A PREFACE TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R002300090002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 139
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 5, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
A PREFACE TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA
Robert C. Tucker
P-134.1
March 5, 1958
1c)
7?e P-11 n D eyouvg4464
STAT
1700 MAIN ST. ? SANTA MONICA ? CALIFORNIA
Copyright 1958, The RAND Corporation
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This paper is a revision of a study originally
written as a contribution to a discussion on
foreign policy in RAND.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PART I: SOME BASIC CONCEPTS
A. Foreign Policy: The Response to Situations. . 1
B. The Comprehensive U.S. Foreign Policy Interest:
Security 3
C. External Requirements of U.S. Security . . 6
D. The General Goal of U.S. Diplomacy . . 8
E. The Mutual Security Interest 11
F. Russia and U.S. Foreign Policy 14
G. The Present Postures of Russia and America 18
H. The Method of Analysis 28
PART II: DANGERS AND DESIDERATA
A. The Dangers of Soviet Political Encroachment 32
1. The Neutralization of Collective
Defenses 40
a. The Policy Pattern 40
b. The Dangers Posed 46
c. How Real Are the Dangers? 50
2. The Acquisition of Excessive Soviet
Influence 55
a. The Policy Pattern 55
b. The Dangers Posed 65
c. How Real Are the Dangers? 72
3. The Aggrandizement of the Soviet Bloc . 75
a. The Policy Pattern 75
b. The Dangers Posed 81
c. How Real is This Danger? 85
4. The Moral-Political Isolation of America 86
a. The Policy Pattern 86
b. The Dangers Posed 89
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5. The Preservation of the Soviet Empire. . . 90
a. The Policy Pattern 90
b. Situation of the Soviet Empire . . . ? 96
c. Implications of the Situation in the
Empire 100
B. The Dangers of Armed Violence 110
1. The Seriousness of These Dangers 110
2. Soviet Policy and Armed Violence 112
3. Dangers of Local Armed Violence 116
a. Soviet Aggression by Proxy ... . . ? 119
b. Soviet Instigation of Armed Violence ? 120
c. Soviet Military Intervention 122
d. Soviet Suppression of Satellite
Revolts 125
4. The Danger of General War 126
a. The Soviet Position 127
b. The Concept of Ordered Security. ? ? ? 130
c. The Political Implications of Ordered
Security 132
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1.
Part I
SOME BASIC CONCEPTS
A. Foreign Policy: The Response to Situations
Practical thinking in the sphere of foreign policy is
characteristically addressed to questions which take the general
form: "iilAt are we going to do about it?" This paper repre-
sents a more or less systematic attempt to define and clarify
the "it" in the question insofar as U.S. foreign policy toward
Russia is concerned-. It is particularly concerned with the ,
political rather than the military aspects of the situation,
although it recognizes that these are inextricably intertwined
and therefore does not undertake to deal with the former in
abstraction from the latter. It is, as the title indicates,
a "preface." Its purpose is not to outline a series of pos-
sible solutions to the problems posed for America at this time
by Russia and her foreign policy, but merely to contribute in
modest degree to the elucidation of what these problems really
are. In some instances, of course, the very attempt to do this
points to possible lines of American response.
Whether Russia is concerned or not, the most general
description of the "it" in the foreign policy question is:
a situation. It is situations about which we may do something
(or fail to, as the case may be). Foreign policy may be
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regarded as the national response to situations in world affairs.
Such situations are objective realities; they do not require to
be recognized, or clearly grasped, in order to exist. They may
be transitory, or they may endure through long periods of time.
They may be an emergency like the Suez situation in October-
November, 1956, or a chronic sore on the international body
politic like the German situation. Further, there are situations
within situations. Thus the German one has its place within
a larger European situation. The latter, in turn, has its
place in a total complex called the "world situation."
Insofar as the position or actions of Russia in the world
are important contributing factors in the situations which
confront the United States, these situations enter into the
purview of U.S. policy toward Russia.
If foreign policy is the national response to situations
in world affairs, what, more precisely, is to be understood by
a "situation"? There appear to be three basic elements which
are constitutive of situations in foreign affairs: (1) a con-
tingency exists; that is, something factual hangs in the balance
somewhere in the world, can "go one way or the other"; (2)
this becomes, or tends to become, a focal point of concern,
for national interests are engaged, in one way or another, in
the outcome; and (3) the issue is, or may become, a reference
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111 point for national action, an action-context: that is, some-
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thing can be done to shape or affect the outcome, to determine
which way things go. The policy response is that which is
done. Foreign policy is the aggregate of such policy responses.
B. The Comprehensive U.S. Foreign Policy Interest: Security
Very little generalization is possible with respect to the
nature of the contingencies that give rise to international
situations and the actions taken in them. About all that can
be said is that actions are forthcoming when the contingencies
become focal points of serious national concern. The concrete
contingencies themselves are infinitely diverse in character,
and the kinds of national actions taken also vary in a multi-
tude of ways.
The one element in the structure of the foreign policy
situation which readily lends itself to further general analysis
is that relating to the national interests engaged. These too
are, of course, diverse. Yet they have, in the case of the United
States, for example, a basic common denominator. Most or all
of the interests which are of any real importance in motivating
American national action in world affairs can be subsumed under
the broad heading of security. Security is the comprehensive
U.S. foreign policy interest; what most generally motivates
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411 U.S. foreign policy is the interest in making the world safe --
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or safer for the American democracy. This statement is not
made in the imperative mood. It is designed not to prescribe
how American foreign policy ought to be motivated but how --
broadly speaking -- it actually is motivated at the present
historical juncture.
A distinction should be drawn between the primary and
secondary aspects of the U.S. security interest. The primary
aspect of national security is safety in the physical sense.
The primary security interest is, therefore, roughly equivalent
to the national interest in defense. Its ultimate guarantee
is the country's military power. It is the interest in pre-
venting the territory and population of the country from being
attacked, overrun, ravaged, or otherwise grievously harmed by
hostile forces from without. This interest is, manifestly,
basic to U.S. foreign policy. It involves the protection of
national survival.
Hardly less fundamental, however, is the secondary aspect.
This involves the security of the society and its institutions,
the safety of the national way of life. The only reason for
speaking of it as "secondary" is that this kind of security
presupposes the other kind: the security of the society pre-
supposes the physical security of the'territory and population.
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But what is meant by the security of the society? Some of the
basic elements that enter into it are the stability of the pre-
vailing order of political institutions, the soundness and
stability of the national economy, and the opportunities for
future national development in the social, economic, cultural,
and intellectual fields. Thus, if primary security refers to
the protection of American national survival, secondary security
may be said to refer to the protection of American national
welfare.
The interrelationships between the primary and secondary
aspects of security are highly complex. If security of the
society presupposes the physical security of the territory and
population, it is also true in a certain sense that physical
security may depend, up to a point, upon the security of the
society. This is the implication, for example, of the conten-
tion frequently heard that "America's economy is its first line
of defense." This might be paraphrased by saying that America's
ability to sustain strong military defenses of her physical
security rests in part upon the structure of American prosperity.
In this instance, the primary aspect of security presupposes
the secondary aspect.
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6.
C. External Requirements of U.S. Security
American security in both the primary and secondary aspects
requires certain international conditions, certain states of the
world, as its external buttress. That is why we cannot very
well do without a foreign policy. The shape of the world envir-
onment is necessarily of vital concern to an America bent on
preserving and promoting its national security. The foreign
policy is an instrument for shaping or reshaping the external
environment in accordance with these needs.
Theoretically, a very powerful militarized America might
remain physically secure even if isolated in a highly hostile
world, even, that is, if it retired into "Fortress America" and
all its world positions were lost to hostile outside forces.
This is the one premise upon which it could be argued that an
active American foreign policy is expendable. However, such a
view is not truly tenable.
First, it is plain that American security in the secondary
aspect could not be reliably maintained for very long in such a
world. At best it would last for a short while. For one thing,
economic autarchy would impose terribly heavy and rapidly
increasing strains upon the U.S. economy. America is now on
the way to becoming a have-not nation with respect to certain
important mineral resources. Continued access to world sources
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7.
of these minerals is therefore a basic requirement of American
security, even physical security (i.e., military needs). And
this, in turn, implies a certain order of international rela-
tions, which is to say the existence in the world of mineral-
rich nations with which America can do business. This means,
for example, that America has a vital interest in preventing
any unfriendly power (e.g., Russia) from gaining political-
economic mastery of Asia and the Middle East. The same problem
may be approached from a purely political point of view. Thus,
an America isolated in an undemocratic world could probably
not remain for long a democratic society. Present constitu-
tional processes would inevitably deteriorate through the
introduction of far-reaching federal controls and the increasing
centralization of authority which would be needed to keep the
country constantly at maximum military strength and readiness.
Nor would such an isolated America possess conditions most
congenial to her further cultural and intellectual progress.
Here again, then, the security of American society requires a
certain order of international relations in which the U.S. is
not isolated in an unfriendly world.
American security in its primary aspect also demands such
an order of international relations. Here, however, the crux
411 of the question is not security versus no security, but more
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security rather than less. In other words, we need not argue
whether or not America could survive for long as Fortress
America in a hostile world. Possibly it could survive indefi-
nitely. But it would not possess as much physical security as
an America with strategically situated and reasonably strong
and dependable allies abroad in the world, or an America which
formed a part of a worldwide system of ordered security. And
since physical security refers to the protection of the very
survival of the country, more rather than less of it is very
greatly to be desired. Hence the primary security interest
dictates the quest for friends and allies. This may be less
true in an age of thermonuclear explosives and intercontinental
ballistic missiles than at any previous period of history.
These devices, that is to say, might under certain conditions
free a great power from dependence upon a given order of inter-
national relations for its physical security. However, this
does not necessarily follow.
D. The General Goal of U.S. Diplomacy
Generalizing the argument to this point, American territory
and American society are most secure not only when America is
relatively most strong in home military capabilities, but also
111 and this is crucial for foreign policy -- when the world
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environment is most friendly (or least hostile to America. In
short, the safer world for America is the world more friendly
to America. The basic interest in making the world safe or
safer for the American democracy gives rise, therefore, to an
interest in making or keeping the international environment as
friendly as possible to America. This is the general goal of
a security-minded U.S. diplomacy.
In practice, foreign policy deals not with an "international
environment" as such but with its component parts -- the sove-
reign national states of the world. Hence making or keeping
the international environment as friendly as possible to America
111 is a procedure which takes place in U.S. relations with a multi-
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tude of individual countries. The word "friendly," as used here,
has a spectrum of possible meanings. At the low end of the
spectrum it may mean no more than "not actively hostile."
Somewhat higher up it may mean "co-operative for specific
mutual purposes." Finally, at the upper end it means relation-
ships of international community. Such relationships are
defined by the idea of neighborliness. As Walter Lippmann
writes, "The test of whether a community exists is not whether
we have learned to love our neighbors but whether, when put to
the test, we find that we do act as neighbors do."* The
U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Boston
1943, p. 135.
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nations which form an international community with America are
those in whose .relations with us, generally speaking, the prin-
ciple of neighborliness prevails. The core of this principle
is mutual trust.
A foreign policy addressed to making or keeping the world
environment as friendly as possible to America operates select-
ively within this 'spectrum. While always in principle interested
in widening the extent of the international community of which
America forms a part, it does not work toward this end alone.
Much of the work consists not in the extension of relations of
community but rather in the reduction or repair of hostile
relations, i.e., in striving to make of this or that foreign
country (e.g., Tito's Yugoslavia) not a good friend of America
but merely a non-enemy or a working partner for specific mutual
purposes.
As a general rule -- and this means subject to possible
exceptions -- the American democracy can cultivate relations
of international community successfully only with countries
where responsible representative government prevails, as it
does, for example, in most of the countries of the Atlantic
community. The reason for this, ultimately, is that the
requirement of neighborliness -- mutual trust -- can rarely
be met by a regime which is not of this character. Where
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authority is not founded on popular consent, the bearers of
this authority are unlikely to be fully and stably trustworthy
in their foreign relations. Internationally speaking, they
are "security risks." From this point of view, among others,
it may be said that America has a definite interest in fostering
the stability and spread of free political institutions in the
world. By so doing we foster opportunities for the further
development of international community, in which the greater
degree of security for America lies.
E. The Mutual Security Interest
This brings us to the mutual security interest, which is
a keystone in the structure of contemporary American foreign
policy. The essential consideration is this: If a friendlier
world is a safer world, then America has an interest in the
continued security of those countries which do in fact contri-
bute, by their international relations and actions, to this
end. Negatively stated, the more insecure a friendly country
or working partner or even (in certain circumstances) a mere
non-enemy is, the more likely is the world environment to
become less friendly toward America and hence more dangerous
for America. Our general level of security is linked in part
with theirs, just as is theirs with ours. As a consequence,
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the national security of a large number of foreign countries
becomes a fundamental interest of American foreign policy.
From America's standpoint as a world power with very heavy
responsibilities and great although nevertheless limited resources
for backing these up, the interest in the security of other
countries must necessarily be selective. The United States,
strong as it is, is not in a position to be indiscriminate in
making foreign commitments involving the defense of the security
of other countries. It must endeavor at all times to strike
what Lippmann calls a "solvent balance" in foreign policy, which
means that the country's foreign commitments are not over-
extended in relation to its power and resources.* It is clear
that a policy of indiscriminate U.S. underwriting of the
security of all friendly andonon-hostile foreign countries
might, in practice, decrease rather than increase the over-all
level of U.S. national security. It might, for example, by
depleting U.S. resources beyond a certain point, contribute
to the undermining of the economic health of the United States.
It might require the maintenance of a U.S. military establish-
ment far larger than American capacities comfortably permit.
It might lead to very many risky and costly U.S. interventions
Ibid.,
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(political and/or military) in local situations around the
world where no issue which could be called truly vital to the
U.S. national security interest was at stake. It might impair
certain international relationships of great security value to
the United States, and so on. The general result might be a
less rather than more secure America.
The principle of selectivity implicit in this reasoning
is that the United States has a fundamental interest in helping
certain other countries to maintain their own security only
insofar as this action means an over-all increment in the level
of U.S. national security. This, of course, is merely a way
of stating the principle of mutuality in terms of the given
problem. In practice, the United States tends to underwrite
the security primarily of those countries whose continued
security is contributory in an especially important manner or
degree to American national security. The first criterion of
"especially important" is the relation of such countries to
American security in the primary aspect. The countries signatory
to the Atlantic Pact are,ibr example, of prime importance in
this respect.
Under certain international circumstances, the need for
the United States to be selective in pursuing the mutual security
interest is offset by a consideration which is fundamentally
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psychological in character. The circumstances referred to are
those in which the security of numerous smaller countries is
threatened by the actions of an aggressively expanding imperial
power. At such a time it may become imperative, forxeasons
ultimately related to U.S. security itself, to protect the
security of small countries which do not qualify for assistance
under the above mentioned criterion. The reason is that the
fall of such countries, while it may not impair our defense
potential in any significant way, will nevertheless have a
profoundly depressing effect upon the international attitudes
and actions of other countries whose security is more directly
related to ours. The American intervention to stop the Soviet
aggression in Korea is the outstanding recent case in point,
possibly the outstanding case of all time. Generalizing, the
principle of selectivity may at certain times be offset by
what we may call the "all-or-nothing" principle in the field
of world security.
F. Russia and U.S. Foreign Policy
The discussion so far has been concerned to elicit some
general principles at the foundation of contemporary American
foreign policy. Before concluding this part of the study it
will be helpful to relate these principles to the concrete
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situation of the past decade in world politics, a situation
in which Soviet Russia has been a dominating factor.
The salient fact of the international situation as it
developed beginning about 1944 was the position and policies
of Soviet Russia, a very large, highly militarized, formidably
situated, and extremely unfriendly power which embarked upon a
bid for the mastery of Eurasia and possibly other parts of the
world. A series of aggressive acts, including the subversion
of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the Soviet war
by proxy in Korea, together with the actions Moscow took toward
consolidating the positions gained by the Soviet army at the
close of World War II into a closed empire, bespoke a deep
antagonism toward America and the West, and a tendency to move
farther and farther if unchecked toward total mastery of Eurasia,
which would, then, mean for America an unfriendly Eurasia. The
communist seizure of power in China and the emergence of the
Sino-Soviet partnership greatly enlarged this possibility.
These developments precipitated an international situation
in the sense defined earlier in the present study. First, there
were certain great contingencies, things factually hanging in
the balance. Broadly speaking, these were (1) the independence
of all the potential victims of further Soviet expansion, meaning
all or most of Eurasia; (2) the status of Russia's new imperial
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possessions, the countries which had already lost their indepen-
dence, although not necessarily forever; and (3) the peace of
the world, which was already being profoundly&sturbed by these
happenings and might break down completely as a result of Russia's
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past, present, and future actions.
Secondly, these contingencies became focal points of pro-
found American concern. The American national security interest
was engaged in manifold ways in the outcome. It was recognized
that both the physical security of the United States and the
security of the American society and way of life were at stake.
It therefore seemed imperative to the government and public of
the United States to do whatever might be done to protect
American security in the face of the manifest direct and indirect
dangers to it. In the case of the creation of the new Russian
empire, the dangers to Western and indirectly U.S. security
had already, in large part, materialized, and the practical
policy issue, therefore, was whether they could be reduced,
i.e., whether the empire could be caused to recede. The
dangerous contingencies present in the other two categories
had not, however, fully materialized; here, therefore, the
policy problem was to prevent them from materializing. Thus,
Western Europe had not yet been incorporated in the Russian
empire. Many important Asian and Middle Eastern countries
still remained independent. General war had not yet broken out.
