CHAPTER 1 THE "NIPC PROBLEM"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05167A001800140003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 98
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2014
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: MISC

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CHAPTER
THE "NPIC PROBLEM'
By early 1965, the future growth and funding of NPIC became an object of
frizxcee. etiu ,-c--044 riti
special concern-to senior Agency k1nagement7(1Vhat role should the Center play
in meeting current and future national intelligence objectives? Would it be-
come another NSA? If so, who could man, fund, and manage so large and complex
a technical operation? What should the organizational and functional relation-
ships be between the Center and CIA; between NPIC and other members of the
Intelligence Community? Should these relationships continue as they were, or
should they be changed? Could the Center, which suffered from a chronic im-
balance between massive inputs of film and escalating requirements on the one
band and limited resources on the other, surviRe and serve the Community with-
out constructive action?
To the Chagrin of NPIC, this whole array of concerns,became familiarly
known among those in higher authority as the "NPIC Problem." In the view of
Center management, the operation of NPIC was going very well indeed, as attested
to by the large share of major finds contributed by the Center in the strategic
threat category of intelligence information. What seemed like problems to others
were regarded more constructively by NPIC as opportunities to capitalize on
breakthroughs in the development of imagery collection systems whose products
could be exploited to provide answers to an ever wider range of intelligence
problems4To top Agency officials, the task of justifying the expenditure of
sharply increasing sums of money on overhead reconnaissance at a time when it
was becoming the object of searching examination by the Bureau of the Budget was
i frustrating and unwelcome one. By mid-I965 it was to reach the critical stage.
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(Page One-A)
PLANS TO SURVEY NPIC
The action at first was mild and groping. In January 1965, the DCI,
John A. MtCone, discussed the advisability of a high-level survey of NPIC
at a morning Deputies Meeting. ?
Director, NPIC. Memorandum for the Record, Telephone Call from the DD/I
Indicating DCI Interest in Having a Survey Made of NPIC, 19 January 1965
(SECRET -- EYES ONLY)
Era ill' ? c, p .
InPcri
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kragu Lwv)--
It is interesting to note that at this point in time technical matters
seemed to be important among the concerns. Though the handling of requirements
JJ
was mentioned, another item-dieussed/was stereo versus monocular scan. Moreover,
Dr. Edwin Land was mentioned as a possibility to head the survey. Though an
updating. by the IG of his 1962 survey of the Center was also discussed as an al-.
ternative -- as was a specially constituted in-house panel", it was with the
provisiR that, in either case, technical specialists would be called in to supple-
ment the work of the IG or the in-house panel. The importance thus attached to
\teGe)nCea/
-the technical side of the question may have derived from the fact that
interest had been generated by questions raised the previous day by Albert D.
Wheelon, the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, or it may have keflected
McCone's own technical interests and orientation. It may have been both. In any
case, whatever the problems -- whether vaguely sensed or specifically identified2---
f
they were to be studied in toto; the solution envpsaged, however remote, seems
1
not to have been regarded as primarily an administrative or bureaucratic one.
As a result of a request by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray S.
tr
Cline, for suggestions concerning how to go about the survey an names of ,persons
who might head it, the Director, NPIC, Arthur C. Lundahl, responded in a memoran-
dum dated 21 January 1965. This memo could be characterized variously as quizzical,
NPIC. D-11-65, Memorandum for Deputy Director (Intelligence), Proposed
Survey of NPIC, 21 January 1965 (SECRET -- EYES ONLY)
inquiring, defensive perplexed, or simply an attempt to elicit more information
about the purpose of the proposed survey. The latter would,seem the most likely
explanation. In all probability the proposal was quite unexpected, and the mere
fact that the idea was an outgrowth of questions raised by Albert Wheelon Was
enough to suggest to any prudent person the need for cautious reaction.-
c)P
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(Page Three)
On the other hand, the Director, NPIC, and his top-level managers, in whomhe
confided and who helped to set the tone of the response, were intimately acquainted
with the explosive growth of NPIC the manifold problems associated with it, and
the price paid for their solution. There can be little doubt that they sensed
something ominous in the proposal.
As it turned out, the investigation was pursued on both fronts, technical and
managerial. The IG did undertake the job of updating his 1962 survey of the Center
and, in the course of so doing, produced a document which contributed the single
most important source of evidence used in the ultimate solution of the so-called
"NPIC Problem." At about the same time, another group of an ad hoc nature was sur-
veying more selectively various aspects Of Center operations. It was chaired by
Dr. Edwin Land. Though this panel produced a brief report of its work and findings,
the port of no detectable significance in affecting the course of action taken
to solve the "NPIC Problem." The resignation of John McCone in April 1965, before
Land Panel. [Report], undated, but c. July 1965 (SECRET)
any of-the surveys were completed, doubtlessly set the stage for a new approach to
the solution of the problem. Certainly, the hopes of NPIC for a technically oriented
solution went with him. It is too easy to assume that had.McCone stayed things would.
have been very different. It would be much more perceptive to regard the departure
of McCone and the decision to arrest future growth of NPIC as part of the samelarger
picture. Both had5in all probability, been overtaken by the rearrangement of national
priorities inherent in the attempt to establish the Great Society.
THE NPIC FIVE-YEAR PROJECTIONS
On 9 April 1965, less than three weeks before William F Raborn, Jr. succeeded
John A. MtCone as the DCI, the Director, NPIC, forwarded to the Director, Office of
Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower, the NPIC manpower and budget projections
for fiscal 1966 through 1970.
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(Page Four)
The projections made in this study, called for a fourfold increase in funds
IC. 0-60-65, Memoran um or Director, 0 ice o Bu get, Program Analysis,
and Manpower, NPIC ProgramPlans and Budget. Projections for Fiscal Years 1966
through 1970, 9 April 1965 (SECRET)
and a three-and-one-half times increase in manpower 6ir. 1970. Though there was '
no indication that interest in Center problems was flagging -- indeed, the IG
survey was well under way by this timeA the effect of the five-year projections
was electrifying. At last, problem was quantified in terms of dollars and people,
figures that even non-technical managers and officials could comprehend. And
what they comprehended was dismaying. Probably no other single document or
event was as significant as this in crystallizing the goal finally set by higher
authority for solving,the so-called NPIC problem. That goal was clearly to
slow down the growth of NPIC, if not to arrest it completely. How to accomplish
the objective was the next task. The five-year projection provided no clues,
but within the next two months the IG report was chtined to do so.
If the NPIC five-year plan was to prove so damaging to what might be charac-
_
terized as the NPIC cause, it is only natural to inquire how such projections
came about and why they were ever revealed. Broadly speaking, the answer lies
in the interpretation of NSCID No. 8 and the assumptions made by the Center.
These planning factors, coupled with time-accounting data supplied by the new
NPIC Management Information System, produced the fateful figures.
As would befit a directive from the National Security Council (NSC), the
language of NSCID No. 8 was broad and quite permissive. Moreover, the memo of
11'
"transmittal to the United States Intelligence Boardi(USIB) accompanying the
National Security Council. NSCID No. 8, Photographic Interpretation,
19 January 1961 (SECRET)
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(Page Five)
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copy of NSCID No. 8 as approved by the NSC at its 12 January 1961 meeting
noted "...the President's (Eisenhower's) statement that there should be no
other center duplicating the functions of the NPIC ...." Granted that the
question of what constituted duplication admitted of more than one interpretation,
Center management had consistently held that it was intended there should be
but one organization engaged in photo interpretation in support of National
requirements. In the view of NPIC, not only was this desirable as a means of
ensuring the objectivity and authoritativeness of such photo intelligence
information, in-mueh-t-he---aame--sens-tha-t----t-Jie-CLA,was-_concoiv-ed-as-the-f-oeel
? . ------
_pg,int-ferno_departmental-finished.intelligenca:: but it was also imperative
for cost effectiveness, especially because of the increasingly sophisticated
equipment needed to provide definitive answers to technical questions
typical of many national requirements. Accordingly, NPIC managers saw the
Center as the organization primarily responsible for the exploitation of all
imagery collected to satisfy national -- as opposed to departmental -- requirements.
In the case of more specific. planning assumptions dealing with such details
as requirements handling photographic inputs, types and formats of reports,
scope of research and development, and above all, a broad range of communittaide
services, the Center position was, with benefit of hindsight, perhaps a bit naive.
Thus, implicit faith was placed in predictions as to when new systems would become
operational. For example, the assumption that sizeable KH-9 inputs would arrive
during fiscal 1968 was largely responsible for a quantum jump in manpower pro-
jected for that year. This, in turn, led to a proposal for new building, which
v -
further galvanized the proponents of NPIC containment into action. As of 1970,
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(Page Six)
however, KH-9 inputs were still a year or more away and, when they commenced,
were expected to be handled, albeit in a much more austere environment, without
a dramatic increase in personnel and without any increase in space.
National non-PI and departmental services of all types provided by the
Center to the Intelligence Community were another object of critical comment.
During the base year March 1964 - February 1965, the Center had devoted 85
man years of effort to this work. The five-year projection called for an in-
crease to 300 in the number of persons so occupied. Here was an item on which
the Center might have economized, at least on paper; pending an opportunity to
test actual needs as well as the political expediency of attempting to satisfy
them.
Research and Development was another bugaboo. From an allocation of
in FY 1965, Center R&D was projected to rise to 5,50X1
by fiscal 1970. Quite apart from the predictable question as to whether or not
such rapidly expanding sums could be committed prudently, the task of overcoming
the initial shock of such a revelation was bound to require much persuasion
and justification merely to reestablish confidence in the minds of those in
higher authority. That R&D of some type and at some considerable cost was
necessary was self evident. Funds for the development of exploitation equipment
had always been a mere pittance compared with the sums lavished on collection
systems. The big difficulty faced by the Center was one of timing. 'Circumstances
seemed to NPIC to indicate the need for a crash program to compensate for past
_deficiencies, to automate as many tasks as possible, and to make ready for the
exploitation of inputs from several new collection systems. Though it is doubtful
41 IC?
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? ur 17.0.RicIE?Cl- PAPER
(Page Seven)
? that anyone in higher authority would have been able at this early date to
articulate the necessary guidance, what the Center needed to do was set some
priorities and apply them. Instead, Center managers,better aware of opportun-
ities for technological advancement than their critics and long frustrated by
the slow progress toward,their goals, chose to mak a stand for everything they
deemed necessary.
A somewhat different problem was posed by the kandling of requirements.
In this instance the problem was more imaginary than real, but its contribution
to the credibility gap was, nevertheless, serious. Since the Center had struggled
under an overload of requirements ever since the days.of the U-2, critics had
repeatedly questioned the effectiveness of the screening mechanism through which
requirements passed before being accepted. Even some strong admirers of the
Center, such as members of the Land Panel of 1965, questioned whether the amount
of detail requested could always be justified from a cost-effective point of
view. However, the fact that requirements handling was not as critical a factor
Land Panel. [Report], undateq;butp. July 1965 (SECRET)
as some had supposed was convincingly established by E. H. Knoche,
the
foremost student of the "NPIC Problem" and a stern critic of the Center, when he
stated, six months after he became Executive Director, NPIC, that "...contrary
to my expectations before arriving at NPIC, I did not find the requirements
picture out of control."
Knoche, E. H. Memorandum for the Record, Meeting with Bruce Clarke and
Roland Inlow, 15 September, 15 September 1967 (SECRET)
The fact that E. H. Knoche discovered more than two years later that the
handling of Center requirements was not "out of control" is suggestive of some-
thing much more important than the ultimate determination of the rightness or
?"ITq7:Tfli
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(Fage Eight)
wrongness of this particular allegation. It helps to exemplify thA true nature of
the "NPIC Problem." Later events were to show that the problem was not one of de-
termining and then justifying a level of need for the Center in terms of manpower
and funds, though this is precisely what NPIC managers were attempting to do.
Rather, the problem was the fact that top Agency officials were being maneuvered
by circumstances into a position between the Bureau of the Budget, which was deter-
mined to throttle the expansion Of centralized photo reconnaissance exploitation,
and the Center, which was pleading the merits and imperatives of a contrary course
of action. Agency officials were beginning to seek a way out of the developing crunch.
THE NPIC WHITE PAPER
The Center five-year projections elicited a request by the Director of Central
Intelligence for additional information in the form of an NPIC White Paper. The re-
sult was a 51-page document, prepared in just a few weeks and entitled, The Role of
gs' Imagery Exploitation in Fulfilling the Intelligence Objectives of the 1960's and
0 1' 1970's. Unfortunately, through some failure in communications, the paper proved to
have been more comprehensive than the DCI had intended, and did not address itself
?R
specifically to the points in which he was primarily interested. Though more defini-
tive guidance was provided later in the Executive Director's memorandum of 15 June 1965
Executive Director. Memorandum for Deputy Director/Intelligence, NPIC White
Paper, 15 June 1965 (SECRET)
to the DDI, the pace of preparation was so rapid that the White Paper was disseminated
a day later without substantial change, save for elimination of Section VII, to which
the DCI had taken exception.
NPIC. [Outline for] The Role of Imagery Exploitation in Fulfilling the Intelli-
gence Objectives of the 1960's and 1970's (NPIC White Paper), undated (SECRET)
The White Paper made an eloquent case for the overriding importance of photography
as a source of good, hard intelligence information. It emphasized the unmatched per-
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(Page Nine)
formance of NPIC in pioneering the timely exploitation of high-altitude photography.
NPIC. TCS 8896/65, The Role of Imagery Exploitation in Fulfilling the Intelli
Lv,p% gence Objectives of the 1960's and 1970's (NPIC White Paper), 16 June 1965 (TOP SECRET
-- Handle via TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINT Control Systems Jointly)
t ?
And it argued the case for strengthening the centralized national interpretation
effort. Since these points were not what the DCI was seeking, the White Paper con-,
e9i/u24
tributed nothing judged_prIxr--heirftiiby those in higher authority who-wefe working-
5-attillit the "NPIC Problem."
THE JUNE 1965 IG REPORT
Though the NPIC White Paper left those in higher authority unmoved, the report
by the Inspector General on his survey of NPIC was apparently just what they felt
was needed to initiate constructive planning. It provided the initial point of de-
parture for decisions that led ultimately to the most dramatic changes in the NPIC
organization since the establishment of HTAUTOMAT. Before the metamorphosis was
complete two and one-half years later, the Agency was to have a new DDI5 ,the Center
was to have a new Executive Director, a new mode of operation, and a complete reor-
ganization. Moreover, with a big assist from the Joint Ad Hoc Imagery Interpretation
Review Group (JIIRG), set up in the fall of 1965 by the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense at the behest of the Bureau of the Budget, the Center was to become just one
of several organizations engaged ilithe exploitation of imagery in response to national
requirements. In addition, national requirements were to be screened and validated
by a USIB Committee responsible for exploitation as well as collection matters. And
not least in importance from an Agency point of view, the cost of NPIC, in dollars
and people, was to be stabilized and the operation contained in the existing building.
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l'i;j1trul4 rii.r.L,it
(Page Ten)
Why did this report meet with such an enthusiastic reception, whereas the
NPIC White Paper did not? The answer lies in the fact that here was a report
based on a study by a presumably disinterested third party in whom the decision
makers had confidence; here was a report that identified Center problems and
attempted to analyze them; and here was a report that at least spoke of an
alternative, however difficult of attainment, to the inexorable growth of the
Center. It was not that the report provided many -- or any. -- ready-made
solutions; the end was still a long way off and not yet even dimly perceived
by anyone. Rather, the IG report pointed out problem areas that could be ex-
amined; it made recommendations that provided food for thought.
The report itself started with an observation in the introduction that
operating problems found in NPIC in 1965 were remarkably like those discovered
at the time of the previous IG survey in 1962, and that the 1965 conclusions
differed only in degree from those of three years earlier. If the intention
? Inspector General. BYE 40694-64 Inspector General's Survey of the ?
National Photographic Interpretation Center, June 1965 (TOP SECRE*IDEALIST/
CORONA/GAMBIT). -
was to engage the interest of the critical reader as well as inform him, the
opening could scarcely have been more effective.
Lest the foregoing remarks be misinterpreted it should be pointed out
that the IG was professedly sympathetic to the Center and its problems. In an
early section of the report entitled "NPIC's Accomplishments to Date," the IG
attributed a major share of the Center's success to its Director, and gave him
high marks for his technical eminence and skill in exercising functional control
of an organization whose administration was incompletely in his hands. The IG
T r? n
liL] EL-
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(Page Eleven)
also expressed unstinting admiration for the manner in which NPIC had man-
aged to cope with a chronic iAbalance between ever increasing inputs of
photography and limited Center exploitation resources. He emphasized the
flexible and dynamic nature of the organization. He had high praise for the
skill of its managers. He spoke with admiration of the motivation, dedication,
and the stamina of its employees. Whereas it may be argued that complimentary
remarks such as these were eyewash and should, in any event, have been expected
as an antidote to less pleasant matters to follow, this seems not to have been
the case. The complimentary remarks had a ring of authenticity to them. Moreover,
the IG took considerable pains to point out that the Center had an excellent
record for finding solutions to its own problems. He professed to believe that
the major impediments which NPIC faced were beyond its control or influence.
He added that it was to this type of problem that most of his report was addressed.
It is scarcely likely that he would, thus, calculatedly have attempted to confuse
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to whom the report was addressed.
If the reaction of the IG and his interpretation of what he found tended to
be exculpatory, why was it received so enthusiastically by Center critics? How
did it serve so well as a basis for decisions that clearly reflected a lack of
confidence in Center management? The answer lies in the interpretation placed
on the facts. The IG, who had just spent several months gathering evidence
firsthand in NPIC, saw Center problems through sympathetic eyes. Top Agency
officials, who were not so encumbered or enlightened, depending on one's point
view, did not. To them, the finished report of the IG was a source of raw mater-
ial for their analysis. As such, they found it highly useful.
. 7.77) Tr
? / EJI
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(Page Twelve)
NPIC Problems and the IG's Recommendations. NPIC problems identified by the
IG could be regarded broadly aseither internal in nature or primarily externally
c.ALA
oriented. With one minor exception the latter dealt with 1) the imbalance
between collection capability, exploitation resources, and requirements, and 2) the
need for a complete systems approach in the design of photo reconnaissance systems.
Internal problems centered primarily around 1) automatic data processing, 2) research
and development and. 3) management and supervision. To solve these problems, the IG
made one or more recommendations, a total of 21 numbered items, some with several
parts.
Photographic Inputs, Requirements, and Exploitation. The IG first called atten-
tion to the failure of COMOR to consider the exploitation capacity at NPIC in deter-
mining the number and scheduling of missions. He also pointed to the inefficiency
of using the same target list for collection and first-phase exploitation. He spoke
of the need to establish a separate, select list of targets comprising those of
current and indications interest from the strategic threat point of view to serve
as the requirement for immediate (highest-priority) reporting.
