THE NEW LANDS PROGRAM IN THE USSR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000800010002-9
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• Document Page Count: 179
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 28, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
N? 1
THE NEW LANDS PROGRAM IN THE USSR
CIA/RR 87
28 January 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
SECRET
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE NEW LANDS PROGRAM IN fliL USSR
CIA/RR 87
(ORR Project 20.827)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S-E -C .-R-E-T
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary
I. Introduction
A. General
B. Basic Agricultural Problems
C. Agricultural Decrees of 1953
D. Formulation of the New Lands Program
E. Comparison of the New Lands Program with the Corn
Program
1
9
9
11
13
16
18
II.
Physical Factors Affecting Production
21
A.
General
21
B.
Northern Zone
22
1.
General
22
2.
Altayskiy Kray
23
3.
Novosibirskaya, Kemerovskaya, and Tomskaya
Oblasts
23
4.
Omskaya, Kurganskaya, Tyumenskaya, and
Sverdlovskaya Oblasts
24
5.
Chelyabinskaya Oblast
25
6.
Climate
25
7.
Winds
27
8.
Rainfall
27
C.
Southern Zone
28
1.
General
28
2.
Wooded Steppe Belt
28
3.
Steppe Belt
29
4.
Semiarid Belt
29
5.
Arid Steppe Belt
30
6.
Climate
31
7.
Rainfall
32
8.
Lands to Be Reclaimed
34
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D. Western Zone 34
1. General 34
2. Climate 36
3. Rainfall 37
4. Lands to Be Reclaimed 38
E. Precipitation-Evaporation Ratios 38
F. Winds 39
G. Conclusions 40
III. Comparison of the New Lands with the Prairie Provinces
of Canada 41
A. Topography 41
B. Soils 41
C. Climate 42
D. Rainfall 43
E. Yields 46
F. Conclusions 49
IV. Acreage Sown, 1954 and 1955 49
V. Yields of Grain 51
VI. Production of Grain, 1954-55 58
A. General 58
B. 1954 58
C. 1955 61
VII. Crop Rotation -- Soviet Statements and Canadian
Experience 63
VIII. Production -- Outlook for the Future 67
IX. Animal Husbandry 71
A. General 71
B. Livestock Program 73
1. Plan of Development 73
a. General 73
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b. Cattle
c. Sheep
d. Swine
e. Improvement of Forage Supplies
f. Role of State Farms
Page
75
76
76
77
77
2. Efforts to Improve Animal Husbandry
78
3. Problems Encountered
79
4. Results
8o
X.
Organization of Agriculture
81
A.
General
81
B.
Role of State Farms
83
C.
Role of Machine Tractor Stations and Collective
Farms
86
D.
Plans and Performance
90
XI.
Mechanization of Agriculture
92
A.
General
92
B.
Tractors
92
C.
Combines
93
D.
Trucks
94
E.
Outlook
95
XII.
Requirements for Petroleum Products
97
A. General 97
B. Requirements in 1954 97
C. Requirements in 1955 99
D. Requirements in 1956 101
XIII. Manpower Requirements 102
A. General
B. Requirements
1. Agricultural Labor
2. Other Labor
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104
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C. Population Increase 105
D. Impact of the Manpower Requirements of the New
Lands 105
XIV. Construction 107
A. General 107
B. Cost of Construction and the Effect on the Soviet
Construction Industry 108
C. Progress to Date 109
D. Conclusions 111
XV. Transportation 111
A. General 111
B. ,Transportation During the First Two Years of the
Program 112
C. Plans and Perspectives 113
1. Railroads 113
2. Motor Roads 114
3. Navigable Rivers 115
D. Conclusions 115
XVI. Effect of the New Lands Program on the Soviet State
Budget 116
A. Difficulties in the Interpretation of Changes in
Budget Allocations 116
B. Budget Allocations to the New Lands 116
C. State Agricultural Investment 119
D. Conclusions 121
XVII. Appraisal of the Program 121
A. Evidence of Strengths and Weaknesses in the Soviet
Socioeconomic System 122
B. Reasons for the Program 124
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C.
D.
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Page
Reasons for the Rapid Initiation and Implementation
of the Program 125
Chances for Success or Failure of the Program . . 126
Appendix A.
Appendix B.
Appendix C.
Appendixes
Acreage Data Relating to the New Lands Program
of the USSR, 1954-56
Livestock Numbers in the Northern and Southern
Zones of the New Lands of the USSR
129
137
Petroleum Products Required by Tractors,
Trucks, Combines, and Other Agricultural
Machinery in the New Lands of the USSR . . . 139
1. General 139
2. Acreages 139
3. Types of Tractors 142
4. Consumption of Diesel Fuel by Tractors 145
5. Consumption of Gasoline by Tractors . 146
6. Consumption of Lubricants by Tractors 146
7. Estimated Consumption of Gasoline and
Lubricants by Combines 146
8. Estimated Consumption of Gasoline and
Avtol Lubricants by Other Agricultural
Machinery
a. Gasoline
b. Avtol Lubricants
147
147
147
9. Consumption of Petroleum Products by
Trucks 148
a. Consumption of Gasoline in 1954 . . . 148
b. Consumption of Lubricants in 1954 . . 149
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c. Consumption of Gasoline and Lubricants
in Intrafarm Operations in 1955 . . . 149
d. Consumption of Gasoline and Lubricants
in the Transport of Grain and Other
Farm Products in 1955 150
Appendix D. Interpretation of Soviet Budget Allocations . 153
50X1
Tables
1. Average Annual Precipitation in the Northern Zone of
the New Lands of the USSR, by Period and by Weather
Station
2. Average Annual Precipitation in the Southern Zone of
the New Lands of the USSR, by Period and by Weather
Station
27
33
3. Average Annual Precipitation in the Western Zone of
the New Lands of the USSR, by Period and by Weather
Station 37
4. Average Annual Precipitation in the Prairie Provinces
of Canada, by Period and by Weather Station 44
5. Comparison of Yields in the New Lands of the USSR and
in the Prairie Provinces of Canada, 1900-1915 and
1906-50 48
6. Estimated Acreage of Grain Sown in the New Lands of
the USSR, by Zone, 1954 and 1955 52
7. Computed Yields of Spring Wheat in the Northern,
Southern, and Western Zones of the New Lands of the
USSR, 1900-1915
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8. Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production of
the New Lands of the USSR, by Zone, 1954
9. Estimated Acreage) Yield, and Production of
the New Lands of the USSR) by Zone, 1955
10. Farm Organizations Engaged in the New Lands
?
Grain in
Grain in
Program in
the USSR, End of Year, 1954 and 1955
Page
59
91
11. Deliveries of Tractors in the USSR, 1951-55 96
12. Consumption of Petroleum Products in the New Lands
Compared with Production of Petroleum Products in the
USSR, 1954-56
13. Planned State Budget Expenditures of the USSR,
1951-56
103
117
14. Planned Soviet Budget Allocations to Agriculture,
1951-56 119
15. Soviet Investment in the National Economy, 1953-56 120
16. Original Plan for the Reclamation of New Lands in the
USSR, 1954-55 129
17. New Lands Plowed in the USSR, 1954 130
18. Planned Sowing of New Lands in the USSR, 1954 131
19. New Lands Sown in the USSR, 1954 131
20. Revised Plan for the Reclamation of New Lands in the
USSR, 1954-56 132
21. New Lands Plowed in the USSR, 1954-55 133
22. Original Plan for the Initial Sowing of New Lands in
the USSR, 1955 133
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23. Original Plan for Sowing of New Lands in the USSR, 1955 . 134
24. Revised Plan for Sowing of New Lands in the USSR, 1955 . 135
25. New Lands Sown in the USSR, 1955 136
26. Livestock Numbers in the Northern and Southern Zones of
the New Lands of the USSR, 1 January 1938 and 1 October
1954 138
27. Acreages Reclaimed, Replowed, Harrowed, Sown, and
Harvested by Combines in the New Lands of the USSR,
1954-56
149
28. Acreages Reclaimed) Replowed) Harrowed, Sown, and
Harvested by Tractor-Drawn Combines in the New Lands
of the USSR) in Terms of Soft Plowing, 1954-56 142
29. Allocation of Tractors to the New Lands of the USSR,
in Terms of Equivalent 15-Horsepower Units, 1954-55 143
30. Estimated Consumption of Fuel by the Tractor Park in
the New Lands of the USSR, in Terms of Average per
Soft-Plowing Unit, 1954-55 144
Maps
Following Page
Figure 1.
USSR:
New Lands Program, 1954 and 1955
2
Figure 2.
USSR:
New Lands, Natural Regions
22
Figure 3.
USSR:
New Lands, Soil Types
22
Figure 4.
USSR:
New Lands, Average Annual Precipitation
22
Figure 5.
USSR:
New Lands, Average Total Precipitation
for May-June-July
22
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Figure 6. USSR: New Lands, Moisture Zones
Figure 7. USSR: New Lands, Average Duration of the Frost-
Free Season
Figure 8.
Figure 9.
Figure 10.
Figure
Figure
11.
12.
Canada: Prairie Provinces, Spring Wheat Region
Canada: Prairie Provinces, Soil Types
Canada: Prairie Provinces, Average Duration of
the Frost-Free Season
Canada: Prairie Provinces, Average Annual
Precipitation
Canada: Prairie Provinces, Average Total
Precipitation for May-June-July
Figure 13. USSR: New Lands, Acreages of Grain Sown,
and 1955
Figure 14. USSR: New Lands, Transportation System
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1954
22
44
46
46
52
112
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CIA/RR 87 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 20.827)
THE NEW LANDS PRCGRAM IN THE USSR*
The "new lands" program in the USSR involves great amounts of
capital investment and manpower and a vast area of land. In less
than 2 years, 30 million hectares,** an area 25 percent larger than
the acreage sown to wheat in the US in 1955, have been brought into
cultivation, and eventually 4o million hectares may be reclaimed.
The new lands program has been developed without major dislocations
In the Soviet economy. A large part of the necessary total investment
has been made, and in the future the program will impose no major
strains on the economy.
On the basis of soil and climate, the major area of the new lands
program may be divided into three zones.*** The Northern Zone in-
cludes the territory between the Ural and the Altay Mountains extend-
ing from the boundary of Kazakh SSR to the bogs and forests north of
the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This zone is the northern part of the
Asiatic spring wheat belt. The Southern Zone, the southern part of
the Asiatic spring wheat belt, extends from the northern boundary of
Kazakh SSR southward into the arid steppe. The Western Zone, the
northeastern part of the Asiatic spring wheat belt, is largely in the
European USSR and includes the southern Ural region, the northwest
Kazakh SSR, and a part of the middle Volga region. The new lands pro-
gram is also operative in several other relatively small areas of
virgin and long-fallow land, chiefly in the southern regions of the
European USSR, East Siberia, and southern Kazakh SSR.
The soils in much of the area covered by the three major zones
are suitable for the production of grain. From north to south the
soils are similar to those in the prairie provinces of Canada, one
of the world's greatest wheat producing regions. In the new lands
area of the USSR, gray-brown soils in the north merge with black soils
to the south. Farther to the south are dark chestnut soils) merging
with light chestnut soils in the extreme south.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 1 November 1956.
** One hectare equals 2.471 acres; 30 million hectares, therefore,
equal about 74 million acres.
*** See Figure 1, following p. 2, below.
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Virtually all of the more suitable soils in the new lands probably
were under cultivation in 1953. There had been unsuccessful attempts
at farming, and large acreages were abandoned because of excessive
salinity and alkalinity. Much of the land reclaimed in 1955, when 30
million hectares were plowed for planting in 1956, was very poor.
More important than the poor quality of Much of the soil in the new
lands are the hazards of climate, particularly in the Southern Zone,
where a major part of the reclamation is taking place. Rainfall is the
most critical factor. In the Northern Zone, average rainfall is about
the same as that in the Canadian spring wheat belt. Annual rainfall in
the Southern Zone averages less than 12 inches, a minimum below which
the cultivation of crops is hazardous. The absence of mountain barriers
between the three major zones and the Central Asian deserts to the south
and the Arctic to the north exposes the new lands to the drying desert
winds, which may cause severe droughts, and to the Arctic winds, which
may bring snow as early as August.
- The new lands area of the USSR is a spring crop region in which
grain -- mainly wheat -- is the major 'crop. Available data do not
permit an estimate of the acreages and yields of specific grain crops
in the new lands, but it may be assumed that yields of wheat are indi-
cative, within a reasonable margin of error, of the yields of all
grain crops.
On the basis of a 16-year series of yield data for wheat grown in
the areas now affected by the new lands program, a long-term average
yield, weighted by the distribution of acreages in the new lands in
1954, has been estimated. The estimate indicates that with an average
distribution similar to that of 1954 an average yield of 6.6 centners*
per hectare may be expected in the new lands. On the basis of the 1955
distribution of acreage, however, the long-term average yield which may
be expected in the new lands is slightly lower, 6.2 centners per hectare;
a larger percentage of the new lands brought into cultivation in 1955 was
in the Southern and Western Zones, which have poorer soils and climate.
* One centner equals 220.46 pounds. A yield of 6.6 centners per
hectare is equal to a yield of about 588 pounds -- 9.8 bushels --
per acre.
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USSR: NEW LANDS PROGRAM
C) Main New Lands area
$SSSS Areas of secondary consideration
Nate. The brariarrs of Ill. .c.r. Lands arras satiate the innotiNe matimum ?any t
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Wide annual variability in yields is to be expected in the new lands,
particularly in the Southern and Western Zones, because of the extreme
fluctuation from year to year in the amount and distribution of rainfall.
This variability in yields is well illustrated by the yields obtained
during the first 2 years of the program.
Almost all of the 4.3 million hectares of new land sown in 1954 was
sown to wheat. Growing conditions were unusually favorable in 1954, and
there was a very good grain crop. The yield is estimated at 10.5 centners
per hectare, 6o percent above the long-term average yield of 6.6 centners
per hectare and about 35 percent above the estimated 1954 average yield
per hectare in the USSR as a whole. The average yield of 10.5 centners
per hectare, when applied to the 4.3 million hectares sown to grain in
the new lands in 1954, indicates gross production of about 4.5 million
metric tons,* about 5 percent of the estimated total Soviet production
In 1954.
During the 1955 crop year, most of the new lands suffered from a
drought, and the estimated yield of 4.3 centners per hectare was less
than one-half of the yield obtained in the extraordinarily good year
of 1954. The yield in 1955 is about 70 percent of the long-term aver-
age yield of 6.2 centners per hectare and is about 55 percent of the
estimated 1955 average yield per hectare in the USSR as a whole.
When applied to the 18.5 million hectares sown to grain in the new
lands in 1955, the average yield of 4.3 centners per hectare indicates
an estimated gross production of almost 8 million tons, about 8 percent
of the estimated total Soviet production in 1955. Because of the much
larger area sown in 19551 production of grain in the new lands in that
year -- in spite of unfavorable weather -- was substantially greater
than in 1954.
Soviet planners know that continued productivity of the new lands
depends on a system of crop rotation) including fallow. Present plans
call for the introduction of rotation systems after an initial period
of 2 to 6 years of continuous cultivation. In the majority of these
systems, grain crops in any one year will occupy three-fourths of the
land in rotation, and fallow and perennial grasses will occupy the
remaining one-fourth.
* Tonnages throughout this report are given in metric tons.
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The proposed Soviet systems of crop rotation appear to include an
exceptionally high proportion of land sown to grain. In Canadian
practice) only one-third to one-half of the land in rotation is sown
to grain) and the remainder is fallow or sown to perennial grasses.
Canadian experience indicates that the Soviet systems may deplete the
soil of the new lands if abnormally heavy cropping to grain is con-
tinued for many years. It is possible, however) that Soviet agricul-
tural planners may not press exploitation of the soil to the point
of depletion before they modify the proposed systems of rotation; there
is evidence that the systems of rotation to be used have not been
determined finally.
Official Soviet statements about expected successes in the new
lands seem to be unrealistically optimistic. The statements about
expected production, for example) imply an average yield over a
period of years of 10 to 11 centners per hectare, a yield which is
about one-third higher than the estimated 1950-55 average yield for
the USSR as a whole. On the basis of the historical yield series
for the area) 6 centners per hectare would be a more reasonable esti-
mate of the long-term average yield that can be expected in the new
lands.
Khrushchev has stated that he expects the annual average production
of the new lands to be not less than 33 million tons (implying a yield
of 11 centners per hectare on an area of 30 million hectares). Canadian
experience in crop rotation indicates that to have 30 million hectares
continuously sown to grain requires that there be 60 mil1ion to 90
million hectares in the rotation system) but no program of acreage ex-
pansion of this magnitude has been implied by Soviet officials. At
the end of 1955, only about 30 million hectares had been reclaimed.
Recent Soviet statements provide a basis for a more realistic esti-
mate of potential production in the new lands. These statements indicate
that the current intention is to reclaim about 40 million hectares.
Experience in Canada shows that of these 40 million hectares, 13 million
to 20 million could be sown to grain. With a yield of 6 centners per
hectare, an average production from the new lands of 8 million to 12
million tons could be expected. This production would represent about
10 to 15 percent of the estimated average production in the USSR for
the period for 1950 through 1953, the 4-year period before the inaugura-
tion of the new lands program. A gross production of 8 million to 12
million tons of grain -- after deduction for seed and waste -- indicates
a net availability for direct human consumption of 6 million to 9 million
tons. This quantity would supply the grain requirements of 30 million
to 40 million people.
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A part of the new lands program is the development of the livestock
Industry. The Soviet government plans to use the large areas of pasture
and the increased production of straw, chaff, hay, and corn as food for
great flocks and herds on each of the newly established state grain farms
and state livestock farms and on the expanded collective farms. Each
new state grain farm is to have between 2,500 and 5,000 head of cattle,
up to 15)000 head of sheep, and 1,000 head of swine. As of 1 October
1955 the new state farms of Kazakh SSR, almost entirely within the
Southern Zone of the new lands, had 89)500 head of cattle) 243,500
head of sheep) and "many pigs." These figures represent an average
of about 265 head of cattle and 722 head of sheep per new state
farm. Although the stocking of state grain farms has been pro-
gressing, as of 1 October 1955 livestock numbers were far short of
ultimate goals.
The immediate source of livestock for stocking new state farms is
apparently the privately owned livestock of collective farm households
and the herds of existing livestock farms. As private ownership in
animal husbandry decreases, state farms may replace collective farms
as the centers of animal husbandry in the new lands. The completion
of this transition, however) will depend on great improvement in the
food base and heavy investment in water supplies and in shelter --
requirements which it will take many years to complete.
The new lands program is being implemented with the participation
of about 10,660 collective farms, 1,740 machine tractor stations (MTS's),
and an undetermined number of 'state farms) including 425 new state farms
organized during 1954-55. In the initial phase of the new lands program
the .larger share of the reclamation tasks fell to existing MTS's and
collective farms, which could most easily exploit the readily accessible
land near them. These farm units have been relatively more important
in the RSFSR) where 1,457 MTS's and about 8,960 collective farms are
engaged in the program.
In establishing the 425 new state farms for the exploitation of
virgin and long-fallow land in the remote areas of the new lands the
Soviet authorities not only have been influenced by the suitability
of the land for large-scale grain farming and by the inadequate labor
resources in the region but also have been motivated by the desire
to expand the state sector of agriculture. Their success in approaching
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this goal is indicated by the doubling of the grain acreages of state
farms in the USSR between 1954 and 1956 as a result of the dispropor-
tionately large role assigned to state farms in the new lands program.
The creation of new state farms in the isolated areas of the new lands
also assured the channeling of a larger share of agricultural products
through the state distribution system.
Agriculture in the new lands is to be highly mechanized. Initial
requirements for machinery have been met by heavy allocations of agri-
cultural machinery to the new lands at the expense of deliveries to
established agricultural areas and by loans of machinery from those
areas. Loans of equipment were particularly important in facilitating
the harvesting and delivery of grain to points of concentration.
The high priority assigned to the new lands is shown by the fact
that deliveries of tractors to the established agricultural areas in
1954 dropped to one-half of the annual average delivery in the 3 pre-
ceding years. In 1955) however, deliveries of tractors to the estab-
lished areas increased to 85 percent. of this 3-year average in spite
of the continuing priority accorded the new lands. Present plans call
for the delivery to state farms in Kazakh SSR during 1956 of more than
two-thirds as many tractors and combines as were delivered to them
during 1954 and 1955.
The major effect of deliveries of agricultural machinery to the
new lands probably has been a delay in the reequipment of agriculture
In the established areas, particularly the grain areas) and therefore
to impose temporarily a greater workload on the existing machinery
park in those areas. After 1956 the mechanization problem of the new
lands program will be largely one of replacement.
The tractors, combines, trucks, and other farm machinery operating
In the new lands require large quantities of diesel fuel, gasoline,
and lubricants. The percentage of the total Soviet production of
petroleum products required for the exploitation of the new lands in
1955 is estimated to have been as follows: diesel fuel, 4.8 percent;
gasoline, 4.8 percent; and lubricants, 1.9 percent. Although these
quantities of petroleum products are large, they do not impose a
serious strain on the resources of the USSR.
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The agricultural manpower requirements of the new lands program are
estimated to be 1.33 million workers, about 2.4 percent of the total
agricultural labor force in the USSR. In addition, about 400,000 workers
are required for the construction and maintenance of ancillary service
facilities associated with the program. The manpower requirements of
the new lands, therefore, are relatively small. In fulfilling these
requirements, however) some specialists and skilled workers have been
recruited from industry, a reversal of the usual procedure in the USSR.
Barring major changes in the new lands acreage goals the program
will not be a continuing drain on the national supply of manpower, and
once the initial requirements for manpower are met, maintenance of the
labor force should not be a major problem.
Announced and estimated requirements for carrying out the new lands
program include housing and communal facilities for about 2.8 million
persons; almost 2)300 kilometers of rail line (to be completed in 1957);
more than 6,00o kilometers of motor roads; granary capacity of more than
773,000 tons; and nonresidential farm buildings for 425 new state farms)
new and expanded MTS's) and expanded collective farms.
It is estimated that the total cost of state construction required
for the new lands program in 1954-56 is about 13 billion rubles. In
addition, the cost of construction of collective farms is estimated to
be 5 billion to 15 billion rubles and the cost of construction of private
housing to be about 5 billion rubles.
Although expenditures for construction have been large in the new
lands, they do not appear to have had a serious impact on construction
in other sectors of the Soviet economy. There have been many lags in
agricultural construction) and a shortage of storage facilities and
elevators caused some losses of grain after the harvest of 1954. It
does not appear, however, that the underfulfillment of construction plans
has seriously hindered the new lands program.
At the beginning of the new lands program in 1954 the new lands,
particularly the Southern Zone, had very few railroads) and most motor
roads were not suited to year-round use. It was inevitable that there
would be serious transport problems until the transportation system
was expanded and improved. In 1954 a high volume of construction ma-
terials, fuel, and machines congested the rail system, and in September
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and October) outbound traffic was snarled by the increased load resulting
from the very large grain crop. During 1955 the transportation problems
were not so severe, because of the opening for temporary service of
several new rail lines in the new lands.
The present program of transportation construction appears to be
adequate to meet the eventual needs of the new lands program. Although
there were confusion and delays during the harvest season of 1956) the
transportation system probably will be adequate in the future.
The new lands program has increased allocations from the Soviet
state budget to the agricultural sector of the economy) but there have
been no consequent reductions in the allocations to other major sectors.
In relation to total allocations to agriculture and to total state invest-
ment the budget expenditures on the new lands appear to be large but not
excessive. The most costly year of the new lands program probably was
1955, when the planned allocations to the new lands were approximately
20 percent of total planned allocations to agriculture. In the same
year) investment in the new lands probably was less than 5 percent of
total planned state investment (in terms of fixed capital) in the
national economy and less than 40 percent of the 1955 total state invest-
ment in agriculture.
The development of the new lands program exemplifies some of the
major strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system. Strength Is indi-
cated by the speed with which resources were marshalled and the initial
objectives attained. An important weakness of the new lands program is
that it appears to have been initiated and developed without a sound
preliminary analysis of the best ways to proceed and without a realistic
estimate of the production of grain that could be expected. Suitable
systems of crop rotation and the total area that is to be reclaimed ap-
parently have not yet been determined.
Khrushchev's expectation of obtaining 33 million tons of grain annually
cannot be realized. Over a long period the new lands probably will not
yield much more than one-third of this amount. The evidence indicates that
an annual yield of only 8 million to 12 million tons) 10 to 15 percent of
the annual average production of grain in the USSR in 1950-53) can be
expected.
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Speed was apparently of great importance to the USSR in the develop-
ment of the new lands. The program was initiated and implemented very
rapidly. Although the USSR will need more grain in the future to feed
an expanded population and although an increase in agricultural produc-
tion is necessary if levels of living are to rise substantially) there
was no immediate food crisis in 1954) and the haste of the program cannot
be explained on economic grounds. The new lands program was dramatic
and, with the probability of initial success) was well designed to win
popular approval. The decision to embark on the program may have been \
influenced greatly by the uneasy internal Soviet political situation
in 1954.
The production of grain in the new lands is dependent on the weather
and other natural factors, and it may fluctuate widely. In any one year,
production may be considerably above or below average. In order to main-
tain yields, the USSR will have to develop systems of crop rotation more
suitable than those that have been discussed publicly. If the stated
intention to sow three-fourths of the area to grain each year is put into
practice) declining yields and large-scale wind erosion may eventually
result.
Although the new lands can produce, on a long-term basis) only about
one-third of the target quantity mentioned by Khrushchev, it is likely
that the program will not be abandoned unless production falls to a very
low level.
I. Introduction.
A. General.
In spite of the continual) optimistic claims of the USSR that
socialized agriculture is the most advanced type of agriculture in the
world) the Soviet government) since the inception of collectivization
in 1928, has been unable to proVide a satisfactory diet for an increasing
population. At times, especially in the early years of collectivization
and during World War II) the USSR has even been plagued by severe shortages
of food.
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The continued discrimination of the Soviet government against
the peasantry and the low priority given to agriculture in the develop-
ment of the national economy had combined to stagnate agricultural
production. The harsh discriminatory policies of the Stalinist regime
after World War II had acted as a deterrent to agricultural production.
The situation in animal husbandry was particularly bad, with the pros-
pect of becoming worse. From 1940 to 1952, according to Khrushchev,
agricultural production had increased only 10 percent, whereas indus-
trial production had increased 2.3 times. In 1953 the Soviet leaders
began to take extraordinary measures aimed at substantially increasing
the lagging agricultural production.
At the time of the pronouncements of Khrushchev in September 1953,
it was apparently the Soviet intention to increase the availability of
farm products within the framework of the existing farm economy. Although
allusions were made to the expansion of acreage) increased farm production
was to result primarily from increasing yields through improved varieties
and techniques and from providing greater incentives to the peasants.
It is possible that the poor harvest of 1953 may have had some influence
in prompting Soviet leaders to take immediate steps to provide the needed
increase in food supplies -- not only in grain but also in livestock
products. On 28 March 1954 a joint Party-government decree called for a
minimum expansion of 13 million hectares in the grain-growing districts
of Kazakh SSR) Siberia, the Urals, the Trans-Volga area, and the North
Caucasus. Immediately after this decree, in the spring of 1954, 4.3
million hectares, largely on the peripheries of existing farms, were
plowed and sown. By 10 August 1954, more than 14 million hectares of
virgin and long-fallow land* had been plowed for sowing in 1955) 1
million hectares more than planned.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of
Ministers of the USSR "viewed these successes ... as the beginning of a
great national cause for increasing the production of grain ... ." They
more than doubled the original goal for the reclamation of virgin and
long-fallow land and increased the ultimate acreage to be plowed for
sowing in 1956 to from 28 million to 30 million hectares. More recently
it has been stated that in the whole new lands area of Kazakh SSR and the
RSFSR the government planned to reclaim approximately 40 million hectares,
of which about 10 million hectares were to lie fallow each year.
* Virgin land is defined as land that has not been plowed for 25 years,
and long-fallow land is defined as land that has lain idle from 2 to
25 years. 1/
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The new lands program essentially involves an increase in the
production of wheat and millet for human consumption. Although more
fodder crops may be sown in the area in the future, the present pattern
of land use in the new lands is not oriented to the needs of animal
husbandry. The development of animal husbandry in the USSR is to be
facilitated primarily by the expansion of corn acreage in the European
USSR. The successful exploitation of the new lands as one of the primary
grain surplus areas in the USSR is expected to permit this shift to corn
chiefly in the Ukraine and in the southern European USSR.
B. Basic Agricultural Problems.
The basic agricultural problems facing the Soviet leaders are
the control of production, procurement, and distribution of agricultural
products. As Khrushchev stated, "A Communist Society cannot be built
without an abundance of bread, milk) meat) butter, vegetables, and other
produce." 2/ Not only must the abundance be produced, but also) under
the Soviet system) a large share of this production must be procured by
government agencies for distribution to the rapidly increasing group of
nonproducers. If this system fails, the USSR, whether socialist or Com-
munist, must resort to imports.
Procurement of farm products has been a major problem in the
USSR since the beginning of the Bolshevik regime. From the government
point of view the ideal solution would have been a system of state farms
owned and operated by the government with all of the production made
available to the distribution agencies. A few hundred such state farms
were established, including the giant "grain factory" in the semiarid
steppe of the North Caucasus and the giant swine farm near Khar'kov in
the Ukraine. State farms have continued to the present and have even
been increased in numbers, but the gigantic grain factory and swine
farm proved to be impractical.*
The major effort of the USSR to facilitate procurement of agri-
cultural products and to gain more effective control over the countryside
was centered in the establishment of a system of collective farms and
MTS's. In the early 1930'6, about 25.6 million individual peasant
* There may have been other such farms established on the semiarid steppe
of the new lands, but if they were established, they probably have been
abandoned. 2/
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households were consolidated into .a few hundred thousand collective
farms. LI MTS's) which are in essence state-owned pools of agricultural
machinery, were set up to effect the mechanization of farm operations
and, in addition) to exercise certain control functions.
On the whole) the socialized sector of Soviet agriculture (state
farms) collective farms) and MTS's) -- up to the outbreak of World War
II -- had failed to achieve the results in production and procurement
hoped for by the Soviet planners. This situation became worse during
the war, and after the war recuperation was slow. It was not until the
favorable 1952 harvest that the production of grain regained the 1938
level. 2/
Nonproducers had not been able to obtain required subsistence
from state-operated stores and had had to purchase a considerable part
of their food at the open or collective farm markets. A large part of
the produce available at these markets was produced by the nonsocialized
sector -- by the private gardens and the privately owned livestock herds
of the collective farm households. The USSR has succeeded in improving
somewhat the production of breadgrain) particularly wheat for human con-
sumption) but has done it by reduction in the acreages to coarse grains
for feeding livestock. By 1953) however, the total grain acreage was
still below that estimated for 1938 (present boundaries).
Attempts also had been made to build up the production and procure-
ment of meat.) milk, butter, and eggs; but these attempts were handicapped
not only by reduced numbers of livestock but also by insufficient supplies
of feedstuffs) particularly grain. Primarily to facilitate procurement)
steps were taken both before World War II and during the 1949-51 period /./
to increase socialized flocks and herds by inducing collective farm house-
holds to turn over privately owned livestock to the communal herds of the
collective farms. By 1953) as a result, a considerable percentage of the
peasant households were left without cattle) with an increasingly bitter
attitude toward collectivization) and with an apathy toward working on
the communal fields and in the livestock brigades of the collective farms.
The acreage and production of potatoes not only was less than
before the war but also) considering the USSR as a whole) had decreased
from 1950 to 1953. p.../ The collective farm households were more interested
in producing surpluses on their own private garden plots for sale on the
free market than they were in working on the communal fields of the collec-
tive farms.
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The collective farm management, furthermore, was unable to cope
with the apathetic attitude of farm workers and the consequent decreasing
production. Most farm chairmen were incapable of handling large-scale
agriculture, and a chairman often maintained his position for less than
1 year. Some farms changed chairmen 2 or 3 times a year. 2/ More often
than not, work was performed in neither a timely nor an adequate way.
Even the activities of the government-owned-and-operated MTS's
were unsatisfactory. The overwhelming majority of the directors, chief
engineers, and even the agronomists of the MTS 's were without adequate
higher education. The machines rented by the MTS's to the collective
farms usually were operated inefficiently by the all-too-hastily trained
collective farmers. According to Khrushchev, a boy might spend 2 to 3
months attending courses. He would be told the salient points about
operating a machine and then be put behind the wheel. ig/ He usually
could not plow a straight furrow or seed in a straight line. He did
not always know how to keep a tractor or combine in adjustment. To
perform his norm, he might plow too shallow or he might leave unseeded
gaps between rows.
C. Agricultural Decrees of 1953.
Before 1953, Soviet leaders repeatedly stated that an increase
In agricultural production and procurement could be created by a reorganiza-
tion of the administration of farm operations, by improving the effectiveness
of mechanical and other techniques, and by increasing the availability of
the means of production. They also believed that in coping with the capi-
talistically minded L apathetic farm workers "the vital task Lin the improve-
ment of agriculturil is to increase the importance of the Party" -- that is,
to strengthen Party control over the countryside. 11/
To consolidate Party control over the countryside and at the
same time to facilitate the procurement of farm products,* in 1950 the
government rescinded the charter guaranteeing the inviolability of each
collective farm boundary. By 1953, about 254,000 separate collective
farms had been consolidated into 94,000 large farming enterprises, 1.3/
each of which included 2 or more former collective farms.
* Other reasons such as facilitating mechanization and crop rotation
have been given. 12/
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In 1951 the Soviet government attempted to go even further and
began to take steps toward consolidating two or more villages on each
of the large farming enterprises into a single population center) which
Khrushchev, the sponsor of this plan, called a collective farm settle-
ment. 111/ This consolidation meant the loss to the collective farm
households of the ancestral private garden plots that had been cultivated
by their families for generations. Although other conveniently located
garden plots were promised, the villagers, already bitter over the loss
of their privately owned livestock, threatened to create a crisis in the
collective farm economy. The plan of the collective farm settlement
had to be abandoned temporarily. 12/ The morale of the collective farm
households, some of whom had entertained hopes that the whole system of
collective farms might be abandoned) was low; and the incentive to work
in the socialized sector was feeble.
There was little improvement in the general situation during
1951 and 1952. Although favorable weather conditions in 1952 some-
what increased the production of certain field crops, animal hus-
bandry was in bad condition and was likely to become worse. ItY From
1940 to 1952, while industrial production increased 2.3 times, the total
production of agriculture, according to Khrushchev) rose only 10 per-
cent. 11/ Against this background, the agricultural decrees advocated
by the Soviet Communist Party were announced toward the end of 1953.
In spite of promises and plans, no appreciable change in the quality
of the diet of the inhabitants of the USSR had been effected by 1953.
As indicated above, moreover, the collective farm household with
its private garden plot and its privately owned livestock was essentially
"capitalistic" and thus at variance with a government-controlled economy.
The use of pressure to weaken the position of the household economy had
not produced the desired result of forcing the peasants to work harder
in the socialized economy of the collective farms. Concessions therefore
had to be made.
In Khrushchev's pronouncements on 3 September 1953 1?/ the govern-
ment reiterated the right of the collective farm household to retain "its
small personal plot to satisfy its consumer needs" and forbade "the practice
of infringing the interests of collective farmers with regard to livestock
in their private possession." The norms for required deliveries for both
collective farms and collective farm households were reduced) and the prices
paid for both required deliveries and such surpluses as might be sold to
the government were increased. At the same time, prices charged to non-
producers of foodstuffs in government stores were decreased.
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The Soviet government decreed the cancellation of arrears in
collective farm deliveries of livestock products and proposed that a
similar action be taken for collective farm households. The government
temporarily reduced certain taxes and offered bonuses and advance pay-
ments. The availability of consumer goods was to be advanced.
