the,
drive of the Reds for nuclear parity increases their potential menace to
the Western alliance. As the United States thus experiences a period of
quieter but unremitting tension, a confusion of many views, obscures the
available guide lines for a practicable US posture. To develop a sound
military strategy capable of supporting national objectives the author;.
(Commandant, Air Command and Staff College), urges a return
to the
fundamentals of fact, reality, and logic.
MOBILE CONCEPT, in Military Review, v, 34, no. 9 (Dec 1954 3-10.
Our present ground formations are based largely upon infantry
forces supported by tanks, artillery, and air.. The tempo and range of our
operations are, therefore, geared in general to the infantry soldier. Since
the important factor is relative mobility, it is obvious that if massed
mechanized, and tank forces are met, they will possess the superior
mobility. The solution lies, therefore, in the creation and training of
large, highly mobile formations based upon the characteristics inherent
in armored formations of corps and, perhaps, field army size. We should
have available sufficient armored divisions and corps headquarters to pro-
vide the training and nuclei around which large offensive ground formations
can be built in time for a strategic offensive designed to bring any possible
war forced upon us to a very rapid and successful conclusion.
THE NAVAL GENIUS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, by Dudle W.
Knox. Boston Houghton Y
Mifflin, 1932. 138 p,
Illustrates the fundamentals of the use of sea power and gives
Washington full credit for his broad planning of grand strategy,
NEEDED. - A MILITARY STRATEGY OF MOBILITY,. by Edgar A.
Parsons,, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, no. 12 (Dec 1956)
l23 -1269.
The purpose of this article is' to stimulate the development, of
a modern and satisfactory military strategy. The author stresses the con-
cept that modern technology can be directed to insure our defense without
millions of US casualties and without necessarily becoming committed to a
war of indiscriminated thermonuclear. bombardment. He outlines a strategy
of mobility that can be so exploited as to make war unacceptable' to an enemy.
The article includes a discussion of the role to be played by guided missiles
in such a strategy. '
READINESS FOR THE LITTLE WAR; OPTIMUM INTEGRATED
STRATEGY, in Military Review, :v. 37, 'no. l (Apr 1957) 14-26.
Small aggressions o not warrant big bombs. Our integrated
strategy must include highly mobile military forces which are capable of
supporting 'our national policy in all types of conflict short of general war.
438345 0 -57 -4
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REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC, by J. C. Wylie, Jr.,
in U. S. NavaL Institute Proceedings, v. 78, no. 4 (Apr 1952) 351-361.
Evaluation o World War II strategic decisions and actions.
Based on:,events in the Pacific area, the study is concerned with the
Japanese decisions on whether or not to start the war, how to start it,
the selection of strategy by which the Japanese planned to fight the war,
and the effect of their limited concept of war on their strategic decision.
The strategic use of submarines by the Japanese and Americans, the two-
pronged spear across the Pacific employed by the US Armed Forces
(Central Pacific Forces and Southwest Pacific Forces), and the distinc-
tion between sequential (or directive) and cumulative strategies are sub-
jects of examination. Although all these'topics were developed from war
events in the Pacific, it is stressed that they are not limited in their ap-
plications. either in time or place.
SEA POWER IN ITS RELATION TO THE WAR OF 1812, by Alfred
T. Mahan. Boston, Little, Brown, 1905. 2 v.
STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS. Washington, Department of the
Air Force, 1954. 11 p. (AFM 1-8.)
This manual, written from the viewpoint of global strategy,
embraces the broad principles underlying the proper application of
strategic air power and relates air operations to all other military actions.
Task force characteristics, requirements, composition, and deployment.
Target selection., effects on various target systems, and the dynamic
nature of targets. Employment of strategic air forces, including control,
interdePendence flexibility, compression, and readiness. Supporting
functions and - relationships . to other forces..
? STRATEGIC AIRBORNE NOT STRATEGIC AIR, by Arthur Y G. Volz,
Jr., in Armor, v. 59, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 1950) 38-39.
Since cities and industries actually form the
Y basis of military
power, the modern air force interpreters of Clausewitz? have tra
the destruction of transferred
the enemy army into destruction of enemy ec n
The radical form of this idea has appeared in the ndestructi o omy.
ion of the
enemy industry by-atomic bombing, without land fighting" school. How-
ever the question does not concern our capacity for destruction. The
real problem facing American strategists today is whether or not suc
a program of destruction is desirable, such
In place of industrial destruction
we ought to develop a strategy of industrial seizure and
addition to replacing the paralysis. In
function of the strategic ir force
airborne, force would , the strategic
also be the modern form of the second
this the strategic airborne forces wo front. -In
? uld accomplish .a dual mission
the strategic air force cannot accomplish. which
It would accompany its eco-.
nomic strangulation (not destruction) with a? truly strategic envelopment
on.
44
STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION. by Henry A. Kissinger,
Foreign Affairs v.35, no.3 (Apr 1957) 379-394
?
.
History demonstrates that superiority in strategic doctrine
has at least as often been the cause of victory as has?'superiority
in resources. An adequate strategic doctrine is therefore the basic require-
ment of American security. Analyzes our military structure whether r n Y ture to 'see
w ,
4 of the U. S. possess a strategic doctrine concluding that
there is a lack of doctrinal agreement among the services. Another in-
hibiting factor in the development of strategic doctrine is the predomi-
nance of fiscal considerations in our defense planning. Strategic doctrine
can no longer confine itself to the problem of providing' the weapons for
war; it must al
so relate them to the purpose of war.
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE BASIC DOCTRINE. Washington,
Department of the Air Force, 1955. 10 p. (AFM 1-2.
Basic doctrine of the US Air Force for employing the nation's
air forces during all forms of international conflict. The various instru-
ments of national policy in an international conflict; and the forces which
comprise the military instrument of national policy. Characteristics of
air forces and principles for their employment. Employment of air forces
in peace and war; and timely provision of adequate air power as the para-
mount consideration for the security and well-being of the US.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; STRATEGIC PLA
FOR COALITION WARFARE 1941-1942, by Maurice Matloff and Edwin M
S
l
ne
l Washington Dttf th A
.,eparmen oermy, Office of the Chief
Military History, 1953. 454 p.
History of plans affecting the missions and dispositions of the
US Army during the early part of World War II. The volume deals brief/
with the joint war plans of the Army and Navy up to the. Fall of 1938, when
n
the planners first explicitly took into. account the possibility that the US.
might be drawn into a world-wide war between two coalitions.: From th
Fall of 1938 it 'follows the story of plans as they directly -concerned the'
Army until the beginning of 1943. From that point in World War II,- con-
veniently marked by the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, of the Y ,? the role
US Army in strategic planning changed. These developments will
be the subject of further treatment in subsequent volumes. Appendixes
show: (a) outline plan for the invasion of Western Europe; (b) War Depart-
ment draft of instructions for London Conference; (c) monthly
of ~ () distribution
total Army strength in Continental- United States and. o
November 1941 through December 1942; (d) geographic distribution of
Army strength in overseas theaters in December 1942;. (e) shipment of
divisions in 1942; (f)? dead-weight tonnage of vessels'under
in Pacific Army control
and Atlantic areas from November 1941 through December 1942?
US Army overseas deployment in October 1941; (h) areas, of strategic
responsibility and US Army overseas deployment in April 1942 and? (i ) US'
Army overseas ?,
deployment and theater boundaries in December 1942.
45
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 I
WHY THE H-BOMB WIPES OFF THE "NEW LOOK," by B.. H.
Liddell Hart, in World, v,1, no, 15 (1 June 1954) 12-14.
Contends That the "new look" policy of massive retaliation was
obsolete when it appeared. Flexible defense is the answer to the commu-
nists' new strategy of infiltration.
f. U.S.S.R.
COMMUNISM AND AIR POWER; A SURVEY OF POSSIBLE COM-
MUNIST AIR STRATEGIES, by Stefan T. Posson' in
Y~ Air Universit
Quarterly Review, v, 7, no. 3 (Winter 1954-55 43-54
pus.
Three patterns of atomic war which may be considered b the
Soviet Union: (1) an atomic blitz inevi Y
tably provoking massive atomic
retaliation and ending in mutual suicide for the nation
lullin of the s involved; (2) the
g West into disarmament, followed by an atomic blitz to finish
off the West's weakened re nish
taliatory capability and ending in victor for the
Soviet Union; and (3) a series of local at Y
the initiative omit wars, in which possession of
would enable the Soviet Union to attrite the West's
retaliatory
capacity to a point where global atomic war could be launched
ex-
cessive risk to the without Soviet Union.
JOHN BLOCH - - A NEGLECTED PROPHET b Adolph
arten in ~ Y G. Rosen-
g , .Tr., Military . Review, v. 37, no. l (Apr 1957 27-3.9.
