BULGARIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001600020001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 106
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 11, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CANCELLED
SR.22
BUILARIA
TABLE CF CONTI-LT.3
A. IA
CHAPTER I--POLITICAL SITUATION
CIA ILTEuAL
USE-011-
11 January 1951
1.
Genesis Of The Present Political Situation . . . . ? . . ? 0
?
4 1
2,
Government Structure . ...................
?
'.11
3.
Communist Political Control . . .
4.
Bulgarian Resistance to Present Regime 0 4 ? ? 0 0 * 0 6 0 0
4
0 23
5.
Stmability Of Regime . . ........?.......
.
. 25
CIMPTill II?ECONOUIC SITUATIU
1. Present 3cononic Situation . . . ? , .
bo*cuiliefit9No..0?\
2, ciculture . ? ? 0 0 in Class
3. Forest and Forest Products 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 CHANGE
'5y,iasIFtED . . . . ;7 TS S -714,71
Po . ? . ? 6 0 6
li
4. Transportation . . . ? 0 . . . CANGED TO: - 0
5. Ferrous anorals an ! * 37
d 'Totals . 0 0 * 0 6 0
(3 IT to, TT 77 33
; -7# 1
6. Hon-Ferrous anerals and -Lbtals . . ? 0 0 0 0 * 0 6 6 *
Dtt,!;
0 * 0 0 38
6 0 6 0 0 e
7. Fuel and Power . *on. * asooye* ea** 00064 * 00 39
8. Chemicals . . . 0 ?0060 0000000 4 * 00000 * 000 41
9. Production Equipment . 0 . . .... . . 6 0 ? 0 0 000 0 6 4 0 41
10. Taxtiles . . . . . . 0 0 V ? 0 ? 90000 0 400009064 4 42
11. Domestic Finance . . 0 * ? 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 PO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 43
12. Foreign Trade . . ........ 064.01.000000600 0 45
3.30 ' S-"Andard Of Living . . 0 0 0 660600 *00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 47
Population and Lianpover 000 oo o o it* oa a o a 48
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CHAPTMIII?FOIMGITAFFATIO
1. Development Of Bulgarian Foreign Policy ? ? ? o ? 4 ? 51
2. Probable Trend of Bulgarian Foreign Policy ..
O ? 00 . 60
66
CHUM 117-4.11LITARY SITUATION
1. ArrIT
? 0 0 00 000000 ? 0000000 2
2. UX5.7 ? ?? 0 a ? it 0 0 0 0 0 000000 a 00000
O00
3. Air Force 9 a ea a a a 0 **a
o? a a 0 a U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65
40 :;ther idlitary and Quasi-alitary Or ani3a.6ions a a e 0 a . 66
Ci1L2T3P.V--JT22,.T3GICM:SIDOES
ARL'i,iT11-.G us =am-
1. 30nora1 a e a *a a a 0 0 0 0 a 0 0,0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 a 0 a a 0 . 60
2. ?olitical ornacooe 0 0 a 0 a 0 0 0t000 a a aa 469
3. :;cononic a 0'0 0 a a 0 0 0 0 a 0 a a0 0 a 0 a 0 a 0 0 0 a a 69
4. alitary. 0 a a a a V a 0 04 a CC 0 a* a.** oo woe 70
111P TIN), 170 TUIE :11I3LOPL1IIT5
A21;1
..11CTING US 3:] CUP-ITY
AP21-,Jf: A--2errain and Climate, . 0 0 0 0 V V V 0 9 0 V 0 a 0 0 0 072
A?Pl:DIX B--Dulgarian Council of ianistors a wee (boa a . 0 79
Ji.C--rolitburo of Bulgarian Commanist Party a Oa a a a a a a 00
iP D?Central Gmmittee of Duljarian Gmmulisb Party . 4 9 0 4 01
A221:DIX E--iographic Information a oaaaaaaa a a a a a . 02
L.Y3:4XE:F--ChrotioloLy of Sijnificant 31/en'u5ir Cocumizatisn of
Dulgaria..a00 a 0 0 a 0 0 a a 0 a 0(9010 0 0 0 91
Document No.
0 CHANGE in Class. 0
kaDECLASSIVIED
ss. CHANGED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA t 7 176
pate;
SVg
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SULEARY
Bulgaria in 1950 is a vassal state of the Soviet Union, uhich is
rapidly being integrated into the Soviet Orbit and being exploited
politically and economically. The successful nSeptedber 9, 19)!)t coup
dvetatu of the Fatherland Front coalition, dominated by the snarl
Bulgarian Comanist Party, wrested control from the regency of young
King Simeon. By reason of their uell-clinciplined, coupaot organiza-
tion and unswerving Soviet support, the Communists have, by
moulded Bulgaria into a Communist state.
Bulgaria is still nominally under political control of the Father
land Front; uhich in actuality is the Oonnunist Party. The single lint
of candidates to the rational Assembly is nominated by the Fatherland
Front. In turn, the Dational Assembly elects the cabinet and appoints
the judiciary. Thus, through control of the Fatherland Front, the
Communist Party controls every activity of the Bulgarian people and
enforces its directives by police action. The Agrarian Party, the only
ostensibly non-Comunist Party now participating in the Front, is nade
up w"lolly of Communist supporters who represent no part of the predom-
inantly peasant population of Bulgaria.
The 1944 Fatherland Front coup dtetat net uith general approval
of the Bulgarian people. After the outlauing of pl, political parties
by the Royal Government in 19340 the large popular parties had not
maintained strong cohesive organizations. The Communist Party alone;
directed by able leaders uho had resided for many years in Ubscour
113E67--TE3-EITuation report has been cancelled and is to be used for
internal reference in CIA only. It contains information
available to CIA as of 1 August 1950.
ONO
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maintained and perfected a snail but effective underground organization
in Bulgnria. This Communist Party was the strong force in the anti
-
nazi reeistance movement during Uorld liar II and consequently was
alreacly organized to assume leadership of the Front.
'Mb onrapse of the Axis in 1944, the disorganized country willingly
accepted the well-laid Communist plans for an ostensible coalition govern-
ment. 'Under the Fatherland Front, Communists had no difficulty in assum-
ing control of key positions in the new government. Ion-Corrunist FF
political leaders did net become aware of the Communist plan to control
the country and tie it irrevocably to Doscot . until after the Connunists
had effectively established corplete police control.
The USSR has successfully blocked n11 efforts of the non-Conrunist
nations to protect the Bulgarian people from imposition of Communidt
totalitarianism. By taking advantage of its position as chairman of the
Allied Control Comission, supported by its oun occupation army during the
Armistice period, and as one of the three supervisory powers under the
Peace Tneaty, the USSR directed the systematic extermination of all
oppositj.on leaders and groups, and set up a Soviet-controlled police state.
Bulgarian OCODOflic progress since the war has been slow and sporadic.
Industrial output is barely eqpa..3 to that of the prewar period. Bulgaria
lacks developed facilities and capital goods for major industrial expam-
sion. Tapansion requires large imports of coal, coke, oil, iron, steel,
equipment and machinery and chemicals. 31ectric power is also in Short
uunply. Poor transportation facilities have hindered economic develop-
ment despite peak loading.
ii
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Agricultural production has risen and in some instances equals
the .?rewar status. Grain production and livestock numbers in 1950 should
apprDxiMate prewar averages;. the output of industrial crops ? particularly
tobacco, the chief export to the West, and beet sugar have risen sharply,
Collectivization, disguised as a cooperative. movement, has not yet
attained full achievement, although Bulgaria is the most highly collecti-
vized of the Soviet Satellites.
The USSR has consolidated its authority over Bulgaria by: (1)
forcing the Bulgarian ecollmv to coordinate its activities more closely
vith other Soviet bloc countries under the Kremlin-dominated Council
for 3conomic Ehtual Assistance; (2) placing Soviet personnel in the
adthistration of key economic ministries; (.3) increasing the number
of Soviet advisers and technicians in important lines of the economy;
(4) dictating trade agreements; and (5) acting as a profiting middleman
in t:le disposal of important Bulgarian exports., The present Bulgarian
Five-Year Plan itself vas undoubtedly drawn under iloscowvs guidance?
The fundamental nir0 of Bulgarian economic planning, as in all
amainist countries, are to communize, modernize, and industrialize, A
prewar production ratio of 70:30 between agriculture and industry is
to be replaced by the end of 1953 by a ratio of 45:55. Total industrial
output by the end of the Five-Year Plan is scheduled to be more than
double 1943 pro,:lnctioil. 'Principal emphasis is on heavy industry, which
is to absorb 03 percent of investment funds, The largest investments
are :or the development of electric pover? mining and the mechanization
of aTiculture,
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- During 1949 and 1950: the treak Bulgarian Any: has received in-
creasing Soviet attention. Soviet nadvisersu now control the Einistry
of Eaten's? and direct political and Fyn itary training of the armed
forces. The Bulgarian Army has steadily increased in size. Its
strength is estimated at 105:000. Soviet equipment has almost entirely
replaced German materiel: and large Soviet military shipments into
Bulgaria continue. At least 30,000 uniformed rxnitia. and 13:500 frontier
guards are trained. and equipped to supplement the arty. immediately.
The greatest threat to Soviet control of Bulgaria is disaffection
-within the party itself. Since the beginning of 1949: the party has
.undergone a continual purge: initiated by the demotion: arrest: trial
and execution of Traicho Kostov and conviction of his alleged co-con-
spirators. Since the trial in December 1949: a continuing party purge
has removed 90:000 party members and at least one-third of the Central
Gaumittee. Simultaneous purges ha-ve ,removed numerous high-level govern-
ment and army officials: charged with Kostovism (i.e. suspected of less
than complc,te subservience to the Kremlin). To insure against deviation
within the Bulgarian Calnunist Party and the goverrrnnt: Soviet officials
supervise and direct the activities of all key ministries: the army and
Bulgaria occupies a strategic position bordering on Turkey and
Greece: which are bases of the 17estern position in the Hear -_]ast. It
also borders on Yugoslavia, the successful dissenter from Stalinist
Corrunism. This makes the continuance of corolete Soviet control over
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Bulgaria a prime consideration for the lireralin. Offensively, Bulgaria
would provide one of the ruin bases for aggression in the Balkan area.
Defensively, Bulgaria acts as a buffer between Western powers and the
Soviet Ukraine. In the current cold 17ar phase of East?West relations,
Bulgaria is useful for propaganda and pressures against Yugoslavia,
Greece and Turkey.
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CIMPTBR I
POLITICAL SITUATION
10 Senesis Or Present Political Situation.
a IlistoricalBan,arian State.
Through centuries of struggle alternately for domination and
survival, the Bulgarians have asintained their identity as an intensely
nationaiistic and aggressive people. The Bulgars? a migratory Liongolian
tribe powerfully organized under a military leader, overwhelmed the
Slays south of the Danube in the seventh century. The resulting merger
of conquerors and conquered created as a Bulgarian heritage the name,
military- organization and fierce natio ii of the Asiatic invaders
?and the language and customs of the Slays. Although the Bulgarian state
in the tenth century became the most powerful in southeastern 3uropei
enco2passing .territory from the Black- Sea and the Sea of .1.7armara to the
Adriatic, it succumbed to Byzantine rule (1010-1136). Bulgaria recovered
its indeoendence and became a successful conqueror under the Asen dynasty
(1107-1250), but weakened by internal dissension and invasion, it vas
finally incorporated into the Ottoman 1-1--)ire (1393), losing all political
independence.
In 1076, after five centuries of subjection to Turkish rule, the
Bulgarians rese in revolt. Such violence marked the suppressive measures
taken by the Turks that the 3uropean powers deranded radical Turkish
colonial reforms. Failure of the Turks to cx)mply with these demands cul-
minated in the Russo-Turk 'jar (1077-1070) and the defeat of the latte.r0
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The Russian-dictated terns of the Treaty of San Stefano (1070)
established a large, autonomous Bulgaria, comprising approximabely
three-fifths of the Balkan peninsula, including veotorn Thrace and
almost all of eastern :acedonia as far as the Vardar River. The European
pavers, alarmed by growing Russian influence in the BalkAnsa called the
Congress of Berlin in 1079, and there nullified the Treaty of San Stefano:
reducing Bulgaria to the small territory betveen the Danube and the
Balkan Mountains and creating the separate eastern province of Rumelia.
Russia /s villingness to satisfy Bulgarian territorial aspirations in the
larger state envisioned at San Stefano, created strong Dulnarian sus-
ceptibility to Russian influence. Pro-Russian sentinent has since been
a powerful influence in Bulgarian a2fairs.
The Treaty of Berlin established Bulgaria as a constitutional
monarchy under nominal Turkish suzerainty. Russian-sponsored Prince
Alexander of DatLenberg, a nephew of Czar Alexander II, nas elected by
the first Bulgarian Assembly to head the new state, pursuant to a con-
stitution adopted at Trnovo in 1079. For several years, Alexander as
the creature of Russia, accepting a Russian-dominated cabinet vhich
immediately suspended the new constitution. His ambition to become a
ruler finally led him, however, to turn from Russian inflUence?
restore the constitutions and effect a reconciliation vith his people.
Ath popular Bulgarian and Rumelian backing, he annexed and incorporated
the latter province into Bulgaria. His success vas short-lived. Aroused
by the Bulger territorial acquisition, the Serbs invaded the country.
Although they nere unexpectedly routed, intervention by Austria saved
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then and it limited Bulgarian gains to an increase in national prestige.
Bulgarial's ,:yot-drIL: independence also caused Russia to redouble its
efforts to regain control of Bulgaria, Russian intrigues brought about
a coup, -which forced Alexander to abdicate. After a counter-revolution,
he returned for a tine, -then finally abdicated again because of lack of -
Russian support..
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was elected by the assembly to
succeed Alexander. His position was rendered so difficult by Russian
and Turkish opposition that the government was for six years virtually
a liberal earty dictatorship under Premier Stambulov. Amatous to re-
ceive Russian recognition, Farr11 nnud ousted Stambulov and established
a nu3sophile regime. Discontent with Bulgarian dependence alternately
on Turkey and i'ussia led Ferdinand, as it had led his predecessor? to
resort to war to strengthen his position. In the First Balkan iYar (1912)
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece wrested Macedonia from Turkey. The inability
of the victors to agree on a division of the spoils precipitated an attack
by Bulgaria on Serbia, which led to the Second Balkan War. Serbia, aided
by aceece, Turkey, and Rumania, won a quick victory that' deprived Bulgaria.
of all :..acedonian territory except the small Pirin area. As an additional
Bulgarian penalty, the southern. Dobrudja was awarded to 113.1mania. The
sevacing of most of Macedonia from Bulgaria still serves as an issue for
Bulgarian irredentism against Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia.
In -acrid liar I, Bulgaria, embittered by Balkan war losses and
lured by promises of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of her
neigAbors, joined the central powers. By the treaty of ibuilLyi (1919)3
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Bulgaria, as forced to Trithdraw from territory seized from Yugoslavia
; and Ctreece and. occupied daring the war. Bulgaria also lost to Yugoslavia
an additional strip along the Yugoslav border (the so-called Western
Provinces) and lost to GreecepIiestern. Thrace frith its Aegean outlet..
During the reign of Ferdinand, partly as a result of Bulgarian
territorial losses of the Second Ball= War, strong internal opposition
had grown ua in Bulgaria. Ferdinand held down this opposition by The
use of the ariv and of terrorists of the International I.Tacedonian
Revolutionary Organization (IMO). The latter organization had been
founded in 1393 for the purpose of liberating liacedonia from the Turks
and. creating an independent Liacedonlan state. As the result of Ferdinandi's
efforts, IIIRO came wider Bulgarian influence and survived through
Bulgarian support. Boris, who succeeded his father Ferdinand at the end
of the fmr, maintained himself in power through the army and ETD and moved
steadily towa.rd dictatorship, suspending the constitution and abolishing
political parties.
The strong pro-German orientation of Bulgaria, fostered by Doris
and his cabinet, brought Bulgaria into ";7orld 'Jar II again on the losing
side, but not as a united nation., lathough the Goran Army occupied
Bulgaria and Bulgaria declared for against agland and the US, many
oppositionists fled to Yugoslavia, jai ninz anti-Liazi partisan forces there,
while others remained in Bulgaria and. organized partisan bands which
proved a constant source of harassment to the Pazis.
In the sur.u.er of 1941.1, as the Russian Arai was on the verge of
entering Bulgaria,- the Bulgarian Government, realizing that defeat and
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Soviat occupation -wore imminent, sent a delegation to Cairo to seek
peace from the Viestern allies. The USSR: however: established its own
pre-aminent right to power in Bulgaria by issuing a declaration of war
agaiast Bulgaria and immediately 'granting an armistice. Soviet troops
then. occupied the country.
On 28 October 1924/4 Bulgaria signed an armistice agreement vzi.th
the USSR: the UK and the US: which provided for an Allied Control Con-
mission of the three powers under Russian chaix' nanship to regulate and
supervise the execution of its terms until a peace treaty could be signed.
The Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria became effective on 15 September 190.
By a plebiscite in 1946: Bulgaria became a republic. The young King
Simeon: who had succeeded to the throne upon the death of Boris in 19243:
was exiled to i!Igypt? and the regency which had ruled for Mn Was disbanded.'
b. 'ind Rise of ti2s.CommunistP
Bulgarian Communism emerged from the Soviet Democrat Party. In
190.3 under the leadership of Dimiter Dla,7,oev: the "narrow" socialist
gtro.up broke away from the Social Democrat Party as a ullanci.st Party of the
labcr class." The two persons destined to become the most influential
leac:ors of the Communist movement in Bulgaria, Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil
Nolarov? v:ore members of this ;,roup, In 1919 the party became the
Bulgarian Communist party and eni;ored the Communist international: which
Dinitrov and Kolarov helped to create.