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? Thirdly, something could be and was done about it. These
contingencies, with special reference to the as yet unmaterial-
ized dangers, became an action-context for American foreign
policy. A whole series of major U.S. international actions
between 1947 and 1952, including principally the Truman doctrine,
the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic pact, the Berlin airlift,
American rearmament, the rebuilding of Europe's defenses, and
the U.S. intervention in Korea, were taken with reference to
the situation as just outlined. The total pattern of American
and generally Western policy response was epitomized in the
term "containment." Its purport was to erect a worldwide
security structure in the face of Russia (or the Russo-Chinese
combination) as an aggressively expanding imperial power.
The international situation has not remained constant over
the most recent years. Especially since 1953, the year of
Stalin's death and Russia's first explosion of a thermonuclear
device, changes have occurred in such vital variabbs as the
technology of war, Soviet foreign policy, and international
conditions both in Russia and her empire on the one hand and in
the rest of the world on the other. The nature and reasons for
the changes are not matters for analysis in this study. Suffice
it to say that the over-all international situation has been
modified as a result. Insofar as U.S. foreign policy toward
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Soviet Russia is concerned, the "it" in the question presents
today a picture of continuity and change. Certain contingencies
necessarily remain as focal points of U.S. concern, world peace
and the status of the Soviet empire being among them. Others,
such as the contingency of Soviet aggressions on the order of
Korea, have come to cause less concern than in the previous
period. Finally, certain new contingencies, having to do not
with conquest but with the extension of Soviet influence by
non-violent means, have arisen as matters for concern. In
short, the pattern of the international situation has altered.
?
Our inquiry into the "it" in the foreign policy question will
relate to the situation in the new pattern. It will be useful
to preface it, therefore, with a short account of the present
Soviet posture in foreign policy.
?
G. The Present Postures of Russia and America
Stalin's death inaugurated a reorientation of Soviet
foreign policy. The new orientation emerged not immediately
but after the period of groping experimentation and sharp
internal conflict and controversy which went on approximately
from Stalin's death to Khrushchev's emergence into definite
ascendancy in Febrpary, 1955. It received its official rati-
fication at the XX Party Congress in February, 1956. It
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suffered a shattering setback later in that year with the
outbreak of revolution in Hungary and associated events else-
where, following which there was in Moscow a temporary strategic
relapse into the old Stalinist posture. But the strength of
the tendencies underlying the reorientation after Stalin's
death is attested amply by the more recent gravitation of
Soviet foreign policy back toward the post-Stalin orientation.
The latter represents Soviet foreign policy as it is most
likely to continue confronting us during the period of years
immediately ahead.
The new posture exemplifies both continuity and change in
Soviet foreign policy. On the one hand, this policy remains
both generally expansive in character and generally unfriendly
toward the Western democracies, and the United States in par-
ticular. In this sense we see continuity. On the other hand,
change is visible both in the nature of Soviet expansiveness
and the nature of Soviet unfriendliness toward America and the
West. With regard to the first point, the pattern has tended
to shift from an expansionism of total control to an expansionism
of Soviet influence in foreign countries. With regard to the
latter, the pattern shifts from Stalinist implacable hate to a
different phenomenon of unfriendliness which is compounded of
pride, dislike, distrust, and fear. Soviet foreign policy
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remains unfriendly toward America in its foundation, but is not
in the grip of a pathological hate. The new unfriendliness
expresses itself, for example, in a spirit of antagonistic
rivalry with America for the first position in world politics.
It does not, moreover, exclude occasional friendly overtures to
America, or even a certain (perhaps the better word would be
"uncertain") amount: of co-operation between the two powers for
purposes which may be mutual, e.g., the purpose of surviving,
or for other purposes which may not be mutual although they
seem to be so. On the whole, the present posture of the Soviet
Union is that of a great power with a state capitalist economic
pattern and an authoritarian political system, and with a
combination of powerful imperialistic tendencies and revolu-
tionary ideology in its immediate background, which is very
conscious of being a great power, is and would like to remain
a dynamic, expansive force in world affairs, and conceives
itself as America's oncoming rival for the number-one position
of leadership on the globe.*
This general view of the situation is based on a series
of analyses prepared or in preparation by this writer,
including D-2936, "Soviet Foreign Policy From Stalin to
Khrushchev"; D-4291, "The New Phase of the Cold War";
RM-1881, "The Psychological Factor in Soviet Foreign
Policy"; and RM-1874, "The Politics of Soviet De-
Stalinization."
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Its assets in this undertaking are formidable, although
balanced by serious liabilities which will be discussed at a
later point. The sphere of which Soviet Russia still forms
the hegemonic center includes approximately a third of the
earth's surface and population. In Asia it embraces China,
North Korea, North Viet Nam, and Mongolia; in Europe, the
satellite states of Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, and Albania, a quasi-satellite dependency in Poland,
with Yugoslavia occupying the anomalous position of an ex-
satellite which is, as it were, of the Soviet sphere but not
in it. In the military field, Russia is one of the two world
superpowers, situated moreover in a strategically imposing and
geopolitically advantageous territorial position. Economically,
it is a powerful complex of expanding industrialization with a
lagging agrarian economy crippled by serfdom in the form of
the kolkhoz. It possesses a vigorous and ethnically diverse
population, and an official ideology whose themes of national
advance and renewal contain distinct elements of appeal in
certain parts of the world, especially formerly backward
countries just emerging into national independence and
modernity. Finally, it has a unique asset for an expansive
foreign policy in the form of a widely scattered network of
foreign political parties and groups which give their first
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allegiance to Moscow and look to it for ideological inspiration,
political direction and guidance. If recent developments have
depreciated the value of this asset in some respects, they may
have enhanced it in others.
There is a certain significant asymmetry between the basic
postures of America and Russia as these have here been character-
ized. Roughly speaking, the American posture tends to be, in
the broadest sense, defensive, that is, concerned on the whole
with the preservation of an international status quo outside
the Soviet sphere. The United States finds itself in a widely
acknowledged position of leadership and foremost responsibility
in a far-flung and very loose collection of diverse nations
called the "free world." What all these nations have in common,
politically speaking, is not internal freedom -- for some of them
are by no means free societies -- but simply the good fortune
of not belonging to the Soviet-dominated sphere of the world,
which is not only internally unfree but also unfriendly toward
us. Contemporary American foreign policy, based on the mutual
security idea, presents itself as a kind of international
insurance policy which is designed, in the first instance,
to pay dividends in the form of American national security.
It underwrites the continued strength and stability of the
411 friendly sphere of the world, giving special attention to key
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threatened sectors, i.e., sectors most vulnerable to encroach-
ment in one form or another from the unfriendly sphere. This
is the very broad sense in which the orientation of American
foreign policy may be termed defensive.
The Soviet posture, on the other hand is -- again in the
broadest sense -- offensive, that is, concerned with the
alteration of the international status quo outside the Soviet
sphere, and this within the framework of the previously men-
tioned basic unfriendliness toward America and the West. In
other words, in "competitive co-existence" as understood in
Moscow, the Soviet Union stands at most to gain and at least
to break even, but not in any event to lose; for the stakes
lie wholly in the non-Soviet sphere, and the elements of the
Soviet sphere itself are not -- they assume for competing.
The Soviet sphere is envisaged as remaining an imperial system,
a solid phalanx of states with Russia as the hegemonic power.
However, it is crucidly important to observe that "alteration
of the international status quo outside the Soviet sphere" does
not necessarily mean Soviet attempts to aggrandize the imperial
system by incorporation of new areas into it. It may mean a
change of the world political as distinguished from territorial
status quo. This significant distinction must be borne in mind
in appraising the meaning of the adoption by Moscow at the
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present time of "acceptance of the status quo" as a leading
slogan in foreign policy. Its reference is to acceptance of
the territorial status quo, but not to the political. It
theoretically rules out, in other words, the idea of forcible
territorial aggrandizement, but not the idea of political
action designed to effect a reordering of relationships with
countries outside the Soviet sphere. The general nature of
this reordering might perhaps be summed up by saying that Moscow
visualizes many countries outside the Soviet sphere as becoming,
in the future, broadly "Russia-oriented" instead of
"America-oriented."
The American defensive world posture is, as has been
stressed, security-minded at the core. Now the question
arises whether elements of a quest for security may not be
present too in the motivation of the Soviet offensive world
posture. The answer must be in the affirmative. While the
motivation of the contemporary Soviet foreign policy is not
reducible to the drive for security, this nevertheless unques-
tionably plays a big part in it. Here too security presents
itself in twofold guise. There is the primary aspect (security
of territory and popUlation) and the secondary aspect (security
of the society). But now we must note a very important fact,
viz., that security of the society means -- for Soviet foreign
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policy -- security of the Soviet system and regime. In other
words, the Soviet regime in Russia identifies the security of
the society with its own security as a political structure.
In this fact lie the seeds of one of the basic conundrums of
American foreign policy toward Soviet Russia. Briefly, America
has a differential interest in Russian security. It has no
reason for wanting Russia to be physically insecure; indeed,
its own national security may be promoted by Russian security
in the primary aspect. On the other hand, it does have a reason
for not wanting to buttress the security of the Soviet regime;
for this regime is not friendly to America and the kind of
society America represents. But in Soviet foreip policy
these two strands are inextricably interwoven. The dilemma
which this creates for American foreign policy is a problem
to which we shall have occasion to return later.
Furthermore, just as the needs of American national
security dictate measures to strengthen and stabilize the
friendly sphere of the world, so in the case of the Soviet
foreign policy the security need (as just defined) dictates
measures to stabilize the Soviet imperial sphere. The vital
analytic importance of the distinction between the two aspects
of security shows itself again at this point. While the Soviet
concern for security in the primary aspect would dictate no
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more than the continuation of the sphere as a sphere of the world
non-hostile to Russia (meaning no hostile bases, no anti-Russian
alliances, etc.), the concern for the security of the Soviet
regime dictates the preservation of the sphere as a political
entity and structure, a system of political dependencies with
one-party regimes similar to the one in Russia and acknowledging
its seniority. The Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolu-
tion dramatized the depth of this secondary security concern in
the motivation of Soviet foreign policy. The revolution threat-
ened the Soviet-oriented political structure in Hungary. Had
it succeeded,.Hungary might well have become a kind of Finland
in world affairs. This represented no serious danger to the
physical security of Soviet Russia. But it was a very serious
danger to the security of the existing political structure of
empire and, indirectly, to the security of the Soviet regime
?
inside Russia.*
Much Western public discussion of the problem of foreign
policy toward Russia is vitiated by the failure to dis-
tinguish the two aspects of security. The tacit assumption
is that security means only security in the physical sense.
This leads to misleading over-simplification of the issues
involved in the future of the Soviet imperial sphere. For
example, it is too easily assumed that arrangements effect-
ively neutralizing the satellite sphere in Europe as well
as a corresponding area to the West of it ought to be
acceptable to a Moscow concerned with its "security."
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Thus, Soviet foreign policy too has an international
status quo (the Soviet imperial sphere) to preserve, and to
this extent the motivation of the policy is security-minded
and defensive. But if the motivation is partly defensive, it
remains true that the posture is broadly offensive. Otherwise
stated, it is a posture of offensive defense, based on the idea
that the existing Soviet imperial sphere will be most secure
not when Moscow is internationally static but rather when it
pursues an active, forward, expansive policy toward various
parts of the world beyond the borders of this sphere. More-
over, this posture of politically active defense is dictated
by the quest for greater physical or military security for the
whole Soviet sphere under circumstances in which the Western
structure of containment is a fait accompli but not necessarily
a fait forever accompli. Thus, in the structure of contemporary
Soviet foreign policy, the security motive not only does not
dictate a static international posture but, on the contrary,
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reinforces the original tendencies other than mere security-
seeking which make it offensive and expansive.
Here, briefly sketched, is the over-all situation which
the United States faces in connection with present-day Russia
and its foreign policy -- the "it" in comprehensive form. To
complete the sketch, however, further mention must be made of
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an element of the situation so far merely alluded to -- the
revolution in military technology. This has altered the world
situation radically. The development of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery to the present
point threatens to turn any future all-out war involving the
two superpowers as antagonists into an act of humanicide,
destruction of the human race; and further developments
presently in progress on both sides toward perfecting long-
range ballistic missiles equipped with thermonuclear warheads
accentuate this threat. The existence of these immensely
magnified powers of destruction accentuates the potential
seriousness of the dangers of armed violence in the setting
of the contemporary divided world.
H. The Method of Analysis
We are now ready to turn to the effort to dissect this
situation in more explicit analytic detail. As indicated
earlier, this will mean (1) singling out what is contingent
in the situation, what factually hangs or may hang in the
balance, in short, what may or may not happen; and (2)
assessing these potential developments in relation to their
probable effect upon the security equation from America's
point of view. To the extent that a given contingency would
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have consequences adverse to the U.S. security position, it is
a "danger." To the extent that the consequences would be an
improvement in the U.S. security position, it is a "desideratum."
Of course, by no means every potential development in the world
situation falls clearly into the one category "orthe other. In
many cases the consequences are of mixed character, and the
developments themselves are classifiable, therefore, as
"ambivalent."
Analysis of this type must necessarily remain extremely
crude and tentative if only for the reason that it has to make
certain arbitrary assumptions about the factual outcomes of the
developments with which it deals. These assumptions are,
naturally ,based very largely on past experience, which,
however, is not always a good guide to the future. For example,
the analyst would tend to assume that a future satellite rising
would be crushed by Russia just as the one in Hungary was, and
would assess the consequences in terms of this expectation. This
is the predictable outcome, but it is not the only coneeivable one
In Part II, which follows, the emphasis falls an dangers.
This stems in part from the fact that the contingencies to be
considered are those, in the first instance, which current
Soviet foreign policy is endeavoring to bring about. This is
no guarantee that they will be brought about, but Soviet effort
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to that end is naturally a factor to be reckoned with. And
since this policy, as premised, is fundamentally unfriendly to
us, it is only natural that the contingencies which it seeks to
realize are likely, from our point of view, to fall in the
category of dangers rather than desiderata. On the other hand,
no mechanical assumption can be made about this, if only because
we have to reckon with the possibility of Soviet miscalculation
of the manner in which certain contingencies might impinge upon
the Soviet interest. For example, it might be calculated in
Moscow that exchanges of students and technicians with Asian
free countries would serve the Soviet interest in building a
base of political influence in these countries. But in the
actual event, exposure to foreign influence might affect
people on the Soviet side more than people on the Asian side,
or it might affect Asians in a manner harmful to the Soviet
political interest. We may lay it down as a general principle,
then, that one should avoid assuming that a given Soviet line
of endeavor is injurious from our point of view just because
the Soviet leaders consider that it will be advantageous from
theirs. Even apart from Soviet miscalculation, it cannot be
assumed that anything which might work in whatever way toward
the Soviet advantage is automatically to the Western disadvan-
tage. The situation is more complicated than that.
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In the assessment of dangers, it is often necessary to
distinguish between two different questions, one relating to
the degree of probability that a given dangerous contingency
will materialize and the other relating to the kind and the
degree of harm which this will inflict. We will use here the
term "reality" to designate the former aspect, and "seriousness"
to designate the latter. The reason for stressing this dis-
tinction is that the two things may diverge. For example, a
given danger may be very real and not very serious, or,
alternatively, extremely serious but not very real. To
illustrate, the danger of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe
is tremendously serious but not, at this time, very real, i.e.,
not likely to occur. On the other hand, there is a real danger
that the Soviet Union will restore its intensive cultural
contacts and exchange with some Western countries, which were
largely broken off after Hungary, but this danger is not a
serious one, i.e., little harm could result.
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Part II
DANGERS AND DESIDERATA
A. The Dangers of Soviet Political Encroachment
Webster defines "encroachment" as follows: "Encroach.
1. To enter by gradual steps or stealth into the possessions
or rights of another; to trespass; intrude. 2. To advance
beyond desirable or normal limits." This is a very useful
concept for an analysis of the type of danger which present-
day Soviet foreign policy presents for the West. The very
breadth of its meaning is suggestive of the real nature of the
situation.
Let us first attempt to form a more concrete picture of
what this policy is and attempts to do. It is not a policy of
international quiescence. On the other hand, it is not a
policy of territorial aggrandizement of the existing Soviet
empire, whether by armed aggression or subversion of foreign
states, save in the marginal case as will be analyzed later.
The primary aim is not territorial aggrandizement but rather
the political reordering of the Soviet bloc's international
environment, and especially those parts of it which lie
adjacent to the bloc in Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
What made this undertaking possible at all was the
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psychological revolution which Stalin's death occasioned in
Soviet foreign policy.*
Stalin's cold war had brought about a division of the
world into (1) the Soviet bloc and (2) the America-oriented
sphere, embracing very nearly everything outside the Soviet
bloc and cemented together in large part by fear of Russia,
which in turn was a reaction to Soviet (Stalinist) hostility
in its many manifestations. This hostility was directed more
or less indiscriminately against all areas outside the Soviet
bloc, although not with the same fore and fury against all
areas. The fountainhead of the indiscriminate hostility was
Stalin, specifically the psychopathology of Stalin. Conse-
quently, his death caused it to subside and made possible the
emergence of a substantially new pattern in Soviet foreign
policy. The United States and main Western democracies
remain in the focus of a generally continuing Soviet
unfriendliness, but the hostility has subsided in intensity
and, above all, ceased being indiscriminate. Now it became
possible for Moscow to try to make friends with selected
Cf. Robert C. Tucker, RM-1881, "rhe Psychological Factor
in Soviet Foreign Policy"; RM-1949, "The Changing
Pattern of Soviet Foreign Policy"; and RM-1884, "The
Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization," for details of an
analysis of this psychological revolution.