Attaching greater importance to the common man
rise of the modern industrial state; John Bloch (advisor to the Russian -
Czar); contradicted orthodox military doctrine in
forecasting and the course
consequences of World War I in his work THE
( FUTURE WAR IN IT
TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS, published in
1898). This article resurrects?the book and indicates the military and ,
political, significance of it during the era in'which
lessons it was written, and the
which it provides for doctrines and policies
of today.
A MILITARY FORECAST, by Air Marshal Douglas
Forces Magazine Colyer, in
(Mar 1955) 13-14.
Interpretation of the probable pattern of S
in the opening Quiet military action
stage of a future war. The Possibility that t
develop into a hot war b he cold war may
by a series"of almost imperceptible Y
of the Soviet Navy's submarine fast destroyer, and cruiser fleet ?
the Army and Air Force; and the be inni of sae of
for g ~ a Western global strategy
defense against communist aggression,
46
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SOVIET BID FOR THE ,SEA, by Rear Adm. E. M. Eller, in U. S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 6 June 1955 619-627.
The Soviet coon is the world's second strongest seapower with
the most modern navy afloat. It is constantly growing, and will someday
challenge the US directly in a contest for the control of the seas. Applying
the lessons of World War II the Soviet Union is avoiding the naval mistakes
of Germany and Japan and is building the type of fleet and merchant marine
to give it logistical support that will be able to carry out any of the opera-
tions of modern naval combat, Admiral Eller evaluates the role and the
place of the Soviet Navy in USSR's strategy for world conquest; its growth
since 19 30 while the rest of the world paid no heed; and the challenge, and
threat it presents to US where public opinion fails to comprehend that the
destiny and security of America are inseparable from the sea and a strong
Navy capable of protecting it. -
THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF TAKES STOCK; CHANGES IN
MILITARY DOCTRINE, in World Today, v, 11, no, 11 (Nov 1955 492-502.
The adjustment o Soviet military doctrine to the new situation
created by the Soviet Union's changed position in the world and b the de-
velopment of at Y
omit and thermonuclear weapons. Analysis of the four
components of the old doctrine: party dogma, military ideology, military
science, and military art. Changes which have taken place in the im-
portant principles of encirclement, relative strength, and surprise ag-
gression. Instructions which have been issued to the Armed Forces to
conform with the changed meaning of these principles.
SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
by Raymond L
Garthoff
Glencoe
,
.
.
,
Ill., The Free Press, 1953, 587 p.
This study is a contribution to the research program conducted
for USAF by the Rand Corporation. The pattern of this doctrine and some
interpretations of its basis. The relation between Soviet military doctrine
and Soviet political doctrine and,strategy. An analysis of the current'
c;
basic Soviet principles of war, Examination of the operational, tactical, y
and organizational field doctrine of the various combat arms of the Soviet
armed forces. The missions of land power, airpower, and sea power -in
Soviet doctrine and the doctrine for implementing these missions
-
A
a~
.
p
pendix includes: organization of the Soviet armed,forces; and a bibliog-
raphy. '
SOVIET MILITARY THINKING SINCE STALIN, by N. Gala , in
A Y
rmY, v. 7, no. 2 (Sept 1956) 59-61. .
In their diagnosis of Stalin's "constant factors," (of Soviet
military theory) Soviet military theoreticians accept Western thought
though twisting .it to fit the dogmas of Marx and Lenin,'
47
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SUVOROV, by Brig. Gen. C. Mc; I. Delf, in Army Quarterly,.
V. 69, no..l (Oct. 1954) 94-100.
The personal characteristics and generalship of the Russian
general, and,his strategy and tactics in fighting the French Revolutionary
armies in Italy in, 1799.. His campaign demonstrated Russian capabilities
and qualities-which are still applicable - a disregard for logistics, an
Asiatic unconcern for human life and hardihood and fortitude of the indi-
vidual soldier and his fanatical devotion to his leader. -
SUVOROV; A RUSSIAN TRADITION, by Col. J. D. Hittle, in
Marine Corps Gazette, v. 37, no. 8 (Aug 1953) 40-47.
The career of and the command principles employed by this
Russian general. His methods of training and commanding men; the
modern concepts of his operations in the eighteenth century; and brief
description of some of his campaigns. Excerpts from his work THE -
SCIENCE OF VICTORY.
4. Tactics
a. General Aspects
CONSEQUENCES. OF PROGRESS IN ARMAMENT. Consequences
des progres de l'armement, by Gen. Audet, in Revue de Defense
? Nationale, v.10 -(Oct 1954) 255-275. In French.
A French Army general's concept of how future military _
.
operations will be governed by the use of atomic weapons and the ?devel-
bpment of. mobility, particularly the type of mobility Provided by aircraft
..
. - DECISION IN THE FACE OF DEFEAT, by Col. Alexander. D. Surles,
Jr., in Military Review, v. 34, no. 12 (Mar 1955) 24-34.
Problems commanders will face in any future war, and -
historical examples to justify the requirement of a, new doctrine. Inherent
in this new doctrine must be more dispersion, more flexibility, additional
and alternate channels of communication, greater decentralization of
responsibility and initiative, a more streamlined organization and less
concern with the loss of real estate,, as such. A sounder discipline is es-
sential - a discipline which must be based on the increased effectiveness
of our junior leaders, and an improved system of training must
be evolved
48
which recognizes and includes the chaos and confusion of combat, .the
loneliness of the battlefield, and the increasing requirement for tumor
without comforting directives from above.
FIRST BLUEPRINT FOR ATOMIC WAR, in U. S. News and
Report, v 3 World
_8, no. 8 (25 Feb 1955) 24-28 plus.
The new concept of Allied tactics in Europe.
Under this con-
cept, NATO Forces will meet a Russian attack by using combined round-
air operations on the threshold i
of East Europe and seize the initiative with
atomic firepower. The old concept of retreating behind the Rhine, then
fighting back, is out., If the Russians choose war, their armies will be
hit at the Iron Curtain. NATO's war plans; availability of manpower,
planes, guns, and missiles to support the new strategy and tactics; and
how manpower and weapons are to be used in case of a Russian attack.
GRAND TACTICS IN MODERN WAR, by Ma'. Gen. B. T. Wilson
in Army Quarterly, v. 69, no. 2 (Jan 1955) 185-193.
Historical examples, especially from World War II of the
application of grand tactics which are defined as the art of stringing
~ battles together and of fighting them to the best advantage. Such tactics
are attributed to Moltke, Guderian, Montgomery, Rommel, and others
GROUND DEFENSE IN THE ATOMIC ERA, in Tairiku Mondai
(Mar 1956) 12-20. Translated from Japanese.
Stenographic record of a. round-table conference held recently
by the Asiatic Mainland Research Society.. It was noted that the introduc-
tion of missiles into warfare is resulting in new tactics and requiring
alteratIon in the organizatinfdit
o o,groun uns.
IMPACT OF ATOMIC WARFARE ON AIRBORNE OPERATIONS,' by
lit. Col. Norman E. Martin, in Military Review, v.34, no. 10 (Jan 1955)
25-31,
An appraisal of the effect of atomic weapons, employed both
offensively and defensively, on airborne operations. The impact of
atomic warfare on the following three principal phases of an airborne
operation: marshalling, movement to the objective area, and operations
in the airhead. The greatest threat to an airborne operation, from the.
standpoint of enemy atomic capabilities, , occurs after the airborne force
has- been delivered into the airhead, and not during the marshalling or
movement phases.
49
i-I
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ON DEFENSE, by Lt, Col. Lewis
IMPACT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS ..
-
C. Taynton,. in Military Review, v. 36, no. 6 (Sept 1956) 4957?,
've positions
The?.t reat o an atomic attack against defense p
laces additional emphasis on greater dispersion, passive protective
:
P
measures, the employment of mobile reserves, and on active security
measures.
IMPACT OF MISSILES ON TACTICAL DOCTRINE, by Gen. W. G.
-
st v. l1, no.12 (Dec 1956) 114-124.
W an; ~inArm .InformationDi e The doctrine to
guide an Army equipped with guided missiles
?
and nuclear warheads must match in scope and flexibility the war-making means now provided by atomic missiles. Of equal and vital importance,
~ s pos
this new doctrine must consider the threat established by the enemy
session-of a similar missile capability."
INFANTRY IN MODERN BATTLE; ITS ORGANIZATION AND TRAIN-
ING, by Gen. :Richand N. Gale, in Canadian Arm Journal, v. 9, no. l
(Jan 1955) 52-53. How use of atomic weapons will affect the conduct of battle.