The Dalgarian Party 'Congress in 1921 adopted as its goal the Soviet
form of dictatorship of the proletariat and proclaimed as an indispensable.
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prerequisite for accomplishment Of the aims of Germanism the alliance
of workers and peasants under the leadership of the writing class.
The ill-fated Comaunist uprising against the Bulgarian Governmnt
on 17 September 1923/ later described as "premature" by Dimitrov, re-
sulted in the outlawing of the party. Dimitrov, Kolarov and other.
leaders fled from the country and became actively associated with the ?
Comintern and the Soviet Politburo/ directing from abroad the underground
activities of Bulgarian Communism. During the next twelve years there
'was constant factional dissension within the party, which WaS resolved
-when Dimitrov, faithfully following the dictates of the Comintern,
succeeded in 1935 in discrediting the "deviationists"/ charging them
with the bombing of the Sveti Hedelya Cathedral in 1925 and failure to
aid in the suppression of the Tightest coup dletat of 19311, which re-
sulted in the outlay/1'c of all Bulgarian political parties.
Having purged its ranks of dissident elements and completely
bolshevized the party/ Dimitrov/ echoing the Comintern, adopted the
propaganda them of fighting against Fascism. The Party Plenum of
February 1936 pointed out as the irnodiate task of the party the building
of a popular anti-Fascist front of "democratic" organizations with the
ostensible goal of restoring those rights which the Fascist dictatorship
denied. The Oomunists had no difficulty in securing the support of ari
opposition grouec..) in these objectives..
Upon entry of Bulgaria into 17orld War II, these segments of
the popuirition ai-vosecl to the pro-German Goverment immediately began
partism activity. The Communists quickly assumed leadership of these
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efforts Years of underground and partisan activities in Bulgaria,
directed by Diraitrov? Kelarov and other Bulgarians in lios caul, had
built up a tight and well-disciplined Bulgarian Comanist organization
ready on Bulgariats?surrender to impose its leadership on the completely ?
d_iscrganized country.
In keeping Tdth a Coramunist policy of "outward" cooperation with
all socialist parties and trade union movements for the ultimate pur-
pose of dominating them, the first Fatherland Front which staged the
successful coup of 9 Jeptomber 19114 was nor:Li/1,131y a coalition of four
parties?Zveno, Agrarian, ? Social Democrat, and Comcluaist. Of these
groups, however, only the approximately )10,000 Com:mists were homo-
geneous and effectively organized with a definite plan of action, although
the three other parties represented at least 75 percent of the Bulgarian
people.
The non-Communist coalition parties were all represented in the
new cabinet under the ostensible leadership of Kiraun Georgiev (Zveno)
as Prime-..inister, The strategic iiinistries of interior and Justice,
controlling the lie-lice and courts, were reserved by the Connunists. With
the support of the occupying Red Army it -would undoubtedly have been
possible to effect an imnediate Comurrist dictatorship for Biagaria, but
the USSR apparently decided that it rmtad not be expedient to disclose
its ultimate pl ens for Delgaria before the peace treaty negotiations had
been completed.
To the dismay of the great majority of the Bulgarian people, the
Communists, under the cloak of the armistice provision that Bulgaria wipe
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out all Facist-type organizations, immediately set about the wholesale
purging of all elments optposed to Comunism. ,It is estimated that during
the -first year of the Fatherland Front at least 3,000 persons mre executed
through olegal" action while several times that number were put to death
without trial. Thousands were thrown into Plaboreducationaln camps.
Supported and directed by the Soviet delegation in the Allied Control Com-
mission and by Bulgarian Coarmnists newly returned from Lloscoul the Com-
munist -.--)artisan forces came out of the underground and established their
control throughout Bulgaria, disaming all other elements including the
few units of other Fatherland Front parties which possessed arms. The
police, accused of being pro-Fascist, were replaced by a Communist-directed
People's iiilitia, and leadership of local govennaent units MS seized by
the Cbmunists. Although the arty was ostensibly under Zveno Party
leadership, top Communist administrators were filtered into the i;ar
i.iinistry 7.-itia the r'sult that a drastic any purge was effected. The
Coiramists were aided in their effort to control the government by the
development of splinter groups in the other coalition parties, at least
some of which were fostered by deliberate Comm-list tactics.
The situation on the eve of the 19145 national elections was
critical for uninterrupted continuation of Communist control. Nikola
Petkov? the leader of the numerically superior Agrarian Party withdrew
from the Fatherland Front and attempted to take his entire party with
him. A small splinter group which remained within the Fatherland Front
was ilIT-ae dial; aly recognized by the Front as the only legal Agrarian Party.
The sane procedure followed with the Social :Democrat Party. Kosturkov,
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a member of the Radical Party, vhich vas too snail even to be included
in the original Fatherland Front, indicated willialiposs to join the
cabinet and was made flinister of -3ducation. Although his party dis-
avoved him, the Communists officially announced that five parties sUp)orted
the Fatherland Front, udth Kosturkov as leader of the fifth party.
The Agrarian and Social Democrat opposition parties boycotted
the polls, despite the fact that their right to participate in the elec-
tions had been insisted upon by the US and UK as members of the Allied
Control Commission. The op)osition nlaimed that the ministries most
closely concernedvrith the elections (Interior and Justice) vete in the
hands of Communists, and that the militia, courts and electoral machinery
vould be employed in such a nay as to assure a Columnist victory. Specific
objections vere made to the reduction of the age for voting and office-
holding, to the granting to the army and militia of the right to vetetand
to exclusion of the opposition from use of the radio. The opposition vas
further discouraged by a nanny adopted TAW for the Defense of the Peoplels
Authority, vhich provided for the death penalty for the formation or
leadership of any "Fascist organization aimed at veakening or destroying
the authority of the Fatherland Front, and for any action that provoked
disorder or discontent.
Despite repeated US and UK protests that election conditions nere
unsatisfactory and that any government so elected vas not truly repre-
sentative, the 'elections vore held. The anistry of the interior announced
that 05 percent of those eligible had voted, and that the Fatherland Front
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had :f4eceived 08 percent of the votes cast. By prearrangement, the
splinter Agrarians uithin the Front and the Communists each received
about one?third of the seats in the assembly.
At the lloscou Conference in December 1945: the three foreign
ministers agreed that the Soviet Government would give friendly advice
to the Bulgarian Govarnment uith regard to the desirability of the inclusion
in the Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front, nou being formed, of
an additional tuo representatives of other democratic groups, uhe (a) are
truly representative of the groups of the parties :Lida are not participating
in the government, and (b) are really suitable anduill York loyally rzith
the governments" Leaders of the opposition Agrarians and Soniad Democrats
uere willing to participate on these terms but nade additional demands
forneu elections, the right of the opposition to be represented in the
ranistries of Interior and Justice, and the release of imprisoned party
members. Lbs con informed the government in Sofia that such denands were
contrary to the Los= Agreement, and another Communist?dominated cabinet
uns installed,
The opposition parties actually participated in national elections
held in October 1246 after Bulgaria became a republic under even more
restrictive conditions than those to uhich they had objected in 1945G
Protests by the US and Great Britain brought forth bland denials that
any adverse conditions existed and assurances tha Bulgaria was complying
wholeheartedly in the Allied demands for free and open elections. Actually,
the elctions were narked by Communist resort to hooliganism and physical
violence. The official results showed 364 seats for the Fatherland Front
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and 101 for tile opposition, with the opposition polling a million and ?
a quarter VOtOS 0 The cabinet subsequently formed was headed by Premier
&corgi Dimitrov, former Secretary?General of the Third International,
The Communists, having obtained a nominal ascendancy in Bulgaria
under a thin veneer of legality, proceeded imediately with the task
of crushing opposition forces. A mounting series of alleged plots and
conspiracies against the Fatherland Front Government: conveniently im?
plicating opposition leaders, were discovered at opportune intervals.
All opposition newspapers 1-rere d,raduelly suspe.nded. In Jeptember 19147
after a trial conducted with a typical disregard of all Viestern concepts
of justice and. judicial procedure, the Agrarian leader Ni'kola Petkov was
condemned to death and hanged. In the following yearoKosta Lulchenr,
leader of the Social Democrats, and eight others were convicted of treason
and sentenced to prison. Since then the Communists have disposed of all
other apposition leaders estirnted by the Communists to have sufficient
actual or potential following to threaten immunist control'.
2. Government Structure.
? In September 1946, the, monarchy was abolished by plebiscite, and
Bulgaria became a republic,. A constitution, adopted in December 1947,
outlined a democratic form of F.,overnment structure. This "governErnt",
however,. has served only as a legal facade for the real authority in
Bulgaria?the Central Committee of theBulgarian Communist Party and
its elite Politburo whose members are appointed alxi removed on orders
from the Kremlin. In a widely publicized speech, Prime Ilinister Chervenkov
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statsd that "no constitution, no organization, no personality in
Bulgaria can be held above. the Central Committee and the Politburo."
"The Central Cornittee," he declared, "is responsible for everything in
our country." ?
The formal divisions of the government are completely controalPd by
members of the Stalinint hierarchy of the Communist Party. All important
-posi7,5ions are filled by Communist Party members of those ample-bay sub-
missive to that party. Intense Soviet fear of deviation from Ubscow.and
failure ef oven-ambitious economic planning for Soviet exploitation of
Bulgaria have motivated 'a Continuing purge of government and party officials.
Although. Bulgarian Communists hold the positions, it is reliably reported
that Soviet citizens actilally direct operations in key ministries.
Ito The Constitution.
A tremendous Communist propaganda campaign by the Fatherland
Front before the 19146 elections, featured a draft constitution prepared
by a Communist-dominated commission in the image of the &evict 1936
Constitution. ath comparatively minor changes, the draft uas adopted
by the Grand Uational Assembly on I. December 1947. It is democratic in
form and language, but all liberal provisions and Guarantees have, in
practice, been nullified by the adoption of restrictive laws permitted
by its loose wording and by arbitrary action of police authorities.
The constitution provides that all authority emanates from the
people through referendum and the free, general, and direct election
of representatives in the Kational Assenbly, called "the supreme organ
of state authority." All citizens over 18 regardless of sex, nationality,
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race or religion are entitled to vote. Equality of all citizens, in-
violability of the person and the hone, and freedom of religion, speech,
the press', cammnication and assembly are declared to be basic.
The foundations are laid for modern social legislation: labor is a
right of each citizen, with renumeration proportionate to quantity and
quality of -i-Jorlc.; the state insures pension rights and indemnities in case
of illness, accident, unemployment and old age; public health service is
insured; marriage and family are under the protection of the state; educa-
tion is a right, primary education being free and compulsory; rights and
protection of minorities are gneranteed; aid in the development of science
and art is promised.
The constitution further provides that "the land belongs to those
who cultivate it" and that private ownershil) and its transfer by inheritance
"are recognized and protected by law." Such guarantee is being increasingly
circumscribed by the tide extension of state ormership and monopoly and by
broad undefined terms of the state-controlled Economic Plan repeatedly re-
ferred to in the .Constitution.
Since the National Assembly has sole .authority to amend the constitu-
tion,: adopt all laws and determine their constitutionality, Communist con-
trol of candidates to the assembly means control of the country..
b. 7.1cecutive.
The government (Council of ilinisters) is thEi supreme executive
and efirdnistrative organ of state authority, and consists of the President
of the Council of T.Inisters (Premier), the Vice-Presidents (Vice Premiers),
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the ?resident of the State Planning Col_luission, the President of the
Commission for State Control, the President of the Committee for Science,
Art aad Culture, and the Einisters. In the present..1-ouncil there are
eighteen ministries.
(AppondlY B lists members of the Council of anisters as of
1 Auc.lat 1950.)
Praesidium.
m?
In keeping with Soviet practice, the function of Chief of State
is vested in a Praesidium, elected and subject to dismissal by the
national Assembly. The Praesidium consists of a president, two vice
presidents, a secretary, and fifteen
?
ers. Its pomers technically
include convoking the assembly, promulgating all lans,. exercising right
of pardon, acting in place of the assembly Ilhen that body is not in
sessf.on (but subject to confirmation by assembly), appointing and
recaaing diplomatic representatives and receiving foreign diplomats.
The authority of the Praesidium? however, is so limited by restrictions
that it takes no independent action.
(10 Leclislature.
The national Assembly is nominally the supreme organ of state
authority and the sole legislative body. Peoplels representatives are
elected for a four year term, one representative for every thirty _
thousand inhabitants. In the present assembly elected in December 1949,v
there are 240 members. To preserve the fiction of a Fatherland Front,
156 t.re listed as Communists, 40 as Agrarians, and 36 as "Independents"
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In reality, all of the members are Communiet?approved in advance,
a sievsle electoral list of "Fatherland Front" candidates being
presented to the voters, There is no provision for voting against
a candidate and blank ballots are considered to be in favor of the list,
According to the constitution, only the assembly passes and
interprets laus and decides on their constitutionality. It elects
the "Government" (Council of illnisters), and the Praesidiuml adopts
the State Economic Plan, adopts the budget and determines taxes, con?
trols the referendum, and decides questions of Tier and peace, Since
the elimination from the assembly of actual opposition in 1947, all
assembly votes have been unanimous and by acclaim. Its sole? function
undw the present Communist regime is to give rubber stamp approval to
action previously determined by Communist Party leaders*
(4? 221111.4212:?
The constitution provides that "judges are independent; in
issuing their decisions, they obey solely the laws" Supreme judietel
supervision over all courts is exercised by the Supreme Court those
members are elected by the National Assembly for five years. The &hie
Prosecutor, charged uith "supreme supervision of the strict application
of the laws," is elected by the assembly for five years and appoints
and dismisses all other court prosecutors.
In flarch 1943, the asseobly adopted the "Lau on the Organization
of the Peoplels Courts" uhich provides for the administering of justice
by the Supreme Court, the Regional, District and local Peoplels Courts,
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and other special courts instituted by special laws. In general, the
District Courts have original jurisdiction and the Regional Courts
and the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. The constitution reserves
to the assembly the authority to determine the constitutionality of laws,
A striking instance of the flexibility of Bulgarian judicial
procedure to meet an-runist needs was the adoption of the ItLaw for the
Trial of lie:tabors of the Government" on 20 Octobt-r 1949. This measure
provides for trial by the Supreme Court of government officials for
crimes committed by them in their official capacity and simultaneously..
for any other crimes outside their official capacity. The simultaneous
indictment of any person associated with them in such crimes is also
authorized. This law thus permits the almost immediate sentencing, with?
out right of appeal, of those deemed dangerous by the Communist rej_me.
The defendant is allowed only seven clays after the service of the
indictment to prepare his casep and the government must bring the case
to trial within one week thereafter. By the timely passage of this law,
T.raicho Rostov was hanged seventeen cicvs after service of the indictment.
f. Local. Government a
Local government under the constitution is administered by a
People ts Council for each municipality and county, members of which are
elected for a term of three years. The councils have constitutional
authority to carry out all economic, social and cultural enterprises of
local interest and to promulgate and implement economic plans and budgets
within the limits of the State 3conomic Plan and Budget* Because of rigid
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Corm:dot control of local elections as troll as of all council actions,
the councils serve merely to disguise, under the fiction of representative
govemuent, the dictatorship a the Communist Party, which is exercised
throu .11 a parallel party structure?
3. '7,ouraunist, Political Control.
a. Political Parties?
Bulgaria is rapidly approaching the form of the Soviet single-
party state. Flominally., two of the parties oricj.nary comprising the
Fatherland Front coalition still rmain in existence?the Communist
and Agrarian. The latter makes use of the name of the party rhich: before
its extermination in 1947, was the largest single politica/ party. On
several occasions before King Doris outlawed political parties, it had.
received a clear majority in national elections.
To preserve the appearance of a democratic government, the Com-
raunict Party goes through the motions of presenting its single list of
candidates through the fiction of a Fatherland Front coalition. Communist
leaders, however., lose no opportunity to point out that the party is not
subservient to the Fatherland Front but is, rather, its directing force.
(1.) The Communist Part,
The Communist Party is the pre-eminent political organization,
superior to, and controlling the Government of 13ulga.ria.
(a) _ L.,Or-anizational Structure.
According to the statute of the party, which follows
the basic pattern of that of the USSR, the following groups constitute the
main organizational structure: ThePa_ .aty...22.12.2.s.2.-Pr is the "supreme organ
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of the party." It meets once every too years and "establishes the tactical
line of the party on basic questions of current policy" The Central
Committee "determines the manner pf election" of delegates to the
colvresses. The Congress elects the Central Oarriittee and determines the
numher of its _.-embers. The Central Committee is charged with the "organize-
tion" of a Politburo for its political work, an Oreanization Bureau "for
the general direction of organizational work:" a Secretariat "for current
mit of organizational-executive nature," and a Central Control Commission
for "party control." BetuDen party congresses the Central Committee
convokes a jj_12.tiatIl_Parnfer2Ig_ilLElsa at least once a year. Delegates are
elected by district and urban committees of the party, but the "norms
for representation" and "the manner of election" are determined by the
Central Committee.
Theoretically, the conference can remove Central Om-
mittee members, and can fill vacancies from the list of candidate members
selected by the congress. In practice, however, supreme authority and
leadership of the Communist Party and through it, of the country, is vested
in the Central Committee and the Politburo. Georgi Dinitrovuas Secretary-
General of the ientral Committee, consisting of approximately fortr members,
until his death in July 1949. Since that timovno successor has been
officially ruined, but Prime Einister Wilco Chervenkov, although nominally
designaued First Secretary, occupies DinitroOs former position,
(The members of the Politburo and Central Committee are
listed in Apendices C and t.)