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foreigners -- with Tito, Nehru, U Nu, the Scandinavians, the
Turks, the Egyptians, the Austrians, etc. -- not because the
Soviet leaders esteemed these foreigners but because such a
course was extremely useful, in accordance with a rationally
calculated Soviet interest. This is a highly over-simplified
diagnosis of the psychological revolution, but it contains
the fundamental point that has to be comprehended beibre
anyone can grasp what post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy is all
about. It involves a change from political irrationality to
political rationality.
The new policy takes its start from the world as Stalin
left ie, a world divided between the Soviet bloc and a loose
America-oriented sphere. It sets out to encroach politically
'upon the latter, to trespass upon this preserve by diplomatic,
economic, cultural, and ideological means, i.e., by the
conventional devices of modern foreign policy. In the process
it imitates some of the very practices which the United States
had earlier evolved in its international insurance policy,
such as foreign aid, technical assistance, student exchange,
cultural intercourse. However, it assimilates these practices
into its own peculiar structure of motivations. The military
incursions stopped as the political intrusion began. The
Soviet leaders set about winding up -- though not overhastily,
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for fear of seeming weak -- the aggressions in progress (Korea,
Indo-China) and many related manifestations of Stalinist cold
war. Thus, the new policy has two main prongs. One is
calculated non-aggression. This particularly needs to be
stressed, because the political meaning of inaction is not
always easy to appreciate. In this case, a most important
element of the new structure of Soviet world strategy consists
in not doing certain kinds of things. The other prong is
active political effort to capitalize upon the resulting
relaxation of fear in the non-Soviet world and induce a re-
ordering of political relationships between the Soviet bloc
and much of the America-oriented sphere.
Building on a base of all-round "normalization" of
relations between Soviet Russia and the independent countries
of Europe and Asia, the policy is designed, in the first
instance, to redraw the diplomatic mep, to make of the
America-oriented sphere of the world or large parts of it a
sphere no longer America-oriented, looking to a future day
when many parts of it may become, broadly, Russia-oriented --
in the political, economic, military, cultural and ideological
respects. It is, thus, an ambitiously expansive policy in its
ulterior design. But in terms of its immediate goals, it is
much less ambitious. It seeks to detach nations -- especially
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Asian and Middle Eastern nations -- from dependence and
reliance upon the West, encouraging the middle countries to
adopt a middle political position, to shift their orientation
in world politics, and especially in defense, away from the
West and America. Countries which adopt a middle position,
particularly with regard to their defense arrangements, are
called by the post-Stalin Soviet foreign-policy doctrine
"peace zones." The policy looks to the eventual transformation
of all or most of non-Soviet Eurasia, from the English Channel
to Indonesia, into one big "peace zone." Ultimately, it
presupposes, the great "peace zone" will become a zone of
preponderant Soviet or Soviet-bloc influence. This, very
roughly, is Moscow's image of the drama of competitive co-
existence and its future outcome.
Latent in the new configuration of Soviet policy are
certain dangers now to be analyzed. First however, a general
comment. How we approach the assessment of these dangers will
necessarily depend in part upon the underlying assumptions.
In particular, it will depend on whether we proceed from the
need for some kind of U.S. international insurance policy or,
alternatively, from the need to preserve the international
insurance policy in the form evolved during the cold war of
1945-1953, i.e., the "cold-war structure" of American foreign
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policy or "policy of containment." The new Soviet strategy of
political encroachment presents very many serious dangers from
a point of view which rigidly adheres to the latter. The
crucial reason is that Soviet world strategy has changed. The
American policy of containment was from the beginning in
essence a counter-strategy, designed to meet a Soviet
(Stalinist) cold war offensive. Manifestly, the rigid appli-
cation of this counter-strategy will begin to yield poor
results or even land its forces in deep trouble when the
original offensive strategy which it was correctly designed to
meet has substantially altered, in this instance to a new
offensive strategy which, speaking in military parlance again,
might be compared with warfare of maneuver, being a policy of
political mobile maneuver.
The counter-strategy was workable in the cold war
precisely because the middle countries were confronted from
the Soviet side with a constant tangible threat to their
security and independent existence, being reminded over and
over again (Czechoslovakia, Berlin blockade, Korea, Indo-
China, the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, etc.) by Stalinist
hostility toward the outside world of their dependence for
security upon Western and particularly American protection.
Now, however, by the prong of military quiescence (calculated
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non-aggression) in their policy structure, the Soviet political
generals have it in their power to lessen the felt need abroad
for big-power protection, to make the middle countries feel
safe or at any rate safer, i.e., less threatened by Soviet
aggression, and hence to reduce their motive for participation
in a continued structure of containment policy. And by the
other prong, which is the pursuit of an active policy of
cultivating co-operative relations with independent countries
of the middle zone, they can reinforce this effect. This
political offensive of mobile maneuver, symbolized by the
civilian jet transports which carry negotiators of aid-and-
trade agreements to capitals of neighboring independent
countries, cannot be effectively met by a frozen counter-
strategy of political position warfare on the part of the
United States. Such a counter-strategy becomes in many ways
a political anachronism.
But if we proceed -- as we shall here -- from the al-
ternative point of view that America's purpose in world
politics is not to make a success of an established configu-
ration of policy but simply to promote the security of the
United States by the best available means in the circumstances
as they now exist and promise to exist in the near future,
then our assessment of the dangers may justifiably be more
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moderate. For the dangers latent in the new Soviet posture,
while genuinely serious at various points, are quite a
different matter from the standpoint of an adaptable America
in quest of security than they are from the standpoint of an
America rigidly committed to a specific structure of policy
as the only thinkable means of obtaining security. The
adaptable America will not be so vulnerable in the basic
political sense as the rigidly committed America; it will be
less obsessed with the dangers latent in the new world
situation and more cognizant of the opportunities that may be
present for change in healthy directions. However, from this
standpoint, which inquires into the dangers not in relation to
an established structure of American foreign policy but in
relation to the security of America as such, the problems of
analysis grow highly complex. For example, the Soviet effort
to normalize the once deeply disturbed relations with many
independent countries of Europe and Asia would be immediately
classified as a "danger" by an analyst rigidly committed to a
persistent cold-war policy structure -- for it obviously is a
danger to successful continued pursuit of that policy; from
that point of view, whatever lifts the previous temperature
of cold-war frigidity in Soviet relations with the outside
world is bad and dangerous. From the other point of view,
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however, the normalization of Soviet relations with other
countries is not immediately identifiable as an evil or danger,
and might even be desirable. It would all depend upon the
consequences for the continued security of these countries and
our own, and this in turn would depend upon a great many
intricate factors, including the function of normalization in
the overall structure of the new Soviet world strategy.
It is to the question of danger in this latter perspective
that the discussion now turns. We shall examine the dangers of
Soviet political encroachment under five headings: The Neutrali-
zation of Collective Defenses, the Acquisition of Excessive
Soviet Influence, the Aggrandizement of the Soviet Bloc, the
Moral-Political Isolation of America and the Preservation of
the Soviet Empire.
1. The Neutralization of Collective Defenses
a. The Policy Pattern
The aim of transforming all or most of non-Soviet
Eurasia into one great "peace zone" means, in the first in-
stance, the neutralization of the system of military defenses
against Russia which has been erected across the southerly arc
extending from Norway to Japan. This is a central element in
the new Soviet world strategy. And precisely because the
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strategy pursues a plurality of related goals, no one single
motive can be specified as the driving force behind this
component element. Beyond doubt, one of the strongest elements
in the complex of motives is the desire to improve the physical
security of the territory of the Soviet bloc, and of the Soviet
Union in particular, vis-'a-vis American striking power now
poised around the whole circumference of the bloc. However,
the policy of neutralization also pursues certain political
goals connected with the improved security of the Soviet
political system and the creation of better opportunities for
the radiation of Soviet influence out into the future neutralized
sphere. The task of assessing the dangers implicit in the
policy is complicated by this intricacy of motive forces.
The policy of neutralization attempts to achieve certain
objectives of military-political significance to the Soviet
Union by political means. What makes this conceivable from
Moscow's point of view is the fact that the strategic en-
circlement spoken of above is not simply a military reality,
but a politico-military reality. It rests in part on a
political structure of interlocking multilateral and bilateral
defensive alliances and agreements of which the U.S.A. is the
central power hub. This structure is largely an outgrowth
and legacy of the Stalinist cold war, when fear seized many
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middle countries* and impelled them to band together for
common defense. Since Stalinist Russia was in this sense
critically responsible for the coming into being of the
alliance structure, post-Stalin Russia can, through changes
of behavior, undertake to be critically responsible for its
decline and fall. That is what the policy of neutralization
endeavors to do. Its points d'appuis are the middle countries.
The policy is aimed, so to speak, at the middle countries but
against the United States.
The policy is not rigidly committed to some one parti-
cular result or form of result. It would, of course, like to
see the whole ramified system of defense alliances, beginning
with NATO, dissolve; but that is no more than a paper wish
and a talking point for Soviet propaganda. The real aims
embrace a whole spectrum of lesser and more practicable Soviet
desiderata. These are moves of one or another kind by middle
countries to resign responsibilities in collective defense
against Russia. At a minimum, the policy would dissuade them
from increasing their responsibilities in any way; the recent
?
The phrase "middle countries" as used here embraces all
the countries in the sphere of the world friendly to
America which participate in one way or another in the
common defensive system.
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Soviet-negotiated pledge by Iran to permit no military bases
on its territory is a case in point, as is the barrage of
Soviet warning against permitting U.S. atomic support commands
to be stationed on foreign territories in proximity to the
Soviet Union. Beyond this, the policy would persuade middle
governments to decrease their responsibilities under the defen-
sive system by such various steps as requesting the United
States to withdraw its personnel or evacuate its bases (cf.
Iceland's tentative move in this direction not long ago),
withdrawing from a given defensive alliance, declaring the
country's military neutrality, and so forth.
The policy follows a definite and coherent pattern of
persuasion in the pursuit of its ends. On the one hand, it
seeks to persuade the middle countries that they would be
safe from molestation by Russia even without the protection
afforded by their affiliation with the common defensive
system. The means of persuasion on this score are highly
diversified. They include (1) Soviet military quiescence
combived with the cessation of cold-war hostilities still in
progress when Stalin died (Korea, Indo-China, etc.) and of
related symptoms of official Soviet hostility to foreign
governments; (2) a series of moves designed to drive home
411 the idea that the Soviet Uriion does not plan to make war on
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any neighboring countries (the withdrawal from Austria,
evacuation of the Soviet base in Finland, evacuation of Port
Arthur, announced serious cuts in the standing Soviet military
establishment, the show of affirmative interest in limitation
of armaments, etc.); (3) puntilious observance of the Austrian
treaty, designed to dramatize Soviet willingness to coexist
in peace with small undefended neutral nations in its vicinity;
(4) the practice of friendly coexistence with independent
countries, with selective emphasis on the advantages of such
relations with Russia when the given independent country is
militarily non-aligned with the West (India, Burma, etc.);
and (5) the propaganda of neutralism. On the other hand, the
policy seeks to persuade these same countries that by their
alignment with the Western military system they subject them-
selves, in event of general war, to a threat of total and
utter national destruction. This is done by means of official
warnings, by statements and demonstrations of Soviet military
capabilities in the field of massive retaliation. Thus, the
policy seeks on the one hand to persuade the middle countries
that they are individually in no danger of Soviet aggression,
and on the other hand that they are in very great danger of
perishing in the collective holocaust which total war would
initiate. In effect, the two-pronged argument wants to
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convince them that the collective security system in which
they participate has ceased being a system of true mutual
security as between them and the United States. They, it
argues in effect, are sacrificing their own national physical
security in event of total war, for the sole benefit of an
American air-atomic strategy which would be willing to see
them destroyed when the Russians retaliate massively against
U.S. basest and meanwhile receive nothing important in the way
of present security returns, since Russia does not threaten
them individually in the absence of total war. This is the
pattern of persuasion which underlies the Soviet policy of
neutralization. It is predicated on a set of Soviet assumptions
which may be formulated as follows: (1) a situation in which
there seems little present danger of conventional armed aggres-
sion from Russia is one in which exposed middle nations would
be encouraged to think of military non-commitment as a possible
course; (2) a situation in which total war seems to threaten
their utter annihilation is one in which this possible course
might also seem -- in increasing degree -- the prudent course
to take.
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b. The Dangers Posed
Disregarding for the moment the issue of the relative
effectiveness of the Soviet policy of neutralization, let us
consider just what dangers it poses. It is plain from what
has already been said that the policy is directed against U.S.
interests. While the points d'appuis are the middle countries,
the aim is to improve the Soviet military-political position
in the world vis-'a-vis Russia's principal world rival, the
United States, by encroaching politically upon what was,
during the Stalinist cold war, the America-oriented sphere.
Soviet neutralization of all or a large part of the
system of collective defenses would seriously compromise the
security position of the United States as well as other
countries friendly to the United States. The serious conse-
quences would include: (1) a worsening of the U.S. military
position vis-'a-vis Russia in event of war between the two;
(2) a weakening of the deterrence position, possibly increasing
by some undeterminable degree the danger of general war; and
(3) a weakening of the secondary security benefits which the
military security system provides for exposed middle countries,
resulting in some possible impairment of U.S. security to the
extent that it depends upon the continued security of
societies now enjoying protection through a relationship to
the system of collective defense.
. _
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Further, there is the possible danger of a chain reaction
in the spread of neutralism (military non-alignment) once the
trend gets fairly started. That is, each instance of national
resignation of responsibilities in collective defense might
reinforce tendencies elsewhere to follow suit. Russia, be it
noted, is in a position to reward the de-aligned country with
the benefits not only of peace but also of improved relations
in the economic and other fields, and at the same time subtly
to remind other countries in the vicinity of the newly neutral-
ized country that their own position remains more exposed than
ever in event of general war. Thus, the combination of
pressures involved in the pattern of persuasion as outlined
above may grow more potent as persuasion begins to pay off --
if it does. The neutralization of Austria at Soviet initiative
belongs, by the way, in this very context of political analysis.
Far from signifying a "retreat" (as some observers wrongly in-
ferred when it came), it signified an attempted major advance
toward getting the new policy of neutralization under momentum.
Austria was the big initial "gimmick" with which Moscow went
into the diplomatic business of neutralizing collective
defenses in the non-Soviet sphere.
Three broad reasons were listed above for considering
that the Soviet policy of neutralization poses a serious
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possible danger to the United States. Two of the three re-
late to military factors. In assessing the situation from
this standpoint, it must, of course, be remembered that the
military aspect undergoes change as further development takes
place in some fields, most notably long-range missiles. As a
result of such development, the existing system of collective
defenses may at some point begin to lose some of its present
function from the viewpoint of planning for war and planning
for deterrence. Hence a time factor enters into the assess-
ment of the dangers of neutralization.* Beyond this, however,
it must also be remembered that this is a multi-purpose Soviet
policy, and not exclusively concerned with military factors.
It also served political functions, as mentioned above.
Further, the relative importance of these different functions
The Soviet leaders, for understandable reasons of their
own, have an interest in suggesting to foreign countries
that the U.S. bases may already be in the process of be-
coming militarily anachronistic. Thus, Marshal Zhukov
said in a speech in May, 1957: "As regards the military
bases situated around the Soviet Union and people's
democracies, on which the political and military leaders
of the capitalist camp pin big hopes, these bases -- now
that ballistic and other rockets of great power, speed
and accuracy have appeared -- have already lost the
significance they once had" (Pravda, May 29, 1957). The
same theme has been accentuated in more recent utterances
by Khrushchev and others.
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of the policy may be obscured by Soviet official pronounce-
ments, which put the Soviet case against the bases exclusively
in terms of legitimate Soviet concern for physical security.
It is politically advantageous for the Russians to put the
case in these terms. Further, it would be distinctly dis-
advantageous politically for them to assert or even hint in
any way that their interest in disaligning middle countries
has anything to do with a political goal related to but
separate from the purely military situation. Nevertheless,
the policy is a multi-purpose affair, and we should therefore
expect the Soviet Government to persist in it even if, with
the passage of more time, the purely military significance of
the collective defense system should decline.
It follows from what has been said that any far-reaching
trend of Soviet-induced neutralization of our collective de-
fenses presents a clear and serious danger to the United States.
But this does not imply that any instance of neutralization is
a danger or, in other words, that U.S. security demands the
preservation of the entire existing status quo in collective
defense, the continued intactness at every point of the whole
world structure of military security vis-4-vis Russia. On
the contrary, it may be that a certain streamlining of the
system of defenses would in no way weaken it for the performance
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of its essential functions in the security field in the
present set of circumstances, and that on this criterion
not every area now aligned with our military system need
remain so. It might even be that conscious removal of
some link which was both weak and non-essential would make
the system itself stronger by reducing the political strain
on it. But whether or not this would present a danger to
the United States might depend in large measure on whether
the change occurred through initiative from the West or
initiative from the East. If it came about as a part
payoff on the Soviet policy of neutralization, it might
prove much more dangerous to the rest of the security
stricture -1 for reasons already indicated above -- than it
would be if the West itself had taken the initiative in
making an adjustment.
c. How Real Are the Dangers?