Concealment discipline, cover, and sensible dispersion will be necessary. Air su eriorit is not indispensable, but available air resources should be
p y
put to skillful, economic, and worthwhile use. Scientific developments
must be related to the, generally accepted order of battle and equipment of
,
divisions. Correct handling of tanks and tank-infantry cooperation should dominate tactical thought. Tactically, all resources must be exploited
along with skillful use -of ground, surprise, - and use of cover, darkness,
mist or fog, and smoke. Simple tactical exercises without troops should
,
be worked out to stimulate thought and develop technique, later to-be used
with troops on battalion scale,
THE MISSIONS OF TACTICAL AVIATION IN ATOMIC WARFARE.
Les missions de?l'aviation tactique en erre atomique, by Camille
Rbu8eron, -inForces Aeriennes F rancaises, no. 103 (Apr ,1955) 617-
631. In Frenc .
The effects-of atomic and thermonuclear bombs and radio-
activity;'the role of aircraft in direct support concentrated about fifty-
kilometers behind the, front and with the mission of covering the sector
with hundreds of radioactive craters; and responsible for indirect sup-
port by means of strategic bombing with thermonuclear bombs delivered
by guided missiles and heavy fighter-bombers.
50
"POINT OF NO RETURN" by Mai, F, Le. G. Whetting, in Journal
of the Royal Artiller, v.82, no. 2. A r 1955
(P ) 81-94, ,
Characteristics and effects of the atomic bomb; deployment of
infantry and armor on a wi
de front in atomic war; -factors affecting artiller
in defense; present artiller weapons y
Y in the light of atomic warfare; recom-
mended changes in the organization of infantry and deployment y nd armored divisions; acid '
of the artillery, incorporating recommended organizational'
changes
REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF AIR SUPPORT. Reflexions
sur la notion d'appui aerien, by Lt, Col. J. L. ?Lecerf in Revue de
Defense Nationale, v,10 (Oct 1954 286-297. In French:
En view of recent progress in armament and the evolution of
tactical operations, the concept of air support under French doctrine has
recently been changed from "support of an-arm " to "participation- in a
joint battle." Thi y
J This provides a clearer distinction between the two types
of action autonomous and '
( point) which the French Air Force can imple-
ment within the scope of a glven,mission involving all armed forces.
THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF SIR FRANCIS' DRAKE, b
Arthur Stanley Riggs, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 76, no. 12
(Dec ,1950) 1345-1359.
A brief review of Drake's part in English history in which the
thinking and action of this sailor, tactician, and father of amphibious war-
fare are reviewed. Considered not from the historical point of view, 'but
as patterns of thought and action applicable in the future as they were in
the past. ,
TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN A FUTURE WAR; by. Group Capt. E. W,`
Pinto, in Military Review, v. 35, no. l (Apr 1955) 89-95.
Conclusions drawn from World War II experiences with
respect
to the employment of tactical airpower in the following missions:. (1) gain-
ing and maintaining air superiority in the theater of operations; (2) interdic-
tion -of the battle area to deny movement of enemy troops and supplies; (3)
provision of close air support to the land forces in.the battle area; and (4),
air reconnaissance (strategic reconnaissance for both ground and air force,
needs, tactical reconnaissance mainly for the ground forces, and artillery
reconnaissance). The integrated organization of the tactical air force
(which will hold good in any future war). with its -own command and coequal
with the ground forces has demonstrated the strength and versatility of air
power. -
-51
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THE TACTICAL ORGANIZATION OF TROOPS, by Gen. Blumentrflt,
in Military Review, v. 34, no. 5 (Aug 1954) 8-23.
o enable the modern student to understand current military
developments; and to sense future trends, it is essential that we have a-
thorough knowledge. of,historY and understand the evolution of formations."
,
This, study is based upon recollections of the author's experience as a
teacher:;of tactics at the Berlin Kriegsakademie from 1933 to 1935. He
reviews the battle formations of the Greeks, Romans, during the Middle
Ages and the early modern times, in the eighteen century, armies, and
during both World Wars.
THE TEAM OF MOBILE WARFARE: ARMOR AND AIRBORNE, by
Capt. Everett C. Royal, in Armor, v. 64, no. 2 (Mar-Apr ' 1955) 4-6. -
Armor and airborne forces are complementary forces which,
~f' united as an operational team under one .commander, form one of the
most effective combinations it is possible to devise, because they possess
the highly desirable characteristics of mobility, firepower, and shock
action. ,:More combined arms training by these two forces is absolutely
necessary.
A VERIFICATION OF LANCHESTER'S LAW, by J. H. Engel, in
Operations Research Society of America, Journal, v. 2, no. 2 (May 1954)
163_171.
A mathematical technique for verifying the applicability of a
certain type of generalized Lanchester equations. The law states that the
strength of a combat force is proportional to the square of the number of
combatants entering a battle. The technique is applied in an analysis of
the battle for Iwo Jima, and it is found that. the equations did describe the
situation. Such analyses will increase in value when repeated often
enough to permit general conclusions to be drawn.
WARFARE TODAY; HOW MODERN BATTLES ARE PLANNED AND
FOUGHT ON LAND, AT SEA, AND IN THE AIR, ed. by Adm. Sir Reginald
Bacon and others. London, Odhams Press, 1944. 256 p.
Contents: Features of modern war; the war on land; develop-
ment of armoured forces; the attack of' armoured forces; defense against
armoured attack; how air power affects land warfare; fighter defense;
fighter offense; bomber offense; air power at sea; fleet air arm; sea war-
fare-offense; sea warfare defense; combined operations; airborne attack.
b. Germany - Historical Examples
52
DEFEAT OF THE LUFTWAFFE: FUNDAMENTAL 'CAUSES, b
Gen. ? Adolf Galland Y
in Air University Quarterly Review, v; 6., ho: 1"?
(Spring 1953) 18-36. "
A former general of the German Air Force discusses 'the, "
factors responsible for the decline and poor showing of the Luftwaffe dur-
ing the later stages of World War II - factors which stemmed from: 1
deficiencies of organization and training; (2) internal influences, such as
Hitler's stoppage order for research and development, the .lack of a clear
operational plan for the offensive against England, technical inadequacies,
the lack of q
night fighter aircraft, and others; and (3) the effects of Allied
strategic air attacks.
GAS ATTACK AT YPRES; A STUDY IN MILITARY HISTORY, by.
Rudolph Hanslian. Edgewood Arsenal, Md., Chemical Warfare School,
1940. 55 p. (Pamphlet No. 8. )
Account by a German authority of the first chemical warfare
success in military history. Preparations for the attack, analysis of the
military action, and French and British reactions as noted in their official
reports. Eye-witness testimony and conclusions.
HOW HITLER BROKE THROUGH IN THE WEST, by Capt. B. H.
Liddell Hart, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 12 (Mar 1957) 52-62.
"The course o the world in our time was changed, with far-
reaching effects on the future of all peoples, when Hitler's forces broke
through the defense of the West in May 1940." The author feels that it
was one of the most sweeping victories in modern history and although
Germany was defeated in the end, it remains doubtful whether the con-
sequences of the breakdown in West's defenses can ever be redeemed.
SWORD OF SILK, by Capt. Boyd T. Bashore, in Infantry School.
Quarterly, v. 46, no.4 Oct 1956 56-69; v. 47, no. 1 Jan 1 64-76.
A two part article based on tape recorded interviews with
German, General Kurt Student on how the Germans' developed and employed
strategic airborne warfare, how Hitler failed to grasp its significance,
and' how' we profited from German experience and, soon outstripped them.
c. United States
ADAPTABILITY: INDEX TO SURVNABILITY by Gen, W., G..
Wyman, in Arm Information Digest, v. 12, no. 61 (June 1957) 2-11..:
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G 19.
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he Army's..program for tactical employment of mobile forces
on the atomic battlefield is
an-important transitional step, keeping the
Army abreast of evolutionary ?changes in?technolo and materiel. Charts
show gY
organization of mobile forces.
~YZ
p
AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS, Washington, Department
of the Ar
Force 1954: 17 p. (AFM 1-4.
Provides the basis for an understanding of the manner in which
the air defense of the US is operated. Functions of air defense; and
its
utilization of basic Air Force units, Arm and Navy forces and civilians.
Y '
Planning, command and organization, and training for air defense. Types
of operations for air defense; and procedures and methods of air defense
operations.
ATOMIC DEFENSE RECONSIDERED, by Lt. ` Col. Seymour
L. _
Goldberg, in Infantry School Quarterly, v.47, no, l (Jan 1957) 41-49.
Another concept or defense against atomic weapons is pre-
sented: linear defensive positions in great depth with dispersion at all
echelons consistent with the mission as the answer to defense on the
atomic battlefield.