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(b) iaborshi
Vasil Kolarov announced to the Bulgarian Fifth Party
Congress in December 1948 that membership of the party comprised 500,000
"perfectly organized and disciplined" Yorkers, In June 1950 at the party
conference, Premier Cnervenkovadnitted that over 90,000 members had been
eliminated since the congress and that the medbership consisted of 420,045
members and 13,307 candidate nedbers,
The social composition of the party announced to the
Fifth Party Congress uas as follows:
Lierkers 27%
Peasants 115%
3mployees (presumably civil
servants) 16%
Craftsmen 6%
Others (students, houseuives?
etc,) 6%
According to Chervenkovs, the composition of the party had not changed
appreciably since December 1948; but be emphasized the fact that new
membership recruits had been drawn too heavily from the civil servant
groups and that the number of unrkers should be increased. The number of
yomen nembers, 61,206, vas stated to be entirely insufficient,
(c) Leadershie,
The individual stature of leaders of the Bulgarian
Omnaanist Party has mnrkedly declined in the past eighteen months. Com-
munist control in Bulgaria from 1944 to 1949 as in the hands of able
Bulgarian Communists uho had participated in the machinations, of inter-
national Communism for the past taenty years, The loading Communist,
Geor3i Dimitrov, and his first deputy, Vasil Kolarov, fled from Bulgaria
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after the ill-fated 1923 Communist uprising and remained in the Soviet
.jnion until 194./1.. The coq-dete subjugation of opposition to Communist
control of Bulgaria vras accomplished under the leadership of these con-
vinced Communists.
The party maintained a facade of solidarity until the
early port of 1949 then Traicho Kostov,, the heir-apparent to Dinitrov, Pas
deprived of his party and government positions and later (December 1949)
tried as a traitor and hanged. "Irestovisra" has become the Balgarian
synonym for any deviation from absolute subservience to nos= and to it
has been attributed the failure of Bulgaria to meet the requirements of the
lobscow-directed economic plans. After the deaths of Dini troy and Icelarov,
a ruthless irom1in carnaign pas launched to eliminate top Bulgarian Com-
munists Phose loyalty to I:lose= might be secondary to their -Bulgarian
patriotism. According to pronouncements of the hierarchy, the resultant
party purge, thich has already taken a toll of from 15-20 percent of its
membership, including hundreds of high ranking members, via continue..
(2) The Fatherland Front Coalition,
The Fatherland Front inhich formed the first postuar govern-
ment of Duleria -pas made up of four political parties rzhich actuaijy
represented the masses of the people in the following order: Agrarian,
Social Democrat, Communist and Even?, The extremely small Radical Party
.was added :later. The Agrarian and Social Democrat leaders, although opposed
to Communism and suspicious of Communist tactics, recognized the necessity
of joining in the coalition but mistakenly thought that their nuraeriri-iny
superior representation would prevent them from being submerged by the
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Corm:mists. As outlined in Chapter IB? the Communists have cleverly
and :7utLlessly used the Fatherland Front to: (1) secure, initially,
a coalition of existing political parties; (2) naintain the ficbion of
coalition by exterminating the actual party representatives and leaving
in the Front a splinter group of Communist collaborationists under the
name of the original party; and (3) bring about the disbandment of the
collaborationist parties as fast as practicable.
The Fatherland Front?which is the sole Bulgarian political
organization tolerated by the Comunist Partyhas degenerated into a
convenient Communist organization. The Fatherland Front (i.e. Communist)
ticket is the only one presented to the people for their automatic approval.
Apparently the Communists, in view. of stolid peasant resistance to con-
muni2,ation and collectivization programs, still feel it necessary to main-
tain the fiction of Agrarian participation as a party wititha the Front.
The :-Pront has also become an ideological catch-all for the numerous ani
overlapping political control organizations which have been set up by the
Communists for purposes of coercion and propaganda,
bl?, Political Pressure.
"The 'mechanism' of our People's Oenocracy consists of the djrecting
force, in the person of the Communist Party?vangnard of the worker's class--
and of a series of 'transmission belts and 'levers' which help the vanguard
with the workers' class, the peasant, craftsmen, people's intelligentsia--
the nass of the uorking people ...," said Vulko Chervenkov in June 1949.
Under the direction of the Communist Party, Bulgarians of all
ages and both sexes have been regimented into country-side mass organiza-
tions. These organizations are the "transmission belts" for disseminating
a constant flau of Soviet ideology to every Bulgarian and for extending
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Communist domination into every
possible field of popular activity and
. interest including labor, education, culture, and recreation*
Among the more important of these Oommunist-controlled organiza-
tions, 'with their Oonaunist-cla-ined membership are: Bulgarian Trade
Unions (MPS), over 1,000,000; Bulgarian Tlone&s Union, 6005000;
Dimitrovian Union of People's Youth, 6005000; Union of Bulgarian-Soviot
Societies: 1,100,000; General Farmers" Trade Union, 10200,000* These
'organizations serve the purpose of direct popular country-tide control,
not only in the larger cities but in the griarksst villages* The Bulgarian
Home Radio jervice, for example, reported in January 1950 that the Sofia
division of the. Bulgarian-Soviet .society consisted of 469 separate organi-
zatiOns with branches "in almost all enterprises and offices of more than
30 workers said official s.11 The many mass organizations serve ideally as
forties for the constant reiteration of Communist propaganda aimed at the
ideological reorientation of the Bulgarian people*
c. Secret Police*
Communist ideology, forced on the Bulgarian people at a constantly
increasing tem)o through every conceivable medium of thought-control, has
made converts of a maxinura of 10 percent of the population. However, through
actual force, exercised principally by the People's 1.1ilitia, the Communist
? regine holds the entire population of Bulgaria in complete subjugation*
The Law- for the People's LIilitla, adopted on 25 LIarch 1948, gives
the Lanister of Interior supreme power over the militia which., in turn,
is given practically unlimitedauthority over the lives of all Bulgarians*
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Little is knoun concerning the actual composition and operation of
the JilitiMother than as set forth in the above law),thet makes nuncrous
references to special laws that may be invoked uhen necessary.' Probably
the most powerful divisions are the Uniformed Mitia (a militarized body
uJeiel is organized territorially and includes the Frontier flilitia and the
Special Eilitia)? the 7,conomic Section, charged uith resoonsibility for
conbating economic sabotage, and the all-powerful State Security Section,
which guards the security of the Ceramist Government of Bulgaria both
inside and ,nitside the country. 1:0 reliable information on militia strength
is available, but total personnel her, been estimated as hij.1 as 120,000.
The high efficiency of the militia is unquestioned. The recent removal of
Anton Yugov, iiinis-ber of Interior since the 1944 coup, and the increasingly
frequent reports of the presence of Soviet LTD personnel in the militia
inchoate the Kremlinis fear (which may or may not be uell-founded) lest
national deviation threaten its most powerful Bulgarian control uoapon.
All basic individual rights are constantly violated by militia
action. The Bulgarian citizen is under constant surveillance; his hone
is subject to entry and search uithout warrant; his telephone is tapped;
even his presence on the street at an unusual hour is challenged by
3111itia mem Thousands of Bulgarians have been seized by the militia men without
re/nal Charge and have disappeared. Their fate?uhich even their
immediate fanilies may never learn?may be forced labor, imprisonment or
execution.
4
arian Resistance to Present Re ine.
Resistance in Bulgaria is largely confined to uishfulthinlelng on
the part of the great majority of the population, that the hated. Communist
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regime vrill be overthrow' as the result of a Soviet defeat at the hands
of the West in a third World War. The popolar loaders under uhom anti-
Communist resistance night have been developed have either been killod by,
the Communists or jailed. A very Lou anti-Communist leaders have escaped
from the country, but tine is erasing from the remembrance of the people the
resistance activities of these leaders, and has probably left sone resent-
nont of their release from the harsh ii Ce of their countrymen.
very organization in Bulgaria that rias a potential source for
stimulating resistance has either been destroyed or thoroughly comuntzed.
The Drthodox Caurch, uith its 6,000,000 menbers, although nominally independent,
is actually under the control of the Ilbscau Patriarchate. Its hierarchy has
been cleared of dissidents. The small, once influential Protestant and
Roman Catholic groups have been even more completely brought under Com-
munist control by replacement of the Upstern-influenced clergy nith those
subservient to the regime, and by the closing of their schools. All cultural
or;aaizations nith Western ties have been disbandedl and the importation of
all books and periodicals from the host has been banned.
Although it is improbable that the Communist regime can readily convert
the advilt population of Bulgaria to its ideology, the atmosphere of
suspicion, horror and fear engendered by the police state,mdnirCzes the
posaLbility of effective organized resistance nithout tangible aid from
outside the country. A sporadic series of trials and convictions of
purported leaders of "resistance" bands are uidely publicized in Soviet
propaganda media. It has been impossible to ascertain, honever, uhether
the resistance groups actually exist or uhether this is merely another Soviet
means of impressing on the people the complete futility of any resistance.
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Since 1949, -6he regime has permitted a large continuing exodus
of the 750,000 Idoslam Turlis uho constitute Bulgaria's only large
minority. Inasmuch as permission to depart from the country has been
granted otherwise only to a few reliable Comunists since 1944, it is
appacent that the regino fears the resistance potentialities of this
homogeneous and almost 'wholly anti-Communist group.
5. ,3t_21Alit
rhe maintenance of a firm hold on Bulgaria is of great strategic
significance to the USSR for the f ollowing reasons: (1) through Dulgarial s
traitional clai rin to Lacedonia, the USSR hopes to be able to continue its
drivT) toward an outlet on the Aegean Sea by encouraging Greek-Bulgarian
hostility; (2) traditional Yugoslav-Bulgarian rivalry can be used as a
pretext for Soviet pressure on Tito; (3) offensively, Bulgaria is a
valuable advance base for spear-heading a Russian drive to the Turkish
straf_ts; (4) defensively, the loss of Bulgaria nould open a natural invasion
route to the Soviet Ukraine; and (5) the loss of Bulgaria? which traditionally
has been regarded as the most Russophile of any of the Satellites would be
a major blow to the prestige of the Soviet Union.
Although the overwhelming majority of Bulgarians are opposed to the
re,give? the 'government has complete police control* The only present threat
to Soviet supremacy in Bulgaria is fram ITithin the party itself. Before
the i',,renlin can assure its hold on Bulgaria, it must ensure the absolute
loyalty of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The tremendous continual party
purge since 1949 indicates that the Soviet Union considers its control of
the Bulgarian Party to be imperfect. Indeed, it is probable that large
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segnents of thepartyare restive under tie increasing exploitation of
the country by the tL.3fl0 There is, however, no indication of any wide-
spread organized Dalgarian Gaanunist opposition which might threaten
Soviet control.
Soviet dopination of the party? amyl police, and coverniamTb seens?
under current conditions, sufficient to naintain the stability of the
present regine by force if necessary.
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CHAPTER, II
ECONOUTC SITUATION
10 Present Economic Situatione
The economic value of Bulgaria to the USSR is slight. Elneral re-
sour es of uranium and other non-ferrous ores, however, are assuming
increasing importance to the Soviet Orbit. Under certain military condi-
tions, the country may provide some logistical support to the Soviet?
Union, but it cannot be considered as an important economic asset to the
Soviet Orbit.
71conomic progress since the uar has been slog and sporadic. Indus-
trial '_,utput is barely equal to that of the prewar period. Predominantly
a land of small peasant farms, Bulgaria lacks developed facilities and
capital goods for major industrial progress, and development is contingent
on imports of coal, coke, oil, iron, steel, equipment, machinery, and
chemicals. 3loctric pouor is also in short supply. Transportation
facilities have always been poor. The railroads, althourththey have
carried an umrecedented volume of traffic, have not mot planned goals, and
failure to meet schedules has seriously interfered uith planned production
in some sectors of the country.
Agricultural production has risen and in some instances equals the
prewar status. Grain production and livestock numbers in 1950 Should
amproximate prewar averages; the output of industrial crops, particularly
tobacco, the chief export, and beet sugar, has risen sharply. Collec-
tivization, disguised; .1 as a cooperative movement, has not yet attained
?
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;13:1CIII2
full achievement, although Bulgaria is the most highly collectivized
of the Soviet Satellites. The tempo of further collectivization u--11
be largely governed by the availability of agricultural equipment, most
of which Trill have to be imported, although the industrialization program
includes the domestic development of the agricultural machinery industry.
Soviet control over the Bulgarian economy, and therewith over
Bulgarian politics, is increasing. The USSR has tightened its authority
by: (1) forcing the Bulgarian oconow to coordia:.te its activities 'more
closely Trith other Soviet bloc countries under the Kremlin-dominated
Council for 'conomic Liutual Assistance; (2) placing more Soviet personnel
in the administration of key economic rui nistries; (3) -increasing the num-
ber of Soviet advisers and technicians in important lines of the economy;
(4) dictating certain trade agreements; and (5) acting as a middleman in
the disposal of certain important Bulgarian exports. The present Bulgarian
Five-Year Plan itself vas undoubtedly dram with Lbs coups guidance and
approval.
The fundamental aims of Bulgarian economic planning, as in all Com-
munist countries, are to communize, modernize, and industriAli ze. A
prewar production ratio of 70:30 between agriculture and industrial
production is to be replaced by a ratio of 45:55 by the end of 1953. To
meet this ratiof, industrial output would have to rise to more than double
the 1948 production by the end of the Five-Year Plan. Principal emphasis
is on heavy industry, uhtich is to absorb 33 percent of investment funds.
The heaviest investments are being directed toward the development of
electric power and mining, and the mechanization of agriculture.
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Thus far, Bulgaria has been the least successful of all the Satellites
? in the execution of its industrial Program. The Tue-Year Plan (1947-191.0)
nissed certain scheduled goals b,; 'aide nargins. The current plan appears
to be, faring no better. Industrial production is lagging, and despite
effwts to maintain average qualitative standards, production of defec-
tive materials is high. Schedules for industrialization will most cer-
tainLy not be met. Both materials and equipment are lacking, and there
are phortages of industrial managers, technicians, engineers, and skilled
20 12.1.21a1
Agriculture dominates the Bulgarian econorly? provides a means of
livelihood for about thee-quarters of the total popillation, and accounts
for about 90 percent of allexports, Small peasant holangs have aluays
predominated; in the preuar period, no holdings exceeded 100 hectares, and
09 percent of the 900,000 farms were 10 hectares or less. This number
uas augmented in 1946 by the redistribution of 134,690 hectares belonging
to uolls" (ouners of 10 hectares or more) and the former estates of
Southern Dobruja.
The aye-Year Plan calls for a 57 percent increase over 1939 levels of
agrieultural production. To accomplish this, the government bn-q stressed
the Cormation of "farm" cooperatives, uhich could readily be converted into
collectives. A surelus of landless and narginal peasants ha made possible
the -past growth of cooperatives from 110 units in 1944 to 1,605 units in
1950. One general limitation on the government 7s program from nou on is
the Iced to avoid peasant resistance on a scale that mould jeopardize the
Bulgarian econow. To achieve linited objectives the government has a
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82CEL:le
strorg weapon in its control over the limited saeply of fertilizers seeds
and rachinery. A second limitation on collectivization plans is the
availability of mechanized agricultural equiment. It is doubtful rthethor
either machinery or the amount of arable land in coo)eratives uill be
sufficient to achieve a planned increase from 3 percent in 19/49 to 60
percent in 19530
Bulgaria ie divided into four major agricultural areas: the Danubian Table-
lands, the Balkan Mountains, the Central Depression, and the Southern Highlands?
Land use is estimated as 41 percent arable, 33 percent in forests: 10 percent
in meadows and pastures and 16 percent other. Approximately three-quarters
of the arable land is planted in uheat and maize. The soil is generally
fertile. The chief hazard is droughts which is chronic in the Southern
highlands and frequent in the Danubian Plains. 2,xcept for rough pasture
lands, the Balkan Mountains are unimportant agriculturally. Along the
Danube, uheat and nAize production predominates. The principal crops
grown in the Central Depressions uhere comparatively intensified agricul-
ture is practiced, are corns wheats roses: and sunflowers. Specialty crops,
such as tobaccos fruits, vegetables, rices and cotton cone from the
Southern ili-fhlands.
Government plans provide for a considerable improvement in agricultural
equipmnt and jractices. As an initial steps in 1940 the government requisi-
tioned heavy farm machinery to form the 36 machine tractor stations now in
operation. Because there is no domestic production of heavy agricultural
equipaent such as conbiness tractors, and threshing nachiness the establish-
ment of a planned 150-tractor station networks essential for servicing co-
operatives, is de2endent upon imports, mainly from the US3h. The Five-Year
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SECRST
Plan calls for an increase in the tractor pool of from 4,200 to 10,000
units. Annual domestic fertilizer utilization is set at 65,000 tons for
1953 an amount exceeding the consumption of the entire country betueen
1935-1944. Although those objectives are not likely to be net, a gradual
improvement over present day yields is likely to result from a continuation
of the better rotation system introduced by the Germans; elimination of
strip farming; the use of irproved seeds, fruit trees, and brooding stock
from the neuly organized state farms; drainage and irrigation projects
along the Danube and the Haritza River Vnlley, and superior agro-techniques.
Conrunization, shortage of seed, and drought have combined to prevent
the re-establishment of Bulgaria's preuar position as a food exporter and
have necessitated substantial grain and some potato shipments from the
USSR. Better yields in 1948, after the 1945-1947 drought, have gone far
tauard restoring normal conditions, but --)easant hoardings and refusal
to utilize land fully has necessitated grain imports for the urban
population.
? Meat and rnize occupy about 60 percent of seeded acreage. Other
grains are relatively unimportant and normally account for but 20 percent
of the total cereal crop. Ordinarily, yields are superior to those of the
other Balkan countries.
Output of fruits and vegetables? primarily because of the drought,
has barely regained preuar levels. The chief vegetables are potatoes
and beans, both of uhich were exported prior to 1945. Current potato
production barely meets domestic reqpirements, and bean yields, despite
increased plantings, are still belou preuar.
