OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 178
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 22, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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departure tne
ohose toe line of the glev-4,:oscow Railroad. That is, they took and
12-13 :F.i.:-)otember. an the ,north as v. line of Germans
oeourerk the road -along the swampy Chernigovshchina. On the south,
Oherkesly ond re ichu se.eved as departure points. Here the right,
;h steoo? bank receued far fro the Dnepr and here the Germans made
:'eories. Both point? have railroads running from the west.
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Prm these twc deoarture .points they made two rings: Nezhin-
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?vila-::i-Oher:tassy and .honotop-Romny-Kremenchug. The huge swamp, 112ubeA
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nhict eo:tended in that very sam- dfrection, was left between the rings. 1
Th 1 encircle:gpnt to the south of Kharkov also is very significent.
ied Army began the attack on :fllarkov 20 _ley 2.942 by blows to tie
:lorth a. to -..he south of t'o.c. city. The penetration on the south was
uu,?cese-ul an.1 was (:_evelopei iv th.ri direction of Lozovaya. Due only
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CONFIDENTIAL
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the -k,eep bank of the sforthern.onets; the penetration wao, not
ouocesof-olly w3dene. Two Soviet armies actually penetl'ated into 1.17,e
II pooket and occupicd Lozovaya. Again due only to the steer bank o': the
1 Jo_ctherla Donets, the Germans were a:ole to direct their wedges from the
r ouath and from the north on the oling of the renetration of tbcir
front; oloving by the flank along the front. 'Both Soviet armiee
'o'ind themselves cut off. The ope?..-ation lt4as ended 2-5 -Juno.
The General Gharctexj.stics of,the Ukrainian Tbeatre of allttiA'y
Opqations,
Te:oritorially Wne Ukrainion Theatre of o;ilitary Orprations*in-
(Andes he zone bounded on the north by the southern border of Ioleeya
the lioe Chernigov? Ovrucn, Sarnyo Kovel and further, Lublin, Zadom,
]3reslau)t on the sOuth by the nacthern coast of the Black Sea and the
lirfurther I -1 Im il, Budapest, Vienna; on the east by the meridian
Yharkov, Aariupol; on the west by the line 131%eslauc Brno, Vienna.
The total extent in depth equals approximtely 1500 kilometers,
and the width is from 400 up to 700 kilometers.
According to the Soviet allitar:?, Dist.rict Division, the Ukrainian
Theatre includes the Kiev :alitary District (Headquarters; Kiev), the i
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CONFIDENTIAL
IIGSIDUZATRAI-ZBLE110:1 11 i Lica 04,e.e
Il Geography 513eon Ueeg, "Ukraline
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Odessa ,alitary Diestrict (Odessa), the Tavriz eillitary District
T ISZieferopol), an the lirecarpathian lilitary District (Lvov).
The trkrainiae?Tbee.tre of ;:filitary Operations, in combination with
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'the southern part of the Prebaltic, Eastern Poland, .2astern Austria
E.nd Aungery, in military literature takes the name The Eastern
Zuropean Theatre of Mitary Operations."
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This single Eastern ;Jluropean Theatre of jilitary Operations along
middle and in the center is divided by the thick forest--swamp
20ne of I'olesa into two independent theatres: the White Aussian and
the Ukrainian.
The General Si lificance of the Theatre
A. During Offensive Operations from the ,Last to the Viost
1. The central part of the theatre, rrom the present-day
Soviet-.Polish border and up to the line Zorostin-Vinnitsa, is a region
of concentration and deployment of Soviet troops.
2. Along the Ukrainian Direction lies the shortest to the
central part of he 'Nestern-Zuropean Theatre along the line L7iev-Lvov9
1,:=ague, ]u.rnberg Saarbrucken.
3. Operations in the western direcion IFIed to the s:e.:,evee of
a series of rolitical and economic centers such ast 1,Yakow,torice
the ObenetOkhov?leard coal region, I'rague, and others.
- A, During slowed down' operatione in, the ?ibite 2iussian Theatres
cenditions-are created by a blow on Poznan and 'Berlin so as to attain a
,
deep strategic encirclement of the armies of the adversal.y operatiog
in the White Ruseian Theatre.
5. The armies of the Ukrainian Theatre, with their movement
Pr orward, all more and more overhang the territories of the Ba3kan
1-aninsula : which in the future war will become an independent theatre,
in which the Soviet General Staff will strive for the fixing of its left
flank by way of an attempt at overrunning the Straits,
B. During Offensive Operations from West to 3ast -
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(Crt:raiv:ZionSN:rap)
'SS ID IMIT.AISLATIOn
GU? gra-I.:1/%7f III 1C11 iCOfl Geog? "Ukrai. e"
CONFIDENTIAL
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1. The strategic defense of the east (Soviet) side in the
Ukrainien Theatre guarantees:
a. The possession for itself aid the utilization of the
Ukrainian bread, which in the total bread balance of the US6A holds
one of the first places.
b. The covering of the Powerful metallurgical industry of
the Ukrainian SSR and the Don coal asin; the possesrion of the Drogobych
petroleum region.
2. The penetration of the western armies, even though only to I
the line Sarny-Troekurov? the Prut (it flows into the Danube at the city 1
of Galati) cuts off Romania, Bulgaria, and all the remaining parts of thd
11
Balkan Teninsula from the south-western part of the USSR, which with
the presence of sureriority of Allied air forces in the Black ;ea will
force the Soviet Union to refuse from further active operations in the
Balkans and in inor (Turkish) Asia. (Page 93a)
3. Further penetration, say in tho direction of Lvov, .Kiev and
Xnarkov, cuts the unified Ukrainian 'Zheatre into two parts, placing in
an-isolated situation first the Odessa Region, then the Crimea, which
aetually also took place during the Second ;.orld War.
1 4. penetration to J.;harkov severs almort all routes of comnuni-il
[cation which connect the contra] Dart of the usoa with the southern
pirts.
5. Debouche into the regon of Poltava and 4harkov creates
the prereouisites for the development of bio:ws:
-a in a northeasterly (oloscow) direction.
i b. In an easterly and in a southeasterly direction to the
middle and lower Volga.
c. Debouche into Lhe middle Volga creates the prerequisite
fror a blow to the rear of the aosco (central) region.
The peculiarity of the Ukrainian Theatre of Yiilitary
Is characterized by two circumstances:
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1. The southern flank of the Soviet part of the theatre
nust coordinate closely with naval forces both during an offensive,
lnd also during defenser
In equal measure also the adversaries of the USSR will
obliRed to reinfol;ce the operations of ground troops which are
operating on the shore of the Elack, Sea with the operations of naval
:areas.
. 2. The land part of the whole Ukrainian Theatre, according
its geographic and topographic qualities, is not homogenous. If
up to the line: Przemysle, Stanislav, Chornovtsy, the beret River, the
:ocality permits employment of all types of troops, then further move-
ments are dependent on overcoming the Carpathians. And it is not by
chance thet the troop units of the Precarpathian Zilitary Distrist
consist mainly of mountain-rifle units.
The Soviet General Staff, under present conditions, is in
a more advantageous situation than its probable adversaries.
a. Romania is still a satellite of the USSR and the Sqviet
Union will not -emit a repetition there of events similar to Yugoslavia.
b. The border of the Transcarpathian District are draArn so
t:nat the Soviet Armies are already located in the Transcarpathia, in the
Hengal-iRn IThl-Jey. At the beqinning of war not only units of the Pre-
carpathian Jilitary District, but also of the Siev idlitary District
will be moved to Hungary..
Speaking about the fact that in the northern half of he
Ukrainian Thaatre there is no particularly hindering condition for
employment of all types of troops, it follows to make a remark on the
spring and autumn periods when thanks to rains the roads of the Ukrainian
ahlatre "evaporate" and become almost impassable.
The Ukrainian Theatre has a sufficiently dense net of
railroads to support the supply of a minimum of 50-50 infantry divisions
reinforced by tank and artillery divisions and like support units .(page
OCS Fani
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DISSE-1164ATION CbfitiliatatONS
(Ciar.cificacion ap)
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CONFIDENTIAL
G3 Jalitary
liGeogra.Phy III, _Goon Geog "Ukrairle"
1 e tz+ft ? .S 2.0
The LublL.g..S.-22.sgional Direction:
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650X1 -HUM
TOMO /7.1.M?440:26
rine operational line: Ghernigov, Ovruch, Sarny, Xbvel, Chelm,
Tublin is
With
Direction
called the Lublin Direction
offensive oosrations from the west cto the east, the Lublin
receive the name Chernigov Direction.
/The surply artery of the Lublin Operational Direction is the rail-
road: Chernigov-Ovruch-Belokorovich-Sarny-lCovel-Lublin, or Kiev-Z.oro-
sten-Sarny. It is in its entire extent, from Chernigov and up to Lublin,
single tracked wi),h a maximum through capacity of 24 pairs of trains a
a4whicia su.lonorts tie supply of two mdium armies (8-10 divisions with
isupport unito).
This civantit o. troops also constitutes the operational carzcity
or the Lublin Divectbn.
The operation
following:
1. It extends from the south. to Polesye
l'io...actical coordination
-Tac;-trc and the right flank
significance of the Lublin
between the
of
thc-a
Direction conaists
in the
alai simply by this the
left flank of the Waite 1:ussian
Ukrainian Theatre is accomplished
During the 'gar, in 1944, the Lublin direction was assigned to
tie White .Russian Theatre; the armies of the Pirst Vihite aussian 2ront
w)crated here.
This was not done by chance. The matter is that Polesye cannot
a an independent direction. In order to tie together the armies
o-)e,:atinc to the north of iolesye with the armies operating to the
(oommnd)
south of Polesye, a single direction/is necessary.
A similar solution of the question about Polesye and about its
connection with the Mite ZI.USSiPX1 and the Ukrainian Theatre is the most
reasOnable.
- 2. With debouche of the eastern (Soviet) troops into the region
of Lublin their further operations, in dependence on the general
operational situation, can be fteveloped along three directions:
a. To ljarsav,.along the right bank of.the Visla without
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crossing it. This direction is more simply fulfilled since between
Iublin and 7iarsaw tl,elre is not a single hindering condition for the
employment of all types of troops.
b. An offensive to the west in the general direction Radom-
Siotrkbv-Lodz. This-direction leads to the deep operational flanking
of the Warsaw Fortified Region. Besides this, a strike in the direction
or Lodz separates the Warsaw Region from the Zrakow-Czestochowa Region.
An offensive-.toward Radom-Lodz is tied with the necessity
or forcing the middle Yisla in the region of Deblin (Ivangorod) and
t) the south of it, and then forcing of the Pints River. The Visla to
ole south of Deblin is 200-250 meters; for forcing it army and front
pentoon units are required..
Both the indicated directions pursue the purpose of the creation
coordination with the White Russian Theatre.
C. The development of a strike on the front Krakow-Tarnow to
the deep rear of the Peremishlyansh Fortified Region, as well as along
the right bank of the Viela River, without a crossing to its left bank,
bvt aith obligatory forcing of the right tributary of the Visla -- the
Szn River, which in its lower coirse presents a very serious obstacle;
the strike may be dire-cted on the front Czestochowa, 4atowice with the
purpose of neizing the-Dombroushi coal basin with simultaneous debouche
In the rear of the Krakow Region.
(Page 94a)
It follows to examine the Lublin Direction together with the
ladimir-Volinski (or Rovno) Direclion, especially in the event that
he Lublin Direction shall be subordinated to the operational plan of
he White Russian Theatre when the troops of the Lublin Direction will
coordinate with the White Russian Armies. In this instance the
Tladimir-Volinski Direction acquires an independent significance. Thus
it was in 1944 when the. armies of the 'First Ukrainian Front operated in
direction Rovno-Vladimir-Volinski-Zamostya by which scheme it was
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the Lublin Direction is less suitable for the employment of all troes
Western Bug. In mmparis)n with the Vladimir-Volinski (Aovno) Direction.1
The most favorable conditions of loce.lity are located west of the
1
g (4? troops. As to this, it is possible to judge even by the fact that
[one of the main paved highways runs from Kiev through Zhitomir, Zovo-
grad-Volinski, Rovno, Lutsk, Vladimir-Volinskiijalong that very line,
the main aerodromes are located.
The Lublin Direct. on, lying on the south border of Iolesye, js
enclosed by it, and here there are relatively many swampy areas,
especially in spring and autumn.
Sluggish rivers, the right tributaries of the Pripyat, flow through
these swampy areas. Due to the swampyness, these rivers, not wide in
themselves present not only simply a tactical but also an operational
significance as defenbive lines during offensive operations both from
the east and from the west.
.The following can be cited from the number of these rivers:
a. The Turiya on which the city of Ebvel stands.
b. The Stir on which the city of Lutsk stands.
c. The Gorin, with its tributary the Sluch.
P.=s0 NUM-31
3
'50X1 -HUM
successful in forcing the rivers San and Visla at Sandomierz and in 1
creating the Visla (or Sandomierz) bridgehead from which, 'after build-
up of strength, still a further offensive began in January 1945.
Speaking about the topography of the locality of the Lublin
:)rection, it can be said that ttere are no absolutely difficult to
traverse "narro*-4 places for the utilization of all types of troops.
infAntry and its equipment, there is no limitation; for the
employment of tank and motorized units, there are limitations in indi-
-ridual regions, mainly on the river lines about which it will be told
below. For aviation, there is also no special limitations, but under
the condition that the main aerodromes shall be located south of the
Ovruch-Sainy and Kovel.
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Ukrairie I 9
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d. The Ubort and several others, more minor.
Prom the number of other river lines, it follows to remark on:
a. The Varta, in its upper reaches.
b. The Visla, with its tributary the San.
c. The 'hestern-Bug.
d. The Dnepr and the Pripyat (in the viatnity of Ohernigov).
The following regions constitute separate fortified regions:
a.