BATTLE REPORT; THE WAR IN KOREA, by Walter Kari Malcolm
W. Cagle, and -Frank A. Manson g'
New York, Rinehart, 1952. 520 p;
History compiled from official records and accounts by combat
correspondents of US Navy and Marine Corps actions in Korea from the
outbreak of war through the evacuation at Hungnam. The beginning of hos-
tilities;. Navy activity around the Pusan perimeter; employment of
carrier-
based planes; the preparation, and execution 'of the Inchon landing; the u
to the Yalu River; and the hard-fought " push
. advance in another direction" that
ended in evacuation.
CAVALRY, AND I DON'T MEAN HORSES, by Mai. Gen. Jam -
Gavin, in Har er's, v. 208, no. 1247 (A p 195 es M.
(p 4) 54-60.
- The success- of future warfare will
e de Pend
on how well a nations
forces arPrePaced for operations based on the concepts of
and firepower, General Walker's forces were defeated mobility, shock,
d in Korea in June
1950 because the factors of mobility, sur rise
his dis osal P , and firepower were not
p against the attacking North Koreans. E at
p in World
War II also indicate that whenever these factors were
they spelled the difference between victory present or defeat. The advent of
p special premium on top rate mobilit atomic
combat. The US ;Arm is y and firepower in round
y getting bogged down with heav g
Y equipment, there-
54
fore, US military preparedness should be directed 'toward the classic con-
cept of cavalry, whereby infantry, armor, and air will become
give the US ~ a team to
mobility and momentum over its otential adversaries and to.
et there "fust " ~~ '
g est with the mostest and not lastest with the leastest."
CAVALRY OF THE SKY; THE STORY OF U. S. MARINE COMBAT
HELICOPTERS, by Lynn Montross. New York, Harper, 1954. 270 p.
The development of Marine helicopter combat tactics and tech-
niques since 1947, and employment of combat helicopters in Marine opera-
tions in Korea. Appended: US Marine Corps helicopter units and com-
manding officers, and glossary of military and aeronautical terms. Bib-
liography, photos, maps, sketches, charts, and diagrams.
DEVELOPING TOMORROWS ARMY TODAY, by Brig, Gen.
Frederick W. Gibb, in Army Information Digest, v. 12, no. 6 (June 1957)
24-33.
At the US Army Combat Development Experimentation Center,
Fort Ord, Calif., new concepts, organization, and doctrine are subjected
to exhaustive tests to keep pace with advances in technology.
LESSONS FROM KOREA, by Fridolin von Senger and Etterlin, in
Cosantoir, The Irish Defence Journal, v. 11, no, l (Jan 1951) 2-7.
In the Korean war, two main experiences of World Wars I and
II have been reaffirmed: (1) occupation of territory in an initial phase of
war does not pay if the territory occupied is only a fraction of thatbelong-
ing to a world-wide belligerent coalition; and (2) manpower is indispensa-
ble; and lack of manpower inevitably induces the nation affected to re-
place-manpower by technique. Analogies are drawn between the 'Koren.
campaigns and battles in World Wars I and II indicating the ?necessity for
choosing ,a battlefield which by its lines of defense allows shortage of
manpower to be made up by naval superiority, or, if manpower is abso-'.
lutely inadequate for a defensive battle, for avoiding engagement and
withdrawing in 'time in order to commence a war of maneuver in which
mobile and armored divisions have' already scored successes.
NOTES ON DEFENSE, by Maj. Melbourne. C. Chandler,. in Military
Review, v. 34, no. 11 (Feb 1955) 38-49?
Because the ideal conditions in defense have been overem-
phasized in US training, the military student has a tendency to visualize
all defense under ideal conditions with an almost flankless front. It, is
not 'the intent of the author to propose changes in US Army's doctrine of
,
55
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command, Limited to a general summary of the princi les, doctrine tac-
tics and techniques P '
of the combat phase of tactical air. operations as they
affect surface operations. APpended: charts showing organization of USAF
and major commands; World War II Army comments on the, effects of tac-
tical air support; joint Army-Air Force agreement on air control teams;
new terminology used in joint air-ground operations; numbers of aircraft .
assigned to various types of. units (war strength); standardization factors
for use in map maneuvers; guide to aircraft employment; ground target
damage assessment chart; tactical air missions chart; and procedures for
obtaining offensive air support and tactical air reconnaissance,
defense, but rather :to indicate those fundamentals requiring greater em-
phasis,.when conducting a: defense in the future. To this end he discusses:
defense in depth; organization of the defense area; factors determining the
size of,.units,needed for the defense of an area; conduct of the defense;
artillery positions in defense areas and planning of artillery fires during
.the conduct of the defense; defense against
armored attacks; rear area
security and reserves; and the role of mobility and speed in the defense
of the future. Active and aggressive defense aimed at killing the enemy
rather-than merely stopping or repelling him must be emphasized.
A SEMINAR ON MOBILITY IN WARFARE, by 2nd Lt. David Drew
Gilpatrick, in Armor,., v. 64, no. 4 (July-Aug 1955) 14-17.
To asst US Military Academy cadets in developing a sound
professional base, a group of officers at the Military Academy recently
conducted a seminar at which the .following- areas were discussed: (.a) the
development and progress of mobility in the employment of cavalry armor
infantry, artillery, ? signal, and engineers; (b) the development and progress
of mobility in the employment of the tactical air-ground team; (c) the devel-
opment and requirements for staff action in mobile warfare and more spe-
cifically, the development of th the mission-type order; and (d) possible char-
acteristics'of the war of the future. The mechanics of the seminar, which
are described, can be readily adapted to units in the field. Such a seminar
can be held at company, battalion, or combat command level. A book bib-
liography is appended to assist anyone interested in setting up a similar
study group.
TOMORROW'S INFANTRY
TODAY, by Brig. Gen. Carl F. Fritzsche,
in Arniy Cbmbat Forces Journal, v. 5, no. 9 (Apr 1955) 20-24.
- Tactics of atomic war developed at the Infantry School are based
on the, concepts of dispersion, mobility, and protection. The co'
ncept of dis-
persion requires?,independent and semi-independent operations by single e bat-
talions and rapid concentration, ,when needed, near the enemy, which fn turn
requires emphasis on communications and improvement of existing security
means.. ;The concept of mobility requires modern types of round
as well as development of air mobility through use of assault transports,
helicopters, and parachutes. The cone t of p protection places greater em-
phasis on movement and maneuver at night. -The new doctrine'
of mobile de-
fense is that of an offensive defense deploying battalion-size units of com-
bined arms in positions of depth as strong-points or grouped on islands of
resistance. Studies conducted by the Infantry School in fire-
ordination and improved assault techniques. - support co-
US AIR FORCE BASIC DATA. Fort Leavenworth Kans.,
and General Staff Colle a., 1954 Command
g 65 p. (ST 31-35-i.).
Organization and operation of theater air forces at all levels of
d. U.S.S.R.
IRON CURTAIN STRATEGY, in East and West, no.4 (1955) 16-19.
The concept of double envelopment (obkhvat) is a favored move-
ment in the Soviet strategic doctrine. It will, in all probability, be applied
when the Soviet General Staff decides upon the 'H" hour, It is an axiom of
Soviet strategy that successful land operations must be carried out on the
largest possible territory with sufficient reserve of area in the rear to fall
back upon in case they are attacked or for maneuvering in preparation for
their own offensive of counter-offensive operations. In this light examines
military and political aspects of the central part of the East-West Front in
Europe where the Soviets on their side have an immense territory of more
than 9 million square miles, and the Western Powers are badly squeezed
into a narrow strip of round of just over 300, 000 square miles between the
Iron Curtain and the Atlantic.
OPERATIONS IN THE-TAIGA, by Lt. Col. Raymond L. V. Pearson,
in Military Review, v. 37, no. 1 (Apr 1957) 40-52., -.
Whether future wars are nuclear or nonnuclear, big or little, .
or fought in the forest, bungle, mountain, ox plain area, our ground forces
must -be equipped and trained to utilize climatic and terrain
conditions.
The lessons of the Finnish-Russian wars of 1939 and 1944 are evaluated.
SOVIET ARMOURED PRINCIPLES, by Maj. ?M. F. Vassilieff, in
An Cosantoir, v. 15, no. 10 (Oct 1955) 469-477.
'Experiences of World War II show that the Soviet Command
massed tanks together in the decisive direction instead of dispersing them
along a whole front. Beginning with Stalingrad,' the High Command put into
effect new forms of attack operations, with groups of tanks in formation of
many successive echelon's oriented in the direction of the decisive blow.
This enabled penetrations of up to 300 miles at rates of fifteen -to twent
Y
miles in twenty-four hours. Organizational structure of a present Soviet`;
tank corps. (Translated from Russian by Capt. D. N. Brunicardi. )
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A SURVEY OF SOVIET ARMOR, by Michael S. Davison, in Armor,
v.60, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1951) ?34-40.