31
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$I; 6"1-02
Industrial crops have been increasing steadily in importanee over
the past fifteen years and have received special enphasis under the
Comanist regime* Tobacco, Bulgarials most important export, which is
bought by the USSkand resold to the West, exceeds the prewar production
rate. Oilseed crops, sunflowers, soya, and cotton are scheduled to pro-
vide substantial export capacity-by-the end of .the Five-Year Plan. The
planned expansion of cotton output to 20,000 tons(doub1a prewar) by 1953
is to came from Southern Dobruja, and should be enough to meet domestic
textile requirements. The cultivation of roses for essences has declined
to one-third of prewar, although increased plantings are being made as
the result of pressure from the USSR. An analysis of the major crop
yields is outlined in Appendix fi,
Animal husbandry is backward* Half of nil cattle are used entirely for
draft purposes; the other half, for both draft and milking. Livestock
numbers now exceed preuar levels although they suffered from German requisi-
tions in 1943, and from the shortage of fodder crops. Further increases
are elanned by 1953, particularly in the number of hogs and poultry.
Growth in population has outdistanced the rise in livestock nunbers?
however, so that today there is shortage in over-all animal products even
though there are cone exports.
The government has plans for expanding the food processing industry,
which, if accomplished, could make it an important factor in the Bulgarian
economy. Ample facilities already exist to fulfill domestic requirements;
there are 4,000 flour mills, 7 sugar refineries, 15 breweries and 6 dis-
tilleries, 100 canning factories, 6 frozen food and 20 oil extracting
plants. German influences greatly expanded the last three categories in
the late thirties and during the war.
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02.N
3ulgariats urban food rationiur, syste, since its inception in 1941,
has 'peen continually plagued by difficulties created by peasant hoarding
bureaucracy, and poor transportation. Government-P3located acreage and
production quotas theoretically control the utilization of food, but
peasant intransigence has greatly handicapped the Cornunist programs.
These factors are in part responsible for the continued imports of Soviet
grain-160,000 tons in 1949-29 --althouu,h it is possible that a large part
is destined for stockpiling.
3. sorest and Forest Products.
_
3ulgariats uood products industry, uhich is primitive and under-
developed, furnishes the bulk of domestic consunption, except of pulp,
and '??aper products. Newsprint is so critical that circulation of the
two leading Comunist papers had to be curtailed in January 1950.
The Five-Year Plan calls for a 63 percent e.oansion in the wood pro- ?
cessing industry. If attained, this uouldeliminate dependence upon
impcots for construction timber (currently 30,000-50,000 tons from Rumania),
and furnish a Valuable export item. Although 1949 schedules have been mot,
fulfillment of the plan is unlikely. It is improbable that sufficient
felling and Processing equipment Trill be acquired and the necessary trans-
port facilities developed to reach the 1953 goal, awing to its relative
unimortance in the rbit econaw. Indigenous production by 1953 should
cover construction timber requirements, but pulp and paper products nill
still be needed from abroad.
Timber output has increased gradually since 1934, in direct ratio to
tranqportation fasilities. annual growth, between 6 and 605 million
cubic meters exceeded fellings until l947.
33
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The total cut of 5.6 mil/ion
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cubic meterstin 1933 (.9 million for industrial use and 407_ million
for fuel) reached 7 million cubic meters (2 million indubtrial and 5
raillion fuel) by 1949.
L.. Transportation.
Five overburdened rail lines form the backbone of the Bulgarian
transportation system. Practically all freight and passenger travel
is by rail. Although through truck routes are developing, motor haulage
is still largely restricted to urban drayage. liaterborne commerce
prinarily transits the Danube aid Black Sea, and air movements are insig-
nificant. Administration has recently been nationalized by consolidation
of the 13 directorates concerned with transportation into one ministry
trith four administrations (rail, auto, water, and air).
The railway system is one of the,weakest in Zurope. It has long
suffered from undermaintenance, overeiTloitation, and decrepit equipment.
Traffic is too diversified, the largest tonnage being coal (17.6 percent
of all freight), followed by grain (11.1 percent). Line capacity is
limited by shallow road beds, light ballast and rails, sharp curves, and
frequent gradients; double heading of locomotives is required for pally
trains. Average speed in 1946 was 12 miles or hour end the maximum
line capacity was 12 trains daily, with an average of 3 to 10.
-1quipment inventories, although statistically superior to prewar
(135 .:)ercent for locomotives and 1)11 percent for freight cars, comparing
1930 and 1949), are generally obsolete. Because railway equipment
manufacturing facilities have been non-existent, vrith the possible excep-
tion of a plant in Sofia, all rolling stock has had to be imported,
traditionally from Germanyand Austria.. Used equipment of Czech, Polish
3L
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and aerman orijai has constituted the bulk of postwar acquisitions.
Practically all cars are of the liL;ht two-axle type, and a Lou have air
brakes; postwar acquisition of West German air brakes was halted by
Western export controls. Mief repair facilities are in Sofia, Plovdiv
and Goma Orohovitsa. Railway shop capacity, althou;p still inadequate,
is slowly increasinL;0 and a return to prewar efficiency is indicated by
a drop in the number of unserviceable locomotives from 60 percent in
19)al to 12.5 percent in 1949.
Projected and partially completed rail lines would Greatly ease the
current situation and would be of some stratezic importance. A major
difficulty uhidi has developed, hauever, in that the 104 kilometers of nevi
and 27,106 kilometers of repaired tracka3e "contributed" by "volunteer"
youth bri,:ades proved to be unserviceable until it was completely re-
built. Goals of the Five-Year Plan are: (1) an estimated 27 percent
increase over 1949 in tons per train, (2) a reduction in tura-around-tine
from six to five days, (3) lar,Ip increases in locomotives and car inven-
tories, (4) an alrost quadruplinc; of cars with automatic brakes, and
(5) the installation of 161 kilometers of block siznals. Over-all fulfill-
ment is not expected until the late fifties, takinc into consideration
other prior orbit demands. But thanks to Lyeatly intensified use of
existik; facilities and Soviet standards and techniques, the freiGht load
is nearly double that of the prewar period, and existin; deficiencies Day not
be critical for the accomplishment of the Five-/ear Plan. The deficiencies
of the transportation sys'ven would not seriously hamper Soviet military
operations in the Balkans. inistin; roads and raiIrrays -jive the Soviet
Union direct connection across DulL;aria with the frontiers of Turkey,
35
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Greece, and Yugoslavia. These routes are adequate to sup ort
operations against all three of these countries sinultaneous
Libtor transport has always been underdeveloped, uith neither roads,
vehicles, nor neintenance facilities adequate even by the lea stanrinrds
of the Balkans. Accordingly, the government is stressing this field,
planaing the doubling of highuay mileage, a 395 percent increase in
freiht tonnage, and a 59 percent increase in motor vehicles by the end
of the Five?Year Plan. Projected truck and bus routes are to supplement
the mil netuork0 iletor services earn3leling rail lines are to be
eliminated and the equipment is to be shifted to inprove schedules in
areal such as the Balkan ountains, 'where few other forms of modern
tran3portation exist. Under this plan, 35 percent has been added to
road mileage3and freight tonnage hauled has been doubled in the past
tuo 7ears. At this rate of progress, planned increases should generally
be nide on schedule, but even so, vehicle traffic will continue to be
of minor imoortance in Bulgarian transeortation.
The resent supply of trucks, augmented by abandoned German vehicles,
is greater than prevar. :Equipment, except for a fan' spares, must be
imparted. :oat of it comes from the 'USSR, uhich has furnished Bulgaria
1,500 trucks since the uar; supplenontary sources are Ozechoslovaida?
Austria, and France. The problaa of maintenance is formidable, as a
result of the diversified origin of past acquisitions, uhich often
require obsolete parts, and the shortage of skilled mechanics and repair
shop3. The situation is being eased by concentrating imports on a few
Soviet and Czech models, and by increasing the pool of trained labor
and axpanding rejair facilities.
_36
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The Bulgarian Merchant Marine has nluays been small it new con-
sists of about 25 vessels with a gross dead weight of 20,000 tons.
Port capacity is low; stevedore labor is inefficient and underpaid,
and mechanized handling equipment scarce. Oomeotic shipbuilding is
largely confined to the port of Stalin (Varna) uhich has the industryfs
only drydock. Regular sailings are confined to the Black Sea and the
.Danube . There is also an irregular service in the Eastern Llediterrannal..
Bulgarian ships have never been capable of carrying more than a minor
share of foreign trade. But the increase in Soviet-Bulgarian commerce,
uhic:1 reqnjres a comparatively short haul, has led to a greater reliance
on the hone fleet. The shift in foreign trade, uhich is predominately
:aca,cxborne, from Central urope to the USSR has also resulted in reducing
Danube Elver shipments to but a fraction of prounr volume. Stalin has
replaced Bourgas as the leading port.
5, 7errOus Lidnerals and netals.
Lacking facilities for iron and steel production, Bulgaria must
rely upon orbit resources for both current requirements and the equip-
ment and technical assistance necessary to develop domestic production.
Lack of investment capital, poor transportation facilities, and low
domestic requirements previously prevented development of a steel industry,
but naumaterials? except for metallurgical coking coal, are sufficient
to support a small one and the government plans to develop one. The
Five-Year Plan calls for a coking plant, too blast furnaces, and a small
integrated steel nill? Lith a capacity of 20,000 tons of pig iron and
10,000 tons of ravr steel. Inasmuch as construction is not yet undervay,
37
3:3CM
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s2 m7
these goals uill not be met until well after 1953. The relatively .
aln11 deposits of high grade iron ore, nickel,. titanium, tungsten,
chronite? and manganese arebeing increasingly exploited. Their
extraction receives a high priority because they are all in short supply
in the satellite countries.'
6. Uon-Ferrous Einerals and Lbtals.
Dulgariats natural resources of most value to the Soviet Orbit are
its comparatively sroll supply of good qua)-rty ores of copper, lead,
zinc, pyrites, antimony, gold, and uranium. Lith the exception of gold,
ill of these minerals are in short supply in the Soviet Orbit, and for
this reason the deposits are to be vigorously exploited.
Preunr non-ferrous mineral production vas never large, and reserves
Imre only incompletely surveyed. Since the uar, the Corrmlnist regime
has not released data on the extent of deeosits or output. However,
plans for the expansion of production in the Five-Year Plan are relatively
extensive.
Special miphsasis is to be given to the extraction of copper, lead,
and zinc. Eau construction is to include a lead-zinc uprks, a concentra-
ting plant for copper and other ores, and reconstruction of copper
recovewplants for the production of electrolytic copper. This program
is to be accomplished uith the technical and financial help of the USSR.
There is no available accurate information on production of uranium
in Bulgaria. Production at the most important source, the Golen mine
at Dukhova, has been estimated to be about 120 tons of ore per ueek.
The ore is concentrated. at Dukhova and loaded on Soviet vessels at Stalin
38
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61,01.-re
'for slapment to the if6La.
one of the Most acute problems facing the Communist regime in the
exploitation of mineral resources is the shortage of manpower. /In
unustla
high rate of labor turnover and inadequate labor discipline
in 15149 hampered fulfillment of the plan for non-ferrous metal mining
and caused the industry to fall short of its goal by 25 percent. Produc-
tivity has remained among the lowest in 3urope. These factors and the
prevailing ineptitude in the implementation of a socialized economy fore
dooms the attainment of 1953 production plans for non-ferrous ninerals.
Fuel and Fewer.
Developed resources of coal and electric power are barely adequate to
meet current domestic energy requirements. There is no crude petroleum
prodnction, even though large oilshale deposits could be exploited at
law cost. Oil demands are primarily net by imports from neighboring
Rumania. Three kinds of coal are mined: low grade anthracite; a type of
bituminous which is generally unsuitable for metallurgical coke; and a
good quelity of lignite. Production in 1240 was 3.4 million metric tons,
and output in 1949 remained the same. Reserves of bituminous and lignite
are large. About 90 percent of all coal production is lignite from the
Pernik Basin near Sofia. Some 40 percent of total output is consumed by
the railroads, 36 percent by industry (principally to generate electric
porrer)? and 13 percent for private heating. The remaining 4 percent is
exported as lignite briquettes.
Opal supplies are presently inadequate because of the decline in
quality, failure to meet planned goals, and poor distribution; household
39
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consumption has had to be rationed. Good mininc; equipment, left by
the Germans, is marini; out, and the small quantities of USSR machinery
available are of poor quality. Also, inefficiency and unrest aaen:.; the
-liners is keepin?; productivity at a lou level. Under prevailinL; conditions,
the 1253 sal of 6.5 million metric tons ui21 not be reached; it is
doubtful indeed if output will rise much above the current level.
Because of a lack of industries uhich are larze-scale users of
electricity, the development of elecuric )euer has been slow. 7.1ectrieity
is second to coal and fuel wood as a source of ener,ff. Output in 1243,
althouh double thet of prewar (1232) and mainly colzumed bf a la;inc
industry, -was still far s'sort Lf meetinj requiramen.s. .21ectricity is
available to only half of the total population. The present trend is
not so much to increase sneratin capacity as to attain wider distribution.
Li,z_ite fuel and uater -eouer resources are sufficient to permit further
increases in the production of electricity. Dulsaria is handicapped by
lack of equipment, capital? and technical skill. L3oviet urbit production
of electrical equipment has not been adequae to meet Bulgarian and other
Satellite requirements. Therefore, Dularia must look to the Yiesb for
such imports.
The total plant capacity of 127,000 kilouatts in 1946 baroTY
ezcoeded -;.reuar. frora 1947 to 1249 only about 40,000 kilouatts wore
aided. Most of the increase was thermal, but future construction calls for
emphasis on hydro-electricit:, uhich uould alter someuat the 1949 ratio
of 6:4 favorin,; thermal. A planned 110,000 volt nether's:, thick mill be
only )arbiaily complete by 1953, jreatlyha)rove the )auer supply in
ho
.J.
C'?___. 12.
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all but the eastern section of the country. The total capacity scheduled
under the Five-Year Plan (1953) is 460,000 kilowatts. It is estimated
that it will be impossible to construct the 300,000 kilowatts of addi-
tional capacity required to attain this joal because of the generally
law level of technical slri31, the shortage of qualified personnel, and the
dependence upon impLrts from the Met,
8. Chemicals,
The chemical industry of Bulgaria is based primarily on the output
of little more than workshops turning out comparatively large quantities
of crude wood distillation products and small amounts of explosives,
carbides, copper sulfate, glycerine, alcohol, pharmaceuticals, rubber
articles, bone glue, perfume, paints and varnishes. There is no produc-
tion of basic or heavy chemicals, such as sulphuric acid, synthetic
acmcnia? caustic soda, or soda ash, ouch of uhich must'be imported from
stern airope,
Plans for a modern domestic chemical industry revolve around comple-
tion of a single ,')23 million plant at Dimitrovgrad in the Laritza coal
basin. It is estimated that this installation, initially designed by
Austrian specialists, Trill manufacture
annually 230,000 tons of synthetic aunonia and nitrogenous compounds,
Decause construction and equipment of the plant cannot be accomplished
solely by domestic effort, currently inadequate orbit assistance must
be increased if full production is to be attained by 1953.
9. Production EquiAment.
The weakest link in the Dulgarian industrialization program is the
almost complete absence of a machine building industry. The Five-Year
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Plan recognizes th3 vrealmess and provides a goal for l93 that would be
sevenfold 'the output of 1939. Realization of this objective is unlikely
because of domestic shortages in technical labor, special equipment, and
component parts. :Wen if production goals unre attained, domestic re-
quirements must continue to depend largely upon imports. Hence, unless
the Soviet Orbit greatly steps up its aid, uhich thus far has been barely
adequate, ouing to the scarcity of such equiemant in the orbits another
phase of the Five-Year Plan uill remain unfulfilled and-will have an
adverse effect on all segments of industrial development.
The minor posturer production developed so far has been confined to
simple, general-purpose type machines0 such as drill presses; lathes,
milling machines, and planers. None of these are on a mass production
basis; rather, imports from Czechoslovakia and the USSR are now meeting
curranb requirenonts.
10. Textiles.
In terms of employment, the manufacture of textiles is Bulgariats
largest industry. To achieve the planned target for 1953 (production is
to be 230 percent of the 1939 level), efforts are being directed toward
Increasiik; domestic production of.fibres; technological improvements,
and obtaining additional machinery. The government policy is to increase
production in the mills and to decrease that of the village hand loons.
ptimated Production of fla
in thousands of me
or Textiles
ers
Planned
1938
1949
1950
1953
Cotton
30,000
25,000
30,000
90.,000
Wool
3,000
3,100
3:300
7,600
Sint and Linen
2,000
1,800
2,000
4,500
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The industry is deem:lent to a great extent on outside sources,
particularly the USSR, for raw fibres.
Some 60 percent
and 90 percent of raw wool requirements are of domestic
textile industry is
currently serving Soviet interesta.
for example, retain for domestic use only, a small part
of raw cotton
Origin. ?The
Bulgarian mills,
of the yarn spun
from Soviet cotton, The greater part is returned to the USSR.
Postwar growth of the industry has been small, and in vi eu of the
shortages of raw cotton and machinery in the Soviet Orbit and of the
1017 priority apparently assigned to the Bulgarian textile industryi it
is unliltely that the production planned for 1953 um be attained.
11. Domestic Finance,
One aspect of the transition to a Communist econow in 1948 uas
the transformation of the governmentts budget into an instrument of
state planning, and specifically of forced industrialization. Increasingly
heavy government expenditures are financed primarily by the turnover tax
(a levy on all transactions) supplemented by expropriations, a graduated
income tax, "voluntary" loans, and other taxes designed in part to
elirdnate private enterprise.