The policy of neutralization germinated slowly during
the first year and a half or so after Stalin's death. In
early 1955 it began to unfold swiftly and seriously, first
with the Austrian gambit and then a whole sequence of further
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Soviet moves associated with that one.* By mid-1956, the
prospects were beginning to look promising from Moscow's
viewpoint, the most notable success being Iceland's tentative
decision to request a U.S. withdrawal. Then came the stormy
autumn of 1956 and Russia's military suppression of revolu-
tionary Hungary. This was a shattering setback for the policy
of neutralization.
That policy, as stressed, relies on a pattern of per-
suasion in which one essential element is the demonstration by
Moscow of its willingness to coexist in peace and friendship
with small neutral countries in its vicinity, not to molest
them. Austria had been exhibited as a case in point. But
when Hungary in the person of its Communist premier Nagy asked
to be a small country enjoying the blessings of neutrality,
Moscow replied with military invasion and the reimposition of
a Gauleiter regime. Understandably, the whole Soviet venture
in the promotion of neutralism for non-Soviet countries
suffered as a consequence of this spectacle. It exposed a
These are analyzed in the writer's RM-1949, The Changing
Pattern of Soviet Foreign Policy." Of special importance
was the series of moves subsumed there under the heading
of "Operation Withdrawal," and the creation of the Warsaw
Treaty system as a device for shifting the Soviet military
posture in Eastern Europe to a defensive "new look."
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deep-lying duplicity in the post-Stalinist policy structure,
based as it is on a modified imperialism for the Soviet bloc
and, on the other hand, new ways in Soviet dealings with the
outside world. The Soviet leadership, in other words, is in
something of the position of a syndicate of racketeers who,
having a firm monopoly of the underworld, set themselves up
in a more or less legitimate business on the outside and then
find, much to their inconvenience, that they must revert to
gangster.methods to quell certain underworld forces who would
like to be dealt with on the up-and-up too. Russia will be
continually plagued in the effort to conduct a legitimate
diplomatic business with the outside world so long as it
insists on preserving its established imperial structure.
Despite all this, however, the dangers of neutralization
should not be dismissed as unreal. It is far too early to say
that no harm is likely to result for the structure of military
security from continuing future Soviet efforts at neutrali-
zation. Even if many weaker independent countries continue
in differing degree to distrust Soviet Russia, there is a
rather cogent and potentially corrosive logic in the two-
pronged pattern of Soviet persuasion delineated above. Hence
the question arises: Under what possible conditions might
the dangers inherent in the Soviet policy of neutralization
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become considerably more real than they are today? One
condition would be that Soviet Russia persists in the pattern
of persuasion. This it is doing, and with the advent of the
sputniks and ICBM, the Soviet argument to the middle countries
has grown morepersuasiven than before. Another would be
that it avoids a recrudescence of the type of situation
exemplified in Hungary. This is quite possible.
A third potentially critical condition has to do not with
what Russia does but with what the West and especially America
do or fail to do. As has been pointed out, the Soviet policy
is designed to persuade the middle countries that the America-
backed military security system no longer offers them security
on a basis of real mutuality. They, it is argued by word and
deed, gain nothing important in time of peace, for Russia
does not threaten them individually with any form of aggression,
while, on the other hand, they stand to lose their very national
existence, and unnecessarily, in event of general war between
East and West. The conclusion follows that the middle coun-
tries reap only insecurity from this system, while America
gains positions for potential activating of an air-atomic
strategy of total war against Russia. This, incidentally,
probably explains in large part why the official Soviet line
(as restated, for example, by Khrushchev in his interview on
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"Face the Nation") holds that America is actively planning to
make war on Russia. To admit otherwise would be to relax the
pressure behind this pattern of persuasion of the middle
countries to resign their responsibilities in the collective
defense.
The third condition of potential Soviet success in
neutralization -- "success" meaning various things ranging
from a slackening of effort in the collective defense system
to actual military disalignment in the extreme and no doubt
marginal case -- would be the failure of the United States
and its principal allies in counter-persuasion. By a failure
in counter-persuasion is meant the failure to do what is
necessary in order to persuade the middle countries that the
system of collective defense, or a modification of it, does
still provide security on a basis of mutuality and rationality.
Doing "what is necessary" essentially means, in turn, evolving
and announcing a good military strategy. To suggest what such
a strategy might be is beyond the scope of this study. How-
ever, this at least may be said: Whatever a good strategy
may be, it is not one which simply assures the destruction of
the enemy country in a global holocaust; it is not, in short,
a strategy of meaningless victory. A good strategy may be
defined as one which not only promises to make the outbreak
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of war in various forms least likely, but also to maximize,
in event of war, the possibilities of prosecuting it success-
fully under conditions of maximum protection of the territories
and vital interests of oneself and one's allies and also, to
the greatest feasible extent, of the peoples on the other side.
2. The Acquisition of Excessive Soviet Influence
a. The Policy Pattern
The next major topic to be considered under the dangers
of Soviet political encroachment is the acquisition of ex-
cessive Soviet influence in foreign countries outside the
existing Soviet empire.
The great Eurasian "peace zone" envisaged by the contem-
porary Soviet foreign policy would be, as has been said, a
sphere of preponderant Soviet influence. Here again it is
essential to recognize that we are dealing with a different
policy configuration from the Stalinist, this difference being
conditioned by a change of Soviet motivation growing out of
Stalin's death. The Stalinist policy of cold war expressed
a dynamism of Soviet control; the post-Stalinist policy of
competitive coexistence expresses a dynamism of Soviet influence.
The one aimed primarily to create more and more new Soviet
111 satellites; the other aims primarily to bring more and more
foreign countries under varying degrees of Soviet influence.
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The reason why Stalin's death occasioned this change of
operative motivation is that the felt need for absolute
control died with him.
First, a few words about the general idea of "influence,"
which is a broad and elastic term. A relationship of
influence in international politics differs in quality from
the kind of relationship in which one government is a
satellite or agent or governmental front organization of the
other, as the Soviet satellite regimes were in Stalin's time
and more or less remain in the majority of cases even now.
In the relationship of influence, the influenced state re-
mains a real political entity in its own right. However,
within this framework, it is,in varying manner and degree,
dependent upon the influencing state; and in the extreme case
becomes what is called a "dependency" of the latter.
But the relationship of influence can obtain without the
influenced state becoming in the full sense a dependency of
the other. At a minimum, for example, the influenced state
will simply be in a position of endeavoring not to offend
the influencing power by any steps in foreign policy, or,
beyond this, to please the latter whenever possible within
certain limits. This would describe the relationship of
contemporary Finland to Soviet Russia. Farther along the
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influence spectrum, the influenced state may be in the
position of actively co-operating with the international
policies of the influencing one and emulating some of its
internal policies. An example of this might be the relation-
ship of the Nasser regime in Egypt at certain periods to
Soviet Russia. And as this latter example attests, it is not
to be assumed that the relationship of influence is one in
which the influenced state must necessarily participate
reluctantly, faute de mieux, as Finland does in its relation-
ship with Russia.
The change of motivation from the quest for total control
to the quest for influence brings with it a whole cascade of
change in the range and types and means of action in Soviet
foreign policy. In order to create satellite regimes, it is
ordinarily necessary to overthrow existing governments by one
means or another. In order to gain influence, on the other
hand, you enter into relations with them. This explains
the great shift toward government-to-government relations in
post-Stalin foreign policy, spearheaded by the continuing
drive for "normalization." Normalization, in turn, opens up
a very wide field for further Soviet action to build influence
in foreign countries. The means of potential influence-
building are very diverse: political contacts at top levels,
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the regularization of conventional diplomatic relations, the
negotiation of outstanding government-to-government issues
(frontier rectifications, financial claims, repatriation of
citizens, etc.), the cultivation of contacts at various
official and semi-official levels, the encouragement of
tourism, increases of trade, economic assistance projects,
export of capital and technicians, cultural and scientific
exchange, arms exports, and so on. Another important field
for influence-building is the relations between political
parties, and here, for example, is the context of the new
Soviet drive to repair relations between Communist and
Socialist parties.
The quest for Soviet influence and the Soviet policy of
neutralization are interactive and mutually reinforcing.
That is, the more Soviet influence develops in foreign coun-
tries, the more predisposed they may be to disalign themselves
from the Western system of collective military defenses. For
example, Soviet trade with Iceland (through import of its fish
products) shot up sharply during the two years preceding the
Icelandic parliament's decision to request a U.S. withdrawal.
On the other hand, the neutralization of a given foreign
country, partial or complete, is calculated to help clear the
ground for the Soviet quest to build influence there.
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Neutralization promotes influence, and influence promotes
neutralization. This is why it has been stressed abpve that
the Soviet policy of neutralization must not be interpreted
as narrowly military in its motivation. By the same token,
however, the quest for influence must not be interpreted
as exclusively political; military considerations are very
much present in it too. The future Eurasian "peace zone" is
often projected by Moscow's spokesmen in the image of a new
"security system" which would replace "existing military
blocs." More accurately, there would be two "security
systems," one for Europe and the other for Asia. Under the
Soviet idea of an "all-European security system," the NATO
and Warsaw alliances would be dissolved, giving way to
a Europe in which all states would be aligned together in a
general non-aggression pact, i.e., a Europe in which Russia
would be the dominant military power. Europe would have be-
come a Soviet protectorate. The "Asian security system"
would follow the same pattern save that here the dominant
military power would be the Sino-Soviet partnership. Mani-
festly, the idea is to convert Europe and Asia into a Soviet
security system. For it would be a system of dependence of
European and Asian countries upon Russia as the one military
superpower in their midst.
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The new Soviet quest for influence illustrates the
contention that contemporary Soviet foreign policy does not
respect the existing political status quo in the world, that
it would change things, reshape the political environment.
Moscow does not resign itself to the great Eurasian terri-
tories beyond the present Soviet empire remaining predominantly
an America-oriented sphere of the world. It would make of
them instead, a broadly Russia-oriented sphere. They would
become, in short, militarily, politically, economically,
culturally and ideologically more and more oriented toward
Soviet Russia. Perhaps it would be roughly accurate to say
that this ambitious policy visualizes for the future a "fellow-
traveling" Eurasia, a collection of diverse countries which,
each at its own pace and in its own manner, are going Soviet
Russia's way. This conception does not necessarily imply
any definite "time-table" of arrival at political destinations.
The image of the future Eurasian zone of preponderant
Soviet influence unquestionably differentiates between the
established and stable democracies of Western Europe, on the
one hand, and the countries of the Arab-Afro-Asian world on
the other, many of which are in transition from former
colonialism and economic backwardness to modern nationhood.
The Soviet policy of influence can hardly hope, at best, to
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make much more of Western Europe than a collection of Finlands.
Its potentialities in Asia, Africa and the Middle East are much
greater. To countries in the throes of change Russia can
advertise itself as a nation which was once in their position
but pulled itself up in a short space of years to the rank of
a great and powerful modern state. It can offer Russia's path
after the October Revolution as one which other "backward"
countries might want to follow. Further, the dictatorial
nature of the Soviet regime need not always be a foreign-policy
liability in relations with those countries in which the drive
to modernize is strong and democratic processes are still rela-
tively weak.* Moreover, Russia has a much greater potential
for ideological rapprochement with Asian socialism than with
Western social democracy, which has long been predominantly
anti-Soviet in thought and sentiment.
A case in point may be the present situation in Indonesia
where President Sukarno has espoused a concept of "guided
democracy." In a speech at Madium, Sukarno said: "The
National Council...is a midway form of government between
the Western system and the Communist system that we can
adopt to the original nature of our own personality,
namely, gotong rojojg (mutual assistance." In reporting
this speech, the New York Times (June 20, 1957, p. 4)
noted, significantly, that Sukarno "flew to Madium in his
Russian Ilyushin transport plane, a gift from Soviet leaders
when he visited the Soviet Union last year." Here is a
good example of the new Soviet expansionism of influence
in action.
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_ A final important point is that the internal political
pattern in a number of under-developed countries, especially
Arab countries, is one of contention between different politi-
cal forces with rival claims for national leadership. One
of these forces might be described as the traditional ruling
element; the other as the radical intelligentsia; which is
predominantly leftist in inclination but not Communist. In
such situations, the Soviet dynamism of influence does not
always place the stress on government-to-government relations.
It does so if the radical intelligentsia has already come
into the political ascendancy in the given country, but not
necessarily if the traditional ruling element is still
ascendant. In other words, the Soviet politics of influence
generally bank on the radical intelligentsia rather than the
traditional ruling element in these countries. Here it is
well to recall an historical consideration, namely, that there
is a certain broad sameness of pattern as between those
situations and the one which prevailed in nineteenth-century
Russia, where a traditional ruling element was opposed by a
radical intelligentsia, one section of which came into power
in October, 1917. The intelligentsia may play a much bigger
and more politically potent role in economically underdeveloped
countries than elsewhere, and the Soviet politics of influence
speculate heavily on this fact.
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A brief further word on Moscow's working image of the
future European zone of preponderant Soviet influence. As
already suggested, the policy of influence differentiates be-
tween what can be done in Europe and what can be done in the
Arab-Afro-Asian world. For the European democracies, "Finland-
ization" or "Austrianization" represents the probable height
of Moscow's present ambitions. The European sphere of influ-
ence, if achieved, would consist very largely (apart from
Soviet-bloc countries) of states which remain, as Finland does,
internally free although Russia-oriented in external policy.
They would accept Soviet Russia as the dominant power in
Europe and a force not to be antagonized. The situation might
be describable as a coordination of European national policies
toward Russia. The basic political framework would be the
Soviet-sponsored "all-European security system." Here it needs
to be noted that in the further development of Soviet official
thinking along this line in the recent period, there has
appeared a trend which might be called "Soviet Europeanism."
Moscow has bruited a number of proposals as supplements of the
"all-European security system." One is the proposal for an
"all-European" program for coordinated development of fuel and
electric power resources. A third offers an "all-European"
program for mutual economic and financial assistance. Meanwhile,
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Moscow continues to voice the most strenuous opposition to
every scheme for European integration (Euratrom, the common
market, etc.) which is predicated on the existing partition of
Europe and takes Western Europe as its working nucleus. The
new "Soviet Europeanism," presupposing as it does a conception
of Europe as a concert of separate national states under over-
all Russian aegis in the political, military and economic
fields, reflects the policy of influence in its European variant.
Although the rise of the policy of influence marks a
shift toward government-to-government relations in Soviet
foreign policy, this does not mean that Soviet Russia has lost
411 interest in the political fortunes of foreign Communist Parties
?
or ceased to regard these as potential political assets of
real importance. Far from being disregarded under the new
policy, the foreign Communist Parties are being assimilated, in
a sense, into the expansionism of Soviet influence. In the
first place, total centralized control of the world Communist
movement from Moscow has relaxed along with total centralized
control within the Soviet empire and the Soviet state itself.
This makes possible, to a certain extent and in certain coun-
tries, a degree of revitalization within the native Communist
Party. Secondly, the new Soviet foreign policy, by shifting
to the effort to cultivate close relations with many foreign
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governments rather than to overthrow them, tends to create a
situation and atmosphere in which the native Communist Parties
can break out of political isolation and bid actively for an
influence role in the political life of their respective
countries. Now that Russia strives to appear on their national
horizons as a friendly foreign power, they no longer have to
bear the stigma of functioning as agents of an unfriendly
foreign power. On the contrary, they can bask in the re-
flected new respectability of their political patrons in Moscow.
Thus, if Khrushchev and Bulganin show no visible interest in
the Indian Communists on their travels through India, this
does not mean that they really have lost interest in them or
that the Communists suffer politically as a result. This is
born out by the recent success of the local Communist Party
in the Indian state of Kerala where the Communists have
come to power in a free election -- an unprecedented happening.
The expansionism of Soviet influence stands to gain as a
consequence of this, and the pattern may be repeated elsewhere.
b. The Dangers Posed
Disregarding for the moment the factual odds for or against
the success of the Soviet policy of influence, what are its
potential implications from the standpoint of America's interests
in foreign policy? What are the stakes involved?
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Realization of the grandiose idea of transforming most
or all of Eurasia along with much of Africa into a sphere of
preponderant Soviet influence would very seriously endanger
the security of the United States in both its aspects, primary
and secondary. The dangers of neutralization, discussed
earlier here, would be actualized, and the great new neutral
belt in the world would be tending increasingly toward a
Russia-oriented posture of neutrality; if not a part of
the Soviet military system, it would at any rate function as
part of the Soviet world security system. American democratic
society -- its political processes, economy and culture --
would find itself in a much less friendly world milieu than
at present. In general, the prospects for this form of
society would be considerably diminished. On the other hand,
the security of the chief unfriendly power, Soviet Russia,
would be greatly enhanced. The structure Of empire, as well
as that of internal Soviet rule in Russia, would be more
secure once the Sovietized heartland was surrounded with
nations under various degrees of Soviet influence -- a cordon
sanitaire in reverse.
That American security would be seriously endangered by
full-scale realization of the Soviet policy hardly needs em-
phasizing. But what if we do not presuppose full-scale
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realization? A more likely assumption, after all, is that the
Soviet expansionism of influence will achieve only some partial
success in the period immediately ahead. How would the dangers
be assessed on this assumption?