All of these measures to stimulate collective farm households
to perform more and better work, not only in the sector of the social-
ized economy but also in the private household economy, were designed
to create an "upsurge" in agricultural production.
The pronouncements of 3 September 1953, however, left no doubt
that in producing this "upsurge" in agriculture) the MTS's would become
the "decisive force in agricultural production." Given control over the
operations of the collective farms, the MTS's were charged with the
following tasks: (1) increasing yields of crops, (2) obtaining an in-
crease in the socialized herds of livestock with a simultaneous rise in
productivity, (3) completing mechanization of field crop production,
(4) increasing the total production as well as the production for the
market of farm and animal products in the collective farms they serve,
(5) extending the mechanization of labor-consuming processes in animal
husbandry as well as in the production of potatoes and vegetables,
(6) introducing into collective farm production the achievements of
science and the best agricultural practices, (7) insuring the further
organizational and economic consolidation of collective farms, and
(8) improving the material well-being of the collective farmer.
To insure the position of the MTS's as "the decisive force in
agricultural production)" the number of MTS's was to be increased, and-
thousands of engineers from industry and technical institutes were to
become directors and other officials. Tens of thousands of agronomists
and technicians were to be attached to the staffs of the MTS's. Other
tens of thousands of tractor drivers) combine and excavator operators,
assistants, recordkeepers, and mechanics were to be permanently employed,
and other thousands were to work on a seasonal basis. Appropriate ad-
ditions of equipment, of all kinds of machines, and of fuel for motors
were to be provided) and proper storage and repair facilities were to
be built.
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Never forgetting that "the vital task in the improvement of agri-
culture is to increase the importance of the party)" the government pro-
posed to send some 50,000 tested Communists to the countryside "to direct
them to the strengthening of the villages."
With the exception of the resolution of the government to expand
the potato acreage by 4,128,000 hectares and the vegetable acreage by
1,300,400 hectares in 1954, little was said in all these plans about in-
creasing acreages. It appears that in creating an "upsurge" in produc-
tion, the Soviet leaders were placing emphasis on reorganization and on
increasing yields through better breeds, better and more mechanized
techniques, and the use of more mineral fertilizer.
D. Formulation of the New Lands Program.
Although Khrushchev, in his speech of 3 September 1953, emphasized
building up production by increasing yields, the Central Committee of the
Party in its Resolution on Agriculture took a further step. The Committee
first stated that it was considered necessary to develop "the raising of
winter and spring-wheat ... by increasing the yield further in the major
regions where it is grown as well as in the regions of the central black
soil belt and the districts on the right giest.7 bank of the Volga." These
regions are .all in the European USSR. Forecasting developments in the new
lands, the Committee further stated: "The production of hard wheat in
the regions of the South East) Kazakhstan) and Siberia must be increased." 12/
This statement may be construed as implying increases in acreage. The "corn
program" was also forecast: "Considerably more corn must be. sown in the
southern) southeastern) central black-soil belt and the non black-soil
regions." 22/ These statements) incidentally, put an end to the myth
propagated by Malenkov that the grain problem had been solved "definitely
and finally." 21/ It is possible that the poor crop of 1953 may have had
some influence in prompting the USSR to embark on the so-called "new lands
program" at this time.
Newspaper references to the reclaiming of virgin and long-fallow
lands began to appear in December 1953 and continued to appear in increasing
numbers during early 1954. Tentative outlines of the program were announced
piecemeal in a series of forums held in Moscow during January and February.
These forums, convened by the Central Committee to propagandize the new
lands program, included conferences of academicians, MTS workers, state
farm workers, "leading agricultural workers," and Komsomols of the Moscow
area. 22/ A Party call for volunteers appeared in Izvestiya on 23 February
1954.
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The formal basis for the development of the new lands program,
the joint Party-government decree of 28 March 1954 (which was presaged
by Khrushchev's address to the Central Committee Plenum and the Plenum's
decision on the subject), called for a minimum expansion of 13 million
hectares in the grain-growing districts of Kazakh SSR, Siberia, the
Urals, the Trans-Volga area, and the North Caucasus. This expansion
was to take place by the reclamation of virgin and long-fallow lands
during 1954 for planting in 1955. Of this acreage, 4.3 million hectares
were to be reclaimed by state farms and 8.7 million hectares, by col-
lective farms.
In 1954 the state farms were to reclaim and sow 500,000 hectares,
and the collective farms, 1.8 million hectares, a total of 2.3 million
hectares.* The remainder was to be sown for the first time in 1955. In
addition to the goal of 13 million hectares, the decree "approved the
initiative" of local organs which had volunteered to reclaim a total of
more than 1 million hectares over the plan. 2Lij Both the plan for
sowing virgin and long-fallow land in 1954 and the plowing of land in
1954 to be sown in 1955 were overfulfilled by 10 August 1954. 22/ A
total of 14.1 million hectares had been plowed by this date (including
719)000 hectares in districts not included in the original plan) against
the goal of 13 million hectares.
The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers
"viewed these successes ... as the beginning of a great national cause
for increasing the production of grain in the country by the reclamation
of unutilized fertile land." Accordingly the program was more than
doubled by a joint decree published on 17 August 1954 2?../ entitled
"Further Reclamation of Virgin and Idle Land for Increasing the Produc-
tion of Grain." This decree raised the original goal for total sowing
on new lands from 13 million hectares in 1955 to from 28 million to
30 million hectares in 1956. It was later stated that in the whole area
(Kazakh SSR and the RSFSR) it is planned to reclaim approximately 40
million hectares of land, of which about 10 million hectares will lie
fallow each year. a/
The new lands program involves essentially an increase in the
production of wheat and millet. The reason for expanding the produc-
tion of the food grains (wheat and millet) was, in the first instance,
* It was initially reported, that 3.6 million hectares of new lands
were plowed and sown in 1954. More recent evidence, however, indicates
that the 1954 acreage reached 4.3 million hectares. 22/
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to provide sufficient additional bread to take care of the annual popu-
lation increase. Khrushchev gave certain additional reasons for the
program: (1) to provide a continuing increase in the standard of living,
(2) to feed the increasing number of nonproducers created by the shift
of population from the rural areas to the urban centers, (3) to supply
more grain to the rural areas engaged in growing technical and other
nonfood crops, (4) to provide reserves to meet any eventuality, and
(5) to export grain.
At a later date, Khrushchev stated: "The main reason behind the
need for an additional quantity of grain is that we must sharply in-
crease the production of fodder to meet the requirements of the livestock
husbandry." 2f)_/ The necessity of further increasing the grain supply to
meet the additional requirements of planned expansion of animal husbandry
brought the Soviet leaders to the so-called "corn program." This program
parallels the new lands program and is essentially part of a single pro-
gram the purpose of which is to establish an adequate grain base as a
decisive prerequisite for an "upsurge" not only of husbandry but of all
agriculture as well. In Khrushchev's words, to obtain a "successful
solution of the tasks of Communist building, it is necessary to have
alongside a powerful industry a comprehenbively developed agriculture
able to produce as much foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials as
are required for an uninterrupted supply to the population and to cover
other needs of the country." 22/ The acreages devoted to grains for
feeding livestock in the USSR were not sufficient to produce the quanti-
ties planned by the Soviet leaders. A decree of February 1955 provided,
therefore, that the 3.5 million hectares of corn seeded in 1953 be ex-
panded to not less than 28 million hectares in 1960. 22/ This expansion
was to take place largely in the European USSR.
It is not the purpose of this report to analyze the corn program,
which will be discussed in detail in a forthcoming report. A brief com-
parison of the new lands program and the corn program, however, is given.
E. Comparison of the New Lands Program with the Corn Program.
The decree issued by the Soviet government in February 1955
planned the expansion of the corn acreage from 3.5 million hectares
seeded in 1953 to 28 million hectares in 1960. 31/ Other than a
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relatively small acreage in the Georgian SSR (Region V)* Transcaucasus),
the area seeded to corn for the production of grain was almost exclusively
restricted to the European USSR. Except for a few thousand hectares in
southern Voronezhskaya Oblast (Region VII, Central), practically no corn
for the production of grain had normally been seeded above 50 degrees
north latitude, which is the latitude of the city of Khar'kov in the
northern Ukraine.
About one-fourth of the 3.5 million hectares of corn seeded in
1953 was concentrated in the territories acquired from Rumania at the
close of World War II, almost exclusively in the Moldavian SSR. Another
one-fourth of this acreage was seeded in the areas adjacent to the Cau-
casus Mountains, chiefly in Krasnodarskiy Kray and the Georgian SSR. The
remaining one-half of this acreage was scattered throughout the Ukraine
and in the valley of the Don River. None of these areas is remotely com-
parable to the Illinois and Iowa corn belt in the US. Except for a few
thousand acres in Minnesota and North Dakota, no corn in the US is grown
for the production of grain, and little is grown for silage, north of the
45th parallel, which passes through Minneapolis. 1g/
In launching the corn program the Soviet government stated that
corn was to be seeded wherever it would grow and regardless of whether
or not it would mature. The European USSR has an area in which corn
will produce ears that normally ripen enough to be garnered as grain.
To the north of this area is a belt of considerable latitude in which
corn plants produce immature ears with a high moisture content. This
corn can be conserved in the form of silage. Soviet officials claim
that this corn-ear silage can be fed to swine and chickens in place of
sound (dry) grain and that the rest of the plant can be ensiled as feed
for other livestock) particularly dairy cattle. 31/ The northern and
southern boundaries of this belt will fluctuate with the yearly fluctua-
tions of climate and will be determined to some extent by the earliest
frost. It is the further intention of the USSR to seed corn for use
as green fodder and silage in the European USSR and in the Asiatic USSR
as far north as corn will grow. Moderate acreages of corn for grain,
silage, and green fodder have invaded even the new lands.
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Although collective farms theoretically are to formulate their
own plans as to where and to what extent they are to seed corn, they
have received a mandate to expand corn acreage "by as much as is re-
quired to maximize grain production." Under this mandate, the corn
acreage, chiefly in the European USSR, was expanded to 17.9 million
hectares in 1955. fl/
As indicated above, the corn program is to be largely restricted
to the European USSR. The crop not only is to use lands not otherwise
sown to grain but also is to replace other grains, particularly oats and
barley, which may not give such profitable returns. Some corn was seeded
on fallow lands and even on small acreages of virgin lands. In general,
however, the corn program contrasts sharply with the new lands program
in which expansion of acreage is to be chiefly in the Asiatic USSR and
which is largely directed toward the use of virgin and long-fallow lands.
There are other sharp contrasts between the two programs. Corn
is an intensively cultivated crop which can use hand labor. Acreage is
to be expanded in land-poor regions -- in regions) that is, where arable
land per able-bodied worker may be as little as 1 hectare (Zakarpatskaya
Oblast in the western Ukraine) and 4.2 hectares (Gor'kovskaya Oblast in
the north of the non-black-soil region). L/ Although the government
plans to produce special machinery for seeding, cultivating, harvesting,
drying, and ensiling corn, its expenditures on the program up to 1955
have been moderate, and much of the work has been performed by hand. The
burden of "maximizing grain production" has been left on the shoulders of
the collective farm workers themselves. On the other hand, the new lands
program involves extensive, as contrasted with intensive, ? cultivation of
the land and is being carried out in land-rich regions where arable land
per able-bodied worker ranges from 14.8 hectares (Novosibirskaya Oblast
in West Siberia) to 34 hectares (Pavlodarskaya Oblast in Kazakh SSR).
The government is making heavy expenditures to supply tractors, seeders,
combines, dryers, storage capacity, other means of production, housing,
and transportation to implement the program.
The corn program is associated with plans to increase livestock
numbers and to make available more meat, fats, milk, and other high-quality
foods to improve the domestic diet. The program is being developed near
large centers of consumer demand. In contrast, the new lands program is
being developed in areas far from centers of use and is associated with
increasing the wheat and millet supply, primarily for human consumption.
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The two programs, which are being developed simultaneously, have
the common purpose of supplying an abundance of food for building up a
Communist society. Although the two programs are common in ultimate
purpose, they are not without elements of competition, and they may tend
to handicap each other.
The corn program is being carried out in areas where the con-
ditions of soil and climate are not particularly propitious for the
production of corn as dry grain. On the other hand, the physical fac-
tors affecting production in the major regions where the new lands
program is being developed are positively hazardous.
II. Physical Factors Affecting Production.
A. General.
When the USSR began to outline plans for expanding acreages into
virgin lands and into lands which had long been fallow, areas widely
scattered throughout the European USSR and the Asiatic USSR were marked
for development.* Many of these areas are relatively small) and ex-
ploitation of them will involve no real problems of administration or
organization. The major problem facing the USSR is the successful
exploitation of a large and more or less continuous area which includes
the northern rayons of Stalingradskaya Oblast and most of Saratovskaya
and Kuybyshevskaya ?blasts in Region VI (Volga) 2Y; Chkalovskaya Oblast,
the western rayons of Bashkirskaya ASSR, southeastern Sverdlovskaya
Oblast, and most of Helyabinskaya Oblast in Region VIII (Urals) 11/; all
of Region IX Nest Siberia) lying south of a line from the city of
Tyumen', passing just south of Tara to the Ob' River, and thence north-
east to the city of Tomsk Igh and the northern part of Kazakh SSR in
Region Xa (Kazakhstan).** 221 This is the area that for the purposes
of this report is called the "new lands."
On the basis of soil and climate and other factors affecting
agricultural production,*** the new lands may be divided into three
major geographic zones:
** See Figure 2, following p. 22.
See Figure 3, following p. 22.
*** See Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7, following p. 22.
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The Northern Zone consists of the southern part of Sverdlov-
skaya Oblast and most of Chelyabinskaya Oblast in Region VIII and the
southern part of Tyumenskaya and Tomskaya Oblasts; most of Altayskiy Kray
and Omskaya, Novosibirskaya) and Kemerovskaya Oblasts; and all of Kurgan-
skaya Oblast in Region IX. This zone is the northern part of the
Asiatic spring wheat belt.
The Southern Zone consists of all of Severo-Kazakhstanskaya)
Kokchetavskaya, and Pavlodarskaya Oblasts and the northern parts of
Aktyubinskaya, Kustanayskaya, Akmolinskaya, Karagandinskaya, Semi-
palatinskaya, and Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblasts in Region Xa (Ka-
zakhstan). This zone is the southern part of the Asiatic spring wheat
belt.
The Western Zone consists of Chkalovskaya Oblast and part of
Bashkirskaya ASSR in Region VIII; most of Kuybyshevskaya and Saratovskaya
Oblasts and the northern part of Stalingradskaya Oblast in Region VI; and
the northern part of Zapanno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast in Region Xe.. This
zone is the northeastern part of the Volga spring wheat belt.
B. Northern Zone.
1. General.
The greater part of the Northern Zone of the new lands is a
plain. The water table is high and may be no more than 1 or 2 meters
below the surface. LT/ The drainage of much of this zone is poor, marsh
lands are frequent) and potholes -- often large ones -- are scattered
over the area. The water in the potholes may be fresh in the north) but
in the south it is often saline.
Largely because of the proximity of ground water but also
because of the character of the soil, meadows and pastures parallel
certain of the river bottoms and border the lakes and undrained water
holes on the ridges. Wooded areas are dense in the north and scattered
in the south. Also scattered throughout the zone are soils unsuitable
for cultivation -- saline soils, meadow swamp soils, leached soils in
the birch forests) sandy soils on the piney terraces) and stony soils
and eroded soils on the steep slopes.ill/ Among those soils that grow
only grass weeds or sedges are areas where cultivation of crops is
practical, and level stretches are well suited to mechanized agriculture.
From the time in the nineteenth century when political offenders from
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Figure 2
USSR: NEW LANDS
? Kolitashlv?
Taro ?
?Sh?oronali
ElarabinS%
Noventbnsu
SiavAtiret.. q
%Kuiuna?
ONE
Akmotino?
? 111Thezkazaan
.IRAL SEA
25086 1.56 (First revision 9-56)
Union Republic boundary (SSR)
Oblast, Kray or Autonomous
Republic (ASSR) boundary
(:) Administrat've center (Oblast,
Kray or ASSR)
NATURAL REGIONS
based on climate and natural vegetation
Toigo
Deciduous forest
Steppe
Dy t pp d
semi-desert
Mountain vegetation
t I
New Lancia area
Wooded steppe M. Desert CI) :1:Tiadlalr7atrel:s
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,90
300 300 Mies
0 100 703 300 ....feeten
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USSR: NEW LANDS
50X1
F:aure 3
rzerHe -
s-g-7,--- - g
. mb.
i - - 7
-4es.iss-T
' - ' L,--:: itss_j_ L-LI;CS'''''"L s
:/
me.,
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4.?
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ir.< 0 N
i 4. .71 _ , Jag
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, ''-r>,---
ez,
g
A
A K
rgesgg
gs7szez.
GtrwretialifilitSht mein
s m.sr S earn, SSP
TEl Pedzcd and beg soils
SOIL TYPES
Mountain or highland sod
Seenchak (saline so:I)
50X1
Chemozem
LigM ctgstnid sail
711 Desert wits
Sand,
Gr-brown pedzek soil
----I Animist ftterd-Plaill essil
Degraded cherreozem
Set/tett (a!ka:i wfl
103
303
Pres?A prg--
Fri Mesdeemchezzozem
m
Ice :co
=a
Dark theatre:it sail
sot:seers
:g SotImed Ways
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USSR: NEW LANDS
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Figure 4
25087 1.56 r 9.t.t
? Union Republic boundary (SSR)
Oblast. Kray or Autonomous
Repo (ASSR) boundary
Adm,nistrative center (Oblast.
0 Kay or ASSR)
Main New Lanes ern
AVERAGE ANNUAL PRECIPITATION
(in millimeters)
(approximate inch equivalents are shown in parentheses)
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1 CI 200 3n3
O 103 TOO 100 .4seetn
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USSR: NEW LANDS
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Figure 5
25088 1-56 4 di ?
Union Republic bounden, MR/
Oblast. Kray or Autonomous
Republic (ASSR) boundary
0 Administrative center (Oblast.
Kray or ASS(?)
Ms N... Lorin yir.4-4
AVERAGE TOTAL PRECIPITATION FOR MAY-JUNE-JULY
(in millimeters)
(approximate inch equivalents are shown in parentheses)
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0- 100 ZOO
0 100 200 )00 11.1aemelers
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USSR: NEW LANDS
; zinkiKrsaintkyiY?rn
? / l:11111.0S:acts:9;3:510:04:150t:55:75.
ar.o
PZ,"?terars
enitetnkk . ? 'Miss,
NOvYY
?
Vasyugar,
50X1
Figure 6
(.0 Ku Ilan.,
?
00catsch
Cheraw?
AbOurne ?
MinuO?
IntKidsol
Ccaraianda
Karkralinsk.
ip3oenskly
*nos?,
049, 0.35
,Dthema,
25090 1.56
MOISTURE ZONES*
0
Union Republ:c bourdary (SSR)
Oblast. Krny or Autonomous
Republic (ASSR) boundary
Adroistrative certter (Oblast.
Kray or ASSR)
0.5 and above
0.2 0.5
Less than 0.2
Sufficient moisture
Deficient moisture
Meager moisture
re
* by coefficients of moisture based on relation of
precipitation to maximum potential evaporation.
(according to Soviet Geographer N. N. Ivanov).
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0 ;CO
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Figure 7
USSR: NEW LANDS
Ac.hina
JThTam ? / al
Ufa ?C c' ry 0
erns% .
1 ?:.E3
'2 'Anthem>.
0 Ishirn?
tan StAlzhen
is
0$ therms?
?:.6.
thar? C........,herya ...........,,..... '3o _
????
Omsk Tata rslc enrsk 3
"In '4.. .1.,404.:, \61(\ulund? .na-01/1 ?1( szonni ne tssit111y
Ktseirrsitessi:Stoi \ .
I
6. -t---.":
--
On ,-----=
1 h eithrOver? q'c'
eltrv
Wins; $ <
air ,
si?..vto NovO?MIrsk
\
5 ,r. t , too? ? .?'?.?...???? oirrovov
\
Form 0 Ar ? A -. -L N. ../ w..., s' Pr:Zg r
l'' I c,:k. kart So
1/4. ?? `-----0 ornatt
ii
%...... lao /
are r Orsa
Akrnolinn?
R470; /Jo
re:00110, ? oeriz
25089 1-56 (fast resis.on 9-56
*7
ARAL SEA
? Union Republic boundary (SSR)
Oblast. Kray or Autonomous
Republ;c (ASSR) boundary
0 Administrative center (Oblast,
Kray or ASSR)
Maks Mew Lands area
AVERAGE DURATION OF THE FROST-FREE SEASON
(number of days)
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Cr 100 2013 303 lo
103 203 WO 1110,01*.?
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European Russia were herded into farming groups and scattered along the
"exile trail" from Novosibirsk to Barnaul) the suitability of different
soil types for production of field crops has been tried out. After such
experiments, many potential farm sites were abandoned. Marginal lands
were left fallow for many years and became overgrown with weeds and grass.
For the most part, however, where the water table is not too high, the
soil not too saline) and the climate not too inclement, the better soils
were being exploited in 1953 as collective and state farms. The new
lands program provides for the reclamation of much of this virgin and
long-fallow land. The USSR planned to plow 4,481,000 hectares of such
lands in the Northern Zone in 1954 for sowing in 1955. Of this acreage,
51.6 percent, 2,310,000 hectares, were to be reclaimed in Altayskiy
Kray.
2. Altayskiy Kray.
Altayskiy Kray is in the southeastern corner of Region
IX and is by far the most important district in the new lands. In the
drainage basin of the Ob' River, at the foot of the forested Salair
Ridge and Altay Mountains, are large areas of virgin and long-fallow
lands comprising four natural belts. The lower foothills are wooded
steppe country which has a variety of good farming soils, but the pos-
sibility of erosion must always be considered. Climatic conditions are
most favorable for the cultivation of grain crops. Between the foothills
and the Ob' River is a rolling steppe with rich black soil (chernozem)*
similar to the wheat soils of eastern Kansas and Nebraska. West of the
Ob' River on the Priobskiy plateau, soils are lighter, merging into
semiarid steppe and arid steppe toward the south. In the flat depressions
the soils are saline.
3. Novosibirskaya, Kemerovskaya, and Tomskaya Oblasts.
North of Altayskiy Kray, in the drainage basin of the Ob'
River, lie Novosibirskaya) Kemerovskaya, and Tomskaya Oblasts.
In general, this area is not as good farming country as is Altayskiy
* There are 10 types of black soils (chernozems) in the USSR. Such
black soils have been formed in various areas throughout the world on
lands that were covered with grass for thousands of years. The grasses
have brought the mineral plant nutrients up toward the surface of the
soil. Through the centuries the grasses have added organic matter to
the soil. The organic matter and the available mineral nutriente
make the soil highly productive.
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Kray. Along the Ob' River there are large massifs of sand and pine
forests. Kemerovskaya Oblast is divided by a forest-covered mountain
massif (Kuznetskiy Ala-Tau). Toward the north there are alluvial and
bog soils, which increase in extent northward toward Tomsk. There is,
however, a considerable area of good black soil in southern Novo-
sibirskaya Oblast and somewhat less fertile black soils in southern
Kemerovskaya Oblast. North of the black soils there are a variety of
soils, some of which are good for farming. The USSR planned to plow
490)000 hectares in Novosibirskaya Oblast and 151)000 hectares in
Kemerovskaya Oblast in the fall of 1954 for sowing in 1955. No land
was to be plowed in Tomskaya Oblast. Actually, 660,000 hectares
were plowed in Novosibirskaya Oblast, and 160,000 hectares in
Kemerovskaya Oblast. I?V
4. Omskaya, Kurganskaya, Tyumenskaya, and Sverdlovskaya
Oblasts.
West of the drainage basin of the Ob' River are Omskaya,
Kurganskaya) Tyumenskaya, and Sverdlovskaya Oblasts, in the drainage
basin of the Irtysh River and its tributaries) the Tobol and Ishim
Rivers. This region is a plain sloping gently toward the north, reach-
ing its lowest elevation, 61 meters, at Tara on the northern margin of
the new lands. The plains region below the altitude of 300 meters
(784 feet), including the drainage basin of the Ob' River and parts
of the northern oblasts of Kazakh SSA, is part of the vast West Siberian
lowland which continues northward to the shores of the Kara Sea above
the Arctic Circle.*
The greater part of this group of oblasts is wooded steppe.
South of the Trans-Siberian Railroad in Omskaya Oblast and along the
southern boundary of Kurganskaya Oblast are fertile, black soils similar
to those in eastern Kansas. Along the rivers there are alluvial soils
bordered by belts of good farming land) and on the ridges between the
rivers are soils that are marginal in fertility. There are many areas
of clay soils, which may drop out of cultivation in wet years. In some
areas; these soils are impregnated with alkali and saline salts to the
degree that cultivation of them is impractical. Along the northern
margin of the new lands there are grey-brown soils, similar to those in
central Wisconsin) which have developed under deciduous forests. kV
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The USSR planned to plow 1,1251000 hectares in Omskaya)
Kurganskaya, and Tyumenskaya Oblasts in the fall of 1954 for sowing in
1955. There were actually 1,517,000 hectares plowed) of which 1,017,000
hectares, 67 percent) were in Omskaya Oblast. No acreage was planned
to be plowed in Sverdlovskaya Oblast. IS
5. Chelyabinskaya Oblast.
Chelyabinskaya Oblast lies on the east slope of the Ural
Mountains. From north to south the foothills) and a fairly level strip
to the east, are classed as wooded steppe) steppe, and arid steppe.
Areas of fertile black soils alternate with those that are less fertile.
Most of the land in the steppe area is under cultivation. The bulk of
the virgin land was covered with a variety of grasses and weeds and was
used for pasture. Many of these areas are not cultivated, because the
soils are alkaline, saline, or rocky 1.191; but the USSR planned to plow
405,000 hectares in the fall of 1954 for sowing in 1955. Actually,
504,000 hectares were plowed. 20/
before 1953) the farm 50X1
lands of the Northern Zone appeared as islands of cultivation surrounded
by marshes) forests, sandy stretches, low-lying grasslands, sparsely
vegetated pastures, and toward the south, saline wastes. To a consider-
able extent, it is into such surroundings that cultivated fields are
being extended by the new lands program.
6. Climate.
The crops to be cultivated on the collective and state
farms of the Northern Zone of the new lands have been determined, as
they were in the areas of better soils, largely by trial and error,
to be those that have given the best returns under the prevailing
climatic conditions.
The Northern Zone of the new lands has a relatively short
frost-free growing season -- less than 120 days in the east but somewhat
more than 130 days in the west of the zone. At Omsk the average grow-
ing season is from 16 May to 19 September -- about 125 days, 21/ which
is similar to the season in central South Dakota. 52/ Within this
season, grain and other crops must be sown and must mature sufficiently
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to be harvested. During the severe winter the temperature may drop to
49 degrees below zero centigrade (C) (56.2 degrees below zero Fahrenheit
(F)))* and in the low lands the ground may freeze to a depth of from
1.5 to 2 meters.p./ As late as April the mean daily temperature at
Omsk ranges from degrees below zero C (21.2 degrees F) to 3 degrees C
(37.4 degrees F). The bulk of the planting is done in May but sometimes
earlier, as it was in 1934 when 13 percent of the grain was sown in late
April. 22/ The summers are moderately warm, the mean daily temperature
at Omsk ranging from 13 degrees C (55.4 degrees F) to 23 degrees C
(72 degrees F) -- on occasion, however, the temperature may run up to
39 degrees C (102 degrees F). Because of the high latitude the days are
long, and sometimes -- as it did in 1934 -- harvesting can begin in late
August. Usually, however, it does not get into full swing until Septem-
ber. Z,/ The autumn is short) and the average daily October temperatures
at Omsk range from 4 degrees C (39.2 degrees F) to 3 degrees below zero
C (26.6 degrees F).
Experience has shown that because of the severity of the
winters) winter wheat cannot be profitably grown in the Northern Zone.
Out of a total of 13;044,000 hectares** of grain sown in 1938, only
42,700 hectares were sown to winter wheat. Lysenko developed a winter
rye which he recommended particularly for Western Siberia. By 1938,
however, only 1.2 percent of the grain acreage was sown with winter
rye. The region is chiefly a spring crop area in which 99 percent of
all crops are planted in the spring. Because of the shortness of the
growing season, many crops are not grown, and corn is not grown for
grain. Through 1938, only 100 hectares of corn had been seeded. Al-
though corn has not been known to mature in the Northern Zone of the
new lands, it may be possible, as far as the length of season is con-
cerned; to grow the crop for silage and green fodder. The grains that
have proved most satisfactory in the Northern Zone of the new lands are
spring wheat and oats. Even these grains frequently have to be dried
artificially because of the shortness of the growing season and untimely
precipitation in late summer. There are also other factors that handicap
the successful production of grains and other crops.
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7. Winds.
The Northern Zone of the new lands is windy, as is all of the
new lands. Southeasterly winds prevail in winter and northerly and north-
westerly winds in summer. No major physical barriers prevent winds from
blowing into the new lands from the Arctic regions in the north or from
the Asiatic desert in the south. Winds of gale force (more than 51 kilo-
meters per hour) 2Y from the south may bring drought, blowing the top-
soil in dust clouds from the roots of grain and withering growing crops.
Winds from the north may bring snow in early August before the crop is
fully ripe or in September before the harvest is complete) causing heavy
losses of grain suitable for milling. This happened in 1934, when more
than one-third of the wheat crop at Omsk was unfit even for cattlefeed.
8. Rainfall.
The annual rainfall in the Northern Zone of the new lands is
not abundant. One of the stations reporting the largest annual precipita-
tion is Tomsk on the northeast margin of the new lands (20.9 inches), which
has about the same rainfall as Huron, South Dakota, or Amarillo, in the
Panhandle of Texas. 59/ Only a relatively small acreage of grain is grown
In Tomskaya Oblast, however) and somewhat more rain falls at Biysk in the
foothills of eastern Altayskiy Kray, where the acreage sown to grain is also
relatively small. Average annual precipitation in the Northern Zone of
the new lands of the USSR, by period and by weather station, is shown
In Table 1.
Table 1
Average Annual Precipitation
in the Northern Zone of the New Lands of the USSR
by Period and by Weather Station 2/
Inches
Period
Kurgan Omsk Novosibirsk Barnaul Biysk Tomsk
November through February
2.1
2.5
3.9
3.4
6.o
5.5
March through April
1.0
0.8
1.3
1.2
3.3
1.8
May through July
5.3
5.3
5.5
5.1
6.9
7.2
August through October
3.7
3.7
4.8
4.2
5.9
6.4
Total
12.1
12.3
15.5
13.9
22.1
20.9
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The grain acreage in the Northern Zone is sown almost exclu-
sively in the latitude of Kurgan, Omsk, and southeastward through southern
Novosibirskaya Oblast to Barnaul. The annual average rainfall ranges from
12.1 to 13.9 inches. These averages correspond to the rainfall belt in
eastern Montana and Wyoming, where grain is produced most profitably
by dry farming.
Although the average annual precipitation in the Northern Zone
probably is sufficient to produce such crops as will mature during the
short growing season, the distribution of rainfall throughout the year
leaves much to be desired. At Omsk, for example, about 20 percent of the
precipitation occurs during the November-February period, and only 6.5
percent falls during the short spring, March through April. That means
that winter precipitation must be preserved by fall plowing so that the
melting snow may sink into the soil and build up a reserve for early
development of the plants. Precipitation during the growing season is
propitious, but rain through the August-to-October period may hamper
harvesting and cause grain to rot in the fields, particularly if there
is an early frost.
In the Northern Zone, bringing the virgin and long-fallow
lands under profitable cultivation is complicated by the hazard of
fluctuation of rainfall from year to year. Soviet leaders are aware
of this prqblem.
C. Southern Zone.
1. General.
In the Southern Zone the virgin and long-fallow lands that
have been scheduled to be reclaimed are chiefly in the northern part of
Kazakh SSR. Soviet plans considered the zone to be divided from north
to south into four belts: a wooded steppe belt, a steppe belt, a semiarid
steppe belt, and an arid steppe belt. _621 The characteristics of these
four belts are associated essentially with differentials in climate,
chiefly rainfall.
2. Wooded Steppe Belt. ?_a/
The wooded steppe belt of the Southern Zone of the new lands
is located along the northern boundary of Severo-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast
and is a continuation of the wooded steppe of the Northern Zone. It is a
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flat, poorly drained plain) dotted with many shallow and comparatively
small hollows) potholes, and sinks. Aspen and birch grow in these
hollows which are frequently swampy, on podzolic soils similar to those
of northern Wieconsin and Michigan. Li On the higher flat sections
are undrained plains where marginal black soils and scattered spots
of saline soils have developed. These soils are close to ground water
(3 to 5 meters). They dry slowly in the spring and must be worked within
a relatively short period.
3. Steppe Belt.
The steppe belt of the Southern Zone of the new lands oc-
cupies a 20- to 50-kilometer belt beginning in northern Kustanayskaya
Oblast, passing through the southern part of Severo-Kazakhstanskaya
Oblast and the western part of Kokchetavskaya Oblast. Most of the
steppe belt lies in the West Siberian lowland. This almost-level plain
is pocked with flat depressions of varying size, some of which are
lakes (some fresh, some salt), swamps, and saline wastes. The character-
istic soils on the level plains are typical chernozems. These are black
soils like those in Omskaya Oblast and are often slightly alkaline. If
the area of the swamps and saline wastes does not cover more than 20 per-
cent of the area proposed to be reclaimed, the soils -- including the
slightly alkaline, black soils -- are considered to be suitable for produc-
tion of crops.
4. Semiarid Belt. 4.4/
The semiarid belt of the Southern Zone of the new lands oc-
cupies the plains region in northern Kustanayskaya Oblast, the southern
drainage basin of the Ishim River in northern Akmolinskaya Oblast)
and the eastern plateau of Kokchetavskaya Oblast. The predominant soils
are clayey black soils and, less frequently, loamy* black soils. Some-
times these soils form uniform massifs, and sometimes they alternate
with saline soils. If the saline soils take up more than 20 percent of
an area, they should be avoided in plowing virgin lands. Some of these
areas have been recently fallowed, and -- according to plan -- they were
to be reclaimed first. A certain type of black soil occurs in the south-
eastern part of Kokchetavskaya Oblast in the vicinity of the Kazakh
Volcano region. These soils are stony and are not suitable for cultiva-
tion, except in small sections between hills. By 1955, much of the existing
pasture in this belt already had been plowed.
* Loamy soils are intermediate between clayey soils and sandy soils.
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In general the Soviet soil scientists know where the unsuit-
able soils (shallow, rocky, saline, subject to flood, subject to erosion,
and the like) are located. It is questionable, however, that any of the
20,000 city-bred Communists who are directing the new lands program have
any practical knowledge of unsuitability of soils, and few of the managers
of MTS's are skilled in soil science. In 1954-55, in any case, in both
the Northern and Southern Zones a considerable acreage of unsuitable land
was plowed that afterwards had to be abandoned. _61/
Along the southern margin of the Southern Zone of the new
lands, to the north and east, there are barren plains dotted with white
and grey alkaline sinks, and black, rocky ridges loom on the horizon.
These plains are the arid steppe.
5. Arid Steppe Belt.
The arid steppe belt of the Southern Zone of the new lands
extends as an intermittent strip from the southern drainage basin of the
Ural River in the northern part of Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast* to
the upper valley of the Irtysh River in the vicinity of the city of
Semipalatinsk. The terrain is irregularly broken by plateaus, mountains,
tablelands, deep valleys, and a volcanic area of ancient craters and
ridges. Consequently, the soils of this belt are even less uniform than
are the soils in the more northern belts. The belt of fertile dark
chestnut soil of Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast extends across the
northern part of Aktyubinskaya Oblast to the Mugodzhar Mountains.