The 1949 budget of 165 t1 1 ion levas vas Dore than twice the amount
fixed for 1947 and over sixteen tines that of 1939. Revenue of al
billion lavas and expenditures of 202 billion were budgeted for 1950,
the first year for which a planned surplus has been announced. .The
largest sum to be exeended is for the expansion of industry, followed
by national defense and state security, and social nelfare. A lesser
amount is spent for government administration. Um that the transition
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to a ammunist economy has been made, future budgets will not increase
so swiftly, and will shaa more extensive use of soviet budgetary prac-
tices.
Inadequate accounting, gross mismanagement, and excessive production
costs brought about a serious financial confusion uithin the Bulgarian
economy' in 1940. As a result, the government has been forced to resort
to sIpplemental budgets. Uanipulation of appropriations and expenditures
betw3en various categories and the denunciations accompanying the renoval
of the finance Linister in late 1949 indicate obvious mismanagement of
finalcial affairs. The systematic adoption of Soviet methods should
rest re financial order lthin the next year or two. The national finan-
cial plan, like the national budget, aims at developing industrial produc-
tion. The largest capital investments are planned for heavy industry,
tran3portation, and electric pauer development. State enterprises In
1953 are to supply 04 percent of investment income. The remainder is
to cone from wholesale trade and other sources. Unless there is a large
increase over revenue that has so far been derived from state enterprises,
the Ave-Year financial plan 'will not be more thai tuo-thirds fulfilled*
The State Bank, which is accountable to the Linistry of Finance,
cont:.ols the flow of currency, serves as a government fiscal agent, and
handles n11 foreign transactions* The only other important institution
is the investment bgaikl, which provides long-term credits for the invest-
ment plan. The several hundred local popular and cooperative banks are
subwdinate to the National State Bank. Technically, the main function of
the two principal banks is to serve as media for financing budgetary
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operations in accordance vith state economic plans. Lbladninistration
and poor organization of the banking system, however, have largely
prevented it from fulfilling its function.
12.
Bulgarian foreign trade is not significant in world markets* ate
strategic elTorts are small quantities of uranium and other non-ferrous
ores, vhich go entirely to the Soviet Orbit countries. The composition
of trade reflects the difficulties inherent In the industrialization of
Bulgarials predominantly agricultural economy. Imports are largely indus-
trial materials and equipment, and exports are for the most part tobacco
and other agricultural products.
Bulgarian ?amerce vas olau to recover from the effects of llorld War
II. Bulgaria did not receive lend-lease, US var surplus, and UaRRA goods,.
and it vas not until 1947 that the volume of Bulgarian external commerce
approached normal. At first, trade vas monopolized by the USSR. Since
1947 it has been shared more and more by the other Satellites. Trade
vith 'des-tern -ilurope is insignificant, in quantity, although imports from
that area are of increasing importance to the Bulgarian plan for industrializa-
tion.
The Soviet Union continues to dominate Bulgarian trade. The 1949
trade agreement of )113 million involved Soviet shipments of machine tools,
tractors, vehicles, petroleum products, cotton, non-ferrous metals, and
iron and steel manufactures. In return, Bulgaria is to supply principally
tobacco: vith lesser amounts of lead and zinc concentrates, copper and
tin ores, and cement. Tobacco resales to third countries (including the US)
have been of particular benefit to the USSR*
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The Council for !icononic I:utual Assistance (02A), organized in
1949 in Loscow, is to coordinate intra-orbit foreign trade and trade with
the outside world, with the primary aim of furthering industrialization
in the Satellite area. Mats policy of expanding intra-orbit trade will
aid the industrialization of backward Bulgaria, because it will make avail-
able industrial supplies ,that otherwise could not be obtained. In the
period 1946-1949; despi'ue the break with Yugoslavia, the estimated Satellite
share of total Bulgarian exports increased from 17 to 30 percent, and the
share of total imports from 0 to 45 percent. The benefits obtained from
Satellite trade are best illustrated by trade relations with Czechoslovakia.
The Czechs have furnished and pledged to Bulgaria, in part on long-term
credit, a variety of industrial itons such as rolled materials, machinery,
instruments, and chemicals in exchange for foodstuffs and non-ferrous ores.
Czechoslovakia has resisted greater Czecho-Dulgarian trade because the
latter can supply little of value after fulfilling USSR demands0 iloreover?
that which Bulgaria delivers is of mediocre quality. All Bulgarian 1950
trade pacts with :astern Iluropean countries provide for a sharp increase
in the volume of trade. Bulgariats internal difficulties, however, make
it improbable that exports can be appreciably increased.
Bulgarian trade with ',iestern3ureee, even in 1949, then it reached
a postwar high, is but a fraction of the previous annual average. .xports
of ,`,0,5 million to Western ]urope in 1949 were only a little greater than
one percent of total :astern Airopean exports to Western urope? and in-
ports were less than 2 percent of total imports, partly as a result of
Bulgarian reluctance to compensate for nationalized properties. The
principal development with the Uest during 1949 was the restoration of
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relations with Western Gerlany and a dollar increase.. in
trade nith Austria,. The forner reopened to Bulgaria a source for
industrial and precision equipment? while the latter is the Min supplier
of strategic grinding disks and .is a source of railroad equipment.
Practically all the Western Tkropean countries have furnished ball-bearings
and are contributing to Bulgariafa hydro-electric development plans. Future
trade ?relations uith that area will continue on a small scale ? for :)roducers
in 0.3:3C countries seeldng to broaden markets in the face of increasing com-
petition and will be limited by stricter ',export controls on items sought
by 13ulgaria. Commerce with other than 17krope,an countries rrill continue to
be negligible.
13., Standard of
The standard of living in Bulgaria is second to that of Iituca/7?
lthich leads the Balkan Communist countries, but compared to Western.
3urope? it is quite poor. Since 394/4., a gradual improvement in living
conditions in the prewar and war periods has been reversed. The present
situation is as bad as at any tine since 19200 and was caused, in part
by economic dislocations resulting from the war and from the impact of
Cxxamtnist industrialization plans on an indifferent and even hostile
peasant ;population. Liner government efforts to improve conditions vtin
probably have little effect, but may check further declines in the standard
of living.
The diet of the population resembles that of other Southeastern
ikropean countries, in that over 70 percent of the total caloric intake
is otiained from cereals. Consumption of meat and dairy produc-bs is low.
To supplement the meat supply, the goverment has encouraged the expansion
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of the fishing industry; the output in 1950 is to be throe times that of
1939. The country as a whole has a higher nutritional level than that
of Ihmania and Yugoslavia, because the traditional cultivation of vegetables
Penults a more varied diet. Bread, houever? has been scarce in the cities
during the past year; bread rations -wore cut in 1943 and the price has
risen.
The disease rate is high, particularly in the overcrowded urban
centers. Tuberculosis is widespread; 200,000 active cases and 50 deaths
JM ly upre admitted in 1947. Dbdern drugs are scarce, except for
scattered lots of former German supplies and donations from international
relief organizations.
14. rsizaLtior_lanjt-ter_.0
The total population of Bulgaria is increasing gradually. From
slightly over 6 million in January 1935, it grau to 7 million by 1946
(3201000 being acquired from Ernania -with Southern Mbruja), and 'is
estimated at 7..2 million as of January 1950. Approximately 60 percent
of the populace is uithin the torking ages of 15 to 55. The total
population is divided abo-it equally botueen the tup sexes. Density of
Population in Bulgaria (about 6)4 persons per square kilometer) is le%
comdaredulth other countries of airope0 flinorities? including scattered
rural settlements of Turks and gypsies, comprise about 13 percent of the
total.
Government controls, encompassing all phases of labor activity,
regulate the assig:Lment and allocation of the working population. Under
the law of :-/ardi 1940, Persons betunen the ages of 10 and 50, specialists
over 50, and foreign residents are subject to work mobilization. Dere
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recent laws not only subject both _len and uomen to mobilization, bifc., al so
provide that construction workers, defined to include nearly all able-
bodied persons, must contribute time to state or public projects. Various
"Voluntary" brigades and labor "edUcational" camps are an additional source
Of labor. Despite such measures, turnover and absenteeism are aidespread,
ouing to poor uorking conditions and low gages, lioreover, lou :morale and
the shortage of skill ed supervisory porsOnnel are retarding development
of Bulgarials c conomic plane.
The population of BUlgaria is estimated to be 76 percent rural.
Government pi ens call for a moderate grouth in the number of non-agricultural
workers from 080,000 in 1950 to 948,000 in 1953. This viifl be accomplished
only by reducing the present work force .of 2.7 million, and ul 11 depend
in large part on the rate of agricultural mechanization. The government
also plans to induct uomen and youths intc the ranks of nonagricultural
labor.
The. Soviet Union and Ozechoslovakia supply Bulgaria vith technical
specialists. Special courses and apprentice training have been initiated,
and enrolL.ient in vocational institutes is double that of preuar. The
quality of education, honever, is inferior to that available in Germany,.
Italy and other. Ubstern countries.
Independent trade unionism has not existed since 1934, ahen the
government outlawed strikes and organized all workers and employers into
national syndicates. Ubst non-agricultural labor is non enrolled in the
General 'Jorkers t Professional Union (OM'S) vihich includes 32 national
unions,. Tr-Voluntary" ZieMbership rose from around 600,000 in September 1947
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to 750,000 tuo years later* Like the Soviet trade unions, ORPS servos
principally as a channel for political indoctrination, increasinc labor
productivity, and administerinz rationing*
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CHAPTER III
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. 122.72122mgd-211ABleadfin.Eadma2411n.
The surrender of Bulgaria to the USSR on 9 September 1944 and the
?
successful coup d'etat of the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front on 23 SePtem-
? box' established a firm basis for Bulgarian subservience to the tiSSR. The
Bulgarean Armistice provided for supervision by an A]] ad Control Commission
of the Three Powers under chairmanship of the USSR until the effective date
of the peace treaty. The Soviet chairman acted unilaterally to approve Come
munist maneuvers, and by refusal to participate in any discussion of Bulgarian
vio1at!4ons, effectively nullified US and UK attempts to force Bulgarian
compliance with the armistice terms. Until the end of 1947, the mer-riding
Soviet influence in the country was further guaranteed by the presence of the
Red Amy.
A system of interlocking military, political, economic, and cultural
agreements with the USSR and with the other Satellites firmly subordinates
Bulgaria's external as well as internal affairs to Kremlin policy. Bulgaria
became a member of the Cominform at its inception. Together with the other
Soviet Satellites, Bulgaria rejected participation in the European Recovery
Program in 1947 and obediently cooperated in the creation in January 1949 of
the Sariet-sponsored Council of Economic Mutual Assistance, designed to integrate
the eccinomy of the entire orbit under Soviet domination. Bulgaria has faith-
fully echoed the Moscow-led chorus of protests and wer-mongering charges against
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the Atlantic Pact and the Military Aid Program. Bulgarian propaganda
consistently follows the Kremlin lineo
a, Watiana.
The course of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations since 1944 graphically
illustrates the complete dominance of Sofia by Moscow.
Immediately after the Fatherland Front assumed control. of Bulgaria,
a provam of friendship and cooperation between the traditional enemies was
initiated, with the usual political, economic, military, and cultural treaties
and agreements.
The meeting of Tito and Dimitrav at Bled in July 1947 climaxed this
friendship campaign. The Bled Protocol provided for coordination of the eco-
nomic plans of the two countries, a customs union, readjustment of BulgerYugoslro border areas, renunciation by Yugoslavia of the 625,000,000 reparations
awarded to it by the Bulgarian Peace Treaty, an agreement for coordinated
activity in their attitudes toward "frequent provocation by the Greek Monarch
Fascists" and on problems in connection with the Danube ,"which belongs solely
to the countries along the Danube." On 28 November 1947, Tito and Dimitrov
again net and signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and
Mutual Assistance.
The mutual vilification campaigns initiated by Tito's break with the
Cominform revealed the fact that the Bled agreements included plans to in-
corporste Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia into the Yugoslav Macedonian Reptblic.
Undoubtedly this was a part of the larger Soviet plan at that time for the
creation of a subservient Macedonian State which would eventually include
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Greek Nacedonia. The planned seizure of Greek territory probably included
promises to Bulgaria of an outlet to the Aegean through western Thrace in
exchange for the loss of Pirin Macedoniaa
The expulsion of Tito by the Cominform resolution of 28 June 1948
signaled a complete reversal of the vaunted Bulgar-Yugoslav 'malty. Emphasis,
however, is still placed by Bulgarian propaganda on the fact that there is no
quarrel between the Yugoslav people, who are represented as reluctant victims
of Tito's savage police control, and Bulgaria.
Should the Kremlin decide that avert military action must be used to
destroy Tito, not only is Bulgaria in a strategic geographic position. for
launching such an attack, but long-standing Serbo-Bulgarian territorial dis-
putes could furnish an excuse for attack. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian Government
is conducting an extensive campaign to discredit and harass Tito. On Bulgarian
initiative, the Treaty of Friendship and the customs union and border agree-
ments have been abrogated. Bulgaria has hurled against Tito vituperative
charges of espionage and subversion, highlighted by trials of alleged Titoite
spies and saboteurs. On the diplomatic front, Bulgaria has declared almost
the entire staff of the Yugoslav Legation in Sofia 22/15sla...2420,0 Yugoslavia
has retaliated in the same menner.
Bulgaria continues to maintain a stepped-up war of nerves against the
Tito Government by troop activity along the Yugoslav border, frequent border
incidents, constant harassment of,Yaroslav representatives in Sofia, and a
continuing propaganda barrage charging that Yugoslavia plans an attack on
Bulgaria.
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.b.tiSMIUMELPIZadetZle
(1/ biliCiatatiZe
The Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria became effective Oil 15 September
1947 The USSR clepesited its ratification immediately after the hanging of
Naas Petkov and expulsion of the opposition deputies from the National Assembly.
As the treaty provided for the withdrawa1 of occupation troops from Bulgaria
within ninety days after its effective dates, the Soviet Union delayed ratifica?
tion until Communist control was assured by almest complete annihilation of
organized opposition led by Petkov.
Bulgaria,. with firm Soviet support, has consistently violated every
major provision of the treaty, and has either refused to answer or insolently
denied repeated protests of the US and other Western signatories. Tho USSR,
charged jointly with the US and the UK with representation of the Allied Powers
in all matters concerning execution and interpretation of the treaty for eighteen
months after its effective data, effectively blocked repeated attempts of the
Western signatory powers during that period to enforce Bulgarian compliance.
Attempts by the Western nations to secure a satisfactory reply to
a series of notes specifically enumerating flagrant violations of the treaty
by which Bulgaria is bound "to secure to all persons "0 the enjoyment of Inman
rights and of the fandamental freedoms" have completely failed. The USSR has
consistently refused to participate in the arbitration of disputes as provided
by the treaty, and has joined Bulgaria in piously maintaining that (1) every
citizen of Bulgaria enjoys complete freedom and all human rights as set forth
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in the Eulgarian Constitution; (2) the alleged violations are in fact legitimate
acts of the Bulgarian Government in its effort to stump out dangerous enemies
of the state conniving to overthrow the completely democratic government of
Bulgaria; (3) the Western protests constitute meddling in the strictly domestic
affairs of Bulgaria, which the latter will not tolerate; and (4) no dispute exists
inasmuch 813 Bulgeria has always faithfully complied with each provision of the
treaty.
In 1949, the General Assembly of the United Rations, over bitter
protests of the the USSR, placed on its agenda violations of human rights by
Bulgaria, Hungary and Rimiania.By aresolution on 22 October 19490 the assembly
referred to the International Court of justice at the Hague a request for an ?
advisory opinion whether, the diplomatic exchanges between the Western Powers
and the three Satellites constitute disputes under the terms of the respective
treaties, and, in the event of an affirmative opinion, haw the dispute mould
be decided if the three Satellites refused to recognize the existence of a
dispute. Proceedings were stalemated by Satellite refusal to name represents.
tives for arbitration and by the ruling of the International Court of Justice
in July 1950 that the UN has no right to name such arbitrators
(a) Attsgmtue_telut&e_gl,_Qexwjeattjhgn.
Since 25 July 1947, Bulgaria repeatedly has requested admission
to the United Nations. The USSR9s offer to accept Italy and other Western.
sponsored nations in exchange for the admission of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania
was twice rejected? The last proposal, made on 21 June 1949, woad have doubled
Soviet bloc representation in the General AsseMbly.
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:20 &aidaiMILAZ-142.5.2.
The holding of the key chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission
by the 'USSR and the presence of the occupying Red Army in Bulgaria. until December
1947 rendered completely impotent every attempt of the US to break Soviet control
of Rulgaria. During the entire armistice period the US, joined by the UK,
protested consta tly against the terroristic methods by which the 'USSR engineered
destruction of all opposition in Bulgaria through rigged elections, suppression
of basic freedoms, and "judicial murder" of opposition leaders.
Despite the failure of the US to impede the Soviet attempt to subjugate
Bulgaria, the US accorded recognition to the People's Republic of Bulgaria
on 1 October 1947 and exChanged diplomatic representatives. The attempt to
maintain correct relations was unsuccessful from the start? With increasing
insolence, Bulgaria ignored the normal courtesies of diplomatic procedure,
evading entirely or refusing to 'acknowledge repeated US objections to the viola-
tion by Bulgaria of its obligatioas as a civilized government. Attacks upon
the US and its diplomatic representatives became increasingly virulent.