In the first place, there is no ground for taking the view
that any Soviet influence whatever in countries of the sphere
of the world friendly to America, no matter how small in ex-
tent, is a danger to them and us. Like arsenic, Soviet in-
fluence in small amounts needs not be poisonous in effect and
might even -- conceivably -- have some beneficial consequences.
The prerequisite of the Soviet quest for influence in foreign
countries is, as has been pointed out, the policy of normali-
zation -- and normalization implies Soviet acceptance of the
existence of independent foreign governments. Within this
framework, influence is sought by means of the conventional
devices of great-power foreign policy, especially economic
devices. Up to a point, no danger need necessarily be posed
either to the given middle country or, indirectly, to the
United States. For example, the security of the present
non-Communist system in India is not likely to be adversely
affected by the construction of a steel mill under Soviet
auspices, or by Soviet orders which keep the depressed cottage
shoe-making industry of Agra on its feet, or by the appearance
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II/ of Soviet technicians in modest numbers in India. On the
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contrary, free India may become somewhat more secure as a
consequence of these things. Nor does this exhaust the
potentially beneficial consequences. For example, it is only
when Russia acquires a foothold of influence in a foreign
country that it runs the risk of a misstep. Briefly, as soon
as the Russians acquire means of exerting influence over the
policies of an independent foreign government, they are going
to be powerfully tempted to do so, e.g., by threatening to
off advantageous economic arrangements which have been set
on the base of normalization if the government fails to do
thus and so. But this in turn may have the unexpected effect
of immunizing the foreign government against the Soviet
cut
up
expansionism of influence -- and doing so in a much more
effective way than any preventive propaganda from well meaning
friends across the ocean could have done. The behavior of
Russian emissaries dispatched to foreign countries under the
policy of influence may also have an immunizing effect, may
open foreign eyes to Soviet Russian realities in a way which
hardly would happen if Soviet isolation from the external
world continued. These reflections expose a possible dilemma
at the heart of the new Soviet expansionism of influence:
it will be effective only so long as it remains within the
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bounds of the Soviet attempt to cultivate co-operative relations
on a conventional plane, but will boomerang just as soon as
Moscow reaches for a political pay-off, presses the potential
political advantages to be derived from the new pattern of
relations. This needs to be balanced by a realization that
Moscow may be shrewd enough in places to permit the political
interest on its new policy of influence to accrue slowly and
quietly in the bank, not attempting to "cash in" until
circumstances warrant a strong expectation of success.
Further, one must take account of a potential boomerang
effect upon Soviet policy itself. Insofar as small amounts of
Soviet influence have an immunizing effect on foreign govern-
ments, the new Soviet ardor for foreign policy may cool by a
number of degrees. And even in less unfavorable circumstances,
the practical problems and frustrations attendant upon the
effort to play a great-power part in the affairs of independent
foreign nations may have a sobering effect in Moscow. In
addition, pursuit of a policy of influence sets up certain
possibilities that might not otherwise exist for an un-
wanted counter-influence on Soviet minds. The Soviet Govern-
ment cannot send Russian engineers to foreign countries out-
side the Soviet bloc, or exchange students with them, without
running a risk that the Russians will be more influenced than
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influencing with respect to political attitudes. Finally,
Soviet distribution of economic largesse
Russian people go on living for the most
poverty is calculated to antagonize wide
domestic opinion, with effects which may
ficant even though not yet evident.*
Thus, there is no ground for America to take the view that
any increment of Soviet influence in independent foreign coun-
tries is an unmitigated danger. From the U.S. standpoint, what
is to be feared is Soviet acquisition of excessive influence.
abroad while the
part in the dreariest
sections of Russian
be politically signi-
It is not an easy matter to determine the point at which Soviet
influence becomes, from our point of view as well as that of
the middle country concerned, "excessive." It is not something
expressible in quantitative terms,** nor is the point likely
* *
The fact that the Soviet popular press does not talk much
about the aid program for foreign countries does not mean
that Russian citizens are in the dark about it. Russians
know much more than their press tells them.
It is interesting, however, to note that, according to
some reports, Tito has on one occasion warned Nasser that
it is unwise for any small country to tie up more than,
or as much as,25 per cent of its foreign trade with Russia.
If the report is well founded, then it would appear that
Tito views Soviet influence as excessive when, on the
economic side, a quarter or more of a small country's
commerce is with Russia.
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to be uniform for all foreign countries. Much, for example,
will depend upon the stability of the existing social-political
setup and economy. Broadly speaking, however, Soviet influence
in a foreign country becomes excessive at the point where that
country tends to grow Russia-oriented in its external and in-
ternal policies. By "Russia-oriented" is meant biased in favor
of Soviet Russia. In the military field, for example, it would
mean pursuing a policy of pro-Soviet neutrality. In foreign
policy generally, it would mean permitting Russia to have a
determining say -- or veto -- in the positions which the given
country adopts on international issues (e.g., opposing U.N.
condemnation of Russia's action in Hungary because any other
course would offend Moscow). In international economic
relations, it would mean a tendency to tie up an unhealthy
amount of the country's commerce, capital imports, etc., with
Russia. These are various criteria which might be employed in
determining the point at which Soviet influence becomes ex-
cessive. A still more comprehensive criterion would be that
Soviet influence grows excessive whenever and wherever it
significantly weighs the scales toward success for the scheme
of transforming Eurasia into a sphere of preponderant Soviet
influence. For the United States, excessive Soviet influence
so defined is a definite danger. It threatens to make the
world less friendly, and therefore less secure.
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c. How Real Are the Dangers?
In approaching this question, it may be useful to
set the situation in historical perspective. The Soviet policy
of influence began, in the period from 1954 to 1956, by scoring
some rather impressive initial successes, particularly in the
Middle East and Southeast Asia. But the performance was
deceptive in its way. For it began with a backlog of possi-
bility for which Stalin was largely responsible. He had, as
it were, set up the situation for his successors. It was his
cold war which made the international atmosphere so chilly
for Moscow and froze possibilities for acquiring Soviet influ-
ence abroad. Hence the most potent resource of the post-Stalin
foreign policy was, quite simply, the thaw, the ability to
create a d?nte. And the alacrity of the positive response
in many capitals probably reflected most of all a feeling of
enormous relief over the d?nte rather than any strong desire
to reorient policy toward Russia.
But this was a situation of diminishing returns for the
Russians; they could call off the Stalinist cold war only once.
Beyond the d?nte, real performance would be the major test.
Performance covers a great many things. How hard is Soviet
currency? How much money would the Russians be prepared to
lend? On what terms? How much capital could and would they
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export? How much trade were they really prepared to engage in,
and how dependably? Would there be invisible political strings
attached, which Moscow soon would start to tug? What manner
of men were these Russians, of whom so very little has con-
cretely been known? What kind of relations were they going to
develop now with the countries of their own sphere? A hundred
questions of this kind enter into the performance equation.
And when we reflect on the answers to some of them which inter-
national experience in the post-Stalin period has afforded,
the danger of Soviet acquisition of excessive foreign influence
may not appear so great.
Attention has already been called to the essential incon-
sistency in the Soviet position as between the external pursuit
of the politics of influence and maintenance of an imperial
system in the relations with other countries of the Soviet
sphere. This is a heavy liability for the expansionism of
Soviet influence. Soviet recognition of this was undoubtedly
one of the reasons for efforts undertaken from 1954 on to
modify intra-bloc relations in minor ways, as, for example, by
dissolving most of the "mixed companies." The needs of the
new Soviet foreign policy called for a modicum of de-
satellization. Ironically, this culminated in the Hungarian
national uprising. The suppression of this was a very great
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blow to the expansionism of influence, as to the policy of
neutralization.
These considerations are reassuring ones from the Western
point of view. But it would not be justified in concluding
that the danger of excessive Soviet influence in foreign coun-
tries is unreal, or that it will not become real in the coming
years. Any such optimism on the part of America would be un-
warranted. For one thing, various elements in the perfor-
mance equation might develop in the Soviet favor,especially
in the economic field. Further, the degree of success which
the Soviet policy of influence has scored in the Arab world,
and especially in Egypt and Syria, attests to the reality of
the danger. And this also helps to throw light on an impor-
tant question: Under what type of conditions does the danger
of Soviet acquisition of excessive influence become a real
one? A big part of the answer is: under conditions such as
those existing in a number of Arab countries, where tradition-
alism is crumbling, the social structure is unstable, and one
important political force is a radical intelligentsia imbued
with a malignant anti-Western nationalism. In such situations,
the crucial determinant of Soviet success in acquiring ex-
cessive influence is this very local political force, or
elements of it. The Russians merely play the part of
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opportunistic beneficiaries, offering arms, economic assistance,
and anti-American slogans. But the anti-Western intelligentsia
is itself the fulcrum of Soviet influence, a force actively
gravitating toward Moscow. As an American has reported from
Damascus: "The Russians don't have to ask us to do anything,'
says a leader of one of the anti-Communist parties. 'We will
do anything we think they might want, we are so grateful.'"*
Or as the New York Times says (June 20, 1957) of Akram Hourani,
leader of the Arab Socialist Renaissance party: "Mr. Hourani,
like Colonel Serraj, is not a Red, but a fanatical nationalist
who believes Soviet policy suits Syria's interests." It is
this hate-imbued nationalism that mainly explains the success
the Soviet expansionism of influence has had in the Middle East.
3. The Aggrandizement of the Soviet Bloc
a. The Policy Pattern
We now come to the class of danger which remains
uppermost in a great many minds when Russia is under consider-
ation: the danger of further aggrandizement of Soviet Russia,
Claire Sterling, "Syria: Communism, Nasserism, and a
Man Named Serraj," The Reporter, June 27, 1957, p. 16.
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or territorial expansion of the Soviet bloc. What is feared
is the appearance of new "people's democracies" in the world,
particularly, of course, in countries situated in proximity
to the Soviet Union.
As we know, a "people's democracy" does not typically
spring into being spontaneously under pressure of popular
demand; the peoples, as a rule, prefer just democracy. The
aggrandizement of Soviet Russia has taken place, typically,
through active if in some instances more or less veiled Soviet
intervention to this end, involving aggression of one kind or
another. That is, the Soviet Union has acted to suppress
political forces standing in the way of the creation of a
Soviet satellite regime. Yugoslavia and China are the two
marginal cases, in which internal convulsions took place in
conditions growing out of World War II; in both instances,
however, Soviet action played an important part in the out-
come. Summing up, the question whether new "people's demo-
cracies" will appear in the world is, to a very great degree,
a question of what Russia is going to attempt to do, a
question of Soviet foreign policy. How can the policy be
characterized from this point of view? Very briefly, the
situation appears to be as follows: it is not an operative
aim of contemporary Soviet foreign policy to create new
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"people's democracies" in the world. More specifically, the
policy is one of not aggressing against non- "people's-
democratic" regimes in order to supplant them with "people's-
democratic" ones.*
Thus, contemporary Soviet foreign policy operates within
a certain limitation: No active effort by generally aggressive
means to establish new "people's democracies." But now we come
to the "other hand." For this limitation does not exclude an
interest on the part of Soviet foreign policy in the emergence
of new "people's democracies." For example, it leaves it open
to Soviet foreign policy to work by conventional and/or non-
conventional means to promote conditions in this or that
country which, in Moscow's view, are best calculated to lead
to further internal development in the direction of a "people's
democracy." Nor does it exclude, in the marginal case, non-
* The term "aggression" is used here in a broad sense. Its
meaning is not confined to situations involving the use,
in one form or another, of armed violence. The sense in
which I use it is one which would lead us, for example,
to class the Soviet action in February, 1948, in Czecho-
slovakia as aggression. Other examples would be Soviet
or Soviet-engineered actions in Poland, Rumania, Hungary
and Bulgaria in 1944-47 to suppress political forces opposed
to satellization. Aggression in this broad connotation
embraces active Soviet moves against regimes or political
forces standing in the way of the establishment of a
"people's democracy." It embraces what has been called
"non-overt aggression."
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aggressive Soviet effort even in the contemporary period to
"help along" a situation which might have such an outcome.
The limitation would perhaps lite most accurately describable in
these terms: Nothing shall be done which would arouse the
thought or, at any rate, enable it to be said persuasively
that the Soviet Union's actions were directly and critically
responsible for the appearance of the new "people's democratic
regime" in country X.
This is a self-imposed limitation within the frame of
reference of contemporary Soviet foreign policy. How the
limitation grows out of the structure of policy as delineated
in the foregoing pages is not hard to see. It would be in-
compatible with serious Soviet pursuit of the two great aims
already discussed, neutralization of our collective defenses
and the expansion of Soviet influence through Eurasia, to
pursue at the same time the aim of creating new "people's
democracies" by overtly or covertly aggressive means. The
whole experience of the Stalinist cold war teaches the
successors that satellite-building on the classical (aggressive)
pattern makes the middle countries feel more dependent upon
the West and America for their protection, more inclined
to enter alliances which are anti-Soviet in their character
and orientation, and less and less amenable to Soviet
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influence-building by the conventional devices of foreign
policy. Briefly, satellite-building and influence-building
are contradictory lines of action. The contemporary policy
structure being built around the idea of influence-building,
satellite-building must be restrained within the limits above
described.*
It is important to diagnose the operative limitation in
relation to the new structure of Soviet foreign policy because
there has been a mistaken tendency to see it in quite different
terms. Many Westerners have grasped the fact that Soviet foreign
policy is, in the respect here being considered, operating
411 under certain self-imposed limitations. But the broad tendency
has been to assume that this is so because of Soviet fear of
nuclear war. No one would be inclined to suggest that the
Soviet leaders are unafraid of nuclear war, or that their
fears on this score do not influence their contemporary foreign
policy in the general direction of restraint. This, however,
is probably best seen as a factor which reinforces the self-
?
Here it must be stressed again that the new Soviet policy
structure, centering in influence-building, grows out
of the subsiding of the psychological need for absolute
control (i.e., for satellites) which actuated Stalin's
policy. On this, cf. RM-1881, "The Psychological Factor
on Soviet Foreign Policy."
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imposed limitation. It is not correct, in other words, to
view the limitation as a simple product of fear of nuclear
war, as a reaction to Western "deterrence" policy. Of course,
it might be argued that the question of motivation is rela-
tively unimportant: The fact is that the Russians are
operating under this self-imposed limitation. What difference
does it make why? In fact, it may make all the difference be-
tween a good Western policy and a bad Western foreign policy
whether or not we act not only in awareness of how the Russians
are acting but also in awareness of why.
For example, if U.S. foreign policy is predicated upon
the assumption that announced Western readiness to reply with
military force is crucially what keeps Moscow from further
satellite-building at the present time, and if this is mis-
taken in the sense just suggested, then U.S. policy is
likely to suffer from what might be called the over-evaluation
of deterrence talk. To put it very crudely in terms of analogy,
if I shake my fist regularly in my neighbor's face and say
"Don't you dare attack me!", at a time when my neighbor, for
other reasons of his own, has no intention of attacking me,
my fist-shaking will have been largely superfluous and in
fact may do me considerable harm, by example, by hurting my
reputation for cool-headedness in the eyes of my friends; and
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111 this will be still more true if, when my neighbor refrains
?
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from attacking me, I conclude that this is because I have
been shaking my fist at him so strenuously and then decide
that I had better go on shaking it or even shake it still
more strenuously.*
b. The Dangers Posed
As already indicated, even if satellite-building is
not an operative aim of the contemporary Soviet foreign policy,
this does not exclude the possibility that the policy will
indirectly foster the appearance in the world of new "people's
democracies." Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two
different ways in which this might come about within the frame
of present Soviet foreign policy: (1) The marginal case of
Soviet influence-building; and (2) independent political
success by foreign Communist parties.
By the marginal case of Soviet influence-building is
meant a situation in which the Soviet quest for influence in
a foreign state is so successful that conditions locally
The statements made here are in no way meant to suggest
that the West can afford to abandon its deterrence
posture via-'a-vis Russia. They merely raise the question
of the political uses of the deterrence posture.
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ripen for the self-transformation of the given foreign regime
into a regime of the "people's democratic" type. The most
obvious present candidate for such a role is Syria. This
would represent a new pattern of political development, a
pattern which might be described as self-satellization. The
force critically responsible for the outcome would not be
the Soviet Union, which would merely-be helping the process
along by such means as political collaboration, arms supplies,
propaganda activities, economic assistance, etc. But the
local radical political grouping, which might not at first be
Communist in complexion but rather extreme nationalist, would
be the active fulcrum; that is why "self-satellization" is
the only proper designation for this marginal case in which
Soviet influence leads to the appearance of a new "people's
democracy." A local Communist movement is a prerequisite for
the culminating phase in the marginal case.
Alternatively, the appearance of a new "people's
democracy" might result from independent Communist action and
success in the political struggle in certain states. This
pattern would differ from the one just analyzed in that the
regime in power would not itself undergo transformation into
some sort of Communist or quasi-Communist regime. On the
contrary, it would be displaced by a government formed by
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the native Communist Party, as the National Congress provincial
government in the Indian state of Kerala has been replaced very
recently by a Communist Party provincial government. This
broad pattern, let us note, is not only countenanced by con-
temporary Soviet foreign policy, it is specifically and
publicly endorsed as a political line. The line was laid down
at the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February,
1956. It is the line on a "peaceful" or "parliamentary" path
to communism. The essence of the idea is that Communism
should achieve political victory in certain countries, as
distinguished from seizure of power by subversive-conspira-
torial means and/or armed aggression. It is true that the
Czechoslovak case was cited as an example of a political
victory of a Communist Party, whereas in fact that was a
clear case of Soviet aggression. But this should not lead us
to conclude that the new line is meant as a pure hoax. It
quite clearly states that the local Communist Party's aim
would be to revolutionize the state. It disdains to conceal
the aim of transformation of the society in which the
Communist Party may come to power. It is, in this aspect,
much closer to Marx's Communist Manifesto than the Party line
through large parts of the Stalin period of Soviet history.