'Mese soils are similar to the chestnut soils of western Kansas.
East of the mountains the soils of the Turgay tableland in the central
part of Kustanayskaya Oblast are carbonaceous, dark chestnut soils of
clayey composition. These soils are sticky when wet and must be worked
in a very short time when conditions are suitable. There are also de-
pressions of saline soils that should not be worked at all. In the
eastern part of Akmolinskaya Oblast, the southern part of Pavlodarskaya
Oblast, and the northern part of Karagandinskaya Oblast, a strip of dark
chestnut soils is interrupted by a series of volcanic ridges alternating
with level glens. The soils of this region may be silty. Springs are
frequent, and there are meadows dotted with small volcanic formations.
* The northern part of Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast lies in the
drainage basin of the Ural River and is economically associated with
the western part of Chkalovskaya Oblast of Region VIII (Urals). This
oblast is therefore included in the Western Zone of the new lands.
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In the northern part of Pavlodarskaya Oblast, on both banks of the
Irtysh River) there are sandy barns, light barns, and sometimes sandy,
dark chestnut soils. The soils that are fallow as well as those that are
In pasture are scheduled for reclamation. Because of the irregularity
of the terrain of the arid steppe belt, care in the selection of the
areas to be reclaimed must be taken to avoid erosion.
Similar to those in the Northern Zone of the new lands, the
soils in the Southern Zone best adapted to farming already had been lo-
cated by 1953 and were occupied by collective and state farms clustered
in the northern part of Kazakh SSR. These farms tend to be concentrated
in the wooded steppe belt; the typical steppe belt; and, to a lesser
extent, in the semiarid steppe belt, wherever the better soils (partic-
ularly the black soils) are found. Farms have also been established
in the arid steppe belt in scattered localities possessing the most
suitable soils.
6. Climate.
As in the Northern Zone of the new lands, the crops to be
cultivated on the collective and state farms in the Southern Zone have
been determined, by trial and error, to be those that have given the
best returns under the prevailing climate.
The frost-free growing season in the Southern Zone averages
about 130 days, only slightly longer than the average in the Northern
Zone. The winter is severe. The absolute minimum temperature ranges
from 45 degrees below zero C (49 degrees below zero F) at Kustanay to
49 degrees below zero C (56 degrees below zero F) at Akmolinsk. 12/
As in the Northern Zone, the severity of the winter makes impracticable
the cultivation of winter wheat. Out of 3,493,700 hectares planted to
all crops for the harvest of 1938 in those oblasts of Kazakh SSR that
for the purposes of this report have been included in the Southern Zone,*
only 500 hectares were sown to winter wheat and 114,700 hectares were
sown to winter rye. The Southern Zone is a spring crop area, and in
1938 spring grain occupied 88.6 percent of the total sown acreage. 12/
* Statistically, the Southern Zone was considered in 1938 to include
Aktyubinskaya, Karagandinskaya, Kustanayskaya, Pavlodarskaya, and
Severo-Kazakhstanskaya Oblasts. After World War II the present oblasts
(boundaries of 1945) were formed out of parts of those oblasts.
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Spring is late, as is indicated by the mean daily temperatures
in April, which range from 6 degrees C (42.8 degrees F) to 4 degrees below
zero C (24.8 degrees F) at Kustanay but are somewhat lower at Akmolinsk --
from 4 degrees C (39.2 degrees F) to 5 degrees below zero C (23.0 degrees
F). /2/ Because of the climate much of the planting is usually delayed
until May) the bulk of the crop being planted after the 15th of the
month. IA/ On the average, the summers are only slightly warmer than at
Omsk. The July mean temperatures at Akmolinsk range from 13 degrees C
(55.4 degrees F) to 26 degrees C (78.8 degrees F). The extreme summer
maximum temperature, however, averages the same as at Omsk -- 37 degrees
C (102 degrees F). The autumn is short) and during October the mean
daily temperatures at Akmolinsk range from 6 degrees C (42.8 degrees F)
to 3 degrees below zero C (26.2 degrees F). /V
In Kazakh SSR) harvesting usually begins during the last half
of July and continues through August, and) as in 1934, more than one-half
of the grain crop may be harvested in September. /2/
Spring wheat is the most important grain grown in the Southern
Zone -- 58.7 percent of the total spring grain acreage in 1938. Millet
was next in importance with 14 percent followed by oats with 10.3 percent
and barley with 4.9 percent; 0.7 percent of the spring grain acreage was
sown to other. grains. Because of the shortness of the growing season)
corn was not grown for grain in this zone. It is possible, however, to
grow corn for silage and green fodder) and about 1,000 hectares were
seeded in 1938. IY Although spring wheat is the most important grain
sown in the Southern Zone, it should be noted that millet) which is
more drought resistant than wheat, is second in importance and that
oats fall to third place in extent of acreage.
Because of the shortness of the growing season and the rela-
tively large precipitation in late summer and early fall) the harvested
grain has to be dried artificially before it can be stored safely.
7. Rainfall.
In the Southern Zone of the new lands, rainfall diminishes
rapidly from north to south as the terrain approaches the Central Asiatic
deserts. In Severo-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast, annual rainfall at Petropav-
lovsk averages 14.1 inches, about the same annual precipitation as at
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Denver, Colorado. II/ On the southern fringe of the new lands the annual
precipitation averages only 8.8 inches, somewhat less than at El Paso,
Texas (9.2 inches). Average annual precipitation in the Southern
Zone of Lhe new lands of the USSR, by period and by weather station, is
shown in Table 2.
Table 2
,Average Annual Precipitation
in the Southern Zone of the New Lands of the USSR
by Period and by Weather Station .!"
Inches
Period
Petro-
pavlovsk
Aktyu-
binsk
Temir
Akmo-
linsk
Kus-
tanay
Kok-
chetav
Karkara-
linsk
November through
February
2.3
3.0
2.8
4.o
1.8
1.7
2.0
March through
April
1.1
0.9
0.8
1.3
0.5
0.6
0.8
May through July
6.2
2.8
3.1
5.1
4.8
4.7
4.2
August through
October
4.5
3.9
2.1
4.2
4.4
4.o
4.1
Total
14.1
10.6
8.8
14.6
11.5
11.0
11.1
a. 79/
In the greater part of the Southern Zone, annual rainfall
ranges from 10.6 to 11.5 inches, less than at Helena, Montana (11.6
inches), 130/ and in parts of Nevada. 131/ Petropavlovsk which has an
annual precipitation of 14.1 inches and Akmolinsk which has a precipita-
tion of 14.6 inches are exceptions. Also an exception is a small area
in the drainage basin of the Irtysh River near the city of Pavlodar,
where the annual rainfall averages less than 10 inches. (Si
Agricultural production in most of the Southern Zone is
governed not only by the low annual precipitation but also by the dis-
tribution of rainfall during the year. Winter precipitation is light,
and there is a shallow snow cover. As a consequence, there is a low
reserve of soil moisture in the spring. There is little rainfall during
March and April, and retention of the snow cover, early tillage of the
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soil, and application of moisture conservation methods are of great
importance. The heaviest precipitation occurs during the months in
which crops are making their growth (May, June, and July). The heavy
rainfall in August, September, and October, however, tends to hamper
harvesting and may reduce considerably the quantity and quality of
garnered grain.
As much of the virgin and long-fallow soils of the new
lands as possible is plowed in the fall, primarilx to decrease the
work in the short spring period. In certain areas, fall plowing
also may help to build up soil moisture as the foundation for the
development of field crops during May) June, and July.
8. Lands to Be Reclaimed.
Initial Soviet plans called for the plowing of 5,910,000
hectares* .2./ of virgin and long-fallow land in the Southern Zone in
the fall of 1954. Actually, 7,293,000 hectares** of virgin and long-
fallow lands were plowed. Almost one-half of this acreage was plowed
in centrally located Kokchetavskaya and Akmolinskaya Oblasts.
D. Western Zone.
1. General.
The Western Zone of the new lands, as defined for the pur-
poses of this report, includes certain of the western rayons of Bash-
kirskaya ASSR and Chkalovskaya Oblast of Region VIII and a certain
part of Region VI lying within the boundaries of Kuybyshevskaya
and Saratovskaya ()blasts and the northern part of Stalingradskaya
Oblast. For the purposes of this report) the northern part of
Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast also will be included in the Western
Zone.***
* This figure includes 15,000 hectares in Semipalatinskaya Oblast.
** This figure includes 186,000 hectares in Semipalatinskaya Oblast.
XXX The northern part of Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast lies in the
drainage basin of the Ural River and is economically associated with the
western part of Chkalovskaya Oblast. These two areas formed one of the
most important surplus grain districts of Tsarist Russia.
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In Bashkirskaya ASSR) in the area selected for reclamation)
there is very little forest. Only in the higher reaches along the Belaya
River and in the hollows and depressions in the south are there groves
of oak. The soils south of the Belaya River are, for the most part,
typical or leached chernozems. These fertile soils are well adapted to
the production of hard spring wheat. In Bashkirskaya ASSR the USSR
planned to plow 205,000 hectares of virgin and long-fallow land in the
fall of 1954 for planting in 1955, giving attention to the suscepti-
bility to erosion of the soils located on inclining terrain. Actually)
401,000 hectares were plowed. 21.2/
The area east of the Volga River in Region VI that has been
selected for reclamation may be divided into four natural belts) as is
the Southern Zone: a wooded steppe belt, a typical steppe belt, a
semiarid steppe belt, and an arid steppe belt. These belts succeed
each other in a north-to-south direction. 2tg This succession is
based primarily on moisture conditions in Kuybyshevskaya, Saratov-
skaya, and Stalingradskaya Oblasts.
The northwestern rayons of Kuybyshevskaya Oblast are wooded
steppe. The soils in the islands of farmlands are typical leached and
carbonaceous black soils the properties of which change somewhat in
relation to the peculiarities of the relief. The soils of this area
are among the best adapted to production of spring wheat. IV" These
rich soils are already being fully exploited, and there is little, if
any, land in Kuybyshevskaya Oblast planned to be reclaimed. The
northern part of Saratovskaya Oblast east of the Volga River is a
semiarid steppe. The soil is generally black but of a light composi-
tion, which is particularly well suited to the production of millet.
Dark chestnut and light chestnut soils predominate in the central-
southern part of Saratovskaya Oblast. Spring wheat is the predominant
crop, and oats and millet are next in importance.
The extreme southern part of Saratovskaya Oblast and the
northern part of Stalingradskaya Oblast (formerly the Volga-German
Republic) is arid steppe. The soils are chiefly chestnut in type,
and saline areas frequently are found. Planting is done largely in
those depressions which store up considerable moisture in the spring. .??/
This arid steppe land is a spring wheat and millet area) and the USSR
planned to reclaim 330,000 hectares in Saratovskaya Oblast in 1954 but
succeeded in plowing 488,000 hectares for sowing in 1955. In Stalingrad-
skaya Oblast, 373,000 hectares were reclaimed. ?2/
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The northwestern part of Chkalovskaya Oblast is a region
broken by ravines, sometimes hilly and largely covered by forests.
The central rayons in the valley of the Ural River form a rich farm-
ing area. The black soils of this area are particularly suited to
millet, but spring wheat is the main crop. The eastern rayons.of
Chkalovskaya Oblast are a low, gently rolling plain in which crystal-
line rocks occur. Sometimes black soils overlie the rocks, but they
are stony and alkaline. 22/ In Chkalovskaya Oblast, plowing in 1954
for planting in 1955 was planned at 700;000 hectares, but 1;0821000
hectares were actually plowed. 21/
The northern part of Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast lies
in the southern watershed of the Ural River. This area is a westward
continuation of the arid steppe belt of the Southern Zone of the new
lands. The soils are dark chestnut, well adapted to production of
wheat. 22/ The USSR planned to plow 305,000 hectares in 1954 for
sowing in 1955, but 534,000 hectares actually were plowed. 22/
2. Climate.
In the Western Zone of the new lands the frost-free growing
season is generally more favorable for crop production than the season
in the Northern and Southern Zones -- 140 days at Ufa in Bashkirskaya
ASSR, 150 days' at Kuybyshev, and 160 days in central Saratovskaya
Oblast./ The winters are less severe in the Western Zone; the
absolute minimum temperature at Ufa in Bashkirskaya ASSR is 42 degrees
below zero F, 92/ compared with 56 degrees below zero at Omsk in the
Northern Zone. Although the absolute minimum temperature is not as
low in the Western Zone as in the Northern Zone, the winter tempera-
tures are still too low for winter wheat to survive -- except in a few
sheltered spots. Spring work begins about 15 days earlier 2g than
it does in the Northern Zone -- the mean April temperature is 43 degrees
F, 91/ compared with 37 degrees F at Omsk. The summers are warm; the
July temperature ranges from 74 degrees F at Ufa to 81 degrees F at
Urallsk in Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast Z/ and may reach a high of
98 degrees F at Ufa and 104 degrees F at Ural'sk. 22/ In the Western
Zone, grain matures more rapidly than it does in the Northern Zone,
and harvest may begin a month earlier. 100/ The Western Zone is' one
of the most important grain-producing areas in the USSR because soils
are well adapted to wheat growing even though much of the area is
subject to drought.
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3. Rainfall.
Rainfall in Bashkirskaya ASSR in the Western Zone is rela-
tively great, the annual average reaching 23.1 inches. This is about
the same as precipitation in Custer County) in central Nebraska. 101/
Precipitation drops to 14.6 inches at Chkalov in the Ural River region,
about the same as in Fort Laramie, Wyoming. 102/ In the arid steppe
region of Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast) annual precipitation averages
12.3 inches. This average is similar to that in parts of Carbon County
in south central Wyoming, west of the Rocky Mountains. 103/ Average
annual precipitation in the Western Zone of the new lands of the USSR)
by period and by weather station, is shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Average Annual Precipitation
in the Western Zone of the New Lands of the USSR
by Period and by Weather Station 21
Inches
Period Ufa Chkalov Ural'sk
November through February
8.o
5.1
3.3
March through April
2.2
1.9
1.2
May through July
6.8
August through October
6.1
2.8
3.7
Total
23.1 14.6 12.3
a. 10/
The distribution of precipitation in Bashkirskaya ASSR
is heavy in winter, and although it is light in March and April, it
is sufficient to provide good growing conditions for production of
grain during May, June) and July. Harvesting, however) may be
hampered by too much rainfall in late summer and early fall.
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Chkalovskaya Oblast is protected by forests on the north
and has good snowcover and good average rainfall during the growing
season, and good production is usually assured. Extending northward
from the arid steppe belt, however, there is danger of drought. Zapadno-
Kazakhstanskaya, northeastern Stalingradskaya, and eastern Saratovskaya
Oblasts are in less favorable positions, and precipitation in winter
must be conserved so that the accumulation of soil moisture by the
beginning of spring may constitute a basic source of water for the
whole growing season. There is less rainfall during the May-July
period than in the northern areas of the Western Zone. 105/
4. Lands to Be Reclaimed.
Of the 13 million hectares originally planned for reclama-
tion, the new lands program allocated 1)680,000 hectares to the Western
Zone for reclamation in 1954. Actually, 2,878,000 hectares were re-
claimed, of which 1,616,000 hectares) 56.2 percent, were in Chkalov-
skaya and Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblasts. 10S
E. Precipitation-Evaporation Ratios.
Reference has been made to seasonal variations in temperatures
and to the distribution of rainfall throughout the year. It is not
exclusively the absolute amount of rainfall that determines plant
development. Some rain runs off, carrying soil with it, and some of
the water that sinks into the soil evaporates. The suitability of an
area for the cultivation of a given crop bears a general relationship
to what is called its "precipitation-evaporation ratio." There are
several methods of computing such a ratio, but all of them take into
consideration precipitation and evaporation and are intended to measure
the moisture that is available for crop development.*
In the US the greater part of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Missouri
lie in what might be called a wooded steppe belt. The precipitation-
evaporation ratio of this belt is 0.64 or more. The ratio decreases
toward the west -- through what may be called the grassy steppe) the
semiarid steppe, and the arid steppe to western Utah) where the ratio
of 0.16 or less indicates near-desert conditions. 108/
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The USSR also computes a sort of precipitation-evaporation
ratio similar to, but not identical with, that used in the US. Along
the northern fringe of the Northern Zone of the new lands, this ratio
is about 0.60. Roughly paralleling the Trans-Siberian Railroad the
ratio is 0.50, but it decreases toward the south -- through the wooded
steppe; the typical steppe, the semiarid steppe; and the arid steppe
to the southern fringe of the Southern Zone of the new lands, where
the ratio is roughly 0.20, ELV decreasing southward toward the Central
Asiatic desert.
In the US the line indicating a precipitation-evaporation
ratio of 0.50 passes near Manhattan, Kansas, and northward near
Lincoln, Nebraska) and Brookings) South Dakota, and southward it
passes near Dallas, Texas. Thus the area of the Northern and Southern
Zones of the new lands south of the Trans-Siberian Railroad corresponds
to our western wheat and grazing lands which extend out to the desert.
There is, however, a difference. The average annual rainfall at Man-
hattan, Kansas, and northward and southward where this corresponding
area in the US would begin, is 25 inches, about twice that at Omsk
(12.3 inches). Precipitation drops to 8.8 inches at Temir on the
southern margin of the Southern Zone. Thus it is to be assumed that
the moisture relationships would be much less favorable southward in
the new lands than they are from central Kansas westward.
As far as soils are concerned, there are large areas of virgin
and long-fallow land in the Northern and Southern Zones of the new
lands that are satisfactory, even excellent, for production of wheat
corresponding to the black soils and chestnut soils in the US. In
the US, however, the Rocky Mountains intervene between the western
deserts and the principal wheat areas. There is no such barrier be-
tween the Asiatic deserts and the Southern Zone, the Northern Zone,
and the southern part of the Western Zone. The possibility of dust-
bowl conditions and winds of gale velocity makes the long-term outlook
hazardous.
F. Winds.
The Northern and Southern Zones of the new lands have no major
barrier against the winds from the Arctic in the north or the winds from
the Asiatic deserts in the south. These winds often are of gale velocity.
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In 1954 an atmospheric high developed in the Asiatic desert
attended by a clockwise movement of the air masses which drew a mois-
ture-laden "front" down from the Arctic, dumping water onto the new
lands and creating conditions that resulted in high yields of grain.
A similar circulation, however, also brought snow in August into Barnaul
and the areas to the north.
The clockwise movement of the air masses in 1954 brought hot, dry
air from the desert across the Caspian Sea into the North Caucasus area
(Region IV), the Volga Area (Region VI), and the Ukraine (Region III),
creating a severe drought and reducing yields of grain.* In 1955, on
the other hand, the winds blew from the south. An atmospheric pressure
system developing in the Asiatic desert early in the season was attended
by a counterclockwise movement of the air masses. Hot, dry air swept
northward, not only across the new lands between the Altay and the Ural
Mountains but also up the Volga River, and all of this vast region
suffered a severe drought. There was almost a crop failure.
At the same time, air masses from the eastern Mediterranean Sea
moved northward, heavily laden with moisture, and heavy rains fell over
the Ukraine, which had a very large production of grain. 111/
G. Conclusions.
Largely because of its vast area the USSR has a variety of
climates. Low production of grain in one part of the country may be
offset by high production in another section. This fact may have
played a major role in the planning and launching of the new lands
program.
In plowing the vast acreage planned for the new lands, Soviet
leaders are taking a chance on planting some areas that are poorly
suited to farming and may have to be abandoned after the first trial
and returned to growing grass. Other acreages may be submarginal soils
that may prove unprofitable after a longer period and may also be
abandoned eventually. The characteristics of certain of the soils are
such that dust conditions are likely to develop, and climatic condi-
tions threaten frequent droughts. After the present enthusiastic pro-
gram of applying mechanization to plowing, sowing, and combining, a
retrenchment is inevitable. Abandonment has already begun, and in
spite of attempts in other areas to recuperate such losses the acreage
of new lands ultimately retained for cultivation may be considerably
less than planned by the Soviet leaders.
* The movement of the air masses was plotted from daily weather charts. 110/
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III. Comparison of the New Lands with the Prairie Provinces of Canada.
In certain physical and climatic characteristics the Northern and
Southern Zones of the new lands are analogous to the Prairie Provinces
of Canada -- Manitoba) Saskatchewan, and Alberta. The Prairie Prov-
inces, which constitute one of the greatest spring wheat regions in the
world, lie north of 49 degrees north latitude, the latitude which ap-
proximately marks the extreme southern boundary of the Southern Zone
of the new lands.* The Canadian spring wheat belt, however) is almost
entirely below the parallel of 54 degrees north latitude, which bisects
the new lands and forms the approximate northern boundary of the
Southern Zone. 112/ Thus all of the Northern Zone of the new lands,
with the exception of Altayskiy Kray, lies above the Canadian spring
wheat belt.
A. Topography.
In general, the physiographies of the Prairie Provinces of
Canada and of the new lands of the USSR are similar. A large part
of both regions consists of level or rolling lands well suited to
large-scale, mechanized agriculture. A relatively minor part of the
land is suitable only for grazing or, because of topography) is
totally unfit for agricultural purposes.
B. Soils.**
The major soil belts in the Canadian spring wheat region are
extensions of similar belts in the US. Thus the black soil belt which
passes through eastern North Dakota and South Dakota and western Min-
nesota extends northward into Manitoba and thence northwest into the
northern part of the Canadian spring wheat belt in Saskatchewan and
Alberta. The dark chestnut soils of western Nebraska extend north-
ward through the western part of the Dakotas and into the central
Saskatchewan and Alberta wheat region. The light chestnut soils of
north central Montana extend well into southeastern Alberta and south-
western Saskatchewan. On the northern margin of the Canadian spring
wheat belt are found the gray acid soils, similar to the soils of
central Wisconsin) which developed under deciduous forest cover.
* See the map, Figure 8, following p. 42.
** See the map, Figure 9, following p. 44.
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The principal soils* of the Prairie Provinces of Canada are
analogous to those in the new lands, where they occur in belts ex-
tending from the forested northern margin into the semiarid, short-
grass steppe in the extreme south.** The dark chestnut, the light
chestnut, the fertile black, and the less fertile black soils are
the most important, comprising the chief agricultural areas. Ap-
proximately two-thirds of the total farming area in both the Prairie
Provinces and the new lands have rich black and dark chestnut soils.
The occurrence of alkaline and saline soils in regions of low annual
rainfall is common to both the Prairie Provinces and the new lands.
The proportion of these undesirable soils, however, is larger in the
new lands than in Canada.
The most important area of wheat production in Canada is
on the dark chestnut soils. Although the richer black soils give
larger and more reliable yields, farming on these soils is diversi-
fied, and the relative acreage sown to wheat is less. 113/ Before
the beginning of the Soviet new lands program in 1953, the greater
part of the wheat acreage in the Northern and Southern Zones of the
new lands was in the areas with a preponderance of black soil. 114/
Expansion of the sown area contemplated for the Northern and Southern
Zones will take place primarily in the dark chestnut and the black
soil belts. 115/
C. Climate.
By far the most critical factor in the production of wheat in
both the Prairie Provinces and the new lands of the USSR is the climate.
Both regions are dominated by strong, continental climates, and each is
subjected to extremes in temperature and rainfall. Long cold winters
and warm, sometimes hot, summers are characteristic of both Canada and
the new lands. The low winter temperatures preclude the growing of winter
wheat, but small acreages of winter rye are sown in both regions.
The spring season in both regions is short, and, as a rule, spring
grain is sown in April and May. Summer temperatures in Canada are some-
what lower than in the new lands. Mean July temperatures range from 61.6
* The Canadian soil types, simultaneously reflecting decreased rainfall
and sparser vegetation, occur in fairly well-defined belts from north to
south.
** For a detailed description of the soils of the new lands, see
p. 21, above.
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CANADA
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156115 11.56
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degrees F at Edmonton, Alberta) to 67 degrees F at Winnipeg, Manitoba,
to 69.3 degrees F at Medicine Hat, in the semiarid steppe of Alberta. 116/
The temperatures in the new lands range from 74 degrees F at Omsk in the
Northern Zone to 83 degrees F at Aktyubinsk in the semiarid steppe in the
Southern Zone. 1E/ Summer temperatures as high as 111 degrees F have
been recorded in the Canadian spring wheat belt) 118/ and 113 degrees F
has been recorded at Kokchetav in the new lands. 212/
In general) average annual temperatures throughout the new lands
are higher than in the Prairie Provinces, in spite of the similarity of
geographic orientation. The frost-free growing season in the Prairie
Provinces, with local exceptions, is generally shorter than it is in the
new lands.* Throughout the most productive Canadian wheat lands the
frost-free season ranges from about 95 to 110 days. 120/ Again with
local exceptions, only in the semiarid region of southeastern Alberta
and southwestern Saskatchewan is the frost-free season longer than 110
days. These ranges contrast with 118 days at Tomsk and 128 days at
Tyumen', at the northern edge of the new lands. 121/ Frost generally
is not a limiting factor in the cultivation of grains in the Canadian
wheat belt and in the new lands, but the possibility of killing frosts
in the late spring and early fall is an ever-present menace to agricul-
ture.
D. Rainfall.
The average annual rainfall in the Canadian wheat belt has cer-
tain similarities to that in the Northern Zone of the new lands of the
USSR -- Winnipeg) near the wheat-growing center of Manitoba, 20.5 inches,
and Tomsk, on the northern margin of the new lands, where little wheat
Is grown, 20.9 inches; Melfort in Northern Saskatchewan, 15.4 inches)
and Novosibirsk in the east-central part of Novosibirskaya Oblast)
15.5 inches; Saskatoon, near the center of the wheat-growing area of
Saskatchewan province) 13.8 inches, and Barnaul, in the important wheat-
growing area of Altayskiy Kray, 13.9 inches; Medicine Hat) in the semi-
arid region of southeastern Alberta) 12.7 inches, and Omsk) in the center
of the Asiatic spring wheat belt, 12.3 inches. Average annual precipita-
tion in the Prairie Provinces of Canada) by period and by weather station,
is shown in Table 4.**
* See the map, Figure 10) following p. 44.
** Table 4 follows on p. 44. See also the map, Figure 11, following
p. 46.
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Table 4
Average Annual Precipitation in the Prairie Provinces of Canada
by Period and by Weather Station 2/
Inches
Period
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
Winnipeg
Melfort
Saskatoon
Swift Current
Medicine Hat
Edmonton
November through February
3.7
2.6
2.2
2.6
March through April
2.4
1.5
1.3
1.5
May through July
8.3
6.5
6.4
6.9
5.2
8.5
August through October
6.1
4.8
4.o
3.9
Total
20.5
15.4
13.8 LI
14.9
12.7
17.6
b. Because of rounding, figures do not add to totals shown.
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Figure 9. Canada: Prairie Provinces, Soil Types
Figure 10. Canada: Prairie Provinces, Average
Duration of the Frost- Free Season
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In Canada it is generally recognized that crop cultivation in
regions where annual rainfall averages less than 12 inches is extremely
hazardous. The variability of rainfall increases as the average annual
precipitation decreases) thereby introducing a considerable risk of
crop failure. Relatively little wheat, therefore) is sown in Canada
where the annual rainfall averages less than that at Medicine Hat (12.7
inches). Probably less than 5 percent of the total acreage of the
Canadian wheat belt is sown in such areas. 123/
In sharp contrast, about 6o percent of the sown acreage of the
new lands in 1955 was in areas with annual rainfall of less than 12
inches. Almost all of the acreage sown in areas with annual rainfall
of less than 12 inches was located in the Southern Zone of the new
lands, where the average annual rainfall is generally lower than the
lowest in the Canadian spring wheat belt. In the greater part of the
Southern Zone the annual rainfall ranges from 11.5 inches at Kustanay
to 10.6 inches at Aktyubinsk to 8.8 inches at Temir on the southern
margin of the new lands.*
As noted in the discussion of rainfall in the new lands, it is
not only the total annual rainfall which influences crop production but
also the distribution of rainfall throughout the year. In the new lands,
as in Canada, the heaviest precipitation occurs during the growing season)
May through July.** In Canada the average rainfall during these 3 months
ranges from 5.2 inches in the semiarid region at Medicine Hat (relatively
unimportant for wheat growing) to 8.5 inches at Edmonton, Alberta, in the
center of the northwestern wheat-growing region. In the Northern Zone of
the new lands the range is from 5.1 inches at Barnaul in Altayskiy Kray,
in the center of the most important region of the new lands, to 7.2 inches
at Tomsk, on the northern margin of the new Lands) where little wheat is
grown. In the Southern Zone the range is from 2.8 inches at Aktyubinsk
to 6.2 inches at Petropavlovsk. In general) the rainfall during the
growing season is better in Canada than in the Northern Zone of the new
lands and considerably better than in the Southern Zone.
* There are, however, two localized exceptions. Petropavlovsk, on the
northern margin of the Southern Zone, has an average annual rainfall of
14.1 inches, and Akmolinsk, 400 miles south on the northern slope of the
Kazakh Folded Upland) has 14.6 inches.
** See the map, Figure 12, following p. 46.
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Rainfall during the months of August, September) and October
in both the new lands and in Canada is less than during the growing
season but considerably more than the winter precipitation, in the
November-through-February period. Spring rainfall is light in Canada,
but it is better than it is in the Northern Zone of the new lands and
considerably better than in the Southern Zone.
The precipitation-evaporation ratio) or moisture efficiency,
of the rainfall received is as important as a favorable distribution
of rainfall. In the new lands the precipitation-evaporation ratio
along the northern margin of the Northern Zone in the area of gray-
brown forest soils is about 0.60, and at Omsk in the black soil area
it is about 0.50; thence it diminishes rapidly to 0.20 near the
southern fringe of the Southern Zone. The precipitation-evaporation
ratio pattern for the new lands is similar to that for Saskatchewan)
the most important wheat producer in the Prairie Provinces of Canada.
On the northern margin of the Canadian wheat belt in the area of gray-
black soils at Prince Albert) the ratio is 0.59. In the area of deep
black soils, it is 0.55; in the area of shallow black soils, it is
0.50 to 0.46; in the area of dark chestnut soils it is 0.47 to 0.38;
and at Medicine Hat, Alberta) Lig in the semiarid region which is
under the strong influence of the desiccating "Chinook" winds from
the southwest, it diminishes to 0.20.
Although the precipitation-evaporation patterns for the two
areas are similar, the Prairie Provinces, with generally larger annual
precipitation, are in a more advantageous position for crop production.
Furthermore, it is rare that a severe drought is experienced simultaneously
in all of the Prairie Provinces -- a result, in part, of the Rocky Mountains
intervening between the deserts and the Canadian wheat belt. The absence
of any natural barrier in the new lands exposes the area to the hot, dry
winds from the Central Asiatic Desert, winds which may produce a severe
drought throughout the entire Southern and Northern Zones.
E. Yields.
During the 45-year period observed (1906-50)1 yields of spring
wheat in the Prairie Provinces averaged 15.3 bushels per acre. In
relation to the extent of area sown to this crop, this yield is among
the highest in the world. There is, however) no discernible cycle of
good and bad years in the Canadian wheat belt, but yields may fluctuate
widely from year to year -- from a high of 26.0 bushels per acre in 1915
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Figure 11. Canada: Prairie Provinces, Average
Annual Precipitation
? Figure 12. Canada: Prairie Provinces, Average Total
Precipitation for May -June -July
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to a low of 6.4 bushels per acre in 1937, for example. Prolonged periods
of below-average crops have been experienced, most notable of which was
the drought period from 1929 through 1938, during which yields averaged
11.7 bushels per acre. In 1930 and 1932, nevertheless, yields were above
the long-time average of 15.3 bushels per acre. A complete crop failure
throughout the Prairie Provinces has never been experienced. Even in
1937, the worst crop year on record) when Saskatchewan obtained a yield of
only 2.6 bushels per acre, Manitoba and Alberta obtained yields of 15.7
and 9.7 bushels per acre, respectively.
A historical series on yields in the new lands comparable to
that for the Canadian Prairie Provinces is not available. A 16-year
series (1900-15) on yields in the new lands is available. Although
a longer time series would be more desirable, this 16-year period is
believed to be a normal period and therefore suitable for the purpose
of comparing the 2 areas.
Yields in the Prairie Provinces are significantly higher, averag-
ing 15.3 bushels per acre compared with 9.3 bushels per acre in the new
lands. Actually) the average yield in the new lands is less than the
average yield in the poorest region of the Canadian wheat belt. The
Medicine Hat Crop District in the semiarid region of Alberta has an
average yield of 10.3 bushels per acre. 125/ Even in the Northern Zone
of the new lands, where) as a rule, the yields are highest because of
the generally greater rainfall and better moisture efficiency, the aver-
age yield is only 11 bushels per acre) 28 percent less than in the
Prairie Provinces.
Variability of yields in the 2 areas is surprisingly similar)
annually averaging 23 percent in the Prairie Provinces and 24 percent
in the new lands. Below-average yields were obtained in 20 out of 45
years in the Canadian wheat belt and in 8 out of 1,6 years in the new
lands. The lowest yield obtained in each of the 2 areas as a whole was
6.4 bushels per acre. There is a sharp contrast, however, in the highest
yields obtained. Whereas the highest yield in the new lands as a whole
was only 13.5 bushels per acre, a yield of 26.0 bushels per acre has been
obtained in the Prairie Provinces -- almost double that in the new lands.
A comparison of yields in the new lands of the USSR and in the Prairie
Provinces of Canada is shown in Table 5.*
* Table 5 follows on p. 48.
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Table 5
Comparison of Yields in the New Lands of the USSR and in the Prairie Provinces of Canada
1900-1915 and 1906-50
Yield Variability of Yields Average Variability of Yields a/
(Bushels per Acre) (Percent of Average Yield) (Percent)
Area Highest
Lowest
Average
Highest
Lowest
New lands (1900-1915) hi
Northern Zone
15.6
5.3
11.0
142
48
25
Southern Zone
14.4
3.5
8.6
168
4o
30
Western Zone
14.3
1.7
8.7
164
18
33
Total new lands
13.5
6.4
9.3
145
47
2)4
Prairie Provinces (1906-50) hi
Alberta
27.4
6.o
17.1
169
35
29
Manitoba
27.5
9.0
17.4
158
52
20
Saskatchewan
25.2
2.6
15.1
167
17
27
Total Prairie Provinces
26.0
6.4
15.3
170
42
23
a. Average deviation from the mean, without regard to sign, expressed as a percent of the mean.
Figures for the new lands are based on the acreage distribution for 1955 as shown in Table 9, p. 61, below.
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F. Conclusions.
In spite of many striking similarities to the Canadian wheat
belt in geography and climate, the new lands of the USSR are less favor-
ably disposed climatically, especially in amount of rainfall) than are
the Prairie Provinces. In view of experience in the Canadian wheat belt
during the past 50 years, it seems improbable that a similar success in
wheat production can be achieved in the new lands. As noted above,
yields in the new lands before expansion into the less productive soils
not only were significantly below the average in the Prairie Provinces,
as a whole) but also were below the yields of the poorest region in the
Canadian wheat belt. Because about 6o percent of the area seeded in the
new lands in 1955 was in regions where annual rainfall (12.7 inches)
averages less than in the poorest wheat-producing region in the Prairie
Provinces, yields in the long run possibly may not average as high as
those obtained in the least productive regions in the Canadian wheat belt.
IV. Acreage Sown, 1954 and 1955.*
Estimates of production of grain in the new lands of the USSR de-
pend primarily on applying to the acreages sown the estimated yields)
which vary with the modifying influences of climate and with other fac-
tors affecting plant growth. These influences differ considerably in
the Northern, Southern) and Western Zones. It is necessary not only to
determine as far as possible the total acreage sown to grain in any given
year but also to divide the total acreage into its zonal segments.