Deblin (Ivangorod), -711Ach has a system of forts on the west
b. The lame? Fortified Region.
c. The Sarny 2ortified Region.
d. The Ovruch :Fortified Region.
[ e. Yhe southern part of the Llozir Fortified Region (along the
[
tEbort -Aver).
The supply bases are: Kiev, Knrostint Ovrucht Zhitomir, Rovno,
Lutsk, ovelt 7arsaw, Lublin, Lodz, Deblin, Radom, and Sandomderz.
(Page 95)
The Lvov-XrElow Onerational Region
In the previous conference, we pointed out that the Lvov Direction
in the main operational direction of the Ukrainian Theatre of llilitary
lOperations.
In col=risen with the White aussian Theatre, the Lvov (Kiev)
Direction is eouivalent to the Smolensk (doscow) Jirection of the
White Russian Theatre.
The Zone of locality to the north and to the south of the central
Aercis line: 'Xiev-Ivov-Przemysle-Krakow-Katowice belongs to the Lvov-
Krakow Operational Region. The Czestochowa Region, the Aatowice, Xralcow,
. - -
Ro gionS
ITe2zemysle, Lvov, TaTnopol, Proskurov, Berdichev, Zhitomir and Xiev are
Ilincluded in this 'zone.
' The general operational significance of the Lvov-Krakow Region
for one or the other side will be included in the fact that:
l. The region Lvov-Brodit Tarnopol and l'roskurov for the one side.;
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.4IEIXIMII 4
CONFIDENTIAL
?
laroslav,
10
for the other s--- UM
Y
will be the regions of concentration and deployment of troops.
96 During offensive operations from the east to the west, the
shoeteo-u route to Southern Germany, Czechoslovakia and to Austria runs
,
from the Lvov Region.
During offensive operations from the westto the east, the shortest
routes to T,he political and economic centers of the Ukraine and to the
southern part of the USSR run from the Lvov-Xiev Direction.
3. A strike from Lvov in the direction of Kiev severs the
Ukrainian Theatre into two parts, cutting off the southern part into
an isolated situation; in equal measure, a strike from Lvov on 4rakow
and further into Slovakia also severs the western part of the Ukrainian
Theatre into two parts.
4. The attainment of success in the Lvov-Kiev Direction leada to
tae loss on the Soviet side of operational contact with the Laikan
c)untries.
5. From what hes been said, it is possible to make the general
eliminary conclusions;
I
Ia. The operational directtons of the Ukrainian Theatre have
Ian independent significance, independent of the White Russian Theatre.
Coordination of the Lvov-Krakow Direction with the armies
I'of the White Russian front pursues a purpose, not as much opera -a anal
as. much as strategic, directea to the attainment of coordinated
operations not in the Eastern-European, but in the Western-European
Theatre.
b. The Lvov-Krakow direction is aimed toward the central part
of urope; it skirts the Balkan Peninsula.
This circumstance causes the
Soviet side to have huge forces for operations in the Balkans to the
5outh of this direction.
In the last war the armies of two fronts were directed to
The Second Ukrainian Front developed a strike from Iasi,
the Balkans;
Stzyrip)
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Geography III, All .Geog aa.)
CONFIDENTIAL
1
Cluj and also to BudapeSt, Bratislava-Vienna; the Third Ukrainian
11
50X1-HUM
Front, on Izmail-Bucharest, then to Belgrade and around the southern
extremity of Balaton Lake to Graz and Linz in flanking Vienna from the
south.
In distinction from other operational directions of the
Uhruhian Theatre and the Balkan Peninsula, the direction I:coy-Krakow-
Cottbus-Berlin, or Krakow-Dresden-Leipzig, actually does not have
hindering conditions for the employment, of all types of troops. The
locality between Lvov, ,Berlin and Leipzig is rich with a net of rail-
roads and highways (Page 95a) routes of communication. Here, besides
the Visla, there are no other water barriers, but even the Visla does
not present a specially serious obstacle in that sector.
The Lvov-Krakow-Breslavl-Berlin direction is well equipped in the
aviation sense. More or less, all the large populated points have
aerodromes, and also points, as for example, Kiev, Shepetovka, Zhitomir,
Proskurov, Zmerinka, Brodi, Kremenets, Peremishl, Yamoslav, Novi Sonch,
Krakow, Berestechko, Berditchev, SaMbor, Grodek, Rzhesimv, Katowice,
Opele, Breslavl, OstrzoY, Gloguv, Lignits and many others have military
0
aerdromes.
A
On the Soviet part, tle sactor Lvov-Zhitomir is the water divide
between the river Pripyat and he river Dnestr. The rivers from the
Kamenets-Podoloski plateau fall, some into the Pripyat (the Turya,
Stir, Gorin, Sluch and others) and others, into the Dnestr; in such a
manner the head Waters of these rivers, flowing in largelrelatively
high)valley banks are not obstacles for troops.
The cities, especially in the western part of the examined theatre,
are ouch more serious defensive regions.
The cities Lvov, Peremishl, Krakow, Breslavl and more to the south,
Budapest, Brat/ slay' and others, are strong defensive points. Of these,
only Peremishl, then Breslavl, have a fort system, but nelVer-the-less
I:be-battles at Budapest, Lvov, and Bratislav were prolonged for the
0." VORM
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- CONFIDENTIAL
4
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12
'
50X1-HUM
course of three and more weeks, The defensive possibilities of the
indicated cities lies- in the fact that they occupy a large area built
ii
up with solid buildings; in this area an army of several tens of
thousands of troops cah operate.
The Second World War is *urfeited with examples of the defensive
capability of a 'whole series of cities which are not fortress cities
i(Odessa, Stalingrad, Leningrad, Budapest, Vienna, Berlin and others).
In individual sectors of the -I:ploy-Krakow direction, the operations
o ground troops must be coordinated with river naval flotillas.
Such sectors are:
a.
b
The region of Kiev (the Dnepr Naval Flotilla).
The region to the southeast of Lvov (the Dnestr Naval flotilla).
The region to" the northeast from Krakow (the Visla Naval
d. The region of Berlin - the rivers Oder and hpee.
Out of the number of in supply bases, it is Possitie to
cite the following:
E . Closes Lvov, Shepetovka, Proskurovv, Zhmerinka; Rzheshuv, Tarnuv
Crakau, Sandomir and Katowice.
Lodz,
b. Distant or deeoz !j.orosten, Zhitomir, Berdichev, Pastov, Kiev;
Breslavl, Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, Drezden, Berlin, and others.
(Page 96)
The Uzho,orod Direction and the Ohempitilay-:tasi__Qp_2magnill
Reaion
The title, "Ush7orod Direction (or the Jlikachevo Direction), is
thoroughly treated in the prewar descriptions of theatres of military
operati ons; today this title does not completely accurately reflect
the truthful situation of the future.
The
from the
Ungvar),
Uzhgorod Direction is considered to be the zone
central operational line: Lvov-Sambor-Uzhgorod
orv Lvov-Stri-Ahkachevo and further, Budapest.
_
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of territory
(in Hungarin,
DISSEMINATIOitorN ittataNs
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CONFIDENTIAL
?
15 50X1-HUM
The exl,reme right boundary of this zone is the line: Tarnov-liovi
oonch-Z.Oshitze and further, the border between Czechoslovakia and
dungary; the left beundary: Tarnopol,-Holomiya, the Yablonitse Pass
and further along the Romanian border to Zbust, Debrechen, Oradea-Zare,
Seged.
The Uzhogorod Direction correctly could be entitled the Budapest
Direction: it encompasses ,the whole Hungarian plain and the closest
operational target is the seizure of the Budapest region.
The Uzhgorod Direction runs in the beginning from north to south
with a subsequent turn to the west toward Budapest.
A proper analyeis.of the Uzlegorod Direction is conditioned by
three conditions:
a. The penetration of the former Polish-Czechoslovakian state bor-
ders, located exactly on the crest of the forested Carpathians;
b. The topographic conditions of the Carpathian Mountains to the
south and the southeast of Lvov where it has several completely passable
passes to the Hungarian plain;
c. The latter-determines the trace of the railroad net leading
from Poland to Hungary through the extreme eastern reaches of the
former Czechoslovakia territory.
The offensive the Soviet armies in 1944-45 was organized
according to that. To this condition, sPecifically the concrete
circumstance, the fact contributed, that Romania, at the moment of the
offensive operations of the armies of the Ukrainian Fronts, actually
did not show any serious reeistance. Bulgaria did not show any
resistance. Yugoslavia was already under the control of the partisan
armies of Tito.
Chernovitsi and.Iasi are united in one region not only because
these points territorially are close one to another, but also because
the operations of tr'pops there have an operational community.
ocs FORM one,
The 49 zAita--:
pissemmiotrortnintrows
(Cissziffec.thin
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50X1 -HUM
The Chernovitsi-Iasi-Kishinev operational region inclules the
1
.1 Ohernovits District, the northern half of Romania and the northern part
Ii of the .-Loldavian SSR (Beesarabia).
I
The operational significance of the region is included in the
1. The Uzhgorod (Hukachevo), Cernovista and
are the Carpathian Directions, which in their turn stipulate:
a. The necessity for the western armies to overcome the
Carpathians with limited strength in the presence of stubborn defense
from the east side.
b. The operations of the western side inevitably are ramified
4ishinev-Iasi Direct ors
ti
ii
(1) The overcoming of the Carpathians.
(2) The building up of forces to the east of the
Carpathians for development of further operations.
2. For the eastern side, the loss of the Carpathians means a
direct and immediate threat of a debouche of hostile armies in the rear
a. Of the Odessa Region.
b. Of the Lvov-Iroskurov-Shepetovka-lovno Regions (a blow on
nmerinka-Vinnitsa-Zhitomir, or more deep, Beltsi-Uman-aCanev).
(Page 96a)
Together with this, southern Romania and Bulgaria, with their Black
Sea ports, are lost;-the ?petroleum fields of Ploesti and Drogobych are
lost.
For the eastern side, as already demonstrated in previous con-
versations, the operational situation at the present time is somewhat
simpler since the USS.3. can, in the premobilization period, dispatch its
troops into Romania and Hungary and also into Bulgaria.
The operational tie of the Uzligorod Direction with the Iasi-Kishinevi
01".-z, PORI; neve-,
? I Mit 49 LAPJ -1
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CONFEDoNtutto.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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1-6'S ID U LP
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Geography III, Mil Econ Geog "Ukral
I PAss NUMMI 50X1-HUM
1,5
Region for both sides Consists of the fact that these regions mutually
aid and support one another.
It is impossible to wage offensive operations in one direction
(Uzhgorod or Kishinev-Iasi) while not waging at the same time active
operations in the other. With the development of Soviet operations-
toward Budapest, the western side, covering with minor forces in the
:Eastern Carpathians and- the northern spurs of the Transylvanial Alps,
nay be able Lo mount a-blow from Belgrade through Arad, Debrechin.
In equal measure, with offensive operations of the western armies
In the Uzhgorod Direction, the eastern side, covering the Danube and
those same spurs of the Transylvanian Alps, may be able, from the
region of Dezh-Cluj to mount a blow through Oradea-!are and Arad on
Solnok, Seged and further on Budapest.
Exactly such a situation is created if active operations are
developed in ?omnia, and passive operations shall be carried out in
.ohe Uzlogorod Direction. -
3. The third geileral significance of the described regions for
both sides consists of the fact that he who shall control Hungary and
aomania, and by that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, then that one shall be
;he proprietor of the situation in the Balkans in general, and the
upproacIles to northern Italy, in particular.
4. As for one, so also for the other side, thoolo.est aim of
operations will be to seize (the holding, for the othe..!:. side)
Budapest, Belgrade and Bucharest.
The eastern side, after overcoming Budapest, accuires freedom for
the development of a blow on Vienna, and with overcoming Belgrade and -
Bucharest, will attempt to debouohe on the shore5oT the Adriatic,
Aegean, and larmora_Soeas.
ors FORM 4-
I MAR 4/0-t
DissEmiwknoitatiotlintitroms
(ClcsL-ificat?icri &)
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50X1 -HUM
In the future war, Turkey cannot under any conditions remain
neutral. Thus, the eastern side cannot terminate in Romania and
Bulgaria with the opf!rations of three to four armies as took place in
:The routes of communication of the examined part of the Ukrainian
Theatre of operations are weakly developed.
)The railroads Of the Uzhgorod-Budapest Direction are in some-That
better condition due to their 2CY tes:_i
a. Im)v-Sambor-Urengorod-Chan, /ishkolts-Budapest.
b. Lvov-Stvi-Veretski Pass-liukachevo-Chap-Debrechin-Soinok-
Budapest.
c. Lvov-Stanislavoir-Y.ablonitse Pass, further along the border to
k:hust, Satu-Hare, Oradea-Mare, Seged.
Supplementary roads run from Krakow and Tarnov6
rUp to Transca::Tathia, that is up to the descent to the Jungalan
plain, these roads have a minor through capacity, not more than 12-15
pairs of trains. In winter, thanks to the snow drif?,s, the transport
capacity falls tuo three times, that is to four-six-eight pairs a day.
In ail 6 there are five through roads. They, with the most un-
favorable conditionscf winter time, can pl-ovide 30-40 trains, bui, f_n
sunlar 60-75 trains. 3hich completely suppocts the supply of five-eight
divisions.
ahe Chernovita and Iasi region is in a more worse situation.
ITTortuous and more long routes run through there.]
a. Tarnapol-Chernovitsa-Dezh. (Page 96b)
b. Vinnitsa-Zhmerinka-Mogilev-Podolsk-Lipsani and further, either
Chernovista, or to Dorokhaya, and again to Dezh, by the very same road.