The following conclusions are drawn after surveying tactics
(pre-war concepts, World War II - offense, World War .11 - defense,
operations at aught, and operations in winter), organization, training,
and qualities of the Soviet soldier: offensive operations of Soviet armor
are characterized by deliberation with emphasis on detailed planning and
careful rehearsals; the motivating factor of the offense is the massive
infantry assault, saturated with tanks and given violent artillery and air
support;. the continuity of the attack is maintained by around-the-clock
operations; the conduct of the defense is marked by great tenacity and by
the employment of reserves in coordinated counterattack rather than in
piece'-meal commitment; the organization appears to be flexible, adapted
to the mission and the material available; training is intensive and-
realistic and an eye on terrain and climate; the Soviet soldier is a -very
capable fighting man with a strong sense of patriotism; and armor is an
essential- component of the Soviet combined arms team. Its employment
is tacticaiy sound and its material is of a high order.
5. Logistics
a. \1IsceUaneous Aspects
? THE FUTURE OF MILITARY AIR LOGISTICS, in Interavia,- v. 11,
no.4 (Apr 1956) 263-256. -
The four ,jet transport formula which has just es
just established itself
in the ?id clvii market 'will also profoundly change military air logistics
a moat all the ply of the military?staffs whose responsibilities have
e~zasnied to an innterc onanent1 scale. In fact, since both the load ca a-
4laes:mod the c~ ~I-ing aneeds of the ne P
~ ; new your-jet transports are more than
as m-e eni figs, their advent will enable the number of
qI, ~"sf~ ~m Muir to more a siren load over long distances to be
~ divided
by iZ.
GLOB2.L I.t3tii~TIQ AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943 by Richard .~ ~ . ~. ~.-, . ~ ~ Y hard M.
w. ley. Washinton, De artment of
~_. P the Army,
ta~C' of i .y. syory, 1956. 'S0 p.
? IMPLICATIONS.OF THE MISSILE ERA, in Army, v.7, no. 4 (Nov'
1956) 22.
".... Our war power really is the means we have times its
mobility. You can have everything in the world you might need to win a
war but if you can't get it there, you get second prize, which means you
have lost..." (Partial transcript of a,radio broadcast by Lt: Gen. James
M. Gavin on "Survival in the Air Age? over MBS during which he de-
scribed the strategic and tactical implications of the missile era. )
"THE INFLUENCE OF LOGISTICS ON MILITARY STRATEGY"
ADAPTED FROM LECTURES TO THE CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE,
by Mai. Gen. G. S. Hatton, in Army Quarterly, v. 72, no. 2 (July 1956)
173-181.
With historical examples, the influence of maritime and air
power, and in the atomic age.
LOGISTICS IN WORLD WAR II; A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY,
by Robert Greenhalgh Albion, in United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
v. 83, no. l (Jan 1957) 97-102.
A survey of published works (official and unofficial US and
British histories) dealing with the various aspects of logistics in World
War II.
A NEW FIELD FOR LOGISTICS RESEARCH, by Rear Adm. Bern
Anderson, in Naval Research Logistics Quarterly,, v,1, no. 2 (June 1954)
79-81.
An intensive study'of the German logistics system during the
Italian campaign would be a fruitful field of research. The German troop
movements and concentrations were made. quickly and effectively, and
they must have been backed by a smoothly functioning supply and administration system. The major moves made by German units to demon-
strate their rapidity. The German supply. organization, planning factors,
and requirements could be. studied 'with profit.
PRACTICAL AIDS TO LOGISTIC PLANNING, by Herbert A. Jordan,
in Military Review, v.32, no. 3 (June'1952) 34-48.
Principles, short cuts, and time savers which were applied,
successfully in the past and which may serve as a guide in developing
similar aids to meet the requirements of a particular planning staff.
438345 0-57 -5
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TEN YEARS AGO... THE PREPARATION OF THE LANDING
OPERATIONS. Voici dix ans... La preparation du debarquement, ) y
Georges Blond, in Miroir de l'Histoire, v.5, no, 53 (1954) 666-680.
In, French.
The preparations for Allied landing operations in France in
1944, including: the construction of "prefabricated ports, " the designa-
tion. of "blockships" destined to be sunk along the French coast to offer
protection for the small landing operations, the construction of the in-
vasion fleet, operation PLUTO (pipe-line-under-the-ocean), and the
organization of the troop transports.
b. United States
ARMS: FOR OUR ALLIES, by Brig. Gen. Joseph M. Colby, in
Qrdnance, v.40, no. 21.1 (July-Aug 1955) 49-53.
An account of the Offshore Procurement Program which in
addition_to,providing guns and ammunition for the NATO armies, has aided
European economic recovery and helped' reestablish a dispersed munitions-
pr-oduction:baae abroad.
KQREA AND. LOGISTICS; by James A. Huston, in Military Review,
v:36,,_ no-.11(Feb. 1.957) 18-32.
United States. support in the conflict in Korea was one of the
greatest logistical efforts in our history. The lessons learned and the
procedures-developed there should prove of tremendous value in the- future.
('This article is, taken from a study on "Logistical Support for the Conflict
.
in.Korea, ;,,written.by Dr. Huston: for' the Office of the Chief of Military
History; D'eparrment bf the: Army.)
KOREA: THE MILITARY LESSON, by Eric Larrabee, in Harper's
Magazine, no. 1206 (Nov 1950) 51-57.
The ability of Communist armies to 'live off the country,
largely eliminating the lines of supply and communication which our air
power intends to destroy, accounts for the failure of the North Koreans
to collapse under our air attacks. If we are to be successful in. counter-
ing Communist aggression wherever it occurs,, we must change our basic
philosophy concerning the mountains of supplies necessary to support a
field army. We can no longer" on
afford the largesse that put 'ten. tons of
supp v`behind everyman in the European theater; we are simply nAt that
rich. '' R duci. g the non-essential supplies will allow a reduction in the'
pxeaentl rwasted?manpower needed to handle these supplies
in rear areas.
.-...,~aaarC:;:,,s,ucE.iri.S n.' ;l': ~ ~pr;:,r?+.e wr;::~3?:r{~.~~~. - _
The author advocates a reduction in the size of our infantry division and
the extension of airborne planning. He warns that w
we must overcome our
Present-disadvantages of an unwieldy Army and overtaxed supply
if we are to successfully counter future Soviet moves in the Korean pattern.
17
LOGISTICAL MUSCLES BY MISSILES, by Lt. Col. Robert B. Ri
in Arm , v. 6 no. 10 1956 28- gg'
_~ ~ (May ) 29.
Predicts that in the future - "perhaps in less than ten, years"
the Army will have a family of guided missiles carrying supplies to units
in combat. How such guided missile supply ships will be used,' and the
impact they will have on ground warfare.
LOGISTICS AND WORLD WAR II ARMY STRATEGY, by Col. 'H. F.
Sykes, Jr., in Military Review, v.35, no.2 (Feb 1956) 47-54.
Explores the interplay between the grand strategic and logistic
decisions of the US Army during World War II and concludes that the pro-
jection of military requirements must be on the broadest possible basis
and must allow for flexibility and alternative courses of action. The idea
that a single set of requirements tied to a single strategic plan furnishes
a proper basis for wartime production should be shunned. What is needed
is a pattern of production which can support many courses of action while
precisely fitted to no one of them.
LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY. PLANNING FOR BOTH MUST BE
INTEGRATED AND CONCURRENT, by F. S. Low, in Ordnance, v. 35,
no. 184 (Jan-Feb 1951) 302-304.
Discussion, of the close relationship between strategy and
logistics as demonstrated, by the instance of the Guadalcanal campaign in
World War II. - In surveying Korean logistics, the author concludes that
"w.e reacted surprisingly well militarily in the Korean operation" because'
we had learned the basic necessity for relating strategy to logistics.
Strategic plans for future warfare will not be able to contemplate any
major operations during the first eighteen to twenty-four months of an
emergency unless the necessary supplies are on hand at the start; or the
production cycle is well started. '
LOGISTICS AND THE SUPERWEAPONS, by Maj. Thomas 'J. Mc-
Donald, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 8 (Nov 1955) 39-46. ?
Fighting forces are no better than the logistical system that
supports them, and logistical planning must be oriented accordingly. How-
ever, changes in organization for sake of change must be avoided., The
- 61
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author, asks -what course ,must the strategic commander and his to g
istcian
? take in:planung ;during, a- cold war, to prepare for both nonnuclear and lim-
ited nuclear,war,, or possibly:thermonuclear war, and then : .- proposes
a
new approach to logistics based on:. 1 careful screening of our equip-
merit'needs, 2 full use of all applicable
() developments in the field of com-
munications, (3) more airlift fbr the support of ground force operations,
(4) radical improvements in the overland capabilities of land transport,
and 5 () logistical reorganization, designed to exploit all the possibilities
which exist' from th e most modern to the most primitive, because both
maybe required.'