In December 1949, during the trial of Traicho Kostov, the US Minister
in Sofia was charged with espionage and slit/version. These proceedings were
climaxed in January 1950 by a formal Bulgarian demand for the withdrawal of
the minister based on these allegations. The US replied with an 'ultimatum that
the Dulgarian Government either withdrew the request for the ninister'a recall
? or accept severance of diplomatic relations. After four weeks of complete
silence on the part of Belearia, the US, an 20 February, 1950 informed Bulgaria
that it was withdrawing its entire legation and requested withdrawal of the
small Walgarian Legation in Washington. The US pointed out in its formal
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note that Idespite all these difficulties, the US Government wishes to nuaintain
diplomatic contact with Bulgaria because of the sincere desire of the American
people to work toward better understanding with the Bulgarian people" and
reaffirmed its continuing friendship for the people of Bulgaria, although it
had become impossible to maintain its Legation in Sofia "in view of the present
attitude of the Bulgarian Government."
A, Relatioup with Other Western Fame.
Bulgaria still maintains diplomatic relations with major western Euro?
peen powers, although their diplomatic rdssions have been subjected in varying
degree to restrictive measures. Great Britain has borne the brunt of Bulgarian
pressure and in order to keep diplomatic representatives in Bulgaria has had
severely to curtail its activities. Small legations are still maintained by
Italy, France, Switzerland, and Sweden. These are doubtless tolerated because
of their relatively smell influence on, and limited contact with, the Bulgarian
people.
WILLia2110-1=3-9.232101.
The unsuccessfUl attempts of Bulgaria to acquire Macedonia as part of
the Great Bulgaria envisioned by the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) have set a
pattern of strife and bitter enmity between Greece and Bulgaria. Armed Bulgarian
raiders constantly terrorized the Greek Macedonia area in the early 19000s.
Bulgaria attacked Greece in the Balkan Wars of :1913. In both World Wars, Bulgaria
seized and ,occupied part of Macedonia and Western Thrace but was forced out by
the peace treaties.
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At the end of World War II, Greece presented Claims against Bulgaria
for some 6,500 square miles of territory extending across the frontiers of
Western Thrace and Greek Macedonia. Bulgaria countered with claims for access
to the Aegean Sea through territory acquired by Greece from Turkey following
World War 1. The final decision denied Bulgarian claims, fixed the boundaries
as of 1941, and awarded to Greece reparations from Bulgaria in the amount of
$45,000?000? on which payment has never been made.
Bulgaria haa relentlessly pressed its claims to Greek territory and
has continuously fostered unrest in northern Greece. On 3 December 1946, Greece
brought the situation before the UN Security Council, charging Bulgaria, Albania,
and Yugoslavia with aiding Communist guerrillas in northern Greece. The Balkan
Commission appointed by the UN, although hampered in every possible why
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, found that those countries had given such
assistance. A commission remaining in Greece has reported the continued
Bulgarian aid to Communist guerrillas and violation of Greek territory.
Since the defeat of the major portion of the Greek guerrilla forces
in 1949v Bulgaria has Continued to give refuge to guerrillas and their dependents,
harboring 5,000 to 10,000 guerrillas at the present time. Bulgaria has joined
with the other Satellites in refusing to return captured Greek children,
alleging that they are being protected from "Athens aseassins."
Although repeatedly denying UN authority over its peace treaty violations,
Bulgaria has continued to send protests to the UN charging numerous Greek viola-
tions of their common border. However* the UN Special Committee on the Balkans
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stated in-its 1950 report that Bulgaria continues to "give moral and material
assistance to guerrilla raiding and sabotage parties," and added the Special
Committee is of the opinion that the continuing potential threat to Greek
political independence and territorial integrity is to be found at present
chiefly in Bulgaria."
Eattigilial=1-2E112.
Relations between Communist Bulgaria and Turkey are markedly hostile.
Bulgarian-born Turks, of whom there are at least 700,000, constitute.Bulgaries
only large minority. Although the Bulgarian Government claims to represent
the entire Turkish minority, through the participation of a small Communist
group in the assedbly? in reality the Turks have been ruthlessly persecuted0
and large groups have been removed from strategic sections of Bulgaria.
The policy of the Bulgarian Government to refuse to permit its citizens
to leave the country has been relaxed in the ease of those of Turkish origin.
Since 19490 considerable numbers have been permitted to emigrate to Turkey,
apparently in order to lessen the internal threat to the present regime of a
hostile and homogeneous minority and to reap the benefits of confiscation of
property of the emigrants.
Turkish-Bulgarian diplomatic relations have been openly strained
since 1948 when the Turkish military attaches were declared persona non grata.
Charges and counter-charges of provocation of border incidents, oppression of
respective minority groups and violation of their property rights continue to
be exchanged. Bulgarian propaganda claiming aggressive Turkish intentions
continues to be intensified.
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. 12, zl itagliej2W_QUI2
Bulgaria, foreign policy will continue to be directed by the Soy-let Union
to serve its own best interests. It is likely that Soviet policy will continue
to form Bulgaria to maintain its harassment of all diplomatic representatives,
except those of the USSR and those of the other satellites, with the design
of accomplishing complete isolation of Bulgarians from Western contacts. For
the tine being, however, the fiction of Bulgaria as a sovereign nation will be
mairtaf.ned to strengthen the Soviet position by sheer force of numbers in
international affairs and, as a token concession to Bulgarian national pride.
Kthough the Bulgarian political structure is underioing repeated purges
to repLace suspected deviationists, there is no indication of any weakening of
actual Soviet control, nor of the existence of any active resistance movement.
It is, therefore, probable that only a major war and the defeat of the USSR
would 7t'eturn to Bulgaria its freedom of action in conducting relations with other
countri.es.
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CHAPTER IV
MILITARY SITUATION
Since the "liberation of Bulgaria in 1944, Soviet influence has
entirely supplanted that formerly exercised by Germany. A great many
Bulgarian Communists who had served in the Soviet Army during World War
II returned with the Soviet Arm and assumed important posts in the
Ministry of Defense and the command of larger units of the Bulgarian
Army, The presence, throughout the Bulgarian military organization,
of at least 2,000 Soviet advisers increases the effectiveness of Soviet
orientation and strengthens the reliability of the arpy.
Sweeping purges of non-Communist officers from 1946 to 1948 and
their replacement by Communists, although initin13y detrimental to the
efficiency of the armed forces, have made the Bulgarian armed forces
probably the most reliable in the orbit. Soviet emphasis has been
placed on the improvement of the army; the air force and the navy remain
smalL and relatively ineffective adjuncts.
In the event of Soviet-directed hostilities against Yugoslavia, Greece,
or Turkey, it is probable that the Bulgarian Army under its present
pro.,Soviet leadership mould fight well, particularly if successful, Al-
though the average Bulgarian soldier is not a Communist, he is amenable
to dtscipline, imbued with traditional Bulgarian chauvinism, and generally
apathetic politically. Should initial successes be followed by reverses,
the Bulgarian Arlon: as in the past, would disintegrate rapidly.
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The Minister of Defense is responsible for over-all direction of the
armed forces, including supervision of political and military training.
The Chief of the Army General Staff is responsible for general efficiency
of a32 armed forces ,and commanders of ground, naval, and air forces report
to him.
1. Am.
R. agL_zStre.Wiailj2mL_LzaBtk2.
The Bulgarian Army is composed of four armies, consisting of 11
infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and miscellaneous independent
regiments and brigades. The estimated total strength of officers and
men is 105,000. This force is supplemented by an estimated 13,500
frontier troops and at least 30,000 members of the uniformed militia.
The army units are generally distributed throughout the country,
with the following significant concentrations: (1) the Sofia area; (2)
the upper Struma Valley; and (3) the Kurdzhali-Khaskovo-Svilengrad area.
During 1949-1950, particularly during the 1950 summer maneuver season,
there was a general gravitation of troop strength from the southern
frontier to the Yugoslav border.
h. Personnel.
Most of the general officers are politically reliable, relatively
able, and have had varying amounts of combat experience either as partisan
commanders or as officers in the Soviet Army. A high percentage are
graduates of the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. Junior and field grade
officers represent the weakest link in the chain of command, both in train-
ing ard Soviet orientation.
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e.X.1?#416,1-1A
The sweeping purges of non-Communist officers between 1946 and
1948, in which an estimated 10,000 or more were dismissed, created a
severe shortage of trained field grade officers. In order to relieve this
shortage, considerable emphasis has been placed on both political and
combat training of field grade officers. In spite of recent improvements,
it will probably be several years before the trained officer shortage is
eliminated.
The majority of conscripts in the Bulgarian Army are of peasant
origin. The individual soldier is amenable to discipline, has considerable
physical endurance and personal bravery, but is generally poorly educated
and lacking in mechanical training or experience. Through mandatory political
indoctrination courses, the regime is attempting to insure political re-
liability throughout the armed forces.
2. ESBIEDIde
Large quantities of materiel are being furnished to the Bulgarian
Army by the USSR with the ultimate goal of achieving complete standardi-
zation of equipment. There are still fairly sizable stocks of German materiel
in the hands of Bulgarian troops. Bulgarian armored units are equipped
with a minimum of 350 Soviet T-34/85 tanks. At least 80 percent of the
artillery is of Soviet manufacture. The obsolescent German weapons which
are still in use will probably be scrapped in the near future as rapidly
as they can be replaced from Soviet stocks.
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obwmur.
Fire control and signal equipment is believed to be in short
supply. This lack will have an adverse effect on the artillery and especially
the anti-aircraft artillery capabilities.
91211g/111121.
Although reasonablywelI-equipped, trained and led, the Bulgarian
Army alone has limited offensive eapabilities. Nbrale and the will to
fight would probably be relatively high at least initially against Yugo-
slavia and Greece which held territory long coveted by Bulgarians.
Bulgarian enthusiasm for any attack directed against Turkey would be
tempered by a healthy respect for Turkish fighting capabilities.
In a conflict between the USSR and Western Powers, Bulgarian troops
mould probably be utilized for maintaining security within Bulgaria,
occupation duties in areas overrun by the Soviet Army, and guarding
lines of communication. The size of the Bulgarian combat force used
would depend in large measure on the theatre in which it Itz committed.
It in probable that in a Soviet drive against Yugoslavia, Greece, or
Turkey, Bulgarian forces of considerable size would engage in oombat.
Igem.
The Bulgarian Navy is small (2,300 officers and men) and subordinate
to the army. For its primary operational function -- security of the sea
frontier -- the navy is equipped with one over-age destroyer and about
40 miscellaneous small craft, including 16 harbor minesweepers. Naval
headquarters are located at Varna. There are two subordinate naval commands,
the Danube and the Black Sea, with headquarters at Ruse and Varna, re-
spectively. Naval bases are located at Ruse, Varna, and Burgas.
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Coastal elements of t:In frontier troops perform garrison duty
at the naval bases and serve as coast watchers. Although acministratively
unCer the anistry of Interior, those units are probably under local
opere.tional control of the naval base commands at Varna and Burgas. Coast
artillery has been transferred from the navy to the army. The navy's
over all capabilities are weak because of lack of combat experience and
Soviet reluctance to provide modern equipment.
3. Air Force.
The Bulgarian Air Force, which is a component of the armyp has negligible
offensive capabilities and is incapable of defenses against strategic
air attack by a major power, The air corp i personnel numbers about 6,500?
of whom 330 are pilots of mediocre quality. Tactical aircraft consietsof
38 light bombers and 4E fighters of Soviet World War II design, out of a
total aircraft strength of some 210. Aircraft in tactical units are
maintained and 1.ept operational only with the greatest difficulty. Lack
of aircraft suitable for the lift of airborne units precludes their tactical
use in sizable numbers.
Bulgarian air facilities, comprising 37 airfields and one seaplane
station, are inadequate to support a major air effort. 047 two airfields
have hardsurfaced runways (Sofia/Vrazhdebra and Graf Ignatiev).
Biolgaria's Air Force is currently dependent upon imports of planes and
engines from Czechoslovakia and the USSR. Bulgaria's four aircraft plants
have the capacity to produce only a limited output of light training planes
or gliders of wooden construction; and so far as is knownItliere are no air-
craft engine plants in the country. Since the end of World War II, the
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aircraft industry in Bulgaria has engaged only in the repair and maintenance
of a:scraft. Bulgariairequirements for aircraft munitions, armament, and
aviation gasoline must be met by imports. Bulgaria lacks effective radar
defense, but reportedly has an extensive visual and sonic warning system.
4. 2112,2E_MiliandOuasiz:1_411ita?nizations.
a. TI2plefs Militia.
The primary function of the Peoplefs Militia, which is under the
Ministry of the Interior, is to maintain internal security. The uniformed
militia is estimated at a strength of at least 30,000. Of this total,
the Frontier Guards number about 139500. The uniforned militia units are
traired and equipped as well as or better than units of the armed forces.
Loyalty to the regime is believed to be greater than that of the armed
forces. The total number of militia (including the Economic Section for
the control of economic sabotage and the powerful State Security Section)
is ectimeted as high as 120,000. A large proportion of the non-uniformed
militia also receives military training.
b. Guerrillas.
Greek guerrillas, estimated to number between 8,000 and 10,000
are receiving training in camps throughout Bulgaria for possible use either
in Ytgoslavia or Greece.
c. ThaILtior_a_.2.L.'Fhters A ainst Fascism.
The Union of Fighters Again pt Faoeism consists of approximately
200 COO armed men, most of whom have had military training and some combat
experience and are loyal to the present regime, Members are divided into
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small units and receive periodic combat training. The prinal7 purpose
of the org-nization is to support the militia and to maintain a general
surveillance over' the population.
The National Union for Snort and
Technics.
The National Union for Sport and Technics includes between 400*000
and 600,000 members and has as one of its goals the military training of the
Bulgarian youth. All of the sport activities of this organization are de-
signee to help build up the country's military manpower potential.
The Anti-Fire DefensaLagaa.
The Anti-Fire Defense Organization, with a strength of less than
1,000 men* probably forms part of a Civil Defense Corps aimed at strengthen-
ing air raid defenses or internal security forces. The members must complete
18 months of military training* after which they are given additional para-
military training in special schools.
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STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
1. alatal-
Under complete Soviet domination, Bulgaria7s status affects US
security only as it may be exploited to further Soviet foreign policy
aims. Bulgaria is strategically important to the US because of its
geographic location adjoining Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, where
the interests of the US and the USSR conflict.
In the event of war between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers,
Bulgaria would serve the Soviet Union offensively as a bridgehead and
communication line into the E6diterranean area and the Near East. De?
feasively? it is an important Soviet buffer against any attack aimed at
the relatively vulnerable Ukraine.
The fiction that Bulgaria is a sovereign and independent nation is
consistently maintained and exploited by the Soviet Union. Although all
Bulgarian participation in international affairs is wholly dictated by the
USSR, the Soviet Union is in a position to disclaim responsibility for the
acts of the "sovereign Bulgarian nation" in the event of any niscalculation.
The USSR has made full use of this subterfuge in refusing to cooperate
in Western attempts to force Bulgaria adherence to the terms of its peace
treaty, thus permitting Bulgaria to engage in a growing rearmament program.
Bulgaria, together with the other Cominform Satellites, is a con?
tiruin.1 threat to peace in the Balkans, necessitating diversion of funds
and manpower by adjoining countries to the maintenance of costly military
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DLVAW:
establishments at the expense of development of their no
economies.
Bulgaria has continually provoked incidents on the Yugoslav, Greek, and
Turkish borders; large-scale troop naneuvers have been held near the
border regions during 1950; a virulent propaganda campaign has been con-
sistently -waged charging US-sponsored aggressive plans of all three
neighboring countries against Bulgaria. The possibility is ever-present
that the USSR might direct a Satellite attack, to include Bulgaria,
against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey, in that order.
2. Political,.
Of strategic importance to the US is the fact that at least eighty
percent of the Bulgarian population, which is anti-Communist, and probably
a rajority of Bulgarian Communists, resent Soviet control and exploitation
of their country. The Soviet-oriented Bulgarian Communists and the Soviet
agents in Bulgaria have tried through propaganda and terror, to e14n4nate
this potential source of resistance, but they have not been entirely successfUl.
Because of Bulgaries exposed strategic position, continuing emphasis nust
be placed by the USSR on control measures. If the Soviet control apparatus
over the Bulgarians should be weakened appreciably and if Western aid were
assured, Bulgarian resistance might threaten continued Communist domination.
3. Economiq.
The present economic value of Bulgaria to the Soviet Orbit is slight,
although Soviet exploitation has succeeded in obtaining: (a) certain metals,
including uraniur3/4 which are in short supply in the orbit; (b) the resale of
Bulgarian tobacco, one of the countryls most important commercial crops, and
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(c) the use of agricultural products, particularly wheat, in good crop
years. Industrially, Bulgaria will be a liability to the USSR for many
years, unless the Soviet Orta is able to supply basic equipment and
technical education far in excess of probabilities. In the event of
war, Bulgaria could contribute significant amounts of food to Soviet
and orbit forces in that area.
40 lalitarr.
. The Soviet Union has placed great emphasis within the past year
en improvement of the Bulgarian Army. The result has probably been a
significant increase in the offensive and defensive potential of the
Bulgarian Army. The Bulgarian Axmy would probably fight effectively in
any Soviet?sponsored aggression against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey
because of historic Bulgarian antipathy toward these neighboring countries.
The Bulgarian Army, however, would need to be substantially augmented
by other Soviet/Satellite forces to defeat any of these countriesa
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CHAPTIa vi
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
Soviet control of the Bulgarian Governments the Communist Party,
and the people will become progressively stronger. Penetration of all
Bulgarian activities by an ever..-increasing number of Soviet agents and
an intensive Stalinist-Communist education program for the Bulgarian
people will prevent the organization of any large-scale resistance
movement in Bulgaria. Soviet fears of Bulgarian national deviation,
however, will continue to plague the regime and result in continuing purges.
Bulgaria will become progressively more isolated from the West and
more firmly integrated into the Soviet Orbit. The Bulgarian Government
will impose increasingly restrictive measures on remaining Western diplo-
matic missions and may at any time sever diplomatic relations entirely.