To rectify these shortcomings, the IG recommended that the DDI:
Prepare and submit through the CIA member of USIB a proposal for the establish-
ment of a USIB Committee on Exploitation (COMEX) whose function would be to
ensure a better correlation among collection capability, NPIC's production
capacity, and the requirements for photo intelligence. (No. la)
Recommend to the Chairman of the Committee on Exploitation that the Committee
give immediate attention to the task of establishing a priority list of first
phase readout requirements to be levied on NPIC for accomplishment. (No. lb)
Several matters concerning existing procedures at NPIC for processing require-
ments and undertaking exploitation in response to them also engaged the attention
of, the IG. For the most part, these related to in-deptyetailed)reporting, as
opposed to immediate reporting. The IG saw need for a stronger management hand in
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(Page Twelve-A)
validating requirements to be levied on the Center. He expected the COMEX to
play a leading role in setting policy and even in selectively making decisions
regarding the acceptability of unusual reques:for NPIC services. He, therefore,
saw no further need for the NPIC Ad ?Com and recommended that the Director, NPIC:
? Abolish NPIC's Advisory Committee. (No. 2a)
To provide a mechanism for identifying those cases where the COMEX should
participate, selectively, in the'validation of requirements levied on the Center,
the IG recommended that the Director, NPIC:
Establish the policy that any photo interpretation requirement whose fulfill-
ment would call for an estimated commitment of NPIC man-hours in excess of a
prescribed maximum be referred to the USIB Committee on Exploitation for approval;
that the Director, NPIC, prescribe this maximum; that the maximum be flexible;
and that it be revised periodically to reflect current and anticipated NPIC
? workloads. (No. 2b)
Having decided that he COMEX should exercise rather broad powers inapproving
the types and, in some cases, the specific requirements to be levied on the Center,
the IG realized the need of COMEX for some quantification of the existing NPIC
workload. He, therefore, recommended that the Director, NPICr
Submit to the Chairman of the USIB Committee on Exploitation quarterly reports
detailing NPIC's existing workload, including backlogged detailed projects,
and estimating NPIC's capability to take an added work during the next quarter.
-%
(No. 2c)
The IG observed that photo interpreters were repeatedly interrupted in their
work on detailed reports, particularly as a result of the task force approach to
immediate exploitation. He also noted the repeated changes in scope of such projects,
particularly in response to requests to include the latest information on the subject
under investigation. It was evident to the IG that speedy completion of each de-
tailed reporting project, once it was commenced, was the best solution ot the problem.
He recalled that in the past the Center had used the task-force approach in working
10? SECRET
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(Page Twelve-B)
joint military service-CIA projects, though primarily for a different purpose. He
reasoned that two or more interpreters should be able to complete the job more
quickly than one, so he recommended that the Director, NPIC:
Reinstitute the practice of assigning detailed projects to specifically created
task forces whenever the project is of such magnitude as to require approval
by the USIB Committee on Exploitation. (No. 2d)
The IG took cognizance of a.proposed revision of the exploitation cycle being
readied for Community approval by NPIC. It consisted in dividing the exploitation
cycle into three related phases, each of which, in turn, was subdivided into three
sub-phases. The Chief advantages of the proposal were that it established a phased
NPIC. Proposed National PI Exploitation Program, no date. (SECRET)
NE,
priority in reporting, and that it provided a systems approach to the handling of
photographic inputs, thus coordinating in some degree the several classes of require-
ments associated with the complete exploitation of the material. Though the IG be-
lieved this proposal likely to fall short of what was needed to realize substantial ,
relief in coping with the chronic overburden of exploitation work under which the
Center labored, he thought even this limited ordering of the National workload might
be more than the Community would accede to voluntarily. He endorsed it as better
than the existing practices. To provide against the possibility that the Community
might rebuff the Center in its attempt to gain approval for implementing the proposal,
ti,
the IG recommended that the Director, NPICtiitut:
If the proposed revision of the exploitation cycle fails to gain acceptance,
refer the proposal to the Committee on Exploitation for resolution by the
USIB. (No. 2e)
The COMEX proposal was very basic, in the view of the IG, to greater order and
control in the management of exploitation resources at the national level. It was
_
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(Page Twelve-C)
also violent therapy. Whereas the Center had long recognized and agitated for
some joint consideration of collection and exploitation problems, it certainly
had no intention of presenting outsiders the opportunity, e IG's proposal offered
,6
for committee interference in the management of NPIC. Moreover, the establishment
of a separate committee invited rivalry between the proposed COMEX and COMOR. In .
spite of these drawbacks, the IG's proposal was a step irflthe right direction. It )ust
needed more thought and refinement before being adopted.
. kt
(7y-1
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17013MITG PAPER
(Page Thirteen) ,
The Systems Approach to Photo Reconnaissance. In the course of his inves-
tigation of NPIC, the IG observed in depth the manifold problems caused by the
failure of systems designers to understand the needs of photo interpreters and
those supporting them -- particularly programmers and photogrammetrists. Most
important among these requirements was the one for precise data on the attitude
of the collection vehicle and its position in space at the time of each photo-
graph. He found that the solution to this and other exploitation problems caused
by design deficiencies in the three major collection systems, U-2, KH-4, and KH-7,
then being exploited at NPIC was one of retrofit, with its attendant inadequacies
4
and limitations.
If the design of collection systems had such far reaching implications with
respect to photographic coverage, image quality, data reduction, and mensuration,
how did it happen that NPIC permitted these deficiencies to develop? Here was
a responsibility that the IG laid squarely on the shoulders of those managing
the collection effort in the Community. He found that in the one area where NPIC
was able to assume leadership, the Performance Evaluation Teams which conducted
post mortems on the photography from each reconnaissance mission, the Center was
doing a good job. Contrariwise, during the design and testing phases of new
collection systems, participation by the Center had been rendered ineffective or
impossible because of unilateral management actions by the collectors, by the
vagaries of committee actions, and by a paucity or absence of operational clearances
for Center personnel.
The IG considered the substantial elimination of exploitation problems caused
by design deficiencies one of the two most important goals resulting from his in-
vestigation, the other being the establishment of the COMEX. His critical concern
in this instance was based on the conviction that it was imperative to achieve a
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VORTUNG PAPER
(Page Fourtebn)
breakthrough in the time needed to exploit photography, if the Agency were to
avoid a rapid expansion in the allocation of personnel and funds for NPIC. He
further concluded that any substantial decrease in the amount of time needed to
exploit a given amount of film depended on the further automation of photo inter-
pretation techniques. This, in turn, obviously required that those designing
the collection systems work in close collaboration with NPIC to maximize the
interpretability of the imagery and to ensure the sufficiency, accuracy, and
useability of the related technical data needed to automate exploitation.
To accomplish the desired integration of effort in the designing and operation
of photo reconnaissance systems, the IG recommended that the DDI:
In collaboration with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, prepare
a proposal, for the DCI to submit to the Director, NRO, for an integrated
systems design program in photo reconnaissance; (No. 3a), and
Include, is an essential element of the program, a provision for the estab-
lishment for each reconnaissance systdm in existence or under development,
an NPIC design team (composed of photogrammetrists and computer programmers
as well as representatives of the NPIC Plans and Development Staff) to work
on a continuing basis with, and have direct access to, design specialists in
NI O and in contract manufacturing firms. (No. 3b)
Tr. C
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(Page Fifteen)
tivl 01(216 4 r-,/ t)
Automatic Data Processing. Pursu , 'tl-11. _earliefl recommendation (No. 3A
\\ .u'll
that NPIC participate in implementing proposed integrated systems design
program (Recommendation No. 3a), the IG now recommended that the Director, NPIC:
Establish for each reconnaissance system in existence or under development
a design team composed of a representative of the Plans and Development
Staff, a photogrammetrist, and a computer programmer; that each systems
team work on a continuing basis with manufacturers and with their opposites
in OSA of the DD/SW; and, subject to approval of Recommendation 3b, in the
NRO of the Department of Defense to develop maximum integration of collec-
tion and exploitation effort in reconnaissance. (ND. 4d).
The IG found that most of the remaining ADP problems were either largely in-
ternal or substantially within the control of the Center. Among them, were serious
problems in the management, staffing, and operation of the Information Processing
Division (IPD). By and large, however, he took the position that the latter
problems stemmed from the joint effects of rapid growth and inadequate staffing,
that division management was cognizant of them and was taking appropriate remedial
action, and that what IPD needed most was time to let the corrective measures
take effect. The IG did, however; recommend that:
,
The Director, NPIC, provide the Information ProceSsing Division immediately
with sufficient increase in Tb O and accelerated recruitment to permit the
inauguration of a fully-staffed, three-shift computer operation. (No. 4h)
The IG also discovered interface problems between NPIC computer personnel,
on the one hand, and Center planners and intelligence production personnel on
\Sleh i,,,,j / of-'an inadequate other. He diagnosed them as'-consisting?, basically of an inadequate under-
standing by ADP personnel and those whom they supported of each other's functions
and problems\dNeaused-by lack of satisfactory communications. These problems were
aggravated, as he saw them, by the youth and inexperience of a large majority of
IPD employees. To combat these difficulties the IG recommended that the Director,
NPIC:
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(Page Sixteen)
Inaugurate a program of orientation of plans and development staff, photo-
grammetrists, and computer programmers in each others skills with particular
emphasis on the application of computers. (No. 4a)
Inaugurate for the purpose of breaking down group prejudices a series of
informal seminars in which specialists in programming and photogrammetry
present briefings and lead discussions setting forth their accomplishments ,
and their problems, e.g. with the UNIVAC equipment. (No. 4c)
Direct that all NPIC components requiring data processing services, or
under investigation for possible computer applications, supply in writing
to the Information Processing Division all information required by pro-
grammers to execute their assignments. (No. 4b)
Direct the managements of all NPIC components concerned with mensuration,
e.g. the Photo Analysis Group (PAG), the Photo Interpretation Division
(PID), and the Technical Information Division (TID), to arrange intensive,
continuing orientation and utilization by their personnel of mensuration
equipment on line to the computer, to keep accurate records of such activ-
ity, and to ensure proper reporting of design limitations or malfunctions
encountered, in order to speed debugging and freezing of production models
for general use throughout the Center. (No. 4i)
In his interviews, the IG heard many complaints about the poor service ren-
dered by UNIVAC. Accordingly, he recommended that the Director, NPIC:
Wye aggressively in NPIC's relations with UNIVAC to demand and obtain
solutions for present-day difficulties with UNIVAC equipment and computer
programs and routines. (No. 4f)
The other two recommendations the IG made with reference to ADP showed
evidence of concern for the Center's ability to, handle some of the broader aspects
d
of the ADP function without outside he pr-T us, he recommended that the Director,
NPIC:
Assemble a small board of computer system managers and senior programmers
from such firms as United Aircraft, Boeing, North American Aviation, and
Lockeed, and that appropriate NPIC personnel join with this board to review
policy and performance of the Information Processing Division on a quarterly
or more frequent basis. (No. 4e)
Delay decision on the acquisition of a next generation of more powerful
equipment until current computer programs are performing effectively and
until existing workload has been effectively streamlined, e.g.by sharp cut
back of the target brief workload. (No. 4g)
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(Page Seventeen).
In the same vein the IG recognized the pressure to subordinate NPIC
computer management to the Office of Computer Services (OCS). He concluded
that hard evidence on the merits of this proposal was lacking. He did add,
however, that NPIC should work closely with OCS in matters to 1)
personnel, job procedures) and performance evaluation, and 2) 1,ilsystems design
and the development of new equipment.
c_ai/A4/(
If the foregoing views and recommendatiolissisplayed sane ambivalence
concerning the ability of NPIC to handle its ADP program, they also constituted
a pat admission of his own limitations to deal with the question definitively.
Whereas he professed to see the need for NPIC to have and retain control of its
own computer facility and to believe that the Center was in the process of working
out its own ADP problems, he couldn't resist the contrary urge to seek some
outside help. The proposal to involve the Center with OCS was philosophically
attractive , but bound to be troublesome politically. His flat recommendation
to defer acquisition of next generation ADP equipment was both ambiguous as to
the type of equipment meant and of doubtful competence in yield of his own technical
limitations. His recommendation that a board of outsiders review the management
of IPD# at frequent intervals was at best groping.
In spite of these limitations, his analyses and recommendations were to
prove useful, particularly in helping to speed the solution of problems involving
personnel and operations. Even in the case of broader questions concerning policy,
the major thrust of his findings was sound and helpful to senior#Agency managers.
Thus, he did perceive the vital role of the computer facility in Center operations,
ind he did see correctly, even if with some reservations, that the Center had to
control it.
Tu?
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(Page Eighteen)
Research and Development. The IG's observations led him to conclude that
NPIC labored under serious deficiencies in photo interpretation equipment. He
conceded, however, that photo interpreters could get the job done with existing
equipment, but at the cost of lower productivity and greater risk of losing
)erz.cu,t,
vital information. At the same time, -.Stiport-iate=that ha--bsolve0
NPIC of responsibility for these deficiencies. He observed that NPIC had been
successful in developing many pieces of equipment, and that the Center had done
particularly well in equipping photogrammetrists and reproduction personnel,
including the photo laboratory. Thesljoints of some significance, since
they demonstrate the confidence of the IG in the ability of NPIC to carry on
a successful research and development program. Indeed, his main complaints
were that the NPIC program was too narrowly based and that it repeatedly suffered
from an inadequate allocation of personnel and funds.
Though he gave the Center credit for its successes, he did not find that the
NPIC RD programs without faults. One of them involved the handling of itryPtop,
meat contracts. He noted that 13 persons were responsible for monitoring over
100 contracts and requisitions whose value exceeded $13 million. The same 13
persons had many other assigned duties, ranging all the way from coordinating
joint development and procurement of equipment in the Intelligence Community to
testing and evaluating bread-board models and production units. He commended
the contract monitors for what he characterized as their remarkable job over the
years, and he expressed the opinion that any shortcomings in their work resulted
largely from factors over which they had little influence. He endorsed the need
for expansion, as provided in the Center five-year projection, but he questioned
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(Page Nineteen)
whether academic qualifications should not be raised for new personnel to handle
the larger and more sophisticated effort. To get more highly qualified candidates,
he pointed to the need for a higher grade structure, and suggested that NPIC
might profit from the experience of the DDS&T in assessing the question of grades.
To cope with the foregoing problems, the IG recommended that:
The Director, NPIC, give priority attention to assessing the skills needed
to fully meet NPIC's R&D obligations to the intelligence community, and to
seeking revision of the grade structure of the Plans and Development Staff
as necessary to attract personnel with the skills needed. (No. 5)
The IG observed a number of deficiencies in the management of the NPIC
development program, a situation he charged primarily to a shortage of personnel.
Most serious among these was his contention that the Center was accustomed to
accept technical proposals and approve them as specifications for the resulting
contracts. To correct this, he recommended that the Director, NPIC:
Begin now to build an improved capability to write technical contract
specifications in house; and that contracts routinely specify spare parts
and technical manuals when appropriate. (No. 6a)
The IG characterized the testing and evaluation of equipment by Development
Branch personnel as catch-as-catch can. He further raised the possibility that
those involved in development might lack the objectivity needed to make an un-
biased evaluation. To remedy this situation, he recommedded that the Director, NPIC:
Divorce test and evaluation from the Plans and Development Staff and establish
it as a unit immediately subordinate to the Executive Director, NPIC. (No. 6b)
The IG observed that the Plans and Development Staff had recently instituted
a regular equipment maintenance program, but found it staffed by only two persons
from the Development Branch. He expressed the opinion that it should be expanded
and established as a separate branch. Accordingly, he recommended that the
C7:774
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PAPER
(Page Twenty)
Director, NPIC:
Remove the responsibility for equipment maintenance from the Development
Branch of the Plans and Development Staff and establish it as a separate
branch in the Plans and Development Staff with sufficient T/0 positions
to fulfill the maintenance function adequately. (lio. 6c)
fa")
The IG reiterated his belief that NPIC R&D funds were4adequate, particularly
/1/P/C. LoY,
in view of the broad chair,-under NSCID No. 8, for developing photo interpre-
,-i
tation equipment for the entire Intelligence Community. He pointed out that much
development work undertaken by the Center could be brought to a successful con-
clusion only by extending state-of-the-art frontiers. He deplored the necessity
of taking current operating expenses off the top of funds granted NPIC and
allocating to R&D only what was left. He noted, however, the limitations imposed
by the number and capability of R&D personnel then occupying Plans and Development
positions, and stressed the need for recruitment of additional qualified personnel
as a prerequisite to the allocation of additional funds. Subject to this condition,
he recommended that:
The Director, NPIC, press with senior Agency management the imperativeness
of a stable and expanding R&D budget, and, having done so, establish and
enforce within NPIC a budgetting and staffing philosophy that assigns a
much higher priority to the requirements for research and development than
has been possible in the past. (No. 7)
One final point was made by the IG concerning NPIC R&D. He chided the Center
for construing its responsibility for joint development of equipment too narrowly.
He Called particularly for the Center to exercise greater initiative in obtaining
participation by other Community members in the designing of equipment -- as
opposed to the joint procurement after it\is developed. He endorsed the proposal
by the Plans and Development Staff to establish a Committee for Photographic
Equipment (COPE) and the assignment of a full-time Executive Secretary. The IG
made no recommendation of his own on this subject. Presumably he considered the
Center proposal adequate.
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(Page Twenty-One)
In any assessment of the IG's findings on Center RD, it would have to be
assumed that NPIC critics probably were far less forgiving of Center shortcomings
than the IG. Thus, they would likely regard the IG's stress on the urgent need
for the Director, NPIC, to assess the skills needed to meet fully the NPIC RD
commitment as an indication, if true, of action long overdue. Likewise, the
charge by the IG that technical proposals were prone to evolve into contract
specifications, and his emphasis on the need to develop an in-house capability
to write such specifications almost certainly constituted prima facie evidence
in the minds of Center critics that NPIC control of the expenditure of R&D funds
was far from adequate. Though it was, perhaps, not as significant as either of
the two foregoing points, the low esteem with which the IG regarded the test and
evaluation of equipment submitted for acceptance at NPIC and the fact that he
recommended that the function be removed from the Plans and Development Staff
and placed under the Director's Office must have added to growing doubts con-
cerning the management of NPIC research and development. The situation was further
aggravated when the IG suggested the need for more highly qualified candidates to
fill new slots in an expanded Plans and Development Staff. It not always
necessary to state-a proposition directly. Put this way, the message, whether in-
tended or not, was easily deduced.
In the face of a pituation like this, it would, indeed, be unlikely to expect
the early commitment of millions of additional dollars or the allocation of
sharply increased manpower (Whatever, the IG's personal convictions and in spite
of his earnest attempts to give the Center its due, his findings shouted over his
head. In short they boded the Center no good.
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Management and Supervision. The IG discovered serious problems in the
recruitment and training of Center personnel, in the use of overtime, and in
records management. He also discovered a whole host of management problems
relating to the deployment and supervision of personnel as a result of the
joint nature of Center operations. Of all the management and supervisory
problems, the latter were the most exacerbating.
First and foremost among circumstances setting the stage for trouble was
the fact that the Center was jointly staffed by CIA and DIA personnel, the
latter mainly photo interpreters. Though the Director, NPIC, had functional
control over DIA, personnel, he had no administrative control over them. For-
tunately, DIA chose to assign its civilian photo interpreters, who comprised
approximately 60% of the DIA contingent in 1965, on a non-rotating basis. The
Director, NPIC, had no voiceihowever, in the selection of DIA photo interpre-
ters assigned to NPIC, and only a limited role in the selection of DIA appointees
?0.16p
to key managerial positions in the Center.