MODERN ARMY SUPPLY SYSTEM, by Joseph A. Bourdow, in -
Army, v. 6,? no. 12 (July 195.6) 33-35,
How data processing and computers are used by the US Army
in PROJECT MASS (Modern Army Supply System) which was designed as
a test, operation of the Army t, ogi. stcal system and its capabilities to -
sup-
port-the mobile; flexible field?Army?that is coming. MASS begins on
1, July 1956 with, the Seventh Army in the role of a guinea pig. Photo of a
computer and a transceiver which?examplify the electronic equipment that
will keep MASS going at full, speed.
W .. .
A "NEW LOOK" FOR ARMY LOGISTICS, by Lt, Col. Prentiss B.
Reed, Jr., in Military Review, v. 35, no, 3 (June 1955 37-44.
The actors to be considered if the US logistical system consist-
ing the vast technolo is -
~ g al industrial complexes is to survive in atomic
warfare. We must analyze the Zone of Interior logistical structure for over-
concentrations, single-facility operations, and excessive) unified control of
operations, and initiate an ' y
a immediate program to correct these conditions in
the ZI Field plant; steps must be taken to eliminate the dangerous vulnerabil-
ity of the logistical structure of our existing overseas commands and bases;
the new and forceful reasons for restoring a military charac
ter to logistical
operations must be clearly conveyed to the officer corps, and the trainin
our? officers young must restore major-emphasis on .developing the desi
seek and carry responsibility; US must never-again become involved in a
theater of operations as it did in Korea, on an unplanned,
conceived in shoestring basis,
terms of the preatomic World War II
:a logistical scheme of oper-
ations; nd the greatest single lesson in logistics in Korea was that it dem-
onstrated that the logistical' operations there were the la
II t st of the World War
YPe,
endeavors of this nature. A long-range program, consistent with the needs
of the countries involved, is required fo
concerned for maximum effectiveness, It is
with the introduction of US military equipment and supply, its.
employment and maintenance with training and schooling - es ec'ally
pertains to the employment, care a p r quip-
nd maintenance of the American e
ment furnished, -
STRATEGIC MOBILITY, by Ma', Gen. Earle
Informati G. ? Wheeler; in,Arm,;
Information ~ Digest, v, 12, no, 1, (Jan 1957 3-12. ? ---~
Our deterrent capability for heading off local
ability to win a wars .and our ,
general war depends in large measure on strategic mobility. Director of Plans Offic Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Militar
Operations, Department' of the Arm defin Y
mobility " ~~ Y, es the meaning of strategic
y as getting there and describes how airlift and se
the Army's capability f alift enhance
or modern warfare. -
C. Defense Establishments And Military Organizations
1, General Aspects
REFLECTIONS ON MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, by
Lt, Col. Daniel A. Raymond, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 5, (Aug 1955)
31-43,, ,
.Assesses the US Army implementation of the MDAP in one
country and derives therefrom such "lessons"
as maybe of benefit in future
62
THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF PRUSSIA A
RECENT AND FRANCE, AND
CHANGES IN THE ART OF WAR b Lt. C
and Henr Reeve 7 Y . ol, C. C. Chesney
y London, Longmans, 1870. 258
P
Contents: RECENT CHANGES IN THE, ART OF-WAR.1~
MILITARY GROWTH OF PRUSSIA P '
p. 58; MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF " .
FRANCE, p, 126; 1UFLED ORDNANCE IN E
and FRE NGLAND,AND FRANCE, p, 170;
NCH LAW ON-THE RECRUITMENT OF
THE ARMY, p, 247..
THE OLD EUROPEAN ARMY, by W. F. Jackson Kni
Ma ght, in Forces
Magazine (Mar 1955) 8-10, .
Characteristics of the Roman Arm whic
order i Y h secured peace and
in the vast territory of the Roman Empire and contributed to the
longest ? period of peace mankind had ever experienced in historical times.
Emphasis on the legions, or the regular branch of 'the Army and its
standard of excellence in regard to organization; operational
, capability,
training, discipline, and esprit de corps.
63
M
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a. Great 'Britain. .
THE CASE FOR A ROYAL UNITED SERVICE, by T. D. Calnan;.
'in Ro al'Air Force Quarterly, v. 3, no. 1 Jan 1951 15-22.
. The defects an imitations of the present organization of the
British Armed' Forces are examined, and the effectiveness of the organ-
ization in peace and war, together with the employment and efficiency of
the forces themselves are analyzed. Based on this analysis, a reorgan-
ization is ,proposed which is said to result in a thoroughly efficient
national organization for the control and coordination of the Armed
Forces, so as to make'their employment effective in war, and to make
their administration, and training more efficient and economical in
peace.
[THE QUEEN'S AIR FORCES] in Flight, v. 63 no. 2314 (29 Maa
Y
1953) 93 p. (Coronation issue.)
Description and photographs on: mission, or g and aircraft personnel, of the various RAF commands; histories, resent
status, and aircraft of the Air F P
orces of Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Ceylon, and India; British
and Commonwealth naval air arms; and a chronological list of highlights
in British Aviation since 1926
b. NATO
ALLIED NAVAL, AND?A.IR COMMANDS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
by Adm. Earl Mountbatten, in Royal United Service Institution Journal
v. 100, no. 598 (May 1955) 17 1-16. '
Steps leading to the formation of the Allied F -
orces, Mediter-
ranean Command (AFMED) on 15 March 1953. Organization and re -
'sibilities of air and naval forces of France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, _UK,
and US. All-over strategy, chain of comm y'
gY~ and, and division of responsi-
bilities. Map.
c. United States
AMERICAN DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
by Timothy W.
Stanley. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 156. 202 :
64
"....Tells the stor of the most significant developments in'.
national security structure during the.past ten
analyzes the years.. ? ?~ It.carefully
policies and operations of the National Security Council and -
the role of the Department of Defense Y
t as the instrument of unification of
he services....'
THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN PERMANENT .
DEFENCE JOINT BOARD OF
1940-1945, by Col. C. P. Stacey, in International Journal,
no. Z (Spring 1954) 107-124.
The Board was an experiment in I'
and an inn nternational organization
ovation in both 'Canadian and American external
policy. Founded
fourteen years ago,' it developed through the years into an imp
ortant
element of Canadian-American relations '
of the and in the defensive organization
West. Events that led to the formation of th
ization a Board, and its organ-
, mission, and achievements during World War II. Includ
of the Board's recommendations d es a lest
Se to wring the period August 1940 through
p tuber 1944, .
CHANGES INSIDE THE PENTAGON, by H. Struve Hensel in
Harvard Business Review, v. 32, no. l (Jan-Feb 1954 98-108.
The organizational philosophy behind the recent changes in
the Department of Defense. Decentralization of operations; civilian con-
trol and military decisions; powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; and management of the Joint Staff, among others.
COMMAND AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, b Lt. Col. Kyle
Davis In Military F.
Review, v.34, no. 1.1 (Feb 1955) 24-33.
If future commanders are to know the proper acceptance of
,responsibility and application of authority, the principles of command and
other degrees of authority must be established. Neither the
, US statutes
nor US Army regulations define the elements of ?command.." The lack of
adequate definition has not constituted a serious problem in subtle a -
mental levels, , p rt
but it continues to be a handicap at national level and places
an unnecessary burden upon the leaders of the US defense establistiment.~
For instance, the- National Security Act of 1947 failed to establish-clearly
the Secretary of Defense as head of the Department of Defense with .
h com-
plete authority, over its activities. Failure to state that the 'Secretary of
.
Defense was a commander subordinate to the Presiden Y
t, or a deputy com-
mander to the President, precluded the establishment of a clearly defined
chain of command and severely affected the efficiency of the entir
Establishment. Reviews the 1949 findings of the Hoover Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government the 195
? 3 findings ?
of the Rockefeller Committee, and the President's
,Reorgamzation Plan.
Number 6, which he prepared and presented to. Con gre'ss following the.
Rockefeller report. The need for definition remains, because somehow
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these studies have translated into words the concept they wished to es-
tablish.. The author, in his search for adequate means of describing the
relationships that exist and should exist at all levels of command and
authority, presents his definitions for: command, direction, control;
staff supervision, and coordination.
DEVELOPMENT OF UNIFICATION, b Dudley W. Knox in
Naval Institute U.S.