The decree of 28 March 1954 called for the sowing in 1954 of 2.3
million hectares of virgin and long-fallow land, of which 500,000
hectares were to be sown by state farms and 1.8 million hectares by
collective farms. Actual performance, as indicated below in terms of
thousand hectares, considerably exceeded the plan:
Region
State Farms
Collective Farms
Total
RSFSR
550
2,150
2,700
Kazakh SSR
250
1,350
1,600
Total USSR
800
3,500
4 300
For acreage data relating to the new lands program of the USSR in
1954-56, see Appendix A.
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Because the new lands program was not inaugurated until the spring
of 1954, it is reasonable to believe that most of the new areas sown in
1954 were on land in the proximity of already existing state and collec-
tive farms which could reclaim such land with a minimum of effort. In
all probability, most of this land had been under cultivation in recent
years but had been abandoned for a sufficient length of time to be
classified as virgin or long-fallow land.
During the early summer of 1954, large numbers of tractors and other
agricultural machinery were sent into the new lands. The 4.3 million
hectares sown in the spring are assumed to have been replowed in the
late summer and fall. In addition, 13.5 million hectares of virgin and
long-fallow land were plowed for the first time, making a total of 17.8
million hectares plowed in 1954 for sowing in 1955. In April 1956, it
was reported 127/ that 20.5 million hectares had been sown in 19551 indi-
cating that 2.7 million hectares probably had been plowed in the spring
of 1955. The 20.5 million hectares sown in 1955 are estimated to be
accounted for, in terms of thousand hectares, as follows:
Region
State Farms
Collective Farms
Total
RSFSR
4,400
5,600
10,000
Kazakh SSR
4,600
5,900
10,500
Total USSR
9,000
11,500
20500
In 1954, less than 20 percent of the new lands were sown by state
farms. By 1955, however, the program for setting up new state farms
was well under way, the largest number being established in Kazakh SSR.
As indicated in the tabulation above, about 44 percent of the new lands
were sown by state farms.
On the basis of information appearing in the Soviet press, the 1954
acreage of 4.3 million hectares can be distributed by zones as follows:
Northern Zone, 2.05 million hectares; Southern Zone, 1.32 million hec-
tares; Western Zbne? 690,000 hectares; and 240,000 hectares remain un-
distributed by zone.
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The 18.5 million hectares reported 128/ to have been sown to grain
in 1955 is similarly broken down by zones as follows: Northern Zone,
5.14 million hectares; Southern Zone, 8.65 million hectares; Western
Zone, 2.6 million hectares; and 2.11 million hectares remain undis-
tributed by zone.
Estimated acreage of grain sown in the new lands of the USSR, by
zones, in 1954 and 1955 is shown in Table 6.* There is insufficient
information concerning planned oblast acreages for 1956 or any later
years to permit a similar breakdown by zones for years after 1955.
V. Yields of Grain.
Because of the limitations in the available data, precise estimates
of grain yields in the new lands of the USSR or for the USSR as a whole
cannot be made. Since 1933, all published information on yields in
terms of centners per hectare and absolute data on production of
grains have been distorted through the use of so-called "biological,"
or "on-the-root," yields instead of "barn," or "harvested," yields.
This practice has inflated Soviet production figures by a significant
percentage.** The only available long-term series of acreage, yield,
and production data on a regional basis is a pre-World War I series.
Part of this series covering the years 1900-1915 has been used in this
analysis as a basis for arriving at a judgment of the yields that might
be expected in the new lands.
Some comment should be made concerning the relevance of the 1900-1915
series to current yields. Two questions must be considered: first, Is
the average yield for the 1900-1915 period a good estimate of the histori-
cal average yield over a long-term period or Has the average yiele during
the 1900-1915 period been biased by abnormal weather conditions or for
other reasons, and, second, Have there been technical advances in recent
years which would tend to make the 1900-1915 data inapplicable to the
present day?
* Table 6 follows on p. 52. See also the map, Figure 13, following
p. 52.
** Since 1953 the Soviet government reportedly has reverted to the
use of "barn" yields, but no absolute production figures have been
published since that time.
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Table 6
Estimated Acreage of Grain Sown in the New Lands of the USSR, by Zone
1954 and 1955
Thousand Hectares
Northern Zone
1954
1955
Chelyabinskaya Oblast
150
500
Tyumenskaya Oblast
6o
210
Omskaya Oblast
350
1,020
Kurganskaya Oblast
170
280
Novosibirskaya Oblast
250
660
Kemerovskaya Oblast
70
160
Altayskiy Kray
1,000
2,310
Total
20
, 50
5,140
Southern Zone
Severo-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast
100
870
Kokchetavskaya Oblast
160
1,620
Pavlodarskaya Oblast
300
1,260
Aktyubinskaya Oblast
loo
460
Kustanayskaya Oblast
250
1,970
Akmolinskaya Oblast
310
1)890
Karagandinskaya Oblast
30
270
Semipalatinskaya Oblast
40
210
Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast
30
100
Total
1,320
8,650
Western Zone
Bashkirskaya ASSR
220
390
Chkalovskaya Oblast
270
1,110
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Figure 13
256089-56
0
-144 USSR: New Lands-Acreages of Grain Sown , 1954 and 1955
J
1
iin Relation to the Distribution of Spring Wheat, 1938
?
?M1/4
1/4%. ? 4
.
?St%LN__}
I'
Xr. ? ?
s ????
5
1020 -
\\I e
350 ?
210 rj
6t:121LJ
/
r- Tyumenskaya Omsk y
2310 75. ????
? . INvi
i ;Novosibirsk ya '1.- ??,. :-. '
i - t- N -,0 , R N`ZONE ?-
?3/4, '2rj] 1 .1 ? 5 /1 1260 ?i:
_
.1.
Kurganskaya,Sevg/O-Ka aldistansklay. L../ `,.
NC _
1-.
es."
? B
270 k,
82E1E Chka ovsk ya STERN Z ?
ornii
W
Saratovsk ya
r??r
..???\
?S'
? 1
..erlr ?
5r
F A
k
5 64
Main New Lands area
? A
5.-51
? ri
V)
120
,--
Zapadno- I 't
Kazakhstanskag ? -
Each dot represents 2,000 hectares of
spring wheat sown in 1938
Economic Region boundary
Administrative boundary (selected)
200 400 Miles
0
200 400 Kilometers
re. m
1;
V.) ,' ?
I
N.d
1
1
too
Aktyubinskskaya
r _dr
\ ?
r .00
'r
V
y
\ 250
210
Semipalatinskaya
30 100
seCD
Vostochno-
Kazakhstanskaya
Akmo inskaya
Kusta ayskaya, _ , -
5 --, 270
-
-,r 3a1111111
. Karagandinskaya
Ca!
? ?-5 ??' ?-ceter-
' 5 # _debts.," BAR
1: ? )
SECRET
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Pur
GRAPH EXPLANATION
1020 195.5 acreage
(1000's of hectares)
1954 acreage 350
(1000's of hectares) Li
Boundaries are not necessarily those
recognized by the U.S. Government.
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Table 6
Estimated Acreage of Grain Sown in the New Lands of the USSR) by Zone
1954 and 1955
(Continued)
Thousand Hectares
Western Zone (Continued)
1954
1955
Saratovskaya Oblast
8o
480
Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast
120
620
Total.912
2,600
Area not distributed by zone
240
2,110
Grand total
4,300
18,500
It has not been possible to obtain conclusive evidence concerning the
"normalcy" of the weather during the 1900-1915 period. A tabulation was
made, however) of the average April-through-July rainfall* during the
1900-1915 period at eight stations in the new lands -- Chelyabinsk, Kurgan,
Omsk, and Tomsk in the Northern Zone; Akmolinsk in the Southern Zone; and
Chkalov and Ural'sk in the Western Zone. This tabulation revealed that
the 1900-1915 averages for the 4-month period were very close) in most
cases, to the long-term averages taken from a 26- to 70-year record. The
range of variability was from 85 to 132 percent of the long-term aver-
ages.
Regarding technical advances that conceivably could have made the
1900-1915 data inapplicable to the present day, it may be argued on the
one hand that some increase in yields should be expected because of
Improvements in mechanization and perhaps the use of better techniques
* Rainfall during the April-through-July period is a crucial factor
in determining the yield of spring grains.
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of cultivation in general, which would permit more timely execution of
the sowing and harvesting operations. It is also reasonable to assume,
on the other hand, that during the 1900-1915 period the best lands in
the new lands were already under cultivation and that now, as progres-
sively poorer lands are sown, the effect will be a decline in the aver-
age yield based on the better lands.* It is probable that the expansion
into poorer lands would tend to offset possible gains in yields of small
grains that might be expected from mechanization and other improvements
in techniques.
A more recent series of yields are those for 1928-32) the period
just before the introduction of "biological" yields. In this period
the average yield of spring wheat in the then Zapadno-Sibirskiy Kray
(roughly representative of the Northern Zone) was 6.2 centners per
hectare. The estimated 1900-1915 average yield of spring wheat in the
8 oblasts and Altayskiy Kray which constitute the Northern Zone was
7.3 centners per hectare. Similarly, the 1928-32 average yield of
spring wheat in the then Kazakhskaya** ASSR (roughly representative of
the Southern Zone) was 5.6 centners per hectare. The 1900-1915 esti-
mated average yield of spring wheat in the 9 oblasts which constitute
the Southern Zone was 5.7 centners per hectare. Thus during the 1900-
1915 period, yields for the Northern and Southern Zones were approxi-
mately equal to, or slightly larger than, the yields during 1928-32
for roughly comparable areas.
In the absence of any relatively recent average yield series, and
on the basis of the reasoning outlined in the preceding paragraphs,
the yield series for the 1900-1915 period has been used as a basis for
arriving at a judgment of the yields that might be expected in the
new lands. Computed yields of spring wheat in the Northern, Southern,
and Western Zones of the new lands of the USSR in 1900-1915 are shown
in Table 7.***
An examination of Table 7 reveals that yields of spring wheat vary
considerably from year to year in the new lands. No pattern of good or
bad years is discernible for the 16-year period. In the series based on
the 1955 acreage distribution pattern, however, in 8 of the 16 years,
* New land when first brought into cultivation may have a better soil
structure than adjoining land that has been in use for a larger number
of years, and for a few years it may produce slightly larger yields, in
spite of the fact that in other respects the land is inferior.
** Actually called Kazakskaya (Ra3aRcitaFt) ASSR before 1936.
*** Table 7 follows on p. 55.
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Table 7
Computed Yields of Spring Wheat in the Northern, Southern, and Western Zones of the New Lands of the USSR
1900-1915
Centners per Hectare
Based on 1954 Acreages Based on 1955 Acreages
Year
(1)
Northern 2/
(2)
Southern H./
(3)
Western h/
(4)
Total 2/
(5) (6) (7) (8)
21
Northern 1 Southern 2/ Western 51/ Total q/
1900
4.0
2.3
7.0
4.0
4.0
2.3
7.0
3.6
1901
3.4
4.4
3.1
3.7
3.5
4.8
3.2
4.1
1902
7.7
5.8
4.6
6.5
7.6
5.3
4.5
5-9
1903
10.4
9.7
4.5
9.2
10.4
9.6
4.4
9.0
1904
6.4
4.6
9.4
6.3
6.4
4.7
8.4
5.8
1905
9.6
9.5
6.5
9.0
9.7
9.4
5.9
8.9
1906
9.5
5.8
1.6
7.0
9.3
5.9
1.6
6.2
1907
8.8
7.6
5.4
7.8
8.7
8.3
5.1
8.o
1908
8.8
6.2
5.7
7.4
8.8
5.6
5.6
6.5
1909
6.8
3.4
8.6
6.o
6.9
3.6
8.o
5.2
1910
7.7
4.3
6.8
6.5
7.8
4.7
5.6
5.8
1911
5.0
2.7
1.3
3.6
4.7
2.4
1.1
2.9
1912
7.3
6.o
6.6
6.8
7.4
5.9
6.8
6.4
1913
7.4
4.9
8.7
6.9
7.5
4.9
8.3
6.2
1914
9.2
8.6
7.0
8.6
9.2
8.9
7.1
8.7
1915
5.4
5.0
9.4
6.o
5.6
5.3
9.5
6.0
Average
7.3
5.7
6.o
6.6
7.3
5.7
5.8
6.2
a. The 1900 yield in each oblast or kray in the Northern Zone was multiplied by the 1954 acreage of the
oblast or kray (see Table 6, P. 52, above). The sum of these production figures was divided by the 1954
acreage for the zone, thus obtaining a 1900 zonal yield weighted on the basis of 1954 acreages. For each
of the remaining years, 1901-15, a similar yield for the Northern Zone was computed, each weighted on the
basis of 1954 acreages.
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Table 7
Computed Yields of Spring Wheat in the Northern, Southern, and Western Zones of the New Lands of the USSR
1900-1915
(Continued)
b. The same procedure as is described in a, above, was used to obtain the yields for the Southern and
Western Zones, based on 1954 acreages.
c. Each of the yields in column 4 is a weighted average of the 3 zonal yields, with the 1954 acreage for
each zone being used as the basis for weighting.
d. The same procedure as is described in a, b, and c, above, was used, except that 1955 acreages rather
than 1954 acreages were used as the basis for weighting.
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yields for the new lands as a whole were below the average of 6.2 centners
per hectare (9.3 bushels per acre). During the 1900-1915 period, yields
ranged from 47 percent to 145 percent of the average yield for the whole.
period, with a mean deviation* of 24 percent from the average yield.
Wide annual variability in yields is to be expected in an area where
there are extreme fluctuations from year to year in the amount and distri-
bution of rainfall. In general) the variability of crop yields is greater
in the drier areas. Yields not only are larger but also are less variable
in the Northern Zone, where annual precipitation and moisture efficiency
are higher than in the Western and Southern Zones.
In the Western Zone, yields range from 19 percent to 164 percent of
the average for the 16-year period for the zone. In the Southern Zone,
yields range from 40 percent to 168 percent of the zonal average) and in
the Northern Zone) yields range from 48 percent to 142 percent of the
zonal average. In the Northern Zone the mean deviation from the zonal
average yield during the 16-year period was 25 percent, increasing to 30
and 33 percent in the Southern and Western Zones, respectively.
In general, there tends to be an inverse relationship between the year-
to-year variability in yields and the size of the area for which the yields
are computed. Thus there is less year-to-year variability in yields for
the USSR as a whole than for the new lands alone. Similarly) there is less
variability for the new lands as a whole than for any particular zone within
the new lands.
On the basis of the 1955 distribution of acreage) the computed 1900-1915
average yield in the new lands as a whole was slightly smaller than the yield
based on the 1954 acreage distribution (6.2 centners per hectare compared with
6.6 centners per hectare) (see Table 7**).*** This reflects the fact that in
1955 the expansion of acreage was, in general) relatively greater in oblasts
having the smallest yields.
Average deviation from the mean, without regard to sign.
** P. 55, above.
-X** In the Western Zone there was a decrease from 6 to 5.8 centners per hec-
tare) but in the Northern and Southern Zones there was no decrease. The fact
that the decrease for the new lands as a whole was greater than that for any
of the component zones is explained by the fact that in 1955 the percentage
increase in acreage was greater in the Southern and Western Zones than in the
Northern Zone) and hence the lower yields of these two zones had greater
weight than when the distribution was based on 1954 acreages.
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In appraising yields for 1954 and 1955, deviations from the long-term
averages given in Table 7* were estimated on the basis of weather informa-
tion, travel reports by Western observers, and Soviet statements on crop
conditions. These deviations applied to the long-term averages are the
basis of the 1954 and 1955 yield estimates, which were applied in VI,
below, to estimated acreages to determine the production of grain in the
new lands.
VI. Production of Grain, 1954-55.
A. General.
The new lands of the USSR are a spring crop region, and grain
(primarily wheat) is the predominant crop. Because of lack of informa-
tion, it is impossible to classify the grain acreage seeded in the new
lands into its components of wheat, rye, barley, oats, millet, corn, and
the like. Because spring wheat is by far the preponderant grain, however,
it can be assumed that yields of spring wheat indicate within a reasonable
margin of error the yields of all grains.
B. 1954.
There is evidence that almost all of the area sown in 1954 (4.3
million hectares) was sown to grain. This acreage, as indicated in
Table 6,** was distributed as follows (in thousand hectares): Northern
Zone, 2,050; Southern Zone, 1,320; Western Zone, 690; and areas
not distributed by zone, 240.
The new lands as a whole had unusually favorable weather during
the 1954 growing season, and the result was a very large grain crop.
Estimated acreage, yield, and production of grain in the new lands of
the USSR, by zone, in 1954 are shown in Table 8.***
The yield figures shown in Table 8 are estimates based on devia-
tions from the long-term average yields given in Table 7. In estimating
the 1954 deviations from the long-term average, the following factors
* P. 55, above.
** P. 52, above.
*** Table 8 follows on p. 59.
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Table 8
Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production of Grain in the New Lands
of the USSR, by Zone
1954
Zone
Acreage
(Thousand
Hectares)
Yield
(Centners
per Hectare)
Production
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Northern
2,050
12.7
2,600
Altayskiy Kray
1,000
15.0
1,500
Remainder of zone
1,050
10.5
1,100
Southern
1,320
9.0
1,200
Western
690
6.5
450
Areas not distributed by zone
240
10.5
250
Total
4,300
10.5
4 500
have been considered: available weather information, statements appear-
ing in the Soviet press, official government statements,
The type of informs-
zones are discussed
tion used and the yield estimates for each of the
below.
50X1
50X1
On the basis of weather information, Soviet press statements, 50X1
it is concluded that yields of grain in 1954 in 50X1
the Western Zone of the new lands along the Volga River were slightly be-
low average. Saburov, in his November anniversary speech, noted that "in
many parts of the country /the south Ukraine and Volga districtg the
weather was unfavorable." lag Yields probably were smallest in the
lower part of the Volga region, and conditions were somewhat better toward
the north. in the northern half of Kuybyshevskaya 50X1
Oblast yields probably were near or slightly above average. 130/ On the
basis of weather information, yields in the remainder of the Western Zone
are assumed to have been somewhat above average. For the Western Zone as
a whole, therefore, it is estimated that yields in 1954 were from 5 to 10
percent above average, about 6.5 centners per hectare.
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Data published in the Soviet press as well as official govern-
ment statements 131/ indicated that in 1954 the yield of grain in Altay-
skiy Kray in the Northern Zone of the new lands was about 15 centners
per hectare. This yield is more than double the estimated average yield
for Altayskiy Kray. Available weather information
lindicate, however) that the announced yield probably is
reasonable. Yields were also considerably above average in the remainder
of the Northern Zone. On the basis of available weather data and the
fact that there was considerably more publicity given to successes in
Altayskiy Kray than in any other area) it seems likely that yields in
Altayskiy Kray were substantially larger than in the remaining areas of
the Northern Zone. Thus for the Northern Zone as a whole the yield is
estimated at 12 to 13 centners per hectare) about 75 percent above the
zonal average. Although this yield is about 20 percent larger than the
largest computed yield during the 1900-1915 period for the Northern Zone
(see Table 7*), this difference may be explained by the fact that the
yield in the most important part of the Northern Zone, Altayskiy Kray)
was exceptionally good.
Available weather information and Soviet press comments indicate
that yields in the Southern Zone of the new lands were also very good
but) compared, with the long-term average, probably were not so good as
those in the Northern Zone. In a speech in November 1954) Saburov stated
that "in districts of Western Siberia Lroughly representative of the
Northern Zong twice as much grain will be harvested as last year 19537
... and in Kazakh SSR 5ough1y representative of the Southern .Zone
almost 35 percent more grain will be harvested." 132/ Even taking into
consideration the fact that there was a larger percentage increase in
acreage in the Northern Zone than in the Southern Zone, it seems likely
that in relation to the long-term average, yields were better in the
Northern Zone than in the Southern Zone. The yield in the Southern Zone
has been estimated at about 6o percent above average, about 9 centners
per hectare.
The yield assumed for the areas not distributed by zone was the
weighted average yield of the three zones.
The weighted average yield in 1954 for the new lands as a whole,
based on these zonal estimates, was about 10.5 centners per hectare.
When applied to the 4.3 million hectares of grain area, this average
results in an estimated production of grain in the new lands in 1955 of
approximately 4.5 million tons.
* P. 55, above.
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The estimated average yield in 1954 for the new lands of 10.5
centners per hectare is about 35 percent above the estimated yield in
1954 for the USSR as a whole. The estimated production of 4.5 million
tons of grain in the new lands in 1954 is about 5 percent of the esti-
mated Soviet production for that year.
C. 1955.
The acreage sown to grain in the new lands in 1955 (18.5 million
hectares) was announced in the Soviet press. This acreage, as indicated
in Table 7,* was distributed as follows (in thousand hectares): Northern
Zone, 5,140; Southern Zone, 8,650; Western Zone, 2)600; and areas not dis-
tributed by zone, 2,110.
In contrast to 1954, most of the new lands suffered from drought
in the 1955 crop year, and yields were less than one-half of those ob-
tained in 1954. Estimated acreage, yield) and production of grain in
the new lands of the USSR, by zone, in 1955 are shown in Table 9.
Estimated Acreage, Yield, and
of the
Table 9
Production of Grain in the New Lands
USSR, by Zone
1955
Zone
Acreage
(Thousand
Hectares)
Yield
(Centners
per Hectare)
Production
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Northern
5)140
5.5
2,850
Southern
8)650
3.5
3,050
Western
2,600
4.5
1,150
Areas not distributed by zone
2,110
4.3
900
Total
18,500
4.3
7,950
* P. 55, above.
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The Western Zone of the new lands apparently was on the western
edge of the drought area and hence was relatively* not so severely af-
fected as were the Northern and Southern Zones. It was reported that
yields in the Volga area, although below average) had not been affected
by drought as much as the new lands farther to the east. 133/ Rather
severe drought conditions, however, existed in Chkalovskaya Oblast and
Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast. l34/ On the basis of these reports and
of available weather information, it was judged that the yield in the
Western Zone in 1955 was about 4.5 centners per hectare) about 80 percent
of the long-term average.
In the Northern Zone the effects of the drought, although not
quite so severe as they were in the Southern Zone, were still signifi-
cant. For example, available information indicated that the expected
yield in 1955 in the Rubtsovsk area of Altayskiy Kray was from one-third
to one-half of the very large yield obtained in 1954 in that area. 135/
In addition) in the southern part of Kurgapskaya Oblast)
"the plants' need for moisture from the shoot stage
to the heading stage was satisfied by only 17 to 26 percent." 13?/ Con-
ditions in the central and northern parts of Kurganskaya Oblast) however,
were better than in the southern part. On the basis of this information
and of weather information about the Northern Zone) it was estimated that
for the zone as a whole the yield in 1955 was about 5.5 centners per hec-
tare, about 75 percent of the long-term average.
Drought conditions in 1955 were most severe in the Southern Zone
of the new lands. One Soviet source stated: "The 1955 spring and summer
weather in the northern oblasts of Kazakh SSR was extremely unfavorable ?
for the growth of wheat. During the entire vegetative period there was
one light rain Lin the second 10-day period of Julx7 which soaked the
soil only to a depth of 3 to 4 centimeters. Besides that, there were
frequent dry hot winds. There has not been such a drought in Kazakh SSR
for 44 years." 137/ This reference to a drought 44 years ago refers to
the 1911 drought, when the yield in the Southern Zone (essentially the
grain area of Kazakh SSR) probably was near an all-time low) less than
3 centners per hectare (see Table 7**). A Deputy Minister of Agriculture
in the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Agriculture also stated that, because of the
drought, the yield of grain in 1955 in the new lands of Kazakh SSR was less
than one-half of the 1954 yield. On the basis of all available information
the 1955 yield of grain in the Southern Zone has been estimated at 3.5
centners per hectare) about 6o percent of the long-term average. This yield
is about 4o percent of the 1954 yield.
Relative to the long-term average.
** P. 55, above.
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The weighted average yield in 1955 for the new lands as a whole,
based on these zonal estimates, is about 4.3 centners per hectare, which --
when multiplied by the 18.5 million hectares of grain area -- results in
an estimated production of grain in the new lands in 1955 of almost 8
million tons.
The estimated 1955 average yield for the new lands of 4.3 centners
per hectare is about 55 percent of the estimated average in 1955 for the
USSR as a whole. The estimated production of 8 million tons in the new
lands in 1955 is about 8 percent of the estimated Soviet production for
that year.
VII. Crop Rotation -- Soviet Statements and Canadian Experience.
Soviet planners know that a system of crop rotation, including
fallow,* must be introduced into the new lands area if productivity
is to be maintained. In an area as large as the new lands, with its
varying soil and climatic conditions, there are certain to be varia-
tions in the most suitable type of rotation system required. Thus a
rotation system suitable for the Northern Zone of the new lands would
not be appropriate under the conditions in the Southern and Western
Zones. Roginets, Minister of State Farms in Kazakh SSR, expects that
even a single state farm may require several different rotation systems
as a means of coping with the soil and topographical conditions peculiar
to different parts of its cultivated area. 141/
* Several types of fallow are planned for the new lands as a means of
accumulating moisture and controlling weeds. In the northern part, emphasis
Is being placed on "clean" fallow 138/ and "strip" fallow. In "clean"
fallow the land is allowed to lie idle during the growing season and is
cultivated only to the extent necessary to prevent the growth of weeds.
In "strip" fallow, 139/ strips of "clean" fallow are alternated with strips
of corn or sunflowers to control wind erosion. Some of the corn may be
left uncut to aid in retaining snow during the winter months. In the
southern and western parts of the new lands, or in light-textured soils,
Soviet agronomists recommend either "strip" fallow or "occupied" fallow.
A vetch-oats mixture or oats or rye alone and occasionally even corn for
green fodder are sown to create so-called "occupied" fallow as a means
of controlling the wind erosion that would occur if the land were left
bare. 140/
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Roginets also states that the question of which system of crop rota-
tion to establish in the new lands "had not been decided" as of January
1956. Although this is undoubtedly true of particular areas of the new
lands) it appears that a general pattern of land-use had been agreed upon
as a basis for setting Up a rotation system.
For the first few years after bringing virgin or long-fallow land into
cultivation, the USSR plans to sow grain year after year. On the best
soils) grain will be grown continuously for up to 6 years before the intro-
duction of a system of crop rotation. On the poorer light-textured soils
of the new lands, Soviet plans apparently call for the introduction of a
rotation system after an initial period of 2 to 3 years of continuous produc-
tion of grain. 142/
An April 1954 issue of a Kazakh SSR Academy of Science journal con-
tained a proposed crop rotation land-use plan for the virgin and long-
fallow lands of Kazakh SSR. 1111/ The basic rotation system called for
a 10-field system in which 70 percent of the land would be sown to grain)
primarily wheat, and the remaining 30 percent would be left fallow and
sown to perennial grasses.* In the more arid regions of Kazakh SSR an
eight-field rotation system was recommended, in which one-half of the
land would be sown to grain and the remainder left fallow and sown to
grasses.
In February 1956 a Soviet agricultural scientist, Andrianova, des-
cribed proposed 5- and 6-field systems of crop rotation. 144/ In these
rotation systems, grain would occupy 70 to 75 percent of the land, and
the remaining 25 to 30 percent would be fallow and sown to perennial
grasses.
There have been many proposed systems of crop rotation published in the
Soviet press, but the majority imply that in most of the new lands, grain
in any one year will occupy about three-fourths of the land in rotation)**
* Perennial grasses serve to maintain fertility) improve soil texture)
reduce soil erosion) and control the growth of weeds.
** There is an exception in the most arid sections of the new lands, where
the recommended system of crop rotation includes 50 percent sown to grain
and 50 percent left fallow and sown to perennial grasses.
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fallow and perennial grasses occupying the remaining one The role
of perennial grasses in the rotation systems appears to be rather flexible;
"the grass will be grown as long50X1
as it gives high yields."1)12/ "the 50X1
practice under the conditions of Severo-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast fin the
heart ot the new landil has been to leave a field under grass for 3 to 4
years. Areas under low yielding grasses can be plowed in the second or
even the first year of use."
General statements made in the summer of 1955 by Lobanov, 146/ who at
that time was the official spokesman on agricultural matters for the
Council of Ministers, USSR) and by a Deputy Minister of the Kazakh SSR
Ministry of Agriculture 11E/ are in general agreement with the systems
of crop rotation recommended in the press. These statements imply that
once a rotation system is put into effect, 75 percent of reclaimed land
would be kept planted to crops, primarily grain, compared with the 70 to
75 percent usually called for in the recommended rotation systems.
As livestock numbers increase in the new lands, it is possible that
the requirements of animal husbandry may have an influence on the system
of crop rotation. More fodder crops, including corn, may be introduced
to replace the natural forage lost in the process of reclaiming pasture-
lands, and the amount of perennial grasses included in the rotation system
of individual farms may be determined) in part, by the needs of increased
flocks and herds.
Based on experience in the Canadian wheat belt -- an area with physical
and climatic characteristics somewhat analogous to those of the major part
of the new lands -- the Soviet systems of crop rotation discussed above in-
clude an exceptionally large proportion of land sown to grain. In the more
arid regions of the chestnut soil zone of Canada, where conditions roughly
approximate those in the Southern Zone of the new lands, a so-called 15-
year rotation system is practiced in which one-third of the land is sown
to grain in any one year, and the remaining two-thirds of the land is left
fallow and sown to perennial grasses. In the zones of dark chestnut and
black soil in Canada) many parts of which are more favorable for produc-
tion of grain than is the Northern Zone of the new lands, there are at
least 3 recommended rotation systems, varying in length from 9 to 16 years.
In all cases, however) only about one-half of the land is sown to grain in
any one year; the remainder is left fallow and sown to grasses.
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This comparison of recommended Soviet and Canadian systems of crop
rotation reveals that the USSR plans to have a significantly higher
percentage of land in grain in any one year than is the practice in
Canada; hence there must be correspondingly less fallow and perennial
grasses.
Otto Schiller, a German agriculturist who worked in the USSR during
the 1920's as manager and agronomist on large-scale farms leased as
"concessions" to German corporations, has stressed the importance of
perennial grasses or fallow in the new lands. 148/ Schiller discussed
a system of crop rotation suitable for the new lands, in which one-
third of the land would be sown to grain and two-thirds left in fallow
and sown to perennial grasses. This is similar to the system recom-
mended in portions of the chestnut soil zone of Canada. Schiller's ex-
perience in bringing virgin and long-fallow lands into use in the
Trans-Volga and Kuban districts leads him to the conclusion that
preservation of the soil structure is the most important prerequisite
for maintaining satisfactory yields in the new lands. According to
Schiller) the soil structure can be preserved only by leaving the soil
idle or sown to perennial grasses for several years after each short
period of cultivation. His practice, while in the USSR, was to crop
reclaimed land only 3 years out of every 8 or 9 years.
Both Schiller's work and Canadian experience indicate that the USSR
is in danger of depleting the soil of the new lands if the abnormally
heavy cropping at present anticipated for the new lands is continued for
many years. It is possible) however, that Soviet agricultural planners
do not intend to press the soil to the point of depletion before modifying
their system of crop rotation. One Soviet agricultural scientist believes
that in the black soil areas a large proportion of grain crops can be
maintained for as long as 10 years before the soil structure will require
conservation measures. He also recognizes that in the areas of light,
sandy soils, perennial grasses may be required much earlier than in the
black soil areas, if soil structure is to be preserved.
Although a proportion of grain crops as high as 75 percent) if con-
tinued for long) would be a threat to the soil structure of the new lands
and would increase the possibility of serious wind erosion, it is possible
that this proportion will be reduced as the different soils approach
depletion. Whether or not reduction of the grain area in the system of
crop rotation will be sufficient to prevent serious damage to the soil
and a permanent reduction in yields may depend more on political considera-
tions than on the recommendations of Soviet agronomists.
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VIII. Production -- Outlook for the Future.
Khrushchev and other Soviet officials have made numerous statements,
many of which appear to be extremely optimistic, concerning the yields
and production expected from the new lands. This section discusses a
few of the more important of these statements and attempts to arrive at
some judgments concerning possible achievements in the new lands.
In his report of 23 February 1954 to the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, 149/ Khrushchev asked, "What will the country get as a
result of the reclamation of the 13 million hectares?"* He then answered,
"If we assume that only 10 to 11 centners of grain LTer hectarg will be
harvested on the reclaimed lands, this will give an additional 800
million to 900 million poods 53.1 million to 14.7 million tona7 of grain,
including 500 million to 600 million poods 5.2 million to 9.8?million
tong of marketable grain." Later in his speech) Khrushchev became even
more enthusiastic -- "With yields of 14 to 15 centners per hectare, the
gross harvest of grain on the reclaimed areas can total 1.1 billion to 1.2
billion poods 58 million to 19.7 million tong and its marketablejart
800 million to 900 million poods 53.1 million to 14.7 million tons ."
Later evidence indicates that an average yield of 10 to 11 centners per
hectare is the official Soviet goal. At the XX Party Congress, almost
1 1/2 years after the goal for new lands acreage had been raised to 28
million to 30 million hectares) Khrushchev stated, "Calculations show
that we shall be able to receive annually from the new lands not less
than 2 billion poods 53 million tong of grain." 15_2/ Computed on the
basis of 30 million hectares, the production of 2 billion poods requires
a yield of 11 centners per hectare.
The chief agronomist of the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Agriculture stated
that he "anticipated an average yield comparable with the southern Ukraine,
say 7-8 centners per hectare." 151/ About 6o percent of the total planned
new lands area is in Kazakh SSR, and an average yield of 7 to 8 centners
per hectare there would require a yield of 15 to 17 centners per hectare
(more than double that in Kazakh SSR) from the new lands of the USSR if
the over-all yield of 11 centners per hectare were to be obtained. Officially
announced goals for Kazakh SSR indicate a planned grain yield in 1956 of 10
centners per hectare, 152/ which may suggest that Soviet planners do not
agree with the yield of 7 to 8 centners per hectare given by the Kazakh SSR
Deputy Minister of Agriculture.**
* This acreage was then planned to be reclaimed.
** It is possible that Kazakh officials have made a distinction between
the average long-term yield and the yield planned for 1956, but no such
distinction has been noted in the Soviet press.
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Various Soviet officials have made estimates of the yield required
for the new lands program to be financially successful. A Deputy Minister
In the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Agriculture said that in order for the new
lands program (possibly referring only to the Kazakh SSR part of the new
lands) to be financially successful, it was necessary to obtain an aver-
age yield of 4 centners per hectare. He stated further that if the area
received one good harvest every 3 years the new lands program would be
profitable. 153/ An official of the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture
stated that the "campaign would be worthwhile if a long-term average
yield of 6 centners per hectare could be maintained."* He expressed
his conviction that this figure would be exceeded but said nothing about
a much higher average. 154/
The expected average yield of grain of 10 to 11 centners per hectare,
suggested by Khrushchev and others, is unrealistically high. In order to
maintain over a period of years an average yield equivalent to 10 centners
per hectare, Canadian experience (based on soil, weather, and other fac-
tors affecting production) has shown that it was necessary to practice a
system of crop rotation with one-half to two-thirds of the land fallow or
sown to perennial grasses.
In general, the soil, weather) and other factors affecting production
in the new lands are less favorable than in the Canadian wheat belt. The
currently proposed system of crop rotation indicates that one-fourth of
the land is to be fallow or sown to perennial grasses. Under such condi-
tions the yield of 11 centners per hectare suggeated by Khrushchev is
unreasonable.
An average yield of grain, anticipated by the chief agronomist of the
Kazakh SSR Ministry of Agriculture, "comparable with the southern Ukraine,
say 7 to 8 centners per hectare" is also unrealistically high. The average
yield in the USSR as a whole is only 8 centners per hectare.