It differs from the Manifesto only as regards the means of
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gaining power. Instead of a grandiose class war, there will
take place, it supposes, a more or less conventional political
struggle in the c9urse of which the Communist Party will ac-
quire a dominant role or something close to it in the political
life of the country concerned. Pretty obviously, what this
line has in mind is the pattern of political life prevailing
in newly independent countries where no stable constitutional
order has as yet evolved.
The birth of new "people's democracies" means further
Aggrandizement of the existing Soviet bloc, and this is a
danger for the United States inasmuch as its comprehensive
security interest cannot but suffer as a consequence.
Aggrandizement of the Soviet or Sino-Soviet bloc is a danger
to the United States in the broadest sense simply because it
signifies an expansion of the sphere of the world unfriendly
to America. Among the more specific adverse consequences to
U.S. security in both senses, one might mention (1) the loss
of strategic positions, or,alternatively, the gain by Russia
of strategic positions which it does not now have; (2) the
contraction of the political, economic and cultural world zone
which forms the medium for the present functioning of American
society and, conversely, the expansion of Russia's world zone,
signifying greater security for the Soviet type of society
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and less for the American type. Further, in the event that a
single country goes "people's democratic" in any key area of
the world, this would possibly lead to a political chain
reaction of similar events elsewhere. For example, if
influential India took this path, a number of countries in
the orbit of Indian influence might do so likewise.
c. How Real is This Danger?
It follows from what has been said earlier in the
present section that the question regarding the reality of
the danger of the birth of new "people's democracies" is not
primarily a question for the Russian specialist. If this
danger materializes anywhere within the contemporary terms of
reference of Soviet foreign policy, the decisive forces for
the change will be forces native to the country in which it
occurs. On a rough estimate, one might suggest that the
danger is scarcely real at all in Europe or, more broadly,
the zone of NATO. The danger of aggrandizement of the Soviet
bloc through the process of influence-building carried to an
extreme is at this time greatest in those countries of the
Arab world where a radical intelligentsia infected with a
malignant nationalism is on the political make. The danger
1110 of aggrandizement of the Soviet bloc through local conquest
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411 of power by Communist Parties fighting in the political arena
?
is probably greatest in certain countries of free Asia, parti-
ticularly Indonesia.
A further question arises: Under what conditions might the
danger, if not now real, become so? Here it might be suggested
that one such condition would be the collapse of the contemporary
structure of Soviet foreign policy, i.e., the structure which
is governed by the concept of Soviet influence-building. For
in these circumstances, Russia might possibly decide to cut its
losses by taking over in an aggressive way any areas in which
it had gained a good foothold in the period of influence-
building (e.g., Afghanistan).
4. The Moral-Political Isolation of America
a. The Policy Pattern
To promote the intensification and spread of anti-
Westernism in general and anti-Americanism in particular is
one of the principal concerns of contemporary Soviet foreign
policy. The underlying purpose is to achieve the moral-
political isolation of Russia's principal opponents, meaning,
in particular, the core of the Atlantic community -- the
United States, Britain and France -- and, within this circle,
especially the United States as the keystone of the Western
system of political relations.
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This policy is very closely interwoven with the two main
strands of Soviet foreign policy already considered. The
policy of neutralization aims to displace Western and chiefly
American military power from the great Eurasian belt of
countries which envelop the Soviet bloc to the east, south,
southwest, west, and northwest. The expansionism of influence
seeks to fill the resulting power vacuum with Soviet political
influence, bringing key parts of the great middle zone into a
relationship of greater and greater dependency upon the Soviet
bloc. The policy of moral-political isolation serves, and in
turn is served by, these two Soviet policies. It is the third
major element in the structure of contemporary Soviet foreign
policy conceived as a policy of political encroachment.
As in the cases of the former two policies, deliberate
Soviet quiescence, meaning abstention from aggressive behavior
against middle countries, is crucial to the policy pattern.
The policy is based on Russia's not doing certain kinds of
things, specifically many kinds of things that Stalinist
Russia was doing in Stalin's last years. This tends to
relieve fears of Russia and its intentions which, in turn,
for long had the effect of holding divisive forces within the
non-Soviet world more or less in check. It unleashes these
forces to do the work which they would naturally tend to do.
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Insofar as they are forces of an anti-Western and/or anti-
American bent (e.g., anti-colonial sentiment, Asian neutral-
ism, Arab nationalism, anti-capitalism, pacifism, etc.), the
Russians can and do calculate that, if left to themselves and
discreetly encouraged, they may in certain circumstances work
to Russia's advantage, assist it to achieve its aims in
foreign policy.
The pursuit of this Soviet policy line is one of the
principal functions of contemporary Soviet propaganda.
Political action plus calculated inaction -- is brought in-
to play to further the moral-political isolation of Russia's
principal opponents: For example, action along various lines
to identify Russia with the aspirations of Arab nationalism
against the West and Israel; action to identify Russia with
Asian neutralism in the person of India against Western-
oriented Pakistan; action to identify Russia with all the
anti-Western forces in the former colonial nations; actions of
various kinds, primarily in the sphere of propaganda, to
identify Russia with those forces of Asian and European opinion
which aspire to international tranquility and an end of the
cold war, isolating America as the one great power whose
policy motto sometimes seems to be "The cold war forever";
action to identify Russia with the trend of world opinion
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which is horrified at the whole idea of nuclear war, isolating
America in this respect; action to identify Russia in the
U.N. with the increasingly influential Arab-Afro-Asian bloc
against the West and America, eand so forth.
b. The Dangers Posed
From the standpoint of the philosophy of American
foreign policy enunciated earlier, it is a basic concern of
the United States to keep the international environment as
friendly as possible, for a more friendly world is, other
things equal, a more secure world for America and its kind
of society. The Soviet policy pattern here under consideration
strikes straight against this U.S. aim; it is dedicated to
making the world a more hostile setting for America, a less
friendly world. The danger posed is a serious one even though
the contingencies involved may be of a rather intangible kind.
In the end, no asset of U.S. foreign policy is of greater
importance than the moral capital of America in international
affairs. By "moral capital" is meant the fact that America
has traditionally been held by many other nations in trust,
affection and respect. Since this happened long before anyone
thought of organizing a U.S. government propaganda service, it
is obviously not something built by propaganda. It was not
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created primarily by talking but by beins -- being liberal,
being charitable, being trustworthy, being tolerant, being
free, being peaceful in aim and temper, being interesting as
a country. Just as only America herself could ever have built
up this moral capital, it is only America herself who could
dissipate it. No unfriendly force, such as the Foreign Office
in Moscow, could ever do this. But the unfriendly force could
lend an effective helping hand in the process of dissipation
if America herself were moving in that direction. In short,
Russia cannot achieve the moral-political isolation of America;
but it can exacerbate the situation if America is engaged in
her own moral-political self-isolation.
5. The Preservation of the Soviet Empire
a. The Policy Pattern
The present analysis views the dangers latent in
contemporary Soviet foreign policy as being, in the first
instance, dangers of Soviet political encroachment on the
interests of the non-Soviet world, of which the United States
is the leading power. "Encroachment," as already mentioned,
implies in its broadest sense the idea of trespassing, of
going beyond natural or normal limits. A policy of encrolh-
ment is, then, typically an outgoing, forward, active foreign
policy, one which concerns itself to alter the status quo.
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Now, however, we come to a vitally important element of
contemporary Soviet foreign policy which is stand-pat and
protective, concerned to maintain a status quo, to keep things
as they are. This is the policy of preserving intact the
existing Soviet empire, of keeping the international positions
which the Soviet Union acquired during its Stalinist empire-
building phase in the aftermath of World War II. Whatever
changes it would make in the technique of imperial rule, in
the mode of relationships with the countries absorbed into
this empire, the post-Stalin regime, and especially under
Khrushchev, has made perfectly plain its determination not
to preside over the liquidation of the new Russian empire.
The repression of the Hungarian revolution was only the most
brutal act of dramatization of this.
Thus, we are confronted with a contrast between those
aspects of Soviet foreign policy, reviewed above, in which it
seeks to alter a present political status quo in the world,
and the aspect now under consideration, in which it seeks to
preserve a status quo. However, it is quite legitimate to
consider this later aspect too under the general heading of
Soviet encroachment. For these very international positions
which the present policy would freeze and perpetuate are
products of Soviet encroachment in the past. The present
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policy is one of stabilization of a system of Soviet encroach-
ments on the external world which created, in sum, a satellite
empire for Russia.
An empire, in the broadest sense, is a system of inter-
national relations in which one state maintains hegemony over
others through force, or the threat of it, pressure of various
kinds, and the attempt to keep the other countries of the
system in a condition of dependency. The Soviet empire is
such a system of international relations today despite the
relaxation of some Stalinist controls. The post-Stalin
regime has been very anxious to advertise this relaxation as
a transformation of the nature of the imperial system. It has
wanted to make it appear that the system has ceased being im-
perial in character. This, for example, was the intent of
the phrase "commonwealth of socialist nations" which was used
in the state document issued in Moscow during the troublous
days of November, 1956. It is also the intent of the phrase
"world system of socialist states," which was introduced into
Soviet currency at the XX Party Congress in February, 1956.
But contrary to the implication of these phrases, the system
of intra-bloc relations remains broadly imperial in nature,
and it is set Soviet policy to keep it that way. Further,
the policy envisages no retreat from present territorial
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positions. The system is to continue to prevail over all
territory where the writ of "people's democracy" runs today.
This includes the East German "democratic republic," as well
as North Korea and North Viet-Nam, three Soviet-dominated
parts of partitioned countries. In the case of Gomulka's
Poland, Moscow is prepared to admit a degree of autonomy
within a frame of acceptance of Russia's imperial hegemony.
However, this is a grudging concession, and it is not Soviet
policy to encourage other Soviet dependencies in Eastern
Europe to go Poland's way.
Among the many motives behind this Soviet policy, special
emphasis must fall upon the security motive. The determination
of the post-Stalin regime to preserve the existing empire is
governed in large part by fear for Soviet security in event
of its recession. Here the distinction between the two
aspects of security must be recalled. Both aspects are in-
volved in the Soviet motivation. The existing system of
territorial positions abroad, which receives its military
expression on the European side in the Warsaw treaty organi-
zation and on the Asian side in the Sino-Soviet military
alliance, is a large and important forward protective zone
from the Soviet military standpoint. It gives Russia, for
the first time in the Soviet period, a buffer sphere in both
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Europe and Asia, and a dominating military position on the
European continent. These facts must be taken into consider-
ation in assessing the political position of the Soviet
military professionals. They will tend to give their support
to the political element which commits itself most seriously
to the preservation of the existing Soviet military positions
abroad.
But important as the motive of strategic security is in
the calculations of the Soviet regime and its military leader-
ship, the motive of political security probably comes first
with the ruling circle. In the first place, not even a ground
defense in great depth in Europe and Asia gives the Soviet
Union true military security in the nuclear age. However,
from the purely political point of view, preservation of the
existing structure of empire is dictated by the most urgent
considerations of survival of Soviet rule. The loss of the
empire would be the loss of the Soviet ideology, and with
that would go the regime's whole claim to continued existence
inside Russia. It would be the loss of the ideology because
it would show the Soviet type of state structure to be not the
IIprogressive" next stage of human history but just one more
anti-democratic form of political existence, which a people
will get rid of whem it has the chance. This, as the men in
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the Kremlin know, is death to their regime. The motive of
political security of the Soviet structure at home dictates
the preservation at all cost of the Soviet empire abroad.
The failure to distinguish between the two aspects of
the security motive underlies much Western confusion in regard
to Soviet policy. It has been supposed by many Western ob-
servers that if the West could only devise some way to guarantee
Russia's military security in the wake of a Russian withdrawal
from Eastern Europe, the Kremlin would then have no great
objection to such withdrawal. This is the outcome of attempting
to analyze Soviet motivation in terms of "security" without
distinguishing between its two aspects. The weakness of the
argument is immediately visible when this distinction is drawn.
For then we see that while Russian strategic security might
conceivably be served, or at any rate not seriously undermined,
by some arrangements alternative to the existing ones in
Eastern Europe, the political security of the Soviet regime
would be incompatible with the collapse of the imperial
structure. However, since the Soviet leaders cannot for
political reasons afford to admit this openly, they naturally
tend to stress for public consumption the aspect of strategic
security. This further reinforces the tendencies of Western
analysis to go astray in the problem.
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b. Situation of the Soviet Empire
Contemporary Soviet foreign policy, as argued above,
eschews further empire-building in favor of influence-building,
but would protect the existing imperial status quo. The Soviet
Government takes the position that the empire ("world system of
socialist states") is a fait accompli of universal history which
must be respected as such by all/nations, and that any improve-
ment of East-West relations take place, if it takes place at
all, within the framework of recognition by all concerned of
history's works. This was dramatized by the calculated refusal
of Khrushchev and Bulganin to discuss the "satellite question"
at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. It is reflected in
the current (January, 1958) Soviet slogan of mutual recognition
of the "status quo," what the slogan has in mind is primarily
Western recognition of the Soviet status quo on Eastern Europe
and Asia. The Soviet Government denies that there is anything
contingent about the further status of its empire except
insofar as the Soviet Union itself may take the initiative in
easing certain imperial controls or otherwise altering the
techniques of empire.
The security of the non-Soviet world was endangered in
many ways by the formation of the Soviet empire, and while the
empire may be a fait accompli the United States and the other
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Western powers have never been willing to reconcile themselves
to the idea that this fait is forever accompli. It would, of
course, be naive of Western or any other statesmen to suppose
that a strong Russian state could ever, or should ever, be
isolated from adjacent areas of the world. Eastern Europe, in
particular, has long been regarded by many as a natural Russian
IIspecial-interest" area, in the affairs of which Russia has as
much right to a. role of leadership as the United States has,
for example, in the Western hemisphere. But an empire con-
sisting of imposed regimes resting on force is another matter.
The formation of this empire (1) greatly increased the mili-
tary strategic threat posed by Russia to the West, by estab-
lishing it in forward military positions; (2) placed free
countries adjacent to the empire, such as Greece and Turkey
for example, in jeopardy; (3) led to the political-territorial
partition of Germany and Korea, transforming both countries
into areas of international tension and potential world
conflict; and (4) buttressed the political security of the
Soviet regime in Russia in a number of important ways, inter
alia by reinforcing the ideological myth on which, ultimately,
the Soviet regime in Russia rests. These were the principal
dangers which materialized as a result of the formation of
the Soviet empire. And even though the empire-building phase
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of postwar Russian foreign policy may now have ceased, the
existence of the empire remains inevitably a source of very
deep concern to the West and the United States as well as to
the satellite peoples themselves and other small countries in
the vicinity of Russia and China.
At this time, moreover, the development of events has
shown that the status of the Soviet empire is far more
"contingent" than Moscow will officially admit, and this quite
apart from what the United States or other Western powers may
do about it. The condition of the empire is unstable, as
even Moscow obliquely confesses when its Party journal
411 Kommunist says that the watchword of present policy is
?
"consolidation of socialist countries."* (Italics added.)
Both at the level of the regimes in power in some countries of
the empire and among the populations, there are at work today
centrifugal forces. As Hungary and Poland have shown, when
the forces above and the forces below come together, the
consequences can be history-making. In Hungary, the result
was a national insurrection, which Russia suppressed by force
of arms. In Poland, it was the formation of a semi-autonomous
Communist regime.
Kommunist, No. 5, April, 1957, p. 15.
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Inasmuch as it may be within the capability of the United
States to exert a certain influence over further developments
along these various lines in the Soviet empire, not only by
what it says and does but by what it refrains from saying and
doing, it is important to see what they mean, that is, how
they affect our foreign-policy interests as defined earlier
in this study. Let us now try to evaluate the situation in
these terms.
We may start with the simple fact that a condition of
instability now infects the Soviet imperial system, and that
centrifugal forces are at work within it. A new element of
contingency has now entered into the situation. However,
there are at present very close limitations on this contingency.
It would be useless, for example, to bank on a cataclysmic
collapse of the Soviet empire. For there are no indications
that such a turn of events is within the realm of realistic
possibility. By its action in Hungary, in particular, the
Soviet regime served notice of its willingness and deter-
mination to use overwhelming force to prevent the revolutionary
collapse of a satellite regime and the emergence of a free
political system on its ruins, as would have happened in
revolutionary Hungary. There is no reason to doubt that the
411 Soviet regime has both the capability and intention to
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suppress any future national insurrections in countries of the
empire. Thus, the realistic prospect in the empire is not a
prospect of collapse or cataclysm but rather of continued
sub-surface instability in the system of relations and
conceivably of further developments elsewhere along the Polish
line. It is also possible that the Hungarian situation will
repeat itself elsewhere, but if this should happen the out-
come is not likely to differ from the Outcome in Hungary.
These, at any rate, are our assumptions.
c. Implications of the Situation in the Empire
The simple fact that a condition of instability in-
fects the Soviet imperial system is highly consequential. The
implications may conveniently be assessed under three headings,
as follows.