C. Pervomaisk-Balta-Beltsi, Iasi, Pashkani5 and further around
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TETD uiNrilAusLemoN ----fraTaary Tk: u?u?Lzu
Geography III, Hil Econ Geoa nUkralneu
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- CONFIDENTIAL
PA GS MUMBER
17 50X1-HUM
SISSIME.1,19, .1,3v
to the north and on v126 very same road running to Dezh, or going around
through Adzhud to Alba-Ulya and Arad. The entrance to Alba-Ulya can be
dene from Zishinev through Tekuchi, Rdmnik, Brashov, Sibiu. However,
as to this road, it is hard to estimate in the future since it is
intended for the sti-on.:_y-of armies operating in the Bucharest, Sofia
Dtrections.
[The enumerated single track roads and their transport capacity are
not higher in comparieon with the roads of the Uzhgorod Direction.j
According to the possibilities for utilization of troops, the
1
zhgorod'Budapest Direction is more suitable.
1 The western Beskids, the Tatry Aountains, the eastern Leskids,
combined in the general term, the Sylvanian Careathians)are more passable;
1 their average altitude is 4500-5000 feet at the same time that the
average altitude of the Eastern Carpathians is 6000 feet, and the 1
Transylvanian Alps, 7500-8000 feet. Thus, it is not by chance that the
operations of the Third. Ukrainian Front went in flank of the Transylvanial
Alps from the south.
From what has been said, it follows that during the development of
_
offensive operations in central Romania s.:eecial mountain troops ob-
_
ligatorily are required, employed in not very large independent detach-
ements with the presence of light (mountain) artillery, light. infantry
weapons, supplied with e- great quant;ty of radi-o equipment, and having
its own independent mobile mountain (pack) transport.
Tank troops, especially in large formtions, up to passage of
he northern spurs of the Transylvanian Alps can be utilized to very
limited extents.
The military operations of troops will aim for the seizure of the
ountain passes, the mountain valleys through which the highways run
d the cominanding heights from which to cover these valleys..
Oin FORM ..1nm -
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23: CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
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Fran-the point of.vieu of the utilization and employment of aviation, 'there 50X1-HUM
are no actual, ?specie-11y hinderim conditions. Houever, the Carpathian Mountains
1.- - difficult in that here there is an extremely limited qty of mit very largo
1 aerodromes and landing areas in the In-'.:erearpathian Plain (the center of Romania).
11 The basic aorodromei.3 are located in Hungary, south Ranania and in the uentern
I Ukraine. 'or the number of Soviet aerodromes, the follming can be cited: Lvov,
Yurovich (to the east of Ircrov), Sarbor, Grodok (east of Saribor), Ushgorod, Zhuravitse
.(east of Si.) Staniulavov, Brodi, Prelkurov, Chernovitsa, Levograd-Volinskii,
.!
2hitomr, Bordichev, Vinnitsa, ZhmerinIza, Uman, Balta, Pervomai.sk, Tiraspol, Kishinev.
In addition, on this territory, there is spread around a great quantity of temporary
and civil aerodromes.
In the Polish, Csoohoslovakian, and Hungarian territory, there can be pointed
cut the following aerodrole bases: Kresno (west of Peremishl, Presev (north of
keehitse), Dova-Ves (northwest of 1:oshitse) Koshitse, Dishkolts, Budapest and its
Kvskemat?
environs (eight aerodromes),(Segedkeid (two aerodromes),Debrechin and others.
The majority of the above enumerated ?ooluts are not only air bases but also
lases for ground troops.
(:Pa v 97)
Ismail-ftharest Re/iqg
The Ismail-Bucharest Region should be ezamined in combination with the
srAtime Operational Llrection since betueen them is an inseparable unity. Aloyiz
v-B--h that, betueen theSe two sectors of the theatre, there are also direrences th
onerational aims. Thus, it is best of all to consider them senarne3y.
? To the make-up of the Iznaff.1-Bueltarest Operational Region belong:
The Odessa Distiict
The southern part of ioldakilan SSR
The Ismail District
The region of Foicshan, Inik, Gelets, and Braila, and
T.he regions of Ploesti and Bucharest
The Danube FaVOre, from its mouth and up to Rushchutc (south of Duchara8t) with 3Az
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23: CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
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CONFIDENTIAL
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TdiWUEZE710M alitafirMonomee.
Geoaraphy III. 1111- Econ Geog nUkraine"
!raw, azeRNI'auftaccP.- ??eraanswirounanovisa.4.* ?e?
"
PAGF. NUMBER 11
19 50X1-HUM
great nmiber of large and small branch channels, with the exception of the railroad
brldgb at the villale of ahernovod, does not have a permanent bridge crossing,
and forcing the river in this section is extrem4y difficult.
The Danube River divides the Maritime Direction (the right bank zone of the
Danube) from the Bucharest Direction.
If the operations of ground troops on the Bucharest Direction are poor:I...7
coordinated with the operation of naval forces, then the operations of ground troops
in the Maritime Direction are in general senseless without a naval fleet.
As the main operational line of the Ismail-Bucharest Region, it is necessazy
to consider the line: Tiraspol, Remenesht, Galats, Bucharest, Kreiova; as the
supplementary;
a. Kishinev, Fokshan, Rimnik, Ploesti.
b. The Dbnube: Galats, along the left tank of the river Georgiu (Dthardzhiu).
The nearest operational target is the overrunning of the political-economic
regions of Ploesti-Bucharest with the development of subsequent operations: either
in the direction of Kre;fova-Belgrade or along the fraat Sofia-Plovidiv.
With offensive operations of the eastern side, it is necessary to asseme that
from Btcharest, the operations will be developed namely in the direction oP Belgrade,
and the operational aims towards the Bulgarian territory and southern Yugoslavia
will be to take the maritime aeires as prisoners.
With offensive operations of western armies -Prom the region of Belgrade, their
operational perpose also Ia1.3.1 be the mission of seising Bucharest and Ploesti..
The seizing and holding for itself of the region Ploesti-Bucharest is a vital
necessity as well as for one, so also for the other Side.
Both sides, with onerations on. the northern Danube (up to the sharp bend of
the river) to the north of Ghorna-Voda, will screen the left of the 2bn-13:be, leaving
sufficiently strong garrisons at several points.
Further offensive of thewesteen armies, it appears, must be developed in a
northeasterly direction and after debouohe on the line Ga/ats-Fokshan, this
direction becomes the principle one, since the Maritime Direction along the right
bank of the Danube runs into the suampy delta of the Ehnube with its three wide
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" Geography in, 3-;i1 ricon Geog "Ukraine" I
channels (bays): Tho Geolev, the Snlina, and the 11.11)35ka.
Speaking bout the differences of the operational purposes of the Bucharest-
`Boll-;rade and the Naritime 111.rections, we point out that the first will be greater
conducted with the operational and strategic coordination with tho wades operating
in the central and south part of Europe, .and the Fiaritirare Direction will be complete".1,y
connected with the Balkan and Asia anor Theatre.
(Page 97a)
50X1-HUM
Thus, the problems of combat with landings froii the sea (which eertaim2,y will
_
- attempted by both sides) must be carried out by the maritime P.,rou9s.
The develoommt of operations in the future war in southeast Europa to a great
stent predestines the positions of Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece.
With operations along the Danube, the Soviet armies will be in a better posit ? on
because o:?f" the Soviet General Staff has disposed of the powerful Danube Flotilla hers
wnich can be roft.nfomed by the Dnestr and Ihenr River Flotillas. The western aril.es
a.ve oblicd to use improvlze.tion.
The ' '.n bases of the Dana's River Flotilla are considerz.s.d to be points in .::.he
Channel
Iit;.11.iski / of the Danube and in partitnclar izraail, Chilya-liova, 111.11,ya, and o::here',,
It !. eelevant to say, the Kiltiskii chancel is complete2y in Soviet hands 2.11C1
11
at the present time strong shore fortifications are being constructed there. An
river transit of the USSR upward along the Danube goes not through the Liter-
national Snlina Canal, but through the Kiltiskii channel.
lumiril and the region north of it are covered by the Danube, the Prut and the
Seret *.-mich gives to that region the possibility of becoming the region of
concentration and deploymnt of the Soviet Balkan Armies.
Recites of comunication are:
a. lash i.n6.Y.w.-Birls&-Tekuchi.-03uzeu-floesti.
b. Tirsepol?tioraaneshti-Galatsuzeu.
c. The branch line to :Email rrom the Akiceman-Romaneshti railroa&
the fo
II -1:1 form of a communicetion route by the Lail stern Side according to the mod for
The Danube, x?xhich fy.'eezes in its lover course for 6-7 weeks will be utilized
-
movement,
FrAti
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200-1
SEIINATIONcormtNitk-rNs
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(ChnIstficatiol $p)
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4:t
(Chszification Stamp)
CS R W, TRANSL4710p Militavy Ecrincerl
Ge9rfrepliv III: Nil Er.ori Geer? "Ukraine"
II
CONFIDENTIAL
? -
PAGE NUM2E?
?
--1
21 50X1 -HUM
It is necessary also to add the sea communication lines to the number at
supply routes.
To the number of oupoly basesb-Viong:
a. Close: Kishinev, T.iraspol, .Akkerraen, Belts', Rilr.initsa (on the Dnestr),
b. Distant: Uraa-11, Balta, Pervomt...Ask.
c. Sea: Odessa, Ilil_colaev, Akkenran, and the Crimean ,ports.
One of the complicating problems requiring solution by the Soviet General
Staff is tile mission of covering the supply bases, the railroad centers, the river
and the seaports from the air, keeping in mind that the aviation of the adversaries
of the USSR will be more powerful.
(Page 98)
The Naritime Operational Recdon
The liaritime Operational Region is termed the shore zone of the Black Sea
vp to the right bank of the tfliiCa
Sharp differences in purposes and mirsions which will confront the troops
emist between the Bucharest region and the Haritime Direction.
The differences are explained by the following:
-1. The 1.riube River.
The .-irtfoe: from its mouth and farther north, almost up to the so-called
rIron Gate" (west of the city Turnu-Ceve:dn) is difficult to force. Particily,
impassable is the section of the river from Rushchuk and up to the mouth where
the Danube with a great nttinber of charmels, flooded basins, pools, and so forth,
does not permit neither tactical, nor operational coordthation.
If, along the left bank of the Denabe, the operations of the Western
armies can be developed, to.any depth, right up to the iiepre, and those of the
eastern armies, up to Belgrade and further to the West, then the liar:IA-lute Direction:
for the Eastern Side begins from the line: C.-elats, Isakeha, Mocha, Ceoravskii
Channel, and for the Western Side this line is the final line of the Nall:time
Direction.
FORii r.rin
E.A.r.! IAJU-1
piSSGMINATIOttli rth t !MONS
(Cias:dficcIdon Sup
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Georiraphy 7'411 Econ?Geog "Ukraine"
rt Imams% ....,?rarnarma
PAGSNUMMM
22
e....vreacso....rfs,rwsmame.6.-ot. -
?. The developmeni, of operat4.one ,r the Eastem artries on the Bucharest 50X1-HUM
(Erection,
up to debouche on the line Folesti-Bucharest, will be to go farther in
the western dirrection retiring from the sea, that on the Maritime Direction
operations will be developed simply alo-ag the . shore.
3. The closest oucrational aim of the Maritime Direction is the seizing
the Ronimiien and Bulgarlar.- port bases (Constanta, Varna, Buas) as initial
concentration points for organization of a carax.in for the sake of seizing the
straits.
For this is rec,aired the seizureof the lower course of the
A-tnube and its mouth since without that the Maritime arnios trill be cut off in
isolated battle, not receivinz assistance drilo opera.tin::.; beyond the Dambe.
As has been mentioned frequently, the USSR, in conterrporary conditicam,
in _a ,-aoro advantazeous eondttion, in the concept of the possibility of utilisinr,'
the indicated ports, in coaparison with the western armies, however, this circum-
stance is not permanently operatins. It may turn out thus, that with the first days
of the war. these port bases will become not Romanian-Bulgarian and not Soviet.
1.1.. From the very name itime Direction" it is obvious that operations
in it oblig,ator."0;y- take place in a conjunction of ground and naval .?orces.
5. The peculiarities of the Maritime Direction are:
a. Up to the border between Romania and Bulgaria, that is 1.1D to the
line Rushchuk-Shurala-Varna on2y one ar.7 ?rroup can operate along the IlaritiTrae
Mreetion. For this reason this army F;roup. , most. i1ce1y. tifl be marines;
b. Further ope-eations will take place in divergent directions.
(I) To the borders of Asia-,Mknor and to the borders of Greece with
the purpose, if.Stin not tae seizueoe of the straits, then the seizure of European
Turkey.
(2) To Sofia and further to the Adriatic Sea.
c. After debouching in the region of Sofia, the Sofia Direction age.:th
subdivides into:
(1) The Dish-Saraelio Direct "on.
(2) The Skople-Timn Direction.
OCS FRM ?-?
I MAR9 49 .20CL1
(93b)
a- ===="
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(Page 98a)
pDagationa_pg_the Second and ThigILEIxAkojan
Prontfil 191111:11.5
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-
Is ID WATUTIVi UT ICI I J. alitarrit460Tioi FEEC
0!.-,TaT.111S1' III, al Econ C.-eozg ?Wkra-Lne"
3 a ? n I I in I IN I I I= IR
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PAGS NUM3Eft
24
In other words, the future war In the Balkans 'Elul not be like the pas50X1-HUM
w,270. This is ,erplained by the fact that Ybgoslavia fell out of the Soviet bloc and
under all circumstances she cannot rat= asain to its ildceup; as to the im-
possibility of neutrality of Turkey, we 02-ea6y spoke.
33ulgaria, which must ckeCesd herself against Yugoslavia on the west,
against Greece and Turkey on tho South, limr find herself In a serious position.
And it may happen that the Bulgarian ar:7 at once after the beginning of the war will
be thrown across the Eanube.
One may not be a prophet but maintain that at the tine when. the question
- i ,-- .?...