Proceedings, v. 76, no. 12 (Dec 1950) 1309-1315.
cardinal problem that now confronts us in the development
of true unification consists of the chasm separating Army and Nav Y
con-
cepts. of organization,. administration
th and operations. From the outset
the Navy had unity within itself. However the Arm
unification ~ y has never had true
being an organization of loosely knit, semi-independent
Corps. Another conflicting concept is that of overseas air bases
Air Force contends that long-range airplanes diminish the need of ad-
vanced air bases, whereas the Navy supports the u
This use of the carrier.
brings up the controversy of the carrier versus such air
the B-36. These and planes as
other concepts require clarification in many minds
to the end that more genuine unification
of thinking among the Armed
Services may be achieved.
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES. Fort
Leavenworth, Kan., Command and General Staff School, 1923. 58
"The pamphlet presents a brief outline of the general organ-
ization of the land forces of the United States, including a theater of
It resents in considerably more detail the projected war organization of
tactical formations, the functions of commanders and staffs an
system of ad U and the
ministration.
NAVAL"PREPAREDNESS, b Vice Adm. F.
Y S. Low,, in Ordnance,
v40, no.211 (July-Aug 1955) 34-36. -
The US Navy is keeping abreast of the enormous tec
advances in armament and equipment in order to increase its striking
power and mobility and maintain control of th g
e seas for national defense.
Reorganization of the-Department of Defense following the recommendations
Rockefeller Committee. The organizational concept of
Photographs. the Navy.
PENTAGON REORGANIZATION: PHASE THREE
in U. S. Naval Instit , by John R. ?Probert,
ute Proceedin s, v: 81, no, l (Jan 1955 51-6
T The ) 2'
proposals or reorganization of the US Department
Defense made b the President's Reorganization by Plan No. 6, the changes
66.
made by implementation of the Plan, and the changes during the last year which ?
make up the third and last phase of the reorganization.
The
DePartment, of Defense has become more like the other executive depart-
ments of the Government and authority and responsibility have been more
precisely located in the Secretary of Defense. Though the Ch
Joint Chiefs has received airman of the
the responsibility to manage the Joint Staff and
to approve the selection and tenure of the Joint Staff the
lost , members have
power, but they have not been submerged or subordinated. Plans
to be formulated for the approval. of the Secretary, member and any individual
can appeal to Congress any decision of the Joint Chiefs.
REPORT OF THE ROCKEFELLER COMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION. Washington, 1953. 25 P (US Senate
,
83d Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Armed Services, Committee
Print.)
The Committee investigated the basic organization and pro
cedures of the Department of Defense, especially the position of the
Secretary of Defense and his relationships with his principal civilian and
military officials, and recommended: (1) clarification of the authority of
the Secretary of Defense 2 clarification , () of the command channels within
the Department; (3) increase in the ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
serve as the top military planning and advisory group; (4) abolishment of
a number of statutory boards which have proved too unwieldy and rigid
and which could be administered by Assistant Secretaries; and (5) authori-
ty for the Secretary of Defense to safeguard the promotional prospects of
officers who serve in his office.
d. U.S.S.R.
HANDfOOK ON THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE ARMIES. PART I:
THE SOVIET ARMY. Washington,, Department of the Army, 1953. 172 ..
DA Pamphlet No. 30-50-1 P
( .)
The military system; military doctrine; organization of the
field forces; personnel and training; logistics; weapons; equipment; uni-
forms, insignia, decorations, and awards; the Red Navy; the Red Air
Force'; and the quasi-military organizations of the Soviet Union, Charts
diagrams, photos, and other illustrations.
THE SOVIET ARMY, ed, by B. H. Liddell Hart. London, Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1956. 480 P.
" ... The aim of this book is to provide a reliable account, and
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 comprehensive picture, of the So'viet Army in all its aspects - by drawing
on and piecing together the knowledge of a wide range of experts in vario
us
countries who have made a special study, or have had direct experience,
of particular aspects and organs of this Army."
THE SOVIET ARMY; ITS SOLDIERS AND TACTICS. Fort Lee Va.
Q
t
'
uar
ermaster School 1954 24
. , p. (Student Workbook 151.46. )
A synopsis of the'pamphlets of the SOVIET ARMY series fro
m
which the most pertinent and significant facts have been extracted For
more complete details reference should be made to the
the MANUAL pamphlets and to .
OF CURRENT SOVIET ARMY WEAPONS, prepared b the
Office of the.Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Third Army. Characteristics
of the Soviet soldier; training in the Soviet Army; weapons and
logistics;
organization of small and medium infantry units;' offensive and defensive
doctrine; execution of the attack and conduct of defense; and employment
of tactics in special operations (assault of a fortified area, and combat in
cities and towns). Appended: a list of Soviet military
"Artillery is the quotations (e, g.
Y God of War"). Photos of various Soviet weaPonsu organ-
izational charts of Soviet units and illustrations showing the layout of
Soviet antitank obstacles.
THE RED ARMY TODAY, by Col. Louis B. Ely. Harrisbur
Militar Service P Harrisburg, Pa.,
y ubkshing Co., 1953. 272 p.
Organization, tactics, and personnel of the Soviet Arm
chief/ on up-to-date based
chiefly information from soldiers who left Russia to take u
life in the Western world. With chapters discussing: Soviet infantry;
armor; artillery and its weapons; cavalry commands and Cossack
services and engineers; air support and airborne forces; Soviet partisan
capabilities, including partisan tactics in World War
make the II, the people wkio
Army; quality and combat ability y of the Red Arm
of th Y; comparison
the Soviet Army with the armies of the Western
potential of the European powers; satellites; Soviet Army 'capabilities and objectives; and current trends with possible
equip ment respect to capabilities of Soviet officers,
P techniques, and tactics. Appendixes on: how the Soviet
compares with Western divisions; Red Army organization and weapons;
recommended collateral readin ? and illustrat' g f
i
ons o Soviet uniforms 'and
! g insignia.
SOVIET IMPERIALISM, by G. A. Tokaev. London Gerald Duck-
worth, 1954.? 73 p.
Political strategy and tactics of the Soviet Union,Soviet-military-
political' and military-philosophical doctrine; and organization and strength
of Soviet Armed Forces The author, formerly an engineer colonel of the
he
Soviet Army, assisted for nearly fifteen 'ears in the formulation rears and prac-
pplication of most of the fundamental military and military-technical
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doctrines of the USSR. Since 1940 Col. Tokaev occupied a series of in-
creasingly important technical posts in Soviet aircraft production, and in
1948 was serving in Berlin as Soviet expert on jet and rocket problems. He
and his family crossed over to the West in 1948. The military aspects
of
the book include information (mostly of fragmentary nature) on: Soviet
military science, artillery, armor, paratroops, mechanized troops,
'cur-
rent types of Soviet aircraft, guided missiles and atomic weapons; Soviet
Navy, stockpiling of supplies, equipment research, standardization staff
and military education, and morale and welfare of the Soviet Forces.
2. Evolution
a. General Aspects
THE ARMED HORDE, 1793-1939; A STUDY OF THE RISE, SURVIVAL
AND DECLINE OF THE MASS ARMY, by Hoffman Nickerson. New York
Putnam's, 1942. 427 p. '
"This book traces the origin, survival culmination and recent
decline of the mass army recruited by universal, compulsory service which
,
with its corollaries of unlimited taxation and governmental control over -the
governed, has so evilly transformed warfare during the last hundred and
fifty years.. .
ancient armies; and the impetus given to military arts and sciences in
the twentieth century.
MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, by Capt. Ambrosio. P. Pena, in
Military Historical Review, v.2, no. 2 (Dec 1954) 13-17 plus.
/though history does not record just when and how the first
form of military organization originated, it is known that formation of
armies followed closely the progress of nations. A well-geared military
organization is often the yardstick of the degree of progress of 'a nation.
The basis for military organization during the early developmental stages
of society; formation of armies among the nations of ancient world; the
early tactical set-up; degeneration of the military art following the fall of
the Roman Empire; rebirth of military art with the era of Rennaissance
at the turn of the fourteenth century; employment of mercenaries by the
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THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS UNTIL 1940. Le genie jusqu'en 1940,
by Col. de Lesquen, in Revue Historique de L'Armee, v. 11, no, 4 Nov
-
1955) 67-88, In French.
History and various stages of evolution of the French Corps
of Engineers from its establishment through the Napoleonic Wars, the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, World War I, and the 1939'-1940
campaign of World War II.
,
Brussac. Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1955. In French,
History of the Legion from its creation in 1792 through the
many campaigns fought by its members up to the end of the Indochinese
Revolutionary War, including also particulars on the Legion's structure
,
its renowned esprit de corps, and the recruitment and train of its
members.
NAVAL AVIATION 1915-1954. Aeronavale 1915-1954
Vulliez, Paris , by Capt.
Amiot-Dumont, 1955? In French.