The situation with respect to CIA personnel was,perhapsieven less satis-
factory, though in this instance most of the difficulties were created by deci-
sions made i4the Center itself. The overriding fact of life here was the dilemma
of the Director, NPIC, in having responsibility for the management of both the
national center and a separate CIA detachment. Despite the fact that he and his
Executive Director were well aware of distinctions between the two organizations,
though perhaps less clearly cognizant of which CIA, projects should be. national
And which departmental, they were never able to communicate these distinctions,
var.
orA the need for them, in a manner comprehensible to Agency customers or senior
Agency managers. This lack of understanding had caused them much travail since
jTi
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(Page Twenty-Three)
the establishment of the Center, and it was to .ncrease-in thejuture.
The situation was seriously aggravated by the organization in June 1963
of the Photographic Analysis Group (PAG), where all national photo interpretation
h/44
was performed, and -the manner in which CIA photo interpreters were to be selected
and assigned to work the031. PAG had no Tb, only what the IG characterized as
an informal manning chart. All CIA photo interpreters appeared on the Table of
Organization for the Photographic Intelligence Division (PID), the CIA depart-
mental detachment. Agency photo interpreters were simply assigned on rotation,
-normairl)Ione year at the outsetjand later two, to work in PAG.
The ramifications of this arrangement were just short of appalling. Thus,
CIA photo interpreters did not necessarily occupy the position in which they
were carried on the Tb. Some PID branch chiefs were temporarily!assigned to
PAG, leaving their PID positions to be filled by others who could only be
designated as acting. At the time of the IG's survey, he found that imPID all
PhD
fourA branches were being run by acting chiefs and acting deputies. In one case,
the acting branch chief was a GS-14 photo interpreter occupying a non-supervisory
T/O position. In another, the acting deputy was a GS-12 from well down in the
I/O. The IG pointed out that an individual could be a supervisor one year and
not the next, and that the situation utterly precluded an orderly development
of managerial skills and advancement up through the supervisory ranks.
If the situation was bad in PID, it was equally bad, or worse, in PAG.
Agency photo interpreters assigned on rotation to PAG found themselves at a
.disadvantage in dealing with DIA appointees who were assigned there permanently
and more familiar with the operation of PAG. Worse yet, managers in CIA/PID
displayed a marked tendency toward the selection of new recruits or relatively
7it:] cFT
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inexperienced photo interpreters for assignment to journeymen positions in PAG.
Thus, the IG found at the time of his survey that whereas 69% of CIA, photo in-
terpreters assigned to PAG were GS-10 and lower, only 1.6% of DIA civilians
fell ;in the same category. Indeed, this policy of short-term rotation, with
its alleged deleterious effects on the quality of the national product, was a
bone in,he throat of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. And heAcomplained
about it.
Director, DIA. Letter to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
5 January 1965 (SECRET)
This policy of short-term rotation and lack of a PAG Table of Organization
confronted management with profound problems in evaluating the performance of
individual CIA, photo interpreters. TO solve this, a procedure was established
whereby the supervisor,lrated the performance of the individual on a 17-point
1
evaluation sheet. This evaluation was then reviewed by the PID career panel,
which arrived at a consensus constituting the final evaluation. A person's
fitness report was, thus, not the work of the supervisor who signed it. This
practice was a source of bitter objections raised by many Agency photo interpreters.
To alleviate these difficulties the IG recommended that:
The Director, NPIC, establish a formal T/O separate from that of CIA/PID,
to accommodate CIA personnel assigned to PAG for duty; that responsibility
for personnel administration of CIA employees assigned to PAG be trans-
ferred from Chief, CIA/PID, to the senior CIA officer in PAG. (No. 16)
The Director, NPIC, establish and enforce as long-term policy the concept
that CIA, photo interpreters assigned to the national effort will have at
least one year's experience in CIA/PID before transfer to PAG. (No. 18)
The Director, NPIC, establish a system for managing rotation between CIA/PID
and PAG along the lines of the FieldrReassignment Questionnaire mechanism
of the Clandestine Services. (ND. 19)
The Director, NPIC, direct that fitness reports be written by the immediate
supervisor; that the role of the PID Career Panel be confined to an ex post
facto review; and that uniformiiy in rating's be attained by educating super-
visors in proper fitness reporting. (No. 12)
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(Page Twenty-Five) 1'1'-i1" *LIA
There were two less profound difficulties related to the joint manning of
PAG that engaged the attention of the IG. One was the fact that, although neither
CIA nor DIA had honored its commitment in filling PAG positions, DIA had come
much closer to doing so than the Agency. The IG expressed the opinion that CIA
was open to censure for its failure. He, therefore, recommended that:
The Director, NPIC, transfer from CIA/VID to PAG enough photo interpreters
to fill and keep filled the CIA commijEment to the national effort, even at
the expense of a short term degradaqn of the CIA departmental effort. (Nb. 17)
.
The second of the two lesser difficulties conderned a Ofacto favoritism in
work assignments. Second phase exploitation involved a scan of the entire mission
to identify new targets, to note changes in targets of secondary importance, and
to index all targets imaged on the photography. The resulting body of information
was called the Mission Coverage Index (MCI). The MCI scan was a task almost uni-
versally disliked by photo interpreters. The IG noted that many DIA interpreters
assigned to the Scientific and Technical Division of PAG did not work on MCI teams.
He expressed the opinion that all photo interpreters, regardless of grade, experience,
or personal preference should share work on the MCI. To bring this about, he recom-
mended that:
?The Director, NPIC, direct the Chief, PAG, to establish a policy of rotation
of photo interpreters within PAG to achieve equitable sharing of first and
second phase scanning assignments and that this policy apply equally to CIA
and toIDIA photo interpreters. (No. 20)
Though the IG observed well and diagnosed correctly the most serious among pro-
blems stemming from the two-hatted responsibility of the Director, NPIC, and the bi-
zarre measures taken by the Center to exercise managerial control under the circum-
stances, his recommendations failed to bring about a comprehensive solution to the
problems. Nor, for that matter, did anyone else succeed in contriving an overall
solution. In the end the problems were simply eliminated by the decision to divorce
the management of the CIA detachment from that of NPIC.
TO (7, FCRU
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Turning to)some of the other managerial problems, the IG observed that
NPIC had been chronically understaffed. He attrxbuted this condition partly
to a failure by the Center to pursue its recruitment program as vigorously
or imaginatively as it should have. He cited, for example, the NPIC policy
of restricting the search for photo-interpreter trainees largely to...males
with degrees in geology, geography, or forestry. He expressed doubt that
suitable interpreter trainees could be found only among those with earth science
backgrounds, and cited the testimony of the Foreign Technology Division of the
Air Force Systems Command, another organization with many photo interpreters to
support his contention. The IG flatly accused NPIC of discriminating against
women in its hiring. To implement his conclusion, the IG recommended that the
Director, NPIC:
Direct that the search for photo-interpreter trainees be broadened to include
fields other than the earth sciences and that the search not be limited,
wittingly or unwittingly, to males. (No. 10d)
More significant than the internal policies of NPIC in affecting recruitment
were circumstances largely beyond Center control. The IG noted the disastrous
effect of the ceiling freeze of 1964 on filling NPIC vacancies after it was lifted:4
He pointed to the competitive inadequacy of the Center grades in scarce labor
markets. He spoke of the unwillingness of mathematicians and computer programmers
to wait for security clearances, and cited the fact that not one of the experienced
computer programmers put in process by NPIC during the previous year had actually
entered on duty. To ameliorate these difficulties, the IG recommended that the
Director, NPIC:
Seek authorization from the DirectOr of Personnel to establish certain posi-
tions in NPIC under the Scientific Pay Schedule, including reserve appoint-
ments if appropriate, in order to attract experienced, higNy qualified
personnel, particularly for work in the Technical Intelliegnce and Information
Processing Divisions and in the Plans and Development Staff. (No. 10a)
11
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Request the Director of Personnel to expedite approval of NPIC's proposal
for establishing certain photogrammetrist positions under the GSS pay
schedule [a special pay category for scientists and engineers]. (No. 10b)
Initiate a concerted recruitment drive patterned after that of the Office
of Scientific Intelligence to fill existing vacancies in the NPIC T/0.
The recruitment effort should be monitored by the Executive Director, NPIC,
and weekly progress reports, by Division, should be submitted to him. The
effort should combine a dragnet approach involving Agency recruiters and
a rifling approach directly involving several senior NPIC officers. (No. 10c)
Better orientation of new personnel and a broader program of training were
needed, according to the IG. In the case of training, he expressed the opinion
that all intelligence specialists who utilized photographic evidence should have
some orientation in its use. Though the Office of Training offered such a course,
which the IG suggested should be revised so as to focus more sharply on NPIC,
it had not been scheduled in over a year for lack of candidates. To overcome
these defects, the IG recommended that the Deputy Director for Intellignece:
/1
Direct the Director, NPIC,'on'collaboration with the Office of Training to
develop basic orientation and refresher courses in the uses of photography
in intelligence analysis; and (No. 9a)
Inaugurate a program within the intelligence directorate which would require
all cleared analysts to receive such training on a scheduled basis and en-
courage the participation of cleared intelligence officers from other direc-
torates. (N0. 9b)
Another aspect of training in which the IG showed interest was the orienta-
tion of new employees. He observed that NPIC had made what he characterized as
substantial progress in this area since the 1962 survey, but he said that it had
Ny. not gone far enough. He reported that one of the ,eeRenegV-complaints he heard
from new employees was the length of time it took to become familiar with the
functions and physical location of others in the organization and how to obtain
_needed support. The IG, therefore, recommended that:
The Director, NPIC, expand the internal orientation course materially,
perhaps to a full week in length. (No. 13)
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(Page Twenty-Eight)
With reference to the recruitment of personnel in scarce categories, the
IG pointed out that many such persons were already earning more than NPIC could
afford to pay, and that colleges did not even offer training in some of the
specific skills desired. He concluded that NPIC would have to underwrite the
training of people with these skills through Agency-financed external training.
He'dkdorsed the development of a cooperative training program in which NPIC
would finance part of a student's education in return for a commitment to work
for the Center. Accordingly, the IG recommended that:
The Director, NPIC, initiate a phased program for training personnel in
skills that are not now on the market at prices NPIC can afford to pay;
and that he give consideration to developing a cooperative program at the
undergraduate level. (No. 14)
In a somewhat different vein, the IG noted that NPIC had never succeeded
in having one of its candidates nominated for attendance at the National or
Service War Colleges. He added, morekrer, that he knew of no other Agency
component that was at deeply or continuously involved with the military as NPIC.
He concluded that the Agency was remiss in failing to capitalize on such an
opportunity, and he asserted that many senior NPIC officers were well able to
represent the Agency creditably. He, therefore, recommended that:
The Deputy Director for Intelligence request the Chaitman of the Training
Selection Board to give due consideration to the nature of NPIC's respon-
sibilities, its extensive involvement with the military, and its contri-
bution to the total national intelligence effort, in the selection of
nominees for the senior war colleges. (ND. 15)
Another management problem in NPIC involved overtime. The IG observed that
use of overtime by the Center was excessive and chronic. He noted that working
dcup a, Lti-c.-K
one or two twelve-hour days a week andseven-day-weeics for weeks in succession
were not uncommon among NPIC employees. He stated that such burdens, which
tended to fall unequally on the more competent and experienced personnel, not
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only adversely affected the health of the employee and his family obligations)
but also lowered his productivity while at the same time increasing the risk
of error. He pointed out that, in response to Agency pressure to reduce over-
time costs, the Center had adopted the policy of no overtime pay for CIA super-
visors. In addition, according to Agency regulations, CIA employees in grades
GS-11 and above were obliged to contribute the first eight hours of overtime
vh?4e,
each week, even though the work was directed. At the same't the IG pointed
out that DIA civilians, with whom Agency personnel worked shoulder-to-shoulder,
were paid for all overtime, regardless of grade or position.
He expressed the wish that he could recommend the substantial elimination
of overtime in NPIC, but admitted this was unrealistic in view of the lack of
control by NPIC of film inputs, and the resulting requirements. He concluded
that it was time to begin paying for the work required. The question was how
to do it. He noted the unsuccessful attempt by NPIC to have Center positions
designated as production positions, thereby automatically authorizing the payment
for all overtime. He, therefore, proposed that NPIC be exempted from Agency
regulations by recommending that:
The Deputy Director for Intelligence seek approval for payment of all over-
time directed and worked by CIA employees assigned to NPIC, without regard
to grade or position and without regard to contrary CIA regulations--subject
only to the statuatory limitations. (No. 11)
A final management problem identified by the IG involved the storage of
rapidly mounting quantities of roll film. He pointed, for example, to the fact
that such holdings had nearly doubled during the previous calendar year, and that
the NPIC record holdings--largely film--constituted the second largest in the
Agency, second only to those in the Office of Central Reference. He asserted
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that NPIC was slow to face up to the problem, but acknowledged that the Center
had obtained an experienced records management officer in April 1965. The IG
expressed serious doubts of the need for NPIC to retain on file copies of all
photography, and expressed the hope that development of the film chip program
night hasten a decision to discard selectively some of the roll film. Though
he conceded that it was too early for the new records management officer to
reach any judgments, the IG himself recommended that:
The Director, NPIC, initiate a phaged program of reducing roll film hold-
ings by discarding film that is repeatedly duplicated by more recent cover-
age and which is revealed by NPIC film control records to be not of contin-
uing intelligence interest. (slo. 21)
In view of subsequent changes in the management of NPIC, it is worth pausing
to get the IG's findings on the whole range of management problems into perspec-
tive. Did they clearly demonstrate the culpability of management within NPIC?
Of the DDI as Executive Agent for the DCI? Or both?
For the PID/PAG mess and all its ramifications, the Center had to accept a
major share of the blame. Much of the trouble that derived from it could have
been avoided, if the Center had made a more decisive distinction between PID and
PAG, and had operated them as separate entitiesl The provision of a PAG TAble
of Organization would have set the stage for unequivocal job assignments and made
clear the available routes for career advancement. It would have precluded the
nightmare of rotation and averted DIA concern over its effect ?X Center products.
It would have obYiated the need to meddle with the normal preparation of fitness
reports and the resulting controversy. And it should have eliminated the oppor-
tunity for CIA/PID managers to manipulate assignment of CIA photo interpreters to
the detriment of PAG and to the advantage of CIA/PID.
Such a clear-cut distinction should also have set the stage for an improvement
/FP
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in the handling of requirements and a better understanding of the difference
between the national center and the CIA detachment. As it was, PID served as both
the funnel through which ell CIA requirements came into the Center and the screen
\4?Lirt,"
which separated those wiLicildeze to be designated national those to be
treated as departmental. This practice placed strong temptation in the hands of
CIA/PID in making decisions As,s4a whether a given requirement should be regarded
as national, in which case it went to PAG, or departmental and stayed in PID.
Moreover, to have required that the distinction be made before the requirement
reached NPIC would have demanded an awareness on the part of Agency analytical
components of the difference between the national and departmental efforts,
something that top NPIC management sought in vain to encourage. All of this
could have been done by or at the initiative of Center managers--including, as
a last resort, a proposal to establish the CIA detachment as a separate entity
reporting directly to the DDI.
The next most troublesome issue on which the IG made recommendations was
overtime. The degree to which this was an issue either externally, with senior
Agency executives, or internally, with overworked employees who were not being
paid for some of the work they were required to do, was a function of the amount
of overtime. If the overtime were reduced substantially the issue would become
a small one, whether in dollars Yin ihe magnitude of employee dissatisfaction.
(It should be realized, however, that some loved it, in spite of pious protests,
cS
for the added income it provided.) The IG profeued to believe that excessive
overtime couldn't be avoided. Later events were to prove that this was not the
case. In the fall of 1966, under the same managers, the Center was to prove that
overtime could be reduced without crippling production, though with some reduction
and delay in services. To this extent, at least, the Center missed an opportunity
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(Page-'Thirty-TWo)
to take positive action at an earlier date, when it would have been more re-
assuring to top Agency officials.
The delinguency in meeting the Agency commitment in the staffing of PAG
and the elimination of favoritism in assigning photo interpreters to the mission
scan were wholly within the ability and authority of NIC to solve, but it is
doubtful that these were issues of such moment as to call for drastic action
from outside the Center. The same was true of the mounting volume of roll film.
As far as obtaining enough people to do the work was concerned, the major
issue was getting an adequate and stable Tb. Discounting the impactAirregular
substantial increases in the Tb O coupled with periodic tapoicdmao ceiling freezes,
the Center could stand on its record. Whether to give preferential consideration
to male candidates with earth science backgrounds or not was an issue of no major
proportions. And the Center could scarcely have been charged with a failure to
plead for more competitive grades,rincluding those on the GSS scale. It could
likewise hardly be charged with'the intermin#le delays in clearing job candidates
or in failing to try to do something about it: These were all matters in which ,
()I
higher authority, whether at the DDI level or311bove, had to shoulder a major
share of the criticism.
In matters of orientation and training, the record of the Center was basically
good. Only in one instance, the further elaboration of the orientation course
for new Center employees, was there some lack of Center initiative, but even in
this case it was partly a question of judgment.
As far as the orientation of Agency analysts in the capalgilites and limita-
tions of photographic evidence, the Center had done much througfithe years. If
analysts were reluctant to attend, the Center could do little about it. As far
TT)
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(Page Thirty-Three)
as external training, including the selective funding of training for specialists,
, (L .
was concerned, the Center had taken sei%w initiative and succeeded in establishing
some precedents. Whether louder hollering would have produced better results or.
merely greater resistance is a moot question. And no one could accuse the Center
of failing to advance candidates for the National or Service War Colleges. Here
was a case where the Center was unsuccessfulcking the entrenched positiol of
older Agency components with better Headquarters connections. In all the foregoing
training matters/ the Center was essentially up against the wall; any movement could
only be achieved with the help of higher authority.
Ground Photography. One other subject caught the attention of the IG 'in the
course of his 1965 survey. It was hand-held, ground photography. His interest
in this was stimulated by complaints that he heard in Headquarters interviews
concerning the competence of NPIC to exploit this type of photography. He -deter-
mined- that the criticism all apparently stemmed from one embarrassing incident
in which the Agency,using a measurement made by NPIC missed the length of a
Soviet ICBM by 15 feet whereas DIA published the correct figure.