1, of.' the 1.-,ems of the war unconationaW, can be determined, that the western amies
end and
Tali put i:1-tei -,, trot= in Vorbhora Ita"., 121 Austria, Yugoslavia,i?Gr;eece; iNteill
occupy Albania; the Soviet troops in their tuer'n will seize Hungary, Czechoslmskia,
Rom,mia and Bulgaria. Then will be the campaign of the strunle for the Balkans.
1 There is, it is true, one condition; which speaks in favor of the Soviet
anyT. The Soviet troops, with the eicception of the liaw.and the Air Forces, in
the initial period appear to be stronger and they may outstrip the western arnies
in seizing western Europe and the Balkans inasmuch as the Allied troops in western
%rope are "nothing to speak of The strong point of .the western armies is that
they, utilizing their superiority in naval and air forces, will create in the Balms
"a desert zone? where in general for a long time no army can be able to operate.
The offensive of the western armies, and as well of Turkey and of Greece,
obviously will go along just these operational directions:
From the front Belgrade-NOvi Sad "el the arect4on Irad-Thezh.
b. To the South of the Transylvanian Alps along the Balkan plain to Bucharest.
e. From Rish to Plerna-Sfarna.
The operations of the Turkish army and the Greek anr will be eorabined in the
latter direction.
The western anities in their oni7en3ive in the northern and northeastern
direction collie with the poweeta natural defensive barrier, the Danube.
To, what has been s aid it is necessary to add onl;y? that the sou:th (right)
balk of the Danube is mountafizacius, and the left is low and swampy. Thus, the
Oa: siorre4
tmn 49 200-I
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DISSFMNATIOZONFID ENTIArs
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.?
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- CONFIDENTIAL7=-2e-P-7-
GSIDUSATNUOCM JA12.1.cmv. scoaole,
1
1 III, 1111 rcon G-oe "Ukraine"
aknube is more favorable for the xlestorn armies, and not for nne eastern. -Bee:de!50X1-HUM
PACHUMMM
25
this, all the Danube fortresses, except Izmail, although aged (Silstav, Ruenclrulc,
Turtukai, Silistriya, Chernovoda, Isakcha and Tulcha), aro located on the raised
bar% and thus they cannot be serious obstacles for the western arm:10E4 at
the same time during an offensive oP the eastern armies, these fortresses become
very serious hinderances.
When ie spoke above -the fact that the offensive of the Soviet Aries, at least
during their thrust into Bulgaria, disintegrates into sever" ineependant directions
(the Maritime - to the ste'aits; the Sofia and Alekoandropollc ), we did not
stimulate an interest in :the question of supply of the troops of the directions.
_
And it is necessary to hare in mind that the railroads running fm Soviet territory
q
do not cross the Danube anywhere. This signifies that the supply routes are tied to
sea ports which undoubtedly e-111 become objectives for air attacks and objectives for
landing from the sea -hich, in the end, may eliminate the present superior position
of the satellites of the USSR, Romania and Bulgaria.
The most accessible places for making landing operations from the sea are in
i the region of Constants (.0 the north and to the south) and the resion of the ports
of Varna and Burgas. In the remaining sectors, landing operations are complicated
11 due to the steep shores VAeln it is possible to organize a -We -or-three tiered system
f:'ire (Pae 98b)
The Soviet General-Stef anticipates the possibility of landing operations
;I froi the sea by western armies on the Balkan shore of the Blacic Sea and is doing
_
U necessary'for the os.-Aeetios of defense.
s_
The majority of the .loints, not to mention the port areas, are strengthened
by shore fortifications _beginning from Odessa 1.733 to the conjunction of the Bulgarian-
h Turkish border. _
Strong defenses have bean ilade In the Enestr estuary, then around Volkov, in
the Pot,$;a Strait, on,Cape Hidlya, around ;Aangaliya, on the Sereb*.anii Shore,
1
1.
1 bank of the Danube, this leans that the main supply bases of the Soviet Armies must
near..sta*
khov, on Cape Palokastro and at other places.
Since the railroads from the region of Kishinev do not cross to the right
be the sea basest
Odessa, Akkerman, (Belgorod-lEnestrovskii), C-onstanta and Varna,
I PIA52 200-1
L'ISSE?MINATIOt oftriortmArioNS
(Cicscifico.tion Sip)
7.1
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? (Cirn.liSicz!fan Srzp)
1:s.-1.11.'r,a7-y-19-56-116111i-Z
C?c-3o5r-an1,v i1il hcon Ocog 4Ukraino"
uhich, as was said above, iaay destroyed.
IPAGE NUMMI
26
50X1-HUM
The problera of bases and the supply of troops becomes, in such a fashion, almost
Y the nain probleot in that theatra for the Soviet armies of the Balkan Peninsula
(Page :ill).
glIeZ...W:MOSItaJlc:jilI0iXM.9...qMgal.
It :!.E., nuik:syary to consider the basin of the Black Sea as an independent theatre
f nilitary operations despite the fact that it iD the left flank of the general
oastern-IlUrooean Theatre.
The Black Sea is closely' connected 17ith the Balkan sector and the Zakavkaz
, Theatre. In the future tar, when the Balkan countries, Turke7, and the near East
I
shall be the arena of a foightful battle, the si.nificance of the basin of the Black
Sea trill bccone exceedinray important.
Already today, articles appear in the Soviet military press c:cmonstrating
that the Black Sea is a "aus-lan Se0 wn&ch the Russians owned to thousand years
ago.
This plesent conference is dedicated to the Crimea as the win Black Sea region
of" the *3oviet seaboard.
For waging operations, the Soviet Union possesses a series of sea, air, and
ground 'bases on the Crimea Shore, in Sea of Azov and at other points of the Black
Sea, including bases on the shores of Romania
IIvestern a:rides do not have,.
I s
accommodations for the defense of this region.
and Bulgaria, the like of which the
The Mill base for naval forces is Sovastopoli a natural closed anchorage rith
There are, practically speaking, no other good naval bases on the Crimean Shore.
Small naval units of defensive significance can be based at: Bvpatoriya, geodosiya,
Kerch ' an d Yalta.
In the nuMber of other naval bases of the Soviet seaboard of the Black Ser..,
it is necessary to indicate Odessa, Novorossisk, then Akkerman (Belgorod-Lnestovooi),
Ochakov, Bikolaev, Ttapse, Sochi, Sukhumi, Poti, and Batumi.
The latter five points cannot bo considered as naval bases; they must be added
to the series of r'efensiva regions for defense of the terwito,Tial waters of the
?
OCS cninnn r
I msz 111 .ZAAJ-1
D"'N'Al'CONFIDENTIAt"
11101110111110
(C1.7.5.71licattel
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?(Cizzr,Flicaacm St:7:17p)
IGS ID USA VitliSLKUOII-141.11tary ?non .
Ge,ofrrnrht.IIT Ecor Goon. up-rairen
_
? ...TM 4 IMO
. CONFIDENTIAL
1 Black Sea.
Tem--uk, ?ask,
mesNugun
50X1-HUM
In the Sea of Azov, it follows to mention: Taman, Bordyansk (Osipenko),
Taganrog and Rostov-on-the-Don.
Resulting fro: that has been said, the main naval operational directions can
be mentioned: the ports of :Romania and Bulgaria: Constanta, Varna, Burgas;
Constantinople (Isembul); Zonguldak (the main coal region of Turkey) and the
closest region to the straits fron the east; Sinop and Sansun, as the initial poi-:ts
for a campaign into Anatolia; Trapezund; as auxiliary, cooperating with the ZakaVkoz
Theatre of ialitary operations.
From the rant of vie:7 of the western armies, the follouing nissions can be
set as the main operationa tasks:
a. Holding the straits in their eon hands,
b. Strenztheniw; of the south (iluricish) shore of the Black Sea.
c. Seizure of Constanta, Varna (Stalin) and Burgas in order to protect their
operations from the area of these points.
d. Isolation of theffiain Soviet naval base, Sevastopol, and then Odessa, and
e. Initiation of landing operations.
Relative to the execution of landings from the sea, the region: Odessa, the
northern shore of the Kirkinitckii Bay and the sector been Akkennan and the
Kiliya channel of the Danube, arouse the most interest.
The Soviet General Staff anticioates the possibility of.snch operations (Page
of tnear adversarles, and does 611 in order tna.t; -sum operavionc
nia)Acamnot be accomplished. The ludnimeasures are connected tith the creation of
a tough defense.
On the Crimean Shore, landing operations, vith suitable conditions of the
operational situation, are possible in the regions: Yevpator2. Feodosiya, North
and Seuastorol.
At these ooints, utth the exception of Sevasterol, there ?:'ere landing operations
during the var.
On the Crimean PeninsOn and on the approaches to it, there are the following
fortified regions: the Sevastopol, the Nerdh (opposite Taman), the Yevpator4a,
the Feodosiya, the Yalta, the Kop-Takil, the Perekops of three lines of fortified
C:= FOPM
- I MAR 49 AN
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positions - Porlkops? Aria:Tomsk and Ushchun; arid the Ak-I4oniFeodosiya.
28
50X1-HUM
To the number of natural fortified lines, covering listant approaches to
the Crimean throat (the Perikops), belong:
a. The lo*,:or course of tho South Bug.
b. The Dnepr River in the sector Nhorson,flikopol where there are no bridge
orossinqs.
The Crimea is poor in railroad routes. It is connected cfith the center Zrar
two railroad linos: .
a. raerson-Perekops-Dzhankoi-Sfu),f eropol-Sevastapol;
b. i:elltopol-Dzhanicoi:Kerch.
The Kerch Peninsula, the supply of which can be assigned to the Azov Flotilla,
is in a sanifilat bettor situation.
The Crimea is also poor in highway routes, but their absence is not a hindering
condition since the Crimean steppe permits movement by all. types of trans7ort off
the reads.
;Waiving from what has been said it it is possible to point out the ground
operational directions:
a. The Crimean: (1) The Kerch (Kerch-Dzhankoi),
(2) The Silferopol (Siolforopol-ithankoi).
b, On the approaches to the Crmea:
) The Khersen,
(2) - The lielitopol,
If !rt is impossible to say about the Black Sea, natura4y, that it is "a
Russian Sea", then it is possible to say this about the Soa of Azov.
-"
The entr- into the Sea of Azov '''12.^ough the ice.,-,:mh Strait is closed by the
Korth and Tzlian fortified regions which -reser iaemzelves as a system of shore
batteries along the whole extent of the strait.
With a penetration int8 the Sea of Azov initial seizing of Kereh and Taman
or one or the other of the shores of the Korth Strait is required.
There are no specially good sectors for carrying out landing operations
in the S.7)a. ofAzov. It is almost impossible to land on the sector between TeTruk
?r-
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I PAGE NUMEEP.
50X1-HUM
difficult in the region of Azov, Taganrog and Rostov enich present themselves as
and Kamishevat, thanks to the exceedinsly swamny locality; also landing is
fortified points, mutually covering and supporting one another. The northern shore
of the sea between Stepmovka (south of Eelitopol) and Taganrog presents itself
as much more possible.
The operational directions of the Azov sector are:
a, The Krssnodarete with further development of a strike,
(1) Either through Tikho-,-,e4ya-Sallsk to Stalingrad,
(2) Or through Nropotkin-Armavir to Grozny,
b. The Rostov-Stalingrad, and
c. The Dnepropetrovsk. (Page 111b)
Several through railroad routes ran to the northert shore of the Sea of Azov,
and in this relation the sector ilelitopoi-Ptostov is in a more favorable situation.
Of the air bases (aerodrome centers) in the considered sector, the only main
ones are: Odessa,. Pervomaisk, Kiroe'ograd, Apostolovo (southeast of Krivoi Rog),
namenka (south of Dikopol), Berislav (opposite Kakhovka), Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe,
Aelitopol and Fedorovka, Lozoeaya, SIavyansk, Gorlovka, Stalin?, Rostov, Taganmg,
ask, Berdyansk (Osipenko), Krasnodar; stations: Timoshevskaya, Gribsnskaya,
GostagamEkaya; Taman, Perikop, Alanyemsk, tzhmkol, Sarabuz? Kacha,
and
Koktebel, Yevoatoa'ASaki. (Pale 112)
? TheejUnificance of...the Zakavkaz_Theatre of ralitarv- Ooeratipns
Under the title "Zakavkoz Theatre of Militarv
Onerations", the soviet General
Staff understands the zone of locality lying between the ruorldian of Keroh-Dtmassk
St
(37 degrees of latitude) and the Meridier of Teheran (the 51,4degree of latitude),
bounded on the north by the main Kavkaz Range, and on the eauth by the line of the
north shore of the! Persian Gulf - the port of the Haifa on the llediterraine Sea.
"We will put the north border along the line Rostov-on-the-ton-Astrakhan.
The territory-of the theatre is un to 1000 kilometers in width and up to
1500 kilometers in length. It flanks the states: in the event of a local
conflict, those adjoining the border of the Zakavkaz, the northwest corner of Iran,
and the eastern part of Persia; in the event of the develonment of the more wide
OCS FORM
11A.1 49 200-I
D4SSi.:MATiOtafinilaittAr"
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riGiTria7:771S -Tic3rt Ti=7. ji:217V--1270.11u,i1-t.0
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? tr.
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PAG NUMEr.
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0
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co u
nflict of' a orld 1:ar1 :olso ',,he territory of Irak and Syria on the south and
.11m..kali.oTf,o from tho righ; bank o the Danube on the 1,,br.c,h.
The theatre has throe peculiarit:.e.s which distinrsuich it fraa the other
? 0 theatres of Tralita.ry operations and impose its impri'nt not only on the tactics of
troops but also on their ornization.
Tho -?irst pecullarikr is Its clear defined mountain character which excludes
the massive ermloyment of heavy militaxy technical equipment of around troops and
??,o.neral the execution of larc;e operations, splittiner, them into separate directions,
so:let/mos not connected one to another, The southr..:est territory is desert ea.prxises
"e,:occ.:, in addition, the e-nployment af.' special tactics, .and ova! the organi-
zation of the troops crperatinfr, there.