Improved radio jamming and more stringent radio control measures. may out
off the last access of the Bulgarian people to Western information.
There is a growing danger to US security in the strengthening of the
? Bulgarian Army, which may become powerful enough to launch an offensive
action against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey. Bulgarian propaganda places
continuing emphasis on the danger of imminent attack from neighboring
countries described as tools of US aggressive plans for destruction of the
Soviet Orbit. Bulgariaus relentless campaign to harass Greece by constant
border violations will continue to hamper US efforts to build up the Greek
economy as a bulwark against Soviet external and internal aggression.
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APPEITDIX A
TERRAIN AIID CLILIATE
1. Terrrdn.
a.
?????????????=1?MIIMMI?1111?????????????????????????11?????
The Bulgarian Bank of the Danube, unli he the rinrshy,
Rumanian side, rises sharply from the river. The valley bottom widens in
only a few- places, notably near Vidin and east of Ruse. Immediately along
the river, however, are 5 of the 39 Bulgarian towns with a population of
more than 10,000. The towns are Supported. chiefly by traffic with the
rich Danube tableland. South of the 300- to 400-foot cliffs along the
river, the tableland slopes gradually upward to the Stara Planina or its
foothills. The wide, level tableland is interrupted by a series of north-
south valleys which typically have a high steep bank on the east and a
gentle rise on the west. Of all the streams that flow across the table-
land to the Danube, only the Iskur rises south of the Stara ?Janina. The
others are short and seasonal in flow, since the Planina hae no region
of permanent snow. Llost of the villages are located in the valleys? -which
provide both shelter and water supply. Between the valleys,' the broad
upland is a monotonous eapanse of rolling grain fields. The Danube table-
land, with its fertile yellow wind-blown soil, is one of the richest
agricultural areas of Bulgaria and normally sup lies one-third of the
cereal harvest of the country. Population 'density is about GO per squnre
kilometer.
From west to east the altitude of the tableland increaSes to 11650
feet at the divide in the Deli Orman. Although once heavily forested? the
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',C.112,T
Deli Orman nou has only scattered clumps of small trees, scarcely dis-
tinL;uishable from the thick bushes. Beyond the divide, the Dobrudzha
presents a di-Pferent landscape. A netuork of ravines j_ves the area a
red, hilly aspect, particularly in western Dobrudzha.; eastern Dobrudzha
bears more resemblance to the Danube tableland. In eastern Dobrudzha,
however, aridity is pronounced. There are no permanent streams and the
ccuntryside is treeless.
b. Stara Planina.
The Stara Planina is the southernmost section of the S-shaped mountain
ccmplex that curves across eastern .:]urope from Czechoslovakia to the
Black Sea. The worn, rounded surface of the Stara Planina is reflected in
the name, which is Bulgarian for "Old :buntain." Although the mountain
chain roaches 7,800 feet at its hijiest point, the average elevation is
5,000 feet. Tovard the vest, the chain continues to the Black Sea as a
series of isolated hills. The more accessible areas have 'ion,: been cut
over and zrazed, but the steeper slopes still have stands of beech.
The Stara Planina has never been a formidable barrier to transit
or colonization. Passes are high, but relatively accessible and numerous;
west of Kotel, nine roads and two railroads cross the mountain. On the
nerth3 slope villages extend to elevations of 2,600 feet. -3very valley
has a scattering of houses with fields of buckwheat, rye or barley, and
fruit trees. The Stara Planina and the foothills are the center of the
Bulgarian cottage industries--lace making, leather working, etc.--but
the inportance of the toms of the area is steadily diminishing. Gabrove?
which has doubled its population in the past 25 years, is the single
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exception. Here a modern industry, includin,_; more than 15 toile mills,
has replaced the family workshop.
On the nortr., the approach to the crest of the Stara Planina is
gradual', but there is a sharp drop on the south to a series of valleys at
levels ranging from 900 to 11500 feet. The valleys of Pirdop, Narlove,
Kazaillult3 and Sliven are located in the dEpression between the Stara Planina
and the two lower mountain chains that parallel it to the south. The eastern
valleys are joined by both road and railroad, which pass over relatively
lul saddles between them, but the railroad connection through to the Pir don
Val icy has not yet been ? completed. The val 1 eye, sheltered by the circling
mountains, support a dense agricultural population. ;,here slopes are not
too steep,. the valley sides are used for vineyards, orchards, and rose
gardens. The alluvian soils of the vnl ley floors are covered with fields of
theat and corn.
In the basin between the Stara Planina and the Vitosha Planina,
Sofial the capital of Bulgaria, occa:des a position similar to that of
Karlovo, L'azanluk, or any of the valley towns. Although it is not centrally
located in Bulgaria nor surrounded by wee ciol 1 y prosperous country, the
city dominates the largest basin east of the Yugoslav border and the .
strategic route from, Belgrade to Istanbul. Since its Choice as the capital
in 1073, Sofia has become the outstanding commercial and industrial center
of the country. Its population of 435,000 is more than three times as
large as that of the second city, Plovdiv.
c. Uhritsa Lowland, -
The liaritsa lowland region is about 30 miles wide and it extends
west from the Black Sea two?thirds of the Tray across Bulgaria. The greater
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part of the area is drained by the LTaritsa River systau. The gradient
of the :inritsa is low, with a fall of about 350 feet between Pazardzhik
and he Turkish frontier. The western hnlf of the region and the area
immediately east of Stara Zagora are nearly flat, with a relative relief
of less than 70 feet. The remainder of. the region consists of loW lull s
Dear Plovdiv and Up the river from Pazardzhilc, where the Earitsa flood
plain widens:, the marshy river bod has been planted to rice. Beyond the
flood limits, the fertile?steppe-likeland stretches north to the Srodna
Gora and south to the Rodopi Lountains. About three-fourths of the land
in c7ops is devoted to cereals, especially winter wheat. On the slopes are
vineyards and mulberry trees. In the sandy parts of, the hills toward
Khaskovo? brushwood thickets are interatzed with the grain fields. 2ast
of 121,e Tundzha the landscape changes grad7Inlly. ,Villages are still large
but aro further apart than in the rest of the lowland. Population density
frills below 50 per square kilometer, and in the vicinity of Burgas it is
as law as 30 per square kilometer. At Slirgas? the lowland ends in three
shallow lakes that are barely separated from the Black Sea by low bars.
? In this area, settlement is discouraged by law crop yields from the salt-!?
impregnated soils and by malarian marshes.
d. Southern Uountaims,
The Southern Uountains are characterized by centers of very dense.
population in the few spots that aro favorable for agriculture and scattered
shepherd villages in the mountains proper. Unlike?theingle chain of the
Stara Planina, the Southern Ibuntains are .a substantial barrier to communica-
tion and form a real ethnic and climatic boundary. The main grou)s of moun-
tains are the Strandzha, Rodopi, Pirin-Rila, and Yugoslay. border ranges?
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aelative relief in -tdie 3tr3ndzha reaches 000 foot near the
Turlish border although elevations are little more tha:. 2,000 feet
above sea level. Because of relatively high rainfall (.35.2 inches at
ral)cd Tunleve),, the region supports a considerable stand of timber. The
chief occurztions of the few inhabitants are wood cutting and charcoal
burning. ribe area is one of the most primitive, poverty-stricken, and.
inaccessible parts of Bulgaria.
?
The altitude of the Rodopi:Joun''-uains increases from oast to Trost.
The eastern Rodopi 1:ouritains, drained by the Arda River and its numerous
tributaries, do not exceed 3,000 foot in elevation coccept irnediately along
the Greek border. Unlike the other Southern Liountains, they are honey-
combed with settlements. The nany village's are mall, if not tiny, rarely
consisting of noro than 50 -;'arriii es and often of fauer than ton. The chief
cash crop is almost invariably tobacco. In the groat mass of central
and western Rodopi, the for: small basins?like those of. Davin, alepelare,
and Ispat?are high and isolated. Agricultural production is limited to
rather meager harvests of grain, chiefly rye.
The 17.esta River divides the ?Rodopi from the Pirin and flila Lbun-
tains,. Here are not only the highest simret ts in Bulgaria but the highest
in the Balkan Peninsula. The mountains have undergone intense glaciation
and present a typicrcily alpine appearance, trith sharp-cut peaks (above
3y000 feet) and lakes. 2ast-rrost communications' consist of Jar() roads;
one, from the basin of Petrich to ilevrokop, thich is little mere than a
trail; the other, from Razlog to Sinitli, thich is suitable for one-
way traffic in good weather. Borth-south commication is restricted to
the Lista and Strum Valleys.-, vIccept for a Lou areas?notably the basins
about Petrich? Gorna Dzhumaya, Dupnitsa, and Kyustenc111 in the Strum
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Valley and, -i:evrokop and ilazlog-Bansko along the 1:::,,sta--the river valleys
are narrow and tortuous. Population is concentrated in the basins.
Specialty crops such as tobacco, cotton; poppy, and vineyards are the
main source of income yuctendil is well-lmoun for it orchards, parti-
cularly prune orchards.
The mountains along the western frontier are quite di rferent in
ap earance.from the Rila-Pirin group. They- are considerably lower, rarely
over 6,000 feet, and much more rounded in form. 1,3ecause of long-standing
Bulgarian-Yugoslav hostility as wall as difficult terrain, only five
and no railroads cross the border south of Sofia.
2. Clizate
The characteristic 'features of Dulgarian calm, te are: (1) a consider-,
able annual range of terverature, trith an average January tetperature of
about 280F. and an average July torperature of about 75?F.; and (2) more
rainfall in the sumer than in the winter. llithin this framework, the
climate varies considerably from one part of the country to another.
?The climate is most rigorous in Danubian Dulgaria. The tervorature
regularly falls to 50 -10?F. in winter and may rise to over 1000F0 in
ilu,-rust. Some parts of the area have the lowest rainfall in Dularial
less than 20 inches annually. Southward toward the Stara Planina? tho
rainfall increases. In the foothills it amounts to26-31 inches and
in the higher parts of the mountain reaches )45 inches. Average tempera-
tures, particularly sumer temperatures, decrease rapidly vith increase
in altitude. Petrohan at 416000 feet has a January average of 23?F and
an August average of 57?F.
The Stara Planina acts as a shield for central Bulgaria. Winter
average temperatures are about 5 degrees higher than in Danubian Bulgaria.
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Rainfall is :vi t: 'L;he Danube tableland but does not equal that
of the foothills. The climate :.?osembles that of -crest-central ialnsas?
altIioui Llansas is a few clejrees hotter in the summer and has a more pro-
nounced sui-zr.w rainfA11 namiraum.
iTo ;eneralization can be apnlied to the 0outhorn 1.Iountains? Tthere
climate depends on local altitude and exposure. In the lour ',Aruma and
iiesta Valleys, which are open to influences from the Liediterranean 3eas
the mai lizlitira rainfall is in Auoist and ,.optoMb.)r and the mardmun is in viinter.
Averae.uinter tsuporaturos are above freezin,:;. On the basis of records
for ..etrich? the closest climatic parallel in the tJE3 is probably the hills
north of Los Anz:ples, California.
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APPENDIX B
BUTLARIAII COUNCIL OF LITNISTERS if*
Title
-A
Premier
Vice Premiers
President, State Planning Commission
President, State Control 0mmission
President, Committee for Science,
Art and Culture
Foreign Affairs
Uational Defense
Interior
Zlectrification and Amelioration
Agriculture
Home Trade
Health _
Posts, Telephone and .Telegraph
Education
Carnal Zconag7
Industry and lines
Labor and SociP1 Welfare
Justice
Public Worke (Construction)
Finance .
Transport
Foreign Trade
Forestry
Nano
&Vtlko CHERVEUKOV -
&Vladimir POPTOUOV
&RaikoDALITAUOV
Georgi3R/IKOV
"Mario LUIVIII0V
Oimo DICNEV
Sava GANOVSla
Petr PAIICIOVSKY
? #Rusi IIRISTOSOV
Lawn GEORGIEV
&Titkocumuntomv
Pelo PELOVSKY
Petr KOLAROV ?
#Tsola DRAGOICHEVA
&aril DRAUALIEV
Petr KAU=
&Anton YUGOV
Dobri TIMMS=
RadiraIDENOV
#131agoi IVAIIOV
airil LAZAROV
iiifixeorgi
li*Diniter WU=
i'boorc,ri POPOV
# Vbmber or candidate member of CP Central Committee
* riember of CP Politburo
** Information received as of 1 August 1950
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Affiliation
Communist
11
BAIN
Communist
ft
Formerly VEIT(); probably
Communist
Communist
n
BEV
Corrnmi st
BAUU
Communist
ft
if
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APPENDIX C
POLITBURO OF BULGARIAN COMUNIST PARTY*
Title
President of Councilof Linisters
Uinister of Industry- and lanes
anister of Transportation
President of Praesidium
First Vice Premier
.linister of Agriculture
Vice President, Council of Uinisters
Uinister of Foreign Affairs
Nam
Vnlko CUERVSDKOV
*Anton YUGOV
Georgi CHADKOV
Georgi M./11MM/
Vladimir POPTOUOV
Titko CHURNOKOLEV
Ratko DAUIABOV
Uincho NEICUIT
CANDIDATE UMBERS
Title Thus
Uinister of Foreign Trade Dimiter GAM'
Personnel Chief, Einistry of Defense Diniter DIUOV
* YUGOV, demoted from his position as Vice Premier and Uinister of
Interior, has been the subject of vicious attack by Chervenkov. It
is likely that his nominal retention an the Politburo is to rointain
the fiction of policy level participation by old-time Bulgarian Com-.
masts.
* Information received as of l August l950
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AP:PENDIX D
MUTR11 COIEETTEE OF DULGARIAli COLLIUNIST PARTY
Umbers
Grudi ATAUASOV
Shteryu ATANASOV
Katya AVRADOVA
flizolaBALKAEDJI2V
Stella DLAGOEVA
Dobri DODUROV
Geor:ACHANKOV
Titko CLMIOKOLW
Vulho CUMMUKOV
GoorL;i plummy
Relic? DALMANOV
Dino DICE3V
Dimiter prow
Tsola DRAGOICIM
Kiril LOOJIAJZ3V
Dimiter GAUEV
Asen GREKOV
Masi HRISTOSOV
Blagoi IVAKOV
Georgi KOSTOV
Ruben LEVI
Alexander Tammy
Lancho =GM
Polo PELOVSKY
Georgi POPOV
Vladimir POPTOUOV
Todor PRAHOV
Ivan RAIKOV
Pencho STAIKOV
Doris TASKOV
Lambo TEOLOV
Geori TSAIMOV
2adenko VIDIIISKY
Anton YUGOV
Todor ZEIVKOV
Candidate Lbmbers
DimiterMITANOV
Petko BUIL/AUX
Stoyan DELCOV
Diko DIKOV
Atanas DIUITROV
Dancho DILIITROV
Elena DILITROVA
Elena GAVRILOVA
Lyuben GERAJILIOV
Stoyan KARADJOV
Apostol KUM=
Ferdinand KOZOVSKY
Kyril LIZAROV
Karlo LUKANOV
EinchoLIIIICIOT
Vera NA.CHEVA
Uisho NIKOLIN
Petr PAUCENSKY
Yanko PAUCV
Petr PENERNIEV
Einko STSDANOV
Teko TAKOV
Vasil TOMMY
Slavoho MUSKY
Stanka TSEKOVA
Dimiter YANEV
YALEV
Zhivko ZhivKOV
HOTE: Io complete list of members and candidate members of
the Central Cotimittee has been published since 1940. The
persons listed above are believed to constitute the Committee
as of 1 August 1950. Since December 194.8 three members have
died and the party has announced the removal of eleven others.
In addition) three other members are presumed to have been re-
moved since they have been under arrest for many months.
81
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CHAIIKOV, Georgi Ivanov-
Present Positions:
1909
Before 1927
APP3I:DIX 3
BIOGRAPHIC IIFORLIATIOU
anister of Transport
limber of Politburo, Central Committee and
Orgburo of Bulgarian Camunist Party.
Dorn in ,Liolseen, Kotel District, Bulgaria.
Little knoon of early life; -oorked as a taildrzs
apprentice.
1927 to 1932 natal worker; dismissed because of union activities;
organized one of first Bulgarian Komsomol groups.
In USSR at Thscoo. Lenin Academy.
1932 to 1933
1933 to 1934
1934 to 1935
? 1935 to 1943
1943 to 1944
1944 to date
. 1947 to 1940
'Octo'ser 1949 to date
Professional organizer of Bulgarian Communist
Party; member of Central Committee of Bulgarian
Youth Union.
Arrested as strike leader; escaped to USSR.
Gommraist organizer in Bulgaria; arrested and
imprisoned; escaped in 1943.
Political Camissar in partisan forces,
Member of Politburo and Central Conalttee of DCP.
President, State Control, Commission.
Minister of Transport.
COLITialT: Generally considered to be organization boss of BCP. Regarded
as a tough organizer rather than a brilliart politician. Chankovls present
appointment is part of the complete reorganization of the Transport Ifinistry
because of the miserable condition of transport in Bulgaria. It is probable
that alaragtr is.dlrecting the political tightening of the ministry Tthile
operational renovation is under the control of numerous "specialists" in-
ported from the USSR.
?
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CHERVEHKOV., Vulko Volov
Present Positions:
Primo Ifinistor
Uember of Politburo and First .;ecretary of
Central Committee of Bulgarian Communist
Party
President of Fatherland Front,
24 August 1900 Dorn in Zlatit ,Pirdop District, Bulgaria*
1914 to 1919 Leader student strikes and -demonstrations:,
1919 Joined CL.,tmunist Par:ty.
1920 to 3.925 Leader Gmaunist Youth Organization; participated
in unsuccessful 1923 uprising; fled to USSR and
condemned to death in absentia.