The explanation was simple enough. The correct DIA measurement was provided ,
by the Foreign Technology Division (FTD) of the Air Force Systems Command, and
was made from the original`gradephotography, for which all the parameters needed
in mensuration were available. The Center measurement was based on news service
wire photos which included no object of known dimensions. Using the best technique
for establishing scale, the NPIC analysts made an assumption about the identity
of the prime mover on which the ICBM was placed. Unfortunately, the assumption
proved to be incorrect, and so was the scale ascribed to the photo. Thus, the
incident did not reveal a lack of technical competence at NPIC in mensuration
procedures. Indeedjin another similar instance where Center and FTD analysts
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(Thirty-Four)
used, respectively, wire service photos and original attache photography, NPIC
anal7sts produced a measurement that proved to be correct whereas FFD analysts
missed it by eight feet. In the latter case, however, the photos used by NPIC
included an object whose size was unequivocally known. The error made by NPIC
in the first case cited was one of judgment in interpretation. This, of course,
was damaging enough?,
The IG noted that circumstances in recent years had caused NPIC to become
preoccupied with the exploitation of overhead photography, and that there
appeared to be too little coordination in the Intelligence Community of the ex-
ploitation of ground photography. He noted that this had not always been the
case. He pointed out that in 1954 and 1955, before the days of the U-2, the man
who later became the Director, NPIC, took the initiative in establishing a joint
Working Group on Intelligence Ground Photography, and that he became chairman
of the group. -He also observed that the work of this group so impressed the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that they requested permission to charter it as a sub-
committee of the JCS Photographic and Survey Section. The IG pointed out that
this group was one of the victims of the rearrangement of people and functions
that followed the establishment of DIA, and that the group had been inactive for
at least two years.
The IG noted some brighter signs. He pointed to the recent publication by
NPIC of a manual on ground photography for use throughout the Community. He noted
NPIC. Collection and Field Mensuration Techniques for Ground Photographs,
no date [but disseminated in April 1965]. (Condidential)
the plan by NPIC to schedule an in-house course on ground photography to be taught
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(Page Thirty-Five)
on contract by a leading photogrammetrist. He further noted the success of the
Center in gaining access to and participating jointly with FTD in the exploitation
of more recent Moscow parade photography.
Past successes, later difficulties, and recent productive NPIC efforts in
coordinating the collection and exploitation of ground photography led the IG'
to recommed that:
The Director, NPIC, take the lead in reestablishing the Joint Working Group
on Intelligence Ground Photography as a mechanism for coordinating community
efforts in ground photography and for the exchange of information in related
fields. (No. 8)
That the specific problem relating to the exploitation of ground photography
hurt the Center out of all proportion to the importance of the single mistake
cannot be doubted. Since the erroneous measurement was used by Agency analysts
and published in the Central Intelligence Bulletin, CIA, as well as NPIC, suffered
acute embarrassment. Moreover, under the circumstances, it involved Agency
executives up through the highest level. Clearly, the NPIC error far overshadowed
the mitigating circumstances in the minds of Headquarters perSonnel. At tbe
same time, the IG found ample evidence to confirm past successes and current
initiative by NPIC in meeting the problem.
THE "EYES ONLY" SUPPLEMENT
The June 1965 report by the IG of his survey of NPIC was Supplemented by
in
a memo covering three items deemed inappropriate for inclusion/the main report.
Inspector General. BYE 40694-65/2, Supplement to the Inspector General's
1965 Report of Survey of NPIC, 21 June 1965. (TOP SECRET/IDEALIST/TACKLE/EYES
ONLY -- Handle via BYEMAN Control System Only)
They were: 1) the position of NPIC with respect to the CIA organization; 2)
possible need for revision of NSCID No. 8; and 3) the role of NPIC in time of
war.
Trt,) c, ,,ThrT
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(Page Thirty-Five-A) .
4
Position of NPIC. -The IG recalled the national character or NPIC
and pointed out that CIA, would be open to criticism should the Agency treat
the Center like any other line component in the competition for funds and
people. One means for enhancing the competitive position of NPIC would be
to change its position with reference to the CIA organizational structure.
The IG noted that the possibility of such a change was considered at the
time of the previous IG survey, in 1962, but that it was rejected in favor
of leaving NPIC under the DDI. The reason given was. the fact that the DDI,
Ray S. Cline, was then but newly appointed and it was judged desirable to let
him study the problem and make his own recommendations.
? In 1965, the IG reconsidered the subordination of NPIC. He said four
? alternatives were discussed: 1) establishing NPIC as a separate entity re-
porting directly to the DCI; 2) establishing it as a CIA, directorate, coequal
with the others; 3) transferring it to the DDSU; and 4) leaving it under the
DDI.
The IG recommended that NPIC remain under the DDI. He rejected the first
two alternatives as too burdensome to the DCI and DDCI, whom, he believed,
were already heavily taxed -With existing responsibilities. He conceded however,
that either of these arrangements would improve the competitive position of the
Center in securing funds and people. He was opposed, however, to making or-
ganizational changes to overcome problems arising, as he saw it, "largely from
a failure in communications.' Either of these alternatives would certainly have
been attractive to the Center, the first because it represented the ultimate in
the organizational elaboration of Center operations, and the second because it
TO') 'ft
C-s'r
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was at least a step on the road to the same goal. Though the IG made no
mention of high-level deliberations on this point in his memo, there is little
doubt that they took Place. There can likewise be little doubt that the DCI
and DDCI were as disinterested in enhancing the competitive position of NPIC
in the face of growing reservations about the control of its operation as they
were unwilling to assume direct responsibility for dealing with emerging pro-
blems in managing the Center.
The possibility of replacing the DDI with the DDSU as Executive Agent
for the DCI in overseeing management of the Center was an intriguing alternative.
The IG pointed out that in matters of "technical support" the Center was more
closely allied to the DDSU than to the DDI. He should have added more. Not
dhlitwould there presumably be a smoother and better integrated effort between
collections system designers and those engaged in PI exploitation, but-competi-
tion of NPIC and ORD for control of research and development could have been
eliminated. More than that, much of the Center output, particularly as related
to installations in the strategic threat category, was even more directly re-
lated to work being done in FMSAC or OSI than in the DDI area. This was par-
ticularly true of third-phase ("detailed") studies. A. more general and less
tangible factor favoring such a change was the decidedly "technical" orientation
of the Center.
Undoubtedly NPIC and its activities would have been more thoroughly under-
,\T-t htLAI, Alitq pvliza%e
stood by the DDSW(bAntl-perhaps,-theeforef-been meTe-susceptibl the kind
of perceptive support and guidance needed to achieve greater effectiveness in
its management. Though this alternative -is an exceedingly tempting one to en-
tertain and lament as a dream of what might have been, it is doubtful that it
TO? 5,,k,f
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Tro oc-r ? 'WORK= PAPPR ?
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"
was attractive to the Center at that time. The problem was one of personali-
ties. Albert D. Wheelon, who was the DDSU, was young, extremely aggressive,
and insensitive to the feelings of others. For this reason alone, if for no
otherel, the Center would probably have been less than enthusiastic over the
prospect of joining the DDSU. In any case, the IG made his decision on other
grounds. He saw no easing of the major problem, the NPIC workload, as a re-
sult of such a transfer, and he said that the DDSU was as already as busy as
the DDI. Yet, If the problem of personalities could have been overcome -- and
it later proved to have been a transient one -- the transfer to the DDSU should
have been a very attractive one for the Center. Though there would probably
have been cries of anguish in the DDI for loss of a very useful handmaiden, the
change mighthave been an exciting and productive one for the Agency. Dramatic
change seemed inevitable. Transfer to the DDSU would likely have produced
(rire,p /7-,eke a:
far morevongtauctave proposalVor solving the NPIC problem as well asAstrength-
e,)
eneirt e technical capability of one of the most productive and important pro-
ducers of hard intelligence information.
Revision of NSCID No. 8. The IG observed that NSCID No. 8 authorized NPIC
only to exploit photography. Since its adoption, other sensors, most notably
radar, were producing imagery of potential significance from a 50X1
strategic intelligence point of view. The IG further pointed out that there
were already signs of incursions on what should properly be regarded as the re-
sponsibilities of a national imagery exploitation center, and cited the SAC
facility at Beale Air Force Base, California to handle the multisensor inputs
from the SR-71 and the abortive attempt by the DDSU to exploit the January 1965
In the lat50X1
TOP cr:Te-CT
tit
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(Page Thirty-Five-D)
case, as the IG noted, NPIC had to step in and do most of the analysis. The
IG mentioned the possibility that the DCI might like to initiate early action
Nreut.5e4
tera2se NSCID No. 8 so as to make NPIC responsible for interpreting products
of all image-forming sensors in response to national requirements. This sugges-
tion apparently fell on deaf ears. ? It is doubtful that the DCI or anyone else
in higher authority was interested in either facing the risks involved in tam-
pering the NSCID or in expanding the legal responsibilitte's of a-component that
was already suffering acutely from an overload of work with which it was unable
to cope.
Wartime Role of NPIC. Although NSCID NO. 8 provided that administrative
control of NPIC would be transferred to the Department of Defense in time of war,
? the details of when and how to accomplish the transfer were never settled. The
IG called attention to the letter of 2 October 1963 from the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, to John A: McCone, the DCI. In his letter,
Deputy Secretary of Defense. TS 188384, [Wartime Role oI NPIC and Problem
of a Smooth Transfer of Control over NPIC to Department of Defense in Case of War],
2 October 1963. (TOP SECRET)
Gilpatric stressed the need for a plan to transfer NPIC administration to the
Department of Defense before the actual commencement of hostilities in view of
the important role that NPIC would play in time of war. He suggested that repre-
sentatives of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
meet an an early date to develop a plan for the transitional phase. He designated
the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency as his representative.
MCCone, who was no man to be intimidated by such pressure, responded on
25 October 1965 that he was already engaged in a broad review of emergency and
war plans as they applied to the Intelligence Community, and particularly to CIA.
DCI. TS 188384-A, [Response to Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense
Concerning the Transfer of NPIC to DOD in Wartime), 25 October 1963. (TOP SECRET)
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Aaid that this study, which might affect his views on the transfer, should
be completed by the end of 1963. He informed Gilpatric that he would be in
touch with him at a later date, when he, MtCone, had determined "to my own
satisfaction just what the arrangements should be for the intelligence community
at the national level."
The IG said that although the question had lain dormant since late 1963,
,1
it was unlikely the DOD had forgotten it. He suggested that it be referred to
the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation. In spite
of the foregoing recommendation, this matter remained unresolved. It is likely
that here was another case where the risk of sitting tight was preferable to the
hazards of reopening consideration of a previously insoluble problem.
This, then, was the state of NPIC in June 1965 as seen through the eyes
of the IG. His report was directed to the DDCI. It contained itemized recommen-
dations for action by both the DDI and the Director, NPIC., Normally 60 days were
allowed for the Deputy Director involved to respond, indicating those recommenda-
tions in which he concurred and those in which he did not --Ara---would.the,-resporises
C ?
be Who would take the initiative? With what degree of urgency would he act?
What would be the responses? Would they indicate who was going to assume a leader-
ship role, whether the decisions were going to come from the top down or from the
bottom up? As it turned out the speed of response, though not of the final de-
cision making, and the apparent determination of top-management to assume control
were to provide a few surprises for those inured to the pervasive lethargy of
bureaucracy.
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?(i)age Thirty-Five-F)
CHAPTER
REACTIONS TO THE IG REPORT
The IG report begot two somewhat different, though not unrelated, reactions,
each reflecting a difference in point of view. One was the considered, item-
by-item response to specific recommendations, either accepting or rejecting them.
The other was the broader view, in this case the question of how to go about
solving the "NPIC Problem." Predictably, the latter was the view taken by the
DDCI. In the nature of things the Center, and, to some extent, the DDI had to
pay attention to details, though the extent to which either could exert any
effective leadership depended on whether or not they, too, could address them-
selves to the broader problem and suggest approaches or produce a plan, albeit
not the NPIC five-year plan, acceptable to higher authority. As it turned out,
both NPIC and the DDI failed, the latter because he could do no more than endorse
the proposals of others, and the Center because it was unable either to perceive,
r
or, having perceived, to accept the ill-defined consti
,ents which higher authority
was struggling to bring into focus.
IOP Sd
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::.(Page Thirty-Six)
REACTION OF THE DDCI
First to respond was the DDCI. The man who staffed out his response was
E. H. Knoche. If the IG report was the first to define the "NPIC problem" in
ZE
terms acceptable to senior Agency executives and therebyfistart the action., hnnvhx)
E. H. Knoche more than any other, was the man who shaped up the solution. His
first assessment of the problem, based largely on the IG report and his personal
knowledge of the Center, was nothing less than prophetic,
"tank,
E. H. Knoche. E. H. Khoche was no stranger to the Center and its operation.
This is a fact that should be clearly understood, lest it be assumed that the
assessment prepared for the DDCI was merely a competent and persuasive piece of
staff work. Knoche, who came to the Agency from NSA, entered on duty 1 November
1953. He was first assigned to OCI. In early 1956, he was named to work on
the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, whose task it was to develop target coverage
requirements for the upcoming U-2 photo reconnaissance flights. In June of that
year he was sent to Weis6den to ensure that plans for COMINT support of U-2 flights
were adequate and in a state of readiness. In that year he was also designated
the first OCI TALENT Control Officer.
Nor were all his contacts as peripheral as this or confined to the collection
side of the AQUATONE project. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, Knoche served on the
PARAMOUNT Committee and functioned, in effect, as its executive secretary. This
not only brought him into the Steuart Building, where the Committee met, but it
also gave him first-hand experience in the production of all-source intelligence
utilizing information from U-2 photography, communications intercepts, and clandes-
tine observers;
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- (Page Thirty-Seven)
By the early 1960's, Knoche had been identified as one of the bright young
men in the Agency and was assigned to the staff of John A. McCone, then the DCI.
At that time, information derived solely from photography was in its heyday.
Almost every satellite mission led to spectacular discoveries, particularly those
related to the Soviet strategic threat. Knoche was kept busy satisfying McCone's
insatiable curiosity about the schedule for or success of a current mission. Once
the photography arrived, he was in touch with NPIC about the progress of exploita-
tion)or arranging for the Director, NPICIto brief McCone. In October 1962 offensive
missiles were discovered in Cuba. Knoche found himself in the thick of that action,
and he gained further exposure to the reactions, at the highest levels, between
photo derived information and that from other sources in the production of finished
intelligence. Or, at times, he saw the lack of any such interaction. These ex-
periences certainly did not leave Knoche unfamiliar withSthe work of NPIC. Nor did
they leave him without vivid impressions of the role photography was playing in the
production of intelligence, or of the role he thougitit should play.
In June 1965, Knoche was Executive Assistant to the DDCI, Richard Helms. Con-
sidering Knoche's long, if somewhat intermittent, association with the Center, it
,4
is not surprising that Helms handed him the IG report and the NPIC White Paper with
the request that he study them and report on his views and recommendations. The
only guidance Helms gave him was the admonition that the Agency had neither the
manpower nor the funds to support the level of operations projected by NPIC. The
(:; urgency with which the DDCI viewed the matter is suggested by the date of Knoche's
Knoche, E. H. [Taped interview] Recollection of Association with NPIC,
30 October 1969. (TOP SECRET--Handle via BYEMAN Control System Only)
response, 2 July 1965, precisely two weeks after the transmittal by the IG of his
report.
Ca /7-3 c.7:77--1'
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'.1;f1J; WORKING PAPER
E
(Page Thirty-Eight)
Knoche's Response. In his response to Helms, Knoche dissmissed the NPIC
White Paper as not worth much of Helms' time. On the other hand, he spoke
Knoche, E. H. (Executive Registry 65-7703), Memorandum for the DDCI, [Views
and Recommendations on the IG Report and NPIC White Paper], 2 July 1965 (SECRET--
EYES ONLY)
enthusiastically of the IG report and urged that Helms read it in its entirety,
primarily, Knoche said, because he was convinced that, "...special measures in
meeting the recommendations are required to get this problem under control." He
added that, "...read in its entirety, the IG report adds up to me to be a strong
50X1
50X1
however, to point out that Arthur C. Lundahl was "...truly a unique national asset
and virtually irreplaLeble." He added that it was "essential" that Lundahl remain
as Director, NPIC. Knoche also said that he saw no real alternative at that time
to the subordination of NPIC to the DDI. These two remarks werdqo be prophetic.
A
Following this introduction, Knoche addressed himself to ardiscussion of major
issues raised by the IG. He spoke first of the manpower crisis, but he questioned
the validity of the NPIC projections, to which the IG had given a qualified en-
dorsement. He believed that a substantial downward revision was possible, and
based his opinion:on the following: 1) the prospect of providing a "hard-nosed"
mechanism for screening NPIC requirements, 2) the hope that oncoming higher-resolu-
tion photography would be susceptible to more, not less, rapid exploitation, and
/
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(Page Thirty-Nine)
3) the assumption that COMOR and USIB could be more selective in identifying
high-priority targets.
Knoche turned next to the IG's proposal for a COMEX. He discounted the
wisdom of setting up a separate USIB committee for exploitation because he felt
that it and the COMOR would inevitably be competitors to thelacute embarrassment
of the DCI in his role as chairman of USIB. As an alternative Knoche suggested
expanding the responsibilities of COMOR to include those relating to exploitation.
( iz.tr fl 'n-? -s; apM7S
This was the first recorded reference to a COMIRgrylii-either case, Knoche en-
)/
dorsed use of the USIB committee to validate requirements levied on NPIC. These
judgments, too, were to be prophetic.
He diverted his attention briefly from the IG report to challenge the assump-
tion, in the projection of NPIC needs, that the existing Center organization
would remain unchanged. This was the first hint of the complete change in organ-
ization that the Center was to undergo two and one-half years later under Knoche
as Executive Director, NPIC.
Knoche dwelt on the fact that for every photo interpreter in NPIC there were
two and one-half to three support personnel. Having said this, he veered off what
might be considered a more expectable course to enter a plea for "legitimizing"
satellite reconnaissance. If this were done, he reasoned that elabprate compart-
mentation would be unnecessary and substantial savings could be realized in personnel
and special facilities currently needed to support it. His criticism of the high
ratio of support personnel in the Center presaged determined attempts later to
redude the ratio. His proposal to legitimize satillite reconnaissance found little
suppor arid came to nought.
Another issue, and a very significant one, raised by Knoche was the possibility
of tasking other, photo interpretation organizations to share the national workload
/
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for which NPIC was at least nominally responsible. He mentioned SAC, the Navy,
and even the British. The flowering of this suggestion was to be seen in the
National Tasking Plan resulting from the JIIRG,Study.
Knoche made another proposal which, like the suggestion to legitimize
satellite photography, proved to be more imagi4iive than practical. At this
point in his consideration of the problem, Knoche assumed that a substantial
augmentation of manpower would be needed at NPIC by 1970 perhaps as many as
850 persons. He proposed to obtaina vast majority of these by a redeployment of
analysts from other DDI offices, and perhaps OSI as well. His argumentation to
support this proposal was greater than that devoted to any of the other issues
he discussed. Perhaps it was prompted by the instinctive feeling that its
success depended on overcoming massive resistance by those who would be uprouted
and displaced from positions and working arrangements with which they were
satisfied. If so he was correct. This suggestion never came close to adoption.
He made just passing mention of space needs, acknowledging that NPIC would
need more in the next five years. In this instance he proved to be an equally
bad prophet.