A long-term average yield of grain for the new lands as a whole of
about 6 centners per hectare (see Table 7**) is judged to be a more reason-
able estimate of the yield to be expected o4Ter a period of years than the
optimistic yields suggested by Khrushchev and others.*** It is possible
that under the cropping system envisaged by the Soviet leaders even this
yield cannot be maintained over a period of years, because excessive
cropping may well have a detrimental effect on yields.
It is probable that this yield is for the new lands as a whole.
P. 55) above.
XXX In any one particular year the yield in the new lands may be signifi-
cantly higher or lower than 6 centners per hectare, depending on the weather
and other conditions affecting production during that crop year.
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If the USSR adopts a system of crop rotation similar to that practiced
by the Canadians or recommended by Schiller,* then 6o million to 90 million
hectares of new land would have to be reclaimed in order to maintain 30
million hectares planted to crops. No plan for an expansion of that magni-
tude has been even implied by Soviet officials. The total amount of virgin
and long-fallow land that could be brought under cultivation was a topic
of discussion by Benediktov, the Soviet Minister of State Farms. Benediktov
said that experts differ on how much land was available but some thought
that 20 million hectares in addition to the 30 million hectares now under
cultivation could be added without clearing forests. 122/
If no more than the present 30 million hectares are reclaimed) and a
system of crop rotation similar to that of the Canadian wheat belt is used,
only 10 million to 15 million hectares could be planted to crops in any one
year.. In this connection Schiller states) "If the Soviets will take care
to stop continued cultivation in time, they may avoid disastrous consequences
such as large-scale wind erosion and destruction of soil fertility for a
long period. This would mean, however, that after two or three years of
initial great expansion, the gain in grain area would be reduced to nearly
one-third of the plan, i.e., to 10 million hectares." 12Y
In his statement to the XX Party Congress in February 1956 that an an-
nual production of not less than 2 billion poods (33 million tons) of grain
could be expected from the new lands) Khrushchev apparently assumed that all
of the new lands would be sown to grain, although in fact in 1955 about 10
percent of the land was sown to nongrain crops. To permit comparisons with
Soviet statements, the production estimates which follow are also made on
that assumption.
If it is assumed that the USSR plans to have 30 million hectares of new
lands sown to grain continuously (requiring 6o million to 90 million hec-
tares in the system of crop rotation), then with a yield of 6 centners per
hectare the total production of grain in the new lands would be about 18
million tons, only slightly more than one-half of the 33 Million tons men-
tioned by Khrushchev. It is extremely unlikely, however) that the USSR is
considering a new lands reclamation program involving 60 million to 90
million hectares.
Benediktov's claim that 20 million hectares more of new land could be
reclaimed without clearing forests would imply a total of only 50 million
hectaresof available land. If suitable systems of crop rotation were
* See VII, p. 66) above.
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applied to this 50 million hectares, about 17 million to 25 million hec-
tares could be sown to grain in any one year. Assuming a yield of 6 cent-
ners per hectare, the average total production from the new lands would then
be 10 million to 15 million tons. This estimate is believed to be the most
reasonable upper limit of the average production of grain that might be
expected from the new lands over a period of years.
Assuming that no more than 30 million hectares are reclaimed, thus per-
mitting only 10 million to 15 million hectares to be sown to grain in any
one year, then with a yield of 6 centners per hectare the average produc-
tion in the new lands of grain over a period of years would be only 6
million to 9 million tons.
On the basis of the above reasoning it is estimated that produc-
tion of grain in the new lands over a period of years may be between
6 million to 15 million tons, which is a rather wide range. A more pre-
cise estimate is based on current Soviet reclamation plans, which call
for the reclamation of 4o million hectares. Again assuming that no
more than one-third to one-half of this area can be sown to grain in
any one year, the grain area would be about 13 million to 20 million
hectares. With a yield of 6 centners per hectare, the production of
the new lands would then be 8 million to 12 million tons of grain,
about 10 to 15 percent of the estimated average Soviet production of
grain for the 4-year period (1950-53) before the inauguration of the
new lands program. A gross production of 8 million to 12 million tons
of grain -- after deductions for seed and waste -- indicates a net
availability for human consumption of 6 million to 9 million tons.
This quantity would supply the grain requirements of about 15 million
to 22 million persons at the 1955 rate of consumption.
All the previous estimates of the production of grain that might be
expected in the new lands over a period of years have been based on the
assumption that the USSR will adopt a system of crop rotation similar to
the Canadian system, which can be expected to maintain yields at the esti-
mated long-term average of 6 centners per hectare. If, however, a rotation
system with 75 percent of the land sown to grain is adopted and continued
over a period of years, the average yield is likely to decrease, and there
is a strong possibility that large-scale wind erosion might occur. Assuming
a rotation system with 75 percent of the land sown to grain, the present
plan for the reclamation of 40 million hectares would allow a grain area of
30 million hectares. For the first few years in such a rotation system there
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might be only a slight diminution in the yield) but in the long run there
very likely would be a significant decrease in the average yield, probably
to a point where the total production would be less than that which could
have been obtained with proper rotation in a smaller grain area.
IX. Animal Husbandry.
A. General.
The character of animal husbandry in the new lands of the USSR
varies from north to south in accord with changing physical and climatic
characteristics. In the Northern Zone, there is more rainfall than in
the Southern Zone, and the moderate summer temperatures, adequate water
supplies) and a relatively large area of high-yielding natural meadows
and pastures have encouraged the dairy industry and swine raising, the
more intensive branches of animal husbandry. Traditionally, however)
sheep have been the most numerous type of livestock in the Northern Zone.
As the wooded steppe of the Northern Zone merges with the treeless
steppe in the south, serious handicaps are imposed on animal husbandry.
Insufficient water, inferior meadows and pastures, summer droughts, and
sparsity of cultivation sharply reduce the density of livestock numbers
and discourage the dairy industry and swine raising in most of the Southern
Zone. The hardiness of sheep and their adaptability to inferior pastures
have resulted, however) in a larger proportion of sheep numbers in the
Southern Zone than in the Northern Zone.*
Shifts in livestock numbers between 1928 and 1938 in Kazakh SSR
and Western Siberia indicate that the present area of the new lands shared
the serious losses incurred by animal husbandry in the USSR during the
collectivization period and that the subsequent recovery was slow. 157/
During this period, a pronounced increase in the relative density of sheep
numbers began in both Kazakh SSR and Western Siberia and continued until
the start of the new lands program. 158/
Animal husbandry in Kazakh SSR improved slowly in the early postwar
years, but the Three Year Plan (1949-51) for the development of livestock
was) on the whole) a failure. Total livestock numbers increased during this
period, but most of the increase appears to have been in sheep numbers.
* The sheep in the Southern Zone are primarily of the coarse-wool, milk
type.
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According to CIA estimates,* the only appreciable increases in live-
stock numbers in the new lands between 1938 and 1954 were that of
swine in the Northern Zone and of sheep in the Southern Zone. In
Kazakh SSR the period from 1950 to 1954 was essentially a period of
stagnation in animal husbandry.
Productivity of livestock in the present area of the new lands
was low in the period before the new lands program. In Kazakh SSR as
a whole, the yield of milk per cow, animal birthrates, and wool clip
were particularly low. Average yields of milk were undoubtedly larger
in the Northern Zone, but -- compared with the resources of the area --
they were small.
In the autumn of 1953, when the new lands program was con-
ceived, the livestock situation in Kazakh SSR, in which the Southern
Zone is located, was unsatisfactory.** Kazakhstanskaya _pravda des-
cribed the situation with striking candor:
As of 1 October 1953 the number of cattle and
horses in Kazakh SSR had fallen short of the 1928
figure; comparison with 1940 shows a drop in the
number of productive livestock and a decreasing
birth rate. From one year to the next, kolkhozes***
of the Republic fail to realize state plans for in-
creasing livestock numbers.
As of 1 October 1953 comparison with 1940 shows
lowered output of milk and wool in Kazakh SSR. Not
a single Oblast in 1953 fulfilled its state plan for
wool delivery; eight oblasts fell short of complet-
ing milk deliveries, and eight oblasts were short
in meat deliveries. 159/
This condemnation is so sweeping that it justifies the inclusion of the
present Southern Zone in the generally unsatisfactory position of animal
husbandry in Kazakh SSR as a whole.XXXX
* See Appendix B, Table 26, p. 138, below.
** For example, total cattle numbers in Kazakh SSR in 1954 had not even
attained the total number planned for the socialized sector alone in 1951.
Only sheep numbers increased appreciably between 1949 and 1953.
*** Collective farms.
**** Developments in animal husbandry in Kazakh SSR are referred to in
this report when such developments are considered applicable to the
Southern Zone of the new lands. Unless otherwise indicated, references
to Kazakh'SSR include the entire republic and not the Southern Zone alone.
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Oblast reports indicate that the Northern Zone also lagged
seriously in livestock development at the beginning of the new lands
program. As in Kazakh SSR, inadequate procurement of fodder resulted
in low productivity and a slow natural increase.
Before the beginning of the new lands program, the primary prob-
lem of animal husbandry in the present area of the new lands was shortage
of fodder. This shortage was particularly acute in winter, when forage
supplies were often exhausted; death and low productivity of livestock
often resulted. Short-run fluctuations in fodder supply caused serious
hardship, but more basic has been the long-run disparity between live-
stock numbers and fodder supply. For example, from 1948 to 1952, live-
stock numbers in Kazakh SSR increased, in spite of the failure to fulfill
the state plan, by 32.9 percent. Although the bulk of this increase was
in sheep numbers) the 5.9-percent increase in fodder procurement during
this period was insufficient to meet increased needs. 14/
In addition to natural handicaps, animal husbandry in the new lands
suffered from the same institutional weaknesses that affected most of the
agriculture of the USSR. These weaknesses appear to have been particularly
serious in Kazakh SSR, where in 1951 only 425,000 hectares of a planned to-
tal of 998)000 hectares were sown to perennial grasses; and only 729,000
hectares of sown and natural grasses out of a possible total of 3 million
hectares were cut. 161/ The fact that animal husbandry in Kazakh SSR was
in a state of neglect is also illustrated by the fact that even by 1955 -
the supply of water to livestock was mechanized by only 3 percent. th2/
B. Livestock Program.
1. Plan of Development.
a. General.
In his report on the new lands program in March 1954,
Khrushchev proposed the "bringing into use of considerable new masses
of seasonal pasture" through the construction of wells) animal shelters,
and human settlements. 163/ Although this program was to include large
areas in the central and southern regions of Kazakh SM., it was also to
apply to parts of the Southern and Western Zones of the new lands. At
first glance, there appears to be a contradiction between this plan and
the plan to plow large areas of natural pasture in the new lands, but
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only in the Northern Zone and in the northern fringe of the Southern
Zone will the plowing of pastures have a major effect. In most of
the Southern and Western Zones the area of pastureland is sufficient
to support both expansion of grain acreage and increased livestock
grazing.
More important to the livestock program in the new
lands than the use of natural pasture, however, is the increase in
production of grain. This increase, however, is not oriented to the
need of new lands livestock for more feed grains. On the contrary,
the new lands are intended to produce grain for human consumption,
thus releasing acreage in the traditional wheat areas of the European
USSR to increase cultivation of fodder crops, principally corn. The
benefits accruing to animal husbandry in the new lands undoubtedly
will be large, but for the most part, they will be only incidental to
the grain program. The natural pastures, state farm water supplies)
farm labor released from fieldwork during the winter months, the MTS
machinery park, and other resources made, available by 'the grain pro-
gram will permit expansion of animal husbandry with a minimum invest-
ment.
The USSR bases the livestock program on the belief
that livesteck can be raised in the Kazakh steppe with a minimum ex-
penditure of materials, work) and capital. This belief is encouraged
by the success of livestock state farms in the area, in spite of short-
ages of labor and of animal shelters.* 165/ The low density of live-
stock numbers, relative to the feedstuff potentialities of Kazakh SSR,
including the Southern Zone, is supposed to make possible a large in-
crease in livestock numbers through the improved use of natural pastures
and hayfields. 166/ Straw and chaff from grain is to make an important
contribution to the feeding of livestock) particularly during the
winter. 167/ Also important will be the fodder and forage crops which
are to be sown as soon as an orderly system of crop rotation is
established in new grain areas. 168/
This approach to the development of animal husbandry in
the new lands is superficially reasonable. It presupposes, however,
that a well-balanced pattern of land use, including a scientific system
* A Soviet study of costs of production in 1952-53 showed that it costs
about the same to produce 1 centner of milk in Kazakh SSR as it costs
in the Ukraine, but the cost of beef and wool was found to be much lower
in Kazakh SSR. 164/
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of crop rotation, will evolve from the new lands grain program. This,
In turn) presupposes that the grain program can survive the rigors of
climate in the new lands. To the extent that the grain program succeeds,
opportunities for the success of animal husbandry in the new lands will
develop. If, in spite of the Soviet tendency to neglect this branch of
agriculture in favor of production of grain, adequate care is taken to
improve animal husbandry) substantial results should be achieved.
The new lands grain program involves the plowing of
large areas of natural pasture and, to a certain extent, meadows. Only
land definitely not suited to continual cultivation is to remain for
the use of livestock:* 170/ In the Northern Zone the area of pastureland
Is small, compared with the vast expanse of pastures in the Southern Zone.
In the Northern Zone, therefore) the grain program will restrict materially
the use of natural pasture by livestock and will increase dependence on
meadow hay and sown fodder crops such as perennial grasses and corn.
Plowing virgin and long-fallow land will have a much less restrictive
effect in the Southern Zone because of its large area of natural pasture.
The difference in the impact of the new lands program
on the supply of fodder in the Northern and Southern Zones is demon-
strated by the long-range Soviet plan for bringing virgin and long-fallow
lands into use. In 1955 it was anticipated that only 5 percent of the
virgin and long-fallow land still available for reclamation in Kazakh SSR
would be sown to pastures and hayfields. In contrast) 29 percent was to
be sown to pastures and hayfields in Western Siberia. 171/
b. Cattle.
In the Northern Zone of the new lands) where the dairy
industry has traditionally been the most important branch of animal
husbandry) the new lands livestock program will undoubtedly promote
greater specialization in production of milk.
In the Trans-Volga and Kazakh areas of the new lands
a shift in emphasis from cattle raising for production of meat to that
for production of milk is planned for the next few years. 173/ This
* In Kokchetavskaya Oblast, for instance, 23.2 percent of the land put
under cultivation by new state farms in 1954 came from existing animal
husbandry farms. 169/
** It is planned to increase cow numbers and milk production in Severo-
Kazakhstanskaya and Kokchetavskaya Oblasts, and also in considerable
parts of Kustanayskaya) Akmolinskaya, and Pavlodarskaya Oblasts. 172/
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shift apparently will depend largely on the manpower, water supply,
and fodder base being developed by the grain program. State grain
farms which are near adequate transportation will raise a large pro-
portion of cows, and those in isolated areas will concentrate on
production of beef. 174/
c. Sheep.
The USSR plans to expand sheep raising on a large
scale in almost all parts of the new lands. The smallest relative
increase in sheep numbers probably will take place in the dairy-farm-
ing areas of the Northern Zone) although in the zone as a whole --
and particularly in Altayskiy Kray -- a large increase in sheep num-
bers is planned for the next few years. 175/
In Kazakh SSR the relative proportion of sheep num-
bers is planned to increase at a rapid rate. Although the bulk of
this increase probably is to take place in the central and southern
areas of Kazakh SSR, large increases are also expected in the Southern
and Western Zones of the new lands.* The greatest increase in sheep
numbers is planned for Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblast in the Western
Zone and Aktyubinskaya Oblast in the Southern Zone. 111/
Increasing the proportion of fine-wool sheep could in-
crease greatly the productivity of sheep raising in the new lands. To
date) however, accomplishments have been so small as to suggest that
the role of fine-wool sheep in the new lands will remain small for the
indefinite future.**
d. Swine.
Swine numbers are to increase in the Northern Zone of
the new lands and in the northern portion of the Southern Zone. 179/
A large increase may be planned for the Northern Zone, but the reported
plan for increasing swine numbers in Kazakh SSR is so conservative as
to preclude the existence of an ambitious plan for the Southern Zone. 180/
* The present plan is to have up to 15)000 head of sheep on each new
state grain farm) compared with between 2,500 and 5,000 head of cattle
and 1)000 head of swine. 176/
** As of 1 October 1955, fine-wool sheep accounted for only 2.8 percent
of total sheep numbers in Kazakh SSR. 178/
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e. Improvement of Forage Supplies.
In state grain farms with considerable areas of natural
meadows and pastures, the feed base is to consist largely of forage
native to the area and rotation fodder crops, particularly perennial
grasses and corn. Wherever grain is cultivated) straw and chaff will
be a significant part of the livestock feed) particularly during the
winter. In the northern fringe of the Southern Zone and in much of
the Northern Zone, many of the new state grain farms can cultivate
almost all the area that they possess for grain and other crops. Here
it may be necessary to create meadows for grazing livestock or to resort
to stall feeding. On farms of this type, straw and chaff, annual legu-
minous crops, corn, and perennial grasses will comprise the feed base
for livestock. Lq1/
f. Role of State Farms.
In addition to the increase of livestock numbers on
state grain farms, there is planned an increase in the numbers of state
livestock farms. Part of this increase will consist of the conversion
of some new state grain farms that were located on poor soil to live-
stock farms. 1.17?/ The remainder of the increase will consist of the
formation of new state livestock farms. This increase is associated
principally with the use of natural pasture in the Kazakh steppe, partic-
ularly for sheep raising. 183/
Plans to increase the numbers of livestock on state
farms in the new lands pose the problem of supplying the farms with
animals. In January 1956) Pravda urged that in spite of the scepticism
of some party members) the stocking of state farms within a short time
would be possible without prohibitive expense. 184/
In March 1956 the Central Committee of the Party and
the Council of Ministers, USSR, announced a decision that the numbers
of livestock held as private property by collective farm households
should be reconsidered in the light of local conditions:
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Bearing in mind the fact that in a num-
ber of areas which are classified by the
specimen statute of the agricultural artel
as belonging to agriculture areas with semi-
nomadic and nomadic livestock breeding) and
owing to the great changes which recently took
place in the direction of animal husbandry
Lin this areg there is hardly a need to main-
tain the number of cattle fixed in the past
for private use on farmsteads. 185/
The seminomadic and nomadic areas referred to include
most, if not all, of Kazakh SSR, and the "changes" referred to undoubt-
edly are those wrought by the new lands program. This decision lends
weight to Pravda's position that new state farms can be stocked without
prohibitive expense.
If, as is likely, many collective farm households own
as many livestock as permitted by the specimen statute of the agricul-
tural artel,* the decision of 26 March 1956 would make available to the
government a large number of livestock) particularly sheep) for stocking
the new state farms. The speed with which this stocking can be com-
pleted, however) will depend on the creation of an adequate feed base
on each farm.
2. Efforts to Improve Animal Husbandry.
Resources supplied by the grain program are the principal
basis of the livestock program in the new lands) but these resources
must be supplemented by specific efforts to improve animal husbandry.
During the first 2 years of the new lands program) such efforts have
been made) but not on a large scale. Meadow improvement facilities
* In Kazakh SSR a collective farm household is permitted to hold as
private property the following numbers of adult livestock:
Nomadic Areas Seminomadic Areas
Cows 8 to lo 4 to 5
Sheep 100 to 150 30 to 4o
Swine 2 to 3 186/
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are being increased, LE1/ and a program for building animal shelters has
been started.* More than 700,000 hectares of corn were seeded in Kazakh
SSR in 1955) a/ but the drought in that year must have greatly limited
the effect of the increase in corn acreage on the fodder supply.
3. Problems Encountered.
Soviet efforts to improve water supplies in the new lands
appear to have met with only little success. Ground water in the more
arid areas of the new lands, where many of the new state farms are located,
Is at "great depth," 122/ and many wells yield salt water. 191/ Many
farms were established before water supplies had been adequately
surveyed) with the result that some farms have to haul water from a
distance. 122/ Recent plans for contruction of large water pipelines
from the Irtysh and Ishim Rivers through the Southern Zone suggest that
ground-water supplies have not proved to be sufficient in this area. 193/
It is apparent that the major problems of animal husbandry
in the new lands during the first 2 years of the program are, for the
most part, the same as those that plagued animal husbandry before the
program was started. Heavy winter losses, inefficient care of livestock)
slow procurement of winter fodder) and lack of MTS cooperation are typical
complaints. It is not clear; however, to what extent these complaints
stem from the traditional weaknesses of Soviet agriculture and to what
extent they stem from the dislocations caused by the grain program.
Animal husbandry is characteristically slow in responding
to investment and organizational reforms. In addition, animal husbandry
is receiving only secondary emphasis in the new lands. During the first
year of the program it received particularly little attention. 194/
When the grain program attains a relatively stable position and when
investment in animal husbandry has had more time to produce results,
a more meaningful analysis of livestock problems in the new lands can
be made.
* In 1955, 700 million rubles were allocated for animal shelters in
Krasnoyarskiy Kray alone, compared with 90 million rubles allocated in
1949 for construction and mechanization of jivestoch7 farms" in the
entire Kazakh SSR.
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4. Results.
From 1 October 1954 to 1 October 1955 the yield of milk per
cow in Kazakh SSR increased by 98 kilograms (kg), or 12 percent) on col-
lective farms and by 56 kg) or 8 percent, on state farms. 195/ The in-
crease in yield of milk per cow in the socialized sector as a whole was
10.8 percent.* Oblast reports indicate that average yields of milk per
cow also increased in the Northern Zone during this period. 196/ These
increases are the only evidence that the new lands program has benefited
animal husbandry in the area.** They suggest that forage supplies pro-
cured during the preceding year of favorable weather were more plentiful
than in past years) making moderate gains in yields of milk possible in
spite of the unfavorable weather Of 1955. Corn, fed as green fodder in
the summer, may also have contributed to increasing yields of milk.
State plan results for 1955 indicate that the period of
stagnation in livestock numbers in Kazakh SSR which had begun in 1950
continued through the first 2 years of the new lands program. 191/
On 1 October 1955 there were fewer cattle in Kazakh SSR than in 1950)
and fewer sheep than in 1951, although both of these earlier years
were bad years for animal husbandry. 198/
On 1 October 1955, new state farms in Kazakh SSR) located
almost entirely in the Southern Zone, had 89,500 head of.cattle, 243,500
head of sheep, and '"many pigs." 199/ These figures represent an average
of approximately 265 head of cattle and 722 head of sheep per new state
farm. These data contrast with the plan to have on each new state grain
farm between 2,500 and 5,000 head of cattle, up to 15,000 head of sheep,
and 1,000 head of swine. 200/ Thus, although stocking of state grain
farms has been progressing, livestock numbers as of 1 October 1955 were
far short of ultimate goals.
* The increase in average yields of milk in the socialized sector as
a whole was calculated by weighting the increase in yield per cow on
state and collective farms in proportion to the ratio of collective to
state farm cow numbers (1.8 to 1). This ratio was calculated by relating
state and collective farm yields of milk per cow for 1955 to the yield
per cow in the socialized sector as a whole.
** The majority of the cows in Kazakh SSR probably are in the Southern
Zone. Changes in the yield of milk per cow, therefore) are a relatively
good indication of developmenti in the Southern Zone.
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Because 250 out of a total of 337 new grain farms were formed
in 19551 most of the livestock of new grain farms probably was procured
In that year.* The scale of procurement implied by these data suggests
that livestock were taken from private owners even before the decision
of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, USSR, formalized
the policy of decreasing privately owned livestock in the new lands.
In view of this decision) and in view of the rapidly in-
creasing share of state farms in the field of animal husbandry) it is
possible that the Southern Zone of the new lands may eventually lose
its remaining nomadic character. As the role of private ownership in
animal husbandry decreases) state farms may finally challenge the pres-
ent predominance of collective farms. The completion of this transi-
tion, however, will depend on great improvement in the feed base and
heavy investment in water supplies and shelter -- tasks which) if com-
pleted at all, may take many years.
X. Organization of Agriculture.
A. General.
The new lands program in the USSR has been implemented with the
participation of some 10)660 collective farms, 1,740 MTS's) and an in-
determinate number of state farms, including 425 new state farms organized
during 1954-55. Influenced by several political) economic, and geographic
considerations, MTS's and collective farms have been relatively more import-
ant in the new lands area of the RSFSR (principally in the Northern Zone
and most of the Western Zone of the new lands)) where 1,457 MTS's and
8,961 collective farms are engaged in the program. Conversely, state
farms, particularly new state farms) have been more important in Kazakh
SSR (principally in the Southern Zone of the new lands), where 337 of
the 425 state farms organized during 1954-55 are located.
Before the reclamation program began, much of the new lands was
composed of vast stretches of unused land. As late as 1953) only a small
proportion of the land in the area was actually under cultivation. In
the Northern Zone of the new lands the percentage of land under cultivation
ranged from less than 30 percent in Chelyabinskaya Oblast to 60 percent
"here and there," and in the Western Zone 30 to 50 percent of the land
* See Table 10) p. 91, below.
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was under cultivation. In the Southern Zone, less than 30 percent of
total land resources was under cultivation. This pattern of land use
may be contrasted with that in sections of the Ukraine and in the cen-
tral European USSR, where more than 80 percent of all land was planted
to crops. 201/
These land use patterns, complicated by differences in population
density, resulted in extreme differences in man-land ratios between the
old established agricultural areas and the new lands. In areas charac-
terized as "land-poor," the amount of plowland per able-bodied collective
farmer averaged 2.3 hectares (ranging from 1.0 hectare in Zakarpatskaya
Oblast in Western Ukrainian SSR to 4.2 hectares in Gor'kovskaya Oblast);
in "land-rich" areas of the new lands the amount of plowland per able-
bodied collective farmer ranged from 14.8 hectares in Novosibirskaya
Oblast in the Northern Zone to 34.0 hectares in Pavlodarskaya Oblast in
the Southern Zone.* 203/
These characteristics of the new lands, vast land resources and
low population density, not only lent themselves to the Soviet concep-
tions of agricultural production, but also made mandatory a program
based on the fixations of mechanization and gigantomania.** As might
be expected, these words have become watchwords in the propaganda campaign
attendant to the new lands program, relating not only to the formation of
the 425 "huge new grain state farms" but also to the augmentation of MI6's
which has resulted in the development of a "new type MTS."
* The man-land ratio in the new lands was planned to be even more
extreme after the virgin and long-fallow land had been brought into cul-
tivation. There were 18.7 sown hectares per able-bodied collective
farmer in Kustanayskaya Oblast in 1954; after the reclamation of a "large
mass of virgin and long-fallow land" there were to be 36.7 sown hectares
per able-bodied collective farmer. In some rayons of the Oblast, and in
other oblasts, the figure was to reach 50 hectares. 202/
** As Khrushchev said, "Had we undertaken to develop the virgin lands
in the usual way by the gradual resettlement of people in the new areas,
we should have required a tremendous amount of people, vast resources,
and much time." 204/
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B. Role of State Farms.
Several considerations, political-ideological, economic, and
physical (geographic), influenced the role of state farms in the
Soviet new lands program. Foremost among the political, or ideolog-
ical, considerations favoring the formation of 425 new grain state
farms was the desire to expand the role of the state-owned-and-oper-
ated sector.* By this strategem the Soviet leaders strengthened
their control over agriculture and, concurrently, succeeded in direct-
ing a larger proportion of gross agricultural production into the
market through state channels than would have been possible under a
system of collective farms. It may be assumed that the effect on the
collective farm market has been roughly inversely proportional to
successes achieved in the canalization of agricultural products through
the state distribution system.
The new lands program, calling for the reclamation of the huge
tracts of land in sparsely settled areas, no doubt was seen also as a
proving ground for one of the basic tenets of Communist dogma -- that
highly mechanized, large-scale agriculture is inherently superior to
other systems.** The physical characteristics of the new lands, which
are ideally suited to such a system of agriculture, permitted the
application of this dogma; the paucity of manpower in the new lands
further recommended a highly mechanized system of agriculture. Not
only were the new lands generally suited to highly mechanized operations,
but also the economy was in the position, relatively speaking, to supply
the agricultural machinery required for large-scale, mechanized grain
farming.***
* For example, the sown acreage on state farms in Kazakh SSR in 1956
was planned to be 7 to 8 times larger than it was in 1953. 205/
** "Ideologically, large-scale socialist agriculture has always been
the Bolshevik goal. ... The old Marxist belief in the superiority of
large-scale methods of production in agriculture, as well as in industry,
had been strengthened by Lenin's unbounded enthusiasm for the tractor,
which he believed would lead the peasant into the promised land of
socialist *agriculture." 206/
*** The general validity of this observation may be deduced from the
percentage of field operations which are reported to be mechanized for
various crops (small-grain cultivation is habitually reported to be more
highly mechanized than is the cultivation of other crops) and from the
increased emphasis placed on the production of agricultural machinery for
the cultivation of nongrain crops during the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60).
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Finally, several economic considerations tipped the scales in
favor of establishing state farms, instead of collective farms, in areas
of the new lands where there were no farming units in existence. Basic
among these considerations was the fact that the cost of establishing
farming units in these areas, regardless of type, had to be borne by the
state. It is one thing to collectivize existing peasant farming units
and quite another to establish farming units in an area devoid of
population.* The choice was to select that type of farming unit thought
to be least expensive and most advantageous to the state. State farms
fulfilled both of these requirements.** It was believed, furthermore)
that state farms used resources, both manpower and machinery, more
efficiently. In addition, a larger portion of the crop from state farms
would be distributed through state channels.
Under the terms of the original new lands program, which called
for the reclamation of 13 million hectares of virgin and long-fallow
land for sowing in 1955/ 4.3 million hectares were to be reclaimed by
state farms, including 2.3 million hectares by existing state farms and
2 million hectares by 125 "new huge grain state farms."*** It was re-
ported that 124 state farms actually were organized in the new lands
during 1954.xxx* Under the impetus of the revised new lands program)
which raised the ultimate goal to from 28 million to 30 million hectares
of virgin and long-fallow land to be sown in 1956, the number of state
farms to be formed was more than tripled, and 425 state farms were
established in .the new lands during 1954 and 1955. Of this number) 337
are in Kazakh SSR and 88 in the RSFSR.
* For a modern analogy, the new lands program and the corn program)
in which the acreages involved are identical, may be considered. The new
lands program, carried out in remote areas, required huge expenditures
by the state, and the relatively modest cost of the corn program, which
was executed in established agricultural areas, was largely borne by
collective farms. (For a brief comparison of the two programs, see
I, E, p. 18, above.)
** The Soviet press has continually expounded the superiority of state
farms in the reclamation of the new lands. These views are accurately
reflected in an article by Ponomarenko, Secretary of the Kazakh Central
Committee, who wrote, "Experience of the 93 huge grain state farms created
in Kazakh during this year shows that at the present) the organization of
new state farms is the most expedient means of massive reclamation of virgin
and idle land and of increasing the production of grain ... ghei7 give the
most inexpensive grain to the country." 207/
*** For data on acreage, see Appendix A.
XXXX See Table 10, p. 91, below.
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Although these new state farms were ostensibly established for
the exploitation of land from the "state land fund," much of the land
Included within their boundaries came from other sources. In Akmolin-
skaya and Kokchetavskaya ?blasts) where more than one-half of the state
farms organized in Kazakh SSR during 1954 were located) land incorpor-
ated into the new state farms was derived from the following sources 208/:
Akmolinskaya Kokchetavskaya
Oblast Oblast
Percent
State land fund
63.7
45.6
Existing state farms with
"excess" land
16.7
23.2
Subordinate economies of
industrial enterprises
10.4
31.2
Collective farms with
"superfluous" land
9.2
0
Total
100.0
100.0
Judged by any standard) the new grain state farms are huge. They
have an average of 30,000 to 4o,000 hectares of land, of which 20,000 to
25,000 hectares are plowland, compared with older grain state farms in
Kazakh SSR which have an average of 18,000 to 28,000 hectares of land, of
which 12,000 to 18)000 hectares are plowland. 209/ The contrast is even
more marked between the new state farms and the average of all state farms
In the USSR) which have land resources that average approximately 15,000
hectares. The size of the new state farms is also reflected in their
tractor parks, which average 100 to 120 tractors (in terms of 15-horse-
power (hp) units) compared with the national average for all state farms
of 36 tractors (in terms of 15-hp units).*
* It has been reported that each new state farm has, on the average) 4o
to 45 "powerful track-laying tractors" (DT-54 and S-80). 210/ On the basis
of deliveries of tractors to state farms in Kazakh SSR during 1954, and
deliveries planned for 1955, a ratio of 1 physical tractor to 2.67 units
of 15 hp each is assumed for the conversion of the tractor park of the
new state farms into 15-hp units. 211/
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C. Role of Machine Tractor Stations and Collective Farms.
The role of MTS's and collective farms has been subordinated to
that of state farms in most popular accounts of the Soviet new lands pro-
gram as well as in public statements by Soviet officials. This fact must
be attributed to the position of state farms -- "the standard agricul-
tural unit at the next stage of social development" -- in current Soviet
agricultural philosophy. 212/ It cannot spring from a quantitative ap-
praisal of the relative amounts of virgin and long-fallow land reclaimed
by state and collective farms) because collective farms under the control
of the MTS's were responsible for,more than one-half of the land reclaimed
during 1954-55 and were relatively even more important during the early
stages of the new lands program.*
As previously indicated, the founding of new collective farms in
the more remote areas of the new lands was militated against by ideolog-
ical and, in part, by economic considerations. On the other hand, just
as economic considerations were claimed as the basis for the decision
to establish new state farms in areas largely empty of population)
economic considerations were also invoked in the decision to use existing
collective farms and MTS's in the new lands as nuclei for the reclamation
program. These collective farms and MTS's, located in sparsely settled
regions, were viewed as isolated farming units surrounded by readily avail-
able virgin and long-fallow land which could be brought under cultivation
in a minimum of time with minimum expenditure. Expenditures for construc-
tion of supplementary housing and of repair and storage facilities at these
MTS's and collective farms were substantially smaller than those involved
in the creation of new state farms. In addition, the labor force of the
existing collective farms and MTS's, if not large enough to meet the
manpower requirements of the land reclamation program) would at least
serve as an experienced cadre which could be supplemented by youthful
"volunteers."
Politically, the Soviet leaders were able to use "independent"
collective farms in their reclamation program because of their control
of the countryside. Their rural control apparatus, the MTS's ("the
* In the RSFSR (chiefly in the Northern Zone of the new lands)) collective
farms plowed 6.6 million hectares of virgin and long-fallow land during
1954, and the state farms, 2.6 million hectares; in Kazakh SSR (principally
in the Southern Zone) the figures were 5.7 million and 2.7 million, respec-
tively. (For data on acreage, see Appendix A.)
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decisive force in the development of collective farming"), 211/ rein-
forced by the reforms of 1953, was capable of "assisting" the collec-
tive farms in fulfilling the reclamation tasks which they had "volun-
tarily assumed."*
One final consideration, the factor of timing, probably motivated
the USSR to assign a large share of the original reclamation program to
the MTS's and collective farms. It was possible to get the program under
way much more rapidly by using resources already in the area (in existing
MTS's and collective farms) than by directing resources into a completely
new operation. The sense of urgency probably was not motivated primarily
by the desire to receive early returns, although this was not unimportant.
It is probable that the principal motive was harsh political necessity.