(1) Implications for Soviet Empire-Building
The instability in the imperial system is not calcu-
lated to whet Muscovite appetite for further empire-building
in the near future. In a period when "consolidation of
socialist countries" meaning consolidation of the imperial
system -- is the watchword of Soviet policy, when Russia is
hard put to preserve the political status quo on a satisfactory
basis, the Soviet leadership is unlikely to be seriously con-
cerned to add to its imperial holdings. Further, some aspects
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of the situation are such that Moscow might have reason to
fear that the addition of more new "people's democracies"
might add to its own imperial political problems. Who could
tell, for example, whether a "people's democratic" Italy under
abgliatti might not tend to gravitate more in the direction
of Belgrade and/or Warsaw, thus strengthening intra-imperial
tendencies which give Moscow much concern?
Generalizing, we may say that imperial instability of the
kind which has become evident inside the Soviet bloc is calcu-
lated, on the whole, to reinforce Soviet quiescence in the
field of further empire-building. This in itself reduces the
danger presented by Soviet Russia to Western and specifically
to American security. It is a plus in the foreign-policy
balance sheet.
However, it is extremely important not to overestimate
this factor. The contemporary Soviet abandonment of an active
empire-building policy (in favor of the influence-building
policy) has to be seen and explained in the context of the
whole structure of present post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy,
as analyzed earlier. It should be pointed out in this con-
nection that the shift of pattern in foreign policy took place
rather well in advance of the recent manifestations of
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imperial instability. The latter, then, are correctly diagnosed
as a factor which simply reinforces a definite pre-existing
tendency of Soviet foreign policy to refrain from further
empire-building on the pattern of the period of years immediately
following World War II. It is important to stress this point
because otherwise it might be inferred that we should foment
further instability in the Soviet empire in order to dissuade
Moscow from returning to the empire-building policy. Whether
or not we should do this, it is probably not by any means a
necessary precondition of restraining Russia from the quest
for new satellites. The principle of economy of effort in
foreign policy requires emphasis of this point.
(2) Implications for Soviet Foreign-Policy Successes
The present situation inside the Soviet empire is, for a
number of reasons, not conducive to Soviet success in the pur-
suit of such major elements of foreign policy as those reviewed
above under the heading of the policy of neutralization, the
policy of influence, and the policy of moral-political isolation
of America. In other words, the dangers latent in these
policies are less real than they might otherwise be as a
consequence of the conditions now prevailing in the Soviet
empire.
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This point has already been touched upon above and need
not be reconsidered now in detail. Briefly, the new Soviet
foreign.policy requires for its purposes of international
persuasion that the Soviet empire be given a face toward the
external world which would lend some credence to the phrase
"commonwealth of socialist states." But recent events, and
especially the Hungarian ones, dramatized as nothing had ever
done before the essentially imperialistic nature of Soviet
policy within the bloc. It is a question, moreover, whether
in the long range the spectacle of Soviet-Polish relations
may not be more adverse to the prospects for Soviet foreign
policy than even the Hungarian events were. The latter ex-
posed the Soviet state in the role of a brutal counter-
revolutionary force in world affairs -- but only briefly,
followed by the peace of political death in Hungary, whereas
the present situation in Soviet-Polish relations show some
sign of becoming a long-drawn-out drama of Russian imperial
pretensions versus Polish claims to an autonomous position
within the framework of acceptance of Russia as the leading
country of the Eastern bloc. If so, these relations will
continually remind independent countries of the difficulties
and dangers which any small country is likely to encounter
when it comes into the orbit of Soviet political power and
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111 influence. In short, the "immunizing" effect of Hungary was a
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great one-shot affair; the "immunizing" effect of the spectacle
of Soviet-Polish relations may represent a lengthy series of
"booster" shots.
Another significant effect of the new situation in the
empire upon Soviet prospects in foreign policy has to do with
the economic factor. The policy of influence relies heavily
upon the weapon of Soviet foreign economic policy. Soviet
capabilities in the field of capital export and Soviet control
of economic relations within the Eastern bloc govern in signi-
ficant measure the effectiveness of this weapon. Instability
within the empire tends to deplete the economic resources which
Russia has available for an active economic policy abroad in
the non-Soviet world, and to impair the economic controls.
For example, the Gomulka regime has taken steps to place its
economic relations with Russia on a less exploitative basis
than before, and has made certain claims on Russia growing
out of past economic exploitation -- claims likely to have an
educational effect on a number of countries (India, etc.).
Peking has apparently taken advantage of imperial instability
to reassert and press home still more strongly its own claims
to a greater share of Soviet economic resources. The Hungarian
revolution momentarily blotted out the economy of an important
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component of the Eastern European economic complex, with much
resultant damage to Soviet economic plans and expectations.
In all these ways the instability in the empire adversely
affects the economic and political-economic sides of Soviet
foreign policy, helping to neutralize the dangers implicit in
this policy from our standpoint. Here again, incidentally,
the effect of the Hungarian events was probably much less
important over a longer period than the effect of the Polish
developments. For Hungary's economy, once restored, will re-
main a satellite economy, whereas the economic consequences
of Gomulka may go on plaguing Moscow for a long time to come.
One further important consideration has to do with Germany.
The existing condition of instability in Eastern Europe de-
prives Soviet foreign policy of its flexibility so far as
Germany is concerned. The Soviet policy-makers probably
realize down deep that the partition of Germany cannot be a
perpetual fact of international life. Some day, they know, it
will have to come to an end, and it is very much in the interests
of the new active Soviet foreign policy to bring this about at
Soviet initiative and in a way which best conduces to Soviet
interests -- as was done in Austria. In other words, while
the contemporary Soviet foreign policy would preserve existing
Soviet international positions intact, the German position
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constitutes in a certain sense an exception; it can be held
indefinitely, but not perpetually. To relinquish it at the
right time, in the right way, and with maximum benefit and
minimum sacrifice for Soviet Russia, is an interest of
Moscow's German policy.
But the spread of instability in Eastern Europe has
rigidified the German policy. The Eastern German satellite
is sort of stopper of the whole Eastern European imperial
system. The structure of that system could scarcely survive
the removal of the stopper -- at any rate at this time and in
the immediate future. The flinty negativism of the present
Soviet attitude on the reunification of Germany reflects this
fact. And this, of course, is a big liability for Soviet
foreign policy. Not only does it prevent Moscow from using
the German position in a mobile diplomatic offensive. It keeps
the Soviet Union in the damaging position of having to thwart
indefinitely a settlement which is recognized universally as
one of the chief prerequisites of a real and lasting inter-
national detente. The Soviet policies of neutralization,
influence, and moral-political isolation of the West and
America suffer very considerably as a result.
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107.
(3) Military-Strategic Implications
The spread of instability in Russia's Eastern European
empire has a whole series of significant military-strategic
implications from our point of view. They are ambivalent in
relation to the strategic security of America and the West,
meaning that they have their favorable side and their un-
favorable side as well.
Taking the unfavorable side first, it is clear that
imperial instability creates a certain danger of hostilities
which might not otherwise exist; and while these would be
local hostilities within the Russian sphere, there can be no
guarantee in the present state of the world that local hosti-
lities anywhere will remain localized. The campaign of the
Russian army against the revolutionary people of Hungary is
not necessarily the last event of its kind that we are likely
to witness in the coming few years. It was, after all, merely
the most serious of a whole sequence of such events in the
post-Stalin period, beginning with the June 17, 1953 uprising ?
in Eastern Germany, various concentration-camp risings inside
Russia, the riots in Georgia in early 1956, etc. However,
the Hungarian episode does have a peculiar historical signi-
ficance: it cast a die. It made a drastic reform of Soviet
imperial policy much less likely than it might have been
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108.
before. And it made it much more probable that any future
Hungarian situation, whether in Hungary or another satellite,
would be dealt with by the Soviet regime in the same general
way as it dealt with Hungary. In short, having once shown
itself in an openly countei-revolutionary role, it will be
easier for the Soviet regime to do this again if events push
it in that direction.
There is g further danger of Russian diversionary moves
of a military or quasi-military nature. That is, at a time
when world attention is fixed on a Soviet repressive policy in
its empire, Moscow looks for opportunities to divert attention
to other parts of the world. This pattern was visible in
November, 1956, when in the midst of the Hungarian situation
Moscow did everything possible to divert world attention to
the Suez crisis, and in so doing went to the length of
threatening to send Soviet volunteers to Egypt. This is the
pattern, in part, of a diversionary move.
Looking at the situation now from the other point of view,
it is evident that the Soviet offensive potential suffers as a
consequence of instability in Eastern Europe. And this means
that, militarily speaking, the Soviet Union is less dangerous
to the security of the non-Soviet world in general and America
in particular now than before. While it still remains in firm
military control of the Eastern European areas as a whole, the
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situation in the empire very considerably weakens the Soviet
strategic position for waging war against the West from the
place d'armes in Eastern Europe. Stating this in terms of
the broadest kind of a formula, we may say that the satellites
have become, on the whole, a strategic liability to Russia
rather than a strategic asset. The loyalty of their popu-
lations to the existing regimes, and the dependability of their
armies in event of Russo-Western armed hostilities, are more
than questionable, and the Russians, if they were in doubt about
this before, cannot be any longer. The situation now is that
we have in Eastern Europe not so many Russian divisions plus
so many satellite divisions, but rather minus. For in event
of Russo-Western armed hostilities, Russian divisions would
have to be used to hold down the satellite nations and their
armies.
It is questionable whether, from this point of view,
Hungary or Poland represents the greater weakening of the
Soviet strategic posbtion. It might seem superficially that
Hungary does. For there a regime has collapsed, Soviet
military rule was instituted behind a satellite facade, and
Russia is in the position of having to supervise the policing
of a sullen repressed population. Nevertheless, it is probable
that the Polish development represents a more significant
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weakening of the Soviet military position. For there a
Communist regime of a country which is in popular temper both
anti-Soviet and anti-Russian has achieved a measure of inde-
pendence of action. And this country now has an army of
approximately thirty divisions which is potentially an anti-
Soviet fighting force. Hungary has nothing of the kind. It
would probably not be stretching the truth too far to say that
the largest conventional contribution to the military strength
of NATO in event of a Soviet assault on the West is being made,
today, by Poland.
B. The Dangers of Armed Violence
1. The Seriousness of these Dangers
It is scarcely necessary at this time to argue the
view that military conflict situations in East-West relations,
i.e., situations of armed violence involving clashes of
interest if not of actual forces of Russia and the West, pose
most serious dangers to our security as well as that of others.
The worst thing that can befall a nation, after all, is to be
destroyed. Situations of armed violence in the thermonuclear
age carry the ultimate threat -- the threat of national ex-
tinction. The contingency of war rightly arouses far deeper
concern now than ever before, for the stake involved in whether
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or not this contingency materializes may be national or human
survival.
The effect of recent developments in military technology
is to blur the traditionally important distinctions between
victory" and "defeat" in war. If, for example, one were
speaking of the dangers of war in strictly traditional terms,
it would be necessary to start by distinguishing between the
danger of involvement in war and the danger of being defeated
in war. While this distinction is not necessarily devoid of
all meaning today, existing circumstances focus concern to an
unprecedented degree on the contingency of international armed
violence as such. For it is characteristic of international
armed violence that it can spread and grow into a situation of
total war, and in tqtal war today the concept of victory has
become all but meaningless.
Of course, it cannot be taken for granted that total war
will develop out of any future situation of armed violence
which directly or indirectly involves Russia and the West.
It is possible for armed violence to take place without
evolving into total war. Therefore, the concept of "success"
and "failure" in war has not yet lost all meaning. Further,
it cannot be said that any situation of armed violence in
which the interests of East and West are pitted against each
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other must prove an unmitigated evil from our standpoint.
Thus, the Soviet use of armed violence to suppress the
Hungarian revolution had, as noted earlier, certain conse-
quences which might be regarded as favorable from our point
of view: It helped to neutralize dangers of Soviet political
encroachment on the external world.
Despite these qualifications, however, the contingency
of international armed violence, and particularly when the
interests of East and West are involved, is to be regarded as
a serious danger. For it is potentially the beginning of
total war, and total war now means something verging on
humanicide. The many lesser reasons for regarding inter-
national armed violence as a danger to U.S. security may be
disregarded.
The question of the seriousness of the dangers of armed
violence is not, therefore, one which need be considered at
length in what follows. The primary concern here will be
with the question of the reality of these dangers.
2. Soviet Policy and Armed Violence
An effort has been made in the foregoing pages to
examine the dangers presented by contemporary Soviet Russia
in terms of the structure of its foreign policy. The policy
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has been described as one of political encroachment. Various
meanings or forms of "encroachment" have been touched upon.
They involve Soviet attempts to alter the political status quo
in the world. However, this policy of encroachment is not a
policy of territorial aggrandizement by conquest. Therefore,
it is not a policy which is calculated to produce Soviet
initiative in the resort to international armed violence.
In fact, the structure of this foreign policy is such as to
militate strongly against such Soviet initiative. To put it
bluntly, the policies of neutralization, influence, and moral-
political isolation of America tend to inhibit Soviet initiative
in the resort to armed violence.
This important conclusion needs to be qualified as follows:
(1)
Contemporary Soviet foreign policy does not under
all circumstances exclude initiative in the resort to inter-
national armed violence. As indicated earlier, for example,
the Soviet regime will not hesitate to use military force to
suppress a national insurrection on the Hungarian model in one
of the satellite countries.
(2) If contemporary Soviet foreign policy tends to fore-
go the deliberate use of armed force, since it does not now
seek aims which require the use of armed force for their
attainment, this does not mean that it foregoes the threat
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or show of armed force. On the contrary, much emphasis is
placed an the display of Soviet military power and the theme
of Machtpolitik is prominent in Soviet official pronouncements.
These have their logical place in the structure of contemporary
Soviet foreign policy; they serve certain ends which it pur-
sues, such as the neutralization of middle countries.
(3) Although the dangers which this foreign policy poses
are, on the whole, dangers of non-violent Soviet encroachment,
these are not necessarily unrelated to certain dangers of armed
violence. For example, Soviet political encroachment upon the
Middle East was pursued, in part, through the policy of arms
export to Egypt. This aroused intense Israeli fears and, in
the end, precipitated the Israeli invasion of Egypt and the
Suez crisis. Russia did not take the initiative in resorting
to armed violence. But its policy of political encroachment
was, indirectly, a vital precipitating cause of the outbreak
of international armed violence at Suez in November, 1956.
(4) Even though Soviet Russia does not take the
initiative in resorting to armed violence, it may become in-
volved in such violence. What the structure of present Soviet
policy specifically tends to inhibit is not Soviet participation
in armed violence but Soviet initiative in resorting to it.
IIITherefore, the present structure of Soviet foreign policy is
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not incompatible with a more or less militarist Soviet posture
in world affairs. More precisely, the posture is not one of
shrinking at the very idea of international armed violence or
even at Soviet participation in it. The Soviet threat to
dispatch "volunteers" to aid the embattled Nasser is a case
in point.*
It is obvious, therefore, that the dangers of armed
violence still exist as contingencies for American foreign
policy toward Russia. The fact that contemporary Soviet foreign
policy is a policy of political encroachment rather than terri-
torial conquest, that it does not require the use of armed
violence for achievement of its aims, and that the nature of
these political aims indeed tends to inhibit Moscow from taking
the initiative in resorting to armed violence -- all this does
not mean that there is no longer any danger of armed violence
to be considered.
* Those students of Soviet affairs who explain the relative
military quiescence of Russia in the post-Stalin period
exclusively or even primarily as a fear response to
Western (U.S.) deterrence policy have a big problem here.
To put it crudely, their theory explains too much. In
accordance with it, the Russians ought to be much more
quiescent than they have been. They ought to be afraid
not only of initiating armed violence but of countenancing
it or participating in it if it occurs. But they are not.
This problem is not hard to solve, on the other hand, if
we approach it in terms of the altered structure of Soviet
foreign policy as analyzed above.
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The range of imaginable possibilities extends from total
war in the extreme case to various situations of international
armed violence on a local scale. Let us now consider these
contingencies, concentrating on the question of Russia's
role.
3. Dangers of Local Armed Violence
According to the view stated above, the dangers of
local armed violence are now extremely serious in character
because of the possibility that loc.al armed violence may
graduate into total war. If, in other words, we take total
war as the supreme danger confronting us, we have to ask the
question: Under what circumstances might total war occur? One
very important kind of circumstance under which total war might
occur is the circumstance of armed violence on an initially
local scale, in which the interests if not the actual forces
of East and West are pitted against each other. Accordingly,
we must now ask: How real are the dangers of local armed
violence in the sense just defined? In answering the question,
we will focus attention on Russia as the active factor.