Before turning to his recommendations, Knoche paused to lament the number
of imponderables that complicated his task. He cited the lack of basic decisions
concerning follow-on satellite systems then under consideration and the consequent
impossibility of pinning down future needs with any precision. He also pointed
to the NPIC MD projection, which he judged "fat and exaggerated" and lacking
in either precision or rationale. At the same time he acknowledged that it could
.hold the key to dramatic breakthroughs, which might substantially reduce the
workload and future need for funds. Though his oblique approach to this problem
was a tacit admission of his own puzzlement in dealing with such technical matters,
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(Page Forty-One)
his concern with it foreshadowed his prime interest in NPIC R&D upon being
named Executive Director, NPIC.
For the personal background of the DDCI, Knoche produced his horseback
estimate of NPIC needs in manpower and dollars for 1970. Both were"-r?
60% of the figures in the NPIC five-year plan. They were useful in providing
a rough order of magnitude for his initial judgment that the NPIC five-year
projections were, indeed, much too large while at the same time conveying his
reservations that substantial increases in manpower and funds appeared, nevertheless
necessary. His later judgments, made with the benefit of more conclusive indica-
tions of the political realities of the time, were to discount much further the
t tjjci 61- tv frac /-1 coh.-12 4 4nsprie4,/- ez,),Iir
meed-11e..Gent-_-_-etr=attea?gmeate!tieirDDICfe-stiu'eels.
?
On the basis of his assessment, Knoche made the following recommendations
to the DDCI:
1. That you insist on early actions to respond to the recommendations
made by the IG. The normal procedure is to allow 60 days for the Deputy
Director involved to report back with his concurrences or non-concurrences.
I believe this time span should be compressed so as to permit the earliest
possible consideration, particularly of those issues involving a non-concur-
rence. Recommend you charge the Executive Director, the DD/I, the Director,
NPIC, and the IG with keeping in close and frequent touch to refine the
issues and keep you advised.
2. That you charge the Executive Director, DD/I, and Director, NPIC,
with proposing bold and imaginative plans and programs to meet the recommen-
dations of the IG and to go beyond to face up to the challenges, not only
at NPIC, but within the analytic components of DDI as well. Possibilities
as covered in the report above include delegation of tasks to PI units other
than NPIC; a realignment of the structure of the DDI: and a determination
of ways to reduce the support and overhead at NPIC. Such programs should
also include possibilities for using existing know-how in various components
of the Agency which could be of direct aid to NPIC problems. For example,
the IG report refers to inadequate procedures for NPIC testing of equipment
supplied by contractors. TSD has excellent programs in this regard.
3. That you direct4Executive Director to expedite an inhouse look at
the question of continuing OT revising the current compartmented security
system surrounding photographic materials with a view toward eventual ,
discussion and approval by USIB.
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(Page Forty-Two)
4. That you direct early action to fill the authorized bpt un- 50X1
manned slots currently' le to NPIC, and that you further authorize a
build-up to a figure of -- the capacity of space currently available50X1
vallall
to NPIC. I recommend, however, that you require a proposal for your approval
in the filling of these additional slots either by recruitment from outside
or reassignment from within. The pros and cons of each should be included
in the proposal.
S. That you direct the Executive Director to begin work with the DD/I
and the Director, NPIC, to make more specific projected funding and personnel
requirements and to submit justification to you for increase. This should
include examination of what is possible to provide by way of additional
housing for NPIC as well as planning for an approach to the Bureau of the
Budget for relief.
6. That you direct action to obtain a complete and detailed survey of
plans for future space reconnaissance collection systems as now under study
in CIA, NRO, or industry, in order that NPIC and COMOR may make appropriate
studies -- NPIC from the standpoint of planning for future work and COMOR
from the standpoint of staffing these plans for consideration by USIB prior
to introduction.. In this respect, the DCI should undertake to ensure the
closest possible liaison and rapport between NPIC and systems planners.
This has been lacking in the past. Once the DCI has opened the doors for
NPIC, it will be necessary for Director, NPIC, to exercise his initiative
in keeping the doors open.
7. That you arrange with DCI and USIB to revise COMOR terms of reference
to include responsibility as a USIB committee for assessing the impact of
collection on the exploitation process in NPIC, and that COMOR be given the
responsibility for validating requirements levied on the NPIC.
8. That you direct the Executive Director, the DD/I, and the Director,
NPIC, to take early action to bring the problem of overtime at NPIC under
better control. In this respect, it should be understood by top U.S. intelli-
gence officials and consumers that there is no real reason, except in un-
usual circumstances, to begin immediate and around-the-clock exploitation
merely because a new package of materials has been received. DOD is a
principal consumer of the immediate readout and may not be content with
delayed readout unless told by the very top that there is need for institution
of orderliness.
9. That you direct that the NPIC problem and its implications become
a prime factor of concern in the development of the Agency long-range plan
now underway.
137 -D T 10/ .)11.C.1
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(Page Forty-Three)
Action by the DDCI. Helms accepted Knoche's analysis of the "NPIC Problem"
/41S
and endorsed his recommendations. On 13 July, he sent a memorandum to the
newly named Executive Director, Laurence K. White, extolling the merits of the
IG report on NPIC and naming White the one responsible for expediting and coordinat-
ing actions in response to it. Helms then continued with his views on facets of
DDCI. BYE 4655-65, Memorandum for the Executive Director, SEENCta: NPIC,
13 July 1965 (SECRET--Handle via BYEMAN System Only)
the problem that he considered crucial)and suggested alternatives that should be
explored. All these faithfully echoed points that Knoche made in his report to
Helms. And they should have. The memo was prepared for Helm's signature by
E. H. Knoche.
REACTION OF NPIC
The reaction of NPIC to the IG's recommendations were embodied in a paper
that NPIC forwarded to the DDI on 29 July 1965. This paper took the recommendations
of the IG one by one and gave a "reply" to each. In the case of recommendations
NPIC. BYE 41763-65 IG Survey of the NPIC, 29 July 1965. (TOP SECRET--Handle,
via BYEMAN System Only)
made by the IG to the Director, NPIC, the reply was ostensibly that of the Director
to his immediate superior, the DDI. In the case of those directed by the IG to
the DDI, the replies constituted the responses recommended by NPIC for consideration
by the DDI.
Be94se of the crucial events during the summer of 1965, it is appropriate to
note that a protracted illness kept the Director NPIC, away from his desk for
?
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approximately seven weeks, from early July through the entire month of August.
During this period, the Executive Director, NPIC, served as Acting Director.
It may be questioned whether or not events of that summer would have taken a
LLhe...
different turn had-he-Eli-6-h present and had he been able to participate with
his accustomed vigor.imMediately upon returning to duty. Though the answer to
e
thAsAuestioqIcan never be known beyond doubt, it is significant to note that
he and the Executive Director had worked together closely since HTA days on the
building of the National Center. From the beginning, each had his well defined,
mutually agreed areas of responsibility. Among those devolving upon the Execu-
tive Director were the day-to-day management of Center activities and1supervi-
sion of-the administrative relations between the Center and senior CIA executives.
In the discharge of these responsibilities there can be no doubt that the Execu-
tive Director had the complete confidence of the Director. Thus, short of the
possibility that had he been present the Director might have discerned a com-
pelling need for a dramatic change in existing policy, and that the change thus '
ordered mAght have struck a very responsive chord in the minds of top Agency
executives, it seems unlikely that the outcome would have been significantly
different.
Turning again to the NPIC reaction to the IG's recommendations, the item-by-
item replies were generally positive. In tone, however, they were frequently
defensive and occasionally complaining. Thus having accepted a majority of the
recommendations -- and not surprisingly so, since many reflected NPIC desires --
the Center missed an opportunity to identify its aims with and to affirm its
loyalty to higher authority.
, 7?53:-) ?c 777r
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(Page Forty-Five)
In summary, the following are the gist of the NPIC "replies."
Recommendation No. la: DDI propose the establishment of a COMEX. NPIC
agreed, but added that the committee should not interfere in the manage-
ment of the Center.
Recommendation No. lb: DDI seek to have COMEX establish a list of first-
phase exploitation requirements.. NPIC considered this a minor point and
one easily handled. As in many of the IG recommendations, this was a
problem which the Center itself raised and on which it had already taken
some action.
Executive Director, NPIC. NPIC/D-105-65, Memorandum for Chairman, NPIC
Advisory Committee (AdCom), Selection of Exploitation Targets, 3 June 1965.
(SECRET)
Recommendation No. 2a: Director, NPIC, abolish the NPIC AdCom. NPIC agreed
-- if COMEX came into being.
Recommendation No. 2b: Director, NPIC, arrange for participation by COMEX
in the approval of requityments involving an exceeSonally large effort by
NPIC, and
Recommendation No. 2c: Director, NPIC, submit Center workload figures quar-
terly to Cabirman of COMEX. NPIC "had no basic objection,' but believed the
Chairman, COMEX should be consulted when appointed.
Recommendation No. 2d: Director, NPIC, reinstitute the use of task forces to
work on those projects large enough to require COMEX approval. NPIC reserved ,
this as a management decision. Though it viewed the approach as not impossible,
it pointed to Center efforts to provide an organization capable of handling
such projects. On paper, at least, NPIC certainly had the better of this
exchange.
Recommendation No. 2e: In the event that the revision of the exploitation
cycle proposed by NPIC failed to gain community acceptance, Director, NPIC
refer it to USIB. NPIC pointed to the acceptance and implementation of this
revision on 1 July 1965.
[Recommendation No. 3a: DDI, in collaboration with the DDSU, submit an inte-
grated systems design program to Director, NRO, and
Recommendation No. 3b: DDI include in the foregoing proposal provision for
extablishment of NPIC design teams. NPIC agreed heartily.
TOP SECRFI
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Askage Fo/ 1 .rtySrx)
3 WORIUNG PAPER
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Recommendation No. 4a: Director, NPIC, start orientation program in each
other's duties for Plans and Development Staff, photogrammetrists, and computer
programmers, and
Recommendation No. 4b: Director, NPIC, require that programmers be given in
writing all information needed to do their assigned work, and
Recommendation No. 4c: Director, NPIC, start series of informal seminars to
break down prejudicies of programmers and photogrammetrists, and
Recommendation No. 4d: Director, NPIC, establish the NPIC development and
design teams called for in Recommendation No. 3b. NPIC concurred in 4a
through 4d.
Recommendation No. 4e: Director, NPIC, assemble a board of technical specialists
to review policy and performance of the Information, Processing Division periodi-
cally. NPIC was sympathetic, promised to pursue the suggestion or some alter-
native, but doubted the practicability of the suggestion. For the record, at
least, this NPIC response was certainly reasonable.
Recommendation No. 4f: Director, NPIC, move to improve UNIVAC service. NPIC
response: already done.
Recommendation No. 4g: Director, NPIC, delay decision to get next generation
ADP equipment. NPIC concurred, but with the provision that it not apply to the
acquisition of the UNIVAC 494 to replace the 490. This NPIC proviso was not
unreasonable; in fact, the IG may not have meant to include the 494 anyway.
Recommendation No. 4h: Director, NPIC, provide Information Processing Division
with T/0 and accelerated recruitment to provide three-shift computer operation.
NPIC claimed it was not able to do this and cited the lack of response to
repeated appeals. This was a tender spot. NPIC was frustrated over a lack
of response to earlier pleas and could not resist the temptation to needle
higher authority.
Recommendation No. 4i: Director, NPIC, to provide for adequate reporting on
functioning of mensuration equipment. NPIC concurred and promised action.
Recommendation NO. S: Director, NPIC, determine skills needed to meet R&D
obligations and seek necessary revision of grade structure. NPIC expressed
the hope of doing this as part of the augmentation of staff, assuming an in-
crease in personnel was approved. Surprisingly, NPIC did not choose to com-
plain about the existing grade structure, but did point to the ill effects
of lengthy security processing. It is hard to appreciate, incidentially,
the wisdom of pointedly making the study of skills dependent on approval to
augment the staff. One would expect the study of needed skills totproc-eae
any approval to hire.
T-ID
ZCRFT
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J ? :Kw .
(Page Forty-Seven)
Recommendation No. 6a: Director, NPIC, to begin to develop in-house
ability to write technical contract specifications; have contracts
routinely specify spare parts and manuals where appropriate. NPIC
did not disagree, but protested that, to ..he extent manpower was
available, it was currently doing so. NPIC pleaded further, however,
that its contracts so frequently pressed the state of the art that
the contractor could often do a better job anEway. It claimed that
the real issue should be whether the contract fulfilled Center objec-
tives, not who wrote it. NPIC. pointed out that, in either case, the
Center was responsible for assuring the acceptability of the contract.
NPIC concurred, without reservation, with the section dealing with
spare parts and manuals. Though the Center had a good point, academi-
cally speaking, in its argument about who wrote the contract, the price
paid in making it was probatly1too high in terms of the admitted lim-
itations of NPIC contractiRUeftland the impressions likely evoked in
the minds of those in higher authority. This is an example of where
the Center would Itkeir have been better off to join the opposition
and enlist .pheivrhelp.
Recommendation No. 6b: Director, NPIC, divorce test and evaluation from
plans and development and subordinate it directly to the Executive Direc-
tor, NPIC. The Center demurred about this one, protesting that the man-
power shortage had delayed implementationoof plans for a special unit to
do this work, that such persons would have to work closely with contract
monitors and maintenance personnel, and that there was no evidence of
bias at present. The Center, therefore, proposed to continue with existing
plans, but promised vaguely to reconsider the suggestion later. Here,
the NPIC response was defensive and inflexible. It could have been right,
but to outsiders it probably had the superficial attributes of a capitu-
lation by top Center management to the determination of the Plans and
Development Staff to defend its territory.
Recommendation No. 6c: Director, NPIC, to establish an adequately manned
equipment maintenance shop as a separate branch. NPIC agreed but not
without complaining again about the inability to do so because of lack
of manpower. Though this was obviously no proposal for an expansion-
minded manager to fight, those outside the Center could be excused if
they thought they discerned an attempt to withhold compliance in the
hope of gaining leverage to expedite approval of the additional manpower.
Recommendation No. 7: Director, NPIC, to press for a progressively
expanding R&D budget, and to give high priority to R&D than in the past.
NPIC agreed, but not without pointing out that the Director, NPIC, had
been saying this for years, that it was "senseless" to call for assigning
higher priority within NPIC to R&D when to do so with current funding
would "mean to close down operations." The NPIC reply closed with a
call for more funds or a curtailment of responsibilities. This was one
NPIC response that higher authority heard clearly and heeded. Center
R&D responsibilities were curtailed.
1-`)
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; PITEA
-
(Page Forty-Eight)
Recommendation No. 8: Director, NPIC, to take lead in reestablishing
the Joint Working Group on Intelligence Ground Photography. NPIC re-
plied that the Director would "take up the matter."
Recommendation No. 9a: DDI to direct the Director,,,NPIC, in collabora-
tion with the Office of Training (OTR), to develop-4basic PI course
dealing with the uses of photography in intelligence analysis, and
Recommendation No. 9b: DDI to inaugurate, in his directorate, a program
of such training for all cleared analysts. NPIC expressed willingness
to cooperate, and pointed to an existing OTR course which could serve
as a point of departure for developing a basic course at the codeword
level. The Center further suggested a periodic shorter refresher
course for updating analysts' knowledge. NPIC expressed the opinion
? that such courses would have to be mandatory, if they were to achieve
an acceptable level of participation. It would be difficult to criti-
cize the Center for this reply.
Recommendation No. 10a: Director, NPIC, seek authorization from Director
of Personnel to establish certain NPIC positions under the Scientific
? Pay Schedule, and
Recommendation No. 10b: Director, NPIC, to request the Director of Per-
sonnel to expedite approval of the Center proposal to establish certain
photogrammetrist positions under the GSS pay scale. NPIC concurred,
with some factual explanation of the current status of actions.
Recommendation No. 10c: Director, NPIC, to start a concerted drive,
patterned after that of OSI, to fill NPIC vacancies. NPIC concurred,
but not without reminding higher authority of past Center success in
recruiting and suggesting that the real problem of filling Center po-
? sitions hinged on fluctuations in the strength of the recruiting staff
and .the uncertainty in getting approval for NPIC ceiling requests. In
this case, the Center would probably have been wiser to take an une-
quivocally constructive view and forget the advice. However richly
the latter was justified, it was probably no news, and, in any event,
was unlikely to ingratiate the Center with senior Agency managers.
Recommendation No. 10d: Director, NPIC, to broaden search for photo inter-
preter trainees beyond the earth sciences and to include females. NPIC
struck back on this one. The reply first alleged that the charge that
NPIC confined its search to those with an earth-science background was
false, but admitted a preTs.:?qion to favor 04npproach, much after
the manner that a hunter\re'rwhere the duckAll.F.'" On the matter of fe-
male candidates, the Center was less defensive, pointing out the problem
of overturn among married women and the general lack of females having
a familiarity with military organizations and installations. Here, again,
it would have been more advisable to focus on the future and forget justi-
fying the past. The Center pursued the recommended course anyway.
Recommendation No. 11: DDI to seek approval for all directed overtime at
NPIC. The Center recommended concurrence, but not without righteously
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LLUSJjG R2
(Page Forty-Nine)
recalling repeated unsuccessful efforts by NPIC to resolve the overtime
pay issue, including explicit mention of the Executive Director-Comp-
troller. It also complained about the "heavey demands placed upon many
of its people" in spite of the obvious fact that many of the people in-
volved, whether supervisors or analysts, embraced it with personal en-
thusiasm and pecuniary gratification. Such protests, however sincere,
were all too likely to be .igterpreted by senior executives, who were
hardly unaware of human fo les, as transparent dissimulation. The
Center could very easily have endorsed the IG's recommendation strongly
and hoped that this would at last solve the problem.
Recommendation No. 12: Director, NPIC, to order that all fitness reports
be written by the immediate supervisor; that the PID Career Panel action
be confined to an ex post facto review; that uniformity in ratings be
attained by teaching supervisors to write fitness reports. NPIC made a
defensive concession on this point. The Director, NPIC, was said to
feel that the care and consideration given to career development, prepar-
ation of fitness reports and competitive evaluation of personnel in PID
reflected credit on division supervisors. This somewhat off-target de-
fense was followed immediately by the categorical statement that no de-
viation from Agency regulationsZoovering such matters" would be permitted,
and that the division chiefWas -SO'instructed. It promised that the Execu-
tive Director and division chief would review the whole matter in the near
future. This reply would have been infinitely better without the defense,
which was untenable. The problem of which the IG spoke was widely and,
in some quarters, unhappily known among NPIC photo interpreters. The
division was caught in open violation of Agency regulations. The Director,
NPIC, or the man acting for him, did put an end to the practice. In the
eyes of higher authority, top Center management was put in an awkward
position by this inept piece of staff work.
Recommendation No. 13: Director, NPIC, expand the internal orientation
course. NPIC gave a measured approval to this one, saying that it should
be done, but only after consultation with NPIC components,tadetermine the
extent to which expansion would be of benefit. The Centealso digressed
to explain away past failure to devote more time to this course.
Recommendation No. 14: Director, NPIC, to initiate a program of external
training, including consideration of a cooperative undergraduate training
program. The NPIC response to this one was positive, informative and en-
tirely constructive.
Recommendation No. 15: DDI to request the Chairman, Training Selection
board to give more consideration to NPIC nominees to senior war colleges.
NPIC recommended concurrence, without complaints of past injustices.