1925 to 1944
SepteTber 1944
1944 to date
1945 to date
1947 to date
October 1947
1947 to date
In USSR! (1) studied Uarx Leninism and became
director of Uarx-Lenin School; (2) member of
Central Canaittee of BCP in Uoscou (1941); (3)
directed clandestine Bulgarian-asisto Botev
radio station (1941-19))0
Returncx1 to Bulgaria with Red Arrzr.
limber Politburo and Central Committee of BCP.
Deputy GLIA.
Leader in organization of Fatherland Front;
Chief Secretary; 1948; resigned in 1949; elected
President; Earch 1950.
Attended Warsaw meetinr, for organization of
Cominf ?rm.
Has held increasingly important Cabinet positions,
becoming first vice nremier under Kolarov and
succeeding Kolarovas Premier.
COILB14,7: Although enjoying no personal popularity in Bulgarian Communist
circles, through close association uith Dimitrov in Ubscou? strengthened by
personal relationship (Chervenkovis uife is a sister of Dinitrov); dnd un-
questionable subservience to Ubscou Chorvsnkov has climbed steadily to his
presentpro-eninontposition in Bulgaria. Ho is described as a ruthless and
malicious man, of not more than average intelligence; rough and uncultured.
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SCT
DAL1ANOV, Georgi Parvanov
Present Positions: President ofPraesidiun ?
Ziember of Politburo and Central
Oomnittee of Dalgarian Caamnist Party.
23 September 1892 Dorn in Lopushnap Derkovitsa District p BUlgaria.
Before 1914 Nember Social'st Party and labor organizer among
students and miners.
1914 to 1919 Graduated from reserve officers' school; served
in army; uounded on Dobrudja front.
1919 to 1923
1923 to 1925
ConIanist organizer flihailovgrad district?
Com_landed brigade in abortive 1923 uprising; fled
to Yugoslavia; member of 3C2 efligre committee;
returned Bulgaria and organized underground band
in Derkovitsa.
1925 to 1944 In USSR, except for brief period in Bulgaria to
perfect underground; graduate and instructor Frunze
flilitary Academy; served in fled Army; assisted
Dimitrov in BCP and Comintern nark; helped. organize
International Brigade for Spanish Civil 7ar.
1944 to date Umber Politburo and Central Committee B.
3946 Prorated to Llajor General Bulgarian Army.
1946 to 'Eby 1950 Tlinister of National Defense.
N47 1950 to date President of Praesidium.
CMJIBUT: Danianov's removal as 'jar 11 mister and appointment to the prestige
TE-TT President of the Praesidium I:aliened months of rumor of Soviet dis?
satisfaction with Bulgarian Army control. Because o2 his long residence in
the Soviet Union and service in the Red Arrv, it is likely that Damianov
will retain his party positions.
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DADIAHOV? Raiko
Present Positions: Vice Premier
limber Central OmamIttee and Politburo JCP.
10 Decadber 1903 Born in.Gercina, Gabrovo.
To 1926 Very little knaan of early life; joined BCP;
worked as shoemaker's apPrentice.
1926 to 1927
1927 to 1932
1932 to 1936
1936 to 1939
1939 to 1943
1943 to 1944
1944 to date
1945 to date
Imprisoned for Communist activities.
In USSR; activities unknaan.
Communist worker in Bulgaria.
;-.?.eturned to USSR; participated in jpanish Qtvil
tiar
b
Returned to BUlgaria; again imprisoned.
Active in Gamunist Partisan activities.
:fleeted President, General iiorkors Trade Union.
Limber of Central Committee and Politburo BCP;
Central Committee Fatherland .17`ront.
1946 to date Nether of various delejatipne, repreeentinc Trade
Unions in Prague, Paris, libscoa,
20 January 1950 Vice Premier.
COI 1311T: Thjniic veteran labor leader and responsible for Camanist control
arTatti. in Bulgaria.
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MORGIEV, Kimon Stoyanov
Present position:
11 September 1332
1912 to 1919
1923
1926 to 1928
1928
1934 to 1935
1943 .to 1944
1944 to 1946
(7,--1711m
anister of aectrification.
Born in Pazrdzhik, Bulgaria.
Graduate Sofia :alitary Acadeiv; served in Balhan
liars and -Jorld 'Jar 1; retiradTath rank of colonel.
One of organizers of June 1923 coup uhich overthrew
Stanlyalied Government.
:rinister in Liapchiev 0a.binet.
Organizer uith Darlien Voldhev of Zveno Association.
Participated in overthrow of -..11.shanov Government;
Primo Tmister and lanister of Justice in short-
lived authoritarian regime; tuice arrested by
order of King Doris
Arrested and interned by pro-Gorman regime.
Zvenist group led by Georgiev converted into
political party which joined Fatherland Front;
Prime anister of first FF Government until
succeeded by ')initrov.
1946 to 1947 Vice Premier and Foreign -dnister.
1947 to date Einister of Ilectrification; lost Vice Premiership
in Cabinet formed in January 1250.
CO: 211M Although Georgiev prior to 1944 had been instrumental in the.
suppression of Co`mmunism and establishment of semi-Fascist regines as a
shred, experienced and opjortunistic politician he joined the FF coalition.
His previous anti-Communist activities and precarious personal position
have made lora an excellent "front" for Cowunist maneuvering to maintain the
fiction of a conlition government. Since the complete reorganization and
Duro of the Uinistry of Mectrification announced in September 1949 included
,severe criticism of Georgievs it is probable that Georgiev maintains only
the title of Uinister uith little or no authority. He Tall be a convenient
scapegoat for a mutinuing failure of the electrification program.
86
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0-1,71.'71
URICUST, ITincho nolev
Present Positions: anister of Foreign Affairs
Eonber of Politburo and Central Committee BCP.
23 Liarch 1037 Born in Stara Zagora.
To 1913 1:;ducation included study at Geneva, 'BexT4 and.
Brussels.
1913 to 1933
1933 to date
1941 to 19hb
1944 to 1946
Practiced law; joined CP (1913) and participated
in abortive 1923 coup and jailed for one year;
subsequently jailed for short periods for Calmunist
activities.
Eenber of Central Connittee BCP.
Interned in concentration canp where active as
Coomunist organizer.
Einister of Justice in first Fatherland Front
Cabinet; Deputy to Gia; Olairnan connission to
draft constitution.
1946 to 1947 flinister of 3ducation.
1947 to 1950 President of Praesidium.
1949 President Bulgarian Soviet Societies; :euber of
Politburo.
27 flay 1950 Einister of Foreign Affairs.
As 'a convinced Communist and intelligent lawyor, Keichev has been
instrumental in formulating much of the legislation by which Communist control
of Bulgaria was secured. As Einister of Justices he oranized the Peoples
Court which tried and sentenced thousands of alleged Lazi conspirators.
87
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3CIIST
PAIICIEVSKY, Petr Pavlov
Present Positions: :inister of Defense
Candidate Z.:ember Central Committee DCP.
1902 Dorn in Butan, Orakhovo,
192:1 Participated in Caaaunist uprising and fled to
Yugoslavia.
1923 to 1937 In USSR: attended military schools and joined
Red Army.
1937
1939 to 1943
1943
1944 to 1947
1947 to 1950
27 January 1950
27 :Ay 1950
9 Jane 1950
Participated in Spanish Uvil Varo
Fought -with Rod Army, attaining rank of colonel,
including defense of lioscou.
.Iltered Bulgaria uith Soviet forces as- member of .
Third Ukraine Fronta
Activities unknown, but at some time during this
period uas transferred to Bulgarian Army.
Held various military commands, including Chief
Inspector of Armored Troops.
Appointed Assistant :Anister of Defense.
Appointed *nister of Defense,
alected candidate member of Central Comittee BCP.
COMM: Pancevski is an able and a4perionced army officer. His long
res=ice in the USSil. and combat enperiance during the Spanish Civil Jar
and Ubrld ..ar II as a Soviet officer holding high Soviet decorations for
valor indicate that except for the accident of Bulgarian birth, he is a
Soviet Russian. :le is reportedly married to a Russian and speaks Bulgarian
Llth a Russian accent. His election to the Central Committee probably
presages his rapid rise in the Bulgarian CF hierarchy.
88
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POPTCHOV? Vladimir Homov
Present Positions:
Vice Premier
Eadber of Politburo and Central
Connittee of Bulcarian Communist Party.
1390 Dorn in Belitzal Ras1o3 District (Ijacedonia)0
Before 1923
1924 to 1944
19/15 to date
October 1947
February 1949
August 190 to :-Lry 1950
January 1950 to date
Active in teachers socialist orcanizations,
affiliatja.k.;1-7-.Lth left-wing Croup which in 1918
became Communist Party; trained as mass az;itator
and led preparations of 1923 00=1-list uprisinG
in 1.7.azlo, district; fled to 1Zucos1avia? then to
Iloscou; condemned to death in absentia.
In USSR.: edited Comunist publications under
Dimitrov; participated trith Unervenhov in clandestine
Dulzarian llristd Dotev radio station; returned
Dta:aria after September 19/44.
limber Politburo and ()antral Committee of :CP;
editor Habothicheolce Delo until 19119; Deputy in
Gia; chairman of orein Affairs ?00maission of
GUI and participated in various Cclinainist con-
ferences in Auslnia, liunjary, and Poland.
Attended -aarsaw Conference for aninforn oraniza-
tion.
Secretary General of Fatherland Front, s-acceedt%.,
abervenhov.
Liini..-tor of l'orein 1f.ii rs
Vice l'reuier.
C0111311T% Poptamov is a hardened 71acedonian revolutionary, thorouhly indoc-
trinated in Soviet subservience. He is he top :liacedonian authority in the
L'CP ,and has considerable potter in determinik; LIacedonian policy im.? the
Tito defection, he has spearheaded attachs a?iiinst purported Yuzoslav
a.ression in :Tacedonia has raxwal from the :inistry of ::'oreiL;n .2fairs
may have been merely to rake room for the :moral shifts.11000SSary to introduce
a. nag anister of1-.-ar without removinG anyone from Cabinet level, as Pentemov
Tras the only one holdik; tyro positions. There is evidence that lkyetomov is
devotik; all of. his time to :.:acedonian issues; .there is no evidence that he
haa fallen into flinfavor.
89
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YUGOV? Anton Money
Present 'Positions:
:dnister of Industry and :anes
I.:briber of Politburo, Central Committee
and Ortsburo of.13121;.;arian .Communist Party.
1904 Born in Karassouli, Greek Iiacedonia.
Before 1934
1934 to 1936
1936 to 1941
Tobacco vorker, participatin:; in Julien activities
and strikes; uember and orLAnizer of Komsomol and
Oximumt3t Party; active in IURO; sentenced to death
in absentia by ilihailov.
In USSR: activities unknoun.
Party oranizer Petrich area; orjanized and led
tobaccoworkersi strikes.
? 1941 to 1944 Leader partisan activities; uenber partisan
eneral staff.
9 boptomber 1914 Assigned to Dui; jarian Ariv as Major General.
194h to date .1.1ember Politburo and Central Committee of DCP.
1914 to July 19/49 Lanister of Interior.
Jay 1947 Attended Med Conference.
Jay 1949 Vice Premier in I:olarov cabinet, losinc; post as
Einister of interior.
20 January 1950 to date anis-tier of Industry and inos, losing vice
premiership.
00112UT: YuL.;ev as a seasoned revolution_ry, oranizer and partisan, occupied
a keyi-Josition in the Comunist take?over as Einister of the interior, con
trollinL; the police or._:anization. His downfall has been raid since the death
of DimArov? doubtless because of lack of complete Soviet orientation and as
a victim of Chervenkovls paver .srab,, Yuov has been publicly criticized by.
alwva2kov. He in turn has publicly adnitted his faults in a servile orjr of
self?criticism. ,AlthouL:h no announcement has been made of his removal from
either the Politburo or the Central Committee, it is probable that his days
of influence are over.
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APPEIDn F
1944
September 5
September 9
October 3
'October 28
1945
Uomnber 9
November 18
1946
February
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGhibiCAUT EVENTS ,IN
COHLIMIEZATION OF BUIPJARIA *
USSR declares uar against Bulgaria.
Successful coup d:etat of Fatherland Front;
accepts USSR armistice terms.
Decree laa setting up Feoplefs Courts.
Armistice for Bulgaria signed in UOSCCMN
Return of Georgi Dimitrov to Bulgaria after
22 years in Soviet Union.
First election of deputies to National Assembly
(boycotted by Opposition).
Law for Confiscation of Property acquired
through speculation.
'larch 12 Land Ref orn Bill.
April 27. Decree Lau for Defense of Peoplels Republic.
September 0 Bulgaria becomes a republic by popular
referendum.
October 16 Lau for Compulsory Labor Ubbilization.
October 27
Election of deputies to National Assembly;
Dimitrov bee-ones Premier (Vote g Fatherland
Front; 7O; Communist Party, 55%).
4( Information received as of 1 August 1950
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1947
February 18
Mardi 6
Law for Tobacco Monopoly.
Currency reform outs Bulgarians Bank
deposits and freezes holdings.
April 1 First Two-Year Plan adopted?
Uay AU opposition newspap ars suspended.
July 9 Bulgaria rejects participation in Harsba.11
Flan.
July 30-31 Tito-Dimitrov conference in Bled.
August 21 Bulgarian application for UN membership
rejected.
August 26 Opposition parties outlawed by National Assembly.
September Cominform formed in Warsaw rith Bulgarian partici-
pation.
September 15 Treaty of Peace rith Bulgaria effective.
September 23 Opposition Agrarian loader Nikola Petkov hanged.
October 1 New Bulgarian application for UN membership re-
jected.
November
November 28
December 4
December 15
December 16
December 23
1948
January 16
.February 27
March 6
First restricted area declared in Bulgaria -
approximately 15 kilometers around border.
Yugo-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship?
Constitution adopted.
USSR announces all troops 'withdrawn from Bulgaria
in accordance rith treaty.
Bulgarian-Albanian Treaty of Friendship.
Law for Nationalization of Industryg Danks g etc.
Bulgarian-Rumanian Treaty of Friendship.
Lau f.= Labor-Economic Mobilization.
lag for Expropriation of Large Urban Properties.
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S-::;CRJT
1940
cal limr?myr/.
Larch 10 USSR-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship.
April 23 CZech-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship.
?
Ly 29 HungarianF-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship?
August 11 Fusion of FF Social. Democrats vith Communist
Party announced?
Ceptember 1 Decree Lau closing all foreign schools?
Septerber IG State Secrets Act.
EMember Trial and sentencing of Socin, Democrat 'costa
Lulchev and eight deputies.
December 18-26 Fifth Congress of Bulger:Lim Corrinnist Party.
December 29 First Five-Year Plan adopted.
1949
. January 25
February 19
February 23
Larch 1
Larch 6
Larch 8
Lay 15
960M; for Fatherland Fronts 93.01).
June 11-12 Central Committee of CP expels Rostov and
adopts anti-Tito resolution?
Formation of CIMIA pith Bulgarian participation.
Dissolution of FF Zveno Party.
Bulgaria bans Papal :Tission.
Law Project for the Cults (subordinating all
religious organizations to State control).
Dissolution of FF Radical Party.
Sentencing of fifteen Protestant Pastors?
3lection for Peoples Councils (Votes casts
July 2
JAY 4-5
August 25
OctObor 1
October 3
Death of Georgi Dimitrov in Ubscou.
Sentencing of nine additional Protestant Pastors.
CELIA meeting in Sofia.
Bulgaria denounces "Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of
Friendship.
Bulgaria denounces :Yugoslav frontier convention?
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19/19
Getober 29
aloe:Mbar-1
December 7
December 16
December 18
1950
January 19
January 23
February 1
February 16
February 20
- February 21
iTnrch 0
Juno 10
32,CP,217
Law for the Trial of Kerabers of the Government.
Two-thirds of Bulgaria .declared to be restricted
zone,
Bulgaria withdraws from World Health Organization.
Tr a.iclio Nostov:hen3ed (US I.n.'nistor chargid rrith
conspiracy ? to o\rorblirou 13uIcarian' Goverment).
llection for deputies to national Assembly
(Vote for Fatherland Front (Communist) candidates.,
97.66;.:).
US anister declared persona non ...rata.
Death- of ? Vasil Kolarov.
Vullzo Glervenkov succeeds Kolarov as Premier.
Special courts for siiinistry of Transport
established.
US Trindraws sLegation from Dularia.
Dul3aria. indicts T3ulgarian employees of US
Legation.
US Legation employees sentenced to lon: terms,
ihtiona1 Communist Party Conference; explusion
of 90,000 party members in continuing pure
announced.
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Nap.
10922 - Bulgaria: Roads
10929 Begaria: Railroads .
13.639 Bulgatia: Population
The follcreing maps will be availabie 5st the Nap Librar7 when
completed*
11573 Bulgaria: Faysiograpbic regions
3.1653 cp W.garia: Agricultural Rocions
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Nap.
10922 - Bulgaria: Roads
10929 Begaria: Railroads .
13.639 Bulgatia: Population
The follcreing maps will be availabie 5st the Nap Librar7 when
completed*
11573 Bulgaria: Faysiograpbic regions
3.1653 cp W.garia: Agricultural Rocions
SECRET"
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Nap.
10922 - Bulgaria: Roads
10929 Begaria: Railroads .
13.639 Bulgatia: Population
The follcreing maps will be availabie 5st the Nap Librar7 when
completed*
11573 Bulgaria: Faysiograpbic regions
3.1653 cp W.garia: Agricultural Rocions
SECRET"
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/31: CIA-RDP78-01617A001600020001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/31 : CIA-RDP78-01617A001600020001-1
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. El
DECLASSIFIED
ss. CHANGED TO; TS '
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
77 1763
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/31 : CIA-RDP78-01617A001600020001-1
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