It was necessary to achieve early successes in the program not only be-
cause "enthusiasm" had to be kept at a high pitch among the new lands
"volunteers" and other participants, but also, more important, because
Khrushchev probably felt the need of an early harvest as a means of
proving the "validity" of his program.**
The MTS's in the new lands, augmented by supplementary alloca-
tions of agricultural machinery and personnel, have developed into a
"new type MTS," 21// principally characterized by its large size. The
evolution of this new type of NTS is indicated by the foLlowing indexes
(1953 = 100) relating to the characteristics of MTS's during 1954 in
Altayskiy Kray in the eastern part of the Northern Zone and in Knstanay-
skaya Oblast in the western part of the Southern Zone
* The freedom with which collective farmers plan their crop patterns
may be adduced from the corn program. Shortly after the publication of
a decree on the decentralization of agricultural planning, Ehrushchev
remarked, in relation to the corn program, that "those who do not under-
stand the importance of corn must have it explained to them, must be
taught it; and those who ignore corn must be kept far away from the col-
lective farms, MTS's, and state farms." 21V Consequently, thousands of
collective and state farms throughout the USSR succeeded in overfulfill-
ing the 1955 goal of seeding 16 million hectares to corn by about 1.9
million hectares. 212/
** The joint Party-government decree of 17 August 1954 cited the successes
achieved during the spring of 1954 as the basis for expanding the new lands
program from 13 million hectares to from 28 million to 30 million hectares. 21?/
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Altayskiy Kray
Kustanayskaya
Oblast
Average volume of work per MTS
157.9
156.9
Average number of tractors per MTS
(in 15-hp units)*
163.2
194.8
Average number of permanent workers
per MTS
134.0
171.5
MTS's in the new lands are not differentiated from MTS's in
established agricultural areas by size alone. Their size, coupled
with the task of reclaiming vast areas of new land located within the
jurisdiction of collective farms,** has resulted in a unique disposi-
tion and use of the resources at their command. New tractor brigades
were formed?*** a great number of which were engaged exclusively in
the plowing of virgin and long2fallow land. In addition) many tractor
brigades were organized into tractor "detachments" consisting of 3 or
4 tractor brigades to exploit "large masses of virgin and long-fallow
land located a great distance from the headquarters of the MTS's,
often more than 100 kilometers. "xxxx 226/ At least 650 such detachments
were engaged in the reclamation of new land during 1954 alone.
It is claimed that the enlargement of MTS's in the areas where virgin
* The average number of tractors per MTS in Altayskiy Kray (in terms
of 15-hp units) increased from approximately 140 at the end of 195a to
approximately 235 at the end of 1954 219/; in Kustanayskaya Oblast the
figures were 115 and 220, respectively. 220/ This may be compared with
the national average for all MTS's of approximately 120 (in terms of
15-hp units) at the end of 1953. 221/
** Collective farms in Kazakh SSR, for example, were originally planned
to reclaim an average of 2,428 hectares. 222/ They actually reclaimed an
average of more than 5,000 hectares during 1954-55. 222/
*** In Kustanayskaya Oblast, for example, the number of tractor brigades
per MTS increased from 13 in 1953 to 20 at the end of 1954. EL/
**** These tractor detachments typically consist of 15 to 20 heavy track-
laying tractors) 20 to 30 five-bottom plows, 20 to 30 grain drills, and
other necessary agricultural machinery; fuel trucks; a portable shop; and
not fewer than 100 to 120 workers. 225/
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and long-fallow land is being reclaimed "improves the utilization of
technical equipment) lowers the expenditures of productive work) and
presents the possibility of producing each centner of grain with signif-
icantly lower expenditures of capital and labor." 228/
Although much of the impetus for the expansion of MTS's in the
new lands is to be found in the new lands program itself, it is not to
be inferred that the expansion of MTS's was undertaken solely in re-
sponse to the demands of the new lands program. Actually, a huge pro-
gram designed to bring the repair and storage facilities of all MTS's
in the USSR up to standard had been initiated by the MTS decree of
1953, in response to "a disparity which has arisen in the postwar years
between the level of agricultural machinery with which the MTS's are
equipped and the productive-technical base for the repair and storage
of machinery."* 230/ At that time, 429 MTS's in the USSR were entirely
without repair shops) and about 5,000 MTS's had poorly equipped shops.**
The 10-billion-ruble program embarked upon called for the construction
of 4,200 MTS service stations) the construction or expansion of some
300 repair shops and interrayon capital repair plants,*** in addition
to the construction of thousands of dwellings, garages, and sheds for
storing machinery) during 1954-56. The concerted drive to equip each
MTS with the best repair and storage facilities was stimulated in
western Siberia and northern Kazakh SSR by the new lands program. The
reclamation program intensified the need for adequately equipped MTS's
not only because of the enlarged tractor park but also to insure more
efficient use of the park.
* Buildings (both "productive" and living quarters) and equipment
reportedly constituted only 11 percent of the capital equipment of
MTS's at the beginning of 1953. 229/
** The inadequacies of MTS repair facilities have always been one
of the major obstructions to the efficient use of the MTS tractor
park. The following percentages of the MTS tractor park in the RSFSR
were not in use during the various months of 1955, because of "lack
of technical care": May) 13 percent; June) 17 percent; August, 34
percent; July) 37 percent; and September) 35 percent. 231/
*** These plants are equipped with steel foundries and machine tools
and can almost rebuild tractors or other machines.
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D. Plans and Performance.*
Soviet propaganda has cast state farms) particularly the newly
organized state farms, in the "principal role" in the new lands pro-
gram, although they were originally planned to account for only one-
third of the virgin and long-fallow land to be plowed (4.3 million
hectares of the total 13 million hectares), and MTS's and collective
farms were to plow 8.7 million hectares. The original plan of plowing
13 million hectares was greatly overfulfilled during 1954 -- an esti-
mated 17.8 million hectares of virgin and long-fallow land was plowed --
but the relative proportions of land plowed by type of farm organiza-
tion remained about the same as planned (state farms) 31 percent; MTS's
and collective farms) 69 percent). Of the virgin and long-fallow land
plowed during 1954, 47 percent was located in Kazakh SSR and 53 percent
in the RSFSR.
Because the burden of reclamation in the original plan fell
largely on existing state and collective farms (11 million hectares of
the originally planned 13 million hectares),** much of the virgin and
long-fallow land readily accessible to these established units was
reclaimed during the initial drive of 1954. As a result) much of the
land to be brought into cultivation in the expanded program lay in
areas remote from established agriculture which could be best used by
the creation of additional state farms. With the upward revision of
the new lands program, state farms were assigned a larger share of
the aggregate goal, 14 million hectares of a total of 30 million hec-
tares, approximately 45 percent of the total. Of these 14 million
hectares) it is estimated that about 8.5 million to 10.5 million hec-
tares were to be plowed by 425 new state farms) compared with the rec-
lamation of 2 million hectares by 125 new state farms as originally
planned. The remainder was to be plowed by existing state farms.
The expanded program was differentiated from the original pro-
gram not only by differences in the relative roles of state and collec-
tive farms but also by the geographic distribution of the land to be
brought under cultivation. Under the terms of the original plan, the
acreage to be reclaimed was divided almost equally between Kazakh SSR
and the RSFSR) but in the enlarged plan) approximately 60 percent of
the new lands to be plowed were located in Kazakh SSR (principally
in the Southern Zone of the new lands).
* For data on acreage) see Appendix A.
** MTS's and collective farms were to plow 8.7 million hectares, and
existing state farms were to plow 2.3 million hectares. 232/
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The new lands program, as it has evolved to date, has closely
approximated the revised, enlarged plan. Some 30 million hectares were
plowed during 1954-55 for sowing in the spring of 1956, including ap-
proximately 16.6 million hectares by collective farms (under the control
of the MTS's) and 13.5 million hectares (approximately 45 percent of the
total) py state farms. As provided by the revised plan, approximately 6o
percent of the virgin and long-fallow land brought under cultivation is
located in Kazakh SSR (principally in the Southern Zone of the new lands).
State farms have been more important in Kazakh SSR, where they accounted
for more than one-half of the new land plowed. Conversely, state farms
were relatively less important in the RSFSR, accounting for approximately
35 percent of the virgin and long-fallow land plowed during 1954-55.
The farm organizations engaged in the new lands program in the
USSR at the end of the years 1954 and 1955 are shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Farm Organizations Engaged in the New Lands Program in the USSR
End of Year
1954 and 1955
Units
Type of Farm Organization
Kazakh SSR
RSFSR
Total USSR
1954
1955
1954
1955
1554
1955
Collective farms
1,699
2/
N.A.
8,961 1:2/
N.A.
10,660 2/
10,000
1/
Machine tractor stations
283
2/
N.A:
1,457 f/
N.A.
1,740 g/
1,600
11/
State farms
216
1/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Including new state farms
87
1/
337 h/
371"
88 2/
124
2/
4252/
a.
2
50X1
50X1
k'
3111/
EL/Ig
d.
f.
24/
1'
n.
239/
0.
EY
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XI. Mechanization of Agriculture.
A. General.
The Soviet new lands program of plowing 30 million hectares of
virgin and long-fallow land for sowing in the spring of 1956 has required
large amounts of agricultural machinery. The requirements for machinery
were magnified by the Soviet desire to reduce the requirements for man-
power in the thinly populated areas by establishing large-scale, highly
mechanized grain farming. The requirements for machinery have been ful-
filled, in part) at least, by reallocations and "loans"* of machinery from
the established agricultural areas (principally the Ukrainian SSR and the
southern part of the European USSR) and from the existing new lands agri-
cultural enterprises which were not actively engaged in the program. In
addition, trucks were dispatched from the metropolitan areas) during the
harvests of 1954 and 1955) for use in hauling grain from the fields to
points of procurement.
B. Tractors.**
MTS's and
state :arms in the new lands of the USSR received 115)000 tractors***
in 1954) more than 6o percent of the 186,000 tractors of all types de-
livered to all of agriculture during that year. Deliveries of tractors
to the new lands consisted almost entirely of heavy track-laying trac-
tors,**** amounting to almost 85 percent of total deliveries of heavy
tractors to agriculture during 1954) 115)000 out of total deliveries of
137,000. Deliveries of tractors to the new lands during 1955 were
* These loans may be of a seasonal nature. It has been customary,
upon completion of the grain harvest in the southern European USSR)
to ship tractors and combines on loan to the Asiatic spring wheat belt
to speed up the harvest. Since the initiation of the new lands pro-
gram) trucks also are being sent to the Northern and Southern Zones.
It is not clear whether or not these trucks are sent on a loan basis
or whether they will remain in the new lands and an equivalent number
of new machines will be sent to the areas making the loans.
** See Table 11, p. 96) below.
xxx Tractor numbers are given in terms of 15-hp units.
*xxx References to deliveries of tractors to the new lands mention only
deliveries of "the most efficient and powerful diesel tractors." 250/
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somewhat smaller, about 98,000,* while total deliveries to agriculture
increased during 1955, amounting to 218)000 tractors. Thus the new
lands received only 45 percent of the total deliveries of tractors to
agriculture during 1955. The new lands share of deliveries of heavy
track-laying tractors ("general-purpose" tractors in Soviet terminology)
was correspondingly reduced during 1955) amounting to approximately 60
percent of estimated total deliveries of general-purpose tractors to
agriculture, 98,000 out of total deliveries of 161)000.**
C. Combines.
Deliveries of grain combines to the new lands of the USSR were
considerably smaller) relatively, than were deliveries of tractors. Al-
most one-half of total deliveries of grain combines to agriculture were
allocated to the new lands during 1954, 18,000 out of total deliveries of
37)000. It is likely that MTS's and state farms in the new lands were
allocated approximately the same share of the 46)000 combines received
by agriculture during 1955.*** 351/
Deliveries of grain combines to the new lands were supplemented
during 1954-55, particularly during the early part of the year) by the
transfer of combines from areas in the southern European USSR where
harvesting had. been completed. More than 20)000 combines from these
areas were received in the new lands during 1954 alone) including 6)000
which were directed to the new grain regions of Kazakh SSR (principally
in the Southern Zone), 256/ and more than 14,000 which were directed to
the new lands area of the RSFSR (principally in the Northern Zone), 257/
including 6,000 which were sent to Altayskiy Kray.
* It was planned to deliver 98,000 tractors to the new lands during
1955. gal/ As "more than 200)000" tractors were reported to have been
delivered to the new lands during 1954-55, it is assumed that the plan
for 1955 was achieved. 252/
** Total deliveries of general-purpose tractors to agriculture during
1955 were roughly estimated on the assumption that the ratio between
the number of general-purpose tractors delivered to agriculture and the
total number of tractors delivered to agriculture in 1955 was the same
as in 1954, which is known. 253/
*** It was planned to deliver 26,000 combines to the new lands for
use in the 1955 harvest. 254/
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D. Trucks.
Little is known of the delivery of new trucks to the new lands
of the USSR. In September 1955, Benediktov stated that 30)000 trucks
had been sent to the new lands, presumably as of 31 August of that
year. 259/ It can be computed that the bulk of these trucks, about
18)000,* were delivered during 1954 and that 12,000 were delivered
during the first 8 months of 1955. Apparently this number of trucks
was only about one-half of the number required to perform routine
farm services and to move the grain harvested in 1954. During July
and the first half of August 1954y some 15)200 trucks were shipped
from the southern regions of the European USSR and from the Ukrainian
SSR to the new lands area of the RSFSR. 260/ It is possible that these
trucks were sent on loan to the new lands area of the RSFSR, for
during 1954, "large industrial cities" of the USSR sent (probably on
loan) more than 15,000 trucks to Kazakh SSR for the transport of
grain. 261/ Thus in 1954 there were available in the new lands for
hauling grain from combines to grain floors, to grain cleaners) and
thence to local points of shortage and procurement, 18)000 new trucks
and more than 30,000 trucks from other sources, a total of more than
48,Coo trucks.** There is some evidence that some of the machines
sent on loan to the new lands were returned to the source from which
they came and that some remained in the new lands, the lenders receiving
compensation in the form of new machines.
As stated above, it is probable that in addition to the more
than 18)000 new trucks sent to the new lands in 1954, about 12,000 new
trucks were delivered during the first 8 months of 1955 -- that at
time of harvest more than 30,000 new trucks were available for moving
the poor production of that year. 262/ There is no evidence regarding
the over-all number of trucks classified as "loans" that remained in the
new lands after the 1954 harvest had been moved and the number sent in
for moving the 1955 harvested grain. Any conclusion about these numbers
Is further obscured by the statement that in 1955 Krasnoyarskskiy Kray
received 4,600 trucks dispatched from the southern oblasts of the USSR
and from many regions of Altayskiy Kray, Omskaya Oblast, Novosibirskaya
Oblast, and other oblasts (possibly of the new lands). 263/ As soon as
the grain harvest is cleaned up in one locality the trucks apparently
are sent to some other place to move the grain.
* The figure is rounded.
** All figures are rounded.
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In contrast to the numerous references to the transfer of trucks
and combines from established agricultural areas to the new lands; rela-
tively little has been said in the Soviet press concerning the transfer
of tractors. It is reported; however, that tractors as well as trucks
and combines were diverted from farming units within the new lands which
were not engaged in the new lands program to those MTS's and state farms
(both existing and newly established) which were engaged in the pro-
gram. ?a/
Although large quantities of agricultural machinery had been
directed into the new lands; the goal of "complete complex mechaniza-
tion of all gield7 work" 2.45_/ in the new lands had certainly not been
achieved as of 1955. The production program was accomplished, however,
in spite of serious local shortages of agricultural machinery, partic-
ularly of combines and trucks.
E. Outlook.
Because of the continuing priority which the new lands program
is being accorded; at least during 1956; the machinery requirements of
the program should be met within the next few years. Evidence of this
priority may be seen in the plan to deliver 34,600 tractors to the state
farms in Kazakh SSR during 1956, which is "almost 70 percent of the num-
ber received during 1954-55." 266/ The priority is also reflected in
the plan to deliver 23,100 combines to state farms in Kazakh SSR during
1956, 267/ compared with the 30;000 combines delivered to MTS's and state
farms in Kazakh SSR during 1954-55. 268/
The impact on the established agricultural areas of the delivery
of the relatively large amounts of agricultural machinery to the new
lands was accurately anticipated by Khrushchev in September 1954:
This year's and next year's factory output of
caterpillar tractors; ploughs) drills; and certain
other agricultural machinery will be sent mainly
to newly cultivated lands. Therefore, this year
and next year the number of caterpillar tractors
on the already cultivated land will not be in-
creased. We will send there lighter tractors,
cultivators; and other implements for the culti-
vation of the land and also spare parts for ex-
isting tractors there. 269/
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As shown in Table 11) the delivery of tractors to the established agri-
cultural areas in 1954 was only one-half of the average annual delivery
in the 3 preceding years. In 1955, however) delivery to the established
agricultural areas had increased to 85 percent of the average annual
delivery during the first 3 years of the Fifth Five Year Plan because
of increased deliveries to all agriculture and decreased allocations
to the new lands. The major'effect of deliveries to the new lands
probably has been to delay the reequipment of agriculture in the
established agricultural areas, particularly the grain areas) and
therefore to impose a temporarily greater workload on the existing
machinery park in those areas.
Table 11
Deliveries of Tractors in the USSR
1951-55
Thousand Units
Area
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
New lands
0
0
0
115W
98/
Established areas 2/
137
131
152
71
120
Total USSR
137 A/
131J
152J
186W
218!/
a. 270/
b. Planned deliveries to the new lands during 1955. El/
c. These figures are calculated residuals.
d. 272/
e. Estimated as the difference between total deliveries to
agriculture during 1954-55 273/ and deliveries to agricul-
ture during 1955. 274/
f? 212/
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XII. Requirements for Petroleum Products.
A. General.
Farming in the new lands of the USSR involves the Cultivation
of vast acreages of land with large quantities of agricultural machin-
ery. This machinery is required for plowing, harrowing, sowing, har-
vesting, and other farm operations. In addition, trucks are required
both for tasks on the farm and for transporting farm products to points
of concentration and processing.
Because of the size of the new lands program and the large
machinery and truck park, petroleum products are extremely important.
The purpose of this section is to determine the kinds and quantities
of petroleum consumed in the new lands in 1954, 1955, and 1956.
B. Requirements in 1954.
In the spring of 1954) collective and state farms plowed, har-
rowed, and sowed 4.3 million hectares of virgin and long-fallow lands,
using track-laying diesel tractors. During the summer and fall, these
tractors plowed 13.5 million additional hectares and replowed the 4.3
million hectares. In addition, tractors hauled combines in harvesting
2,042)000 hectares of grain.* These activities are estimated to have
consumed the following metric tonnages of petroleum products: diesel
fuels, 394,000; diesel lubricants, 30,000; and gasoline, 4,000 -- a
total of 428,000 tons of petroleum products.**
In the summer of 1954, combines (both tractor-drawn and self-
propelled***) harvested 4,085,000 hectares of grain) using gasoline-
powered equipment. This equipment consumed 31,000 tons of gasoline
and 2,000 tons of avtol lubricants -- a total of 33,000 tons of petro-
leum products.
* It is estimated that half of the harvested area was harvested
by tractor-drawn combines and half by self-propelled combines.
** For the methodology employed in estimating all quantities of
petroleum products consumed by machinery in the development of the
new lands program, see Appendix C.
*** Self-propelled combines use gasoline both for propulsion and
for cutting and threshing grain. Tractor-drawn combines use gasoline
only for cutting and threshing.
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Petroleum products are consumed in a large number of farm uses
not directly related to field work. For example, stationary motors
are used to produce electricity for lighting and pumping and for opera-
ting milking and feed-grinding machines. Trucks must also be provided
with fuel for work on the farm and for transporting farm products to
points of concentration and processing. Because of the variety of the
tasks performed, it is impossible to estimate directly the quantities
of petroleum products consumed. It is possible, however) to make in-
direct estimates of these quantities. Fuel and lubricant consumption
in "miscellaneous machinery" bears a fixed relationship of somewhat
less than 43 percent to consumption by combines. 276/ On the basis
of this relationship, it is calculated that consumption of petroleum
products by "miscellaneous machinery" was 13,000 tons of gasoline and
1,000 tons of avtol lubricants, a total of 14,000 tons.
An estimate of fuel consumption by trucks can be calculated
from work norms developed by Soviet planners.* One such norm, based
on average field work performed in the USSR in 1938, is expressed in
terms of horsepower-hours per hectare developed by tractors in plowing)
harrowing, sowing, and harvesting. A similar norm was established for
the energy developed by trucks in normal farm hauling, exclusive of the
transportation of grain and other farm products to points of concentra-
tion and processing. The ratio of the norms thus developed for tractors
and trucks in 1938 was 1 to 0.30264.*
For purposes of analysis) it is assumed that the quantity of
fuel consumed by trucks and tractors -- whether diesel fuel or gaso-
line -- is proportional to the normal horsepower developed by each.
The fact that tractors and trucks use different fuels does not invali-
date this assumption) because the theoretical energy availability of
diesel fuel and gasoline is about the same per unit of weight. It is
further assumed that the normal ratio of tractor horsepower-hours to
truck horsepower-hours in 1954 is not widely divergent from the corres-
ponding ratio for the USSR as a whole in 1938. The quantity of diesel
fuel consumed by tractors in field work in 1954 has already been es-
tablished at 332,000 tons. On the basis of these assumptions, the gaso-
line consumed by trucks in farm operations (exclusive of the transporta-
tion of grain and other farm products to points of concentration and
processing) is estimated at 332,000 times 0.30264, a total of 100,000
* See Appendix C.
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tons. Two percent must be added for intergarage and repair opera-
tions, and 5 percent for losses) giving a total of 107)000 tons. There
is no basis for estimating the quantity of gasoline consumed by trucks
in 1954 in transporting grain and other farm products from farms to
points of concentration and processing.
On the basis of a 1948 study of motor transport, the quantity
of lubricants consumed by trucks in normal intrafarm operations is
estimated to have been equivalent to 5 percent of the 107,000 tons of
gasoline consumed in 1954, about 5,000 tons.
C. Requirements in 1955.
In addition to the 17.8 million hectares plowed in 1954 for
sowing in 1955, about 2.7 million hectares of virgin and long-fallow
land were plowed in the spring of 1955. The entire 20.5 million hec-
tares were harrowed and sown; 18.5 million hectares were sown to grain)
and 2 million hectares, to other crops. In the summer and fall of
1955, another area of 9.6 million hectares of land was plowed for the
first time) and the previously plowed 20.5 million hectares were re-
plowed -- all for sowing in 1956. In addition, tractors hauled com-
bines which harvested 8,788,000 hectares of grain. It is estimated
that tractors consumed the following tonnages of petroleum products
In these operations: diesel fuel, 632,000; diesel lubricants) 47)000;
gasoline, 6,000 -- a total of 685,000 tons of petroleum products.
In the summer of 1955, combines (both tractor-drawn and self-
propelled) harvested 17,5761000 hectares of grain. This harvesting
consumed 134,000 tons of gasoline and 7,000 tons of avtol lubricants,
a total of 141,000 tons of petroleum products.
The consumption of petroleum products by "miscellaneous ma-
chinery" must again be determined by the relationship of this consump-
tion to consumption by combines. 211/ Based on this relationship, it
is estimated that such machinery consumed 57,000 tons of gasoline and
3,000 tons of avtol lubricants, a total of 60,000 tons of petroleum
products.
Consumption by trucks must also be obtained indirectly, as it
was for 1954. Consumption of diesel fuel by tractors engaged in field
work during 1955 was 532,000 tons. When multiplied by the factor 0.30264
developed earlier, this figure gives a consumption by trucks on the
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farm of about 161,000 tons of gasoline. Two percent must be added
for intergarage and repair operations, and 5 percent for losses,
giving a total of 172,000 tons. Consumption of lubricants is esti-
mated at 5 percent of this total, about 10,000 tons. Fragmentary
information also permits calculating the quantities of petroleum
products required by trucks in 1955 in transporting farm products
to points of concentration and processing.
First, it is necessary to estimate the quantities of procur-
able (shipped from the farm) products grown on 20.5 million hectares.
As stated above, 20.5 million hectares were sown in the spring of
1955, of which 18.5 million hectares were sown to grain and 2 million
hectares to miscellaneous crops. The 18.5 million hectares sown to
grain are estimated to have produced 7.95 million tons of grain, an
average of 4.3 centners per hectare. For purposes of analysis it is
assumed that the yield of the miscellaneous crops was not less than
that of grain and that the production of grain and other crops in
1955 was about 8,815,000 tons. Khrushchev once indicated that he
expected that about two-thirds of the new lands production would be
procurable 278/ and therefore hauled by truck. If this ratio held
for 1954, then about 5.9 million tons of farm products were moved by
truck.
Second, it is necessary to estimate the average distance over
which farm products must be moved to points of concentration and pro-
cessing. Unfortunately, there is no information available on this
point. Information is available, however, on the average length of
truck haul from railhead to destination for all freight in various
oblasts in the Southern Zone of the new lands in 1955. It is assumed
that these averages represent, at least reasonably accurately, the
average length of haul between farm and points of concentration and
processing. For purposes of this calculation, the average distance
selected was 63.7 km, which is the shortest of the distances reported
for any oblast in the Southern Zone (and which, therefore, probably
yields a conservative estimate of fuel consumption). Using 63.7 km
as the average length of haul, and multiplying it by the tonnage of
procurable farm products, gives a total of 376 million ton-kilometers
(tkm) to be hauled.
Total consumption of gasoline by trucks engaged in off-farm
haul is estimated to be about 82,000 tons. Two percent must be added
for repair operations, 279/ and 5 percent for wastage, giving a total
of 87,000 tons of gasoline consumed. Consumption of lubricants is
estimated at 5 percent of this total, about 4,000 tons.
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D. Requirements in 1956.
As stated above, 30,1 million hectares were plowed in the new
lands in the autumn of 1955 for sowing in the spring of 1956. There
is no evidence that additional acreage was plowed in the spring of
1956. Although there is evidence that 40 Million hectares of virgin
and long-fallow land are planned to be farmed eventually in the new
lands, 280/ it appears that operations will be restricted to approxi-
mately 30.1 million hectares for several years.
If, as in 1955, grain will be sown on about 90 percent of the
cultivated acreage in 1956, then 27.1 million hectares will be sown to
grain and the remaining 3 million hectares to other crops. Combines
gill harvest an estimated 95 percent of the grain acreage, of which
one-half, 12,872,000 hectares, will be harvested by tractor-drawn com-
bines. Tractors will also replow the 30.1 million hectares for sow-
ing in 1957. In performing these oterations, tractors will consume
the following tonnages of petroleum products: diesel fuel, 622,000;
lubricants, 47,000; gasoline, 6,00e -- a total of 675,000 tons of
petroleum products. '
It is estimated that the total acreage to be harvested by both
tractor-drawn and self-propelled combines will be 25,745,000 hectares,
with each type accounting for 50 percent of the total. This amount of
harvesting would require 196,000 tons of gasoline and 10)000 tons of
lubricants, a total of 206,000 tons of petroleum products.
Based on its relationship with consumption by combines, 511/
it is estimated that consumption of petroleum products by "miscel-
laneous machinery" will be 84,000 tons of gasoline and 4,000 tons of
avtol lubricants, a total of 88)000.tons.
Consumption of diesel fuel by tractors engaged in field work
during 1956 is estimated at 523,000 tons. Consumption of gasoline by
trucks in performing intrafarm work would therefore be about 158,000
tons, based on the factor 0.30264 developed earlier. Two percent must
be added for intergarage and repair operations, and 5 percent for
losses, giving a total of 170,000 tons. Consumption of lubricants is
computed to be 5 percent of this total, about 8,000 tons. It is
Impossible to make a realistic estimate of the probable yield of grain
In the new lands in 1956. It seems best, therefore, to take the
long-term probable average yield of 6 centners per hectare for pur-
poses of calculation and, as before, to apply it to both grain and
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nongrain acreage. With 30.1 million hectares under cultivation, pro-
curable farm products (two-thirds of the total) would be about 12
million tons. Based on an average length of haul of 63.7 km, total
truck haulage would be 764.4 million tkm. Gasoline consumption at
0.2164 kg per ton-kilometer would therefore be about 165,000 tons.
Adding 2 percent for repair operations and 5 percent for losses gives
a total for trucks of about 177,000 tons of gasoline. Consumption
of lubricants is estimated at 5 percent of this total, about 9,000
tons.
Consumption of petroleum products in the new lands in 1954-56
is compared with total Soviet production of diesel fuel) motor gasoline,
and lubricants in the same years in Table 12.* It will be noted that
the new lands represent a significant, though not serious, drain on
the petroleum resources of the USSR, particularly of motor gasoline.
Adjustments doubtless have been made in other parts of the economy
in order that the new lands can be supplied with adequate quantities
of petroleum products to cover field and other normal agricultural
work. The estimated requirements for the transport of grain and
other farm products in 1956 will tend to decrease, on the average,
as the completion of the railroad systems reduces the ton-kilometers
of haulage.
XIII Manpower Requirements.
A. General.
In planning the new lands program, Soviet officials were as
aware of the need for providing adequate manpower as they were of the
need for providing machinery and petroleum products.
Several methods were used to get young, trained, and Party-
indoctrinated persons into the new program. All levels of the govern-
ment and the Communist Party were directed to send administrators,
specialists, and experienced workers to the state farms, MTS's, and
collective farms. The all-union and local Komsomol organizations, for
example, were to send 100,000 young Communists to the new lands. Cash
bonus payments, housing loans, and free transportation were among the
inducements offered to acceptable volunteers. 282/
* Table 12 follows on p. 103.
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Table 12
Consumption of Petroleum Products in the New lands Compared with Production of Petroleum Products in the USSR
1954-56
Thousand Metric Tons
Uses
1954
1955
1956
Diesel
Fuel
Motor
Gasoline
Diesel
Lubricants
Avtol
Lubricants
Diesel
Fuel
Motor
Gasoline
Diesel
Lubricants
Avtol
Lubricants
Diesel
Fuel
Motor
Gasoline
Diesel
Lubricants
Avtol
Lubricants
New lands consumption
Tractors: plowing,
harrowing, sowing,
and harvesting
394
4
30
632
6
.47
622
6
47
Combines
31
2
134
7
195
10
Total field work
2211
35
3o
2
?
632
140
47
7
622
202
47
10
--
Other agricultural
work (miscel-
laneous machinery)
13
1
57
3
84
4
Trucks, intrafarm
hauling
107
5
172
9
170
8
Trucks, extrafarm
hauling
N.A.
N.A.
87
4
177
9
Total
394
N.A.
30
N.A.632
456'
47
23
622
633
47
31
Soviet production
9,990
8,090
3,I20
13,080
9,550
3,700
14,840
11,210
4,200
_
Percent consumed
in the new lands 3.9 N.A. N.A. 4.8 4.8 1.9 4.2 5.6 1.9
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B. Requirements.
The USSR has made no announcements about the number of workers
required to reach and maintain the 1956 goal of 30 million hectares
under cultivation.
1. Agricultural Labor.
On the basis of available published material and the number
of worker B ordinarily employed on collective farms, state farms, and
MTS's, the new lands agricultural labor force required by the end of
1956 is estimated to be 1.33 million.* 284/ This figure includes col-
lective farm members, hired laborers on state farms and MES's, adminis-
trative personnel, and technicians of all kinds whose work is directly
related to agriculture.
If the number of all such workers per unit of land prevail-
ing in the established agricultural areas of the USSR** were to apply
in the new lands, the number would be 7 times'larger than the estimate
of 1.33 million. A much smaller labor force is required, however, be-
cause the major emphasis in the initial phase of the new lands program
is on grain farming, which will be carried out on a large scale with
mechanized equipment. As the livestock program is expanded in the new
lands, manpower requirements may rise somewhat.
It is estimated that Kazakh SSR (largely the Southern Zone)
will require 680,000 workers, 51 percent of the total, and the RSFSR
(largely the Northern and Western Zones) will require 650,000 workers,
49 percent of the total. 285/ This distribution may be contrasted with
the distribution of total plowed lands at the end of the 1955 harvest.
Of the 30 million hectares plowed by that date, 59 percent were in Kazakh
SSR and 41 percent in the RSFSR. It follows that the number of workers
per hectare will be lower in the Southern Zone. This lower ratio is
reasonable because fields in the Southern Zone are, to a greater extent,
of the large and level type which permits the efficient use of large-
scale machinery. In addition, about two-thirds of the new lands in the
Southern Zone are worked by state farms, which usually have the highest
priority in obtaining machinery, spare parts, and other materials con-
ducive to labor-saving operations. State farms play a larger role in
the Southern Zone than in the Northern and Western Zones.
* The British have put the lower limit for the number of agricultural
workers required and have made an estimate of 1 million. 283/
** The number is based on the following estimates for 1953: an agri-
cultural labor force of 53 million and a sown acreage of 157 million
hectares, an average of 3 hectares per worker.
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In the discussion of physical factors affecting production,*
it was stated that most existing state and collective farms are clustered
in the northern part of the Southern Zone. It may be assumed, therefore,
that most of the collective farm expansion in that zone will be in the
north. Most of the state farms will be established or enlarged in the
sparsely settled south, where the land is level to undulating -- conditions
that are especially favorable for the development of grain farms.
The predominance of collective farm expansion in the Northern
and Western Zones was a logical development; in the past, collective farms
have been the major bases of settlement in this area. Much of the land
that is being reclaimed in this area has been farmed, was abandoned, and
now is again being brought under cultivation.
2. Other Labor.
Only scattered data have appeared relating to total manpower
requirements in the development of the new lands. It is estimated, how-
ever, that 400,000 nonagricultural Workers** will be required to construct
the facilities and man the services that are to be associated with the
cultivation of 30 million hectares of virgin and long-fallow land. 286/
The addition of nonagricultural workers to the 1.33 million agricultural
workers and specialists gives an estimated total manpower requirement
of 1.73 million workers.
C. Population Increase.
It is assumed that the average family in the new lands of the
USSR during the initial stages of development will be somewhat similar
in composition to that found in East Siberia and the Far East when those
regions were undergoing a less spectacular expansion. In 1938, collective
farm households in those areas averaged 4 persons and 2.5 workers -- that
Is, 1 worker represented 1.6 settlers. 287/ This ratio would indicate
an increase in the population of the new lands of about 2.8 million people,
slightly more than 1 percent of the total population of the USSR.
D. Impact of the Manpower Requirements of the New Lands.
It is estimated that the total sown acreage in the USSR by the end
of 1956 will be approximately 196 million hectares. 288/ The 30 million
hectares of new lands will represent about 15 percent of this total, an
important addition to the sown acreage.
* See II, p. 21, above.
** This figure includes all trade and professional personnel and all
employed persons whose work is not in agriculture.
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Because farming in the new lands is labor extensive, the manpower
required is not in proportion to the increase in crop land. Whereas acre-
age in the new lands will represent 15 percent of the total Soviet crop
acreage, additional manpower requirements will represent only 3 percent
of the total agricultural labor force of 56 million workers. 289/ The
population and manpower requirements of the new lands, therefore, are
relatively small when compared with the total population and with the
total manpower requirements in the agriculture of the USSR as a whole.
The manpower requirements of the new lands, however, will have
an impact on industry. It is estimated that from 1953 to the end of
1956 the agricultural labor force will increase by about 3.5 million.
About one-third of this increase will be allocated to the new lands,
and the remainder will be allocated to the corn program, to animal hus-
bandry, and to other enterprises in the established areas of production.
The manpower requirements of the new lands are being met, in .
part, by transferring workers and peasant families from existing col-
lective farms to farms in the new areas. Some young people reaching
working age are remaining in agriculture rather than going into indus-
try or other urban activities. Many graduates of technical schools are
being assigned to work in MTS's and on state farms, and many members of
the Komsomol organizations are required to volunteer for work in agricul-
ture requiring less specialized skills. Skilled workers and specialists
,are being recruited in industry, in state farms and MTS's, and from among
former members of the armed forces. 290/
Before the beginning of the new lands program, industry had the
highest priority in obtaining manpower. For the period that is required
to meet agriculture's increased manpower requirements, not only are indus-
try's recruitment opportunities restricted but also industry has had to
contribute some of its skilled workers to agriculture.
It is possible that the reduction in the armed forces that was
announced in May 1956 may have been made to alleviate the tighter manpower
situation that has resulted from the new agricultural programs.