Recommendation No. 16: Director, NPIC, to establish a formal Tb O for CIA
personnel in PAG, and to transfer administration of CIA personnel in PAG
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(Page Fifty) 421zR
?
to the senior CIA officer there. This was one on which the Center just
couldn't relent. NPIC took the position that, in spite of a current
review of the situation pursuant to this recommendation, the finding
was still in favor of continuing the existing arrangement. Reasons given
included the claim that the present staffing arrangement could be manipu-
lated to produce the same results as a formal Tb O for PAG, that establish-
ment of the latter would complicate management in PID, that an informal
manning chart would have to be used for the combined CIA/DIA employees
anyway, and that the existing arrangement was a calculated attempt by
Center management to minimize the administrative chores and maximize the
exploitation time in PAG. At best each of these reasons was open to ques-
tion. Considering all the problems spawned by the lack of a formal T/O
for CIA photo interpreters in PAG, it is regrettable that the Center chose
to risk going down fighting on this issue.
Recommendation No. 17: Director, NPIC, transfer enough photo interpreters
to PAG to meet the CIA commitment, even at the expense of some degradation.
of the departmental effort. NPIC branded this recommendation superficial
and claimed that a policy decision was needed concerning the performance
capability to be expected of CIA/PID, on the one hand, and NPIC on the other.
NPIC recommended that the Executive Director-Comptroller, CIA, determine
the nature and scope of CIA departmental needs and the level of effort
that should be undertaken to satisfy: Thus, what was meant as a sim-
ple recommendation to fulfill the CIA commitment to the National PI effort
was escalated to the level of insolubility by tieing it to riddle of de-
partmental versus national work.
/Recommendation No. 18: Director, NPIC, to establish policy of giving PI
trainees a minmum of one year's training in CIA/PID before assignment to
PAG. NPIC agreed unquestionably.
/Recommendation No. 19: Director, NPIC, to revamp the system for rotating
CIA photo interpreters between CIA/PID and PAG along the lines of the Field
Reassignment Questionnaire mechanism of the Clandestine Services. NPIC
promised sympathetic consideration, but expressed confidence that improve-
ment would come anyway with added experience and manpower.
Recommendation No. 20: Director, NPIC, to establish a policy of job
assignments within PAG that would ensure an equitable sharing of second-
phase scanning assignments among CIA and DIA photo interpreters. NPIC
pointed to the implementation on 1 July 1965, of the new exploitation
program, and claimed that this obviated need for further action. The
NPIC. Proposed National PI Exploitation Program, no date. (SECRET)
reply to this recommendation included a denial that there ever was .a dis-
criminatory policy, and claimed that any imbalance apparent to the IG re-
sulted from joint consideration of other jobs to be done and the tapabilities
L?
J
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(Page Fifty-Che)
of individuals available to do them.
Recommendation No. 21: Director, NPIC, to reduce roll film holdings by
selective purging of the file. NPIC took a very deliberate approach to
this recommendation. The Center promised a careful examination of the
problem, including the IG's inputs, during a survey of the film holdings
by the new NPIC Records Management Officer, beginning on 1 August 1965.
NPIC pointed to the vital role of previous coverage in the PI process.
It pointed to its previous concern and efforts to cope with the problem.
It also called attention to the unique attributes and potential value of
the holdings. This NPIC position could be characterized as prudent.
ou
The foregoing Center responses displayA'interesting broad-scale differences
and concomitant inconsistencies. First and foremost, it would seem that the
Center did not decide on the thrust of its responses and then ensure that each
individual "reply" was compatible with it. Thus, the NPIC reaction to the first
three recommendations, which dealt with NPIC-Community relations were accepted
with no disagreement or antipathy and with few reservations. Recommendation
No. 4 dealt with Center ADP problems, which were many and generally unflattering.
Nevertheless, with one minor exception, it was received with good grace and
adopted. The next three No. 5 through 7, recommended certain changes in the
NPIC R&D organization and program. The tenor of these was hardly more critical
than the previous one, but the NPIC response was dramatically different. In-
stead of being tractable, it was inflexible. Instead of being gracious, it
was quarrelsome. The Center response to the recommendation on ground photography
(No. 8) was agreeably neutral.
the foregoing pattern of replies could best be explained by
assuming that each reflected the reaction of t4person or component most con-
cerned with the subject in question. Thus, the responses in matters of primary
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WAKING r11.2:11
(Fifty-Two)
concern to the Information Processing and Technical Intelligence Divisions
were quite agreeable with one exception -- and that a matter concerning TbO
approval and recruitment. The latter were sensitive subjects anywhere in the
Center. Without exception, those in matters concerning the Plans and Develop-
ment Staff were either defensive, negative, or complaining. One, the reply
to the recommendation concerning the RD budget (No. 7), was Oressively offen-
Afaini,
sive. This was, however, an issue that the Center found exasperating pie'
Center responded in an almost uniformly favorable manner to recommendations
about the relations of NPIC with the Community. The one reservation in this
connection, that COMEX not be permitted to interfere with the management of
the Center, was a matter over which senior Agency managers were to make an
even greater issue before approving JIIRG recommendations, a year and a half
later.
NPIC replies to the IG's recommendations on management and supervision,
(No. 9 through 21) were complex. In general the Center was flexible and agree-
able about those on training. It was prudently noncommittal in its response
on film storage. Recommendations dealing with the PAG organization, PID-PAG
'relations, and PID personnel practices were another matter. So were overtime
pay and recruitment. Most unyielding was the position of the Center on the PAG
organization. In only one such matter, the recommendation that PI trainees
have one year's experience before transfer from CIA/PID to PAG, was the Center
Olv '/ fiJ, ) Urtse4J
in unqualified agreement although it agreed to consider changing the rotation
system for CIA photo interpreters. It would be interesting to know in tthat
IC? Sr'r4
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(Page Fifty-Three)
measure this negative and defensive course was set or encouraged by CIA/PID
interests, and in what measure it reflected the strong convictions of the
Executive Director, NPIC, in whose primary area of responsibility these matters
fell. In either case, for the Center and its senior CIA managers, this was a
disaster area.
quite apart from the NPIC replies and their tenor, there was the unanswered
question of when and how the recommendations in which the Center concurred would
be implemented. Aside from the few instances in which action had been taken,
these questions were left open at this time. There was however, to be a period
of a few months immediately following transmittal of the NPIC reactions to the
DDI during which the Center was to attack the problem of implementation vigorous-
ly and issue a total of three progress reports.
REPORT OF THE AD HOC PANEL ?
The Ad Hoc Panel of the Scientific Advisory Board, sometimes referred to as
the Land Panel and at other times as the Kinzel Panel, was formed by the Chairman
of the Scientific Advisory Board, Dr. Augustus B. Kinzel at the request of the DCI.
This panel was to study in particular those facets of the NPIC operation concerned
with the automation of exploitation. Members included Dr. Edwin Land, Chairman,
Dr. Augustus B. Kinzel, ex officio, Dr. James Eyer, Dr. S. Quimby Duntley,
Dr. Launer Carter, and Mr. John Fosness.
The report of this panel, dated 5 August 1965 was a late input to the fund
of information bearing on the NPIC problem. Though not, strictly speaking, a
//0-e-at- ar-se40
response to the IG report, it Moreover, the IG
report was one of the important sources of evidence and opinion used by the panel,
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(Page Fifty-Four)
who, in any case, did very little observing or analysis of their own. It is,
therefore, convenient and not inappropriate to consider it along with other
events and reactions of that summer which were set in motion by the IG report.
The Land Panel met in Boston on 10 July 1965 to deliberate about the future,
course of NPIC technical development. Prior to that meeting, in behalf of the
Panel, Dr. Eyer undertook the task of staffing out some proposals on the pros-
pects of manpower savings through further automation of Center operations. His
findings, according to the subsequent report of the panel, were in substantial
agreement with the conclusion of the IG report and the NPIC White Paper, which
was tantamount to saying that he lacked either the time or the opportunity to
make an independent judgment. He did, jhowever, offer the opinion that the pro-
jections mentioned in the foregoing documents were probably "far too conservative."
He based this reservation on 1) what he believed to be an exponential rather than
a linear relationship between time costs and imagery resolution, 2) an existing
capability for extracting more information from some photography than was being
done, and 3) the prospective introduction of multisensor imagery. As means for
increasing the automation of NPIC operations, Dr. Eyer suggested: 1) further
study of automatic change detection, 2) procurement of more on-line mensuration
equipment, and 3) application of computer-assisted techniques for image enhancement.
Though this spadework was doubtlessly of interest to the panel, and though
it represented the work of a respected scientist who was well grounded in optics, it
gave the full panel neither hope nor. leads of promising means for accomplishing a
speedy breakthrough in increasing the efficiency of NPIC exploitation.
Recommendations of the full panel were hardly more encouraging. They included
1) the establishment of a group to develop principles for generating requirements;
2) the recruitment of additional personnel, at least to the capacity of Building 213;
3) the admonition that Center personnel ceilings
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To?, :.sqjfi.1 WORK=G PAPE?.
'(Fifty-Five)
not be based on purely budgetary considerations; 4) endorsement of the
recommendations of the Optics Panel of the Scientific Advisory Board that
computer-oriented imagery exploitation techniques be investigated further
and that a small optics laboratory be established in NPIC; 5) a comprehen-
sive systems analysis of Center activities, with emphases on validating
requirements levied on NPIC and the automation of procedures used to answer
than; andA) a significant increase in the level of NPIC funding to accom-
plish short-range adaptation and augmentation of automated systems, and a
much larger long-range investment, coupled with RV, to equip it for expiating
inputs from more sophisticated future systems.
In closing, the panel added its approval to the concept of an integrated
approach to the design and funding of reconnaissance Systems. More specifi-
cally, it expressed the belief that systems design should include detailed
plans for data analysis as well as collection, and 'that both aspects should
be included in the initial and total funding of new programs.
That this report was received by top Agency officials without acclaim
is understandable. It was based on no in-depth analysis of Center problems;
it offered no alternative to a rapidly rising allocation of resources to NPIC;
and it didn't even provide details of the technical solutions envisaged on or
estimates of their cost'effectiveness. Thus, senior Agency managers, who
,were so hard pressed by the Bureau of the Budget about the soaring cost of
the NPIC operation, found that the scientists couldn'X help them out of their
dilemma.
Ironically, they ultimately did the one thing the scientists told them
to avoid; they turned to a budgetary solution of the problem.
(1
Ur
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STATUS REPORT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR-COWTROLLER
On 9 August 1965, while the DDI was still considering his definitive response
to two of the IG's recommendations, the proposal for a COMEX and a separate T/0--
as the DDI expressed it--for the CIA detachment, the Executive Director-Comptroller,
L. K. White, prepared a memorandum for the DDCI advising him of the status of
actions taken in response to the IG's recommendations on NPIC. Though he identified
Executive Director-Comptroller. (Executive Registry 65-4586), Memorandum for
the DDCI, NPIC - Status of Actions Taken in Response to IG Survey of NPIC, 18 June
1965, 9 August 1965. (SECRET)
certain specifics, this was not a perfunctory item-by-item accounting of each
recommendation. Rather, it took the broader view of where the DDI and NPIC stood
in the prospective solution of the "NPIC Problem." What the Executive Director-
Comptroller foundjin this context, was not reassuring. He said that the.DDI/NPIC
comments on the IG's recommendations did not impress him as being bold or imagina-
tive enough to solve the complexities of the "NPIC Problem" in a minimum of time.
Stfl kirhigh.*-11s-casts,--ng?niaiyo-r1W",,:Tsolhi.t 1.117=1,1E-M N
').bm
Aarobalrais=sonisTf-7\i'matagersAmimmitt-,?WCSITE3t-han?AuF=athrniZetneneikr.Ge,.:
He spoke, first of all, of the specter of an NPIC the size of NSA. Though he ex-
pressed some interest in the possibility that the DOD might take over:-..as Executive
_ Agent should NPIC get that big, he rejected this as.a short-termr,solution. He said
that since CIA knew more about NPIC than anyone elsejand should, therefore, be able
to achieve a quicker solution, it was not in the national interest to consider such
a change at this time. Moreover, White stsed, any such transfer of responsibility
at that time would be an admission of failure by CIA to manage NPIC properly.
Having decided that the '!NPIC Problem" should be solved by CIA, White observed
that a number of studies had to be undertaken simultaneously to determine what
augmentation of NPIC resources was needed and how fast it could be accomplished
TOP cFCQF-1*
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effectively. He saw these studies falling into one of three categories: inter-
agency; CIA-intra-Agency; and DDI/NPIC.
Among interagency problems, White listed requirements, other photo interpre-
tation facilities, and the COMEX/COMOREX. This, incidentally, was the first docu-
mented use of a name, though not the, one ultimately adopted, for the combined
COMOR-COMEX for which Knoche opted in his 2 July 1965 staff study on the "NPIC
Problem." With reference to requirements, White expressed concern about how to
get "realistic" rather than "idealistic" ones. He asked what other interpretation
facilities were available in the DOD or in the UK to assist in answering national
requirements, how to assess their capabilities, and how to coordinate their joint
efforts. He wondered how to get a quick resolution of the COMOR/COMEX/COMOREX
question and suggested the appointment of a full-time, hard-driving interagency
committee to get the answer. In this, he proposed that CIA take the lead.
White listed R&D and questions of organization and numbers of personnel as
among those that could be solved by CIA, with or without external private assis-
tance. He had a whole series of cogent questions about R&D that extended from
specifically what was to be researched or developed to how to go about planning
and managing an acceptable NPIC R&D program. As far as NPIC personnel were con-
cerned, he wondered how to determine the size of the increase as well as the source
of the people. In addition, he pointed to the need for new construction were the
increase to exceed approximately 300 persons.
' In the DDI/NPIC category, White spoke of an evident need for better management
of the Center as a national asset. He said the situation must be corrected and
asked, provocatively, what was being done about it. ?
White closed with the expressed hope that the questions raised in his memoran-
dum might assist in stimulating thought about how the problems could be solved.
TC
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(Fifty-Eight)
He expressed serious doubt about how quickly substantial progress could be made,
if it lay ithe hands of those who were busy with other pressing duties. Never-
theless, he recommended to the DDCI that a copy of this memorandum be sent to
the DDI and that the latter respond by 21 August how he proposed to attack those
problems which required interagency or intra-Agency participation. The,DCI and
DDCI endorsed these two recommendations.
REACTION OF THE DDI
On 24 August 1965, the DDI responded to the DCI, with emphasis on the inter-
agency aspect of what he called the "NPIC expansion problem." Thus, like the
DDI. (Executive Registry 65-4881), NPIC, 24 August 1965. (SECRET)
Executive Director-Comptroller, his response was addressed to the larger picture,
though in a still more selective way.
He commenced with the assumption that there would continue to be a national
Center under control of the DCI, and that as a minimum, it would do first-and-
second-phase exploitation, i.e., the "immediate readout" of incoming photography.
portovr
The DDI ventured the opinion that this\ostion of the national effort could be
carried on for the next two or three years without an "enormous expansion" in
facility or staff.
It was in the case of third-phase exploitation ("detailed reports") that the
DDI professed to see the big problem in setting the bounds of work appropriate
for the National Center. At the same time)he expressed the opinion that the solu-
tion to this lay in a stricter screening of requirements levied on the Center.
The screening, according to the DDI, should be done by a USIBSubcommittee. Like__
Knoche, the DDI indicated a preference for an expanded COMDR to assume the added
TOP ?S7CRET
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(Fifty-Nine)
task of coordinating the exploitation and collection effort. He went one step
further. He suggested that the USIB subcommittee be named the Committee on
Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, or COMIREX. This was the first docu-
mented record of the name eventually adopted. It appealed to the DDI because
it got away from the connotation of photography alone and conveyed, at least
indirectly, the impression of other sensors as well. The DDI further advised
the DCI that he had arranged for a full-time Chairman for such a committee and
suggested, as the prospective incumbent, Colonel (later General) William Tidwell,
then on detached duty in Saigon. Tidwell was later to become the first Chairman
of COMIREX. Incidentally, in this same memo the DDI made an unsuccessful attempt
to enlist support for changing the name of the National Photographic Interpretation
Center (NPIC) to the National Imagery Analysis Center (NIAC).
The DDI further counseled the need for a CIA detachment as well as a National
Center under Agency auspices to provide a capability to do detailed exploitation
in support of CIA, as opposed to national, needs. He ventured the opinion that
the strength of the existing CIA detachment in relation to the national organiza-
tion at NPIC was about right and should be preserved as the Center grew.
On the basis of the foregoing
of persons at NPIC be incr4d to
work in the Center. Though he did
he meant the
reasoning, the DDI proposed that the number
including 200 DIA employees assigned to50X1
not say so explicitly, it seems apparent that
CIA employees to include those in the CIA detachment. He a191
suggested evicting U.S. Geological Survey personnel from their quarters on the
sixth floor of Building 213 and renovating that space at a cost of $1.5 million
tO accommodate the additional NPIC employees. He spoke of his suggested personnel
ceiling as a "first plateau", which seemed to him fully justified in view of the
Tu?
"4 t
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(Sixty)
expected workload and his belief the augmentation could be achieved promptly.
He stated more specifically that, given a vigorous recruiting program along the
lines suggested by the DCI and already being planned by the Office of Personnel,
the proposed level of staffing could be reached by the end of FY 1967.
As the DDI saw lt, a decision to approve the concept of working toward a-
"first hateau" would buy time for consideration of where to go from there with-
out assuming the ill defined risks inherent in standing still until the long range
problem, in all its complexities, was solved. The DDI thought the latter decision
could be reached in anOther year. By that time, he predicted, there should be
sufficient working experience with the new COMIREX, and the survey of existing
PI facilities and their potential role in-a coordinated photo exploitation effort
being undertaken at the request of the DCI by John Bross, Deputy to the DCI for
National Intelligence Programs Evaluation, should have been completed. The DDI
also acknowledged the intention of the Bureau of the Budget to request a joint
f/
CIA-DIA survey such as the oneqffW mentioned. The DDI observed that, if a
decision should be made later to increase the national exploitation effort be-
yond the "first plateau," The' would be whether to augment personnel and
to;
construct new facilities for NPIC orAincorporate some of the existing military
PI facilities in the national program. Of the two alternatives, the DDI unhesita-
\eantd
tingly`ewes-sela preference for the latter course of action.
The DDI expressed hearty-agreement with recommendations of both the IG and
the Land Panel concerning the need for increased emphais on Center RD. He spoke
of his plans to initiate two contractor studies of NpIc, one to deal with the
existing operation and short-range improvements thereto, the other to deal with
? operations in the period two to seven years in the future. He said he had already
Tin,7:71 cEr?nri.
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enlisted the help of Dr.
of the DDSU to assist in re- 50X1
view of the Center R&D program, thus demonstrating his responsiveness to sugges-
tions that as much use as possible be made of know-how elsewhere in the Agnecy
to solve NPIC problems. He also confidently predicted a broadening of NPIC re-
search and development to include such fields as human fatigue, man-machine re-
lationships, and the like, thus answering objections that Center MD had been too
narrowly concerned with developing equipment.
?