First, a general observation. We often hear the argu-
ment at the present time that there is a growing danger of
what is variously called "limited war," "local war" or "small
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war," as distinguished from "total" or "general" war. This
is thought to be in some way a consequence of the advent of
nuclear "mutual deterrence." According to one version of the
argument, total war now has become exceedingly improbable
because of the total danger latent in it, and in this new
situation the danger of limited wars increases. Alternatively
and more concretely, it is argued that the danger of total
war remains more or less constant while, at the same time,
the danger of limited wars has now increased. General Nathan
Twining has succinctly stated this position:
It is not true, however, that the reason for
small wars becoming an increasing threat is
that the other form of conflict -- total war --
has become less of a threat. If anything, the
reverse is true. The threat of limited war
has increased because the Soviets have acquired
a greater capability to wage general war and
can, therefore, undertake a limited aggression
with less fear of total retaliation.*
It is the argument in this latter form which is serious and
requires critical comment:
General Twining's argument assumes a constant Soviet
aggressive intent of a kind which would naturally find
Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations. House of Representatives. Eighty-Fifth
Congress. First Session. Part I. U.S. Government Printing
Office. Washington, 1957, p. 916. (Italics added)
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expression in attempts at territorial aggrandizement by
aggressive means. The development by Russia of a nuclear
counter-deterrent capability leads him then, quite logically,
to infer that Soviet "limited aggressions" are more likely
now than before. The difficulty with this argument lies in
?
the underlying premise on the constancy of Soviet motivation.
The premise projects the Stalinist past into the post-Stalin
present of Soviet foreign policy. If, however, the
conception of the new structure of contemporary Soviet foreign
policy developed earlier in this study is a correct one, then
this premise is faulty and we are led to the conclusion that
the danger of small wars growing out of direct or indirect
Soviet aggression on a local scale has probably decreased now,
not increased. This is not to say, however, that it has
vanished. Nor, of course, are deliberate Soviet or Soviet-
engineered local armed aggressions the only source of future
international conflicts on a local scale. Moreover, as will
be argued below, the new Soviet policy structure has its own
new kind of potentiality of sowing the seeds of international
violence.
We may now proceed to consider a number of concrete
possible
contingencies of international armed violence on
a local scale for which Soviet Russia might be directly or
indirectly responsible.
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a. Soviet Aggressions by Proxy
This is the case which General Twining's argument
has in mind ("indirect aggression and local seizures of power
by other Communist 'forces"). The classic instance is the
Soviet aggression by proxy in Korea.
As just suggested, the danger of such Soviet aggressions
has decreased in the post-Stalin period despite the fact that
during this time the Soviet capability of waging general war
has immensely progressed. Such actions were an integral part
of the late Stalinist pattern of Soviet foreign policy. They
do not, however, belong in any integral way to the new post-
Stalin configuration as analyzed here, but, on the contrary,
tend to be excluded or at least inhibited by it. A Soviet
aggression by proxy -- such as a resumption of the Korean
conflict, for example -- would directly conflict with the
requirements of the new foreign policy of political encroach-
ment. So long as this foreign policy remains in force, Soviet
limited aggressions or aggressions by proxy are exceedingly
improbable.
The danger cannot, on the other hand, be dismissed as
wholly unreal. If, for example, the new structure of Soviet
foreign policy were to crumble and collapse as a result of
internal changes at the seat of Soviet power, the danger of
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aggressions by proxy might become a real one in certain places,
such as places in which the policy of influence had established
a foothold for Soviet Russia (Afghanistan, Syria, etc.). How-
ever, the collapse of the new structure of foreign policy does
not seem likely at this time. Nor is it at all certain that
a reversion to the late Stalinist pattern in respect of
limited aggressions would result if the new structure did
collapse.
The danger of limited aggressions of a direct kind, i.e.,
with the use of Soviet armed forces, is still less than the
danger of aggressions by proxy.
b. Soviet Instigation of Armed Violence
As had been noted above, the contemporary policy of
Soviet political encroachment can, wittingly or unwittingly
on the part of the Soviet policy-makers, lead to the outbreak
of international armed violence. The politics of alteration
of the political status quo in the non-Soviet world are fraught
with potentialities of international mischief. When a great
power sets out to make trouble for opposing great powers in
such areas of the world as Southeast Asia and the Middle
East, where animosities are rife and the equilibrium of
political relationships is exceedingly delicate, anything can
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happen. When it starts to use the export of arms as a chief
instrument of this policy, the possibilities of violent
ddnouements multiply. This Soviet policy was, as already
noted, critically responsible for precipitating the Suez
crisis. By upsetting or threatening to upset a quasi-
equilibrium between two hostile forces, Arab nationalism on
the one hand and the state of Israel on the other, Moscow
precipitated international armed violence. The same basic
pattern of Soviet action is visible in offers of Soviet arms
to India, which is embroiled in political conflict with
Pakistan over Kashmir, and to Afghanistan, which has grievances
against Pakistan.
The question may be raised whether the Soviet policy is
one of deliberate instigation of international armed violence.
There is some reason to doubt that it is. For example, some
evidence exists in support of the view that it was not Moscow's
intention to foment an Arab-Israeli war by the arms shipments
to Nasser, but merely to aggravate the situation in the Middle
East and to promote the policies of neutralization, influence,
and moral-political isolation of the West and America. But
the question of deliberateness is not crucial. The fact is
that the Soviet Government took a course of action which
objectively instigated the outbreak of international armed
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violence in the Middle East. It did so in full knowledge of
the delicate state of the equilibrium of forces in that region.
It necessarily was aware of the explosive potentialities of
its policy of arms export. Hence we may conclude that the
Soviet Government was at the very least fully prepared to
accept these risks and these potentialities. It was not
deterred by the thought that armed violence might result.
This is the most important fact of the situation. Contemporary
Soviet foreign policy is not afraid of taking action of a
political nature which is capable of indirectly instigating
international armed violence.
This is not only a serious danger. It is, to a very
considerable degree, a new one. It is a source of potential
armed violence which belongs to the pattern of the new Soviet
foreign policy but did not belong to the pattern of its
Stalinist predecessor.
c. Soviet Military Intervention
Another danger of armed violence which may flow from
the new structure of Soviet foreign policy is the danger of
Soviet military intervention in conflict situations abroad.
By "military interventions" are meant armed actions undertaken
at the decision of the Soviet Government by men officially
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classed as "volunteers." These would be undertaken only in
international conflict situations in which the Soviet inter-
vention would be regarded in wide sections of world opinion as
action undertaken in a "rightful cause." It is specifically
this fact which explains why such military interventions are
not inhibited by the new structure of foreign policy to the
extent that Soviet aggressions by proxy are. In other words,
the type of actions under consideration here would bear a real
character of military interventions as distinguished from
planned acts of aggression. A recent instance, which did
not, however, go beyond the threat of intervention, was the
IIIofficially sponsored organization of Soviet "volunteers" to go
to the aid of Nasser during the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion.
Thus, this danger is, as it were, a complement of the danger
of Soviet instigation of armed violence through political
action abroad. Once Soviet foreign policy has precipitated a
situation of armed violence in international affairs, there is
the further danger that Soviet military intervention will
aggravate the situation. This is an extremely serious danger
in that it always involves a possibility that the United States
will be forced to intervene on its own to redress the balance.
A further kind of international situation involving a
IIIdanger of Soviet military intervention must be mentioned as
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at least an outside possibility. This is the case of Soviet
military assistance to a Communist or Communist-dominated
foreign regime which has come to power by more or less non-
violent means but finds itself threatened by violent overthrow.
Here again we are dealing with a type of situation which would
be distinctly novel, a situation associated with the new
structure of Soviet foreign policy. Under the Stalinist policy,
the danger was always a danger of armed violence to install a
puppet regime in power. Under the new policy, this danger
greatly recedes. But under the new dispenation, as argued
earlier, foreign Communist Parties have obtained some small
measure of autonomy, and for this and a number of other re-
. lated reasons may become more formidable as a political force
in their countries than before. This is encouraged by the
new Soviet foreign policy, which visualizes Communist govern-
ments coming to power by a "parliamentary path," i.e., through
more or less non-violent political struggle in the arena of
national life. As has also been suggested earlier, we cannot
rule out all possibility of success for this course, especially
in certain non-European countries (Indonesia for example).
This brings us to the danger of Soviet military intervention.
Let us suppose that a Communist or Communist-dominated coalition
regime cane to power in an Asian country, unassisted by Russia.
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It is quite possible or probable that this would lead to in-
ternal strife in the country concerned, in the midst of which
the new regime might appeal to Moscow for help to remain in
power as the legitimate government. In these circumstances,
which are improbable perhaps but by no means inconceivable,
there is a very real danger that the Soviet Government would
respond with military assistance, including perhaps an expe-
ditionary force of Soviet "volunteers."
d. Soviet Suppression of Satellite Revolts
Soviet military action to suppress a national rising
411 in a satellite country, such as that which occurred in Hungary,
might be classed under the heading of a military inter-
vention. However, in the case of Hungary there was no question
of Soviet "volunteers." It was an official military action by
the Soviet army. This and similar possible actions in the
future deserve to be listed under a separate heading.
It follows from what has been said above (Section II-A-
5-a) that the Soviet Government will not stop short of em-
ploying its armed forces to suppress revolts of satellite
populations which threaten to unseat the local regime and take
the country concerned out of the imperial system. Further,
the action in Hungary meant a burning of Soviet bridges. If
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there was any soul-searching in high places in Moscow last
November in the face of the prospect of going before the world
as an openly counter-revolutionary force, there is likely to
be less in event of a repetition of that situation or something
bordering on it.
Whether armed violence breaks out again on a major scale
in the Soviet empire depends, then, on circumstances in the sub-
ject countries themselves. This danger may not be very real at
the present time, but it cannot be dismissed from consideration.
4. The Danger of General War
In conclusion, we must consider briefly the supreme
danger -- the danger of general or total war in which the two
military superpowers, the United States and Russia, and
antagonists. The fact that this is the supreme danger scarcely
needs stressing. Such a war would not only threaten the ex-
tinction of contemporary urban civilization in the chief
warring countries. It rqight lead, through genetic and other
after-effects of the use of nuclear weapons on a very large
scale, to the extinction of human civilization, to humanicide.
This is the war in which "victory" has become meaningless,
the war which nobody wins.
Many have discerned in this fact a possible guarantee that
such a war will not occur. "Mutual deterrence," it is thought,
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will bar the way to that catastrophe. A more realistic view,
it seems to me, is that expressed by General Twining in his
testimony which was cited above:
It is sometimes said that a total war waged
with modern weapons of mass destruction would
be mutual suicide, and that, therefore, this
kind of war has abolished itself. I think this
is a dangerous fallacy. We must recognize the
fact that total war is no less a potential
threat today, when both sides possess atomic
weapons, than it was several years ago when
we alone had them.*
As General Twining rightly says, it is a fallacy to suppose
that total war has abolished itself just because its conse-
quences would be so predictably catastrophic. It might just
111 as well turn out the other way -- that man abolishes himself
by total war. Other species have undergone extinction. Why
not man? There is no guarantee against it.
a. The Soviet Position
Soviet official thinking in the contemporary period
does not appear to be committed to the notion of general war
as either a desirable or an unavoidable ddnouement of the ex-
isting international situation. Further, the present Soviet
regime is extremely unlikely to initiate general war as a
Ibid.
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deliberate act of policy or, alternatively, to take aggressive
military actions of great consequence, such as an aggression
against Western Europe, which would probably provoke a general
war.
It is not the public pronouncements of the Soviet leaders
which underly this judgment. It would be possible, of course,
to cite those as collateral evidence. One could cite, in
particular, various recent public statements to the effect that
wars are not inevitable any more, and other expressions which
seem to reflect an awareness in high Soviet circles that nu-
clear war would be catastrophic in its consequences for Russia.
But one cannot construct a good judgment out of these public
statements. The proper basis for assessment of the Soviet
position in relation to general war is an analysis of the
actual structure of contemporary Soviet foreign policy. For
such an analysis, if it is valid, tells you what the regime
concerned is factually endeavoring to achieve in international
politics. And the orientation of any regime toward war, in-
cluding general war, is primarily a function of this, i.e.,
of its operative foreign policy, rather than of the general
principles which it publicly espouses.
The operative terms of reference of contemporary Soviet
foreign policy are such that the only type of situation in
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which the Soviet Government is likely to initiate armed violence
with the use of its own forces is one which threatens the loss
of an important imperial position. The foreign policy of politi-
cal encroachment not only does not require the resort to armed
violence as a means of pursuit of its operative ends; it
actually sets up certain pdsitive inhibitions to the Soviet
use of violence, or, otherwise stated, places a premium on
Soviet military quiescence. On the other hand, the operative
Soviet foreign policy may be productive of international armed
violence of a different kind than that involved in Soviet
aggressions or aggressions by proxy -- a point which has been
stressed above. Thus, the Soviet policy, while not a policy
of military aggression, also does not shrink at situations of
violence. It is not a policy governed by anxiety lest guns
go off somewhere. It boldly seeks to reshape an international
political status coo, confident that Soviet military power
affords ample protection in case, as has happened at Suez and
only too easily might happen again, delicate political equili-
briums are upset with violent consequences.
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b. The Concept of Ordered Security
The conclusion which emerges from the previous
section is that general war is neither inevitable nor
even probable, but that it is possible, and that "mutual
deterrence" is no certain preventive. The ultimate danger
is, therefore, a real danger. The essence of the philosophy
of peace through mutual deterrence is the idea of an
automatic equilibrium system. There has never in the
world been an automatic equilibrium system which is not
capable of breaking down in certain circumstances, and
there certainly never will be. The equilibrium system
involved in mutual deterrence can break down too. In
fact, it is much more likely than most such systems to
break down because of the extreme delicacy of many of
the factors and forces and relations involved.
The circumstances in which mutual deterrence may break
down are numerous. The type of situation in which general
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war would be most likely to start despite mutual-deterrence
mechanisms is one in which international armed violence is in
progress on a limited scale and the vital interests of the
powers on both sides, East and West, are engaged in the outcome.
Such situations, as this study has emphasized, are by no means
excluded from the standpoint of the foreign policy which the
Soviet Union is following at the present time.
If the danger of general war remains a real one despite
the situation of mutual deterrence what conditions would have
to be met in order to reduce further if not eliminate this
danger? In simplified terms, the requisite would be a system
of what might be called "ordered security." By this it is meant
that the prevention of general war would not be left to any
automatic equilibrium system but would be sought further
through the conscious, purposeful organizing of the conditions
of peace, aimed at what might be described as the "elimination
of accidents." Negotiations recently in progress between East
and West on the subject of mutual inspection systems to pre-
vent surprise attacks may be mentioned as an illustration
of what the concept of ordered security means.
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c. The Political Implications of Ordered Security
A certain broad image of the world and of the role
of U.S. foreign policy in this world has been developed in
the present study. According to this image, there is an un-
friendly sphere of the world dominated by Soviet Russia. This
is the primary fact of the world situation as confronted by
the United States. The foreign policy of the United States is
motivated by a concern for security, meaning both strategic
security and the security of the American democracy as a way
of life. This concern to be secure in the world dictates a
derivative concern for the security of those countries which
make up the sphere of the world friendly to America. Such
countries are divided into three broad categories: those
which are simply non-hostile to America, those with which
America has developed working partnerships for specific
mutual purposes, and those with which America has relation-
ships of community.
In accordance with this conception, the problem of U.S.
foreign policy has presented itself all along up to this
point as one of maintaining the security of the United States
and the friendly sphere of the world as against the unfriendly
sphere dominated by our principal opponent, Soviet Russia.
Naturally, such a conception makes no provision for American
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concern for the security of the Soviet Union. On the contrary,
it has been indicated or implied at various points that the
American interest is in conflict with any such concern. Now,
however, as the argument comes to its conclusion, it is
necessary to take a critical view of this presupposition. For
the concept of ordered security transcends our framework as
developed earlier.
The crucial point about the idea of ordered security is
that it implies mutual security on a certain plane as between
East and West. To be more precise, the quest for a system of
ordered security would mean that the security of our opponent,
Soviet Russia, becomes for us a desideratum a means of in-
creasing our own security -- and vice versa. And this, of
course, takes us outside the framework of building security
against the unfriendly sphere. In accordance with the concept
of ordered security, the security of Soviet Russia becomes, in
a certain sense and to a certain degree, our own security
concern, and ours in its turn must become, in a certain sense
and to a certain degree, a Russian security concern. Whether
this is a practicable proposition is not a matter for con-
sideration here. What is under consideration is simply the
implications of the idea of ordered security. On the basis
of what has been said, it now becomes clear that these
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implications are quite far-reaching. They affect the whole
foreign-policy universe. A world of ordered security as be-
tween East and West, even if the concrete ordering of security
is only on a fairly rudimentary plane, becomes a different
universe of foreign policy from the one we have known in the
recent past.
In analyzing these implications, it is essential to ob-
serve the distinction which has been drawn here between the
two aspects of security. The concept of ordered security im-
plies that Soviet security becomes, in a certain sense, our
concern, and vice versa. But what sense? This, of course, will
depend upon the approach adopted. It would be possible to
argue that our concern under a system of ordered security
would be exclusively a concern for the physical or strategic
security of the Soviet Union pr the Soviet sphere, and not for
the security of the Soviet regime and system. If so, we would
have to reckon with the fact that while the Soviet regime is,
as noted earlier, concerned to maintain the physical security
,
of Russia, it is also -- and predominantly -- concerned with
its own security as a regime in power and a system in being.
Accordingly, if it entered into a system of ordered security,
it would wish and strive to do so only in such a way and on
such terms as would, in its own eyes, improve the physical
..
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security of Russia and at the same time the political security
of the Soviet system, meaning not only the political structure
of power inside Russia but the existing imperial system. Our
interest, on the other hand, would be an interest in entering
into a kind of system of ordered security which would make
Russia physically more secure but would not make the Soviet
regime politically more secure. Naturally, this presents a
problem of very great complexity.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/10/25: CIA-RDP81-01043R002300090002-1