If there are no major changes in the new lands acreage goals, the
program will not be a continuing drain on the national manpower supply.
Once the manpower requirements have been met and the shifting of some con-
struction workers and other workers to agriculture as their primary tasks
has been completed, normal migration and the maturing of young people
should maintain a constant flow of labor to agriculture and to the other
occupations in the new areas of crop and livestock production.
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XIV. Construction.
A. General.
Expenditures for construction constitute a large part of the
investment in the Soviet neW lands program. Housing and other facili-
ties for workers and their families, transportation facilities, storage
facilities, and miscellaneous installations were built in 1954 and 1955.
Although the construction effort in the new lands has been reduced in
1956, it continues to be important.
Announced or estimated requirements include housing for about
2.8 million persons; communal facilities; almost 2/300 km of rail line
(to be completed by August 1957); more than 6,000 km of roads and high-
ways* 291/; granary capacity of almost 20 million tons; grain elevators
with a capacity of more than 773,000 tons 292/; and nonresidential farm
buildings for 425 new state farms, for new and expanded MTS's, and for
expanded collective farms.
When they are completed, the state farms and MTS's each will
have a repair shop, equipment sheds and garages, storage for petroleum
products, power-generating facilities, an administration building, and
streets and roads. 292/ The state farms will also have livestock build-
ings and local grain storage.
In addition to housing, installations being built at the new
settlements include stores) dining halls) bathhouses, bakeries) schools,
medical facilities, clubhouses, libraries, and wells. The total number
and breakdown of these facilities are not known, but in Kazakh SSR more
than 1,000 stores, dining halls, bathhouses, and bakeries were to have
been completed in 1955. 2212/
Telephone and telegraph lines and radio units have been built. 295/
Plants for making precast concrete, quarries) brick plants, carpentry shops)
and the like are being built in support of the construction program. 296/
Truck repair shops are planned, 2 and a number of new local industry
enterprises are being built. 2 8
* Although rail and highway construction will continue in 1957, most
of this construction will be completed by the end of 1956.
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B. Cost of Construction and the Effect on the Soviet Construction
Industry.
It is estimated that the total cost of state construction required
for the Soviet new lands program in 1954-56 is about 13 billion rubles. 299/
In addition, the cost of collective farm construction has been estimated
at 5 billion to 15 billion rubles, and the cost of private housing construc-
tion at about 5 billion rubles. 222/ The scarcity of information makes some
of these estimates) especially the estimate of the cost of collective farm
construction) quite tenuous. Nevertheless) the sum of 13 billion rubles
probably covers the cost of most of the basic state-constructed facilities
built from 1954 through 1956. Additional construction will undoubtedly
continue beyond 1956 but at a greatly reduced rate.
Although construction expenditures have been heavy in the new lands,
the expenditures do not appear to have had much impact on construction in
other sectors of the Soviet economy. Two measures of the effect of the new
lands program on the Soviet construction industry may be revealing. One
measure is the share of total state construction resources required for
the new lands. Another is the priority rating of construction in the new
lands as it affects construction in other sectors of the economy.
The cost of planned state construction in the new lands in 1955
has been estimated at slightly more than 7 billion rubles, which is approxi-
mately 7 percent of the estimated total cost of new construction in the USSR
for which state funds were allocated in 1955. 301/ The percentage of total
state construction expenditures spent in the new lands in 1955 was consider-
ably more than in 1954, but it will be reduced in 1956. The estimated share
of some of the building materials required for construction in the new lands
varies from slightly less than 7 percent of total asbestos cement shingles
to less than 4 percent of total cement and slightly more than 1 percent of
total soft roofing. 302/ Because of the extensive use of local materials
(clay, stone, mud, reeds, and the like) in the new lands, a close value
relationship between these shares and the percentage of new state construc-
tion should not be expected.
Press and radio reports indicate that construction priorities for
the new lands have been high but not overriding. Considerable effort has
been made to meet the new lands construction goals, but there is little
evidence that other projects have been seriously hindered as a result.
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Several circumstances contributed to the accomplishment of new
lands construction without major effects on the rest of the Soviet
economy. Resources set aside for previous Soviet agricultural schemes
probably were allocated to the new program. Three of the "Great Pro-
jects,"* intended primarily for the benefit of agriculture, were almost
certainly suspended in the first half of 1953. The heaviest demands
for construction resources would have arisen in 1954-56, if these proj-
ects had been continued. In addition) the 10.5-billion-ruble program
for the construction in 1954-56 304/ of MTS's) which was outlined in
1953, may have been drawn upon for the new lands. If this was done)
however, it restricted the development of MTS's in other areas. The
new lands apparently received a considerable share of the resources
released by the completion of a large number of construction projects
in heavy industry in the later stages of the Fifth Five Year Plan
(1951-55). A Soviet statement in June 1955 indicates that tens of
thousands of qualified personnel, engineers, and technicians -- veterans
of the greatest construction projects in the USSR -- have come to Kazakh
SSR to participate in the construction of state farms. 305/ Still an-
other reason for the small impact of the new lands construction program
has been the extensive use of local building materials.
C. Progress to Date.
Construction plans for the new lands were underfulfilled in 1954
and 1955, but the underfulfillment had little noticeable effect on the
Implementation of the agricultural program.** The major share of the
basic construction required for the new lands program probably was com-
pleted by the end of 1955. It is evident that efforts have been concen-
trated on providing the means of production needed for agriculture. Con-
struction of nonresidential buildings at MTS's and state farms is ap-
parently more advanced than construction of housing. The construction
of rail lines is well advanced. The building of storage facilities,
however, may have been allowed to fall behind the ambitious schedule in
1955. The over-all plan for construction in the new lands in 1954 was
evidently underfulfilled by a wide margin, but the 1955 plan probably
was more nearly met, mainly as a result of strenuous efforts in the
second half of the year. 307/
* These three "Great Projects" were the Main Turkmen, South Ukrainian
North Crimean, and Volga-Ural Canals, the construction of which has not
been reported in the press since Stalin's death. 103/
** The shortage of storage facilities and elevators caused some losses
after the harvest of 1954. 22?_/ The poor harvest in 1955 lessened the need
for storage facilities in that year. There have been accounts in the Soviet
press of local shortages of transportation facilities, with resulting con-
gestion.
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Results of the construction plan in the new lands in 1954 were
not fully reported, but it is evident that the goals were far from met.
In 1954 the Ministry of State Farms in Kazakh SSR fulfilled its construc-
tion plan by 80.9 percent; the Ministry of Agriculture, by 67.5 percent;
and the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction, by only 52.3 per-
cent. 308/ It is likely that the construction plan was also underful-
filled in the new lands of the RSFSR.
The construction plan in the new lands in 1955 was almost
certainly underfulfilled, but probably by a smaller margin than in
1954. 309/ Railroad construction was approximately on schedule in
1955, 310/ but there were serious lags in the new lands building pro-
gram in the earlier part of 1955. Half-year plan fulfillment for the
Kazakh SSR Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction was 78 percent 311/
and for the RSFSR Ministry was 79 percent. 212/ The July construction
plan in the new lands of Kazakh SSR was overfulfilled) but it was rec-
ognized that strong measures were needed to overcome the lag in the
first half of the year. 313/ As of 1 August 1955, construction in Kazakh
SSR was still behind schedule) and it was stated that deliveries of build-
ing materials were lagging and that many projects et state farms were
halted. 314/ In a review of progress as of September 1955) it was re-
vealed that construction in the new lands of Kazakh SSR) particularly
of housing, was still lagging badly and that almost no work had been
done at 46 of the 260 state farms where construction was under way. 315/
In an October 1955 issue of Pravda urgent efforts. were demanded
of the USSR Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction, the USSR Ministries
of State Farms and of Agriculture, and the RSFSR and Kazakh SSR Ministries
of State Farms and of Agriculture. These ministries were called on to
analyze the state of construction affairs at every state farm and every
MTS and to take immediate measures to fulfill the established plans. .11/
The measures undertaken to implement the construction program in
the new lands in the middle and later months of 1955 included putting
work on a 24-hour basis) releasing farm workers to construction jobs,
and asking all-union ministries for assistance in the form of supplies of
building materials, equipment, and technical aid. 317/ The USSR Ministry
of Urban and Rural Construction fulfilled its 1955 plan by 85 percent.* 318/
This ministry had the major responsibility for the construction of state
farms and MTS's in the new lands in 1955. 319/
* The plan report of the USSR Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction in-
cludes the reports of the Kazakh SSR and RSFSR Ministries of Urban and Rural
Construction.
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Extraordinary measures for the attainment of necessary construc-
tion goals are apparently to continue in 1956. Projects of the Ministry
of Urban and Rural Construction in the Far East, Siberia, the Urals, and
Kazakh SSR (that is, primarily in the new lands) are included in a broad
grouping of heavy industrial and defense projects at which construction
wages will be 14 percent higher than at other projects. 22/ At the con-
ference on the new lands in January 1956, agricultural workers were asked
to lend their hands to the construction of housing and communal facili-
ties which Ithrushchev described as a task that "must be solved." 321/
D. Conclusions.
Although there have been lags in accomplishment all along the
line, often resulting in underfulfillment of plans, it is probable that
the underfulfillment of construction plans has not seriously hindered
the new lands program. The cost of construction in connection with the
new lands program has been well considered by Soviet planners, and re-
sources for the completion of all projects probably will be forthcoming
without undue strain on the rest of the economy.
XV. Transportation.
A. General.
At the beginning of the Soviet new lands program in 1954, the
area selected for agricultural expansion was served by railroads which
had been built primarily to meet the over-all industrial needs of the
USSR * The two principal east-west lines were the Trans-Siberian Rail-
road in the Northern Zone and the South Siberian Railroad in the Southern
Zone. Connecting these two lines from north to south were the Chelyabinsk-
Kartaly line in the west, the Petropavlovsk-Akmolinsk (Trans-Kazakh Rail-
road) and the Tatarsk-Semipalatinsk lines in the center, and the Novosi-
birsk-Barnaul (TUrkmen-Siberian Railroad) line in the east. The Western
Zone was also served by two rail lines with outlets to the west-- the
Orsk-Buzuluk line in the north and the Kandagach-Ural'sk line in the south.
The Trans-Siberian and South Siberian Railroads linked the Northern ana
Southern Zones with the European USSR, and the Trans-Kazakh and Turkmen-
Siberian Railroads connected the Northern and Southern Zones with Central
Asia.
* See Figure 14, following p. 112.
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Compared with other grain areas, the Southern Zone had relatively
few railroads, and most motor roads were unsuited to year-round use. 322/
The many unpaved roads caused particular difficulty during the spring
thaw, when water destroyed the repairs of the previous year and deep mud
hampered transportation. Under such conditions, transport problems in the
Southern Zone were inevitable until the transportation system was ex-
panded and improved.*
Since 1954, considerable new construction of railroads and motor
roads has been undertaken in the new lands. The principal purpose of
this new construction is to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding agri-
culture. The bulk of the freight on most of these railroads and motor
roads will be grain, but inbound machinery, construction materials, fuel,
fertilizer, and consumer goods will also be important. Industrial needs
have been taken into account, but they appear to have been considered
secondary. The most important of the new rail lines) however, the
Kustanay-Kaymanachikha line, although associated with the new lands
program, probably could be justified by industrial and strategic re-
quirements as well.
B. Transportation During the First Two Years of the Program.
The new lands program has put great strains on the transportation
system of the area. Particularly in 1954 a huge volume of inbound con-
struction materials, fuel, and machines congested the rail system) and
outbound traffic was snarled in September and October by the increased
load of grain following the grain harvest. 323/ Although it operated
under serious stress) the transportation system does not appear to have
presented an insurmountable obstacle to agricultural development in the
new lands. Shipping the grain harvest, however, was attended by losses
of grain stored in the open air while awaiting transport. 324/ It is
probable that in 1955 only a poor harvest prevented a crisis in the
shipment of grain.
Although traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railroad increased sharply,
there appears to have been little difficulty in meeting the transporta-
tion requirements of the new lands program in the Northern Zone. It was
* It also must be remembered that a steady increase in industrial traffic
on the main rail lines has taken place in recent years and will undoubtedly
continue in response to the planned expansion of industry during the Sixth
Five Year Plan.
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Figure 14
OmM rynye4las
Seekhoz
inmni
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ChNome
_ YA--CS151,,AST*
OKCHETAv
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KRA st
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I.R. S.
MENOGORSM C
4," Na.$ iL, ?
_
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?041-004S? ?rvasocp, .0...1
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,
k.. - ?GOMM 011.14ST 1
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? 4-4 I (LC IttakKgrn" .../
.....
? '\ ' e-... RESERVOIR (**. ,'
CI-1114A
25609 9-56
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46p
gewridawes aw net meowed, thew \
teeerterl by the US. Ornament
USSR: New Lands
Transportation System
Ge e al limits of the main New Lands area
RAILROADS
Completed pilot to 1954
Completed during 1954.1956
Planned for completion by 1960
The exact alignments of cenaln railroads are unknown. Points-seek% are lawn to Ire
eking then railroad linn hays bele used where possible to ald M optmoilMitM1 the
octal' alignments.
ROADS
Main motor road
Improved dirt road
I p wed dirt road under construction
Other route (possibly improved)
In mini cases roads shown submerged by ein? 'cumin presumably hm Wn re.
kcaled. but specific informatma is lacking on this Point
Reservoir
,
Head of navigation
Dam
POPULATED PLACES
? over 500,000
? 100.000500000
? 50,000400.000
? 25.000.50,000
? 10,000.25000
o e under 10,000 (selected)
50X1
*Supplemented by additional settlements which figure In the New Lands
program, or which are related to transportation routes.
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not to be expected that the existing transportation system would be
seriously disturbed by the relatively small increase in grain produc-
tion over production on farms already established in the zone. In
the Southern Zone, however, where the absolute and relative increase
In grain production was larger and the rail and road system less well
developed, the demands of the program have been more than the rail and
road system could accommodate without delay and inconvenience.
The greatest concentration of new state grain farms is in
Kustanayskaya, Kokchetavskaya, and Akmolinskaya Oblasts, and especially
in the area bounded by the cities of Kustanay, Kokchetav, Yesil', and
Atbasar. These farms have had to rely heavily on the South Siberian
Railroad, even though it has been overloaded and is not easily accessible
from many farms. Rail facilities at Akmolinsk, Atbasar, and Yesil' ap-
pear to have been unable to cope satisfactorily with the additional
burden of new lands traffic during 1954 and at least the early months
of 1955. 325/
During 1955, several new rail lines were opened for temporary
service, including the Kustanay-Uritskoye and Kokchetav-Volodarskoye
sections of the Kustanay-Kaymanachikha line. 326/ These lines un-
doubtedly facilitated the shipment of the 1955 wheat harvest and of
other freight. Most of the proposed narrow-gauge lines probably will
be in at least temporary operation for the 1956 harvest season. The
completion in November 1955 of a second track on the South Siberian
Railroad 327/ must have relieved greatly the heavy burden of traffic
on this line and will certainly contribute to the effective shipment
of grain during the 1956 harvest season.
C. Plans and Perspectives.
1. Railroads.
By August 1957 the USSR expects to have completed a total
of 1,577 km of standard-gauge and 746 km of narrow-gauge railroads in
the new lands.* 329/ If this goal is achieved, as appears likely, the
* These figures represent a considerable shift from original plans,
which emphasized narrow-gauge railroads. This shift was undoubtedly
encouraged by the lull provided by the poor harvest of 1955. In ad-
dition, some lines that have been completed as narrow-gauge are to be
converted to standard gauge by 1957. 22f)/ Narrow-gauge lines probably
were emphasized originally because they can be constructed more rapidly
than broad-gauge lines.
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1957 harvest season should be attended by no significant transport diffi-
culties, even with a good crop. In addition, improvement of storage
facilities for grain will have reduced the seasonality of grain shipments.
Finally) the heavy imports of construction materials and machinery re-
quired in the first 2 years of the new lands program can be expected to
decline during the next 2 years. Even by 1957) however) there probably
will be many rough spots left in the transportation system of the new
lands; and loading, storage, repair, and other railroad yard facilities
still will require Improvement.
The Sixth Five Year Plan provides that an important new rail
line from Omsk to Barnaul will be built by 1960 and will incorporate the
Karasuk - Kamen'-na-Obi line now under construction. 330/ Although de-
signed to carry coal from the Kuznetsk coal basin, this line will also
serve important grain areas in the new lands. 331/ It is likely that the
Kustanay-Kaymanachikha line will ultimately join the Osmk-Barnaul line at
Karasuk) but no plans to this effect have been published.
In view of the fact that grain grown in the new lands is
intended to replace in some degree the wheat previously grown in the
areas of the western USSR which are now being seeded to corn) it is
probable that the bulk of production of grain in the new lands will be
shipped westward. Large quantities of grain, however, will still be
shipped to the cotton areas of Central Asia by the Turkmen-Siberian
Railroad and to the grain-deficit areas of the north and northeast.
2. Motor Roads.
The USSR plans to build 6)100 km of new motor roads in the
new lands. 332/ About one-half of this mileage will be in the Northern
Zone and one-half in the Southern and Western Zones. 333/ These roads)
for the most part) will feed the railroad system with grain from state
farms and collective farms in the new lands. Government-operated trucks
are to pick up grain from the farms and deliver it to procurement points
and railheads. 2111/ A large number of new trucks will be required for
this purpose, as well as for the internal requirements of the huge new
grain farms. Truck deliveries during the first 2 years, however; do not
appear to have been adequate to meet present needs.
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The construction of major through highways has been given a
relatively small place in transportation plans, probably because truck
transport is more expensive than rail transport.* New service stations,
repair shops, petroleum supply centers, and freight shipping centers
are to be built in conjunction with the road building program. Judging
from Soviet experience in the past) this part of the program may prove
to be slow in meeting the needs of the transportation system.
3. Navigable Rivers.
Navigable rivers carry a very small proportion of total
freight in the new lands. Soviet plans to increase traffic on the
Oh') Irtysh, and Kama Rivers, however) may permit these rivers to make
a significant contribution to the shipment of grain during the harvest
season. 336/ Part of the grain shipped on these rivers will go directly
to consumption centers in the European USSR, via the Ob' River) the
Arctic Ocean, and such ports as Murmansk) Archangel) and Riga in the
northwest, and via the Kama and the Volga Rivers to the central industrial
areas in the west. A larger part of river traffic in grain, however,
probably will be transloaded to the main rail lines within or near the
new lands.
The short interval between the harvest season and the end
of the navigation season complicates the use of navigable rivers for
the shipment of grain) but this difficulty is to be reduced by storing
grain in idle boats after the navigation season has ended and shipping
it out in the spring. 337/
D. Conclusions.
The present program for the construction of new transportation
in the new lands of the USSR appears to be adequate to meet the eventual
needs of the new lands program. Although some confusion and delays may
be experienced during the 1956 harvest season, it is probable that after
that time the transportation system will be adequate for transport needs.
* Shipping by truck is estimated by Soviet planners to be five times
as expensive as shipping by narrow-gauge railroad. 312/
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XVI. Effect of the New Lands Program on the Soviet State Budget.
A. Difficulties in the Interpretation of Changes
in Budget Allocations.
By the use of budget data only, it is impossible to develop a
fully adequate analysis of the cost or the effects on the economy of a
particular program such as the new lands program in the USSR. This
would be true even if many detailed budget data were available. Be-
cause the relevant budget data are limited, it is possible to develop
only a fragmentary analysis of the cost and effects of the new lands
program. (Some of the particular problems involved in the interpreta-
tion of budget data are discussed briefly in Appendix D.*) Because a
large part of the expenditures on the new lands is reflected in the
state budget) however, it is likely that an examination of changes in
the budget can yield some information about the over-all impact of the
new lands program on the Soviet economy.
B. Budget Allocations to the New Lands.
Eleven billion rubles was stated by Zverev as the amount provided
by the 1955 state budget of the USSR for the new lands program. MTS allo-
cations were 5 billion rubles, and state farm allocations were 6 billion
rubles. 338/ Similar comprehensive totals for the new lands budget ex-
penditures for 1954 and 1956 are not available. Eleven billion rubles
cannot be taken as including total resources allocated to the new lands,
or even as total budget expenditures in the area) in 1955. Excluded are
such budget items as some construction expenditures in the new lands)
such nonbudget items as expenditures out of their own funds by khozraschet
organizations, and probably all the expenditures of collective farms.
The new lands program has not been accompanied by a reduction in
the planned state budget allocations to other agricultural areas or by
reductions in other major budget items. Planned state budget expendi-
tures of the USSR in 1951-56 are shown in Table 13.**
* P. 153, below.
** Table 13 follows on p. 117.
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Table 13
Planned State Budget Expenditures
of the USSR
1951-56
Billion Current Rubles
1955
Sector of the Economy
1951
1952
1953
1954
Original
Adjusted 12/
1956
Financing the national economy
178.5
180.4
192.5
216.4
222.4
217.4
237.3
Agriculture
39.0
34.7
(40.4)
2/
(51.5)
2/
55.1
48.1
48.6
Industry
79.9
80.6
82.6
92.3
111.8
99.0
110.0
Transport and communications
11.9
14.3
17.4
21.5
23.0
19.8
21.8
Social-cultural measures
120.8
124.8
129.8
141.4
146.9
N.A.
161.5
Defense
96.4
113.8
110.2
100.3
112.1
N.A.
102.5
Total real expenditures 1/
451.5
476.9
487.3
523.8
541.o
533.0
569.6
b. On 1 July 1955, prices of producer goods were reduced. The "adjusted" figures for 1955 re-
flect the effects of the price cut.
c. The figure is estimated.
d. These figures exclude "fictitious" entries which appeared in the budget in 1953-55 and re-
ferred to changes in retail prices and agricultural prices. Because they did not represent ex-
penditures for resources, they have been omitted from total expenditures in this table.
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Table 13 shows an increase in budget allocations to agriculture
from 1953 to 1954, the first year of the new lands program) of about 27
percent. The increase from 1953 to 1955 is about 36 percent. If a deduc-
tion of 11 billion rubles is made for the 1955 new lands allocation) how-
ever) the 1955 allocation to the rest of agriculture is still greater than
the 1953 allocation to agriculture by 9 percent (an increase from 4o.4
billion to 44.1 billion rubles). In comparable prices, the planned budget
allocation in 1956 is slightly larger than in 1955 (when new lands expend-
itures are included in both years).
Budget allocations to agriculture, as a portion of total alloca-
tions to the national economy) were 22 percent in 1951) 19 percent in 1952)
21 percent in 1953) 24 percent in 1954/ and 25 percent in 1955. In 1956/
allocations to agriculture will be about 21 percent of total allocations
to the national economy. Agricultural expenditures) exclusive of MTS's and
expenditures on state farms, have been reduced in 1956. Because the ex-
penses of the mass resettlement of agricultural workers and of the clearing
and development of land are believed to be included in this part of the
agricultural budget) 1Li2V the reduction may well be explained chiefly by
the fact that the major tasks of the resettlement of agricultural workers
and of the organization of farms have been substantially completed. The
1955 price changes, as shown in Table 13)* would explain part but not all
of the reduction.
Most of the 1951-55 increase in the Soviet budget allocations to
agriculture has gone to the MTS' s. The share of the MTS's in the agri-
cultural allocation increased from 49 percent in 1951 to 59 percent in
1955. In 1956) MTS allocations are planned to be 67 percent of total
allocations to agriculture. Planned Soviet budget allocations to agri-
culture in 1951-56 are shown in Table 14.**
In 1955 the budget allocation to the new lands of 5 billion rubles
for MTS expenditures was only about 15 percent of total agricultural allo-
cations for MTS's? while nearly two-thirds, 6 billion rubles) of the allo-
cation to the Ministry of State Farms went to the new lands. Because the
collective farms and MTS's have developed about 55 percent of the new lands,
these relationships may seem surprising. Because the new lands state farms,
however) had no accumulated funds, had large expenditures for plowing land
* P. 117) above.
** Table 14 follows on p. 119.
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Table 14
Planned Soviet Budget Allocations to Agriculture
1951-56
Billion Current Rubles
Sector
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Machine tractor stations
Ministry of State Farms
Other agricultural ex-
penditures
Total
(19.0) hi
39.0
17.0
34.7
(20.0) hi
(4o.4)
30.8
(51.5)
32.6
9.7
12.8
55.1
32.7
8.o
7.9
48.6
b. This figure is estimated.
from which no crop was gathered in 1955, and had all the initial expenses
Involved in setting up. entirely new farms, it is not surprising that they
received a large share of the allocation to state farms. A large part of
the expansion of MTS's in the new lands, on the other hand, consisted of
additions to, and more intensive use of, existing facilities. A final
reason for the high proportion of Ministry of State Farms funds going to
the new lands is the fact that state farms are heavily concentrated in
the new lands. In 1955, approximately 30 percent of the total sown area
of all state farms was in the new lands. Only 8 percent of the total sown
area of collective farms (serviced by MTS's) was in the new lands.
C. State Agricultural Investment.
In the 4-year period of 1950 through 1953, state agricultural
investment tended to average about 10 percent of total state investment
in the national economy. 21151 Agriculture's share declined in 1953 to
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slightly more than 8 percent, but it rose to about 12 percent in 1954
and in 1955 (from 12 billion rubles in 1953 to 20.6 billion rubles in
1955). Investment planned for 1956 is 21.3 billion rubles) 13 percent
of total state investment in the national economy. Soviet investment
in the national economy in 1953-56 is shown in Table 15.
Table 15
Soviet Investment in the National Economy 2/
1953-56
Total investment (billion
1953
Actual
1954
Actual
1955
Actual
1956
Plan
current rubles)
(145.0) h/
(157.0)
(166.0)
160.8
Investment in agriculture
(billion current rubles)
12.0
(19.0)
(20.6)
21.3
Agricultural investment as
a percent of total
8.3
(12.1)
(12.4)
13.2
The 1956 figures are in invest-
ment planning prices of the Sixth Five Year Plan, which are 16
percent below those of the Fifth Five Year Plan, in which the
figures for 1953-55 are expressed.
b. Figures in parentheses are estimates.
With the available information, total expenditures for the new
lands program cannot be broken down successfully into the shares which
go to investment and to current operations. It is possible, however, to
obtain an idea of the possible magnitude of state agricultural invest-
ment in the new lands. For the USSR as a whole in 1955, state agricul-
tural investment of approximately 21 billion rubles was only 38 percent
of the total planned budget allocation to agriculture of 55.1 billion
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rubles. Even if the 1955 budget allocation of 11 billion rubles to the
new lands were as much as three-fourths of investment, the resulting 8.3
billion rubles of new lands investment would be only 5 percent of total
state investment and only about 40 percent of state investment in agri-
culture. Deduction of 8 billion rubles for new lands investment in 1955
leaves 13 billion rubles for state agricultural investment outside the
new lands, virtually the same amount as that invested in state agricul-
ture in 1953.
D. Conclusions.
Although the new lands program is gigantic in territorial ex-
tent and large amounts of resources are involved, it does not appear
to have been accompanied by a reduction in budget allocations to the
nonagricultural sectors of the Soviet economy or to the rest of agri-
culture. When viewed in relation to total allocations to the national
economy and in relation to total state investment, new lands expendi-
tures are relatively small. A large part of the new lands expenditures
will yield returns over many years, unless the program is abandoned.
After the major impact of 1955, budget expenditures in the new lands
probably will decrease rapidly, although mechanization continues at a
rapid pace in 1956.
XVII. Appraisal of the Program.
An adequate appraisal of the Soviet new lands program requires con-
sideration of several separate aspects of its development and implementa-
tion. On the one hand, as an example of the workings of the Soviet system
in a major economic undertaking, the new lands program suggests some
generalizations as to important strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet
socioeconomic system. On the other hand, an examination of the program
as an economic undertaking raises the following questions: Why was the
new lands program undertaken, why was it initiated and implemented with
such haste, and will it be a success or failure? This section will
discuss these aspects briefly.
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A. Evidence of Strengths and Weaknesses in the Soviet Socioeconomic
System.
The speed with which the USSR brought the new lands under culti-
vation is unparalleled in history. Never before has a country extended
its cultivated area so quickly. In slightly more than 2 years, 30 million
hectares of virgin and long-fallow land will have been plowed and sown.
Thirty million hectares (about 74 million acres) is an area about 25
percent larger than the acreage sown to wheat in the US in 1955. 2L1/ US
expansion into the western areas of the country in the nineteenth century
was not nearly so rapid. From 1889 to 1899, the decade of the most rapid
expansion of the US farm area) crop land harvested increased about 63.5
million acres. 348/
Several important conditions contributed to the speed of the
Soviet expansion, including the treeless character of much of the area,
the preexistence of isolated areas of cultivation, the preexistence of
some basic transportation facilities) and the availability of an appro-
priate technology. Basic to the accomplishment) however) was the ability
of a highly centralized and monolithic state to make quick decisions and
to marshal vast resources and the products of modern technology. Similar
speed would be impossible in a free, decentralized society in peacetime)
even with all the other conditions listed above. In a free society,
thousands of individuals must make separate decisions in order for such
large amounts of resources to be allocated, and the job could not be done
so swiftly.
The new lands program also exemplifies the flexibility of the
Soviet system. As late as October 1952, Malenkov had stated that "the
grain problem is solved finally and irrevocably." 349/ In February 1953
an authoritative discussion of agricultural policy emphasized increases
in yields as a primary means of increasing agricultural production. 222/
By September 1953; however, the new lands program was under considera-
tion, 351/ and by March 1954 a great expansion of cultivated area was
under way.
The flexibility of Soviet planning, like the ability to act
swiftly, arises from the extreme centralization of decision-making
and authority. On the one hand, it may be argued that frequent changes
in policy are a sign of irresolution or injudicious decisions. On the
other hand, however, the ability to shift the direction of major pro-
grams rapidly is a source of strength.
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The new lands program also provides an example of the ability
of the USSR to conceive and carry out with considerable speed a very
large program without major dislocations in the economy. Even in 1955,
the year of the greatest impact of the investment in the new lands)
the demands of the program appear to have been met without serious harm
to other important sectors of the economy. Although there have been
some shortages and bottlenecks in the new lands) they have not been
very significant. The largest part of the necessary investment has now
been made) and the drain on the economy will be less in the future.
The new lands program also exemplifies the potential weakness
of centralized decision-making. Although a society with highly central-
ized decision-making may act very quickly in initiating and carrying out
certain programs, it may act with insufficient information and, as a
result) make avoidable mistakes. This weakness arises because such a
society lacks the balance provided by judgments of many minds and may
lack the means of gathering objective evalhations from those in a posi-
tion to judge best. This weakness has not produced consequences in the
new lands which are as obvious or as dramatic as the positive accomplish-
ments) but in the long run the weakness may prove serious.
A major weakness of the new lands program is that it apparently
was initiated and crystallized in its major aspects without extensive
preliminary scientific planning. The new lands were not an unknown area)
and the USSR had accumulated a considerable amount of experience in farm-
ing in that area. There is much evidence) nevertheless) that the new
program was begun without an adequate analysis of the best procedures
to follow and of the results which could reasonably be expected.
In the early 1930's the attempts of the USSR to extend cultiva-
tion to the dry steppe area failed) and much of the acreage was abandoned.
During the next 20 years the possible expansion of cultivation was the
subject of some discussion in the Soviet press. There was no appreciable
increase, however, in published technical discussion before 1954, and many
Important issues remained unsettled. In fact) some of the most crucial
questions are still being debated. In the summer of 1954) expeditions
were sent to the new lands to make soil surveys. In January 1956 the
Minister of State Farms of Kazakh SSR stated that the question of crop
rotation had not yet been settled. Scientists and specialists have con-
tinued their debate on suitable rotation systems* and have not yet arrived
at a feasible long-run program. Even the total area to be plowed apparently
remains in doubt.
* See VII) p. 63, above.
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The statements of Soviet leaders on the expected results from
the new lands have been overoptimistic. The experience in the 1930's
could not have provided the basis for their predictions) and it seems
unlikely that they are based on sober) scientific analysis. The haste
of the program -- and the evidence discussed above concerning crucial)
unsettled issues -- lead to the conclusion that the USSR may have pro-.
ceeded on the basis of unrealistic expectations. It is possible, how-
ever, that the Soviet leaders do not take seriously their own state-
ments of what the new lands will produce.
B. Reasons for the Program.
By 1953 it was obvious that the USSR would have to obtain more
food to feed its expanding population. In addition, it became evident
that some efforts were to be made to improve the monotonous diet.
To obtain increased supplies of food) the Soviet leaders had
several courses which they might have chosen instead of the new lands
program. They might have imported more food) they might have concen-
trated on increasing yields (the alternative which was emphasized in
the period immediately preceding the new lands program), or they might
have expanded the area of cultivation by clearing forested areas.
In this report, it has not been possible to estimate the costs
of obtaining grain by these various methods. There are reasons to
believe, however, that the Soviet leaders were not motivated primarily
by economic considerations in their decision to develop the new lands
program in the way in which they did develop it.
Expansion into the new lands will yield certain "economic" re-
sults which would not have resulted from the other programs. Expansion
of the area of cultivation into new territory should reduce, as it did
in 1954 and 1955, the year-to-year variability in the over-all agricul-
tural production. In 1954 the yields in new lands were exceptionally
high while yields in the Ukraine were exceptionally low. In 1955 the
positions were reversed) and yields in the new lands were low and those
In the Ukraine were high.
With the increased expansion of industry into the new lands and
the other eastern areas) it is possible that costs of food transportation
will be reduced as a result of the new lands production. Regional self-
sufficiency is a recurring theme in Soviet economic discussion.
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The new lands program had another characteristic which apparently
weighed heavily in the decision to undertake this program rather than the
other possible programs. Excluding the expansion of food imports, none
of the other programs would have produced results so quickly; and none of
them, including expansion of imports) would have been so dramatic.
C. Reasons for the Rapid Initiation and Implementation
of the Program.
Speed was apparently of great importance in the Soviet decision
to expand into the new lands, as is suggested not only by the choice of
this program rather than other possible ones but also by the extreme
haste with which the decision was apparently reached and the program
implemented. Why the USSR rushed into the new lands so hastily is a
question not easily answered. Soviet leaders have not discussed this
question publicly. They have alleged) however, that their decision to
develop the new lands was based on economic criteria. Matskevich made
an obscure and unelaborated comparison indicating that the cost of grain
is less in the new lands than in other areas. 352/ 1Chrushchev said that
"... all these riches -- that is) the virgin soil -- have been unused
all the time ..." because "it was beyond our thought during the first
decades of Soviet rule when we still did not have sufficiently developed
agricultural machine building." 353/ Brezhnev recently said that the
availability of skilled manpower made the development of the new lands
practical now whereas it was not.practical in the past. 354/
It is doubtful, however, that the reasons for the rapid initiation
of the new lands program were economic. It is true that the development
of technology and increased supplies of machinery and manpower affect the
costs of production of grain and can make economically feasible the ex-
tension of cultivation on previously submarginal lands. It is possible
that such conditions) along with the conditions of demand for grain in
the USSR, did make an expansion of the cultivated area desirable. These
reasons are inadequate, however, as explanations of the sudden initiation
of the program and of the extremely rapid commitment of resources without
adequate scientific investigation. The development of technology) ma-
chinery, and manpower did not take place overnight, and it was not necessary
to organize and commit them overnight. The great haste might have been
understandable if there had been a sudden and unforeseen food crisis. In
spite of the poor 1953 harvest, however, there was no evidence of any such
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crisis in the USSR in 1954. In fact) the USSR continued to export grain
In 1954. Clearly) a critical need for grain cannot have been the main
reason for the rapid implementation of the program. In the turbulent
internal situation after the death of Stalin, it is possible that political
considerations weighed heavily in the decision. The program was dramatic
and) with a good probability of initial successes) was well designed to
gain popular attention and approval.