The second pe.culiarit:(,;? is the hot, and in places the unhealthy italcrial
cliraato -?ich hie rs the operations o!..' troops, and temporarily conolotely
ihe
Ii
The third peculiarity is -;-,hc presence of great water eu,:panses (the Black ilytd
Caspian Seas, Untia and Vanskoe Lakes) which cause the oceratlons of the ground
troops to lm caabined with the operations of fleets and flotillas, and pemits the
execution of combined operations.
Operations, speaking about those which transpired in the given theatre &dr; n-:;
the past war, give to us an imnmssion about the ..colQ. which the given theatre
played in the general system. of the renaining theatres of military operations;
one: as well about the character the operations possible in it,. and thus,
hiefly muse on their 'description.
Durint!: the first world IsTar, the theatre played a seCondarr role for Russia
(the main one was the ':este ril Theatre of Ildlitary Operations) but it fulfilled
ono of the responsible onerational-strateTic missions,
It zaa the mission of utrategc
on.
.relent of the 7,toup of coturtries of the adversary (Gs:tunny aod `N.rkey), the
vg of her from the east and in r.articialar, depriving the adversary of strategic
aw material, such as oil?
The 1AB:tan,- operations which deveboped chiefly on. Turkish torrito:t7, attracted
up to 20 Russiqn and nu to 30 TtnitiSh divisions. The most Active operations developed
CCE; i01111
KAR 49
20N IIISSG.NIPKROICONFID ENTIAL.PC.MS
p.
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OX1 -HUM
11
on the Pre-Black Sea and Erzerum Dfrectionse The most characteris ic
Is the Saiilkamish (Turkish), the Erzerum. and Tramezund (Russian)
Operations. The details about them can be read in the books:
a. "The Maneuver Period of the First World War", Professor
KalinknVski, and
b. "The World War", Zaionchkovaki (both are in the school library)
The Sarikamish operation gives to us an example of how three
corps
of Turks which :ere drawn into the comflict, in the course of
30 days lost 70 per cent of their personnel and did not fulfill the
misslion&eizing Sarikamish) because of poor Preparation for operations
in mountains in the cold season of the year (the main losses were those
who froze in the passes), because of the erroneous estimate as to the
utilization of local resources by the troops, and because of the loss
of control of the disunited columns.
On the other hand, the Erzerum Operation affirms the complete
possibility of successful operations under such conditions with
sufficiently tiughtout preparation of operations and with good en-
durance of the troops (Page 112a). The seizure by the Russians of the
city Trapezund (The Trapezund Operation) is an example of coordination
of ground trooPs and arnavy.
The result of the campaign -- the debouche of the Russian troops
on the 'front Trapezund, Erozinzhan, Mush, Rayat, and of the English
in the region of Bagdad -- completed the mission assigned to the
theatre of military operations -- the encirclement of the countries
of the adversary. And only the revolution in Russia and the necessary
withdrawal of the troops from the front did not permit the Allies
to seize the Mbsul oil region.
After the revolution of '17 the events in the theatre transposed
themselves to the territory of the Zakavkaz. 'The Russian Army was
withdrawn from Turkey and Persia. The Turkish troops occupied the
previously lost territory without combat and even entered into the
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Zakavkaz and occupied-Baku. While aiding the newly formed Zakavkaz.
'Republics to supress the attempts of the communist uprising9 they
f at the some time carried out the destruction of the larmenian population.
Well known is the three day massacre of the Armenians in Baku, the
complete destruction of the city of Shush with its Armenian population
and the Drerder and driving of the Armenians inland out of the territory
In Armenia oCcuried by the Turks (the Kars District). This period is
characterized also by internal wars and mutual destruction to a man of
all the nationalities of the Zavkaz that also continued later during
the German and English occupationsof the Zakavkaz. The main purpose of
these occupations was once again the seizure and the holding in their
!own hands of the Baku oil-bearing region.
It follows to recall that the Kavkaz in general and the territory
of the Pre-Kavkaz in particular was a be and concentration area for
for the development of the Anti-Communist movement led by General
Denikin. The conditions of the concentration area permitted the
seizing of Eastern Ukraine and the movement to the north up to Tula.
The events of the Second 7:orld aeveloped only on the reerritory
of Iran. The chief purpose of th: Soviet-English occupation of Iran
was the cutting off of the group of adversaries from the East, tne
creation of a threat to Turkey by way of a strategic encirclement or
it in the event of violation by it of neutrality, and the establishment
of a physical juncti on of the Allies and guarantee of the communioation$
thich aere feeding_the USSR, and a more stron:f guarantee of the oil
regions of Irak and Iran.
The entry of troops on to the territory of Iran did not encounter
resistance from the side of the latter. The occupation completely
fulfilled the mission assigned to it. The desire of the Soviet state
on the sly to carry out a campaign for a reunited Azerbaidzhan
(naturally under Soviet control) finished with complete failure in view
of the negative attitude of the '2urkish Azerbaidzhanians toward the
Soviet system.
carom
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CONFIDENTIAL
From a military point
;following Ltoments?;
Of view,
V.CG NUI45541
50X1 -HUM
it is interesting to note the
a. The main operational direction was the Tabriz.
b. The Pre-Caspian operational direction operated jointly with
the Caspian flotilla which executed a landing at the port of lekhlevi.
C. The Zakavkaz front mounted s blow jointly with the tops of
the Central Asiatic Yront.
In order correctly to define the contemporary significance of the
Zakavkaz Theatre of ailitary Operations, we must consider the two
variants of military operations. The first variant is the breaking out
of a local war, a personal conflict between the USSR and its neighbors
(Turkey or Iran
current political
OA.
the next world
or their bloc). The second variant, and which the
situation dictates to us, is the most likely variant
war in which the adversary of the Obba is the bloc
f the majority, if not all)of the remaining countries of the world.
Inthe event of the first variant, the superiority of strengths
shows itself to bg unconditionally on the side of the ussa and she
will be in condition to accomplish the mission of seizing a sufficiently
-
large territory of Turkish Armenia and Persian Azerbaidzhan. From this,
besides the territorial conquests, and the transfer of the border rram
the vital object --,Baku, there will be no gain, but the succesees of it
undoubtedly will call forth.aggravation of relations with England who
will not con d; mplate -the approach of Soviet troops to her Iranian and
Irak oil without participation. .(Page 112b)
For the opponents of the USSR in this variant the theatre assumes
a more important significance since, besides the posible territorial
annexations, the seizure of Baku, which brings a very serious economic
loss to the USSR, unconditionally interests them.
operations will be accompanied by engagements between
The military
the individual national groups, and as well by the struggle of all
of themwith conquerors -- that is, by a wide wave of partisan movement.
In Ghe event of the second variant ?"-7. the outbreak of a world Tar
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-- the significance -of
the theatre
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34
immeasurably grows for both sides-
1
50X1-HUM
On the side of the Soviet Union_t_Ilhis is exn/ained by_Illt fact ,
1
9..imply that in the given theatre it will solve the mission or separation}
4
of the forces of_the adversary into 3astern and Western prouns. Por
this, it will employ- all forces to push forward a front at least on
the line Samsun-Kaizeri-Yierzin on to Turkish territory and on the line
Lleshkhed-isfagan-Persian Gulf on Persian territory - by this to separate
the territory of Turkey from India.
Besides this, the straLudo encirclement of India (jointly with the
forces of Communist China) is attained by the given operation, and
conseeuently the transfer of India to its side or the forceful occu-
pation of this very rich country.
But in the event of such a conflict, the military operations in
the Zakavkaz Theatre of Iilitary Operations cannot be confined to the
territory of Turkey and Yersia, and unconditionally will be transferred
to the territorx_sf Irak since seizure of one of the nouerful sources
oLlofrlajparsly;oil -- is an important strategic victory and
puts in the hands of the USSR all the advantap;es connected with
rossession of this raw material.
This "demarche' best of all guarantees also the personal oil-
bearing region of the US SA -- Baku -- since it boundlessly pushes
back the border from it.
For the Allied Anti-Communist Bloc, the Zakavkaz Theatre of
Zilitary Operations also may play one of first degree significance.
In the first places from the point of view of preserving for itself
the useful routes of communication of Europe with Asia (and in the first
rank with India); in the second, from the point of view of preserving
for itself the oil-bearing regions of Irak and Persia; in the third
place, in view of the extreme importance of disrupting the supply of
oil to the Soviet Army (Baku yields about 75 per cent of all the oil
extracted in the USSR). In addition to all the rest, the Zakavkaz can
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lbe'considered as the territory from which to
IV.C7.- NUMBER
? -HUM
open the shortest and tho
most satisfactory route to the vital and strategically
f the US.3.11.
important objects
The Kavkaz-Samara Direction cuts offthe European part of the
Soviet Armed Porces from the :Asiatic part and at once disrupts the
normal supply of one. and the other. By a debouche in the region of
Samara, the administra.ivo-economic center of the country -- Moscow
-- is pi.oced ensier a threat, and in event of the prompt transfer of the
6tE.tv.lea
of the supreme commend from :elbscow to .9emara, that also in
general disrupts the complete direction of the fronts and the coordina-
tion of their operations.
This "demarche" Jelivers into the hands of the allies the very
rich bread regione or the uban and the Don, the very rich sources
of coal of the Donbass and in general can be looked on as a completely
advantageous and suitable "place de arms" for the final destruction of
the forces of the Soviet Army with transposition of the operation
beyond the Urals and in an eastern direction, and into the Ukrainian
a westerly uirection,
This latter circumstance becomes still more important in view or
[the possibility of the Allied Havy to coordinate with the ground armies
(the Black Sea) and furthermore to supply them.
Such is the significance of the .Zakavkaz Theatre of Military
Operations at the present time and such opera ons in
the possible future war. (Page 121)
The General DesssiRet.ion of the Theatre of Militarv ?orations
A. The Soviet General Staff under the ventral Asiatic 'Pneatre of
Military Operations understands the territory, bordered on the north
by the line Balkhash -- Aral Sea, on the south by the shore of the Ara-
bian Sea, and on the east by the line Urumchi -- Delhi and on the
it may unfold durid'es
11'
west by the meridian of Teheran.
On the Soviet side, this territory belongs to the Turkistan
oForze
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36
50X1 -HUM
Military A.strict, including the Turkmen, the Uzbek, the Tadzhik, the
Kirgiz and a part of the Kazak SSR.
Beyond Lhe limits of the USJR, the theatre of military operations
includes the territory: the eastern half of Iran; Afghanistan;
-Pakistan; the northwest corner of Aindustan and the eastern part of the
province of China--Sinkiang.
The extent o" the theatre is about 2500 kilometers in length and
same in width.
B. The theatre has severql peculiarities which influence the
organization of troops and the character of military operations.
1. The mountainous-desert locality. 4iore than 60 per cent
of the state borders of the USSR traverses mountains which attain an
altitude of from four wn to six thousand meters. Approximately 50
per cent o the territory of the theatre of military operations is
occupied by mount.ains and highlands, among which is located the highest
summit in the USSR (Stalin Peak, 7495 meters, in the Pamir aountains)
and the highest mountains in the world?the Himalayas and the Karakorum
(with summits, Godwin Austin, 8620 meters and .ulverest, outside of thc
theatre, 8882 meters).
The seconi half of the territory is almost completely occupied
by deserts. The most significant of them on the territory of the USSA
are: The Kara-Kum, the Kizil-Kum, the Hungry Steppe, ani beyond the
limits of the US8R, the Takia-.ulakan (in Sinkiang), the Tar (in Hindu-
stan), the Registan and the Dasht-i-Hargo (in Afghanistan), the
Desht-i-Lut ond the Kevfr lin Iran)
Only a sMall extent. of the territory of the theatre of military
operations is occupied by oases, which are located along the banks of
rivers and present themselves as suitable for settled places. In them
is concentrated the main mass of the population, the density of which
aere attains 100 (in the valleys of the AUrgab, the Zeravshan and the
the
ccs ; NTlit tiuos '
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Geography IIT Econ Geog ?Ukre4'
CONFIDENTIAL
PAO:: IIUMEM
--",.,50X1 -HUM
- Gergan) and even 600 persons per square kilometer (in the valley of
the Indus), at the same time as in the mountains and desert regions
it falls to 0.1 persons per square kilometer and still less than that.
2. The heverc continental climate. The northern part of the
theatre of military operations lies about 45 degrees north latitude,
and the southern part at the 25th parallel, that is, it is located
almost in the tropics.- This determines the unusually severe climate
of the theatre of militare operations. The temperature of the air in
the deserts rises in the shade up to 50 degrees centigrade, an the
soil heats up to 70 and more degrees (the steady temperature of the
sand in the Kara-Kum in June is 79.4 degrees). To tread barefooted on
the soil is absolutely impossible, and eggs placed on the sand are cook.
The presence of high mountain regions gives po*:erful
contrasts in temperature. The highlands have a mild temperature, and
many mountains are covered with perpetual snow (the temperature on the
summits of the Karakorum does not rise hi.R.her than minus 40 degrees
Centigrade).
The remoteness of a great part of the theatre of military
operations from the sea end the enclosure of the territory le- mountains
which do not permit moist winds determine the continentality of the
climate. The completely cloudless sky in the course of the great
part of the year permits the above-noted.elevation of the temperature,
and on the other hand, the severe chilling at night and in the winter.
The daily amplitudes of the ground. attains. 609 and the yearly - 100
degrees.
The quantity of precipitation varies from 100 kilometers (the
deserts) up to 1200 centimeter (the southwest foothills of the '
Himalayas,, the place most rich in rain in the world).