Before closing, the DDI reported that NPIC was moving ahead with the impli-
mentation of many of the IG's recommendations. He said that the Director, NPIC
had, in response to the DDI's request, freed a small group of key staff officers
from their accustomed tasks and put them to work on the various facets of the
overall problem. He indicated that
,(a5d been named by 50X1
was .to re- 50X1
the Director, NPIC, to head this task force. Incidentally,
port three times between 16 September and 24 November 1965 on the
of this group before the pressure relaxed
return full time to their regular duties.
In his memorandum, the DDI requested
foregoing approach to solution o
proposed pavsennei-authorization
accomplishments
sufficiently for task force members to
that the DCI approve in principle the
C Problem," including, specifically, tb,,
50X1
or FY 1967. On 31 August, one week after
the date of the DDI's memo, L. K. White, the Executive Director-Comptroller, pre-
pared a one-page brief for the DCI, summing up the major proposals in the DDI's
memo and recommending approval. The DCI approved the proposals on 1 September.
It may be asked why this proposal was endorsed by White and approved by the
DCL It was based on no personal observations: It accepted, without question,
the major thrust of NPICclaims that a dramatic increase was needed in staff to
handle the projected workload, at least, in the next two years. The number of
rnp cr,Tr?1--T
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(Sixty-Two)
persons projected for FY 1967 was 1300, only three percent less than the com-
parable figure in the Center five-year projection. Though no direct comparison
was possible between the DDI's projection and that of E. H. Knoche in his 2 July,
1965 memo, since Knoche gave a figure only for FY 1970, it is interesting to
recall that Knoche's projection for 1970 was about 60 percent of the comparable
NPIC total. The impression conveyed by these two sets of figures was clear.
Knoche challenged the Center projection too high; the DDI did not. This
message could scarcely have failed to penetrate the consciousness of those in
higher authority.
In R&D, too, the DDI could do no better than accept without question the
IG's claims that NPIC R&D was too narrowly based and too parsimoniously funded.
He didn't even have an idea of his own about what to do next. Instead, he adop-
ted some one else's suggestion, in this case that of the Land Panel, to have not
one, but two, systems studies of Center operations by outsiders. Quite apart,
from the appearance of managerial bankruptcy, this course of action unequivocally
promised just one thing--long delay in getting on with the job.
There were, however, some points in its favor. It divided the problem into
'two iarts and sought immediately to undertake only a limited augmentation. It
thus avoided a definitive comMitment to embark dli an even larger long-term ex-
pansion. Since no one in higher authority had any idea at this junctire just
what to do either, it had the virtue of buying a little time. Moreover, in the
longer term solution the DDI was perceptive enough to express a preference for
what he must have known would be regarded by his superiors with favor, namely,
the sharing of the national level workload by military photo interpretation or-
ganizations. There was an even more important reason. White had hinted it in
his 9 August 1965 memo when he said that "at least at this point in time" the
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VC)17ZTITG PAPER
(Sixty-Three)
DDI was the one who should be responsible for recommending solutions. In other
words, there was as yet no other attractive alternative.
The approval by the DCI of the DDI's recommendation for an appr ch to the
solution of the "NPIC Problem" -- though it proved in hindsight to be no such
thing -- marked the end of the initial flurry of high-level activity generated by
the IG's report. During the next four months, further work on these issues was
to consist primarily of an interaction between the DDI and NPIC on specific pro-
blems. The broader "NPIC Problem" was not destined, however, to simmer down. It
was to boil over in yet another area, that of the budget, and involve the Agency,
as well as the Center in an embarrassing denouement with the Bureau of the Budget.
IC? SEC::.c.71
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Paola:hod from ootoniatic
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yv v.tuu. NG PAPER
(Sixty-Four)
CHAPTER 3
INTERIM RESPONSES AND ACTIONS
? During the period from September 1965 to January 1966, when the first
definitive change was made by top Agency management, the progress being made
by the Center in implementing recommendations made by the IG and the DDI as
well as certain other matters of general import were reported in a series of
three memos from
(SECRET)
1965.
(btURLI)
to the DDI. These and other documents 50X1
Progress Report - NPIC Problems, 16 September 19150X1?
. Second Progress Report - NPIC Problems, 28 Septem150X1
Third Progress Report - NPIC Problems,. 24 NovemI50X1
1965. (SECRET)
of the same period record the few successes and the many failures of the Center
and perceptive guidance
to solve its problems in the absense of
from higher authority, notwithstanding the 24 August proposal of the DDI and its
endorsement by the DCI. Among actions generated by the IG report were those re-
( 6)tZ 1:-?-teee7:9c, d,,,h/unt/y
lating to research and development, personnel, ?.
---
training, and overtime. In addition, the NPIC budget for FY66 and FY 67 and
space for an expanding Center were the object of much attention, some of it ex-
tremely damaging to the NPIC position.
/RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The NPIC R&D program was a matter of prime importance in everyone's mind.
Not only was it a large item in dollars, but it held the key to further automation
in the Center with its potential for increasing productivity and reducing manpower.
Tr IDcTi
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.44
u (Sixty-Five)
Moreover, in consideration of lead time-needed to attain many of the goalsitb
tEet,-, it was a problem that begged for early attention.
As might be expected in view of the predominantly administrative approach
to the "NPIC Problem", the reporting by NPIC of progress in R&D matters revealed
a preoccupation with questions of management. Most pervasive was the contest
between the Center and the DDS&T as to how the expertise of the latter direc-
torate was to be brought to bear on the solution of Center problems. The job
must have seemed straightforward enough to higher authority, if, indeed, they.
may not have been intrigued by the possibility that here was a chance to dem-
onsttte the incompetence of the Center and the indefegibility of its claims.
The results, at least at this time, were not -tai: that conclusive. The Center
entered negotiations with some reluctance and with great reservations, partic-
ularly over the possibility of losing control of its R&D program. The DDS&T,
according to the Center, made a power play to do just that. With such parochial
views and with lack of mutual trust, little progress was realized. Incidentally,
who was briefly employed by the Agency in the DDS&T at this ti50X1
was in and out of the Center frequently as DDS&T\41?;:fr-.42fidon NPIC R&D matters,
but, as late as 24 November, indicated that the Center and the DDS u50X1.
still unable to agree on a definition of
On 21 September, the Executive Director -
Center's five-year R&D program. According to
responsibilities. 50X1
Comptroller was briefed on the
, White seemed intereste50X1l
satisfied with.the "presentation" and promised his assistance in carrying out the
"automation" of the Center. It may be significant that
and not "program."
50X1
November report also spoke of the Director, NPIC and his Executive
said "present50X1L"
Director having made a decisionOn the letting of systems analysis contracts.
2
One
i.
ii ? I
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r?itIk.Nt_ voR-Ea-NG RAPER
(Sixty-Six)
was to go to the Decision Studies Group, who were to produce a simulation model
for evaluating the impact of specific functions or changes in functions on
Center operations. Another was to go to United Aircraft to automate further
the storage and retr.eval of Center information. The latter contract involved
painfully detailed work and many unknowns; it was still far from complete by the
time the "NPIC Problem" was "solved." The former study was more general and less
involved technically. It encountered serious problems, however, some internal
0
to the Center and others to its own contractpr organization. The chief result
was a report, issued 18 months later, whose value was a matter of controversy.
PERSONNEL
Recruitment was also a matter of high priority interest, since the Center
was then under even its currently authorized strength. The Executive Director-
Comptroller had observed with concern, in his 9 August 1965 memo, that although
50X1
since May 1964, the net gain in over
50X1
personsand the on-board strength as of August 1965 va.,
the Center had an authorized ceiling o
a year had been but
only about
The Center addressed itself to the problem of recruitment with no apparent
reservations. The Office of Personnel likewise offered its support wholeheartedly.
50X1
In his 16 September memo as able to report that the Center had proposeu
50X1.4
to carry out almost all aspects of contracting, recruiting, and processing with
the help of experienced Office of Personnel employes detailed to work in the NPIC
Support Staff, and that the proposal had already been approved in principle by
the Office of Personnel. In addition, one senior recruiter,
had 50X1
reported for duty at NPIC the previous day. Subsequent recruitment plans and
Tro cF:(.11Ii
-
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actions described by
I '4'4' 5 U. 1,1 L 4L1.1
(Sixty-Seven)
in his later progress reports included a detaile50X1
Center proposal for expansion of the NPIC Support Staff to handle recruitment,
and a mass advertising campaign in newspapers across the country.
Director, NPIC. NPIC/D-190-65, Personnel Recruitment for NPIC, 22 September
1965. (SECRET)
The Center also took action on the grade structure in technical componentsas
recommended by the IG. Job descriptions and justifications were submitted to the
Chief, Salary and Wage Division for five new positions with SPS grades, and
50X1
reported on 24 November that the first reaction was-encouraging. The Center did
even better with GSS grades. Certain of the film-evaluation jobs were approved
on the spot for GSS rating by the Chief, Salary and Wage Division, and the latter
individual agreed to submit to the Director of Personnel for his approval a Center
proposal to include certain photogrammetrist positions under the GSS pay scale.
On the proposal for the establishment of an NPIC Cooperative Educational
Program, the Center also took action. In a 10 November 1965 memorandum to the
DDS, the Director, NPIC sought approval for establishing such a program, with
provision for a maximum of 20 undergraduate and 5 graduate students in such fields
as mathematics, photogranmetry, optical science, and computer programming.
Director, NPIC. NPIC/D-228-65. Establishment of an NPIC Cooperative
Educational Program, 10 November 1965. (SECRET)
OMI REX
Though matters concerning Community relations were not among those the Center
could be expected to solve directly, they were of the utmost significance. It is,
therefore, worth noting that
reported in his 16 September memo the f50X1
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'CY *)?4JC / 'woman PAPER
(Sixty-Eight)
of what he said would be regular meetings with Colonel Tidwell concerning the
functioning ot a COMIREX and the production capability of the Center. This was,
of course, another problem area in which the Center was in general agreement with
the-course----Z-taction recommended by the IG.
NSCID No. 8
In his 24 August 1965 memorandum, the DDI spoke of the desirability of
assigning to NPIC responsibility for exploiting materials collected by other
image forming sensors,
He further called for a 150K1
vision of NSCID No. 8 to make this clear. This position was one in which the
Center concurred; it was also a recommendation made by the IG in the EYES ONLY
supplement to his report. Accordingly,
reported in his 16 September 50X1
memo that he had assigned three senior NPIC persons the task of drafting a pro-
posed revision of NSCID No. 8 to incorporate this change. This effort proved
\itProductive, however. Doubtlessly, the Agency was reluctant to become involved
in renegotiating the NSCID at a time when it had quite enough other NPIC problems
on its hands. Moreover, top Agency management could hardly view with enthusiasm
at this time any proposal to enlarge the responsibilities of NPIC or to transform
its function from interpreting to analyzing information.
COORDINATION WITH COLLECTORS
This was a minor theme that carried through all ree of
progres550X1
reports. By 24 November, he was able to report that the Center had ready for
approval by the Executive Director and Director, NPIC, a proposed agreement be- '
tween NPIC and NRO for Center participation in the design of collection systems.
"'").S7(7'7:1
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(Sixty-Nine)
NPIC. (Draft] Letter, with Draft of Agreement, from DCI to Director, NRO,
for the DCI's signature, 23 November 1965. (SECRET--Handle via BYEMAN System Only)
In shaping up the tentative agreement, Center representatives worked with James
Q. Reber, a long-time friend of NPIC, who had recently been named deputy to Dr.
Flax, the Director, NRO. Though drawn up, the agreement was never formally approved
and implemented because of the dramatically improved relations between the Center
and NRO as a result of Reber's influence.
FIELD READOUT TEAMS
Though Center managers had little enthusiasm for engaging in a contest with
the Department of Defense over this issue, they dutifully responded to the ex-
pressed wishes of the DCI for NPIC to submit plans for sending field readout teams
to world trouble spots where tactical needs of significance to national intell-
igence problems demanded such effort. On 24 November, was able to re50X1
port that the completed staff study proposing such NPIC participation was
awaiting approval by the Executive Director and Director, NPIC. Like the NPIC-
NRO agreement, this proposal came to nought, perhaps because of anticipated strong
objection from the DOD.
BRIEFING FOR DIA
One example of the growing interest in encouraging greater support of NPIC
by the Department of Defense was the briefing of Generals Taylor and Maples of
DIA bythe Director, NPIC, and his Assistant for Administration on 24 September
1965. This briefing was the outgrowth of an earlier meeting between the DDI and
General Joseph F. Carroll, Director of DIA, at which time problems facing NPIC
over the next five years were discussed. The follow-up briefing of Taylor and
Trip c7.71-PFT
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(Page Seventy),
and Maples was for the purpose of explaining the current status of NPIC planning
and the operation of the Center Management Information System, which provided the
data on which NPIC projections were based. In his progress report of 28 September,
noted that the briefing had gone well. He also reported that both genan
returned to a theme previously expounded by Maples, namely, that the Center should
devote most, if not all, of its efforts to the immediate exploitation of photo-
graphy, leaving the detailed work to departmental elements. Predictably, the
Center briefers opposed the idea "rather forcefully" and gave reasons for their
objections. On 20 August 1965, in a position paper attached to an NPIC study on
changesLin detailed reporting versus Center manpower for the DDI, NPIC had taken
a strong position in favor of continuing Center "detailed" reporting. The last
NPIC. TCS-12271-65, Effect of NPIC's Manpower Needs if the Detailed Reporting
Responsibility were Altered, 20 August 1965. (TOP SECRET--Handle via TALENT-KEYHOLE
Channels Only)
conclusion in this paper stated that the nub of the matter was people and money,
and suggested a more equitable sharing of costs by the prime beneficiaries to
stae the problem. It is possible that the contents of the NPIC memo were dis-
cussed by the DDI with General Carroll at their meeting, and that this renewed the
interest of General Maples in Center detailed reporting.
As a follow up to the briefing, the Director, NPIC, sent a memo to General
Carroll on 30 September, referring to Carroll's meeting with Cline and the sub-
sequent briefing at NPIC of Generals Taylor and Maples. Lundahl suggested that
Carroll might be interested in being briefed himself and offered to do so if Carroll
could fit the briefing into his schedule. At the same time, he enclosed a copy
of the entire NPIC five-year projection report.
_ It is, thus, clear that the Center was responding to the desire by higher
authority to encourage closer collaboration between NPIC and DIA, including a
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(Seventy-One)
greater involvement by the latter in manning and funding Center-operations. It
is apparent that NPIC was also taking the opportunity to ensure that the only
plan for the future available -- the NPIC five-year Plan \-- was in the hands of
DIA.
On 24 November,
ORIENTATION COURSE
reported that revision of the Center orientation 5?X1
course was well under way, and that it would be recorded and automated. He
added that it was expected to be ready by early the following month, but that,
although expanded, it would not be lengthened to a full week. This was the
action adopted by NPIC in response to the IG's recommendation that the internal
orientation course be expanded.
NPIC OVERTIME
In his first progress report,
spoke hopefully of the intention of 50X1
the Center to analyze the overtime problem for the purpose of determining NPIC
needs as well as how to achieve an equitable solution*Ithe question of overtime
pay for Agency and DIA employees. No follow up was indicated in subsequent reports.
In spite of good intentions, the question of overtime was one that could not be
solved without a change in reporting procedures affecting a broad spectrum of cus-
tomers throughout the Intelligence Community. The climate needed to bring about
significant change did not exist at this time either within or without NPIC.
BUDGET
During the late summer and fall of 1965, fluctuations in the number of persons
and amount of funds planned or authorized, for NPIC in FY 66 and FY 67 called for
the expenditure of much effort by Center planners and managers. In part these
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oeventy- two)
fluctuations resulted from the failure of senior Agency managers to Set clear-
cut goals for NPIC and to draw up a plan for attaining them; in part they re-
sulted from the Johnson "economy" drive; and, in part, they resulted from the
very special attention devoted by the Bureau of the Budget to overhead reconnaissance
in general and to NPIC in particular. Though partisans of the Center could cer-
tainly point to an apparent predilection on the part of the Bureau of the Budget to
become unduly involved in the authorization of people and funds for Center operations,
NPIC missed more than one opportunity to demonstrate conclusively that it knew more
about the planning factors involved than did Bureau of the Budget personnel. In
any case, repeated revisions of assets to be allocated to the Center for FY 66 and
FY 67 were demoralizing and diverted management from what might have been more con-
structive work.
Thus, on 3 August 1965, the Chief, Mhnagement Services Staff, NPIC, noted in
a memo to the Executive Director, NPIC, that the CIA Office of Budget, Program
Analysis and Manpower (OBPAM) had advised NPIC of authorization to budget $19.6 millio
and positions for FY 66. These figures represented 120 positions and nea50X1rly
Chief, Management Services Staff, NPIC. Preparation of the Budget, 3 August
1965. (SECRET)
$3 million more than those allowed under the Congressional Budget, on which the
initial NPIC operating budget for FY 66 had been based: Accordingly, Center
Director, NPIC. NPIC/D-94-65, National Photographic Interpretation Center
FY 1966 Operating Budget, 17 May 1965. (SECRET)
managers, led by the Chief;Management Services Staff, prepared detailed plans for
allocating the additional positions and monies. Similar plans were made for an
additional
positions authorized for budgeting purposes by OBPAM for FY 67. 50X1
TO?
rs'
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Chief, Management Services Staff, NPIC. Preparation of the Budget, Part II,
4 August 1965. (SECRET)
In the meantime, the Center, responding to a 28 July 1965 request by the Chief
Budget Division, OBPAM, was busy identifying its lowest priority programsAqual to
20 percent of funds budgeted for FY 1966 and 1967. This request was the result of
Chief, Budget Division. Call for Office Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year 1967
Supplement No. 1, 28 July 1965. (SECRET)
a general order?pursuant to Bureau of the Budget Circular A-44, revised, for every
agency of the government to institute a program of "cost reduction." On 16 August
1965, NPIC responded by placing in this category all non-PI production of both
NPIC and the CIA detachment, all CIA departmental PI exploitation, and one-third
of the national "detailed" PI effort for FY 66 and 60 percent of the planned "detaile
capability for FY 67. In his letter of transmittal, the Acting Director, NPIC said
Acting Director, NPIC. NPIC/D-161-65, Listing of Lowest Priority Programs in
NPIC Office Estimates, 16 August 1965. (SECRET)
that he calculatedly exempted the NPIC R&D program becatise it had repeatedly been
curtailed in previous years. He also pointed to the ficticious character of the
potential "savings" in view of the cost of duplicating NPIC equipment and operations
elsewhere.
On 30 August 1965, the Acting Director, NPIC, sent a memo to the Director,
OBPAM, explaining in detail how the Center planned to use the additional$3 million
in FY 66, should such funds be made available. Generally speaking, what the Center
Acting Director, NPIC. NPIC/D-180-65, Use of Contingency Funds in NPIC FY 1966
Operating Budget, 30 August 1965. (SECRET)
proposed was first to provide for increased costs related to the
TOPS.
additiona5?X1
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(Seveni-jr;'!Foul:r"'- Nivz:A.1.11?4 1-APER
positions and the expected increase in workload, and then to spread the rest, a
little more than one and one-half million dollars, selectively over the 15 major
NPIC R&D categories. Among other data shown in this memo were comparative figures
in the original and revised FY 1966 budgets for total number of positions, average
employement, and average salary. With a ceiling of
estimate of average employement was
positions, the initial 50X1
more positions the later es .50X1
This was a discrepa5 0,X1
timated average employment wa!
that Bureau of the Budget personnel were to challenge later to the embarrassment
of NPIC and the Agency.