Evolution and activities of French naval aviati
battles of Dunkirk ' on from the
in 1915, through the French Campaign of 1940, the
Syrian raids, and the Indoch
inese War, to the collapse of Dien Bien Phu.
c, 'Germany - Historical Examples
PANZER DIVISIONS,, by R, M. Ogorkiewicz in Arm
v. 70 . no, 1 195 Y Quarterly,
(Apr 5) 44-52,
Review of the development of German armored uni
particular reference to: ts, with
(1) the original armored division which.wa
created in 1935;,(2) changes prior to 1940 s
(3) light divisions which evolved
in 1937; (4) the 1940 reorganization; 5 German armored divisions in the
Russian and North African campaigns of 1941-42;
(6) the 1943 and 1944 di-
visions; (7.). armored infantry divisions; and 8 trends in organization and
employment during the latter part of World War II.
THE FOREIGN LEGION, La legion etrangere
by Philippe de
d, Great Britain ,
ARMOURED FORMATIONS, b Lt. Col, C
Quarter/ Y .Paddock, in Army
v. 74, no. l (Apr 1957) 63-68,
Traces the development of armored formati
World War I to the ons in Britain from
. present.
,
ARMS AND THE MEN, by Ian Hay. London 19
Brit, H. M , 50. 330 p, (Gt.
M. Govt,, The Second World War, 1939-1945 series.)
One of eight volumes of a popular history of World War II
This volume tells the story of the art played by the British Army during
war, giving the internal history of events -
of th the growth. and develop-
ment citizen Army, the changes brought about in its composition, training, leadership, ,
and administration by the introduction of tot
mechanized warfare. Also discussed is the revolution, effected Burin
these years in certain army traditions. The g
early chapters deal with the..
inception and growth of the Arm from the
in-
cluding time of the New Model, the sweeping reforms of Cardwell and Haldane.
GOOD-BYE TO BOOT AND SADDLE, OR THE TRAGIC PASSING
OF BRITISH CAVALRY, by E, G. French. London, Hutchison 195
283 p. 1.
,
History of the British cavalry and its re g from
Ei hteenth Century to September 1939, when the last two regiments were
abolished. The traditions life, uniforms, and some of the battles the
fought and won. The concluding chapter they
questions the wisdom of the
abolition, because there, are tactical situations in modern warfare, where
cavalry, and not armor and aircraft, can affect the decisive results.
THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, by Ca pt, Norman
Macmillan in Aeronautics, v. 28, no, 6 (July 1953) 60-62 plus,
Traces the growth of the RAF as a fi htin ? service
Inception in 19 g? g from its
18 to its present size which, in peacetime, is limited b
the current high cost of air ?materiel, With by
h a comparative table showing
'rise in cost of British fighters and bombers since 1914 and a
, listing of
past and present Marshals of the Royal Air Force,
THE THIRD SERVICE; THE STORY BEHIND THE ROYAL AIR
FOR CE, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte. London,
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Thames and Hudson, 1955. 274 p.
The development of the RAF emphasizing forces behind the
scenes that affected policies, and individuals who influenced these policies.
Operations of the Royal Flying Corps (the predecessor of RAF), the Royal
Naval Air Service, and RAF.
e. United States
AIRPOWER'S HOLLOW SHELL, by Gill Robb Wilson, in Air Force,
v.38, no,11 (Nov 1955) 21.
Although the military air establishment of the US is excellent,
there is no hard core or foundation behind it.' There is a lack of: air
concepts, aviation education, and of interest in air power. How we solve
these problems is going to make or break the power of the Free World
and the exercise of democratic government in a period as short as twenty-
five years.
THE ARMY'S PREPARATION FOR ATOMIC WARFARE, by Lt. Col.
Jack J. Wagstaff, 'in Military Review, v.35, no. 2 (May 1955) 3-6.
Steps taken by the US Army to develop atomic capabilities
(atomic guns, guided missiles, the teaching of atomic tactics, and certain
technical and scientific schools for the further education of qualified atomic
technicians and scientists) in keeping with the "new look" strategy. How-
ever, since it seems possible that there will never be an atomic war, tthe
Army must also be ready to fulfill its mission by conventional means and
to do so with a minimum 'of reconversions, rearfning, retraining'
and re-
tooling. We will not have two separate armies, one for atomic warfare
and a?second to fulfill conventional requirements.
HISTORY AND ROLE OF ARMOR.. Fort Knox, Ky., Armored School
1955. 41, p. '
.Background of armor, its capabilities,
and its, current role in
the present US Army. Early history; use and development during World
War I? development and role, 1919-1939; armor in World War II and Korea.
armor developments, World War- II to the resent; and arm
field army.. present; .or in the type
Photos of various tanks 1918-1953.
HISTORY OF UNITED -STATES NAVAL AVIATION, by Archibald D.
Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press,
1949. 345 p.
The story .of 'the development of Naval Aviation to its .present
advanced state, illuminating the means by which we have retained control
of the world's seas over which must pass the raw materials of our indus-
trial strength.
MILITARY AVIATION - THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 1y Owen J.
Remington, in Arm Information Digest, v. 8, no. 9 (Sept 1953) 9-39.
Role played by the US Armed Forces in developing aviation in
the past fifty years. US Army's early interest in accomplishments of
initial aircraft of Professor S. P. Langley and Wright brothers; specifi-
cations of the first military airplane contracted by the Army Air Service
in 1908; establishment of the first US military aviation school; -Navy's
initial experiments with flights from the deck of a battleship in 1910; first
participation of airplanes in a maneuver with US Army ground troops in
1912; adoption of the Lewis machine gun as a standard weapon for US'
military aircraft; impact of World War I on airplane development, and
activities of the American Air Service against the German Air Force;
historic flights and speed records in the post-World War I era; growth
of commercial uses of aircraft; passage of legislation and establishment
of aeronautical agencies which contributed to the growth and development
of US civil and military aviation; impact of World War II on further
growth of military aviation, and the emergence of new tactical and strate-
gic concepts in the use of military aircraft; progress of research and de-
velopment and design of aircraft after World War II and the fruition of the
effort in the performance of American military aircraft over Korea.
SEAPOWER IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, by Donald W. Mitchell,
in Current History, v. 26, no. 152 (May 1.954) 271-276:
Development of the US Navy during the past 160 years, and its
role in future warfare. As long as transportation is vital to war, and
until the time when air, transport replaces sea transport for bulk cargoes,
command of the sea by naval forces will remain of vital importance. The
US Navy stands ready to maintain command of the sea, but it also realizes
that it will be challenged in the future by new conditions and by improved
or new weapons (Mines, submarines, land-based aircraft). How the US
Navy in recognition of the challenge is preparing itself for the conditions
of future warfare and is utilizing naval air power to strengthen US in
offense and defense.
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 .... A study of the organizational growth of the armed forces
of the Soviets, of the component groups within them, and of the conflicts
and conflict situations among these groups. "
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111
THE BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN SEAPOWER, by Comdr. Anthony
Courtney,' in International Affairs, v.30, no. 1 (Jan 1954) 13-23. ?
History o the Russian Navy and naval operations since the
early eighteenth century when the Baltic fleet was built by Peter the Great.
The destruction of Russian naval ships in the Russo-Japanese war. and the
absence of a fleet from 1921 to 1934. The development of an ocean going
fleet since 1934, and the expansion of this program since 1945 including
quantity production of modern submarines. The development of the
Northern Sea Route which links the Northern and Pacific fleets some
months of the year, and the construction of the Volga-Don canal which
solves the problem of internal communication. Lack of seamanship has
been evident in the Russian Navy throughout its history. -
THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET AIR POWER: A HISTORICAL AND
MANAGERIAL INTERPRETATION, by Ramsay D. Potts, Jr., in American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals, v. 299 (May 195 -41:
Evolution o Soviet air power during the years between World
War I and the political purge in the thirties, the period of 1938-45, includ-
ing the climatic experiences of World War II, and the period after 1945;
Soviet progress in the field of aircraft engines; Soviet doctrine on the use
of air power; Soviet aeronautical designers and engineers (IlYushin
,
Gurevich, Lavochkin, and Yakovlev); and progress in Soviet aeronautical
engineering training.
THE GROWTH OF THE RED ARMY, by D. Fedotoff. White. Princeton,.
Princeton University Press, 1944. 486 p.
SOVIET AIR POWER, by Richard E. Stockwell. New York pageant.
Press, 1957. 238 p.
"The author traces the amazing progress of Soviet military
airpower from its crude beginnings to its resent position
present of eminence in
the world, and in the process points out the tremendous strides that the
USSR has made in production, both industrially and education-wise "
3. Command And Staff ?
74 -
e::,.i~S:~;J+~,i::,i ~rss'W~'`,,.--.T.;_' ~.:.~~~`.F~?-Y~`~