3. The disunion of separate sectors. The huge territories
CCS FORM
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PAGE' NUMBER
38
50X1-HUM
of the theatre of operations are occupied by localities difficult to
E traverse and even completely impassable for movement and the waging
of military operationS. To these belong: (Page 121a)
a. The Takia-iAakan Desert with a breadth of up to 300
kilometers,
b. The mountain system of the Pamir, the 4arakoruc, and
t-o.e Himalayas, with an average breadth of up to 500 kilometers,
c. The difficult-to-traverse region, the Hindukush, withe
breadth up to 200-600.kilometers, and
d, The Dasht-i-Lup and Zevir deserts with breadths of 300-
500 kilometers.
Hilitary operations in the directions disconnected by these
natural obstacles will take place without operational conmunication?
and the :iimalayas and the 1.:arakorum divide the theatre of military
operations into two strategic independent sectors: the eastern or
Chinese, and the southern.
A. The relatively poor railroad nets of Central Asia and
India are separated one from the other by 500 kilometers along the
iline Aerm!zel'eshavar 300 kilometers along the line 4petta-Aushka- In
the Sinking Sector, this distance is increased up to 2500 kilometen?:s:
in the Iranian Sector, it is shrunk to 350 kilometers. In this
exPanse the supply of operations can be carried out only by the net
f roads or by aviation.,which abbreviates the auantity of troops whoth
can be employed in an bperation.
C. The Central Asiatic Theatre of Jilitary Operations is not e
main theatre for the USdR: however, its rolC recently has been raised.
It is a "place de arms" from vhich, in due course, comrounism was intro-
duced into Sinkie:ng and extended finally to the whole of China. The
very same thing is being atteelpted with Afghanistan by armed force
6upporting the coming to power of Ammanulv-Khan. At preeent, the tet
: influence is India with its millions of impoverished population.
,
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The shortest distance to India from 'the USSR lies
1 tory of the giveil theatre of military operations.
g
qterritory of theetheatre of military operations is
4
lithe sole source of cotton.
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1 into the valley
t
llof the
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i
Penetrated
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took Iplace on
point of view
X:4
PAGE
NUMBEll
-11
50X1 -HUM
right on the terri-
For the USSR, the
inwortant as almost
Examina Lion of the military events of the past which
the territory of the theatre is important to us from the
as to which directions on which they developed. Re-
calling several of these:
1. The campaign of Alexander the Macedonian (327 B.C.).
From Central Asia,
he penetrated into Kabul, crossed the Hindukush by
the Bamian and Khavak passes, and by the Khaiber passage debouched
II
1
of the Indus; and moving along the southaest foothills i
dimalayas, approached the valley of the Ganges.
2. The Arabian Invasion
raainly
(712). The Arab Achmed Ben Kasima
through Zenedan (Persia) and particularly through
Zandaear in the .eegion of 4uetta and expanding, cut along the whole
[flower Indus
Lzna
penetrated through the Khaiber passage, and also through the
;.iumal passage in the Dullimar Mountains to the Valley of the Indus
and to Pyandzhab (15 Indian c [Taigns).
4. The Mongolian Invasian. (1217-20) The invasian of the
to ?lultan,
3. The_-.1aselman Invasin (977-1030).
From the region or
(Afghanistan was the center of the Gazieividskii 1.ingacm)
'ongolians under the leadership of Ghengis Khan through the Dzhungarskii
( the valley or the river Ili) into the basin of the Aral Sea.
The 1=ersiencampaign of the Mongols by the on of Ghengis
Tulya, through Meehkhed-Shanrud.
The Afghanistan capaign of Ghengis Khan through Herat end
ghanabad to
ii
Kabul.
The India campaign of Babiar (descendent .01 Ghengis Khan, 1504)
rough Kabul and the 121aiber passage into the valley of the Indus to
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II 5. The Peran Invasion (1738) through etuetta.
50X1eHUM
1 The above indicated directions of invasions also at the
11
p Present time are almost the sole suitable directions for carrying out 1
q
II? maseive military operations. (Page 122)
11 11
? 0
,f The Central (Afghanietan) Sector
A. The Central Sector of tae theatre which is being studied by i
i
..?????limmENIMPIrmr,?,
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110
us will be the zone of locality with the borders; on the west, the
Iranian-Afghanistan Border - the Aral Sea ? on the east; the western
shore of Lake Balkhash-Jelhi. In view of the fact that in the indicated r
zoneAfghanistan, the territory of which is the "place de arms" for closi
1
1
operations, borders on the USSR., the sector may be called the Afghani- ,
stan Sector.
1
For the whole theatre of military operations, this is the
mein sector. In it will be resolved the basic mission or the whole
lqi
il
1
ii
theatre of operations -- penetration into India.
It follows to direct attention to the fact that to the three
southern sectors -- entrants to the Soviet- Afgetn borders run
strategic through routes:, to the region of A:usbka, the single track
railroad from the station of erv on the Central Asia Railroad which
1
is joined_ with Krasnovodsk; to the region of Termek,, the single traek
branch line from the _station Kagan (Bukhara), which is joined by a
end to
double track railroad to the deep rear of the country le southern
part of Pamir, by the roads which are good for automobile transport
from the railroad station ofOsh and Stalinbad. It follows to con-
Usider the rivers Sir-Darya and Amu-Darya, passable for small craft for
1 1a great distance, as supplementary through routes.
ii
The locality on ehe other side of the Soviet-Afghanistan
border presents in itself three completely different zones:
1
1, The Afgoho-TurkisLan lowland with a breadth of 50-150
11.11
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the Iranian, Afghanistan, and Soviet borders. This plain gradually
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Geography III, Mil Boon Geo g "Ukraile" 41 50X1-HUM
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rises on the south and is transformed into the foothills of the
Hindukush plateau with a continentally severe and dry climate. The
road net of the lowland is represented in a main artery--the auto-
mobile road Faizabad, Khanabad, Mazar-i-Sherif, laimene, Herat and
further to ISeshed (Iran) with many branches running to the south to
the foothills of the Hindukush and on the north to the Soviet border.
post important are two junctions: Jazar-i-Sh3rif, with roads to Terme?,
1. and to the passes of the iandukush, and Aerat, aith roads to .e:ushka
oF
ana Farak-Kandagar, in circumlocatione,the Hindukush from the west
An obstacle is represented in the river Amu-Darya, ffhich for a
Idistance of 450 kilometers (from the region of lallvaba to the village
Basago) is a border river and having up to 1.5 kilometers width and
1
ilap to 3 meters del,th, a swift current with absence of fords, and preseqts
11
itself as a serious defensive line for both sides,
4 In the summer months a great difficulty for operation of troops
the a.k.fAanets", a wina of soutternly directLon, which regularly rises
in the second half of the day and carries with it masses of dust.
1 2. The mountain system of the Hindukush with a length up to 700
'Kilometers and breadth to 200 (on the east) to 600 (on the west). On
ithe eastern part, it has an altitude up to 7750 meters (the summit of
Tirach-Air) and passes to 500.meters. Only the Berogil I-ass (from the
-valley of the Vakhan-Dare: to the valley of the Yazina) has an alti;?ude
c).f 3800 meters and is the most passable. A great part of the year, the
passes lie under sno;i: and do not permit passage even by pack transport.
The western part of the HimalayeShas a lesser altitude. The
lumerous ranges drop away-in fan shape and gradually diminish to the
outhwest. Between them are desert valleys, covered with stones. The
Lad net is also poor. For movement in a meridian direction in the
koothills,-there is only the nasi- Khavak (3550 meters, an historic
?route between :Kabul and the valley of the Amu-Darya) and the automobile
coad through the Eamian pass (froa Kabul to Mazar-i-Sherif). The road
- 1
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from Kabul to Herat surmounts a large number of passes, passing
50X1 -HUM
ihro.ugh. them on pack trails, passable only a few months of the year.
The road Kabul-Kandagar is suitable for automobile transport. (Page
a)
1221
t
3. The valley ol the Indus and Pundjab is an oasis with subtropic4
al vegetetion, a hersb elimate, and on the southeast is transformed .intoi
1
P
the sand desert, the Tar. The approaches from the northwest are the
passages:,
Ithaiber (from Eabul to Peshavar), Bolans (from Kandagar to thel
lower course of the Indus), and several passes through the Buleimanov
Leountains, passable to pack transport (among them the most useful
is the Gumal Pass).
The Ind River and its tributaries (the rivers, such as the
Pyandzhad) are serious defensive lines and obstacles for movement.
In the drought period of the year, they, in their middle course,
have breadth of'L50-300 metexls and depth of 5-4 meters, and in its
lower reaches the Ind covers several kilometers and form several
channels. In the rainy time, often the rivers overflow and flood
huge areas.
The net of unpaved roads-caravan routes and wagon roads-are little
suitable for automobile transport. The railroad net is well developed.
IL The Central 6ector has the following operational directions:
I. The Gilgits. From Jurgab through the Barwil Pass to
Gilgit and. further along the valley of the Inct River to Leewalpinda.
It permits the operation only of mountain troops, not more than a
division, and that only in the summer months when the passes are open. r
The trails do not permit normal transport of supplies, ana thus Lhe
supply of personnel wi.li have to be carried out at the expense of local
resources- The employment of mechenizei troops is completely elimi-
nated' and aviation is seriously curtailed. The sole mission of the
direction can be e debouche on the flank and the rear of the 'Peshosar
group and disruption of the communic-tion line LakIlareshavar.
.t.trrn.
? Ai::osm 2 ONC.:: .7p)
iCTON MENIAL'
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?
4
,(CLIzsqiciration S.&p)
CONFIDENTIAL
rea'S USA TRANSLATIMIxxonwic
1 Geography III, Mil ilicon Geog ukralne"
PACS NUMBER
lL3
50X1-HUM
l?
2. Faizabad. From the region of Kulgab to Faizabad and
further through the Dara Pass and along the valley of the river Svat
to Peshavar. The capacity is not more than one division of mountain
troops without wheeled transport. The Dara Pass, 4500 meters, is
open only in the summer months. The mission is a debouche on the flank
of the Peshavar group.-
3, The Kabul - the chief one in the sector. It hs two
departure regions: arovabad. and Termez. From the first: movement-
is possible along the-roads through Khanabad, the Xhavak pass to Kabul.
From the second, along the road through liazar-i-Sherif,'Che Bashin Pass
to Kabul. The total capacity is up to Thur divisions of mountain
troops. The mission is the seizing of the capitol of Afghanistan, .4abul.
Further operation will depend on the general purpose of the military
operations. In the event of personal conflict with Afghanistan, the main
group would be directed through Ganzito Kandagar for final occupation of
the country and coving to the side of the Xhniber 1,assage. In thp
event of conflict with India, the main group will be directed to the
southeast with the mission of penetrating to Ilundjab and threatening
Delhi. With fulfillment of this mission, part of the forces from the
bul region will be directed to Kandagar for covering the right flank
d communication with the Kandagar Direction, and on the other hand with
iebouche in the valley pf the Ind, the troops of the Gi/zit and Faizabad
irections will be joiyied.
4. amamir. From the region of Kerk to the south. It
permits the movement of .all types of troops. The mission is limited-
seizing the Afgan-Turkistan Lowland to link the Kabul and Yarakh
[Directions, later to serve as their reserve. Only up to one mountain
division can penetrate further to the interior of the Himalayas along
the valley of the upper course of the river Geri-Rud in the region of
Davaat Yar for further cooperation with the Kabul or,Farakh Directions.
5. Farakh. The most roomy of the directions of the Afghani-
ztan Direction. It permits the movement of up to five divisions of all
200-1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23: CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
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7(;111-1AUM
1 type troops. The close-mission is the deep invasion and occupation or q
Afghami6tan with debouche of the troops in the region of Kandagar.
:he region of Herat and Farakh, it permits the penetration
.1to Iranian territory. The Later mission is the forcing of the Suliman
AiMountains in the direction of t,4uetta and debouche into the valley of
the middle Ind, from which part of the troops can be directed for
Frani)
of troops oni
floccupation of the lower Ind, and part in the direction of the fort of
.,
SandemPn or Ilultan for union with the adjncent directions in the
seizing of Pundjab (Page 123)
The Flank Sectors
To the west and northeast from the Central Sector are located two
Ianking, completely independent sectors of the theatre of military
The first of these is the Iranian 7hich permits operationa1-1
1
strategic cooperation with the central sector, the second: the Cines-i
11
operations.
o Sinking, is completely operationally isolated and operations in it
can take place only with strategic inter-communication with the central
!sector.
A. The Iranian Sector.
Under the Iranian Sector of the Central-Asiatic ?J2heatre of
uJilitar,T Operations is the zone, bordered on the east by the line
Aral Sea-iran-Afgan border; and on the west, the meridian or Tehran.
he width of the zonewhich is 800 kilometers to the north of the Soviet- ,
1
Iranian border, attains 1000 kilometers to the south of it. On the
territory of Iran, it includes its eastern half.
The basic significance of the sector for the Soviet side is
the coordination with the Zakavkaz Theatre of ialitary Operations in
eizing the oil sources of Iran and thus the basic operations develop
'./1 the Tehran Direction. The supplementary significance of the sector
s penetration into.the southeast part of Iran for debouche on the shore
f title Persian Gulf. ,
From the Soviet side, two min direct routes on which the
?Stzrap)
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11,,n 20P-i D,ISSEMINATION coNrintwatoNs
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23: CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
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? IMMINOW
I.
(Ciacci!!torr .S.tzrap)
I CZ UM TMMumal Military he numiu it'ar
I Geography LELEcon Geog "Ukral.12:
. CONFIDENTIAL
immo????=comereomamm..-
I !UV.; SIUMCV..2
____4L,50X1 -HUM
ti
supply of troops operating in the sector is carried out run to the
a
border: the railroad route BukarerDusbak, with branches from Tedzhen
to Saralcs (not confirmed) and the railroad route from Krasnoiio sk
td Ashkhabad (with the facility of connecting Krasnalo ek by sea trays
-
Port with Gurev -and Astrakhan). PAs to the peculiarities of the locality
located on the territory of Loan which influence the operations of
troops, it follows to bring out the following:
L. Two parallel ranges; the Ebpet-Dag and the Turkmen-Kharasan
stretch for 400 kilometers along the border and have only two good
through routes: Dushak-Ieshkhed and AShkbabad-Ktchan-Soltanabad.