On 20 September 1965, the Chief, Budget and Financial Analysis Branch, Manage-
ment Services Staff, NPIC, noted in a memo for the record that he had just received
50X1
work from OBPAM that the NPIC FY 67 budget had been cut approximately
According to his informant in OBPAM, this reduction was recommended by the Budget
[ Chief, B&FAB/MSS/NPIC. Agency Reduction in FY 1967 Office Estimate*,
' 20 September 1965. (SECRET)
Division, OBPAM, in view of Agency "budget problems," and was concurred in up to
the DCI. The Chief, B&FAB, was also informed that the foregoing information was
transmitted to the DDI on 15 September, though no such information had been vouch-
safedett NPIC by the DDI. The Chief, B&FAB, added that OBPAM was requesting a
revised NPIC R&D program schedule reflecting the new, lower total for NPIC Research
and Development. It was apparently to this latter request that the Center owed
thanks for having been informed at all about the cut.
On 22 September the NPIC Assistant for Administration,
50X1
sent a memo to the Chief, Administrative Staff, CVDDI, justifying the 120 FY 1966
NPIC positions authorized by OBPAM and summarizing, by functional category, how
they would be used. His justification for the positions, about two-thirds of which
n siET
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(Seventy-Five
Assistant for Administration, NPIC. Justification for Additional 120 Positions
in FY 1966, 22 September 1965. (SECRET) .
were scientific or technical, was based on the NPIC five-year budget projections
of April 1965 and the NPIC White Paper. He also pointed to the reviews of NPIC
operations and problems by the IG and the Land Panel as well as to the fact that
both had concluded that, if anything, the NPIC projections were probably conserva-
tive. He specifically stated that these 120 positions were regarded by NPIC as
the first step in a long-range augmentation intended to achieve the goals set by
NPIC in its five-year plan. Thus, senior Agency managers were engaging in a pro-
posed buildup of Center personnel which had been triggered and was now being justi-
fied by a plan they had already rejected. The real justification, in their eyes,
was the prudent hedge proposed by the DDI, but they were still without evidence
acceptable to them and to other critics of the Center to prove the need for such
a course of action. Later events were to prove that this was not a strong position
from which to negotiate with the Bureau of the Budget.
One day later, on 23 September 1965, the Chief, Management Services Staff,
NPIC, noted slight revisions suggested by OBPAM in the allocation of the $3 million
of contingency funds in the NPIC FY 1966 operating budget as proposed in the memo
of the Acting Director NPIC on 30 August. The changes were inconsequential and
--7 Memorandum for the Record, Allocation of the Additional 50X1
$3.0 Million for the FY 1966 Budget, 23 September 1965. (SECRET)
appear to have been stricd6 pro forma adjustments intended, perhaps, to achieve
consistency with the treatment of similar items elsewhere in the Agency budget.
If this seemed encouraging, it was soon to prove a false hope.
On 11 October 1965, ft. William Thomas and ea. Donald SmitiLof the Bureau of
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(Seventy-Six) VOREING PAPER
the Budget were briefed by on the. 50X1
r---]additional NPIC positions proposed for FY 1966. This briefing seemed to haT:2,X1
aroused questions in the minds of Thomas and Smith concerning the validity and
manipulation of NPIC data as well as the assumptions on which Center projections
were based. It was apparent, for example, that Thomas and Smith subsequently
pressed the CIA Office of Budget, Program Analysis, and Manpower for an explana-
tion as to how a proposed increase of
increase in average employment of onl
memo to the Director, OBPAM,
positions at NPIC would yield a net 50X1
[sic] persons. In an 18 October 1965
explained that the earlier figure c 50X1I
was in error and that the later figure of 875.9 [sic] was correct. He suggested
that in responding to Thomas, OBPAM instead stress that the Center expected to
Assistant for Administration, NPIC. Justification for Additional 120 Positions
in FY 1966, 18 October 1965. (SECRET)
realize a net increase in average employment o ver the actual FY 1965 fig5?X1
He also mentioned the stepped up NPIC recruitment program and the need for obtaining
approval of the if the recruitment effort just commencing were t50X1.
sustained.
At the close of the 11 October briefing, Thomas had requested a copy of the
FY 1966 manpower utilization projections presented at the briefing. In addition,
he asked for similar data on the actual utilization of manpower in FY 1965. These
data, together with some carefully qualified FY 1966 projections based on the
actual first-quarter experience, were forwarded by on 20 October to t150X1
Director, OBPAM for transmittal to Thomas at his discretion. Request for this
Assistant for Administration, NPIC. TCS-13132-65, NPIC Manpower Estimate for
FY 1966, 20 October 1965. .(TOP SECRET--Handle via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels Only)
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(Seventy-Seven)
information, which included assumptions concerning film inputs and average
number of persons engaged or expected to be engaged in eahh of nine functional
categories, revealed an inordinate concern by Thomas in the fine details of Center
staffing.
Thomas and Smith returned to NPIC on 28 October for what
characte150X1
ized in his 24 November progress report as 'the most exhaustive and intensive re-
view we have ever had," including questions that got down to "specific items of
en, At, TV ,)
equipment." At this IPAgaz hearin theCenter was asked to submit supplementary
information concerning computer rental estimates and the R&D program. In an
18 November memorandum to the Director, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting,
forwarding to him the information requested by Thomas,
pointed mit thal50X1
the estimates on computer rentals had already been submitted and that he was
enclosing information on the stereo-comparator contract and all items of equipment
having a gross estimated value of over $200,000. He added a plea for understanding
Assistant for Administration, NPIC. Supplementary Information on NPIC FY 1967
pudgaIstimates, 18 November 1965. (SECRET).
in view of the difficulty of such precise planning in the face of so many variables,
including a succession of new target budget figures. He closed with a reminder
that the list of equipment submitted by no means fulfilled the real needs of the
Center, particularly for automating the PI process as desired by the DCI.
noted in his 24 November progress report that he had several requ(50X1
from Thomas for further information following the 28 October briefing. He predicted
that Thomas would recommend to his superior disapproval of the full NPIC FY 1966
and FY 1967 manpower requests.
as soon to be proven at least half rig150X1
The budget item in his 24 November progress report indicated, in a parenthetical
comment obviously added after the memo was drafted, that he just had heard Thomas
disallowed the "entire FY 1966 increase."
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op Ec [ET WORKING PAPER
(Seventy-Eight)
The reverberations following this decision continued for at least several
days. On 30 November, wrote a memorandum for the record noting thal50X1
the DDI called the Director, NPIC, on 29 November asking for information by
0900 the next day on how many of the additional 120 NPIC positions for FY 1966
would be used for work on China and Vietnam. The DDI said he needed the
Assistant or Administration, NPIC. Memorandum for the Record, DDI. Request
for Information on Distribution of 120 positions for FY 1966, 30 November 1965.
(SECRET)
'information for a discussion with the DCI on 30 November. There is no indication
that any attempt was made to use this information as the basis for an appeal to
the Bureau of the Budget. The Center estimated that
positions 50X1
would be used for work on China an n Vietnam. Such small numbers were o150X1
Viously within the "noise" level when the entire complement of NPIC employees
was considered.
The FY 67 budget fared no better.
The NPIC five-year plan of 9 April 1965
had projected a need foi
50X1
was for R&D. In his 4 August 1965 memo,"Preparation of the Budget - Part II,"
the Chief, Management Services Staff, NPIC reported that considering realities
of the recruitment effort, he and the Chief, OBPAM, had agreed to budget for 50)(1
positions in FY 67. A 9 November 1965 memorandum for the record prepared by the
Deputy Chief, Management Services Staff, NPIC, noted that th /50X1
jection for RD in FY 67 had been reduced t
s a result of an in- 50X1
ternal Agency review. This memo for the -record also noted a telephone request
Deputy Chief, Management Services Staff, NPIC. Memorandum for the Record,
Reduction of NM's FY 1967 Budget Requests, 9 November 1965. (SECRET)
on the afternoon of 5 November from the Chief, Administrative Staff, 0/DDI re-
questing by 1530 that day .information o4he effect occut of an additional
TOP SECEET
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vo a j _,*.5% WORlakTlx PAPER
(Seventy-Nine)
on the NPIC planned prOgram.
50X1
The response to the foregoing request pointed out that the reduction would
have to come out of funds allocated for R&D and equipment. The Center proposed
reducing the R&D budget by $2 million and the funds allocated for purchase of PI
equipment by one million dollars. Coupled with the previous Agency cuts, this .
would mean a reduction of one-third in R&D funds and 60 percent in those for pur-
chase of equipment, compared with the initial NPIC requests. The Center pointed
out that such cuts were contrary to the recommendations of all experts who had
examined Center operations, including the IG and the Land Panel. The result of
such cuts, according to NPIC, would require a rephasing of the entire R&D program
and result in an inability to provide photo interpreters with new equipment needed
for efficient operations.
The final blow was recorded in a memorandum for the Director, Planning, Pro-
gramming, and Budgeting from the Director, NPIC, dated 2 December 1965. Lundahl
Director, NPIC. BYE 60692-65, Memorandum for Director oT Planning, Programming
and Budgeting, Comments on the Bureau of the Bud!et Reductions in the NPIC Fiscal
Year 1967 Estimates, 2 ecem er 5. OP S 0'I' ? s' " le via
"Sriai-D--sten
noted that he had been advised of reductions made by the Bureau of the Budget ihe
NPIC budget for FY67. The R4 'program was cut by $2,850,000 and the Plans and Devel-
opment Staff by 13 positions and $50,000. The number of CIA positions in NPIC was
5011
set a Once again, tma. prove a better prophet than mediator. --
The foregoing memorandum was also notable for the strong position taken by the
Director, NPIC in defending the needs of the Center as stated in the 9 April 1965
five-year plan. He reviewed the numerous proposal and counterproposals that marked
the preparation and review of the FY67 budget to date, and he related the successive
cuts to the contrary views of the IG and the Land Panel. He then raised some very
TiPup4)
C.
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V-V3 cJ-:(PF-1- 'WORKING PIPER
(Page Eighty)
cogent questions about the implications of these cuts for the future of the Center.
Most fundamantal was the question of whether the Center would still be able to-meet
the responsibilities placed upon it by NSCID No. 8. The Director speculated that
the long-term effect of the FY 67 reductions would likely be a diffusion of PI
exploitation in response to national requirements among other components in the.
Intelligence Community. Unfortunately for the cause of centra.lized exploitation,
he proved to be a good prognosticator.
?tht=itinatxteia..o 't,136ftltsereoutti-inertiT
, - ? ??,."-
Like the adverse decision on the FY 66 budget, this one triggered some sen-
timent for a recldmer. On 11 December, the NPIC Assistant for Administratonsub=
nutted to the Director of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting a draft for an appeal
by the DCI to the Bureau of the Budget. Though the paper was lucidly written, it
Assistant for Administration,NPIC. [Draft Manuscript for an Appeal of BoB Cuts
in the NPIC FY 67 Budget,] 11 December 1965. (TOP SECRET/TALENT-KEYHOLD--Working Paper)
contained no new information and was unlikely to change the minds of Bureau of the
Budget officials who had already reached a decision based on detailed evidence judged
by them to be conclusive. There is, indeed, no indication that the appeal
was ever made.
The fiasco over the budget during the fall of 1965 virtually foreclosed whatever
possibility existed that allocation of resources to the Center might be justified on
4
the basisAwhat was needed to carry out its mission under NSCID No. 8. That miscal-
ulations and ineptness on the part of the Center were contributing factors cannot be
denied. The whole NPIC approach, to overwhelm the opposition with facts and figures
demonstrating the need for a several-fold increase in resources within a mere five ?
years, was untenable. Powerful forces and/or adversaries were working to draw sharp
.0*Arff43"".
TOP -(1?1'
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TOP SE,CR FT VORMIG RIPER
(Page Eighty-One)
limits to the number of people and funds that would be available to CIA. Ongoing
programs in other Agency offices and directorates had to be kept alive. New faces
in top-echelon Agency positions were far less familiar, and, therefore, far less
understanding of the objective worth and importance of NPIC, whatever these may
have been. The strident claims by NPIC for dramatically expanding resources were,
in hindsight, totally unrealistic. If the Agency position was one of some reserve,
it entertained, at least at first, the prospect of an expanding Center. The actions
of Bureau of the Budget examiners, on the other hand, suggested hostility and bias
against the Center, if not the Agency from the outset. Thus, on all counts NPIC
was fighting a losing battle.
SPACE
The portion of Building 213 occupied by NPIC and the CIA departmental unit was
50X1
judged adequate to accommodate
persons. In addition to this, there was the
space occupied by the military tenants, who controlled most of the fifth floor, and
the U. S. Geological Survey unit, which occupied approximately two thirds of the
sixth floor. The latter lay outside the maximum Security area and had not been re-
novated at the time Building 213 was prepared for NPIC occupancy.
Since Center budget figures current in the fall of 1965 postulated an on-board
50X1
strength of NPIC and CIA departmental employees by June 1967, it was apparent
plans should be made to accommodate an additional persons. More than that, the5?X1
possibility that there might be further substantial growth also had to be considered.
50X1
Cbviously, the date when NPIC and CIA/PID employees totale ould be an important
one, since some action, interim if not final, would have to be taken by that time.
Preliminary discussions were under way between NPIC and the DDS and his Office
Tn
177,rp.,i-T
,
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(Page Eighty-Two)
of Logistics by late in the summer of 1965. In his first progress report, on
16 September,
noted these discussions and spoke specifically of the poss..?X1
bility of taking over and ren4ating the space occupied by the U. S. Geological Survey
unit.
Space planning must have continued apace. On 28 September
was ab1e50X1
to identify January 1967 as the date when NPIC and CIA/PID would have outgrown their
quarters. He also listed five alternatives for solving the near-term space problem.
They were: 1) ve the Geological Survey and renovate their quarters (cost-$2 million;
time - 20 months); 2) extend the second floor out over the parking lot (cost - several
millions; time - more than 30 months); 3) pour footings for a six-story building
adjacent to Building 213-A.2but construct only one floor (cost - several millions;
time 30 month); 4) move the CIA map library out of 50X1
and give the 25,000 square feet thus available to NPIC (cost - not
timated)but least of any; time - six months); 5) provide NPIC 50,000 square feet
in Rosslyn (cost - unknown; time - under one year). Of the five alternatives, NPIC
chose number 3 because it provided collocation with the existing operation and the
best option for further expansion.
added that NPIC was considering the 50X1
prospect of shift operations pending completion of the building.
This somewhat informal report to the DDI on the several space alternatives
being considered was followed by an NPIC Staff Study, which was forwarded to the DDS
through the Director of Logistics on 3 November. This study discussed briefly the
Executive Director, NPIC. NPIC/D-223-65, Memorandum for the Deputy Director
of Support, Staff Study - NPIC Space Requirements, 3 November 1965. (SECRET)
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative and recommended approval of alter-
native number 3, the construction of a one-story building adjacent to Building 213-.A,
on the site of the
?
It added that the cost wouPST
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(Page Eighty-Three)
$2.7 millions and revised the estimated time for completion downward to 24 months.
In the discussion of alternatives, the Center pointed out that the production-line
nature of NPIC operations demanded that the additional space be located in close
proximity to Building 213. The alternative recommended satisfied this basic re-
quriement as well as the opportunity for future expansion. Since the recommended
site was located next to Building 213-A, which housed the utilities for the Center,
this was another point in its favor.
noted in his last progress report, on 24 November, that the NPIC sLX1
study had been completed and forwarded. He also added that Col. White thought it
easier to obtain funds for renovation than for construction, especially in view of
the impending review of photo interpretation activities in NPIC and in the entire
Intelligence Community. White, therefore tended to favor evicting the Geological
Survey and renovating that space.
The NPIC Staff Study drew a response from the Director of Logistics, George E.
Neloon, in a memorandum for the DDS, dated 1 December. Meloon concurred in the NPIC
Director of Logistics. OL 5 7206a (DD/S 65-6026), Memorandum for the Deputy
Director for Support, Construction of Additional NPIC Space, 1 December 1965. (SECRET)?,
recommendation and enclosed the draft of a proposed memo for the DCI from the DDS re-
questing approval of the recommended project. In his memo, Meloon gave a breakdown
of the construction costs.and of the time schedule. He advise4, without any hint of
concern, that upon approval, presumably by the DCI, the Office of Planning, Programming
and Budgeting would be notified and that they would- the Bureau of the Budget
and obtain the necessary funds. This sounded disarmingly simple. Meloon also said
50
102,i
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(Page Eighty-Four)
50X1
The profundity of the latter observation was perhaps a measure of the seriousness
merited by the construction proposal. Nowhere in the record is there evidence that
anyone asked any penetrating questions about the demonstrated need for such construc-
tion or the planning assumptions on which it was based. Whether deserved or not,
the evidence left the impression that the whole proposal was one of routine response
to untested claims. NPIC did have a potentially serious problem. The Center was
correct in facing up to it and seeking a solution. The manner in which it was carried
out however, was not one calculated to withstand searching scrutiny. And much of
the blame for the apparent lack ?of rigor lay outside the Center.
One skeptic was heard 'from on 16 December. John Clarke, Director of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting, sent a memorandum to the DDS, Robert L. Bannerman advis-
ing that until the NPIC manpower ceiling was set, there was little hope of obtaining
funds for construction. He mentioned the study of Community PI facilities being
undertaken by the Joint Imagery Interpretation Review Group (JIIRG) and the fact that
the size of the NPIC manpower increase remained a policy question under consideration
by the Bureau of the Budget. Obviously, the Director, PPB, WAS either better in-
formed or possessed more political acumen than the other space planners. His sage
observation marked the close of the initial phase of significant activity in response
to the seemingly inevitable need of more space for-NPIC.
The approach of the holiday season and the waning of activity generated by the
1G report and Bureau of the Budget examiners must have been a relief, however temporary,
17);)
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(Page Eighty-Five)
to beleaguered NPIC managers. If it brought to a close the incessant demands for
plans, figures justifications and explanations, it was hardly a time for rejoicing.
In spite of a viggrous display of the traditional NPIC spirit and a refusal to quit
in the face of adversity, the Center was in trouble. The old charisma was lacking.
NPIC responses were not tuned to the changing times. The Center still believed
?implicitly in. its destiny, but its former allies did not. The feverish ac tivity
during the fall had met with little success.
Some gains were realized in the fields
of personnel recruitment, Community relations and internal training. On the other
hand, the budget hearings had been a catastrophe. Moreover, nothing of real sub-
stance had been accomplished toward solution of the "NPIC Problem." To those on
the sixth floor of Building 213, with nothing more acceptable to guide them than their
five-year plan, their troubles must have looked more like the "CIA Problem."
TOP (77,(.771
N.S'S
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