D. Chances for Success or Failure of the Program.
If Soviet statements on expected production from the new lands
are accepted as the standard of success, it can be stated with consider-
able confidence that the program will fail. The USSR probably will achieve)
on a long-run basis) approximately one-third of the production that offi-
cial statements have predicted. There are good reasons for believing,
however, that the program probably will not be abandoned) even though the
results fall far short of the stated expectations of the Soviet leaders.
First) the Soviet leaders may really expect to obtain much less than their
statements indicate. Second) because much of the investment is already
made, a production considerably less than the original expectations may
be sufficient to justify the current costs and maintenance of the program.
It is possible that official statements on expected production
are not an adequate standard for judging the possible success or failure
of the program. If, as was suggested above, political considerations
were important in the decision to undertake the program, then the polit-
ical effects are relevant to a judgment.
Of course, the Soviet leaders may not take seriously their own
statements about expected production. In any case) Soviet agricultural
goals are not achieved. They often are apparently based on somewhat
naive "planning" concepts or contain an exhortatory or propaganda ele-
ment which raises the goals above a reasonable level.
If an appropriate system of crop rotation is followed) the new
lands probably will add an average of 8 million to 12 million tons per
year (about 10 to 15 percent of the average production during 1950-53)
to the Soviet supply of grain.* This grain) in terms of direct costs --
* In any one particular year, the production in the new lands may be
significantly larger or smaller than the long-run average, depending on
the weather and other conditions affecting production during that crop year.
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such as manpower, fuel, machinery, and the like, which are directly
involved in production -- probably will be more expensive than grain
produced in the traditional grain-producing regions because yields per
hectare will be smaller in the new lands and because such direct oasts
are more closely related to the extent of the area farmed than they are
to the amount of grain produced.
If the Soviet authorities do not develop more suitable systems
of crop rotation for the new lands than they have thus far publicized,
they will not be able to maintain yields and will run great risks of
developing extreme dust conditions, which might even force abandonment
of large areas. Unless such extreme conditions develop) there is no
reason to expect large-scale abandonment of the new lands.
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APPENDIX A
ACREAGE DATA RELATING TO THE NEW LANDS PRCGRAM OF THE USSR
1954-56
This appendix consists of tables (Tables 16 through 25*) which
show the acreage goals for plowing and sowing of virgin and long-
fallow land in the new lands of the USSR. The data are categorized
by republic, as well as by type of farm unit, for the years 1954-56.
Data concerning the acreages of new land actually plowed and sown
are similarly presented.
Because of the limitations of the data, the figures in the tables
should be considered to be only indicative of the actual magnitudes
and should not be interpreted as absolute values.
Table 16
Original Plan for the Reclamation of New Lands in the USSR a/
1954-55
Thousand Hectares
Area Collective Farms State Farms Total
Kazakh SSR 4,100 LV
ESFSR 4,700 2/
Total USSR 8,700 DJ
2,195 2/ 6,300 si/
2,000 f/ 6,700 6/
4,300 1/ 13,000 1/
b. 355/
c. 22i
d. 22y
e. 35 /
* Tables 17 through 25 follow on pp. 130-136.
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Table 17
New Lands Plowed in the USSR 21
1954
Thousand Hectares
Area
Collective Farms
State Farms
Total
Kazakh SSR
5,729 12/
2,775
2/
8,500
4/
RSFSR
6,654 .2/
2,600
1/
9,346
5./
Total USSR
12,300 h/
5,500
1/
17,800
1/
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b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
1.
364/
)5/
366/
36
3 /
369/
Residual figure.
112/
j. The amount of new land plowed during 1954 has been
reported as totaling from 17.43 million hectares 371/
to 18.29 million hectares. 372/ In view of the substan-
tial agreement in republic estimates, the total amount
of new land plowed in 1954 has been estimated at 17.8
million hectares.
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Table 18
Planned Sowing of New Lands in the USSR 2/
1954
Thousand Hectares
Area
Collective Farms
State Farms
Total
Kazakh SSR
RSFSR
Total USSR
55?2J
1,250 2/
1,800 2/
1Q5/
395 1/
500 1/
65o/
1,600 g/
2,300 1/
b. Hi/
"
d.Ms
e. Residual figure.
f. Residual figure.
Table 19
New Lands Sown in the USSR 2/
1954
Thousand Hectares
Area Collective Farms State Farms Total
Kazakh SSR
RSFSR
1,350 12/ 250 2/ 1,600 A/
2,150 2/ 550 1/ 2)700 g/
Total USSR 3,500W 800 1/ 4,3oo 11/
b. Residual figure.
c. 42/
d. 3 1/
e. Residual figure.
f. Residual figure.
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g. 382/
Ii. Residual figure.
1.
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Table 20
Revised Plan for the Reclamation of New Lands in the USSR 2/
1954-56
Thousand Hectares
Area
Collective Farms
State Farms
Total
Kazakh SSR
9,400 12/
8,600 2/
18,000
RSFSR
6,600 2/
5,400
12,000 g/
Total USSR
16,00012
114,000 1/
30,000 1/
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
Residual figure.
38
3 /
Residual' figure.
Residual figure.
h. 388/
?.
j. 390/
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Table 21
New Lands Plowed in the USSR
1954-55
Thousand Hectares
Area Collective Farms
State Farms
Total
Kazakh SSR 8,886 12/
RSFSR 7,714 2/
9,114 si
4,386 f/
18,000 sy
12)100 g/
Total USSR i6,000 h/
13,500 1/
30,100
1/
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b. Residual figure.
c. 221/
h.393/
je
39 /
d. 392/
J.
322/
e. Residual figure.
f. Residual figure.
g. Residual figure.
Table 22
Original Plan for the Initial Sowing of New Lands in the USSR
1955
Thousand Hectares
Area
Collective Farms
State Farms
Total
Kazakh SSR !Li
3,550
2,090
5,650
RSFSR
3,450
1,605
5,100
Total USSR
6,900 hi
3,800 2/
10,700 di
Data for Kazakh SSR and the RSFSR were de-
rived by subtracting the sowing plans for the republics
In 1954 (see Table 18) p. 131, above) from the original
republic reclamation plans (see Table 16, p. 129, above).
b. 396/
c. .32y
d.
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Table 23
Original Plan for Sowing of New Lands in the USSR 2/
1955
Thousand Hectares
Area Collective Farms State Farms Total
Kazakh SSR 4,100 2/ 2,195 2/ 6,300 I/
RSFSR U,700 Ei 2,000 V 6,700 g./
Total USSR 8,700 hf 4,300 1./ 13, 000 ji
a. The original plan for the total area to be sown on
new lands in 1955 is coincident to the area originally
planned to be plowed during 1954.
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Table 24
Revised Plan for Sowing of New Lands in the USSR A/
1955
Thousand Hectares
Area Collective Farms State Farms Total
Kazakh SSR
RSFSR
Total USSR
N.A.
N.A.
11,200 fi
6,800 g/
8,130 la/ to 9,300 si
9,870dj to 10,700 2/
18,000 IV to 20,000 1/
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b.
C. 09/
d. Residual figure.
e. Residual figure.
f. pi21/
g. 11
h. 12
i. 13/
hes
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Table 25
New Lands Sown in the USSR 2/
1955
Thousand Hectares
Area Collective Farms State Farms Total
Kazakh SSR
RSFSR
5,90o ?I 41600 2/ 10,500/
5,600
5,600 2/ 4,400 I/ 10,000
Total USSR 11,500 lj 9,000 17 20,500 j/
Residual
414/
Residual figure.
Residual figure.
Residual figure.
444/
?1?/
Residual figure.
417/
figure.
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APPENDIX B
LIVESTOCK NUMBERS IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN ZONES
OF THE NEW LANDS OF THE USSR
Estimates of the livestock numbers in the Northern Zone of the new
lands of the USSR in 1954 are based on the percentage that each type of
livestock in the area was of the total number of the same type in the
RSFSR as a whole in 1938. On the assumption that the percentages for
the different types of livestock remained the same between 1938 and
1955) these percentages were applied to livestock numbers in the RSFSR
as reported for 1954 418/ to estimate the numbers of each type of live-
stock in the Northern Zone of the new lands in this year. This methodol-
ogy was also used in estimating livestock numbers in the Southern Zone,
with the exception of sheep and goats) from 1954 livestock numbers for
Kazakh SSR. 419/
The estimate of sheep and goat numbers in the Southern Zone of the new
lands in 1954 is based on reported sheep distribution in Kazakh SSR by
groups of oblasts.* 1.1.22/ In view of the probability that goat numbers in
Kazakh SSR comprise only a small percentage of total sheep and goat num-
bers) the reported percentage distribution of sheep numbers was applied
to total sheep and goat numbers in 1954.** Using the percentages re-
ported for each group of oblasts) total sheep and goat numbers in Kazakh
SSR were apportioned among the groups. Sheep and goat numbers for each
oblast in the Southern Zone were then estimated by apportioning to each
oblast a proportion of the 1954 group total equal to the proportion of
the 1938 group total that sheep numbers in each oblast comprised in 1938.
Livestock numbers in the Northern and Southern Zones of the new lands
of the USSR as of 1 January 1938 and as of 1 October 1954 are shown in
Table 26.***
* In Akmolinskaya, Pavlodarskayal and Semipalatinskaya ?blasts) for
example) there were 16.2 percent of the total sheep numbers in Kazakh
SSR in 1954.
** Sheep and goat numbers in Kazakh SSR were reported as a combined
total in 1954.
*** Table 26 follows on p. 138.
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Table 26
Livestock Numbers in the Northern and Southern Zones of the New Lands of the USSR
1 January 1938 and 1 October 1954
Thousand Head
Date and Zone,
1 January 1938 (reported)
Cattle Cows Swine Sheep and Goats
Northern Zone
6,299.7
2,784.7
-2,074.1
7,009.8
Southern Zone
1,555.0
547.2
116.0
1,658.4
Total
7,854.7
3,331.9
2,190.1
8,668.2
1 October 1954
(estimated)
Northern Zone
6,853.1
2,735.6
3,970.1
10,024.6
Southern Zone
2,336.6
804.7
287.2
6,062.5
Total
9,189.7
3,5140.3
4,257.3
16L 087: 1
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APPENDIX C
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS REQUIRED BY TRACTORS) TRUCKS, COMBINES,
AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IN THE NEW LANDS OF THE USSR
1. General.
The object of this analysis is to determine the quantities of gaso-
line, diesel fuel) avtol lubricants, and deisel oil consumed by tractors,
combines) trucks) and other agricultural machinery in plowing, harrowing,
sowing) harvesting, and other agricultural operations in the new lands
of the USSR. In the discussion of physical factors affecting production,*
the area of the new lands was described as comprised of three zones dif-
fering in soil, climate, and other factors. The consumption of petroleum
products by farm machinery cannot readily be differentiated by zone) and
therefore the requirement for petroleum products will be analyzed on the
basis of the new lands as a whole. The consumption of petroleum products
by different types of machines in performing different types of work can
be differentiated. Among these types of work are plowing virgin and
long-fallow land for the first time, replowing land, sowing) harvesting,
transporting grain, and the like. Such agricultural operations can best
be discussed in terms of acreages, production) and services.
2. Acreages.
It is reported that 4.3 million hectares of virgin and long-fallow
lands were sown in 1954. It is assumed that this acreage was plowed,
harrowed) and sown in the spring of 1954 and that 95 percent of the
sown acreage was harvested by combines in the summer of that year.
Acreages reclaimed) replowed, harrowed) sown) and harvested by combines
in the new lands of the USSR in 1954-56 are shown in Table 27.**
* See II, p. 21) above.
** Table 27 follows on p. 140.
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Table 27
Acreages Reclaimed, Replowed, Harrowed) Sown, and Harvested by Combines
in the New Lands of the USSR
1954-56
Thousand Hectares
Year
Acreages
Reclaimed
Replowed
Harrowed
Sown
Harvested
by Combines 2/
1954
Spring
Summer
1955
Spring
Summer
1956
Spring
Summer
4,300 b/
13,500
2,700 2/
9,600 2/
4)300
20,500 2/
30,100 f/
4,300
20)500
30,100
4)300
20,500 1/
30,100 I/
4,085
17,575 1/
25,745 5/
a. The area harvested by combines is assumed to be 95 percent of the
area sown to grass. One-half of the harvesting is estimated to be done
by tractor-drawn combines, and one-half by self-propelled combines.
b. For sowing in 1954.
c. For sowing in 1955.
d. Of this total sown acreage, 90 percent, 18.5 million hectares, 421/ was
sown to grain) of which 95 percent, 171575,000 hectares, is estimated to
have been harvested by combines.
e. For sowing in 1956.
f. For sowing in 1957.
g. It is assumed that as in 1955 about 90 percent of the sown acreage)
27.1 million hectares) was sown to grain, of which 95 percent, 25,745,000
hectares, was harvested by combines.
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It was further reported that the total acreage of virgin and long-
fallow land reclaimed in 1954 in Kazakh SSR was a.5 million hectares,ii.E2/
and in the RSFSR 9.3 million additional hectares were reclaimed; a total
of 17.8 million hectares, then, were reclaimed. 1E3/ This total acreage
includes the 4.3 million hectares reclaimed in the spring of 1954 and the
13.5 million hectares reclaimed in the summer and fall of that year.
It is also reported that "in 1955 collective and state farms on vir-
gin and fallow lands have sown 20.5 million hectares with all agricul-
tural crops ... ." 424/ As indicated above) 13.5 million hectares of
this acreage were plowed for the first time (reclaimed) in the summer
or fall of 1954. In addition) 4.3 million hectares were replayed)
probably in the summer or fall of 1954. This leaves 2.7 million hec-
tares that must have been reclaimed in the spring of 1955. Of the to-
tal acreage, all of which was harrowed in the spring of 1955, 18.5
million hectares were sown to grain. /2-12/ It is estimated that 95 per-
cent of the grain acreage, 17,575,000 hectares, was harvested by combines
in the summer of 1955. There are indications that the total acreage of
virgin and long-fallow lands reclaimed during 1954-55 for sowing in 1956
was approximately 30.1 million hectares. Li-2Y If 20.5 million hectares
were reclaimed in 1954-551 and if it is assumed that this acreage was
replowed in 1955 for sowing in 1956, then 9.6 million additional hectares
probably were reclaimed in the summer and fall of 1955. Pending more
detailed information) jt is assumed that this acreage of 30.1 million
hectares was harrowed in the spring of 1956 and that 90 percent (as in
1955), 27.1 million hectares) was sown to grain. It is further assumed
that 95 percent of the sown acreage, 25,745,000 hectares) was harvesteA
by combines in the summer of 1956.
At the date of this analysis, there is no evidence that acreages of
virgin and long-fallow lands in addition to the reported 30.1 million
hectares were reclaimed in the spring of 1956. Pending more detailed
information) it is assumed that these 30.1 million hectares were replowed
in the summer and fall of 1956 for sowing in the spring of 1957. Dif-
ferent quantities of petroleum products are consumed in each of the
operations shown in Table 27.* To compute the over-all requirements of
fuel, lubricating oil, and the like for tractors in the performance of
such work, the Soviet planners, in their agricultural studies and account-
ing, reduce all field-work operations to a common denominator called "soft
plowing." This common denominator is obtained by comparing each type of
* P. 140, above.
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agricultural work on a hectare of land with the work performed in plow-
ing a "soft," or previously plowed) hectare. The USSR has established
the following factors for each of the operations indicated in Table 27*:
soft plowing (replowing), 1; reclaiming land) 1.4; harrowing, 0.19;
sowing) 0.3; and harvesting by tractor-drawn combine,** 0.5. 427/ .
Acreages reclaimed) replowed) harrowed) sown) and harvested by tractor-
drawn combines in the new lands of the USSR) in terms of soft plowing,
In 1954-56 are shown in Table 28.
Table 28
Acreages Reclaimed, Replowed) Harrowed, Sown) and Harvested
by Tractor-Drawn Combines in the New Lands of the USSR
in Terms of Soft Plowing
1954-56
Thousand Hectares
Acreages
Year Reclaimed Replowed Harrowed Sown
Harvested by Total Work
Tractor-Drawn Performed
Combines 21 by Tractors
1954
24,920
4,300
817
1,290
1,021
32,350
1955
17,220
20,500
3,895
6,150
4)394
52,159
1956
30,100
5,719
9,030
6,436
51,285
a. One-half of the total acreage harvested by combines (see Table 27)
p. 140) above) multiplied by 0.5.
3. Types of Tractors.
The total work performed by tractors in 1954) 1955, and 1956 was
performed by various types of tractors. Those sent to the new lands
during 1954 and 1955 were all of the track-laying) general-purpose
* P. 140, above.
** One-half of the acreage harvested by combines.
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type) consuming diesel fuel but varying in horsepower at the drawbar
as follows: S-80, 65 hp; DT-54) 36 hp; and KD-35) 24 hp. In 1954 an
allocation was made to the new lands of 47,716 tractors of all 3 types
of horsepower, which were equivalent to 115,000 tractors in terms of
15-hp units. As indicated in Table 29, most of these tractors were the
DT-54 type, and there were some of the small KD-35 type and the large
S-80 type. In 1955 the new lands received 38,808 additional tractors
with a combined horsepower equivalent to 98)000 units of 15 hp each.
Allocation of tractors to the new lands of the USSR, in terms of physical
units and 15-hp units, in 1954-55 is shown in Table 29.
Table 29
Allocation of Tractors to the New Lands of the USSR
in Tams of Equivalent 15-Horsepower Units
1954-55
1954
Physical
TIE! Drawbar Hp Units A/
DT-54 36 34,587
KD-35 24 9)109
S-80 65 4)020
Total
Equivalent
15-Hp Units
83)009
14,574
17)420
47,716 115,003
1955
Physical Equivalent
Units a/ 15-Hp Units
29,729
4,643
4,436
71,350
7,429
19,223
38,808 98,002
a. These figures are estimated.
Each of the three types of tractors sent to the new lands in 1954
and 1955 had a different potential soft-plowing capacity. It is esti-
mated that a DT-54 working at full capacity has a soft-plowing potential
of 7.7 hectares 428/ per shift. The potential of a KD-35 is 5.8 hec-
tares and of the S-80) 15 hectares per shift. Applying these factors
to the number of physical units of each type of tractor allocated to the
new lands in 1954 indicates that the soft-plowing potential per shift of
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the allocated numbers of each type of tractor working at full capacity
would have been: DT-54, 266,320 hectares; KD-35, 52)832 hectares; and
S-80) 60)300 hectares -- a total potential capacity of 3791458 hectares.
The percentage of the total potential soft-plowing capacity of the
tractor park in the new lands in 1954, by type of tractor, is computed
to be as follows: DT-54, 70.18 percent; KD-35, 13.93 percent; and
S-80, 15.89 percent.
Similarly calculated) the percentage of the total potential soft-
plowing capacity of the tractor park in the new lands in 1955)* by
type of tractor, is computed to be: DT-54, 70.56 percent; KD-35)
11.37 percent; and S-80) 18.07 percent. Estimated consumption of
fuel by the tractor park in the new lands of the USSR) in terms of
average per soft-plowing unit, in 1954-55 is shown in Table 30.
Table 30
Estimated Consumption of Fuel by the Tractor Park
In the New Lands of the USSR) in Terms of Average per Soft-Plowing Unit
1954-55
Year
Type of
Tractor
Consumption per
Soft-Plowing Unit Li/
(Kilograms)
Percentage of Hectares
Plowed at Full Capacity
(Percent)
Fuel Consumption Share
of Potential Capacity
(Kilograms)
1954
DT-54
10.2
70.18
7.15836
10-35
11.6
13.93
1.61588
s-8o
9.3
15.89
1.47777
Weighted average
10.25201
1955
DT-54
10.2
70.56
7.19712
KD-35
11.6
11.37
1.31892
s-80
9.3
18.07
1.68051
Weighted average 10.19655
* The new lands tractor park included 47,716 tractors received in
1954 and 38)808 tractors received in 1955.
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Each of the three types of tractors consumed a different quantity
of diesel fuel per hectare of soft plowing. In kilograms of fuel per
hectare, consumption is estimated as follows: DT-541 10.2; KD-35,
11.6; and S-80, 9.3.
Applying these factors to the percentage of the total potential
soft-plowing capacity of the tractor park in the new lands representa-
tive of the capacity of each type of tractor gives the weighted aver-
age fuel consumption for the tractor park in the new lands in terms of
kilograms per hectare of soft plowing.
In making this calculation, it is assumed that the relative quantity
of plowing, harrowing, and the like done by each type of tractor is
proportional to the relative potential capacity of each type as des-
cribed in the previous paragraphs.
4. Consumption of Diesel Fuel by Tractors.
All tractors in the new lands park consume diesel fuel. As indi-
cated above, the weighted average fuel consumption per hectare of soft
plowing for the tractor park operating in the new lands in 1954 was
10.25201 kg. It is estimated that tractors in the USSR consume in non-
field work 13.2 percent as much additional fuel as is used in field
work. 1112/ Thus the quantity of fuel consumed per hectare for field
and nonfield work would be 10.25201 times 1.132 -- 11.60528 kg. It is
farther estimated that storage and hauling losses equal 5 percent of
the fuel consumed in field plus nonfield work. 11.31/ Thus total fuel
consumed in 1954 per hectare of soft plowing, including field and
nonfield work, and losses would be 11.60528 times 1.05 -- 12.18554 kg.
Similarly estimated, the total diesel fuel consumed by tractors in
1955 per hectare of soft plowing, including field and nonfield work
and losses, is computed to be 12.11973 kg.
Pending the receipt of more definite information the 1955 rate
of fuel consumption is also used for projected tractor operations
in 1956 because it is probable that the 1956 rate is closer to that
of 1955 than to the figure for 1954 or to the average for 1954-55.
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In terms of soft plowing, the total work performed by tractors in
1954 was shown at 32,3501000 hectares.* This figure multiplied by
12.18554 kg gives 394,202 tons as the total quantity of diesel fuel
consumed by tractors in the new lands in 1954. Similarly calculated)
the total diesel fuel consumed in 1955 is 52,159,000 hectares times
12.11973 kg -- 632,153 tons of diesel fuel. For 1956 the calculation
Is 51,285,000 hectares times 12.11973 kg -- 621,560 tons of diesel
fuel.
5. Consumption of Gasoline by Tractors.
The gasoline consumed in starting tractors, including losses, is
estimated to be 1 percent of the weight of the total diesel fuel con-
sumed, including losses. 1.1E/ The estimates are as follows: 1954)
3)942 tons; 1955) 6,322 tons; and 1956, 6,216 tons.
6. Consumption of Lubricants by Tractors.
The average consumption of all lubricants by diesel tractors is
computed to be 7.5 percent of total fuel consumption.12.J./ Thus
tractor lubricant consumption in 1954 is calculated to be 29,565 tons.
(Total diesel fuel. consumption of 394,262 tons minus fuel losses of
5 percent equals 375,430 tons of diesel fuel actually consumed. Diesel
fuel consumption of 375,430 tons multiplied by 7.5 percent equals
lubricant consumption of 28,157 tons, net of losses. The addition of
an allowance of 5 percent for losses results in an estimate of 29,565
tons of lubricant consumed in 1954.) Similarly lubricant consumption
Is estimated to have been 47,411 tons in 1955 and 46,624 tons in 1956.
7. Estimated Consumption of Gasoline and Lubricants by Combines.
The consumption of gasoline by the S-4 combine (the only type of
self-propelled combine used in the new lands) is 10 kg per hectare. Lgii/
The consumption of gasoline by the S-1 or S-6 combines, which are typi-
cal of all tractor-drawn combines used in the new lands, equals 4.5 kg
per hectare. Lg2/ Each of the two types (self-propelled and tractor-
drawn) is assumed to have harvested one-half of the total harvested
area. The average consumption per combine per hectare in field opera-
tions is therefore computed to be 7.25 kg per hectare. Storage and
hauling losses based on Soviet studies are 5 percent of the field work
consumption. Hence the total expenditure of gasoline per hectare is
7.25 times 1.05 -- 7.6125 kg.
* See Table 28, p. 142, above.
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The total acreage harvested by combines in the new lands is esti-
mated at 4,085,000 hectares.* This figure multiplied by 7.6125 gives
a total gasoline consumption, including losses, by combines in 1954 of
31,097 tons. Similarly calculated, harvesting of 17,575,000 hectares
in 1955 required 133,790 tons of gasoline, and in 1956 harvesting,
25,745,000 hectares may require 195,984 tons of gasoline.
Based on 1952 Soviet technical standards of oil products, 11.?/
consumption of avtol lubricants by combines is estimated at 5 per-
cent of the total consumption of gasoline, including losses. Apply-
ing this factor to the total quantities of gasoline consumed by com-
bines gives the following total consumption of lubricants, including
losses: 1954, 1,555 tons; 1955, 6,690 tons; and 1956, 9,799 tons.
8. Estimated Consumption of Gasoline and Avtol Lubricants
by Other Agricultural Machinery.
a. Gasoline.
Under conditions prevailing in the USSR the consumption of
gasoline by all farm machinery other than tractors is estimated to
be 70 percent by combines and 30 percent by other agricultural ma-
chinery. LE/
Thus the quantity of gasoline consumed by other agricultural
machinery in 1954 is computed by applying the factor 0.4286 (30/70)
to the 31,097 tons of gasoline consumed by all combines in the new
lands in that year.**
b. Avtol Lubricants.
Similarly) the avtol lubricants consumed by other agricul-
tural machinery associated with that consumed by all combines are
computed in tons as follows:
All Combines Other Agricultural Machinery
Year (Metric Tons) (Metric Tons)
1954
1,555
666
1955
6,690
2,867
1956
9,799
4,277
* See Table 27, p. 140, above.
** The ratio of 1 to 0.4286 holds good for lubricants as well as for
gasoline, based on the constant relationship between the consumption
of fuel and lubricants. 112Y
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9. Consumption of Petroleum Products by Trucks.
It is impossible to estimate directly the quantities of petroleum
products consumed by trucks in operations in the new lands. There is
no direct information on which to base an estimate of the number of
trucks working in the new lands at any given time. Some new trucks
were sent to the new lands to remain there permanently. Others were
sent on loan from cities and industrial centers and from the southern
European USSR to operate during the harvest period and to haul agri-
cultural products from farms to points of concentration and processing.
Many of these trucks were returned to the lenders, but some remained
in the new lands) and the lenders were compensated by allocations di-
rect from factories.
a. Consumption of Gasoline in 1954.
A clue to the consumption of gasoline by trucks in farm opera-
tions other than transporting grain an& other farm products can be
deduced from the estimates made by Matskevich in working up the energy
balance of socialized agriculture as of 1938. Matskevich first re-
duced all field work performed by tractors to the common denominator
of hectares of soft plowing and then computed the energy required (in
terms of horsepower-hours) by use of the factor of 49.0544 horse-
power-hours per hectare. 439/ He thus calculated that the field work
of plowing, harrowing, sowing, and harvesting in the USSR as a whole
in 1938 totaled 246.4 million hectares of soft plowing and that a
total of 12,087 million horsepower-hours were expended in this quantity
of work. 440/ The energy expended in the normal activities of trucks --
such as hauling farm workers) fertilizers, lumber and other building
materials, fuel) manufactured goods) and the like -- associated with
246.4 million hectares of soft plowing was computed to be 3,658 million
hoursepower-hours. 441/ This figure does not include the transporta-
tion of grain and other farm products. The ratio of housepower-hours
expended by tractors in soft plowing to the corresponding horsepower-
hours expended by trucks in normal farm operations other than hauling
grain and other farm products was 1 to 0.30264.
The tractor operations of plowing 17.5 million hectares and
harrowing, sowing, and harvesting 4.3 million hectares associated with
the new lands program in 1954 is estimated to be equivalent to 32)350)000
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hectares of soft plowing.* The diesel fuel consumed in performing this
quantity of field work is computed to be 331)652 tons (total fuel con-
sumption of 3945202 tons less 5 percent for losses and 13.2 percent
for nonfield work).** The theoretical energy availability of gasoline
is approximately the same as that of diesel fuel. Assuming that the
normal farm activities in the new lands were not widely different
from those in 1938 as far as truck operations in relation to tractor
operations are concerned) then 331,652 tons of diesel fuel multi-
plied by 0.30264 gives 100)371 tons of gasoline. In addition, 2
percent 1212/ must be added to cover intragarage and repair opera-
tions, and 5 percent must be added for losses, giving a total of
107)397 tons as the possible quantity of gasoline that could be ex-
pected to be consumed by trucks in normal intrafarm operations in
1954.
b. Consumption of Lubricants in 1954.
On the basis of a 1948 study of motor transport, the quantity
of lubricants consumed by trucks in normal intrafarm operations would
be equivalent to 5 percent L013/ of the 107,397 tons of gasoline con-
sumed -- about 5)370 tons.
There is no basis for estimating the quantity of petroleum
products consumed by trucks in 1954 in transporting grain and other
farm products from farms to points of concentration and processing.
c. Consumption of Gasoline and Lubricants in Intrafarm Opera-
tions in 1955.
EstimateS of consumption of gasoline by trucks in 1955 must
be obtained indirectly, as they were for 1954. The tractor opera-
tions of plowing and harvesting associated with the cultivation of 20.5
million hectares of virgin and long-fallow land in 1955 is estimated
at 531,846 tons (total fuel consumption of 632,153 tons less 5 per-
cent for losses and 13.2 percent for nonfield work). This figure mul-
tiplied by the factor of 0.30264 developed above gives 160,958 tons
* See Table 28, p. 142, above.
** See p. 146, above.
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of gasoline. Adding 2 percent to cover intragarage and repair opera-
tions, and 5 percent for losses, gives a total of 172,386 tons as
the possible quantity of gasoline that could be expected to be con-
sumed by trucks in normal intrafarm operations in 1955.
Lubricants consumed by trucks in normal intrafarm operations
in 1955 would be equivalent to 5 percent of the 172)386 tons of gaso-
line consumed -- about 8,619 tons.
d. Consumption of Gasoline and Lubricants in the Transport of
Grain and Other Farm Products in 1955.
Fragmentary information permits calculating the quantities
of gasoline required by trucks in 1955 in transporting grain and
other farm products to points of concentration and processing.
It is necessary first to estimate the quantities of procur-
able (shipped from the farm) products grown in 20.5 million hectares.
As stated above, 20.5 million hectares were planted in the
spring of 1955, of which 18.5 million hectares were sown to grain and
2 million hectares were planted to other crops. The 18.5 million
hectares of grain are estimated to have produced 7.95 million tons, an
average of 4.3 centners per hectare. For purposes of analysis) it is
assumed that the yield of miscellaneous crops was not less than that
of grain and that the production of' grain and other crops on 20.5 mil-
lion hectares in 1955 was about 8,815,000 tons. Khrushchev has stated
that out of a production of 900 million poods of grain, about 600 mil-
lion poods, or two-thirds, would be marketable (procurable). !I'S As-
suming that out of a total agricultural production of 8,815,000 tons
about two-thirds would be procurable, it is possible that about 5.9
million tons might be moved by trucks.
The second step in this calculation is to establish the average
distance over which farm products are moved to points of concentration.
Unfortunately, there is no information available on this point. Informa-
tion is available on the average length of truck-haul from railhead to
destination for all freight in the various oblasts in the Southern Zone
of the new lands in 1955. It is assumed here that these averages repre-
sent, at least reasonably accurately, the average length of haul between
farm and points of concentration or processing. For purposes of the
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calculations, the average distance selected was 63.7 km, 445/ which
Is the shortest of the average distances reported for any oblast in
the Southern Zone of the new lands. Using this average length of haul
and multiplying it by 5.9 million -- the tonnage of the procurable
farm products -- gives a total of 376 million tkm.
The truck park in the new lands is assumed to be composed of
an equal number of 3- and 4-ton trucks. The average length of haul
is assumed to be constant and identical for each type. The share of
the ton-kilometers accounted for by the 4-ton trucks would thus ap-
proximate four-sevenths of the total ton-kilometers -- 215 million
tkm -- and the 3-ton trucks would account for three-sevenths of the
total -- 161 million tkm.
On the basis of the experience of a fleet of ZIS-150 (4-ton)
trucks engaged in construction work in the Moscow area, 44i 6 the
gasoline consumer per ton-kilometer by this truck (loaded) is esti-
mated at 0.126 kg per ton-kilometer, which, multiplied by 215 million
tkm, gives 27)090 tons of gasoline consumed by the 4-ton trucks.
A 3-ton truck (loaded) consumes a gallon of gasoline per 6.9
miles, and a 4-ton truck consumes a gallon per 6.2 miles.)11E/ As-
suming that the difference in gasoline consumption per ton-kilometer
between 3-ton and 4-ton trucks is proportional to their rates of fuel
consumption per mile of full load, the consumption for 3-ton trucks
would be 6.2/6.9 of 0.126 kg per ton-kilometers -- 0.1132 kg per ton-
kilometer. Total gasoline consumed by the 3-ton trucks would be 161
million tkm times 0.1132 -- 18)225 tons. Total consumption of the
truck fleet in hauling 5.9 million tons of farm products an average
distance of 63.7 km would be 45,315 tons.
50X1
the gasoline consumed by an unloaded truck on the r 50X1
return trip to base is 80 percent of the consumption of the truck when
loaded. 448/ The gasoline consumed by the loaded and unloaded trucks
is thus computed to be 45,315 tons times 1.8 -- 81,567 tons. To this
quantity is added 2 percent 449/ for repair operations and 5 percent
for wastage. This gives about 87)358 tons as the total quantity of
gasoline consumed by the truck park in the new lands, in transporting
5.9 million tons of off-farm grain and other farm products (extra-
farm hauling) associated with the exploitation of 20.5 million hec-
tares of virgin and long-fallow lands in 1955.
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of lubricants consumed by trucks would be equivalent
of the 87,358 tons of gasoline consumed in extrafarm
tons in 1955.
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the quantity 50X1
to 5 percent 450/
hauling -- 4-,16O
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APPENDIX D
INTERPRETATIONOFSOVIETBUDGETALLOCATIONS
The composition of the SoViet state budget is such that only a
rough indication of the impact of the new lands program on the economy
may be gained from a study of the budget. The financial operations of
the MTS' s, for example, enter the budget on a "gross" basis, in that
all MTS income and expenditures are budget items. On the other hand,
other state production organizations have ordinarily operated in re-
cent years on a self-sustaining basis) using their revenues to cover
their expenses. The state budget receives taxes from such economic
organizations, contributes funds to them for fixed and working capital,
-_i
and provides subsidies to meet losses and operational expenses. i
4 1
Collective farms may receive state loans for investment purposes and
very recently they may receive "advance" payments on commodities to
be delivered to the state), but such loans are repayable.
State budget expenditures include both investment and operational
items. Enterprises may meet part of their investment needs, as well
as operational expenses, out of their own income. Rinds are accumulated
by enterprises for investment purposes.
It is obvious) therefore) that changes in the amount and direction
of expenditures by, and costs to, the Soviet economy could be adequately
related to changes in budget expenditures only by means of detailed
knowledge of the organizations making the expenditures and knowledge
of the distribution of operational and investment expenditures and the
composition of investment expenditures. An expansion in the activities
of MTS's, for example, would have a greater effect on the budget than
would a similar expansion of the activities of state farms. On the
other hand, an expansion of the activities of collective farms would
have less effect on the budget than would a similar expansion of the
activities of state farms. Changes in the prices of agricultural prod-
ucts might affect budget allocations to the state farms (because their
income would be affected)) but they would not affect allocations to
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MTS's, which do not meet expenses from income. Higher prices for agri-
cultural products also affect the amounts spent by the state for the
agricultural products of collective farms, but they would not be re-
flected in a change in budget allocations to "agriculture."*
* Procurement allocations were separated from allocations to "agri-
culture" in 1955. 1.1.22/
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