2. The eastern pprt of the Elbrus, dividing the Pre-Caspian
Lowland from the remaining Lerritory of the country.
a. The waterless sand deserts, Kevir and Lu, disconnecting the
central part of Iran from its eastern borders.
The roads in the indicated sector are caravan routes, little
and-especially autcraoblio
adapted for wheeledAtransport. The main route is Meshkhed-Shanrud (the
terminal stetion of the railroad).
The operational directions are:
1. The Zakhedan. From the line Zalekha7bed-Saraks to the
south. .The capacity is up to two divisions of mountain troops. The
mission is the seizing of the eastern edge of Iran, and after debouche
in the region Zakhedan, the penetration to ports of the Persian Gulf
(especially to Benuer-Abaza) or invasion on the territory of India
and debouche.to the Lower Ind.
2. Shanrud or Tehm,a.(frequently called lieshked for the main
road junction) is the main direction of the sector. From the line
Zalekhabad-Saraks-Bushak through Meshkhed-Shanrud to TehAran, The
.
capacity is up to five divisions of all types of troops. The mbsion
is the seizing of the northeast part of Iran and a union with the
.Zaka kaz Theatre of Military Operations and seizing of Tehran.
3.uchan. Supplementary to Che first. The capacity is one
CC.:MtiAn.O:?: -4vt-7 P1 r?nel ?
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DI.,5,SE:.MINATiONcoN FIDENTrAtoNs
(Claszificcao:: &)
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23: CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
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? el
(CI=LricaaonSt.am)
? tfe-S-inii TS LAM: I Zi 11 t ar Sr-lia,e ii.,..1.. licte.)
. L.Genceraphy III, Mil Econ Geog .ntilcraike "
---- .. ...LIE In e....t7T11,1{11,..-M/G SY if' 83tdfiCIf ? 4.014.,. lart..3,1.. 1,,...eg git.M.Yr
1
?
??ezmis 4 0504?..e=ome
FAGS HUBS2
46
division of mountain troops. The misrion is the'seizure of Kuchan
and further, Soltanabad and by the establishment of operational
communication belleen the Shanrud and Liaritime Jirections.
4. The aaritime. From th4 region of Zizil-Arvat along the' shore
line of the Caspian Sea to Cbaluz. The capacity is up to two divisions 1
of mountain troops. The mission is seizing or the ports of Zaspia,
osf,ecially the terminal point of the Trans-Iranian Railroad-Bender-i-
Shakh and the establishment or communication with the troops of Lakavkaz
Theatre of Military Cperations. Operations in it can be joined with
operations of a fleet (page 123a).
The Chinese or Sinkiang_qctor
' The Sinkianre Sector of the Central Asian Theatre of illitery
Operations ie the zone of locality stretching from the west to the
east within the border on north of Lake Balkhash-Urumchi, on the south,
the Aral Sea--.Karakorum Range.
The peculiarity of this sector is defined from one side b- the
presence of an almost impassable barrier in average width of kilo-
meters (the system or the Himalaysa, Karakorum, and the Kuen. -Lunys),
which isolates operations in tho Central relci. Sinkiang Sectors, and on
the other hand, the completely inlependent strategic misrion which
stands before the given sector. Its main significano.. 4.s the carrying
of Communism to the countries of China, it is relaVJi . to say, with
the present political situation, not an actual mission.
As main through routes on the territory of the US..iR, it follovis
to consider: railrond routes:" Semipalatinsk-Alma-Ata, Aris-Franze,
Ursatevskaya-Osh. Each of the three terminal stations are joined td
the border by dirt, improved roads, -altogether suitable for utilization
of aUto-transport.
The obstacles for operations of troops against the neighbors of the
.11.3.11CT?
50X1-HUM
USSR are:
The desert of Dzhelisun, located in the center of the
OCS FORM
;it 49 200-i
ted.
DISSE1NATi014 tfirkflinTIAIONS
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Geography III, iIi1 .6con Geog "Ukralpe----------------------------
-
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4:1
CONFIDENTIAL
leGammm It
47
5.0X1 -HUM
Dzungariya.
2. The 'eastern spurs of the Tyan-Shan with an average altitude
of about four thousand meters, however, give the possibility of
operations by the two parallel longitudinal valleys from Auldzh to
Urumchi and from Przhevalsk to Aarashar.
3. The deserts of Takia-jakan, with a breadth up to 400 kilo-
meters, located in the center of the Kashgur.s,ya, the dried-up river
1 Tarimon, along the banks of which is located an almost continuous
oasis.
The sector has the following operational directions:
1. amgEshg.l. Located along the continuation of the road to
Shikho from Ayaguz (a station on the Turksib) to Chuguchak. The
capacity is one division. It permits the operations of all types of
troops. The mission is a debouche into the region Shikho to threaten
the rear or the Kuldzhin grouli. Later, to participate in operations
in the Urumehi Direction.
2. The Urum(hi, the main direction of the sector. Prom the
region of Dzharegt to the east along the nerthern spurs of the
Tyan-Shan. the capacity is up to three divisions; operations of all
types of troops are permitted. The mission is a debouche into the
region of Urumchi to seize the central operationally, favorable
region for continuation of the offensive to the oast, to the interior
of the province.
3.i122....Tyan-Shan. Along the Ili Valley and the 1Karashar Valley,
the general capacity is up to two mountain divisions. The mission is a 1
debouche in the region of Karshar and finally to seize the operationally i
favorable central region of the province.
4. The Ak-Su. Pram the region of Przhevalek through the Bebel
Pass. Operations are possibly only in the summer months and with
forces of not more than one mountain division, The mission is a
debouche in the operational rear of the .Kashgar.roup later, parti-
cipation in operations on the Karashar Direction.
Lee.:
.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23: CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
(Civcrfficati.on &c.r.)p)
?675 l'olkAmmte-roli falitary.2,conommo ttL
Geography III, M1 2con Geog "Ukrai4e"
---------------------------
?
Iwith the mission of seizing the southern oases of Kashgar, The
' 5. "Kashgar. Operations for
Seizing or vac- region of .K'ashgar,
from the
a, From Liirin te.rough
west;
C.
o
PAGE ttUt lan48n
elwer..1.0.02.11.612.11411....d
i......, .......... ....... .......,
fulfilling the close mission, the
-
50X1 -1-UM
develop along three mountain roaas:
the At-Bash aange, from the norhwest;
From Oah tnrouah the Alai Range and the Zarabel Pass,
From
;?amir through the .Aarev.wi Pass, from the
southwest.
The total capacity is up to four mountain divisions; the two lat ver
passes are the less suitable. Further operations must take the
character of a two-pzonged flank of the desert Takla-ijakon and develops
along two roads:
(a) x:ashgar-Ak-Su-Sarashar with the mist ion of
(3.ebouche in the vital region brumch.i-Karas liar; (b) Ka.shgar-1).ota,n-beiran
L
capacity of each of the directions is two-three divisions. The
1 operations of all types of troops are permitted (]age 124).
Operational Directions on the Territory of the ubba
A. Te locality on the territory of the Central-Asian Theare
of alitary Operations has the following peculiarities, favorable for
the Soviet side:
1. The huge pre-border regions are occupied by natural barriers
having a strong defensive nature, Such are: the iishungar Alatai aange,
ii
countries, which not have railroads and a weaXly developed net
Lttle suitable dirt roads.
3. The huge expanses on the territory of Vase rear of the .theatre
the mountain system Tyan-Shan and Pamir, the headwaters of the Amu-
Darya, the Kopet-Bag Range, the .1-re-Caspain sand deserts
.?
11
4
of the
Tae huge expanses or. the territory of the neighboring
of military operations, occupied by the hard-to-surmount deserts,- tlie
;14
.Kara Kizil-KumSand'the Hungry Steppe.
A
The vital regions on the territory of the US13. are: Semi:reche (to
the northeast of Frunze and Alma-Ata), the region 1P2e2ambui-Turkis1en-
OCS IzOPY,
11/4,
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23: CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
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I
(Cli::ification Stamp)
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iTLFey Lconomic
GeograPhv III. Lill Econ Geog "Ukraire"
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"tiTas..Trumtr.R ?
49
Tashkent, the Fergana, Zerabshan, A*urgab, and .KhOrezm Oases. All ohese.
A 50X1-HUM
with the exception of Semireche and the lurgab Oasis. are covered by 11
natural barriers.
In view of What is sold above, the military operations on the 1
Soviet territory of the theatre of military operation. will be
distinguished by Lhe following reculiarities:
1. The theatre will be weakly manned with troops; the employmenL
of massive armies is impossible. The unusually suitable use in the
theatre of formations of the local nationalities in view of their
familiarity with the locality and greater acclimatization.
2. Supply of the soldiers will be hindered, thus it will be
opportune to use products of supply from local resources, and to we
the road net only to haul loads of ammunition and fuel.
3. The most exp../ient strategic maneuver is a two-pronged
flank of the main group of vital regions in the directions: from Oho
northidzha-Alma-Ata-Aris, from the southtilerat-Lukhara-Taehkent, with
the covering of the right direction on the right on the barrier Lake
Balkhash and with joining of the left flank of the second direction by
operations in the region Asnhabad-1:rasnoAk sk.
4. The characteristic operotional-tactical maneuver will be the
encirclement of separate vial regionst(asis), orue-oing them with iedges
into parts and subsequent destruction of the knots of resistenoe.
5. The tactical operations are in strong depdendence on the local
conditions of climate and locality. The mountain and desert regions
compel the emp]oyment of ta*OODS with special organization and in t'oe
main, with pack transport. The hot climate requires great preliminary
preparation and training of troops.
B. The northern sector is the territory, located to the north
of the line Kashgar-Tashkent. .it has the following operationf=,1
directions.
1. 'ChuEuchak. From the region Chuguchak to the station Ayaguz.
DIESEMINATION CONFIDENTilir's
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23: CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
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Zeogr.aphy III, Mil 2con Geog "Ukraile?
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a.
pit.sattlimEso.
50
ve.se.s..1?oatralr.se,w-
The capacity is up to two divisions permitting the operations of all 1
I -:5.N types of troops. The mission is the severing of the Turk a5RaiiroagX1UM
ii
ILine and support of the right flank of the Ili Direction.
2. Ili is the main direction of the sector. From the region
Kuldzh to Alma-Ata and further in the direction of the station Ari.
I The 0%-o&city is 1175 to four divisions. It permits the operations of all 1
:
1 .
!I types of troops. The mission is the seizing of Semirech; furthers
II
debouche in the rgion of the station Ariss to cut off the Tashkent
d
r group from the north. rilhis direction decides one of the main missi,ms c
L
of the theatre of military operations. It re'?tuires the constant
11 reinforcement of troops and strong covering of the right f3ank (PaEe
1 124a).
1
ti Z. The Isikik-Kul. ...from tie region A.k-Su through. the Bebel Pass to t
Przhevaisko The capacity i c not more than one division of mountain
lit
1, troops. Onerati CMS ace possible oily in Crie sumer time. The mission 11
li
is limited?to seize the basin of the Issilf.--.11 Lake and by tills to sip-
port the et flank of the Ili Direction Find to enter into the rear ..n"
II
it the Zarin Group
li
it A
11 -Ls The "lari n . Prom the region of .C,:ashga.2.- in the direction of
Frunze 9 the capacity is one diyi.SiOn of mountain troops. The misdon
. is to seize Frunze:, to aid the Ili Direction in fulfilling its close
i
im5 ssion; further, the junction with its troops. for jo5.nt orerations. I
ti
C. The Central or Pandr hector is that territory in the tria,n,-,le 1
li
'icashga3.4-Tashkent-D2lyc.thr-the alnur3taJn s;n4e1.6 of i,he :i?lergarka Oasis. It it
.:
il
t.4
g
lih1-2s the following operational directions;
,
i
P 1. The Alai.. From "Kashgar to the west to the valley of the
i
lriver .:1-izil-Sv.,. frOTd there the math operations will be directed through
the Taldik. Pass to Osh with the aim of tieing up the 2-iiergena grow);
supplementary directions are the .Kifal 11.1.1., lass and the valley of the
KiZil-Su with the aim of comp-let e blockafle of the Pamir. The capacit
is up to one division of mountain troops. Operations are possible on1,-
in summer months .
FOn ?
Pi) 200-i
CSiMNAT1ONFCMENTIALTIONS
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2. The LlurEab. From Z.:ashgar through the KarasLQ Pass to Adurgab..
The capacity is up to one division of mountain troops. The aim is 50X1-HUM
on invasion to the interior of the Pamir spurs and the liquidation of
1 I
its garrison.
3. The South Pamir. From the region of GiM.t through the Barogil
Pass to Zurgab., The capacity is not more than a division of mountain
, ,
troope,
The mission is that of the ;:iurgab Direction. Operations on
both directions are possible only in the summer.
!
11 4. The Kulyab. .2rom the region of Paizabad-Xhanabad to Kulyab
li and .Garm,, The capacity is two divisions of mountain. troops. The
II
1 mission is the seizing - the Vakhsh Valley; further, the creation of
i1
a threat to Stalinabad from the east and blocade of the Pamir from the
northwest.
D. The southern sector is that zone of locality, located to the
11 north from the line .k(hanabad-Caspion Sea, with eclusion of the
2ergana Oasis. If the III Direction of the morthern sector fulfills one
ri
hI of the basic missions of the theatre of military operations-cuotinr; it
III
I
il
off from the deep rear of the country?then the southern sector fu1-
l!
p,fills the main mission of the theatre of military operations?the
q
.rseizing 01' the territory of the theatre and the destruction of the
1
forces of the enemy cut off in it b7 the Ili Direction. The southern
J
i
isector has the following operational directions:
1
1 1 l. The Stalinabad. From the region of Termez, between the
-?Aafirnigan and the SnIchan-Darya Rivers. The capacity is up to two
mountain divisions. The rnission is, with.coordination of the Kulyab
Direction, completely to seize the southern foothills of the Gissar
Range; further, the troops of this direction can be utilized for
A.
d
reinforcement of the SamaLl-kanOirection
2. The Samarkand. ;IT= the region of the approach of. the Soviet
Afghanistan border near the village of asago to 2carsh-Samerkand-Ta,shkent,
lit is the main direction of the sector and the theatre. The capacity
Ls up to five divisions of all types of troops. The mission is,
t
ii
oos-FoRN
4? 200-1
DISSEMINATiON
utiNFIDENTIAri?"s
, ? ? 4.?
(C hIssificz Lion 5,a:p)
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?
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(C1.3.7.71fk:WonSt-4q.np)
rNiECTYblvivIlsCimon ibconomIc
Geography III, :al Boon Ceog ?Uhralie"
Arlem.-?,n?raor.raoloshontsvA
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mostimm.a frii?r???=1=1
IPAi3S..111DISZ-R 1
52 _,.,.t
i
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50X1-HUM
a olnt ly with th.e Chardzhui -.)..i. rec ti on, the sei zing of the Zeravshan
1
further, jointlf with the Iii JOirection, the liqo.idation of the Tashkent
3. Chardzhui< Prom the reion of Aerat to liushk -..aerv-BukharE1)
the second airection_in importance of the sector, supplementary to the r
6araarimnd Directions, ''The capacity is up to five divisions (incoeaso is
hjnderee,_ only by the absence of'a sufficient, quantity of wator). The
idosion is the seizin or the 147.urgab Oasi and the seveeing of the
reilrood in che roudon of :R,r7 Further, by a blow on Bukhar to join
the Samarkand Direction s.nd,-the seizing or the Zeravshan Oasis, after
v,hich to operate jolly with it.
4. Ashkhabad< l'rom the line Saraks-shke(3 in the general
ai-ection Dushak-Ashkbabad. fhe co,tpecity iz up ?.o four clivisions of
[
all typos of troops. Ihs zadssion 13 the seizing of the Tedzher
l'orther. the lizluidation of the Ashkhabad group.
5. ::topet-DacJ4 suniementa2y to the Ashkhabad JAroction. Pro.'
tT region of ,CUd)an Caeou.,7h the Gaudan Pass to Ashkhaba6. Mt,
r! ea-FP:city is one division of mounttAn troo-os. The mission is the tiein,:
1
,p of ie Ashl-hab< group.
G. 2rom the gion of 2en1er Lzhakh-lazil Atrek n
flFnk of the Konet-D.,:::47. from the 'i'est to 1Cj.zil Aryat-sc.azandzhik. The
ca7s.aity is three divisions of all tyres of 6roops. ,The mission is the
railvo" in ths .oeg-ons of ,Z,A1,...v,t .1-
, , GS ID 1.3i7A TRA:4SLATION killycoary EcOairti tieograpny,
dS=IR Part TTp Crimea
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19
vomi
orr
PAGE t8JNR
8
(b) An offensive to the west in the general direction 'Redon-50X1-HUM
II
Petrokov, which leads to the deep flanking of the Warsaw region,
(c) A strike on the front Crakow-Tarnov to the deep rear of the
?eremishlyansk region.
In ary event, the Lublin Direction is assigned either uith
the Belorussian armies, or with the Ukrainian.
(d)_ In the latter two instances, the development of operatfon
ic tied to the necessity to force the river San (a tributary of the Visla) and the
Visla,
c. The Conditions for Employment of Troops.
(1) For infantry and its equipment there are absolutely no impaesable
localities; tank troops and heavy artillery, and motorized units may encounter diffi.
culty in the coring and autumn periods in sectors adjacent to the Pripet River.,
(2) For aviation there are no special limitations; the URrainie
Theatre has a developed net of aerodromes and their construction with the oreeence
of means of mechanical labor does not, present difficulty.
(3) However, it follows to consider that in the periods of muddy
roads, the Ukrainian roads somewhat ?dissolve" (evaporate) so that it is almoci.
possible to move about on them.
THE UKRAINE (Operational characterJEtio)
82. THE LUBLIN OPERATIONAL DIRECTION (Continuation)
d. Cperationel Bases of the Ukrainian Theatre
(1) On Soviet Territory:
main.
second category.
(a)
(Page 62)
Kiev, Korosten, Zhitomir, Porvomaisk, Odessa, Vinnitse
(b) LVOV; Proskurov, Chernovitsi, Kishinev, Bratslov-
(2) On the territory of other countries3
(a) Warsaw, Lodz: Radov, Petrokov, Chenstokbov, Cracow,
Bucharest, Budapest,
(b) Keltsi, Mishkolts, Debrechin, Lublin, Sandomir.and others.
OCS FORM car. A
:4AR 49 st-raq
" DISSEMINATION CONFIDENTIALATIONS
mili111111M
(Classifical?lan Stamp)
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?
? (Ckr:sificntion Stamp)
GS ID usATRAHSLATION Military Economic
urEa Part IL Crimea-
CONFIDE
PAGE fil,IMBER
50X1-HUM
e. Defensive Barriers of the Lublin Direction%
. ,
(1) Rivers: Varta, Visla, W!Isterb ugvhih alwaysPreSent them-
, ? 1
selves as serious obstacles.
(2) The Turuyaon which stands the cit of Kr:mei, the Stir (on which
stands the city of Lutsk), the Garin with itsttributarg, ihe Sluch; the Ubort and
several others more shallow, but swampy.
? ,t
(3) Fortified Points and Barriers,;,
River and others.
(a)- The Kovel Fortified Rion
(b) Demblin (Ivanograd),,Which,has a fort system-,
?
(c) The Same Fortified .Region ,
(d) The Ovruch Fortified. Region which was donstrUcted in 1930-32,
(e) The south part of the MciFii.7 Fortified'Reglop ',long the Ubcrt
1'
?? A 4.-r?
, .
,
f. Vocabulary; (Not translated sindesalready in English).
(Page 63) THE UKRAINE (OP`erational characteristic),
?
83. LV0V-CRAKOW OPORATIONAL REGION ,
a. Territory and borders of the region
s'
(1) In the composition of the cOnSidered,repion, it follows to include
Chenstokhov Region, Kattovitsa, Crakow, PeremiShl.tvovi.Tarnopol, FrpsktXrov,
Berdichev, Zhitomir and-Kiev.
H' To the Lvov-Crakor Region belongs he zone of locality to the
north and south of the axis line; Kiev-Lvov-Teremisfil-trakow..
b. Operational Significance and'Opeail.onal Aims
(1) The described zone can be called he Lev Direction (with an
offensive from the west'to the east)and The Crakow pirection", with an, offensive
from the east to the west.
(2) The Crakow direction is the'ehlef operational direction of the
. .
Ukrainian Theatre exactly the same, as for example,5as iin,the Belorussian' Theatre the
main direction is the Smolensk (Moscow) direction ?
(a) The region Lvov-arodi44014,Li?Vsgbrov will be the region
? ?
of concentration of the mobilized Soviet armipep-Othe
? *
on Ciakow, Chenstokhov?
?
Oa FORM .111,11 I
MAR 49
?
DISSEMIM110'.
(MONS
(Clia'sification Stamp)
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23: CIA-RDP81-01043R001900230003-9
? . (Classificagon &cop)
1101111111 If
Economi 6+?AVIO,
USSR, Part II. Crimea
"it=112*;?*
wed
Kattovitsi is the region of their deployment,
PAGE NUMIM
10
50X1-HUM
W. For the western armies the region Crakow, Chenstokhov is the
region of assembly and regrouping .of forces for a decisive offensive in the Kiev
Direction,
(c) Throuph the direction Lvov-Crakow run the direct routes to
the region of Breslau, Leiptsig, Prague, and also to the region of Berlin in flanking
it from the south, ?
(d) An offensive of the western armies in the Kiev Direction is
intended to lead to depriving the Soviet side of the Ukrainian bread, coal, and
metal,
(e) Under these conditions the Ukrainian Soviet Front is severed
into two-narts, by which the southern cart from Odessa Region and the Crimea :a. cut
off into an isolated situation,
(f) Simultaneously communication with the Balkan Sector is lost,
which,with the superiority of aviation of the western side, is equivalent to for-
bidd'ing further campaign for the Balkans; the possibility to make a campaign for the
Bosvorus and the Dardanelles disappears as well.
c. Operational Capacity of the Region
(1) In the past war the First, Second, Third and then also the Fourth
Ukrainian Fronts operated in. the Ukraine; in the body of the first was not less than
15-20 divisions.
(Page 64) THE UKRAINE (Operational characteristic)
83. IITOV.4CRAKOW OPERATIONAL REGION (Continuation)
(2) The First Ukrainian Front of 18-20 divisions was on the Lvov-
Crakaw Direction; this quantitY also is the capacity of the LvOv-Crakow Direction.
(3) The Lvov-Crakow DireCtion actually does not have any kind Of
limiting conditions with the exception of the region of Lvov where there is a atrongly
dissected locality, then the Peremishl sector (a fortified region) and the upper course
of the Visla near Crakow.
(4) The Lvov-Crakow Direction is the best suppOrted with railroad an
paved highway routes of communications which, normallyiran supply the operating
OCS FORM nnn,
I PiA.12., 49
?
DISSEMINATIOtariliENITAILTIONS
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GSIDUMTRAUSLATION Military tconomi
USSR; Part II, Crimea
MEVUMMR
11
armies. 50X1-HUM
(5) There are no difficult sectorsofOr the employment of large tank
units (an army) in this direction; the're also is no difficUlty for' employment of
aviation.
(6) Geographically, the Lvov-Orakow Diredtion is the water divide be-
treen-the Pripet and Dnester, the so-called Volinsk-Podolsk Plateau along which the
main routes extend.
d. Defensive Barriers of the Sector?:
(1) Rivers: The San (tributary of the Visla) has a vide swampy valley;
during a freshet it is difficultly accessible for fOrOmg; the ,upper Dnester and Stir
(2) Fortified Regions: Peremishl (an old fortress, many,times des-
*
troyed and again restored), Lvov, and Crakow.
ee Operational Bases:
General: Lvov, Peremishl, Froskurov, Chepetovk,"&merinka, Crakow,
Tarnopol, Tarnov, Novi Sonch and others.
1
(2) Air: Proskurov, Vinnetsa, Zdolbunavo, Berdichev? Lvov, Brzezhani
and others.
f. Coordination with River Flotillas
(1) Operations of ?round armies on the Lvov-Crakow DireCtion will pro-
ceed in individual sectors with the operations of river flotillas: 'The Dnepr Flotilla,
the Dnester and the Visla.-
g. Vocabulary. (Rot translated since already in English)
(Page 65) THE UKRAINE (OPerational'characteristic)
84. THE UZHGOROD DIRECTION AND THE CHERNOVITSI-IASI OPFRATIONAL REGION
? a., General Characteristics of the Region
(1) The title q7zhgorod Direction is maintained in the pre-war
ddscriptions; it would be more correct to call it the Budapest Direction:
(a) The Uzhgorod Direction is the zone of loc/ality' from the central
-
oparational line: Lvov, Sambor, Uzligorod (in HungeriaP,Uitvar), or Lvov, Strii,
. ,
DISGMici\!'111. ?
? -` , (Classification Stzmp)
...AEONS
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,(Classificaion Stamp)
tt,?'4431 katlit
.mmis fed
onmaftplamini:w?==siMr
CONFIDENTIAL:
T5ANSLftT1Q Military Economic Geography,
USSR. Part 4, Crimea
?
PAGE. NUMMI
12
-HUM
(b).- The Uzhgorod (Budapest) Direction brings out the troops to
the so-called Hungarian Plain: It runs in the beginning from north to 'south and
then turns to the west to Budapest.
(2) The Chtrnovitsi-Iasi Region is the connecting sector between the
Uzhgorcd Direction and the Maritime Region; it is impossible to wage active operations
on the Uzhgorod or oh the Maritime Directions without seizing the Chernovitsi-Iasi
Region, and then also the central part of Romania .(Transylvania) because of the
danger from flank blows.
(3)
The Uzhgorod Direction and the Chernovitsi-Iasi Region are
mountainous sectors which., present special requirements 'for the organization of troop
units and hinders the employment of large tank units and heavy artillery.
?
(4) At the esent time the noviet side is in a more favorable opera-
tional situation:
(a) Romania and Hungary are the protectorate of the USER; the
Soviet official border traverses Zacarpathia,(Transcarpathia),
(b) The western armies must overcome the Carpathians, the pro-
tection (defense) of which is simple, and then assemble forces to the east of the
Carpathians for the development of further blows?
b. The Operational Targets of the Sides
(1) The side which shall possess Hungary and Bulgaria will be the
propriator in the Balkans.
(2) For the'east (the Soviet) side the chief operational targets will
include holding for itself-the Hungarian Plain, the passages (passes) through the
Carpathians and Wallachian -Lowland (the locality between the Danube and the Transyl-
vanian Alps):
(a) The loss of the Carpathians io the east side signifies the
loss of the Balkan's a? whole and further threat of loss of the Odessa Region,
(b) Under condition of holding the indicated regions in its own
hand it has' a favorable situation for developing thrusts 'to Austria and southern
GerMany0
cesFollm nnni
MAR 49 4-LiV'''J
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CONFIDER:-
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(Ciessrfication Sear3p)
r?GS ID USA 7.14.24SLATIOII lifiaatary EQ OriOrif u ugs apo
USSR, Part II, Crimea
ILF?Mali